

The Party Competition Between the Kuomintang and the Opposition:
The Case of the 1983 and 1986 Elections in Taiwan

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摘 要

本文以民國七十二年、七十五年之立委選舉為對象，以臺灣地區之三三〇個鄉鎮市區為研究單位，著眼於一個地區的社經發展程度，黨外後援會（或民進黨）的提名策略、失業率、新生代選民壓力，以及省籍結構等對於政黨競爭之影響加以探討。研究結果發現上述因素對政黨競爭皆有影響，其中尤以提名策略及社經發展程度對政黨競爭的影響最為突出，在目前臺灣地區面臨社經、政治轉型的今天，尤其值得注意。

ABSTRACT

This study examined the determinants of party competition in Taiwan. Since Taiwan's socioeconomic development is closely related to the growth of the opposition in the last 20 years, the major hypothesis was that areas with higher levels of development will foster stronger opposition power and eventually more intense political competition. This hypothesis was tested with Taiwan's 1983 and 1986 areal-unit data by controlling for the TCSA (1983) and the DPP (1986) nomination strategy, the local economic conditions (unemployment rate), the age structure (percent of young voters), and the provincial composition (percent of Hakka and Mainer, respectively) in the regression analysis.

The results indicate that all factors in the regression model reveal expected results and have statistically significant effects on party competition except for the percent of Hakka variable in the 1986 model. Above all, the socioeconomic development and the party's strategy have the most important influence. Since Taiwan has been facing the transitional stages in economy, society and politics, it's worthy of paying attention to this finding.

* Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Mid-South Sociological Association held at Mobile, Alabama, October 26-29, 1988.

INTRODUCTION

Compared with South Korea and the Philippines, the democratization of Taiwan in the 1980s seems to be a relatively smooth and peaceful process. Although the ruling Kuomintang's political suppression against the opposition movement had produced tragedies such as the case of Lei Cheng (1960), the Chung-Li Incident (1977), and the Kaohsiung Incident (1979) in earlier decades, the founding on September 28, 1986, of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) was an unexpected opposition success with no significant disturbance from the government. Two months later, the DPP, the first national opposition party organized on Taiwan since 1949, participated in the Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election and did surprisingly well.

In the year after the 1986 Legislative Yuan Election, [1] Taiwan experienced a series of reforms leading toward a full-fledged democracy. For example, martial law and restrictions on newspapers were lifted by the ruling Kuomintang (KMT), life-long members of the Legislative Yuan, the National Assembly, and the Control Yuan have been encouraged to retire by an official proposal presented to the public for review, and the opposition DPP is allowed to operate as a de facto political party even without legal permission. These developments demonstrate that the KMT has decided to promote democracy. However, the KMT's decisions for change are no doubt responses made under strong pressure from street demonstrations organized by opposition groups, especially the DPP.

The acceleration of democratization in Taiwan in 1987 was closely associated with the 1986 election. During the campaign period, most opposition politicians were unified under the same political party, the DPP. The KMT candidates faced the first organized challenge from an opposition party. The process was intense and the result was unforeseen by the KMT. Twelve of the DPP nominated candidates won their posts in the Legislative Yuan, and one DPP candidate was elected among the quota for union representatives to the legislature. The unexpected success of the DPP in this election was a surprise to the KMT, which later announced that a cabinet-level Labor Commission would be added to the Executive Yuan.

These developments, however, would not have occurred if the opposition remained divided, as it did in the 1983 election despite having organized the "Tangwai Central Supporting Association" (TCSA) [2] for the 1983 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election in order to implement a better coordinated campaign against the KMT. Their efforts seemed to be ineffective in winning

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votes for the opposition since only six nominated legislative candidates were elected. Nevertheless, this was an important move by Taiwanese opposition politicians to organize quasi-party coalitions. Other efforts, such as Formosa (Mei-li-tao) Magazine and the Tangwai Public Policy Association, also helped produce the favorable climate for KMT and Tangwai competition in later elections.

The close relationship between the Tangwai and the DPP has had profound implications for social scientists. In fact, almost every DPP leader belonged to the Tangwai camp, and the founding of an opposition party is considered as a major step for the opposition to move toward better coordinated campaigns. Therefore, it is important to compare the 1983 and 1986 elections to identify changes before and after the founding of the DPP.

The major goal of this paper is to conduct a thorough analysis of factors related to the intensity of the competition between the KMT and the TCSA in the 1983 election and the KMT and the DPP in the 1986 election in order to understand more completely the dynamics of Taiwanese politics. In addition to this, this paper will review Taiwan's socioeconomic development after 1949 and relate these changes to the more recent social and political changes in Taiwan. The growth of the Taiwanese opposition movement and the DPP will also be analyzed to illustrate the nature of the electoral competition between the KMT and the opposition. Two township-level regression models will be developed in this paper to identify the social, demographic, economic, and political factors that strengthen the competition between candidates of the two parties. The major focus is the hypothesis that the level of socioeconomic development of an area will stimulate the intensity of the local party competition.

SOCIOECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AFTER 1949

In 1949, on the eve of the final exodus from mainland China, the KMT started its experimental land reform in Taiwan. This program, originally proposed by Dr. Sun Yat-sen in *The Three Principles of the People*, had been unsuccessfully tried earlier by the KMT in Mainland China. When land reform was introduced to the Taiwanese, it included a farm rent-reduction program, a public land sales program, and a land-to-the-tiller program (Yang, 1970:38-85). The social and economic impact of land reform on Taiwan's later development is significant. General living conditions were improved for the majority of farm households, the traditional local power structure was reshaped, landlord-tenant relations

were effectively transformed, and landlords were no longer the sole authority in the countryside. Modern organizations such as political parties, farmers associations, and schools were introduced or strengthened in the countryside. These organizations encouraged participatory democracy, elections, and compulsory education and made available products such as fertilizer, radios, bicycles, and farm machinery. All of these changes served to link the Taiwanese countryside more closely to the cities and subsequently transformed the former in the process.

Following the military collapse on mainland China, the Chinese Nationalist government was eager to keep Taiwan in a more stable situation in the early months of 1950. The outbreak of the Korean War in June of that year brought U.S. military and economic aid to Taiwan, which has helped maintain military stability in the Strait of Taiwan since then. American aid played an important role in Taiwan's economic development during the 1950s and 1960s. The estimated total amount of U.S. aid was about us 1.5 billion until the program ended in 1968 (Taiwan Statistical Data Book 1981:221).

The government's economic policies in the 1960s were designed for rapid industrialization in order to change the predominately agricultural economy into an industrial one and also to develop labor-intensive light industries. The achievements are prominent and worth a careful review. Table 1 presents indicators of social and economic development, including economic, health, transportation and communication, and educational development in Taiwan for selected years. These four aspects represent the major socioeconomic changes that occurred in Taiwan during the last four decades, although rapid improvement did not really start until the mid-1960s and later accelerated in the late 1970s and early 1980s.

The first four indicators are calculated on their 1952 figures and are indices fixed at 100 for that year. The trend of the GNP index shows that significant increases appeared in the 1960s and continued in the 1970s. In 1986 the GNP index figure was seventeen times larger than the 1952 statistic. The per capita income statistics also demonstrate that the Taiwanese experienced rapidly increasing average incomes in the 1970s and 1980s.

One important feature of these surface improvements in Taiwan of GNP and per capita income indices is that these changes have been accompanied by better income distribution. For example, the income share of the poorest 20 percent of the families increased from 7.7 percent to 8.6 percent in the period from 1964 to 1979, while the income share of the richest 20 percent of the

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Table 1. Indicators of Social and Economic Development in Taiwan for 1952, 1960, 1970, 1980, and 1986

	1952	1960	1970	1980	1986
ECONOMIC INDICATORS					
GNP Index (1)	100.0	179.1	448.7	1128.7	1711.2
Per Capita Income (2)	100.0	137.2	263.1	546.4	755.0
Agri. Production Index	100.0	142.5	230.5	289.4	301.4
Ind. Production Index	100.0	242.1	1104.5	3910.1	6000.0
HEALTH INDICATORS					
Death Rate Per 1000					
Population	10.0	7.0	5.0	5.0	4.9
Life Expectancy,					
Females (a)	60.7	66.7	71.2	74.1	75.8
Child Mortality Rate					
Per 1000 (a)	26.0	14.0	5.0	3.0	1.9
Pop. Per Health and					
Medical Facility (3)	—	9919.0	13187.0	1624.0	1608.0
Pop. Per Physician (3)	—	1661.0	2240.0	1323.0	1077.0
TRANSPORTATION AND COMMUNICATION INDICATORS					
Automobiles Per 1000					
Persons	1.0	2.1	7.0	38.8	77.1
Telephone Subscribers					
Per 1000 Persons	3.0	5.2	17.0	130.0	232.7
EDUCATION INDICATORS					
% of Illiterate Age 6+	42.0	27.1	15.0	10.0	8.1
% of Primary Grad.					
Enrolled in J. High	34.0	51.2	80.0	97.0	99.7
% Females Having At Least					
Attended J. High School (a)	—	—	14.3	34.3	46.6

- (1) Adjusted for gain or loss due to changed terms of trade, when 1952 = 100.
(2) Real income at 1976 market price, adjusted for gain or loss due to changed terms of trade, when 1952 = 100.
(3) Figures for years prior to 1971 indicate provincial, county, and city health and medical care facilities and their number of beds. Figures for 1971 and subsequent years include all public and private hospitals and clinics and their number of beds.
(a) Data from Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book, otherwise from Taiwan Statistical Data Book.

families decreased from 41.1 percent to 37.5 percent (Kuo, *et al.* 1981:30-34). Since the achievements of economic development will not be shared by the populace in a society unless a relatively equal income distribution exists, the case of Taiwan provides evidence of an economic development that improved the living conditions of the majority of the people more significantly than has been experienced in less developed countries (see also Jain, 1975 and Barrett and Whyte, 1982).

The agricultural production index indicates that the land reform program probably had substantial impact on the sizable increase of agricultural products in the 1950s and 1960s. This index doubled in the first 18 years (1952-1970) then increased a little more than 30 percent in the 16 years following (1970-1986). Before general industrialization took place in the 1960s, Taiwan was basically an agricultural society in which government policy emphasized the development of the agricultural sector. The land reform program and other agricultural policies encouraged farmers to find high yield, low production-cost crops to raise on their newly owned land. When industrialization first spread in the late 1960s and early 1970s, a significant number of rural residents, especially young adults, moved from farms to urban areas to work in factories, and some of them eventually left the rural areas permanently. The government, while focusing on industrial development, was unable to cope with the problems of agriculture at that time. Labor shortages, inefficient agricultural mechanization, insufficient chemical fertilizers, under-priced agricultural products, and other problems all became factors that delayed further improvement in agriculture in this period. The limited acreage of arable land in Taiwan is, of course, a fundamental problem of agricultural production.

The industrial production index indicates that the real growth of industrialization in Taiwan started after 1960. While industrial production had increased 2.5 times from 1952 to 1960, it increased more than 15 times between 1960 and 1980 and almost doubled between 1980 and 1986. The cessation of American aid in 1968 could have had a serious negative impact on Taiwan's industrial development if foreign and overseas Chinese investment had not poured into Taiwan later. The increase in the industrial production index probably reflects not only the successful efforts by the government of Taiwan to attract foreign investment but also the effective economic policies implemented during this period. The land reform movement, for example, through the program of purchasing land with nationally owned company stock, forced some landowners to become industrialists. This provided opportunities for landowners to enter

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the industrial sector. The policy of emphasizing light industries such as food processing, textile production, electronics assembly, and furniture and shoe manufacturing in the early stage of industrialization also put Taiwan in an advantageous position, since this island had a large and well-educated labor force to work in these labor-intensive industries. The "Export Processing Zones" in Kaohsiung and Taichung successfully attracted foreign and overseas Chinese investment in the late 1960s and 1970s because they offered extremely favorable conditions for investors.

The health indicators included in Table 1 show that substantial improvement of conditions had brought the death rate down from 10 per thousand in 1952 to 4.9 per thousand in 1986 (favorable age composition was an important factor in decreasing the crude death rates at that time), and female life expectancy also increased during the same period from 60.7 years to 75.8 years. Though crude death rates in Taiwan leveled off after 1970, female life expectancy still increased moderately in the early 1980s. The child mortality rates (age 0-4) from 1952 to 1986 showed an even more impressive drop than the crude death rates. Starting with a relatively high level of 26 per thousand, the child mortality rate declined steadily to 5 per thousand in 1970 and 1.9 per thousand in 1986. The improvements are probably the result of better nutrition and increased health services provided by personnel from both public and private institutions. These improvements are shown in the same table as the statistics on the ratio of population per health and medical facility and population per physician.

Among the transportation and communication indicators, both automobiles per 1000 persons and telephone subscribers per 1000 persons increased moderately before 1970 but increased very rapidly after that year. Automobile ownership, which was 1 per thousand in 1952 and 7 per thousand in 1970, increased to 38.8 per thousand from 1970 to 1980 and doubled in the first six years of the 1980s. A similar trend also appeared for telephone subscribers, which increased from 17 to 232.7 per thousand from 1970 to 1986. Economic development in the last 16 years in Taiwan thus resulted in dramatic increases in the number of automobiles and telephones. These statistics show that modern communication and transportation systems are generally available in Taiwan and should be expected to have an impact on daily life.

The education indicators in Table 1 all show that education in Taiwan improved significantly from 1952 to 1986. The proportion of the population age six and over classified as illiterate decreased from 42 to 8.1 percent during this period. Eighty percent of the decrease occurred between 1952 and 1970.

Statistics for both the proportion of primary school graduates enrolled in junior high school and the percent of females having attended junior high school show significant increases after 1970. This apparently is the result of the 1968 extension of compulsory education from six to nine years, which caused most of the primary school graduates to enroll in public junior high schools and provided the opportunity of higher education for females who otherwise might have been forced to conclude their formal education at the elementary school level.

Social and economic development in Taiwan in the 36 years from 1950 to 1986 can be divided into three stages: the first stage is characterized by the land reform movement and the government's efforts to rebuild the agricultural sector in the 1950s; the second stage in the 1960s is distinguished by the establishment and expansion of labor-intensive light industries; and the third stage is defined by the general improvement that appeared in the 1970s and 1980s in various aspects of Taiwanese social and economic life. After 1960 two different trends of socioeconomic changes emerged. In the earlier decade of the 1960s, these changes occurred slowly, whereas in the later period of the 1970s and 1980s the pace of these changes accelerated and diffused island-wide. Important policies such as the extension of compulsory education and the establishment of "Export Processing Zones" were implemented in the 1960s and subsequently had significant effects on social and economic development in Taiwan in the 1970s.

What are the social and political implications of the above socioeconomic changes on the emergence of Taiwanese democratization in recent years? First, accompanying the rapid changes has been Taiwan's transition from an underdeveloped country to a newly industrialized society. In fact, as early as the end of the 1970s, many Taiwanese felt that the society was ready to establish a more democratic political system that would be in accordance with its economic prosperity. [3] Second, by the early 1980s Taiwan had successfully trained a well-educated generation who were already occupying relatively important positions in society. These individuals learned basic concepts of Western democracy in schools or during graduate study years outside Taiwan. Much of this foreign influence, as expected, comes from the United States. Third, the growth of non-governmental sectors in the Taiwanese economy has fostered a new elite class composed of young entrepreneurs and intellectuals who are very independent from the government and the ruling KMT. These elites include professors, journalists, businessmen, lawyers, doctors, and full-time politicians in their 30's and 40's. Fourth, the negative effects of rapid economic develop-

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ment have caused Taiwan to have a very unpleasant living environment. Problems of environmental pollution suddenly became unavoidable and extremely urgent in the early 1980s. Workers also began to express their feelings that they had been exploited by both local and international capitalists during previous decades. Moreover, workers believe that because of martial law they were not allowed to organize independent unions or use strikes to protect their interests. The demands by workers for a better environment and improved workplace conditions and quality of life have added new dimensions to the Taiwanese political arena. Finally, the seemingly endless conflict between the KMT in Taiwan and the Chinese Communist Party in Mainland China during the last 40 years has led the Taiwanese to develop a more mature political attitude on these issues. The KMT political myths based on the Taiwan/Mainland China conflict are no longer accepted by the people without question. Their questioning helps the young, well-educated, and affluent generation develop a new and independent view on the future of Taiwan and the relationship between Taiwan and Mainland China.

TAIWANESE OPPOSITION AND THE DEMOCRATIC PROGRESSIVE PARTY

Prior to the founding of the national opposition DPP, the Taiwanese local factions were the only political forces competing with the ruling KMT. The Taiwanese opposition, which includes a variety of very different factions from across the island, is also referred to collectively as the "Tangwai", or non-Kuomintang politicians, though these factions, as mentioned, are quite distinct political groups. Among them, local/family factions such as those of Yu Teng-fa of Kaohsiung County, the late Hsu Shih-hsien of Chia-yi City, Su Tung-chi of Yun-lin County, and Hsu Hsin-lian of Tao-yuan County, and other more independent opposition leaders like Huang Hsin-chieh, Kang Ning-hsiang of Taipei City, and the late Kuo Yu-hsing of I-lan County and represent different political groups with diversified local interests. Of course, the factionalized Taiwanese opposition is mainly the result of KMT policies including localized elections, strict media control, and restrictions (under martial law) on citizens' rights such as free assembly. The policies had successfully prevented the emergence of strong and unified opposition parties and island-wide opposition leaders (Domes, 1981; Gold, 1986; Ting, 1987).

Despite suppression by the KMT, opposition leaders tried in the 1950s and 1960s to organize formal opposition parties. The most famous case was Lei Cheng's trial for organizing the Chinese Democratic Party in the fall of 1960,

which unfortunately ended with Lei's arrest and a sentence of 10 years in prison. Lei, a veteran KMT member and the chief editor of *Free China Magazine*, was very active in the 1950s in organizing the opposition party with local politicians such as Li Wan-chu and Kao Yu-shu. The KMT authorities decided not to tolerate such political activities and accused Lei of communist espionage. Lei's case represents a typical example of KMT political suppression against opposition leaders. This strategy was, however, quite effective during earlier decades.

Nevertheless, rapid socioeconomic changes and the growth of young political elites in the early 1970s altered the nature of the Taiwanese opposition. With the support of those local/family opposition factions, urban-oriented opposition politicians with grassroots support dominated the new wave of Taiwanese opposition in the early 1980s. The main goal was to formally organize a national opposition party. In the 1983 election, for example, the opposition campaign organization, Tangwai Central Supporting Association for the 1983 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election, was designed by faction leaders to function as a strategic coalition including with centralized campaign activity. This experiment was based on earlier efforts such as *Formosa Magazine* and the Tangwai Public Policy Association. The founding of the DPP in 1986 is, of course, the culminating success of opposition politicians who had paid a very high price in earlier years.

Compared with the KMT, the new opposition party is less centralized and apparently troubled by intraparty factionalism. Factions are generally organized based upon political interests, geographic connections, and ideology, especially perceptions of the best future for Taiwan. For example, the Club of Editors of Tangwai Magazines, a radical coalition of young opposition activists, is one of the leading factions which plays a crucial role in the daily operation of the DPP. In fact, the political line of this unique club has led the DPP toward street-demonstration strategies and emphasizes the policy of Taiwanese self-determination.

The leaders of the DPP understand very well, even as they did before the formal founding of this opposition party, that the survival and growth of their party rely heavily upon its relentless challenging of the legitimacy of the KMT. Therefore, they stress issues such as holding full-scale reelections for the members of the three representative bodies and selection by popular vote of the provincial governor and city mayors for Taipei and Kaohsiung. Other emotional disputes involving labor relations, nuclear energy, environmental pollution, and imported agricultural products have also been seen by the DPP leaders as opportunities to promote their popular support against the KMT.

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Only two months after the formal founding of the DPP, the newly organized opposition party faced its first battle against the KMT in the 1986 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election. The overall performance of the DPP was clearly better than that of the previous quasi-party opposition organization (the Tangwai Central Supporting Association) in the 1983 election, although intra-party conflicts still existed. The most important achievement of the DPP was, however, to legitimize its role in competing against the KMT. With the 1986 election, the DPP earned its position as the most important opposition political party in Taiwan.

PARTY COMPETITION AND DEMOCRATIZATION

In a competitive democracy, political parties compete with each other in elections for opportunities to form governments. Therefore when there is competition in a plural-party system, a party governs so far as it is responsive to, and takes the party of, the governed (Sartori 1984:49). Parties participating in political competitions are expected to accept the legitimacy of their major opponent and the constitutional system (Robertson 1976:3). Since the result of party competition will determine the future ruling party in a democratic society, it is important to study this phenomenon. Downs (1957) developed an economic theory of democracy that emphasizes a spatial model of election competition. His theory of party competition is grounded on a basic assumption: both voters and politicians are rational in elections. This assumption, however, has produced serious disagreements among scholars. Downs' spatial model, which emphasizes the policy issues adopted by candidates in party competition, apparently neglects nonspatial candidate characteristics (Enelow and Hinich, 1982). Factors such as campaign strategy and ethnicity can easily become important variables in determining election results.

Lipset (1959) studied data from 48 societies and found that, although advanced economic development does not necessarily lead to democracy, it is rare to find a stable democracy in societies that are not economically advanced. Lenski (1966) also found that advanced industrialization is often associated with political democratization. However, exceptions are found in all communist-ruled societies. In fact, the totalitarian nature of these societies has made them highly resistant to democratization, no matter how economically advanced they are (Berger, 1986). Since an advanced economy always contains an urbanized and literate population that expects some participation in the political process and the large middle class in these societies also tends to pursue political stability,

political democratization is more likely to occur in these economically advanced societies than in societies with a large and impoverished population.

Studies on the relationship of urbanization and party competition in the United States have provided important evidence for research in this area. For county-level analysis, studies by Eulau (1957), Cutright (1963), Gatlin (1968), and Sorauf (1963) have indicated some support of this hypothesis. But, others have also demonstrated no significant relationship between urbanization and inter-party competition (Bonjean and Lineberry, 1970; Gold and Schmidhauser, 1960; Janda, 1965; Masters and Wright, 1958).

Similar findings on the connection between development and the growth of the opposition were also found among East Asian countries. Results of a study of South Korea opposition voters (Kim, 1979), for example, indicate that there was greater support for the opposition among urban voters, students, and intellectuals than among rural voters. Samuels (1982) argued that the rise of the Japanese opposition parties in local elections in the 1960s and early 1970s was mainly the result of the opposition's manipulations of social issues such as urban problems and environmental pollution.

The changing political relationship between the KMT and the opposition in the early 1980s in Taiwan has had tremendous effects on the democratization of Taiwan. The opposition not only started to challenge the ruling status of the KMT through elections, but they also began to attack the legitimacy of the KMT by denouncing the KMT government and its leaders. Earlier signs of change emerged in the 1980 election. The opposition candidates won a substantial portion of both votes and legislative seats in the 1980 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election. Scholars considered this outcome as evidence of progress toward a multi-party democratic system in Taiwan that will eventually revitalize functions of the legislative body within the Nationalist Chinese government system (Chao, 1986; Copper, 1981; Engstorm and Chu, 1984; Kou and Myers, 1988). Furthermore, a study of the election competition between the KMT and the Tangwai Central Supporting Association for the 1983 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election found that the level of socioeconomic development has a significant and positive impact on the intensity of local political competition (Sheng, 1986). Although this quasi-party opposition organization did not function successfully as a party and the result of this election was not favorable to the opposition, Sheng's findings are very useful to the current analysis.

The development hypothesis was also tested in a study of the 1986 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election to analyze the relationship between

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levels of development and the growth of opposition power, and the intensity of political competition (Ting, 1988). After controlling for the factors of DPP nomination strategy, local economic conditions, age structure, and provincial composition, the socioeconomic development variable proved to be a significant and important predictor of the intensity of party competition. It is clear, the rapid socioeconomic development of Taiwanese society has produced a more diversified social structure that allows opposition groups to grow, and inevitably intensify election competition. For the case of Taiwan, the comparison of the 1983 and 1986 elections will provide a better understanding of the function of an opposition party since in 1983 the Taiwanese opposition only had organized a quasi-party coalition.

The findings of voter behavior studies in Taiwan indicate that Mainlanders are more likely to support the KMT than Taiwanese (Chang, 1987; Hu and Yu, 1983; Mei, 1984; Ting, 1987; Yu, 1982). But, among Taiwanese, Hakkas seem to be more conservative than Fukienese in terms of their attitudes toward democracy and related political behaviors (Lei *et al.*, 1985; Peng, 1978; Ting, 1987). Young voters tended to vote for the opposition candidates, and older voters were more likely to support the KMT politicians (Mei, 1984; Yu, 1982). In the case of Taiwan, the overall trend of opposition demand for democratization seems to coincide with the rate of economic development, although the KMT started to respond to these demands only after the late 1970s. The focus of this paper is, however, to analyze party competition variations at the township-level in order to test the developmental hypothesis at the local-level in Taiwan. Party competition is considered a measure of democratization, and the hypothesis is that the level of party competition between the KMT and the opposition can be predicted by the socioeconomic development of that area.

In Taiwan, the election competition between the KMT and the opposition represents an important stage of political development toward democratization. While the earlier discussion has shown that the growth of the Taiwanese opposition is closely related to the island's socioeconomic development, previous studies of other countries have also provided substantial evidence indicating that development factors such as urbanization and education are associated with party competition. This study uses regression analysis to test whether socioeconomic development increases party competition between the KMT and the opposition.

An index of local socioeconomic development, which is composed of the percent of residents commuting to urban centers, those not involved in a agricultural employment, and the educational level of the residents, is adopted

to test the developmental hypothesis. This variable measures the overall level of development experienced by local residents. One expects that development will foster opposition power and then increase the competition between the ruling party and the opposition. The DPP nomination strategy variable is constructed to control for the impact of the non-spatial factor. One also expects that townships where the opposition has adopted an aggressive nomination strategy will experience an increase in the intensity of election competition between the KMT and the opposition. The unemployment rate and demographic factors such as percent of young voters, percent of Mainlanders, and percent of Hakka are included to control for their influences (see Appendix A for variable construction).

FINDINGS

Table 2 presents the multiple regression analysis results of the party competition between the KMT and the opposition in the 1983 and 1986 elections. The correlations, means, and standard deviations for the variables are presented in Appendix B. Except for the variable of percent of Hakka in the 1986 model, the other independent variables in both elections are statistically significant in these two regression models. Overall, townships with a higher level of socioeconomic development, a higher unemployment rate, a younger age structure of voters, and fewer Mainlanders are more likely to experience an increase in party competition. The coefficients of determination ($R^2 = .2331$ and $R^2 = .3478$ for 1983 and 1986 models respectively) explain substantial portions of the variations in the dependent variable in both models.

Examination of the regression coefficient for the index of socioeconomic development reveals that this variable has the hypothesized effect on party competition. In other words, the higher the level of socioeconomic development of an area, the more intense the competition between the KMT and the opposition. Since this index is composed of percent of local residents commuting to urban centers, those involved in non-agricultural employment, and the educational level of the residents, one assumes that the combination of these components will reflect the overall socioeconomic development of these local areas. Theoretically, people who live in areas with high levels of socioeconomic development not only enjoy a better quality of life, they can also expect a more competitive and democratic political process. This kind of expectation, therefore, can result in more intense competition between the KMT and the opposition.

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Table 2. Multiple Regression Analysis of the Determinants of Party Competition Between the KMT and the Opposition in the 1983 and 1986 Taiwan Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election (N = 330)

Ind. Var.	Level of Party Competition			
	1983 KMT V.S. TCSA		1986 KMT V.S. DPP	
	B	Beta	B	Beta
Index of Socioeconomic Development	.0236* (.0091)	.1983*	.0620* (.0085)	.4751*
Aggressive TCSA or DPP Nomination Strategy	.1473* (.0345)	.2527*	.2181* (.0335)	.3372*
Percent Unemployment	3.7150* (1.0126)	.1820*	1.7928* (1.0462)	.0803*
Percent of Young Voters	1.5362* (.4296)	.2233*	1.3129* (.4049)	.1790*
Percent Mainlander	-.4141* (.1539)	-.1746*	-.7873* (.1542)	-.3035*
Percent Hakka	-.1198* (.0570)	-.1140*	-.0463 (.0602)	-.0403
Constant	-.7148		-.4313	
R ²	.2331		.3478	

* Denotes t-statistics > 1.64. Standard errors are in parentheses.

Based on the above analysis of the 1983 and 1986 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Elections, the pattern of party competition across Taiwanese townships is quite clear. After controlling for other factors in the regression model, the variable of socioeconomic development suggests a higher level of party competition. Moreover, although the variable of socioeconomic development is significant in the 1983 model, the relative strength of the standardized coefficient of the level of socioeconomic development is the most important one in the 1986 regression model (See Beta values in Table 2).

Why would socioeconomic development be so important in increasing party

competition? Areas with higher proportions of local residents commuting to urban centers are either located in or close to highly urbanized regions. In Taiwan, urbanization means better access for residents to information, especially information regarding democracy. The attainment of higher education can also accelerate the development of democratic attitudes. And, of course, more non-agricultural employment implies a further diversified occupational structure. Individuals with these kinds of experiences can be expected to be more open to and sophisticated in accepting the phenomenon of party competition. This finding supports the fundamental hypothesis of this paper that socioeconomic development will contribute to party competition.

The variable of opposition nomination strategy proves to be an important predictor in this regression analysis. Townships where the opposition has had an aggressive nomination strategy experience a higher level of party competition. While the KMT could also respond with intensified campaign tactics, the aggressive opposition policy seems to have an independent impact on party competition. This finding implies that the intensity of electoral competition, after controlling for other social, economic, and demographic factors, is dependent upon strategies adopted by political parties involved in the election.

The unemployment rate variable is also a significant factor in the regression model and has a positive impact on party competition. Since unemployed individuals often blame the government for creating unfavorable economic conditions, they tend to place their hopes on the opposition in elections. Although unemployed workers might not be able to understand the complex economic process, their votes for the opposition and also the overall unpleasant environment of those areas where unemployment is high will inevitably increase party competition between the KMT and the DPP. The general trend of the opposition support seems to come from the lower class and some middle-higher class voters in Taiwanese society. On the other hand, most higher and middle class Taiwanese are still lacking the confidence required to support an opposition party such as the DPP.

Voters between the age of 20 and 39 represent the generation raised during the relatively affluent periods of the 1970s and early 1980s. Their unique socialization experiences, which include substantial exposure to the Western concept of democracy and a modern mass media, probably give them quite different perceptions of Taiwanese politics than those formed by older generations. Thus, they are less likely to accept a one-party political system. Previous research findings also suggest that young voters tend to support the opposition

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candidates in elections (Mei, 1984; Yu, 1982) and thus increase party competition. The positive and significant regression coefficient for the young voter variable in Table 2 provides empirical evidence supporting the above hypothesis. Young voters are clearly associated with the competition between the KMT and the opposition. They tend to generate a more competitive political environment for these two parties in Taiwan.

Provincial differences are important in Taiwan because Fukienese, Hakkas, and Mainlanders are dissimilar in terms of their language, social traditions, and political beliefs. Mainlanders are, in general, strong supporters of the KMT (Chang, 1987; Hu and Yu, 1983; Mei, 1984; Ting, 1987; Yu, 1982). Accordingly, this factor will certainly reduce the intensity of competition between the KMT and the opposition in areas with a high proportion of Mainlander residents. The Hakkas can be classified as a minority group in Taiwan, since their numbers and economic and political influence are less significant when compared with the Fukienese. This minority status has influenced Hakkas to become strong supporters of the KMT in the past, and their voting record suggests that party competition will not increase in areas with significant Hakka population. Table 2 presents negative regression coefficients for both Mainlander and Hakka variables. The percent of Hakka variable is, however, not significant in the 1986 model. The significant and very important impact of the Mainlander percent of the population is that they tend to support the KMT almost uniformly, which works against party competition.

During the last 40 years, the major tactic adopted by the KMT to maintain power has been to stress the potential threats, from Communist China and from the Taiwanese independent movement, to Taiwan's security. Mainlanders appear vulnerable to such tactics. They do not like Chinese Communists, although they are even more concerned about their fate should Taiwan become independent. This fear of Taiwanese independence is based upon the assumption that independence may imply that native Taiwanese would have full control of the government. The KMT has skillfully manipulated the minority feelings of Mainlanders and led them to believe that the only choice they have is to spare no effort in support of the KMT. Therefore, it was expected that Mainlanders would show strong support for KMT candidates in elections. In other words, it is not surprising to see a negative impact for the Mainlander variable on party competition.

The comparison between the 1983 (KMT VS. TCSA) and 1986 (KMT VS. DPP) models also reveals very interesting trends of change. First, the regression

coefficients of variables of socioeconomic development, aggressive opposition nomination strategy, and percent Mainlander have shown significant increases in importance from the 1983 to the 1986 model. Among them, the socioeconomic development variable seems to emerge as the most important predictor of party competition these two elections. This supports our principal hypothesis that socioeconomic development affects party competition and that the relationship is becoming more and more important in Taiwan. As expected, opposition nomination strategy also remains an important predictor in 1986 election. In both years, the opposition attempts to use nomination policy in order to restrict the number of opposition candidates who would participate in elections. This strategy apparently has been effective since the variable of aggressive opposition nomination strategy is not only significant in both elections, but also becomes more important in later year. On the other hand, the founding of the DPP, which represents formal competition against the KMT, may have a very major psychological impact upon Mainlanders because the size of the for the regression coefficient percent of Mainlanders has doubled between these two elections.

Secondly, the unemployment variable and percent of Hakka variable become less important between 1983 and 1986. While Taiwan was still in the bottom of the most recent recession in 1983, the economy has recovered since 1985 and neither the unemployment rate nor the overall economy was a major issue in 1986 election. In fact, Taiwan's economy before the 1986 election had reached an unexpected prosperity. Therefore, the declining importance of the unemployment variable in the 1986 model is understandable.

On the other hand, the insignificant regression coefficient of Hakka variable in the 1986 model indicates that party competition in Hakka areas has been intensified during this period. Since two major DPP Hakka politicians, Hsu Kuo-tai of Tao-Yuan County and Chiu Lien-huei of Ping-tung County, not only participated in the 1986 election but were also successfully elected, it is natural to observe a higher level of competition in Hakka townships. Therefore, the diminishing negative impact of the Hakka variable from significant to insignificant actually implies the increasing importance of this variable in Taiwanese elections. While previous studies (Lei *et al.*, 1985; Peng, 1987; Ting, 1987 and 1988) have found that Hakkas seem to be relatively more conservative and pro-KMT than Fukienese, this present finding may suggest that the overall political attitudes are in the process of transition toward becoming less pro-KMT.

Thirdly, the variable of young voters remains positive and significant in 1986 model. This shows that young voters continue to be an important factor

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contributing to the intensity of party competition in Taiwanese elections. Young voters represent a cohort of Taiwanese who have received quite different socialization process, which is lacking Mainland and Japanese experiences. And, this cohort effect also includes very unusual experience of prosperous life in Taiwan in the 1970s and 1980s. It is widely accepted that the young generation has played a crucial role in recent opposition movements and they tend to support reformers rather than conservatives. Based on the above finding, KMT candidates may continue face serious challenges from young voters in the coming election.

Finally, the coefficients of determination for both 1983 ($R^2 = .2331$) and 1986 ($R^2 = .3478$) equations are satisfactory. The overall trend indicates that the six independent variables included in this analytical model explain substantial amounts of variations of party competition in Taiwan. And, the explanatory power of this model has increased significantly between these two elections.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

This study examined the determinants of party competition in Taiwan. Since Taiwan's socioeconomic development is closely related to the growth of the opposition in the last 20 years, the major hypothesis was that areas with higher levels of development will foster stronger opposition power and eventually more intense political competition. This hypothesis was tested with Taiwan's 1983 and 1986 areal-unit data by controlling for the TCSA (1983) and the DPP 1986 nomination strategy, the local economic conditions (unemployment rate), the age structure (percent young voters), and the provincial composition (percent of Hakka and Mainlander, respectively) in the regression analysis.

The results indicate that not only is the socioeconomic development variable a significant predictor of the intensity of party competition in both years, but that it is also the most important variable in the 1986 model. Socioeconomic development often involves a more diversified social structure that allows political opposition to grow. Since stronger opposition groups will inevitably intensify election competition, this finding supports the hypothesis regarding the relationship between socioeconomic development and party competition. The other factors in the regression models all reveal expected results and have statistically significant effects on party competition except for the percent of Hakka variable in the 1986 model. The more aggressive the DPP nomination strategy, and the greater are the unemployment rate and the percent of young voters, the greater

is the intensity of party competition; greater percentages of Mainlander and Hakka reduce party competition.

Finally, the basic assumption of this study is that the founding of the TCSA and the DPP is the result of social and economic development in Taiwan during the past four decades and that the increasingly intensifying party competition between the KMT and the opposition across the island is associated with the local level of socioeconomic development. The findings of this paper strongly support this hypothesis and show that after controlling for the DPP nomination strategy factor, the unemployment rate, and demographic variables, socioeconomic development is the most important predictor of increased party competition in Taiwan between the KMT and opposition in 1986 election. Moreover, there is a trend of increasing importance of the socioeconomic development variable between these elections.

Notes

- [1] Both the Legislative Yuan and National Assembly elections were held in 1986. However, these elections only reelect about one-third and one-tenth of the legislators and members of the National Assembly, respectively. The rest of the parliamentary members were originally elected in 1947. And, because the KMT suspended elections since then, these representatives have remained in their posts for more than 40 years.
- [2] Tangwai refers to "outside the party." This term includes opposition politicians who are not KMT members.
- [3] The overall Tangwai movement in local elections, the Mei-li-tao Magazine, and the Kaohsiung Incident in 1979 are examples of these political movements during late 1970s.

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Appendix A

The Data Set and Definitions of the Variables

This areal-unit analysis of the determinants of the variations in party competition between the Kuomintang and the Democratic Progressive Party in the 1986 Taiwan Legislative Yuan Election requires a complete township-level data set for both the independent and dependent variables specified in the model proposed in this study. The definitions and sources of the variables are as follows:

- (1) **Level of Party Competition**
Measurement : Divide the percent of votes received by the DPP by the percent of votes received by the KMT.
Source of Data: The 1983 and 1986 Taiwan Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election Reports.
- (2) **Index of Socioeconomic Development**
Measurement : The sum of the Z scores for the following socioeconomic variables – percent of local residents commuting to urban centers, percent of adults aged 15+ working in non-agricultural sectors, and percent of adults aged 15+ having attended senior high school or higher.
Source of Data: The 1980 Taiwan Area Census.
- (3) **DPP Nomination Strategy**
Measurement : Townships where the DPP had nominated more than 40% of all posts are classified as areas with aggressive nomination strategy. Townships where the DPP had nominated less than 40% of all posts are classified as areas with passive nomination strategy. Forty percent is selected as the cutting point because the DPP received an average of 30 percent of popular votes in 1986 election.
Source of Data: The 1983 and 1986 Taiwan Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election Reports. China Times, Page 2, October 24, 1983. China Times, "The DPP Nomination in the 1986 Supplementary Legislative Yuan Election." December 7, 1986.
- (4) **Percent Unemployment**
Measurement : Percent of unemployed adults aged 15+.
Source of Data: The 1980 Taiwan Area Census.
- (5) **Percent of Young Voters**
Measurement : Percent of voters aged 20-39.
Source of Data: The 1983 and 1986 Taiwan-Fukien Demographic Fact Book.
- (6) **Percent of Mainlander**
Measurement : Percent of Mainlander residents.
Source of Data: The 1980 Taiwan Area Census.
- (7) **Percent of Hakka**
Measurement : Percent of Hakka residents.
Source of Data: The 1980 Taiwan Area Census.

Appendix B

Correlation Matrix, Means, and Standard Deviations for Observed Variables for 1983 and 1986 Model (N = 300)

		X1	X2	X3	1983 X4	X5	X6	X7
1986								
	Level of Party Competition (X1)	1.000	.340	.326	.144	.345	.150	-.056
	Index of Socioeconomic Development (X2)	.387	1.000	.474	-.007	.584	.639	-.035
	DDP Nomination Strategy (X3)	.361	.031	1.000	.048	.275	.344	.269
	Percent Unemployment (X4)	.105	-.007	.219	1.000	-.121	.060	.102
	Percent of Young Voters (X5)	.316	.528	-.010	-.133	1.000	.377	-.209
	Percent of Mainlander (X6)	.061	.639	-.039	.060	.356	1.000	-.141
	Percent of Hakka (X7)	.108	-.035	.451	.102	-.213	-.141	1.000
1983	Mean	.267	-.390	.324	.042	.552	.107	.152
	S.D.	.277	2.325	.475	.014	.040	.117	.264
1986	Mean	.333	-.390	.324	.042	.560	.107	.152
	S.D.	.303	2.325	.469	.014	.041	.117	.264