

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學所	考試時間	2月26日(六)第二節
------	--------	----	-----	------	-------------

1. 請以中文陳述以下段落中的主要論點：(From: *Plato: Republic*, translated by G.M.A. Grube and revised by C.D.C. Reeve, 1992. Indianapolis, IN.: Hackett Publishing Company. Pp. 225-228 (Stephanus page: 555b-558c)) (25%)

It seems, then, that we must next consider democracy, how it comes into being, and what character it has when it does, so that, knowing in turn the character of a man who resembles it, we can present him for judgment.

That would be quite consistent with what we've been doing.

Well, isn't the city changed from an oligarchy to a democracy in some such way as this, because of its insatiable desire to attain what it has set before itself as the good, namely, the need to become as rich as possible?

In what way?

Since those who rule in the city do so because they own a lot, I suppose they're unwilling to enact laws to prevent young people who've had no discipline from spending and wasting their wealth, so that by making loans to them, secured by the young people's property, and then calling those loans in, they themselves become even richer and more honored.

That's their favorite thing to do.

So isn't it clear by now that it is impossible for a city to honor wealth and at the same time for its citizens to acquire moderation, but one or the other is inevitably neglected?

That's pretty clear.

Because of this neglect and because they encourage bad discipline, oligarchies not infrequently reduce people of no common stamp to poverty.

That's right.

And these people sit idle in the city, I suppose, with their stings and weapons—some in debt, some disenfranchised, some both—hating those who've acquired their property, plotting against them and others, and longing for a revolution.

They do.

The money-makers, on the other hand, with their eyes on the ground, pretend not to see these people,¹⁹ and by lending money they disable any of the remainder who resist, exact as interest many times the principal sum, and so create a considerable number of drones and beggars in the 556 city.

A considerable number indeed.

In any case, they are unwilling to quench this kind of evil as it flares up in the city, either in the way we mentioned, by preventing people from doing whatever they like with their own property or by another law which would also solve the problem.

What law?

The second-best one, which compels the citizens to care about virtue by prescribing that the majority of voluntary contracts be entered into at the lender's own risk, for lenders would be less shameless then in their pursuit of money in the city and fewer of those evils we were mentioning just now would develop.

Far fewer.

請注意：背面還有試題。

備	註	試題隨卷繳交
---	---	--------

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學所	考試時間	2月26日(六)第2節
------	--------	----	-----	------	-------------

But as it is, for all these reasons, the rulers in the city treat their subjects in the way we described. But as for themselves and their children, don't they make their young fond of luxury, incapable of effort either mental or physical, too soft to stand up to pleasures or pains, and idle besides?

Of course.

And don't they themselves neglect everything except making money, caring no more for virtue than the poor do?

Yes.

But when rulers and subjects in this condition meet on a journey or some other common undertaking—it might be a festival, an embassy, or a campaign, or they might be shipmates or fellow soldiers—and see one another in danger, in these circumstances are the poor in any way despised by the rich? Or rather isn't it often the case that a poor man, lean and suntanned, stands in battle next to a rich man, reared in the shade and carrying a lot of excess flesh, and sees him panting and at a loss? And don't you think that he'd consider that it's through the cowardice of the poor that such people are rich and that one poor man would say to another when they met in private: "These people are at our mercy; they're good for nothing"?

I know very well that's what they would do.

Then, as a sick body needs only a slight shock from outside to become ill and is sometimes at civil war with itself even without this, so a city in the same condition needs only a small pretext—such as one side bringing in allies from an oligarchy or the other from a democracy—to fall ill and to fight with itself and is sometimes in a state of civil war even without any external influence.

Absolutely.

And I suppose that democracy comes about when the poor are victorious, killing some of their opponents and expelling others, and giving the rest an equal share in ruling under the constitution, and for the most part assigning people to positions of rule by lot.

Yes, that's how democracy is established, whether by force of arms or because those on the opposing side are frightened into exile.

Then how do these people live? What sort of constitution do they have? It's clear that a man who is like it will be democratic.

That is clear.

First of all, then, aren't they free? And isn't the city full of freedom and freedom of speech? And doesn't everyone in it have the license to do what he wants?

That's what they say, at any rate.

And where people have this license, it's clear that each of them will arrange his own life in whatever manner pleases him.

It is.

Then I suppose that it's most of all under this constitution that one finds people of all varieties.

Of course.

Then it looks as though this is the finest or most beautiful of the constitutions, for, like a coat embroidered with every kind of ornament, this city, embroidered with every kind of character type, would seem to

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學所	考試時間	2月26日(六)第2節
------	--------	----	-----	------	-------------

- be the most beautiful. And many people would probably judge it to be so, as women and children do when they see something multicolored. They certainly would.
- d It's also a convenient place to look for a constitution. Why's that?
Because it contains all kinds of constitutions on account of the license it gives its citizens. So it looks as though anyone who wants to put a city in order, as we were doing, should probably go to a democracy, as to a supermarket of constitutions, pick out whatever pleases him, and establish that.
- e He probably wouldn't be at a loss for models, at any rate. In this city, there is no requirement to rule, even if you're capable of it, or again to be ruled if you don't want to be, or to be at war when the others are, or at peace unless you happen to want it. And there is no requirement in the least that you not serve in public office as a juror, if you happen to want to serve, even if there is a law forbidding you to do so. Isn't that a divine and pleasant life, while it lasts?
It probably is—while it lasts.
And what about the calm of some of their condemned criminals? Isn't that a sign of sophistication? Or have you never seen people who've been condemned to death or exile under such a constitution stay on at the center of things, strolling around like the ghosts of dead heroes, without anyone staring at them or giving them a thought?
Yes, I've seen it a lot.
- b And what about the city's tolerance? Isn't it so completely lacking in small-mindedness that it utterly despises the things we took so seriously when we were founding our city, namely, that unless someone had transcendent natural gifts, he'd never become good unless he played the right games and followed a fine way of life from early childhood? Isn't it magnificent the way it tramples all this underfoot, by giving no thought to what someone was doing before he entered public life and by honoring him if only he tells them that he wishes the majority well?
- c Yes, it's altogether splendid!
Then these and others like them are the characteristics of democracy. And it would seem to be a pleasant constitution, which lacks rulers but not variety and which distributes a sort of equality to both equals and unequals alike.
We certainly know what you mean.

請注意：背面還有試題。

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學所	考試時間	2月26日(六)第二節
<p>2. 請以中文陳述以下段落中的主要論點: (From: David Hume, <i>Enquiries Concerning the Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals</i>, edited by L.A. Selby-Bigge, 1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Pp. 73-76) (25%)</p> <p>58 But to hasten to a conclusion of this argument, which is already drawn out to too great a length: We have sought in vain for an idea of power or necessary connexion in all the sources from which we could suppose it to be derived. It appears that, in single instances of the operation of bodies, we never can, by our utmost scrutiny, discover any thing but one event following another, without being able to comprehend any force or power by which the cause operates, or any connexion between it and its supposed effect. The same difficulty occurs in contemplating the operations of mind on body—where we observe the motion of the latter to follow upon the volition of the former, but are not able to observe or conceive the tie which binds together the motion and volition, or the energy by which the mind produces this effect. The authority of the will over its own faculties and ideas is not a whit more comprehensible: So that, upon the whole, there appears not, throughout all nature, any one instance of connexion which is conceivable by us. All events seem entirely loose and separate. One event follows another; but we never can observe any tie between them. They seem <i>conjoined</i>, but never <i>connected</i>. And as we can have no idea of any thing which never appeared to our outward sense or inward sentiment, the necessary conclusion <i>seems</i> to be that we have no idea of connexion or power at all, and that these words are absolutely without any meaning, when employed either in philosophical reasonings or common life.</p> <p>59 But there still remains one method of avoiding this conclusion, and one source which we have not yet examined. When any natural object or event is presented, it is impossible for us, by any sagacity or penetration, to discover, or even conjecture, without experience, what event will result from it, or to carry our foresight beyond that object which is immediately present to the memory and senses. Even after one instance or experiment where we have observed a particular event to follow upon another, we are not entitled to form a general rule, or foretell what will happen in like cases; it being justly esteemed an unpardonable temerity to judge of the whole course of nature from one single experiment, however accurate or certain. But when one particular species of event has always, in all instances, been conjoined with another, we make no longer</p> <p>any scruple of foretelling one upon the appearance of the other, and of employing that reasoning, which can alone assure us of any matter of fact or existence. We then call the one object, <i>Cause</i>; the other, <i>Effect</i>. We suppose that there is some connexion between them; some power in the one, by which it infallibly produces the other, and operates with the greatest certainty and strongest necessity.</p> <p>It appears, then, that this idea of a necessary connexion among events arises from a number of similar instances which occur of the constant conjunction of these events; nor can that idea ever be suggested by any one of these instances, surveyed in all possible lights and positions. But there is nothing in a number of instances, different from every single instance, which is supposed to be exactly similar; except only, that after a repetition of similar instances, the mind is carried by habit, upon the appearance of one event, to expect its usual attendant, and to believe that it will exist. This connexion, therefore, which we <i>feel</i> in the mind, this customary transition of the imagination from one object to its usual attendant, is the sentiment or impression from which we form the idea of power or necessary connexion. Nothing farther is in the case. Contemplate the subject on all sides; you will never find any other origin of that idea. This is the sole difference between one instance, from which we can never receive the idea of connexion, and a number of similar instances, by which it is suggested. The first time a man saw the communication of motion by impulse, as by the shock of two billiard balls, he could not pronounce that the one event was <i>connected</i>: but only that it was <i>conjoined</i> with the other. After he has observed several instances of this nature, he then pronounces them to be <i>connected</i>. What alteration has happened to give rise to this new idea of <i>connexion</i>? Nothing but that he now <i>feels</i> these events to be <i>connected</i> in his imagination, and can readily foretell the existence of one from the appearance of the other. When we say, therefore, that one object is connected with another, we mean only that they have acquired a connexion in our thought, and give rise to this inference, by which they become proofs of each other's existence: A conclusion which is somewhat extraordinary, but which seems founded on sufficient evidence. Nor will its evidence be weakened by any general diffidence of the understanding, or sceptical suspicion concerning every conclusion which is new and extraordinary. No conclusions can be more agreeable to scepticism than such as make discoveries concerning the weakness and narrow limits of human reason and capacity.</p>					
備	註	試題隨卷繳交			

考試科目	哲學專業語文	所別	哲學所	考試時間	2月26日(六)第二節
------	--------	----	-----	------	-------------

3, 請用你的話說明以下李翱《復性書》中的段落的主旨。(註: 此段落的標點符號未必正確, 僅供參考。)(25%)

人之所以為聖人者, 性也; 人之所以惑其性者, 情也。喜、怒、哀、懼、愛、惡、欲, 七者皆情之所為也, 情既昏, 性斯匿矣; 非性之過也, 七者循環而交來, 故性不能充也。水之渾也, 其流不清; 火之煙也, 其光不明; 非水、火清明之過, 沙不渾, 流斯清矣; 煙不鬱, 光斯明矣; 情不作, 性斯充矣。

性與情不相無也, 雖然無性則情無所生矣, 是情由性而生; 情不自情, 因性而情; 性不自性, 由情以明。性者, 天之命也, 聖人得之而不惑者也; 情者, 性之動也, 百姓溺之而不能知其本者也…

問曰:「人之性, 猶聖人之性, 嗜欲愛憎之心, 何因而生也?」

曰:「情者, 妄也, 邪也, 邪與妄則無所因矣, 妄情滅息, 本性清明, 周流六虛, 所以謂之能復其性也。《易》

曰:『乾道變化, 各正性命。』《論語》曰:『朝聞道, 夕死可矣。』能正性命故也。」

問曰:「情之所昏, 性即滅矣, 何以謂之猶聖人之性也?」

曰:「水之性清澈, 其渾之者沙泥也; 方其渾也, 性豈遂無有耶? 久而不動, 沙泥自沉; 清明之性鑒於天地, 非自外來也; 故其渾也, 性本勿失; 及其復也, 性亦不生; 人之性, 亦猶水之性也。」(摘錄自: 李翱, 《復性書》, 上-中。)

4, 《莊子》〈齊物論〉中有以下有名的段落。試參考郭象的注, 用你自己的話說明以本段的主旨。(註: 此段落的標點符號未必正確, 僅供參考。)(25%)

物無非彼, 物無非是。自彼則不見, 自知則知之。故曰: 彼出於是, 是亦因彼。彼是方生之說也。雖然, 方生方死, 方死方生; 方可方不可, 方不可方可; 因是因非, 因非因是。是以聖人不由, 而照之於天, 亦因是也。是亦彼也, 彼亦是也。彼亦一是非, 此亦一是非, 果且有彼是乎哉? 果且無彼是乎哉? 彼是莫得其偶, 謂之道樞。樞始得其環中, 以應無窮。是亦一無窮, 非亦一無窮也, 故曰莫若以明。以指喻指之非指, 不若以非指喻指之非指也; 以馬喻馬之非馬, 不若以非馬喻馬之非馬也。天地一指也, 萬物一馬也。

郭象註解

案:〔〕、() 為清代郭慶藩校對文字

物皆自是, 故無非是; 物皆相彼, 故無非彼。無非彼, 則天下無是矣; 無非是, 則天下無彼矣。無彼無是, 所以玄同也。夫物之偏也, 皆不見彼之所見, 而獨自知其所知。自知其所知, 則自以為是。自以為是, 則以彼為非矣。故曰彼出於是, 是亦因彼, 彼是相因而生者也。夫死生之變, 猶春夏秋冬四時行耳。故死生之狀雖異, 其於各安所遇, 一也。今生者方自謂生為生, 而死者方自謂生為死, 則無生矣。生者方自謂死為死, 而死者方自謂死為生, 則無死矣。無生無死, 無可無不可, 故儒墨之辨, 吾所不能同也; 至於各冥其分, 吾所不能異也。夫懷豁者, 因天下之是非而自無是非也。故不由是非之塗而是非無患不當者, 直明其天然而無所奪故也。我亦為彼所彼。彼亦自以為是。此亦自是而非彼, 彼亦自是而非此, 此與彼各有一是一非於體中也。今欲謂彼為彼, 而彼復自是; 欲謂是為是, 而是復為彼所彼; 故彼是有無, 未果定也。偶, 對也。彼是相對, 而聖人兩順之。故無心者與物冥, 而未嘗有對於天下也。〔樞, 要也〕。此居其樞要而會其玄極, 以應夫無方也。夫是非反覆, 相尋無窮, 故謂

備 註 試 題 隨 卷 繳 交

請注意: 背面還有試題。

考 試 科 目	哲學專業語文	所 別	哲學所	考 試 時 間	2 月 26 日(六) 第 二 節
---------	--------	-----	-----	---------	-------------------

之環。環中，空矣；今以是非爲環而得其中者，無是無非也。無是無非，故能應夫是非。是非無窮，故應亦無窮。天下莫不自是而莫不相非，故一是一非，兩行無窮。唯涉空得中者，曠然無懷，乘之以游也。夫自是而非彼，彼我之常情也。故以我指喻彼指，則彼指於我指獨爲非指矣。此以指喻指之非指也。若復以彼指還喻我指，則我指於彼指復爲非指矣。此〔亦〕〔以〕非指喻指之非指也。將明無是無非，莫若反覆相喻。反覆相喻，則彼之與我，既同於自是，又均於相非。均於相非，則天下無是；同於自是，則天下無非。何以明其然邪？是若果是，則天下不得〔彼〕〔復〕有非之者也。非若果非，〔則天下〕亦不得復有是之者也。今是非無主，紛然淆亂，明此區區者各信其偏見而同於一致耳。仰觀俯察，莫不皆然。是以至人知天地一指也，萬物一馬也，故浩然大寧，而天地萬物各當其分，同於自得，而無是無非也。((清)郭慶藩集釋、謝皓祥導讀，《莊子集釋》(台北：貫雅文化，1991)。頁 66-9)



備 註	試 題 隨 卷 繳 交
-----	-------------

考試科目	哲學基本問題	所別	哲學系	考試時間	二月六日(六)第3節
------	--------	----	-----	------	------------

一、知識論的目的是要說明我們怎麼去認識，但就形上學的角度而言，這是否業已假定了我們可以認識到客體呢？若這個假定不成立的話，是不是就等於懷疑論？

反之，若懷疑論是確實的話，它能不能沒有客觀的知識型？若不能的話，懷疑論的知識型是什麼？它怎麼去解決無從認識與客觀知識並置上的兩難？

還是說，這個問題沒有要必要去解決？果真如此，我們又怎麼去證明這種說法的形上優位性？一旦朝這個方向去思考，究竟誰才是真正優位的，形上學？抑是知識論？（50分）

二、倫理學的本義同時具備應然的要求與實然的條件，從知識論的觀點來看，這是怎麼可能的？

若照應然的要求，實然的條件會被壓抑，這時候，還有倫理實踐的空間嗎？

若照實然的條件，應然的要求會遙不可及，這時候，倫理價值難道不會錯亂嗎？

當此之際，為何倫理知識是可能的？請用任何一種倫理主張加以申論之。並注意其知識型的特質，如何讓它在不同於理論知識之餘，仍能達成客觀知識的目的？（50分）

備

註

試題隨卷繳交

考試科目	中西哲學史	所別	哲學系	考試時間	2月26日(六)第4節
------	-------	----	-----	------	-------------

一、依你的了解，孔子的「仁說」與孟子的「性善說」對宋儒的「心性論」有何影響？(25分)

二、華嚴宗與天台宗的主要思想各是甚麼？(25分)

三、德國哲學家康德(Immanuel Kant)曾在他的主要著作《純粹理性批判》中說：

the proud name of an ontology, which presumes to offer synthetic a priori cognitions of things in general in a systematic doctrine, must give way to the modest one of a mere analytic of the pure understanding.

請據此回答以下的問題：(共25分)

(1) 試以亞里斯多德的《形上學》為例，說明在希臘哲學中「存有論」(Ontology)這門學科的理論性質是什麼？它研究什麼對象，處理什麼問題？

(2) 康德在此為何說傳統的「存有論」是「為一般而言之事物的先天綜合認知提供一套系統的學理」？在這種意義下的存有論究竟有什麼理論困難或錯誤，以致於康德要對它進行批判？

(3) 康德在此說「存有論」這個驕傲的名稱應讓位給比較謙虛的「純粹知性的分析論」，試說明康德在《純粹理性批判》中，如何以「純粹知性的分析論」之哲學架構，取代存有論問題的討論？而這種轉變在哲學史上又有何意義？

四、英國哲學家休姆(David Hume)曾在他的主要著作《人性論》中說：

This fiction of the imagination almost universally takes place; and 'tis by means of it, that a single object, plac'd before us, and survey'd for any time without our discovering in it any interruption or variation, is able to give us a notion of identity.

請據此回答以下的問題：(共25分)

(1) 英國經驗主義者洛克(Locke)、巴克萊(Berkeley)與休姆，如何說明人類知識的起源？

(2) 休姆為何會從他的經驗主義立場，最後推論出：「物體同一性」的概念其實只是「想像力的虛構」這種懷疑主義的結論？而這對理性主義的實體學說所產生的批判作用又何在？

(3) 你接受休姆的懷疑主義結論嗎？如果接受的話，請說明你將如何解釋我們所處的生活世界的實在性問題？如果你不接受的話，請說明休姆的經驗主義推論在哪個環節出了問題？如果你部分接受，部分不接受的話，也請說明你的理由何在？