考试科目 財政超論 所列射政州 考试时间

星期

1. (25 分)Consider an economy with one public good, G, a (taxable) private good, x_1 · and an untaxable private good, x_0 . Assume that the technology is such that $p_G = p_1 = p_0 = 1$. Assume that the economy has n identical agents with endowments w of good x_0 and utility functions

$$U_i - x_0 + \alpha \ln x_1 + \beta \ln G$$

- Find the first-best provision of the public good G. Is this unique?
- Suppose that the government is constrained to pay for the public good with distortionary Find the second-best tax, t, on good 1. What is the second-best level of G taxes on x₁ at this optimum?
- c) Compare you answers in (a) and (b). Which has the higher level of G? Discuss your answer in terms of Pigou's (1947) argument about funding public goods with distortionary taxes rather than lump sum taxes. Also relate your discussion to Atkinson and Stern's (1974) treatment of Pigou's argument. Are the results of Atkinson and Stern consistent with your results? Why or why not?

2. (25分)

Part I Consider the two-sector general-equilibrium model of tax incidence attributed to INTUITIVELY describe the incidence of

- A tax on labor in the X sector when the elasticity of substitution between capital and labor is zero in both sectors.
- A tax on capital in both sectors.

Now we vary Harberger's two-sector general-equilibrium model to be a two-country general-equilibrium model of tax competition. Capital is freely mobile between two countries, whereas labor is immobile. The total supply of the world capital is fixed. Both countries tax capital invested within borders to finance government spending. Explain INTUITIVELY:

- The incidence of the capital taxes.
- Will the level of spending in both countries be Pareto efficient? Why or why not?
- If consider the growth of capital, how will answers in (a) and (b) change?

L何謂第一及第二福利定理?有那一個假設第一福利定理沒有,但第二福利定理卻

此一定理背後有何假設?中位選民定理和 Arrow 著名的不可能定理問有何關聯?



必須用到?

- 2.
- (a).公共財資源配置最適條件爲何?
- (b).公共財資源配置最適條件是否會因爲公共財融通方式不同而改變?
- 3.何謂「中位選民定理」(median voter theorem)?

大學團書館

國立政治大學八十入學年度研究所屬士班入學考試命題紙 考认時間 名月24日上午第二 所别四十三天所 往前码碗 夏 50% 中试面要说明经情到季时的微微,思度, 规避风险,指作以 (10%)及国定国院规避到用水纹:竹路。 的試商字说明猜测度等(Conjectural Variation)分析的主英证明 (10年) 成高不同结例 色量假设的反應不同市場指揮行為。 西河特角记明福利铝液学了二大足理。 (10%) 四、试特局ien Real Business Gula 证确立基本精神益评确立。 (1:2) 四、试商务论明最选(2)育酚云·特件心良何以在Over-lapping generation model + 758 At Dynamic Inefficiency ? 國立政治大學圖書館

考试時間

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式.

A consumer in a three-good economy (goods denoted x_p, x₂ and x₃, prices denoted p_p, p₂ and p₃) with income level m > θ has demand functions for commodities 1 and 2 given by

$$X_{1} = 100 - 5\frac{p_{1}}{p_{3}} + \beta \frac{p_{2}}{p_{3}} + \delta \frac{m}{p_{3}}$$

$$X_{2} = \alpha + \beta \frac{p_{1}}{p_{3}} + \gamma \frac{p_{2}}{p_{3}} + \delta \frac{m}{p_{3}},$$

where α , β , γ and δ are nonzero constants

of output.

- (a) Calculate the restrictions on the numerical values of α , β , γ , and δ implied by utility maximization.
- (b) Given your results in part (a), for a fixed level of x₃ draw the consumer's indifference curve in the x₁, x₂ plane.
- (c) What does your answer to (b) imply about the form of the consumer's utility function $U(x_0, x_2, x_3)$? (18%)
- 2. Suppose the production function f (x) is concave function with n inputs (x₁,x₂,..., x_n). Suppose also that ∂f(x)/∂x_i > 0 for all i and x_i≥0, i=1,..., n and that the matrix D²f(x) is negative definite at all x. The output price and input price in the competitive market denote p and w respectively. Use the firm's first-order conditions and the implicit function theorem to prove the following statements:
 (a) An increase in the output price always increases the profit-maximizing level
 - (b) An increase in output price increases the demand for some input.
 - (c) An increase in the price of an input leads to a reduction in the demand for the input. (18%)
- 3. Consider an Edgeworth box economy with two consumers (i=1, 2) and two goods (j=1, 2) in which the consumers have the Cobb-Douglas utility functions $u_i(\chi_{i1},\chi_{i2}) = \chi_{i1}^{\alpha_i} \chi_{i2}^{1-\alpha_i}$, where $1 \ge \alpha_i \ge 0$ and i=1, 2. Consumer i's endowments are $(w_{i1}, w_{i2}) >> 0$ with $\overline{w}_i = w_{1,i} + w_{2,i}$ for i = 1, 2.
 - (a) Solve for the equilibrium price ratio (p_1^*/p_2^*) and allocation (x_n^*, x_{i2}^*) .
 - (b) How do these change with a differential change in w₁₁? (14%)