考試科目	管理文獻評析	所別	科技管理研究所	考試時間	5月22日(六)第二節 8:20～12:00

本試卷包括三大題，請在考試時間範圍內儘量作答（問題分別列於文章之後）。

I. Reinventing innovation at consumer goods companies

A range of orthodoxies is making it harder to develop breakthrough products in the consumer goods industry. It urgently needs a reformation.

Erik A. Roth and Kevin D. Sneader

For years, consumer goods companies excelled at innovation: the steady introduction of profitable, convenient, high-quality products—ranging from disposable diapers to frozen dinners—that changed the daily lives of consumers. Recently, however, these companies have become increasingly vocal about the poor returns on their investments in product innovation. More new products are being launched, but fewer of them are truly innovative.

Paradoxically, little has changed—and that's the problem for the consumer goods sector. As markets have matured, tried-and-true processes for selecting ideas, determining business models, and making investment decisions have become less productive. Existing methodologies have turned into orthodoxies: established ways of doing business that reinforce the status quo and hinder the adoption of novel, tailored, and flexible approaches to innovation. In defining "the way things are done," these orthodoxies also dictate what a company should not do. And because they represent deeply embedded mind-sets shaped by corporate tradition, culture, and values, they are difficult to unwind.

Clearly, not all orthodoxies are wholly undesirable: many of them facilitate the efficiency and predictability that large companies need. Nonetheless, they inhibit the development of breakthrough innovations, which can be six times as productive, measured in terms of the average percentage of sales within a category, as a typical incremental change.

Other industries have their own orthodoxies, but four are particularly ingrained in consumer goods, in the form of conventional wisdom:

- Innovation starts with existing business models and categories.
- Focus groups are at the heart of efforts to generate the insights companies need.
- Companies should rely on internal resources first for innovation.
- Companies should come up with as many ideas as possible and "let a thousand flowers bloom."

Innovation is an inherently multidisciplinary, cross-functional activity. Eliminating harmful orthodoxies therefore requires changes across business units and throughout corporate hierarchies. Some industry leaders, such as General Mills and P&G, have already begun upgrading their approaches to innovation. Others should follow because these improvements will pay significant dividends: the ability to innovate at scale and thus to deliver reliable, sustainable returns on investments in product innovation.

Starting with current business models

Consumer goods companies that stick to what they know—business models based on finely tuned business processes, existing facilities, and long-standing relationships with suppliers and customers—believe they can generate predictable results. When companies free themselves from this orthodoxy, they move beyond the development of the latest type of soda or the newest fragrance for soap (incremental moves that run the risk of

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overextending brands without delivering substantial growth). Instead, they take business-changing steps such as extending brands into adjacent categories, creating "platform" brands that support products across a number of categories, and moving into the white spaces between categories. Consider the following examples:

1. **Extending existing brands into adjacent categories.** For years, P&G's Pampers products focused on a specific consumer benefit—dryness—and overlooked opportunities such as "swimmers" (diapers children can wear in the water). Furthermore, the company categorized both diapers and babies by weight, since it believed that their weight corresponded with their absorbency needs. In 2001, P&G began to see the market differently. Through market research, it discovered that the absorbency needs of babies also correspond closely with their stage of development, as defined by the type and amount of their physical activity. Subsequently, P&G reintroduced its Pampers premium line as Pampers Baby Stages. Realizing that it also could extend the trusted Pampers brand beyond diapers into adjacent, complementary categories, it now offers wipes, disposable bibs, and other products. Since the launch of Baby Stages (which encompasses the product variants Swaddlers, Cruisers, and Easy Ups), P&G's share of the diaper market has risen to 51 percent in 2005, from 41 percent in 2001, and its share of the training-pants market has increased to 18 percent, from 0.5 percent over the same period.[1] Such stellar growth is very rare in a mature and competitive category.

2. **Creating a brand that plays in a number of categories and businesses.** When PepsiCo acquired Quaker Oats in 2001, the Quaker brand had already managed to refresh its old-fashioned image by moving into value-added categories such as granola bars and cold cereals. Since Pepsi's acquisition, Quaker has reached new levels by viewing its brand as a lifestyle choice rather than as a category. Quaker now stands for wholesome quality, health, and wellness (rather than a specific need state), thus allowing Pepsi to stretch into new product areas such as breakfast cookies, weight control instant oatmeal, and a variety of innovative snacks.

3. **Moving into the white spaces between categories.** Many breakthrough innovations arise in the white spaces between existing categories, because opportunities to introduce or fuse consumer benefits are richest there. Witness the breakfast bar, a product that combines the taste and benefits of traditional breakfast cereals with the portability and packaging of energy bars (themselves an innovation largely advanced by the success of PowerBar). Thanks to changing consumer needs and new delivery technologies, cereal makers have successfully expanded their brands into this new category. Indeed, "on-the-go" nutrition is shaping many product categories.

How can companies increase the odds of making such moves successfully? One tactic is to look assiduously for combinations of brands, technological break-throughs, and insights that help a company address a broader set of consumer needs and so spawn multiple innovations. The artificial sweetener Splenda is a breakthrough product with applications in a number of brands, such as Diet Coke with Splenda and Splenda Brown Sugar Blend.

Facilitating the out-of-the-box thinking required to identify innovation platforms is often difficult for consumer goods companies, whose managers and employees are organized by geography, business unit, brand, category, or customer. Specialized teams with discrete resources, incentives, processes, and directions—including a mandate to focus on innovation—may be needed to foster cross-functional activities, such as the systematic fusion of consumer, technical, and industry knowledge to transform seemingly unrelated ideas into feasible product concepts. Researchers gather and brand marketers interpret data on profitable consumer segments. Together with R&D, the team explores current, developing, and even hypothetical technologies. Finally, strategists share relevant analyses of market dynamics and other contextual issues to help refine ideas (for instance, by modifying the positioning of a product or creating customer-specific variants to better meet the needs of channel partners).

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The rewards of this approach are unique insights that can be translated into differentiated new products and businesses. A food product company, for example, conducted a weeklong workshop to generate new ideas by combining consumer, technical, and industry knowledge. An internal team developed go-to-market plans for two new business units with separate structures, leadership teams, and income statements. One of the resulting products eventually became the second most profitable in the company's entire portfolio.

Relying on focus groups

Orthodoxies also reinforce the reliance that consumer goods companies place on established tools for generating insights about consumers. It's easy to understand the survival of popular traditional techniques such as syndicated market research, simplistic quantitative surveys, and focus groups: they are well understood, and some of them—particularly focus groups—are quick and cost effective.

Yet so many companies use the same tool kit to scrutinize consumers that the resulting insights are undifferentiated. What's more, conventional research methods often gather incomplete information. Because they rarely make it possible to experience the full benefits of new or hypothetical products, they often fail to predict accurately whether consumers will understand the technologies that underpin truly innovative products. Consumers are notoriously poor at articulating needs or benefits beyond those they have already experienced: when asking them to imagine true innovations, companies get mixed results at best. Even an industry standard such as simulated test marketing (which often emphasizes historical consumer reactions to new products) reinforces incremental thinking and can give top scores to innovations that subsequently fail the market test. In short, traditional methods can describe past consumer behavior but rarely uncover the white-space opportunities between existing product categories or the kinds of insights that lead to breakthrough innovations.

Companies should diversify both the techniques for gathering consumer insights and the way these insights are used. Many have succeeded with ethnographic or anthropological research approaches such as in-context interviewing and "living with consumers": observing people buying and using products in stores, at work, in restaurants, or at home. Leaders are pushing the envelope further by creating new environments—computer simulations, mock stores, model "homes of tomorrow," and more—to observe purchases and consumption. In this way, managers develop a deeper understanding of the motivations that shape consumer behavior. Consider these examples:

1. General Mills observed its target market—children—playing in school yards when it developed Yoplait's Go-Gurt, one of the fastest-selling yogurt-based products in the United States. The company realized that children, given their active lifestyles, would prefer a convenient on-the-go product that could be opened quickly and held in one hand. The solution, a packaging innovation, gave rise to Go-Gurt: yogurt, in a squeezable tube, that kids can eat without a spoon.
2. Nike marketers, armed with next-generation athletic-shoe prototypes, visit inner-city neighborhoods in major urban areas to interact directly with target consumers. The company can borrow much of its style, attitude, and imagery directly from its customers while simultaneously gauging reactions and building buzz around upcoming products.
3. Dove's recent Campaign for Real Beauty created a vibrant online community that encouraged women to debate the concept of beauty. By monitoring these forums, Dove gathered information critical to developing products that challenge existing paradigms (such as the female consumer's desire for "flawless" skin) in the skin care and cosmetics industries.

Relying on a company's own resources

Most consumer goods companies need to change their interactions not only with consumers but also with other external parties. Historically, these companies have relied primarily on their internal capabilities to manage innovation. But a recent analysis across major consumer goods categories demonstrated that the

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overwhelming majority of US patents arose outside the top seven global consumer goods companies. In the laundry and home care category, for example, 95 percent of the patents filed from 2002 to 2005 did not originate within them.[2] Indeed, the leading companies constitute only a tiny fraction of the world's consumergoods innovators.

Yet our research suggests that few companies look beyond their advertising agencies, to the many alternative external sources of insights: suppliers, venture capital firms, entrepreneurs, and inventors. This oversight may prove costly, since external partners can spot trends, create competition for complacent in-house teams, share technologies and manufacturing processes (in some cases developed for other purposes), and even craft fully developed product concepts. Consider a few examples.

1. Through a joint venture, Clorox (which acquired Glad Brands in 1999) gained access to a critical patented plastics technology that archrival P&G had developed for its baby, feminine-care, and paper businesses. The result of this unlikely marriage was Glad's groundbreaking product Press'n Seal, whose distinctive technology improved the underlying margins of Clorox's business and allowed P&G to generate income from its intellectual property.
2. Coca-Cola and Alcoa observed that consumers store most sodas at home in pantries and have only a few cold ones in refrigerators at any given time. Warm cans limited consumption. With this insight, the companies used Riverwood International's (now Graphic Packaging) packaging technology to create a cardboard case—the Fridgepack—that fits in refrigerators more easily. Incremental volumes rose dramatically, benefiting all three companies.
3. P&G's Connect+Develop program is well recognized as one of the most outward-looking efforts in the whole industry. The company's CEO set clear metrics and targets, such as boosting to 50 percent the proportion of innovations incorporating external ideas, from 35 percent today and 15 percent in 2000. In addition, P&G introduced incentives so that its business units receive credit for sales and profits generated through external relationships. It has also pioneered the use of collaborative online communities, which have become fruitful sources of innovation. P&G now systematically combs the world for innovations it can improve through its own technology, marketing, or distribution. The company uses its extensive external network—academics, alumni, suppliers, technical communities, consumer communities, creative agencies, bankers, and venture capitalists—both to generate ideas and to complete deals.[3]

Helpful as external relationships can be, collaboration does have its perils. In particular, commonly tapped external partners—creative agencies and design studios, in the case of consumer goods companies—can become insiders over time and lose the external perspective necessary to challenge conventional wisdom. Best-in-class innovators avoid this problem by creating external boards of industry thought leaders who meet periodically to supply objective, outside-in perspectives on the company's direction. Given the power of outside ideas, companies should experiment with various approaches for sourcing, jointly creating, and commercializing intellectual property with external partners.

Letting a thousand flowers bloom

Unless companies manage their portfolios effectively, they cannot rationally determine which projects to invest in and which to discard. In fact, our recent research confirmed that consumer goods companies have more ideas than capacity to develop them.[4] Top innovators in consumer goods meet this challenge by aligning their innovation strategies with their portfolio decisions.

Many other companies, however, are overburdened by a principle of orthodoxy: letting a thousand flowers bloom, or creating portfolios loaded with less risky, incremental ideas. To be sure, a few lucky companies play in subcategories, such as yogurt and gum, that are growing rapidly enough to absorb large numbers of incremental ideas. And incrementalism can serve certain purposes, such as maintaining market share or achieving short-term financial goals. However, most companies must actively prune their pipelines, place bets, and back winners.

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Few do, however. Some risk-averse consumer goods companies believe that packing their pipelines with projects, however small and derivative, will help them avoid prematurely discarding winners or, worse, the "next big thing." Incremental projects are also taken up for alleged strategic reasons (one of which is that they are the pet projects of powerful people). Industry convention also plays a role: the average brand manager has only two years to earn a promotion and isn't likely to invest in risky ideas that will take longer to realize.

Unfortunately, traditional evaluation tools (such as returns on investment and net present value) increase the likelihood of prematurely eliminating potential breakthrough ideas and of adopting incremental ones. To predict the performance of incremental innovations, companies analyze various characteristics (say, the most important customer segments) of similar products. By contrast, a company's projections for potential breakthrough ideas, even with historical data for more or less similar products, will be less accurate. Such inaccurate projections can lead companies to underestimate the sales and profits from such projects, which are then killed. Of course, the opposite could happen—profits could be overestimated—but that isn't likely in risk-averse consumer goods companies, given the number of unknowns.

Some companies defend their tendency to let small projects proliferate: they claim that a constant stream of more predictable ideas makes them better able to forecast revenues and profits. And it does, but at a price. First, companies fail to consider the opportunity costs of failing to pursue breakthrough innovations systematically. Second, they underestimate the cost of complexity, typically in the form of insufficient resources for ballooning numbers of projects. (The more projects a company attempts to push through, the more likely it is to have less than optimal operations, which could even strain its relationships with channel partners.)

Finally, these problems become worse as companies grow. Even if the average value of each project stays constant, the number of projects required to sustain high growth rates increases substantially, thus making the effort more complex and less fruitful. Recently, we worked with one senior executive who realized that an almost exponential increase in the number of initiatives would be required to meet his company's growth goals during the next five years, given the ever smaller average expected value of each innovation. Another client discovered that his company's growth goals remained beyond reach, despite the hundreds of innovation projects under development.

Rather than treating all projects equally, consumer goods companies should recognize that they can't develop incremental innovations and breakthrough ideas in the same way. Because the former are usually derivative products targeted at some large group of core customers, they tend not to change as they move through the development process. With such incremental ideas, companies primarily need to confirm that the product is feasible and that current consumers are interested in it. They can develop such products effectively through a standard stage-gate process, which evaluates a product at predetermined intervals. If a project does not meet certain criteria, such as the estimated sales volume, it is abandoned.

By contrast, potential breakthrough ideas aim to offer new sets of consumers substantially novel benefits and unproven technical features. They would therefore benefit from an iterative, learning-based evaluation with many market check-in points, similar to those that venture capital firms and high-tech companies use.[5] Such approaches might, for example, include iterative rapid prototyping, which uses product concepts to create an ongoing dialogue with consumers whose comments shape the design throughout the development process.

Consumer goods companies, once regarded as pioneers of innovation, are now bogged down by the very practices they hoped would keep bright ideas coming. To kick-start growth and rejuvenate ailing innovation engines, these companies must break free of orthodoxy—a tricky task for large, complex, and global organizations, but one that is sure to pay off.

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第一大題-問題：（共計：35 分）

1. 文中提到的"Orthodoxy"，主要可能包括哪些？它如何影響到組織的創新？（15 分）
2. 依作者的提議，組織可以從哪幾個方面著手（包括作法）才可以有更佳的創新成效？你（妳）自己覺得要做好這方面還需要哪些注意到哪些地方？（20 分）

II. Putting organizational complexity in its place

Not all complexity is bad for business—but executives don't always know what kind their company has. They should understand what creates complexity for most employees, remove what doesn't add value, and channel the rest to employees who can handle it effectively.

Julian Birkinshaw and Suzanne Heywood

Despite widespread agreement that organizational complexity creates big problems by making it hard to get things done, few executives have a realistic understanding of how complexity actually affects their own companies. When pressed, many leaders cite the *institutional* manifestations of complexity they personally experience: the number of countries the company operates in, for instance, or the number of brands or people they manage. By contrast, relatively few executives consider the forms of *individual* complexity that the vast majority of their employees face—for example poor processes, confusing role definitions, or unclear accountabilities.

This is not a trivial difference in perception. Our experience suggests that such a disconnect highlights a blind spot many executives have when it comes to managing complexity effectively. A focus on institutional complexity at the expense of the individual kind can lead to wasted effort or even organizational damage. What's more, failing to tackle complexity as most people experience it can, as we've shown before, be financially costly.[1]

Once senior executives recognize that employees typically see complexity very differently than they do, they can begin to take straightforward steps to pinpoint where in their organizations complexity hinders productivity and why. The goal? To identify where institutional complexity is an issue, where complexity caused by factors such as a lack of role clarity or poor processes is a problem, and what's responsible for the complexity in each area. Companies can then boost organizational effectiveness through a combination of two things: removing complexity that doesn't add value and channeling what's left to employees who can either handle it naturally or be trained to cope with it.

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In this article, we review the experience of a multinational consumer goods manufacturer that applied this approach in several regions and functions and consequently halved the time it needed to make decisions in critical processes. This, in turn, helped it bring products to market faster in response to changing customer needs. Such payoffs aren't unusual. Our work with companies in the banking, mining, retail, and other sectors suggests that managing complexity more effectively helps remove unnecessary costs and organizational friction and can even lead to new sources of profit and competitive advantage by boosting a company's resilience and its ability to adapt quickly.

Executives at the manufacturer knew they had a problem with complexity. Rapid growth in the company's Australasia region was requiring significant management attention and travel time and, consequently, was making it difficult for the senior team to manage effectively there and across the company's two other regions (Europe and the United States).

For most employees, however, such institutional complexity didn't matter. They struggled instead with forms of individual complexity—for example, processes that had initially been effective but over time had become increasingly bureaucratic. Many employees, for instance, were frustrated both with how long it took for decisions to filter through to the front line and the amount of work required to implement them (new-product development, for example, took more than a year and required numerous consultations across the company). Duplicated roles (the regions replicated activities performed by the corporate center) and unclear role definitions, which left several groups accountable for sales forecasting and other key activities, only exacerbated the problems. The result was too much time spent on managing internal processes and not enough on understanding customers' needs.

To take stock of the situation, the manufacturer launched a survey that asked employees about the clarity of roles and accountabilities across the company, whether systems and processes were linked effectively, how much coordination individual jobs required and how predictable they were, and, very simply, how hard it was for individuals to get things done and to make decisions.

Although surveys like this are a relatively straightforward way in order to collect useful information, structured interviews or focus groups are also effective for gathering quantitative data about the intensity of complexity and qualitative information on what drives it. Companies can also make a first assessment simply by looking at their own organization charts with fresh eyes. If, for example, employees report that role duplication is a problem, executives can examine job descriptions and org charts to better determine the likely extent of duplication and follow up with the appropriate managers to learn more.

Likewise, companies can uncover hidden pockets of complexity by interviewing employees to understand the key activities, data, and handoffs involved in various business processes. Whatever the method of data collection, companies must avoid sampling subsets—say, a single business unit—and assuming that these views are representative.

Draw a map of what's really going on

Armed with the survey data, the manufacturer constructed several "heat maps" to help senior managers pinpoint where, and why, complexity was causing trouble for employees. Each map showed a particular breakdown—a region or function, for example—and how much complexity of various kinds was occurring there, as well as the level of coping skills employees possessed. The manufacturer's maps helped identify several problems that executives had previously been unaware of.

- A regional map, highlighted confusion over accountability between the company's headquarters and a country office in the same region. The country's head of operations found it difficult to get things done because

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some of the roles in her group were shared with headquarters—her marketing function, for example, also worked for headquarters, while the corporate HR function worked, in part, for her country office. Moreover, the same map showed that employees in Region B found it markedly easier to do their work than employees in Region D did, despite having similar mandates and processes and selling, essentially, the same products. Region B's employees had far fewer interactions with headquarters than did their colleagues in Region D.

- Another map showed how the manufacturer's supply chain employees were struggling with duplication that stemmed from confusing sales forecasting and from ordering processes that required decisions to pass through multiple loops (including time-consuming iterations with regional offices) prior to approval. What's worse, a closer look found that the additional checks and inputs weren't improving the accuracy of the forecasts—these efforts were wasted.
- Meanwhile, executives learned that midlevel managers in all the regions were not using the company's performance-management system effectively. This meant both that the performance information collected was not as accurate as it could be and (more important) that the system was being used only for tracking performance against targets and not for coaching or for conducting developmental discussions on skill gaps and how to close them. Poor data, in turn, made it hard to align employees' skills with the manufacturer's overall strategic needs.

Reduce—and redirect—complexity

Once senior managers have a clear picture of where complexity hampers effectiveness, they can begin to remove any complexity that doesn't add value and channel what's left to people who can handle it. Of course, managers must be mindful that not all complexity is equally manageable, and proceed accordingly.

- **Imposed complexity** includes laws, industry regulations, and interventions by nongovernmental organizations. It is not typically manageable by companies.
- **Inherent complexity** is intrinsic to the business, and can only be jettisoned by exiting a portion of the business.
- **Designed complexity** results from choices about where the business operates, what it sells, to whom, and how. Companies can remove it, but this could mean simplifying valuable wrinkles in their business model.
- **Unnecessary complexity** arises from growing misalignment between the needs of the organization and the processes supporting it. It is easily managed once identified.

For example, to tackle the confusion that had arisen between company headquarters and the country office, the manufacturer redrew its functional boundaries so that marketing and other groups served either the country office or corporate headquarters—but not both. This simplified the jobs of the majority of employees and funneled the necessary interactions between the country office and headquarters to the country managers.

To improve sales and forecasting processes, the manufacturer zeroed in on the information its marketing employees needed most: insights on likely sales volumes given customer needs and the competitive situation. Some insights, it turned out, could be converted into forecasts relatively easily by using data from prior sales periods; others required very specific local input. To provide it, the manufacturer created small teams based in—and focused on—each geographic area. Team members' job descriptions were standardized, and each member was given clear accountabilities for working with headquarters on forecasting, pricing, and promotions. This allowed the manufacturer to remove all unnecessary inputs to the processes, focus local efforts where they were most valuable, and cut the number of rounds of consultations in half.

Meanwhile, the company simplified the sign-off process by building it into its regular business-planning activities, thereby providing more regularity and clarity around the timing of decisions. While these actions added complexity for some workers, the overall level of complexity for most employees dropped markedly, reducing wasted time and frustration while generating forecasts that were just as good as the old ones. Equally important, to prevent unnecessary complexity from returning, the new job descriptions were agreed to globally, and the right to change them was retained by the executive team.

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Finally, to tackle the HR problems, the manufacturer put in place a consistent talent review process across the business that focused much more on performance-management conversations and developmental discussions.

Of course, whenever executives consciously funnel complexity into new locations or "design in" new elements that create added complexity for added reward, they must ensure that the employees in the positions affected are prepared. In many cases, companies will see a need to improve key capabilities in HR and other functional areas.

This was true for the manufacturer, which began addressing its long-term skill gaps by focusing on the recruitment and training of HR employees. At the same time, however, the manufacturer's senior team was careful to provide immediate training to those HR employees who needed help mastering the company's revamped talent review process and rolled out training for all line managers across the business on how they should use this new process to coach and develop staff members—and not just to measure staff performance passively against targets.

Such experiences are common. Whenever companies tackle complexity, they will ultimately find some individuals who seem less troubled by it than others. This is not surprising. People are different: some freeze like deer in the headlights in the face of ambiguity, uncertainty, complex roles, and unclear accountabilities; others are able to get their work done regardless. Companies need to locate the pockets of individual strength and weakness in order to respond intelligently. Although some people can deal with complexity innately, we now know that others can be trained to develop what we call "ambidextrous" capabilities—the ability to tolerate ambiguity and actively manage complexity. Such skills will enable employees to create and use networks within organizations to build relationships and help overcome poor processes, bridge organizational silos, or manage whatever value-creating pockets of complexity their companies decide to maintain (see sidebar, "Building a better bank").

Organizations aren't uniformly complex, and most employees don't experience complexity the way executives do. To better manage complexity, senior leaders must recognize how employees at all levels see it, and then learn what's driving it. By doing so, companies can retain the kinds of complexity that add value, remove the kinds that don't, and channel the rest to employees, at any level, who can be trained to handle it effectively.

第二大題-問題：（共計：35 分）

1. 文中指出的"Organizational Complexity"，大致上包括哪些？什麼是"Individual Complexity"？（10 分）
2. 作者在文中提到了"map"，請問其可能的內涵與分析主軸為何？（10 分）
3. 對於"Organizational Complexity"的降低，作者提出了哪些作法上的建議？你(妳)自己又有哪些想法？（15 分）

第三大題-問題：（共計：30 分）

請依據上述兩篇文獻，試著提出一個研究計畫，包括：研究問題、研究架構、與研究假設。

(也請對於研究假設方面提出一些論述) (30 分)

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