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## Ready for a Female President in Taiwan?

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### ABSTRACT

Campaigning to become Taiwan's first female president, the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen lost the 2012 election by a small margin to the Kuomintang (KMT) Chinese Nationalist Party's Ma Ying-jeou, who garnered substantial women's support in the 2008 election. The feminist gap, rather than the gender gap, has a critical impact independent of party identification and candidate evaluation in explaining the close result in the 2012 election and the vote changes in the two presidential elections.

### KEYWORDS

Taiwan presidential election; gender gap; feminist gap; gender affinity effect; gender equality scale

## Introduction

I felt reservations about making my identity as “a woman” prominent in my campaign, but I realized that doing so could have the effect of drawing attention to gender issues and triggering forward-thinking ideas. However, there was not necessarily any gain to be had in terms of number of votes, because in our society today there are those who will tilt toward one candidate simply because she is a woman, and others who will vote against the same candidate for exactly the same reason, I think the two groups cancel each other out (Taiwan Panorama 2012).

Compared with men, fewer women have competed for positions of national leadership, but their numbers have increased significantly over the past half century. Around the world 71 women from 52 countries became presidents or prime ministers between 1960 and 2009, and more than three-quarters of all female leaders have come to office since 1990.<sup>1</sup> Some Asian countries, such as South Korea, Philippines, India, Indonesia, Pakistan, and Thailand, have had female leaders, but most of them are hereditary scions of leading political families. In traditional East Asian political cultures, women are still expected to submit to the political clout of their traditionally male-dominant family to seize paramount power. In Taiwan's 2012 presidential election, Tsai Ing-wen, the nation's first-ever female presidential candidate, came from a nonpolitical family, which is a rarity. After her party's landslide victory on January 2016, Tsais becomes Taiwan's first female president.<sup>2</sup> Tsai's candidacy in a very close presidential election in 2012 has carried enormous historical and symbolic significance.

After several rounds of constitutional reforms of the 1990s, Taiwan held the first direct presidential election in 1996, followed by the institutionalization of a semipresidential system, designating the president with considerable powers.<sup>3</sup> In Taiwan's 2008 presidential election, there appeared for the first time a significant gender gap in voting, which led to the Kuomintang (KMT) Chinese Nationalist Party's candidate Ma Ying-jeou's electoral victory (Yang and Lin 2013). In the 2012 presidential election, the first female presidential candidate, the Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Tsai Ing-wen, challenged the incumbent Ma. Although Ma defeated her, Tsai did make considerable progress compared to Frank Hsieh, the male DPP candidate who ran against Ma in the previous presidential election. The winning margin between the KMT and DPP dwindled from 17 percent (from 58.45 percent to 41.55 percent) in 2008 to about 6 percent (from 51.6 percent to 45.6 percent) of the vote in 2012. During her presidential bid Tsai adopted "Taiwan's First Female President" as her main slogan during the second phase of the campaign. Meanwhile, she also listed famous female leaders, such as former British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and German Chancellor Angela Merkel, as role models in her speeches in an attempt to gain support from women voters (*Taipei Times* 2011a). This leads us to wonder whether the presence of Tsai as a female candidate was able to sway women voters away from Ma, the candidate whom they preferred previously.

Studies on 2012 Taiwan's presidential election have mainly focused on the issues of cross-strait relations and ignored the gender factor in explaining the electoral result. Indeed, cross-strait relations is one of the deciding factors in accounting for Ma's victory, as many studies indicate that voters who supported the so-called "1992 Consensus" were less likely to support DPP candidates (Tang 2013; Wei, Hung, and Tung 2012). But were we to look at a longer time span, the KMT Ma winning in 2012 is not news, because it happened four years earlier. The real problem is the decreasing support for Ma, who lost more than 1.5 million votes compared to his total from the previous presidential election. Given the incumbent advantage and the support for Ma's cross-strait position, it is still unknown why he lost votes in 2012 when compared to his 2008 campaign, or why the DPP's Tsai was capable of winning more votes in 2012 compared to the 2008 DPP candidate. Ma's poor performance (as exhibited by his low approval ratings) over the past four years alone cannot explain the loss of votes in 2012; his support base must be thoroughly examined. In 2008 it was shown that to a large extent the winning margin between the KMT's Ma and the DPP's Hsieh could be explained by the gender gap, with the support of women providing Ma with a winning edge. Does the presence of the first-ever female candidate in 2012 reverse or change the pattern of the gender gap in 2008? That is, does a female candidate attract more votes from female voters? Why or why not?

To answer these questions, this article begins with a brief theoretical and empirical review of the impact of gender in elections. Given that this is the first time Taiwan has had a female presidential candidate and lack of literature related directly to the topic, we refer to the more general discussions concerning whether voters are biased for or against women candidates and the possible explanations. Voters casting their votes for women candidates according to their gender identities or feminist values are two principal explanations to be investigated in our case. In the former, women are more likely to vote for women because of their same-sex identity; in the latter, feminist women and men are more likely to support women because of shared feminist values, such as the pursuit of equal political, economic, and social rights for women. Next, by using data from Taiwan Social Change Survey 2012 family and gender,<sup>4</sup> we compare the patterns of how the vote changed with or without a female candidate in the two recent presidential elections. We examine separately the effects of gender and feminism in influencing the voting pattern across presidential elections. Finally, by modeling the possible factors in accounting for vote changes, we show that as a whole, women are not necessarily more likely than men to change their votes to support a female candidate, but a particular set of women do so. The gender gap per se cannot account for the vote change, but the feminist gap between sexes is the critical factor pushing for the vote changes. The US study in the 1990s raised the significance of feminist values in influencing the voting result (Sapiro 1991), yet no further research has been done to differentiate the gender and feminist gaps and their respective impacts either in the United States or in a comparative context. This study addresses the differences between the gender and feminist gaps as well as their combined effects in Taiwan's presidential election. As a whole, this study not only acknowledges the historical and symbolic significance of Taiwan's first female presidential candidate but also shows that feminist consciousness has an impact independent of party identification and candidate evaluation in motivating women voters to change their votes.

### **The gender of the candidate matters**

Even though women's movements have progressed relatively well in Taiwan, a disconnect still exists between party politics and voting. Women do not necessarily support the party (DPP) nominating women candidates. Among the few studies on the effects of gender in Taiwan's electoral politics, most focus on the gender differences in party identification and political attitudes. Women are found to be more inclined to identify with pan-Blue parties (the KMT and its allies) than men (Yang and Liu 2006). This phenomenon could be attributed to different value orientations between men and women, with values such as social order, stability, and peaceful relationship across the strait being particularly

prominent in policy preferences among women, which are in line with the KMT party positions (Yang and Liu 2009). In the 2008 presidential election, a male-versus-male contest, it was found that female voters' support for the KMT candidate Ma gave him a substantial margin of victory in the election (Yang and Lin 2010). Gender differences in party identification constitute the strongest factor in explaining gender difference in voting choices, with women less likely to identify with pan-Green parties, and pan-Green women more likely to vote across party lines and cast their vote for Ma. However, gender differences in party identification continue to be unstable in Taiwan (Yang and Liu 2006), which make them of limited utility in accounting for the vote changes between elections.

In the 2012 presidential election, for the first time, Taiwan saw a female presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, challenge an incumbent, Ma Ying-jeou, who previously had enjoyed the support of female voters. Comparing 2008 and 2012 presidential elections using the "Taiwan Election and Democracy Survey" panel data (2008–2012) shows that women voters are more likely than men to change their votes from supporting Ma to supporting Tsai (Yang and Lin 2013). Female voters with stable party identifications transfer their votes from the KMT to the DPP candidate because of the higher candidate evaluations for the DPP candidate Tsai. In comparison, men are more likely to stick to their party identifications in casting their ballots, whereas women are more likely to be influenced by other factors. In Yang and Lin's (2013) study, party identification cannot explain away the gender difference in voting changes; instead, candidate evaluation is considered the most important factor in explaining the changed votes of women voters. However, given the data constraints in the lack of gender perspective, more information is needed about what constitutes the contents of candidate evaluation. The possible connection between women voters and women candidates has not yet been explored in Taiwan. Because this is the first time that a female candidate has campaigned for the presidency in Taiwan, we first refer to existing studies related to women candidacy thoroughly in search of possible explanations.

Most research examining the relationship between women candidates and voters is based on experiments and hypothetical election races and from surveys of voters from actual elections in the United States. The findings from different sources are inconclusive. Many studies find that women candidates are disadvantaged in the electoral process. Women are judged more strictly and need to have better qualifications to compete with men, making it more difficult for women to succeed (Fox 1997, 190). Women consistently received less campaign coverage than their male colleagues, and when women did receive press attention, the coverage tended to question their viability as candidates. As experimental researchers have shown, gender differences in news coverage lead citizens to

develop less favorable impressions of women candidates than their male counterparts (Kahn 1993; 1996). Such media bias persists in presidential campaigns. During the 2008 US presidential election, Hillary Clinton, who ran for the Democratic nomination, suffered from sexism that pervaded the electoral process. There are many examples of the media's misogyny being aimed at her (Carroll 2009; Lawless 2009). Traditionally, women candidates, including Hillary Clinton, who ran for the Democratic presidential nomination in 2008, and Sarah Palin, the Republican vice presidential candidate in 2008, have had to grapple with the double bind that women who are considered feminine will be judged incompetent and women who are competent will be considered unfeminine (Carlin and Winfrey 2009). Hillary Clinton falls into such a catch-22 dilemma that she cannot garner support without holding aggressive qualities that are perceived as male leadership's traits. Meanwhile, she cannot appear overly aggressive while lacking sufficiently communal-feminine traits. Her campaign strategy has been influenced by gender stereotypes, and her media coverage has also been tainted by sexism (Carroll 2009).

In Taiwan's traditional gender cultural society, Tsai, who is single, also experienced disadvantages running as a female candidate, ranging from outright discrimination to subtle discrediting. For instance, former DPP chairman Shih Ming-teh questioned Tsai's sexual orientation in public, claiming that voters needed a clear answer before voting for her (*Taipei Times* 2011c). Another instance occurred during a campaign rally for Ma when the entertainer Pai Ping-ping said that electing a female president would cause a disaster like the floods that hit Thailand (*Taipei Times* 2011b). Many of these disadvantages were the result of gender stereotyping and traditional sex-role socialization. Gender stereotypes about candidates persist in the electoral process and condition voters' perceptions of female and male candidates. Voters perceive men to be tougher, more aggressive, and better at dealing with economy and terrorism, whereas women are more prone to be compassionate, cooperative, and better at handling education or health care issues (Dolan 2010; 2014; Dolan and Lynch 2014). The features of viable candidates are often perceived to be associated with masculine traits. Voters tend to see women as weaker candidates and believe they are less competent on issues, such as military crises and those related to the economy (Huddy and Terkildsen 1993a; 1993b). Indeed, voters might hold stereotypical attitudes about the abilities of women candidates, but the evidence about the impact of these stereotypes is indirect and limited because the candidate's gender is just one kind of heuristic voters use in elections. Other factors, such as candidates' party labels, campaign issues, and low information of the elections, play more influential roles in deciding whether gender stereotype voting appears or not (Goodyear-Grant and Croskill 2011; Sanbonmatsu and Dolan 2009).

However, women may have an advantage in running for office because some voters prefer female candidates and politicians. Theories that explain

votes for women candidates can be further distinguished between the “gender gap” and “feminist gap” approaches. The gender gap approach contends that female voters are more likely to support female candidates than are men (Burrell 1994; Carroll 1988; Miller 1988; Shapiro and Mahajan 1986). It is assumed that women have a stronger preference for same-sex representation than men because of descriptive and substantive representation—women supporting a female candidate may reflect a desire for representatives who “stand for” or “act for” women or both (Dolan 2004; Rosenthal 1995). The idea of descriptive representation assumes that a representative stands for others based on a resemblance between them. Women who vote for female candidates may do so on the basis of a shared sense of identity. Such a psychological connection between women candidates and voters is called the “affinity effect.” Those women voters who cast their votes based on enduring factors, such as social group membership, are also coined as “dependent voters” (Dolan 2004; Pomper 1975). Gender affinity crossing party lines is found in US Senate and gubernatorial elections, in which female voters support other women, even if they are from another party (Fox 1997, 178). For example, after analyzing 1990–2002 US House elections, Brians (2005) shows that female candidates gain marginal support from their own gender, and there is evidence that Republican women voters are more inclined to cross party lines to support Democratic women candidates. Even though the women voters do not necessarily support women candidates on the basis of their shared sex, National Election Study (NES) data from 1990 to 2000 show that there are some additional mechanisms, such as issue salience, gender consciousness, and affective evaluation, that make women voters gravitate toward women candidates (Dolan 2008).

In addition to the gender affinity effect, women are more apt to see women candidates as sharing their concerns and as their substantive representatives who act on behalf of the interests of women as a group. Much of the gender gap in voting may be attributed to differential value orientations between men and women and the salience given to these views. Women have been shown to be less supportive than men of “force and violence” issues, such as capital punishment or nuclear war, and more supportive of “compassion” issues, such as education, health care, assisting the poor, and welfare distribution (Carpini and Fuchs 1993; Dolan 1998; Erie and Rein 1988; Kaufmann and Petrocik 1999). Because women candidates tend to associate themselves with these kinder and gentler issues, they might gain support from female voters. During the 2012 campaign, the DPP characterized Tsai Ing-wen as Taiwan’s Robin Hood, advocating “fairness and justice,” as Taiwan’s long-term goal. Taking this position, the DPP appeals to women voters who are assumed to be more oriented toward interpersonal relationships and stress caring and responsibility toward others. Women’s greater support for “compassion issues,” such as health care, education, and welfare

redistribution, is found to be in concert with Tsai's emphasis on internal distributive justice.

Alternatively, some research contends that feminist values, not gender, make the difference. That is, men and women do not necessarily have different voting preferences, and not all women are the same. Acknowledging that women voters did not automatically support women candidates, many studies have shown the importance of feminist consciousness in connecting women voters and women candidates (Abzug and Kelber 1984; Conover 1988; Cook and Wilcox 1991; Klein 1984; Smeal 1984). Empirical studies also find that those with more feminist attitudes and those who identify with women as a group are most likely to support women candidates (Lewis 1999; Plutzer and Zipp 1996; Rosenthal 1995). Either the voters or the candidates who are identified as feminist would affect voting behavior.

Conover (1988) argues that becoming a feminist may be a catalyst that helps women recognize their own underlying value. Because of the politicizing effect of feminist consciousness, which awakens women to gender-specific values, feminist women are significantly more liberal than all men. This is evident in the empirical findings that feminist values are particularly prominent in policy preferences among women, and the substantial differences between feminist women and all men are greater than those between men and women (Conover 1988). Feminism is a strong predictor of basic political values and policy preferences among women. Cook and Wilcox (1991) revised Conover's thesis and argued instead that feminist consciousness in women and feminist sympathy in men are both strong predictors of values and policy preferences (Cook and Wilcox 1991, 1,120). Feminist consciousness may lead to more egalitarian values and policy preferences, but feminists are also recruited among more liberal women and men. Feminism is not a unique set of values possessed by women; rather, both men and women can accept it. As feminist values of gender equality have gained widespread acceptance, they are expected to have a positive association with preference for women representation (Sapiro 1991).

Furthermore, gender and feminism have different impacts for voters in races involving a different set of candidates (Cook 1998). A feminist woman may vote for a feminist man if a conservative woman opposes him, and a socially conservative woman may support a conservative man over a feminist woman. Taking US congressional elections as an example, in races featuring Democratic women, feminism rather than voter sex influences the vote. Feminist men and women are more likely to vote for the Democratic women, controlling for voters' ideologies and partisanship. However, in races featuring Republican women, voters' sex rather than whether they are feminist influences the vote. Female voters are more likely than male voters to support the Republican candidate, controlling for their partisanship and ideologies (Cook 1998, 70). It is also noted that the gender gap is larger in



elections in which the context of the election activates basic gender beliefs and identities.

In short, the difference between the gender gap and feminist gap lies in the fact that the former emphasizes voters' sociobiological differences, whereas the latter stresses a difference in consciousness. Whether the gender gap or feminist gap could explain a change in votes is often decided by the specific electoral context. Campaigning to become Taiwan's first female president, Tsai's presence is expected to change the gender dynamic of voting. Although an antiwomen bias still persists, women candidates like Tsai might gain an advantage with some female voters. Presenting herself as a departure from traditional DPP candidates and advocating compassionate and distributive justice, Tsai successfully changed the DPP's radical and combative party image<sup>5</sup> and was welcomed for women voters as some polls show.<sup>6</sup> Yet the extent to which the vote change is caused by the gender factor remains to be examined in detail.

On the whole, this study attempts to examine two theoretical hypotheses. The gender-gap hypothesis assumes that women change their votes from the male candidate to the female candidate because of the same-gender consideration. Alternatively, the feminist-gap hypothesis postulates that women transfer their votes to the female candidate because of their gender consciousness. In the sections that follow, we first elaborate the hypotheses and data in detail. After that, some descriptive statistics are reported for preliminary examinations. Then, we specify a multivariate model of voting transition patterns that enables us to test these two competing hypotheses. The conclusion summarizes major findings and discusses implications for gender politics in Taiwan.

## **Hypotheses, data, and methods**

### ***Hypotheses***

Explaining vote stability and change traditionally regards party identification and candidate evaluations as the main factors. Because party identification and candidate evaluations are of great importance to all voters, we expect their effects on voting transition patterns to be significant regardless of respondents' genders. Furthermore, we argue that the voting transition patterns during different-sex competition are not only influenced by party loyalty and candidate preference of the voter but also by some considerations pertaining to a gender effect. According to the gender affinity explanation, women are more likely to vote for women because of their shared-sex identities. Applying this theory to the case of Taiwan, we hypothesize that all else equal, women voters are more likely to transfer their votes from Ma to Tsai.

Alternatively, feminist values or the attitudes toward gender equality might be another reason to explain the voting transition that took place in Taiwan's 2008 and 2012 presidential elections. It is due to the fact that while women's political power and gender equality in Taiwan have continuously improved in recent decades, some doubts concerning the ability of a female political leader during the campaign show that it is difficult to shake the long-held stereotypes of male superiority and dominance in politics found in traditional East Asian cultures. Therefore, this study argues that voters' choices between male and female presidential candidates in 2012 were implicitly influenced by their attitudes toward gender equality. In other words, our second hypothesis is that those who have higher values of gender equality are more likely to change their votes for the DPP candidate. Furthermore, because women have been traditionally marginalized in the public domain and have suffered from gender inequality, we could expect that the effects of attitudes toward gender equality on voting transition are more salient on women voters than on men voters.

### ***Data and methods***

To explore the effects of gender and feminism on voting patterns across presidential elections, this study uses survey data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey 2012 family and gender module (TSCS). The first nationally representative TSCS survey was completed in 1985. Since 1990 the TSCS has been conducted continuously each year. The 2012 TSCS family and gender module, including the ISSP 2012 core questions and other topics that reveal the current status of gender issues in Taiwan, was conducted by the Center for Survey Research, Academia Sinica. A method of stratified three-stage probability proportional to size (PPS) sampling was adopted in this study, and a total of 2,072 completed questionnaires were obtained for the Gender module. After weighting, the demographic characteristics of the sample are consistent with the population. It provides an empirical basis for understanding social trends and gender-related issues in Taiwan.

The most interesting questions about Taiwan's 2012 presidential election are not concerned with who won, but rather with whether people changed their votes when a female candidate entered the race and why they voted in that way. Accordingly, we begin our analysis by examining voting continuity and change in Taiwan's presidential elections. The dependent variable of this study is vote change and stability between the two elections. To simplify the analysis, we develop a voting transition scheme (Table 1). Each row in the table indicates individuals' vote choices in 2008, and each column represents individuals' vote choices in 2012. We include "abstain" as an option because voters may cast invalid ballots or not vote to express their discontent with

**Table 1.** Transition scheme.

Vote Choice in 2008	Vote Choice in 2012		
	Ma (KMT)	Abstain	Tsai (DPP)
Ma (KMT)	consistent	<i>against Ma or change to Tsai</i>	
Abstain	<i>against Tsai or change to Ma</i>	consistent	
Hsieh (DPP)			Consistent

Source: the authors.

certain parties or candidates, which could be understood as a form of protest voting. Thus, we have a three by three table.

The cells on the diagonal are voters who vote consistently for the same party as well as those who abstain from voting in the two elections. The cells to the right of the diagonal are referred to as “vote against Ma or change to Tsai.” On the contrary, the cells to the left of the diagonal are referred to as “vote against Tsai or change to Ma.” Because the dependent variable is nominal in measurement level, a multinomial logit model is used, and the baseline category is consistent voting.

Next, we focus on the effects of gender and feminism on voting transition patterns. Several theory-driven explanatory variables are included in the analysis. First, by coding female respondents as 1 and male as 0, we create a dummy variable of *Female* to test the gender affinity effect on voting transition. Furthermore, to investigate the gender awareness of the respondents, a variable of Gender Equality Scale (*GES*) is developed by four items that tap respondents’ attitudes toward gender equality. A higher score represents greater support for gender equality. In addition to gender effect on voting transition, the statistical model also contains other variables, such as party identification and candidate evaluation. *Without party ID* is a dummy variable that, to capture the effect of party identification on voting transition, recodes non-party identifiers as 1, otherwise as 0. Both *Rating of Ma* and *Rating of Tsai* indicate the extent of the respondents’ favor of the two candidates, which varies from 0 (not at all) to 10 (very much).

## Data analysis

### ***Dependent variable: Change and stability in taiwan’s presidential elections***

By combining the vote choices in 2008 and 2012 recalled by the respondents,<sup>7</sup> Table 2 reports the changes in votes between two elections. The results show that most voters cast their votes consistently for the same party’s candidates in the two elections. For those who vote for Ma (KMT) in 2008, 83.6 percent of them vote for Ma again in 2012. With respect to DPP supporters, an extremely high pattern of voting stability can likewise be observed. More than 90 percent of DPP voters in 2008 cast their vote consistently to the DPP’s candidate Tsai. On the other hand, when we look at the marginal difference of vote-getting

**Table 2.** Changes in vote between two presidential elections (2008–2012).

Vote Choice in 2008	Vote Choice in 2012			Total
	Ma (KMT)	Abstain	Tsai (DPP)	
Ma (KMT)	711 (83.6%) [93.8%]	62 (7.3%) [26.8%]	77 (9.1%) [15.2%]	850 (100.0%) [56.8%]
Abstain	32 (12.5%) [4.2%]	154 (60.4) [66.7]	69 (27.1) [13.6]	255 (100.0) [17.0]
Hsieh (DPP)	15 (3.8%) [2.0%]	15 (3.8%) [6.5%]	362 (92.3%) [71.3%]	392 (100.0%) [26.2%]
Total	758 (50.6) [100.0%]	231 (15.4) [100.0%]	508 (33.9) [100.0%]	1497 (100.0) [100.0%]

Notes. (1)  $\chi^2 = 1383.05$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .001$ .

(2) Respondents who did not vote in the presidential election or cast invalid ballots were viewed as abstaining from voting.

(3) Numbers in () are row percentage; numbers in [] are column percentage.

Source. Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

percentages between the KMT and DPP, we can find the winning margin of the KMT is decreasing. For example, in 2008 the marginal difference of vote getting between the two parties is 30.6 percent (from 56.8 percent to 26.2 percent); however, in 2012 it decreases to 16.7 percent (from 50.6 percent to 33.9 percent). The narrowing gap between the two parties partly results from the erosion of support for the KMT, including those who voted for Ma in 2008 but changed their votes for Tsai in 2012 and those who voted for Ma in 2008 but abstained from voting in 2012, which account for 16.4 percent (from 7.3 percent to 9.1 percent) of the total number of KMT voters. Furthermore, the closing margins between the two parties might be due to Tsai's ability to get more votes from swing voters. About 27 percent of voters who abstained in 2008 supported Tsai in 2012.

The results revealed above provide initial evidence that although the incumbent Ma Ying-jeou defeated Tsai in the presidential election in 2012, she successfully attracted some independent voters and narrowed the voting gap between the KMT and DPP. Next, we focus on the reasons why voters change their votes. Are female voters more likely than male voters to transfer their votes to female candidates?

### **Explanatory factor: The effect of gender affinity**

Does the candidate's gender matter in Taiwan's presidential election? If it really matters, do women voters weigh this factor as more important in their minds than men? In the TSCS data, there is a follow-up question asking the reasons for voting for Tsai Ing-wen (Table 3). In total, about 20 percent of the respondents reply that they voted for Tsai because they support a woman

**Table 3.** Reasons for voting for Tsai by respondents' gender.

Reasons for Voting for Tsai	Gender		
	Men	Women	Total
I support the presidential candidate of the DPP	59 (18.3%)	39 (14.8%)	98 (16.7%)
Her political views appealed to me	90 (28.0%)	64 (24.2%)	154 (26.3%)
I support women to be president	<b>52 (16.1%)</b>	<b>62 (23.5%)</b>	114 (19.5%)
She has very good personal traits	79 (24.5%)	77 (29.2%)	156 (26.6%)
Other reasons	42 (13.0%)	22 (8.3%)	64 (10.9%)
Total	322 (100%)	264 (100%)	586 (100%)

Notes. (1)  $X^2 = 9.98$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .05$ ; bold fonts are used if the adjusted residual  $> \pm 1.96$  in the cell.  
 (2) Numbers in () are column percentage.

Source. Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

becoming president. It is surprising that supporting women to be president is more important than supporting a party endorsement candidate, which accounted for 16.7 percent of the reasons for people voted for Tsai. When we further compare the gender difference for each reason, the result shows that men and women supported Tsai for different considerations ( $X^2 = 9.98$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .05$ ). Women voters for Tsai are more likely to support women candidates than men; and this result provides evidence that gender might be a factor influencing voters' decision in the 2012 election.

Among people voting for the female candidate Tsai, gender matters, but does that mean that as a whole, women are more likely than men to change their votes from Ma to Tsai? On the basis of the above survey question, which was only posed to Tsai's supporters in a single election, this question remains unanswered. Granted that the effect of a candidate's sex on voting is difficult to identify with the data from only one election and given Ma's victories in two consecutive elections facing DPP rivals of different sexes, the best way to detect the gender affinity effect is to compare the vote changes caused by the DPP nominating candidates of different sexes in the two elections. The voting transition patterns shown in Table 1 are further crossed by respondents' gender to explore whether women are more likely than men to change their votes from Ma to Tsai. Table 4 shows that although the chi-square test is statistically significant ( $X^2 = 11.54$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < .05$ ), we cannot find clear evidence supporting the hypothesis of women voting for women. In fact, women voters are more likely than men to vote consistently for Ma even though the gender gap in 2012 was diminished compared with the previous presidential election in 2008. Therefore, it seems too naïve to expect that women support a female candidate just because of a gender affinity.

### **Alternative explanation: The effect of attitudes toward gender equality**

We now turn to the idea of gender consciousness for explaining the change in votes. Before analyzing the relationship between gender equality attitudes and patterns of vote change, we carefully examine the measurement of attitudes toward gender equality. Conceptually, attitudes toward gender

**Table 4.** Voting transition patterns by respondents' gender.

Gender	Voting Transition Patterns						Total
	Consistent KMT Voting	Consistent Abstain	Consistent DPP Voting	Against Ma/Change to Tsai	Against Tsai/Change to Ma	Total	
Male	<b>328 (43.3%)</b>	85 (11.2%)	<b>202 (26.7%)</b>	111 (14.7%)	31 (4.1%)	757 (100.0%)	
Female	<b>383 (51.8%)</b>	69 (9.3%)	<b>160 (21.6%)</b>	97 (13.1%)	31 (4.2%)	740 (100.0%)	
Total	711 (47.5%)	154 (10.3%)	362 (24.2%)	208 (13.9%)	62 (4.1%)	1,497 (100.0%)	

Notes: (1)  $X^2 = 11.54$ ,  $df = 4$ ,  $p < 0.05$ ; bold fonts are used if the adjusted residual  $> \pm 1.96$  in the cell.  
 (2) Numbers in () are row percentage.

Source: Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

equality are a multifaceted phenomenon composed of different gender-related constructs, assessing attitudes toward sex roles in the domestic area as well as gender egalitarianism in different domains, such as the workforce and the public sphere (Beere 1990; Inglehart and Norris 2003; McHugh and Frieze 1997; Spence 1993). Over the past 30 years, researchers have developed reliable and valid multidimensional scales of attitudes toward the sex roles and gender equality.<sup>8</sup> However, these scales cannot be totally replicated in this study not only because of a more limited range of survey items but also because of the ignorance of country-specific contexts. Therefore, we develop a Gender Equality Scale (GES) by combing a battery of four items: (1) All in all, family life suffers when the woman has a full-time job; (2) A man's job is to earn money; a woman's job is to look after the home and family; (3) Politics is for men. It is better for a woman not to get involved in it; (4) Generally speaking, there's more gender equality in Taiwan now.

All these items use statements with a five-point Likert scale measuring the level of agreement or disagreement (0–4). The scores were rescaled so that higher values represent lesser agreement with the statements and greater support for gender equality. The GES was constructed by adding the scores of these four questions together. The range of the GES is 0–16 and the average score is 9.3. Respondents with higher scores on the GES disagree more with these statements and have more awareness of gender equality. According to the criteria for scale assessment, one might expect that a reliable scale should show a certain extent of internal consistency (McHugh and Frieze 1997, 4). In addition, a valid scale could differentiate between individuals who differ in their attitudes toward gender equality. On the basis of these criteria, we examine our GES measurement with a reliability test, factor analysis, and its relationship with other variables, such as respondents' genders, ages, educations, and residential areas. The factor analysis results show that all four items tap into a single dimension and the value of Cronbach's alpha is 0.53, which means the four items are somewhat reliable. Moreover, we compare the average GES score among different types of social demographic variables. The results show that the average GES score is statistically significantly higher when the respondents are younger, highly educated women who live in urban areas. The results are not only consistent with our expectations but also provide strong evidence that the GES is a valid measurement of gender equality attitudes.

We next compare the average GES scores between men and women to different types of voting transitions. Logically, we could expect that the average GES score should be higher in the "voting against Ma/change to Tsai" type, and gender difference in GES should be greater in this type of voting transition. Table 5 shows that among all kinds of voting transitions, the average GES score in the "voting against Ma/change to Tsai" type is 9.54, while the average GES score in "voting against Tsai/change to Ma" is 8.67, which is the lowest. This result can be interpreted as showing that voters with traditional attitudes toward gender equality are not ready to accept a female

**Table 5.** Men and women voters' GES scores in different types of vote.

	Consistent KMT Voting	Consistent Abstain	Consistent DPP Voting	Against Ma/ Change to Tsai	Against Tsai/ Change to Ma
Full sample	9.216 (2.468)	9.561 (2.673)	9.105 (2.520)	9.543 (2.552)	8.667 (3.039)
Male	8.973 (2.293)	9.431 (2.258)	8.813 (2.432)	9.028 (2.339)	8.489 (3.089)
Female	9.424 (2.593)	9.722 (3.119)	9.470 (2.587)	10.135 (2.667)	9.235 (2.994)
Male-female	-0.451*	-0.291	-0.657*	-1.107**	-0.745

Notes. (1) Sample standard deviations are displayed in ().

(2) \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p < .001$  (independent sample t-test).

Source. Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

president, so they would rather vote against the female candidate or transfer their vote to the male candidate. Then we divide the sample into male and female subsamples and compare their difference in average GES in each type of voting transition. We find that women's average GES scores are higher than men's, regardless of their type. However, the differences in GES scores between men and women are only statistically significant among certain voting types. The most interesting finding is that among those who vote against Ma/change to Tsai, the average GES score for women is 10.14 while for men it is 9.03. A statistically significant 1.11-point difference in GES scores is not only the largest but also might mean that the effect of gender equality attitudes on the vote choice may be different between men and women voters.

### **Other factors in explaining voting transition**

Party identifications, candidate evaluations, and issue positions are traditionally regarded as the main reasons for explaining vote stability and change. Thus, we briefly examine these effects on voting transition in this section; and then we view them as major control variables in the subsequent statistical modeling. In Table 6(a) the highly significant chi-square test reveals that party identification is strongly associated with the voting transition types of respondents. Among those who identify with pan-Blue parties, about 89.4 percent are consistent KMT voters, and the same pattern can be observed among pan-Green supporters who consistently vote for DPP candidates. However, the proportion of consistent voting among independents is significantly lower than voters who identify with a party. In fact, 19 percent of independents voted against Ma or changed to Tsai, and about 5 percent voted against the DPP candidate or transferred to Ma. According to the results shown above, we can confirm that party identification has a great impact on the electoral change and stability between two elections.



Table 6. Voting transition patterns by party identification.

	Voting Transition Patterns					Total
	Consistent KMT Voting	Consistent Abstain	Consistent DPP Voting	Against Ma/ Change to Tsai	Against Tsai/Change to Ma	
<b>(a) Party ID:</b>						
Pan blue	370 (89.4%)	9 (2.2%)	4 (1.0%)	21 (5.1%)	10 (2.4%)	414 (100.0%)
Independents	317 (41.8%)	126 (16.6%)	133 (17.5%)	144 (19.0%)	39 (5.1%)	759 (100.0%)
Pan green	6 (2.2%)	10 (3.7%)	215 (79.0%)	32 (11.8%)	9 (3.3%)	272 (100.0%)
Total	693 (48.0%)	145 (10.0%)	352 (24.4%)	197 (13.6%)	58 (4.0%)	1,445 (100.0%)
$\chi^2$ test	$\chi^2=827.6$	df=8	p<0.001			
<b>(b-1)Candidate/favoring Ma:</b>						
Low	21 (5.6%)	40 (10.8%)	213 (57.3%)	85 (22.8%)	13 (3.5%)	372 (100.0%)
Middle	302 (48.5%)	78 (12.5%)	122 (19.6%)	93 (14.9%)	28 (4.5%)	623 (100.0%)
High	356 (83.4%)	19 (4.4%)	12 (2.8%)	23 (5.4%)	17 (4.0%)	427 (100.0%)
Total	679 (47.7%)	137 (9.6%)	347 (24.4%)	201 (14.1%)	58 (4.1%)	1,422 (100.0%)
$\chi^2$ test	$\chi^2=565.5$	df=8	p<0.001			
<b>(b-2)Candidate/favoring Tsai:</b>						
Low	203 (75.2%)	28 (10.4%)	7 (2.6%)	21 (7.8%)	11 (4.1%)	270 (100.0%)
Middle	396 (56.7%)	81 (11.6%)	93 (13.3%)	90 (12.9%)	38 (5.4%)	698 (100.0%)
High	66 (15.2%)	25 (5.8%)	250 (57.6%)	84 (19.4%)	9 (2.1%)	434 (100.0%)
Total	665 (47.4%)	134 (9.6%)	350 (25.0%)	195 (13.9%)	58 (4.1%)	1,402 (100.0%)
$\chi^2$ test	$\chi^2=463.0$	df=8	p<.001			
<b>(c)Issue position</b>						
Independence	102 (25.3%)	38 (9.4%)	176 (43.7%)	66 (16.4%)	21 (5.2%)	403 (100.0%)
Status quo	190 (53.9%)	72 (10.0%)	137 (19.0%)	99 (13.8%)	24 (3.3%)	720 (100.0%)
Unification	190 (63.8%)	28 (9.4%)	36 (12.1%)	33 (11.1%)	11 (3.7%)	298 (100.0%)
Total	680 (47.9%)	138 (9.7%)	349 (24.6%)	198 (13.9%)	56 (3.9%)	1,421 (100.0%)
$\chi^2$ test	$\chi^2=157.8$	df=8	p<0.001			

Note. Bold fonts are used if the adjusted residual > ±1.96 in the cell.

Source. Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

Next, by rescaling candidate evaluation into low, middle, and high levels, both [Tables 6b-1](#) and [6b-2](#) indicate that candidate evaluations are correlated with voting and the voting transition types of respondents. More specifically, [Table 6b-1](#) shows that for those individuals who give the KMT candidate a low evaluation, the percentage of voting “against Ma/change to Tsai” is relatively higher (22.8 percent). In contrast, among those who favor the KMT candidate, about 83.4 percent are consistent KMT voters, and they are relatively lower than others in proportion of voting against Ma/change to Tsai (5.4 percent). This situation seems to be reversed in [Table 6b-2](#) where the candidate being evaluated changes to Tsai. The result shows that among those voters who do not like Tsai, the proportion of consistent KMT voting is 75.2 percent, and the proportion of voting against Ma/change to Tsai is relatively lower (7.8 percent). However, individuals who rate Tsai highly are relatively more likely to be consistent DPP voters (57.6 percent) and have a higher proportion of transferring their vote from Ma to Tsai (19.4 percent).

The future of cross-strait relations has always been the most significant issue in Taiwan’s elections. In the 2012 presidential election, whether, how, and to what extent to open cross-strait economic trade was fiercely debated by the two camps during the campaign. Some commentators even argue that this issue decides who wins the election. Therefore, it is reasonable to examine the impact of individuals’ policy stances on the issue of Taiwan independence versus unification. [Table 6c](#) shows that among those who support the idea that both sides should unify, about 64 percent are consistent KMT voters. However, among those who think Taiwan should claim independence, more than 40 percent are consistent DPP voters. As a result, although the position on independence versus unification is closely related to individuals’ voting patterns ( $X^2 = 157.8$ ,  $df = 8$ ,  $p < .001$ ), it only accounts for stable voting rather than vote change. Given that we are interested in the vote change, this factor is excluded in our analysis.

### Statistical modeling

To ensure that the effect of attitudes toward gender equality on the patterns of voting transition is not spurious, a multinomial logit model is used. The dependent variable is voting transition types, including “consistent voting,” “transferring vote to Tsai,” and “transferring vote to Ma.” Several independent variables are included in the analysis, such as respondents’ sexes, ages, marital statuses, educational levels, labor force participation, self-identified social class, party identifications, candidate evaluations, and GES scores. By using the consistent voting as the baseline for comparison, [Table 7](#) presents the estimated coefficients and corresponding odds ratios after fitting the multinomial logit model.<sup>9</sup>

**Table 7.** Multinomial logit analysis of voting transition patterns.

	Model 1: Male Sample			Model 2: Female Sample			Model 3: Full Sample		
	Against Ma or Change to Tsai	Against Tsai or Change to Ma	OR	Against Ma or Change to Tsai	Against Tsai or Change to Ma	OR	Against Ma or Change to Tsai	Against Tsai or Change to Ma	OR
Intercept	b(SE)	b(SE)	OR	b(SE)	b(SE)	OR	b(SE)	b(SE)	OR
Female	-.579 (.943)	-2.666 (1.77)		-3.986 (1.19)	.466 (1.70)		-1.417 (.766)	-1.202 (1.288)	
Age	-.023 (.012) +	-.018 (.020)	.982	.002 (.014)	-0.37 (.023)	.964	-1.732(.742) *	-.102 (1.074)	.903
Married (single)	.046 (.302)	.355 (.588)	1.43	.102 (.382)	-0.612 (.559)	.542	-.013 (.009)	-.025 (.015)+	.975
Low edu (high)	-.439 (.383)	.775 (.559)	2.17	.090 (.438)	.754 (.691)	2.126	.145 (.230)	.007 (.388)	1.007
Median edu (high)	-.559 (.284) +	-1.436 (.751) +	.238	.336 (.332)	1.399 (.539)	1.715	-.187 (.283)	.627 (.429)	1.871
LFP (no)	-.050 (.311)	.951 .020 (.513)	1.02	-.032 (.294)	-0.544 (.440)	.580	-.111 (.210)	-.324 (.395)	.723
Social class (1~10)	.093 (.070)	1.10 .018 (.118)	1.02	-.069 (.089)	.933 -.235 (.134) +	.791	-.080 (.209)	-.287 (.325)	.750
Without party id	1.130 (.259) ***	.574 (.437)	1.78	1.214 (.298) ***	1.287 (.489) **	3.621	.033 (.054)	-.092 (.090)	.912
Rating of Ma (0~10)	-.246 (.050) ***	.067 (.089)	1.07	-.176 (.052) **	.838 .016 (.082)	1.017	1.182 (.193) ***	.841(.312) **	2.318
Rating of Tsai (0~10)	.160 (.053) **	-.040 (.090)	.961	.123 (.060) *	1.129 -.029 (.091)	.972	-.214 (.036) ***	.037 (.059)	1.038
GES (0~16)	-.092 (.055)	-.043 (.099)	.958	.153(.061) *	1.165 -.103 (.088)	.902	.138 (.039) ***	-.042 (.062)	.959
Female*GES							-.044 (.052)	-.074 (.093)	.928
Model information:							.160(.073) *	.027(-.114)	1.027
	Sample size = 682	Sample size = 611		Sample size = 611	Sample size = 1,293				
	Log Likelihood = -345.048	Log Likelihood = -308.374		Log Likelihood = -308.374	Log Likelihood = -668.040				
	LR $\chi^2(20) = 99.82, p < .001$	LR $\chi^2(20) = 70.85, p < .001$		LR $\chi^2(20) = 70.85, p < .001$	LR $\chi^2(24) = 141.67, p < .001$				
	Pseudo $R^2 = 0.126$	Pseudo $R^2 = 0.103$		Pseudo $R^2 = 0.103$	Pseudo $R^2 = 0.096$				

Note: (1) OR is Odds Ratio (with base category: consistent voting).

(2) +  $p < .1$ ; \*  $p < .05$ ; \*\*  $p < .01$ ; \*\*\*  $p < .001$ .

Source: Weighted data from Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

We present three separate models to test our hypotheses. In the beginning, to compare the similarities and differences between men and women on vote change, we divide our sample into male and female subsample models (Model 1 and Model 2). Then, we include respondents' genders and an interaction term between gender and GES in a full sample model (Model 3) for statistical testing and examining the marginal effects. The sample sizes are 682, 611, and 1,293, respectively. All models perform well with the significant likelihood ratio chi-square test, and the signs of the estimated coefficients are in the expected direction. Several interpretations can be made from these models.

First, looking at the similarities of male and female sample models, we can observe that both respondents' party identifications and candidate evaluations have an impact on the types of voting transition in men's and women's samples. Taking Model 1 as an example, we can say that for male voters, the odds of transferring a vote to Tsai (or a vote against Ma) relative to consistent voting are estimated to be about three times higher for those who do not have a party identification than for those who identify with a party, holding other variables as constant. A similar effect of party identification can be found in women voters (see Model 2). When the focus shifts to the candidate evaluations, each one point increase in preferring Ma reduces the odds of transferring a vote to Tsai (or a vote against Ma) relative to consistent voting by an estimated 21.8 percent  $((0.782-1) \times 100 \text{ percent})$  for men and 16.2 percent  $((0.838-1) \times 100 \text{ percent})$  for women. Conversely, each one-point increase in preferring Tsai increases the odds of transferring a vote to Tsai (or a vote against Ma) relative to consistent voting by an estimated 17 percent  $((1.17-1) \times 100 \text{ percent})$  for men and 13 percent  $((1.13-1) \times 100 \text{ percent})$  for women. The results indicate that the effect of party identification and candidate evaluation on voting transition patterns is significant, regardless of respondents' gender, and for those who are not party identifiers and who prefer Tsai over Ma are more likely to transfer their vote to Tsai.

Second, by looking at the differences between Model 1 and Model 2, we can notice that the effect of GES on voting transition is different for men and women. The GES is statistically significant in the female sample but not in the male sample. This means for women voters, each one-point increase in GES score increases the odds of transferring a vote to Tsai (or a vote against Ma) relative to consistent voting by an estimated 16 percent  $((1.16-1) \times 100 \text{ percent})$ , holding other variables as constant. However, the effect of GES on voting transition does not appear for male voters. This result provides preliminary evidence that women with higher gender equality consciousness are more inclined to change their vote for Tsai.

Although some evidence that women's votes rather than men's votes might be influenced by GES can be found by directly comparing Model 1 with Model 2, the statistical significance of the difference between men and

**Table 8.** Marginal effect of GES on men and women.

	Male		Female	
	Against Ma or Change to Tsai	Against Tsai or Change to Ma	Against Ma or Change to Tsai	Against Tsai or Change to Ma
	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)	b(SE)
GES (0~16)	-0.44(0.052)	-0.074(0.093)	<b>0.116(0.057)*</b>	-0.047 (0.078)

Note. (1) \* $p < .05$ ; \*\* $p < .01$ ; \*\*\* $p \leq .001$ .

Source. Weighted data from the Taiwan Social Change Survey, Family and Gender (2012).

women cannot be inferred by comparing separated subsamples. Accordingly, we include a dummy variable of female and an interaction term of female and the GES in Model 3 to test our hypotheses. In Model 3, in addition to party identification and candidate evaluation, the coefficients of female and the interaction term are also statistically significant in comparing transferring a vote for Tsai with consistent voting. However, the meaning of these coefficients is not straightforward and is difficult to interpret, because the effect of GES on voting transition is now conditioned on voters' gender when we add an interaction term into the model. For example, the coefficient of female is  $-1.732$  and the odds ratio is  $0.177$ , which actually means the odds of transferring a vote for Tsai (or a vote against Ma) relative to consistent voting are about  $0.18$  times smaller for women than men only when the GES score equals zero.

On the other hand, the coefficient of the interaction term ( $0.160$ ) in Model 3 only means that the difference in the effect that the GES has on women's and men's voting transition is statistically significant, and it is impossible to tell from the interaction term alone what substantive effect the GES has on voting transition and whether this effect is statistically significantly different on women and men (Brambor, Clark, and Golder 2006). To determine this, we calculate the marginal effect and conditional standard errors for different GES scores on men's voting transition types (female = 0) and women's voting transition types (female = 1).

Table 8 shows that GES does have a significant effect on women's votes for transferring to Tsai relative to consistent voting; we cannot find the same effect on men. This finding provides support for our hypothesis that the higher the values of gender equality awareness that women have, the greater the possibility that they change their votes from a male to a female presidential candidate.

## Conclusion

Executive positions are regarded as the most gendered of all political offices, and access to the office of president or prime minister is no doubt considered to be "the highest glass ceiling" (Bauer and Tremblay 2011, 1).

Although women have made dramatic gains in Taiwan's electoral politics, the election of a female president remains one step away. In the 2012 election the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen appeared to have picked up the gender mantle by campaigning as the first female president and rallying around compassion issues. In return, voters did respond to her gender in different ways.

Comparing the vote choices in 2008 and 2012, the voting gender gap in 2012 was diminished compared to the previous presidential election in 2008. Yet women voters in 2012 were still more likely than men to vote for Ma. The narrowing gender gap, indicating that some voters change their votes to support the DPP female candidate, combined with the fact that women voters did not necessarily prefer the female candidate to the male candidate, constitutes an empirical gender paradox. To solve this paradox, we hypothesize and prove that the shrinking gender gap is not caused by the vote change of women relative to men in general but by a particular set of women voters holding a higher gender equality value. Among all the voters with different voting patterns, women voters who vote against Ma or change to Tsai score the highest on the GES (gender equality scale) compared to all men and other women. This pattern is further confirmed in the separate and full models. The key factor discriminating men and women voters in changing their vote patterns is the GES. Both men and women have a low probability of changing their votes to Tsai when they hold traditional attitudes toward gender equality, but the gender difference expands among people holding higher GES scores, in which women are more likely than men to transfer their vote to a female candidate. For the other important factors explaining voting, party identification and candidate evaluation did affect the vote choices of voters, but their effects are indiscriminate, meaning that both factors did not result in differences among men and women voters.

Not all women are more likely than all men to vote for a female candidate, but a particular set of women with higher gender equality values do so. Therefore, it is the feminist gap, not the gender gap per se, that explains the changing vote patterns between two presidential elections in Taiwan. To a certain extent, waging campaigns that make use of voters' dispositions toward gender is an asset rather than a liability. Feminist values did rally some women voters to cast their votes for women candidates, but still the effect is not large enough to reverse the result of the game in the current stage. Therefore, it seems logical to infer that expanding the acceptance of gender equality values among voters in Taiwan would be conducive to electing the first female president in the future.

## Notes

1. In the 1960s only three women became national leaders who were not monarchs. In the 1970s only six, and in the 1980s only seven. The first woman to become a prime minister was Sirimavo Bandaranaike, who became prime minister of Sri Lanka in 1960. She was followed by Indira Gandhi of India and Golda Meir of Israel. Isabel Perón of Argentina became the first female president in 1974. The number of female national leaders nearly quadrupled during the 1990s and 2000s, with 26 women becoming national leaders in the 1990s and 29 women serving as presidents or prime ministers during 2000–2009 (Jalalzai and Krook 2010, 5).
2. See *South China Morning Post*. 2014. “The Last Mile for Taiwan’s Presidential hopeful Dr. Tsai Ing-wen.” <http://www.scmp.com/news/china/article/1662791/last-mile-taiwans-presidential-hopeful-dr-tsai-ing-wen> (accessed December 26, 2014).
3. Taiwan’s president is not as powerful as some of the counterparts in other semipresidential countries, but he could also make final decisions without being held responsible in practice. The division of executive powers between the premier and president remains ambiguous at large (Fell 2012).
4. The data set we use is the Taiwan Social Change Survey 2012 phase 6 wave 3, which was conducted by the Center for Survey Research, RCHSS, Academia Sinica. We appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institution and individuals aforementioned. The authors are responsible for views and conclusions expressed herein.
5. DPP is the first meaningful opposition party in Taiwan, and it has its roots in liberal opposition to KMT one-party authoritarian rule. Most observers agree that the party has been stereotyped as a radical party because its policy stance on promotion of *de jure* Taiwan independence, and the resort to massive street protests, which sometimes led to physical confrontations with law enforcement offices. So, as Fell and Cheng (2009) point out, “voters were uncomfortable with its radical Taiwanese independence position, and its reputation for using violence” (182).
6. Before the vote, a poll showed that Tsai only trailed Ma by 4 percent among women, which was considered by the DPP campaigner as the party’s best-ever performance. See *Taipei Times*. 2011. “ANALYSIS: Tsai is changing female voters’ view of the DPP.” <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2011/09/30/2003514563/1> (accessed December 26, 2014).
7. In fact, there were three candidates in the 2012 race. We omitted individuals who voted for James Song, the leader of People First Party (PFP), because they account for a very small proportion of votes.
8. For example, the Attitudes toward Women Scale (AWS) contains 55 items to assess people’s belief about the rights, roles, and responsibilities of women (Spence and Helmreich 1972). Another widely used scale is the Sex Role Egalitarianism Scale (SRES), which covers attitudes toward both men and women in more explicit domains. See Beere et al. (1984).
9. The multinomial logit model is perhaps the most commonly used regression model for nominal outcomes, but the assumption of the independence of irrelevant alternatives (IIA) is implicit in the model. The IIA assumption means that, all other things being equal, a person’s choice between two alternative outcomes is unaffected by what other choices are available (MacFadden 1974). We test this assumption with the Hausman-McFadden test and Small-Hsiao test discussed by Long and Freese (2006). The results show the IIA assumption is not violated and the model is appropriate.

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