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Master's Thesis

**Relations between Taiwan Identity Tendency  
And the Outcome of Presidential elections**

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
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I am also grateful for the understanding and respect shown by my family, their faith in me has always motivated me in overcoming the obstacles while pursuing my dreams.



## Abstract

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impacts on the Presidential elections brought up by the growing Taiwan identity. The trend was inspired by Taiwan independence movements at home and abroad since the 1950's. After the democratization in the late 1980's, more and more citizens have identified themselves as Taiwanese, the trend has not only fueled the pro-independence movements, but also encouraged the political parties to adjust their cross-strait policies. If we see national identity as a variable in building unification/independence attitude, the identity issue will be a political topic at the state level which further affects development and policies of political parties. As a democracy, public opinion has been reflected in every Presidential election, and the national identity issue played an important role in the past Presidential elections. However, in 2008 and 2012, Taiwan identity was not a major strategy since it was already highly internalized and parties had to stand on the same position regarding this issue to maximize the votes. The Chou, Tzu-yu incident encouraged young people to vote when the sovereignty crisis was raised, and they voted the Democratic Progressive Party, the party with stronger Taiwan identity. The voting preference showed that Taiwan identity was still a factor influencing the Presidential elections.

此研究旨在分析不斷上漲的台灣意識如何影響台灣的總統大選。台灣意識受五零年代以來海內外台灣獨立運動啟發，八零年代後期的民主化使愈來愈多的民眾認為自己是台灣人，其中年輕世代的台灣認同比例為最高。成為主流的台灣意識不只助長台獨意識，更促使政黨調整其兩岸政策。若將國家認同作為台人統獨態度的影響因素，認同議題便是國家層級的政治議題，此議題會進一步影響政黨的發展與決策。作為一民主國家，民意總展現在每次的選舉中，過去二十年來台灣意識對投票結果具有一定的影響力。然而 2008 年及 2012 年的總統選舉中，台灣意識的影響力漸弱，甚至不被作為主要選舉策略，此乃因台灣意識已高度內化，而為求選票最大化，政黨在此議題上須採相同立場。2016 年總統選舉投票日前發生的「周子瑜」事件鼓舞年輕世代在感覺到主權受威脅後自發性地參與投票，並將選票投給台灣意識較高的民主進步黨，證明台灣意識依舊是影響選民投票的因素。

關鍵字：台灣意識、國家認同、台灣總統大選

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## Chapter 1 – Introduction

During the second half of the 20th century, people in Taiwan categorized each other into four major identities, aboriginals (the Austronesians who have lived on the island for thousands of years), Hoklo Taiwanese and Hakka Taiwanese (Han people who already lived here before the migration wave after August 1945), and Mainlander (Han people who came to Taiwan after August 1945). Such classification became sloppy and outdated. In the past two decades, more and more people have identified themselves as Taiwanese regardless when or from where their ancestors arrived in Taiwan.

The Taiwan identity was significantly triggered for the first time after the February 28 incident that happened in 1947. Many politically enthusiastic young students went abroad to pursue higher academic achievement and initiated the oversea Taiwan independence movement which inspired the Taiwan identity inside Taiwan island. The Taiwan identity trend grew secretly at first but later went unstoppable after the democratization until today.

Nevertheless, national identity is still one of the most debated political issue in Taiwan society and also a crucial factor in party politics and government policy making process. Nearly half of Taiwan citizens are still struggling from the national identity issue, and nowadays we have three main different claims existing in the society, Taiwan identity, China identity and dual identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese). In the three decades, the identity issue has been used as a political instrument during election season which deepened the divergence within the country.

However, the situation has changed as time goes, the proportion of the three identity claims has been redistributed, the decrease of China identity seems to be irreversible, so is the growing of Taiwan identity. Therefore, understanding how the political situation has been influenced by Taiwan identity tendency would help us to predict the possible scenario of future political development.

The young generation, as members of this new democracy, enjoy full civil rights, therefore it is our duty to understand that our opinions are valuable and our demands for changes will be achieved once a consistent collective identity is formed.

### **1.1 Purpose**

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the impacts on the Presidential elections brought up by the growing Taiwan identity. The trend was inspired by Taiwan independence movements at home and abroad since the 1950's. After the democratization in the late 1980's, more and more citizens have identified themselves as Taiwanese, the trend has not only fueled the pro-independence movements, but also encouraged the political parties to adjust their cross-strait policies, from the issuance of the National Unification Guidelines to the abandon of it, from the special State-to-State Relationship (特殊國與國關係) to one country on each side (一邊一國), from the Consensus of 1992 to respect the fact of 1992 talks (尊重九二會談歷史事實).

We can see the government has shifted its cross-strait policies according to the mainstream opinion of the society. The identity issue on this island has drawn attention from Beijing as well, the People's Republic of China (PRC) has been adjusting its cross-strait policies over the past two decades based on the situation in Taiwan, on one hand, the PRC keeps reiterating the importance of placing hopes on the Taiwanese people (寄希望於人民), and on the other hand, it continuously puts stress on Taiwanese government when the leaders show the intention of pursuing de facto independence. Therefore, there exists causality between Taiwan's public opinion and the cross-strait policies.

The decrease in China identity among Taiwanese society seems to be irreversible, if we see national identity as a variable in choosing unification/independence attitude, the identity issue will be a political topic at the state level which further affects development and policies of political parties. Therefore, it is important to understand how the evolving

Taiwan identity has affected parties when they decide their cross-strait policies and strategies.

## **1.2 Research Question**

Taiwan society has been struggling with identity issue for decades, before 1987, under the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT) authoritarian regime, Taiwan citizens were taught to be Chinese and had to be loyal to the party (KMT) and the country (Republic of China).

At that time, dissidents were ruthlessly suppressed and punished, so was the local identity. Fortunately, Taiwan welcomed its democratization thirty years ago, and the political and educational reforms have since encouraged the young generation to be more politically engaged.

The more information people receive, the more confused they are regarding their own identity. People who grow up after 1987 feel less Chinese, and more Taiwanese. There were several events greatly affected national identity, the first one was the 1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis and the Taiwanese showed their strong will of protecting the sovereignty with their votes in the presidential election, it is worth mentioning that the Taiwan identity increased significantly from 24.1% in 1996 to 34% in 1997<sup>1</sup>. (See Figure 1)

The growing trend of Taiwan identity is obvious, yet how much will the trend effect cross-strait remains questionable, this thesis is expected to answer the question of how parties keep the pace with the trend.


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<sup>1</sup>台灣民眾臺灣人/中國人認同趨勢分佈(1992年06月~2016年12月), 政治大學選舉研究中心, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>



Figure 1 ↓

臺灣民眾臺灣人／中國人認同趨勢分佈 (1992~2016.12)  
 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese  
 as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, NCCU(1992~2016.12)



國立政治大學選舉研究中心 製

# People under 39 want independence

Q. What is the best Cross-strait scenario in the long run?(%)

Achieve independence peacefully
  Achieve independence no matter what conditions
  Status-quo
  Unification with
  Unification ASAP
  No response



Figure 2 ↑

### 1.3 Research Assumption

There were several turning points of Taiwanese national identity, the 1947 February 28 incident, 1979 Kaohsiung incident and the democratization began in 1987. More than 60% of the people who were born after 1987 identify themselves as Taiwanese, and more than 50% of them support Taiwan independence, therefore they are called “Tian Ran Du”(naturally pro-independence) generation.<sup>2</sup> (See Figure 2)

Identity is shaped by the environment and further influences citizens’ behavior. People with different national identity made different political choices. The Sun Flower Movement in 2014 showed the young generation’s dissatisfaction against the passing of the Cross-strait Service and Trade Agreement (CSSTA) by Ma Ying-jeou administration, the passing process at the Legislative Yuan was described “black box” (lack of transparency).

The movement also reflected young generation’s distrust towards the PRC. The movement further effected the Nine in One local election at the end of 2014, and the Presidential and Congress election in 2016. According to the data collected by the Central Election Committee, the voters were mainly from the Tian Ran Du generation and more than half of this group voted for Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), the pro-independence party.<sup>3</sup>

Since elections are held regularly in Taiwan, political leaders must always follow the wishes expressed by public opinion, hence it is reasonable to say that the Taiwan identity will keep influencing the future politics, especially the cross-strait policies.

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<sup>2</sup> 2017 《天下》國情調查 I：39 歲，民意的斷裂點，政治社會，天下雜誌第 614 期，Jan 3rd, 2017  
<http://www.cw.com.tw/article/article.action?id=5080204>

<sup>3</sup> 台灣智庫：年輕人投票率 74.5% 補刀終結國民黨，自由時報，Jan 21, 2016  
<http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1579950>

## 1.4 Expected Contribution

As the most debated topic in every Presidential election, the unification/independence issue has become extremely critical for parties to attract young supporters, the major source of votes. This thesis will analyze the cross-strait policies made by parties across the strait for the past two decades to see how much the public opinion has affected the cross-strait situation, and further examine the outcome to find out if the parties have been working on the right track to fulfill their goals. By identifying the factors shaping the cross-strait relations, we might as well predict the future of it.

## 1.5 Literature Review

It is important to apply theoretical tools and adopt the most suitable theories for studying social phenomenon. In the attempt of discussing the impact brought by the growing Taiwan identity, the first thing is to introduce identity related theories, I will begin with the social identities defined by Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott in their article “Identity as a Variable (2006)” to pave the way to the most popular theories regarding identity-primordialism, instrumentalism and constructivism.

Constructivism emphasizes the construction of identity is influenced by external factors, the thesis intends to explain the evolving identity construction by discussing major political events, therefore I found Sears’s and Valentino’s “event-driven socialization”<sup>4</sup> happens to hold the same view with mine. Their research proved teenagers’ political attitude and behavior could be influenced by the political events which took place during Presidential elections, one thing worth mentioning is that they also found most events that caused greater impact were negative.

Domestic academic opinions also show that constructivism is the most applied theory in analyzing Taiwan’s identity issue. Xiao Gao-yen believes national identity can be defined

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<sup>4</sup> Sears, David O., & Valentino, Nicholas A., “Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Pre-adult Socialization”, *The American Political Science Review*, 1997

as the willing identification of citizens to their political community which makes members willing to contribute to the community, even sacrifice themselves when the community is in danger.<sup>5</sup> Jian Yi-hua defines national identity includes ethnic aspect (blood and religion), cultural aspect (history and emotion), and politic aspect (governmental power and civic right)<sup>6</sup> Shih Cheng-feng sees national identity is influenced by relations between ethnic groups, political parties and interest groups, and limited by the culture of the society and the political system. National identity is also affected by the interactions with other countries.<sup>7</sup>

The thesis focus on national identity on the island and its impact for the cross-strait relationship, therefore before analyzing the impacts, it is necessary to understand the development of Taiwan identity first. After the 228 incident in 1947, intellectuals with political ambitions went abroad to pursue higher academic achievement and devoted themselves in Taiwan Independence movements. Since 1960's, Taiwan identity turned into a political issue, and was greatly promoted by oversea Taiwanese Independence activists. Their work still encourages Taiwan identity up to today and the related publication not only documented their contribution but also has served as materials in studying the forming and growth of Taiwan identity, i.e *Forty Years of Oversea Taiwan Independent Movement* by Chen Ming-chen<sup>8</sup>, *Taiwan's Independence and Founding of State* by Chen Lung-chu<sup>9</sup> and *A Taste of Freedom* by Peng Ming-ming<sup>10</sup>.

Moreover, Chen Fu-pian in his master thesis "History of the Oversea Taiwan Independence Movement"<sup>11</sup> also tried to preserve the stories of oversea Taiwan independent activists and remind the young generation how precious the democracy is.

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5 蕭高彥，〈國家認同、民族主義與憲政民主：當代政治哲學的發展與反思〉，*台灣社會研究季刊社*，1997

6 江宜樺，〈自由民主體制下的國家認同〉，*台灣社會研究季刊社*，1997

7 施正鋒，〈台灣人的民族認同〉，台北：前衛出版社，2000

8 陳銘城，〈海外台獨運動四十年〉，台北，自立晚報設文化出版社，1992

9 陳隆志，〈台灣的獨立與建國〉，台北，月旦出版社股份有限公司，1993

10 彭明敏，〈自由的滋味〉，台北，桂冠出版社，1990

11 陳佳宏，〈海外台獨運動史〉，台北，前衛出版社，1998

Wu Nai-teh pointed out that ethnicity is crucial for Taiwan's political divergence since the ethnic identities are reached by the self-recognition gained from the history and certain social benefits (political, economic, and cultural resource) enjoyed by certain groups. However, the line between Ben shen ren (local Taiwanese) and Wai shen ren (mainlanders) is loose and insignificant in daily life, the tension is mainly shown when it comes to politics, hence, the identity issue is often used in political activities and mobilization.<sup>12</sup>

In accordance with the topic of this research, the literature cited here would be the researches that examined the variables in the Presidential elections in Taiwan, especially the national identity. The literature proved that the national identity has been used as the main strategy to differentiate political parties in the Presidential election in 2000, 2004 and 2008.

Niu Tse-hsun in his PhD thesis, *campaign strategies of Presidential candidates- A Case Study of 2000 Presidential election*, mentioned that the KMT devoted a lot of effort in telling the voters that a pro-independence ruling party would lead to a hostile cross-strait relationship. In the campaign, the DPP legitimately promoted its "Taiwanese shall rule their own country" ideology after Beijing sent its verbal warning, and the result of that year's election showed the Taiwan identity was no longer a taboo, but an awakening of public opinion<sup>13</sup>.

Shaw Chong-hai and Tang Yu-li believed people have stronger ethnic identity would be more willing to participate in politics.<sup>14</sup> The most significant example was the DPP's 228 Hand in Hand to Protect Taiwan activity in 2004 which attracted two millions of people

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<sup>12</sup> 吳乃德, 〈省籍意識、政治支持和國家認同〉, 張茂桂等著《族群關係與國家認同》, 台北, 業強出版社, 2013

<sup>13</sup> 鈕則勳, 〈總統候選人之競選傳播策略--以公元二〇〇〇年我國總統大選為例〉, 博士論文, 國立政治大學政治學系, 2001

<sup>14</sup> 邵宗海, 唐玉禮, 〈台灣地區的族群差異意識與政治參與〉, 會議論文, 政治大學國家發展研究所, 2004

to participate<sup>15</sup>. A survey conducted by TVBS on March 1<sup>st</sup> showed that 18% of the participants (360,000 people) identified themselves as Taiwanese and they were DPP-affiliated<sup>16</sup>. The figure was extremely critical for a tight competition. With the Taiwan identity being successfully raised, the 2004 Presidential election was a battle between “Taiwan identity” and “China identity”

Professor of the Department of Political Science from the National Chen Chi University, Sheng Shing-yuan, believed that the unification/independence issue would no doubt bring huge impact on the elections which might help the DPP at the beginning, but it might become an obstruction later<sup>17</sup>.

Professor Shen was right, the identity card could not save the DPP in 2008 since the KMT candidate also identified himself as a Taiwanese, so it was no longer effective to use the identity issue as the main campaign strategy. In fact, both parties concentrated more on social topics like economic development, pension reform, and so on.

The economic voting theory explained the reason why the China-friendly KMT party won the Presidential elections in 2008 and 2012, when Taiwan identity surpassed the dual identity (both Taiwanese and Chinese) and became the mainstream. The theory was developed by Michzol S. Lewis-Beck in 1988.<sup>18</sup> The economic voting theory believes economic conditions shape election outcomes in the democratic countries. Good times keep parties in office, bad times cast them out. The economic voter, who holds the government responsible for economic performance, rewarding or punishing it at the ballot box. Although voters do not look exclusively at economic issues, they generally weigh those more heavily than any others<sup>19</sup>. In Taiwan’s case, the voters considered cross-strait

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<sup>15</sup> 手牽手護台灣 兩百萬人破台紀錄, 蘋果日報, Feb 29<sup>th</sup>, 2004,

<http://www.appledaily.com.tw/appledaily/article/headline/20040229/747784/>

<sup>16</sup> 最新總統民調, 連宋 43%, 扁呂 36%, TVBS, Mar 1<sup>st</sup>, 2004, <http://news.tvbs.com.tw/other/380727>

<sup>17</sup> 盛杏媛, 〈統獨議題與台灣選民的投票行為:一九九〇年代的分析〉, 政治大學選舉研究中心, 2002

<sup>18</sup> Lewis-Beck, Michzol S., *Economic and Elections: The Major Western Democracies*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1988

<sup>19</sup> Lewis-Beck, Michael S., & Stegmaier, Mary, “Economic Determinants of Electoral Outcomes”, *Annual Review of Political Science*, June 2000

cooperation would benefit Taiwan's economy, and the DPP's pro-independence ideology would only stress the cross-strait relationship.

Conformity theory can be applied in 2016's Presidential election after Zhou Tzu-yu incident took place. Many people felt their national identity was challenged, and the entire society was angry. Based on the conformity theory, many people, while making voting decisions, are affected by or take into account how other people might vote<sup>20</sup>, therefore, when most voters showed their support for Tsai Yin-wen, it might encourage the swing voters to vote for the DPP.

## 1.6 Methods

In order to reach both theoretical and practical significance, the thesis will discuss identity theories first to provide an idea of what identity is and how it is formed. By reviewing the theories and findings proposed by experts in the field, I hope to explain why Taiwanese' China identity dropped to 4.1% in 2016 from the figure of 25.5% in 1992.<sup>21</sup> Psychologists have proved that events might trigger the change of attitudes, even adults can be influenced by political events, in the same way, children can be affected directly, or indirectly as well.<sup>22</sup>

Valentino and Sears found events with regularity and excitement were the most suitable for their "event-driven socialization" research, therefore, they observed teenagers' attitudes during the Presidential elections to prove their party preferences would be influenced by events happened during the elections, and their result showed that teenagers' political socialization was connected to their intense political participation.<sup>23</sup> Hence, major political events took place before the democratization and during Taiwan

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20 Coleman, Stephen, "A test for conformity in voting behavior", Program Evaluation Division of Minnesota Office of the Legislative Auditor (OLA). November 1997

21 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>

22 Valentino, Nicholas A., & Sears, David O., "Event-driven Political Communication and the Pre-adult Socialization of Partisanship Political Behavior", *Political Behavior*, 1998

23 Sears, David O., & Valentino, Nicholas A., "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Pre-adult Socialization", *The American Political Science Review*, 1997



Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016 will be reviewed in Chapter three, moreover, data collected from various credible surveys regarding identity trend will be cross-checked to locate the major turning points of national identity on history.

Last but not the least, in-depth interviews with major parties and official organizations will be conducted to examine if the adjustments have been made to keep up with the growing Taiwan identity trend.

### **1.6.1 List of interviewees**

1. Mr. Lin Cho-shui, master theoretician of the TIM
2. Mr. Chang Jung-kung, former deputy Secretary General of the KMT
3. Ms. Ho Meng-hua, deputy Director of the Youth Affairs Division of the DPP
4. Mr. Lin , Choung-sheng, deputy Director of Department of China Affairs of the DPP

### **1.7 Thesis Structure**

The thesis contains five chapters. The first chapter includes the introduction to the topic, literature review in which the theories adopted in the thesis and the methods for conducting the study.

The second chapter provides theoretical framework which is composed of major theories regarding identity and behaviors.

The third chapter reviews major political events before the democratization and took place during the past six Presidential elections. Sun Flower Movement (2014), as a major recent event, will be discussed in this chapter as well. The data conducted by credible institutions will be analyzed to locate the major turning points in the shaping of Taiwan identity.

The forth chapter is the interview analysis from which I expect to prove the major political parties and governmental offices do take the growing Taiwan identity into consideration when it comes to policy making.

The fifth chapter will conclude the political implication of the growing Taiwan identity, provide the prediction regarding future cross-strait policies. Adjustments toward cross-strait policies from Beijing will be discussed as supplementary to have a more comprehensive idea about how the PRC's reaction towards the growing Taiwan identity.



## Chapter 2 – Theoretical Framework

### 2.1 Definition of identity

In the last decade of the 20th century, scholars began to realize that self-identity would strongly affect individual's recognition towards the social structure and outside world, and further shape the political attitude, behavior and value of a group. The identity issue started to attract attention from politic scholars as a variable that explains political behavior and phenomenon. Scholars came up with different disciplines explaining the concept of identities yet they managed to reach an emerging consensus that identities are among the most normatively significant and behaviorally consequential aspects of politics.<sup>24</sup> There are numerous ways to define the concept of identities, among them I found the four non-mutually-exclusive types of social identities defined by Rawi Abdelal, Yoshiko M. Herrera, Alastair Iain Johnston and Rose McDermott in their article "Identity as a Variable (2006)" were the most suitable definitions to explain identities in modern nations.<sup>25</sup>

#### 1. Constitutive norms:

There are some basic rules followed by a collective identity, normally those are the practices that define one specific identity and lead other actors to recognize it. Norms can be unwritten (約定俗成) or codified (明文規定), and serve as collective expectations for members of the group. When practices are also taken as obligations, they may be seen by the group as ethical.

From the point of view of socialization, an ultimate internalization of constitutive norms is extremely important, the collective expectations of an identity group will eventually to be taken for granted by new members, for example, Europeans adopt Copenhagen

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24 Smith, Rogers M., "Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2004.

25 Abdelal, Rawi, Herrera, Yoshiko, Johnston, Alastair, & McDermott, Rose, "Identity as a Variable", *Perspectives on Politics*, 2006

Criteria (market economy, democratic polity and respect of human rights) to define European-ness.

There are three major signs in the process of internalization:

1. Logic of appropriateness: norms sometimes bias choice and that is to say for one identity, certain behaviors are consciously excluded as inappropriate or vice versa;
2. Common sensible: decisions are made based on the common sense that formed by the norms which means sometimes the options are barely considered;
3. Logic of habituation: norms may be so deeply internalized that they are acted upon completely unconsciously, out of habit and this is the most powerful form of identity.

## **2. Social purposes: (shared purpose, secret mission)**

The content of a collective identity may be purposive, in the sense that the group is brought by specific goals. An easier way to explain the purposive content is that what groups want depends on who they think they are. People can learn a group's interests, goals, or preferences by their purposive content.

Both normative and purposive content of an identity may press obligations on members, but in different ways: constitutive norms impose an obligation to engage in practices that reconstitute the group, while social purposes create obligations to bring the members of the group closer. Literature on nationalist movements and national identities has identified various purposive claims from the cultivation of an identity as a purpose in itself to the creation of a state, for example, the post-Soviet Union societies' "return to Europe".

## **3. Relational comparisons:**

The content of a collective identity is also defined by what it is not. Unlike individual identity, group identities are fundamentally social and relational, defined by the actors' integration with and relationship to others. Since group identities are constructed, we

know that identities may be changed based on the interaction with others. Scholars have already identified three comparisons:

1. One identity is different from others;
2. The relative status of an identity compared to others;
3. The existence of level of hostility presented by other identities towards one identity.

#### **4. Cognitive models:**

The cognitive content of a collective identity describes how group membership is associated with explanations of how the world works, like a worldview, or a framework that allows members of a group to understand their social, political, and economic conditions.

Based on the cognitive perspectives, race, ethnicity, and nation are not things in the world but ways of seeing the world, and the ways of reasoning are distinct to particular identity groups, i.e. Eastern and Western identities have different ways of thinking. In one culture, the identity can strongly affect the interpretation of both the present and the past like Anthony D. Smith argued “*subjective perception and understanding of the communal past each generation...is a defining element in the concept of cultural identity*<sup>26</sup>”, for example, the shared colonial experiences.

#### **2.1.1 Understanding of National Identity**

Under the big picture of identity, national identity has been a well-discussed subfield. In the field of politics, there are three major theories in studying collective identity, primordialism, structuralism (instrumentalism) and constructivism.

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26 Smith, Anthony D., “National Identity and the Idea of European Unity”, *Royal Institute of International Affairs*, 1992

## 1. Primordialism

Primordialism believes an ethnic group is built by people who share the same blood, language, and culture<sup>27</sup>, these connections are so tight that the group members are born with a strong sense of belonging. Based on this perspective, national identity is inherited from the common ancestors. Primordialism is mainly supported by anthropologists.

## 2. Structuralism/ Instrumentalism

Instrumentalism explains identity as a political instrument, and national identity is built by the government or political parties for their own interests<sup>28</sup>. For example, leaders use national identity to consolidate the unity and achieve political goals. National identity is an instrument for collective interests, and it is constructed by political elite.

## 3. Constructivism

Constructivists believe that identity is constructed by individual's experience in life, therefore it is a product of socialization<sup>29</sup>. Since each society has its own norms and obligations; common missions; interactions with different identities and their own worldviews, constructivism provides better explanation for the forming of national identity.

Constructivism has not only received support from Western and Taiwan scholars but has also served as the theoretical foundation of Taiwan independent movements. Theories are usually greatly inspired by the development of contemporary comparative politics and international relation theories, therefore from the definitions of national identity proposed by domestic scholars mentioned in Chapter 1, we can know that they were heavily influenced by constructivism.

### 2.1.2 Event-driven socialization

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27 Geertz, Clifford, *The Interpretation of Cultures*, New York, Basic Books, Inc., Publishers, 1973

28 施正鋒, 《台灣政治建構》, 臺北市, 前衛出版社, 1999

29 閻小駿, 《政治認同理論: 我們是誰? 》, 香港, 香港中文大學, 2016

Psychologists have proved that events might trigger the change of attitudes, adults can be influenced by political events, in the same way, children can be affected directly, or indirectly as well.<sup>30</sup> Valentino and Sears found that presidential campaigns were occasions for increased crystallization of partisan attitudes among adolescents.<sup>31</sup> They observed teenagers' attitudes during the Presidential elections to prove their party preferences would be influenced by events happened during the elections, and their result showed that teenagers' political socialization was connected to their intense political participation during that time.

Furthermore, the research showed that most of the events that have greater impact were bad and tragic incidents, for example Vietnam War and the assassination of John F. Kennedy. The uncomfortable events stay in young generation's mind and influence the contemporary politics.

This theory can be applied in Taiwan's case, the 228 incident (1947) and 1979 Kaohsiung incident were two significant factors in the construction of Taiwan identity, later some controversial events unexpectedly played critical roles in the Presidential elections, for instance 1996 Taiwan crisis, 319 shooting incident in 2004, and Chou Tzu-yu incident in 2016. The events mentioned above unified national consciousness in a short time and formed a great power that brought changes.

### **2.3 Constructivism in Taiwan identity**

Taiwan citizen's political persuasions shifted when the new national identities were formed. Under the ruling of the authoritarian KMT government from 1945 to 1987, most citizens identified themselves as Chinese, hence, the goal of future Cross-strait relationship was to achieve the unification by recovering the mainland. After the democratization, more people embraced dual identity (both Chinese and Taiwanese),

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30 Valentino, Nicholas A., & Sears, David O., "Event-driven Political Communication and the Pre-adult Socialization of Partisanship Political Behavior", *Political Behavior*, 1998

31 Sears, David O., & Valentino, Nicholas A., "Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Pre-adult Socialization", *The American Political Science Review*, 1997

therefore, maintaining the status-quo has become the mainstream ideology, however, around a decade after the localization, Taiwan identity surpassed the dual identity in 2005<sup>32</sup>.

Based on constructivism, Taiwan's national identity is constructed by internal and external factors. Internal factors mean the recognition towards statehood from politic elites and nationals. External factors are recognitions toward Taiwan's status from the international society, and among these recognitions, PRC's attitude is the most important factor in constructing Taiwan's national identity, because as a strong power, Beijing is capable of deciding how other countries recognize Taiwan<sup>33</sup>.

The external pressure aims at maintaining the cross strait status-quo has been competing with the growing Taiwan identity and the demand for Taiwan independence. Such confrontation has great impact on future cross-strait relations, in fact, Beijing has adjusted its policies to cope with the emerging Taiwan independent consciousness, for example, the passing of Anti-secession Law in 2005 as a warning to Chan Shui-bian administration and the signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in 2008<sup>34</sup> as a reward for President Ma Ying-jeou's cooperation.

Next, major political events took place on Taiwan history after 1947 will be reviewed to discuss the mutual effect brought by the internal national identity and external recognition (from the People's Republic of China).

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32 Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of Taiwanese as Tracked in Surveys by the Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>

33 吳威麒, 〈由社會建構論詮釋陳水扁執政時期台美關係的身分認同與戰略分歧-以兩次總統大選公民投票為例〉, 碩士論文, 國立政治大學外交研究所, 2012

34 陳牧民, 〈台灣國家認同研究的現況與展望〉, 施正鋒主編, 《國家認同之文化論述》, 台北, 翰盧圖書出版公司, 2006



## Chapter 3 – Political Events and data cross-analysis

Based on the “event-driven socialization” theory which was mentioned earlier, people are easily influenced by major political events that took place in their adolescence. These political events play critical roles in shaping a person’s identity, and consequently the political behavior. In this chapter, the development of Taiwan identity will be introduced, and major political events will be reviewed to see how this growing Taiwan identity has influenced the Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016.

### 3.1 Development of Taiwan Identity

The island's modern history can be traced back to the period of the Dutch occupation in the 17<sup>th</sup> century. At that time, there were no signs of any administrative structure of the Chinese Imperial Government, and most of the residents on the island were aboriginals living in separate territories. The Dutch brought in Chinese men as migrant workers, most of them settled on the island and married aborigine wives.

In 1662 Cheng Cheng-kung (Koxinga), a loyalist of the old Ming dynasty, defeated the Dutch and the Kingdom of Tungning was founded. The Cheng regime was the first Han regime on the island, it established Chinese education institution which laid the foundation of Chinese culture. The regime was welcomed by the Han residents who settled in Taiwan during Dutch occupation. The Kingdom was later defeated by Qing emperor.

Qing government was not very enthusiastic in developing the island, numerous conflicts between the local population and officials sent from China from time to time, leading to the well-known saying in those days: "Every three years an uprising, every five years a rebellion." (三年一小反、五年一大亂) After realizing Taiwan’s geostrategic value, the Qing authority decided to declare Taiwan to be a province in 1885, 10 years before it was ceded to Japan.

After the signing of Treaty of Shimonoseki in April, 1885, The Taiwan Republic was established in June and issued its Independence Declaration. However, the Republic aimed more at resisting the upcoming Japanese ruling than creating a self-ruling country. This short-lived Republic was a failed attempt, yet a valuable start-up in the forming of Taiwan identity<sup>35</sup>.

Generally, it is believed that Taiwanese has not yet developed the concept of national identity before 1895, what they had was a local identity which was merely a resistance against the ill administration of the rulers<sup>36</sup>.

The modernization brought by the Japanese government connected the transportation network and made it easier for people on this island to exchange opinions with each other. The common feeling of being treated as the second-class citizens pushed the forming of an island-wide identity, therefore Anti-Japanese armed resistances in Taiwan took place frequently during the first two decades of Japanese ruling period.<sup>37</sup> However, the purpose of the local resistances at that time was to get rid of Japanese ruling, not to declare independence.

The armed resistances were replaced by a more civic method, The Petition Movement for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, the petition movement was motivated by Taiwanese' ethnic consciousness, moreover, at that time, the Taiwan identity mingled with a strong Han ethnic identity. That is to say, the purpose of the petition movement was to achieve a complete autonomy, not to found the Republic of Taiwan.

To cope with the potential Taiwan independence movement, the Japanese government adopted "Japanization policy" to assimilate Taiwanese in 1937 which greatly diminished the ethnic unrest. People who were born on the island during 1895 to 1945 were regarded as Japanese, they were culturally assimilated, yet they were still aware of the difference

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35 陳佳宏,《海外台獨運動史》,台北,前衛出版社,1998

36 陳明成,〈陳芳明現象及其國族認同研究〉,國立成功大學歷史學系碩博士班,2002

37 陳儀深,〈台獨主張的起源與流變〉,《台灣史研究》第十七卷第二期,中央研究院台灣史研究所,2011

between their Taiwan identity and the Japan identity of the ruling class. However, the boundary between their Taiwanese and Chinese identities was not very clear<sup>38</sup>, hence, when the World War II ended in 1945, quite a lot of Taiwanese were glad to get rid of the Japanese and excited about the “return to the motherland” as citizens of the victorious nation<sup>39</sup>.

The happy days did not last long, local Taiwanese soon realized the new government from China turned out to be corrupt and uncivilized. The conflicts between local Taiwanese and the newcomers deteriorated which eventually led to an island-wide anti-government uprising.

On February 28<sup>th</sup>, 1947, a dispute between a female cigarette vendor and an anti-smuggling officer triggered civil disorder and led to large-scale demonstrations which were repressed by brutal military force. The KMT government executed a whole generation of local leading figures, and the remaining intellectuals with political ambitions were forced to leave Taiwan in order to escape the executions or imprisonment.

The anti-government sentiment soon aroused a strong Taiwan identity that asked for political independence, therefore, the February 28<sup>th</sup> incident was deemed as the origin of Taiwan independence consciousness.

We can see the Taiwan identity among locals was having a major change in 1947, from the Taiwan identity mingled with a strong Han ethnic identity which asked for a complete autonomy under the Japanese colonial government to the Taiwan identity that pursued Taiwan independence.

These oversea Taiwan independence activists devoted themselves in overturning the autocracy in Taiwan, they set up independence-seeking organizations and the publication

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38 黃昭堂, 《台灣那想那利斯文》, 台北, 前衛出版社, 1998

39 陳儀深, 〈台獨主張的起源與流變〉, 《台灣史研究》第十七卷第二期, 中央研究院台灣史研究所, 2011

they issued raised up the spirit among the oversea activists and encouraged the activists at home.

Chungli Incident that took place in 1977 was the first spontaneous street protest in response to an alleged vote-rigging by the Chinese Nationalist Party (KMT). The incident was followed by a large-scale violent demonstration which encouraged the young locals participating in politics after three decades of the suppression.<sup>40</sup> Moreover, the new generation of political elites made politics less terrifying, more and more intellectuals joined Tang-wai (outside the ruling party) movements<sup>41</sup>. At this time, Taiwan's political demand has passed ethnic issues, and marched forward to a higher level request-the localization<sup>42</sup>.

In 1979, the United States transferred its recognition to the People's Republic of China (PRC) which stirred up public's anger toward incapable government. Eleven months later, a peaceful demonstration requesting for more democracy took place in Kaohsiung, and the participants were arrested. The trials received a lot of attention from abroad, facing the huge pressure from the international public opinion, the KMT regime did not send anyone to the chair which made people realized the government was shakable. These two events gradually facilitated the political reform and helped shaping the modern-day Taiwan identity.

The lift of the Martial Law in 1987 removed the ban on newspaper publication and the forming of political parties, it was regarded as the beginning of Taiwan's democratization. Temporary Provisions Effective during the Period of National Mobilization for Suppression of the Communist Rebellion which allowed the President to be exempted from term limits was ceased in 1991 by then President, Lee Teng-hui<sup>43</sup>. On May 15, 1992, the Legislative Yuan finally passed a bill that revising Article 100 of the criminal law,

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40 詹嘉雯, 〈中壢事件與台灣政治轉型〉, 碩士論文, 國立中央大學歷史研究所碩士在職專班, 2007

41 李筱峰, 《臺灣史 100 件大事 (下) 戰後篇》, 台北, 玉山社出版公司, 1999

42 劉文斌, 〈台灣國家認同變遷下的兩岸關係〉, 博士論文, 國立政治大學中山人文社會科學研究所, 2003

43 刑法第一百條修正案, 台灣大百科全書, 文化部, <http://nrch.culture.tw/twpedia.aspx?id=3893>

whereby laws concerning “conspiracy to incite insurrection”(陰謀內亂罪) and “public advocacy of insurrection”(言論內亂罪) were repealed<sup>44</sup>, people on the island was finally granted the freedom of speech.

The political effect brought up by the democratization initiated back in late 1980’s gradually constructed a national identity based on citizen’s pursuit of the constitutional system and human right. Despite the public has not yet reached an uniform goal regarding Taiwan’s future due to Taiwan’s unique politic development, people’s determination of defending the freedom and democracy is so strong that this force has always been able to reconcile the differences and unite the people.

From the surveys conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, we can see Taiwan identity has been increasing since the 1990’s, and in 1995<sup>45</sup>, Taiwan identity surpassed China identity for the first time, it is obvious that the essence of the national identity has changed and the evolving national identity has played a critical role in Taiwan’s Presidential elections.

### **3.2 Presidential elections from 1996 to 2016**

Taiwanese had been living under the Martial Law and White Terror for a very long time, the public was usually silent except during election season. Elections provided dissidents the chances to speak which elevated the public’s political awareness, we can say that Taiwan’s democratization was carried out simultaneously with elections<sup>46</sup>. Sears and Valention’s research proved that political events influence adolescents’ political attitude and behavior, especially large-scale events that take place regularly, for example,

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44 Li, Hsiao-feng, “From mastering people to people as masters”, Wu San Lien Foundation for Taiwanese Historical Materials, 2001,

[http://www.twcenter.org.tw/thematic\\_series/history\\_class/tw\\_window/e02\\_20010521](http://www.twcenter.org.tw/thematic_series/history_class/tw_window/e02_20010521)

45 台灣民眾臺灣人/中國人認同趨勢分佈(1992年06月~2016年12月), 政治大學選舉研究中心, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>

46 李筱峰, 〈美麗島事件的回顧與省思〉, 美麗島座談會發言稿, 1999, <http://taup.yam.org.tw/announce/9912/991208-d.htm>

Presidential elections<sup>47</sup>. Therefore, major political events happened in each Presidential election on the island will be examined to analyze the relations between Taiwan identity tendency and the outcome of the Presidential elections.

### **3.2.1 First Presidential election in 1996**

#### **Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-1996**

In May, 1995, former President Lee Teng-hui was issued a visa to the United States and one month later he gave a political speech “Always In My Heart” (民之所欲長在我心) in Cornell University. President Lee’s visit to the United States upset the PRC, Beijing fired the first missile in July, 1995 as a protest. The missile was targeting an area near northern Taiwan. The second phase of the missile crisis started by PRC’s statement of launching a military exercise during March 8<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup>, 1996. On March 8<sup>th</sup> 1996, the U.S. dispatched USS Independence to the Taiwan Straits and as promised, People’s Liberty Army (PLA) fired 4 missiles to Keelung and Kaohsiung, the busiest business ports in Taiwan from March 8<sup>th</sup> to 15<sup>th</sup>, 1996. PRC’s provocation was repressed by the United States’ intervention, on March 11<sup>th</sup>, 1996, USS Nimitz met with USS Independence. Ten days later, Lee Teng-hui was elected as R.O.C. President.

The purpose of the missile exercise in 1995 was to show Beijing’s discontent of President Lee’s visit to the U.S. And the following missile test was to manipulate Taiwan’s first Presidential election. The more general aim of Beijing’s fireworks was to stop Taiwan from pursuing independence.

President Lee’s victory showed Beijing that its threats and intimidation were ineffectual, in fact, the People's Republic of China's round of missile tests and live-fire military exercises have only enhanced people’s support for President Lee.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 to 1996 made Taiwanese realize the peaceful reconnection between two straits was superficial and vulnerable. Taiwanese was angered

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47 Sears, David O., & Valentino, Nicholas A., “Politics Matters: Political Events as Catalysts for Pre-adult Socialization”, *The American Political Science Review*, 1997

by Beijing's threat, therefore, the Taiwanese demonstrated their firm determination of protecting Taiwan's sovereignty by their votes. President Lee's victory stirred up the Taiwan identity among Taiwanese, and the missile confrontation has further made the cross-strait relations and national identity the most discussed topics in the following Presidential elections, moreover, one strategy for the candidates to gain support was to claim their "Taiwan identity".

President Lee knew the ethnic divergence and identity disorientation were dangerous for Taiwan. In order to shorten the ethnic gap, President Lee proposed the concept of "New Taiwanese" (新台灣人) based on constructivism. Lee's concept defined nationalism as a self-consciousness of royalty and protection toward a political entity based on the approval to the group culture, and this self-consciousness can be developed regardless the time when members join the group or from where the new members are from.

The New Taiwanese concept slowly reconstructed Taiwan's national identity, in President Lee's four-year term, Taiwan identity reached a 12.8% growth, and the China identity decreased by 5%. President Lee's localization strategy was taken over and promoted to a higher level by his successor, President Chen Shui-bian.

### **3.2.2 Second Presidential election in 2000 - First party rotation**

#### **A divided KMT Party**

In 1994, Soong Chu-yu was elected as the first Governor of Taiwan Province, during his four-year tenure, Soong had been able to accumulate support from all over the island, especially in the poorer central and southern counties, by generously investing funds local public infrastructure. Soong was a star in the KMT, however, then President Lee Teng-hui favored Lien Chan, who once served as the Premier and the vice-President in Lee's regime. In order to decrease Soong's influence, in 1997, Lee Teng-hui agreed with DPP's proposal of freezing the Taiwan Provincial Government, Soong fell out with Lee ever since. The last straw crushed Soong fell in August 1999, when the KMT decided to nominate the vice-President Lien Chan as its candidate for the upcoming Presidential

election<sup>48</sup>. With the strong public support, Soong decided to leave his party and ran as an independent candidate.

Soong was the leading figure in the election, therefore, KMT tried its best to take down Soong, on December 9<sup>th</sup>, 1999, KMT accused Soong of privately taking possession of party poverty while serving as the Secretary General of the party<sup>49</sup>. The accusation seriously damaged Soong's reputation, Soong lost a lot of supporters. However, the KMT did not benefit from Soong's scandal, at the end, KMT's internal strife split the pan-blue votes and gave the DPP the chance to win the election.

### **Warning from the People's Republic of China**

Facing the upcoming Presidential election in Taiwan, Beijing once again intervened, and this time it sent verbal threat. The State Council of the People's Republic of China published the White Paper on the One-China Principle and the Taiwan Issue on February 21<sup>st</sup>, 2000 which stated: *“China is under no obligation to commit itself to rule out the use of force. This is by no means directed against Taiwan compatriots, but against the scheme to create an “independent Taiwan” and against the foreign forces interfering in the reunification of China, and is intended as a necessary safeguard for the striving for peaceful reunification.”*<sup>50</sup>

On March 15<sup>th</sup>, 2000, three days before the Presidential election, PRC Premier, Zhu Rong-ji, gave an aggressive comment by saying *“Whoever proposes ‘Taiwan independence’ will be doomed”*<sup>51</sup>.

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48李登輝：我要開始大聲挺連戰了，中國時報，August 24<sup>th</sup>, 1999,

<http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/vote2000/lien/88082401.htm>

49 立委質疑：宋鎮遠買上億元興票 哪來的錢？，中國時報，Dec 10<sup>th</sup>, 1999,

<http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/vote2000/soong/88121005.htm>

50 一個中國的原則與台灣問題，中華人民共和國國務院台灣事務辦公室，國務院新聞辦公室，北京，

2002 [http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content\\_60035.htm](http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2000/content_60035.htm)

51 China's "Bottom Line" on Taiwan Issue”, Embassy of The People's Republic of China in the United States of America, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/999999999/t36726.htm>



In dealing with the warning from the PRC, both KMT and DPP adjusted their strategies and promoted their policies through mass media.

KMT's candidate, then Vice President Lien Chan, said good bye to President Lee's "Special state to state relationship" and moved toward to its old pro-unification path. Lien proposed the 10-point proposal (連十條) on cross-strait relations as his cross-strait policy.

In 1999, 12.1% of people identifies themselves as Chinese and 42.5% of people had dual identification<sup>52</sup>, therefore, KMT's goal was to consolidate the support from pan-blue voters and attract swing voters. Among the forty-nine TV commercials release by KMT, five commercials aimed at attacking DPP's cross-strait strategies and implying the victory of the pro-independent DPP candidates would lead to a war. KMT released eighty three newspaper advertisements, and eight of them were to attack Chen Shui-bian's pro-independent claims, one thing worth mentioning is that the KMT used one newspaper advertisement to call for ethnic reconciliation<sup>53</sup>.

DPP released twenty two TV commercials, its cross-strait policy was so controversial that it only released two TV commercials related to cross-strait issue, one was to emphasize the DPP would work with the PRC, not fight with it; the other one was to counter then PRC Premier, Zhu Rong-ji's verbal warning with the subtitle of "*Elect our own President, cherish our democracy*"<sup>54</sup>.

DPP's goal was to consolidate the voters with Taiwan identity (39.6%) and attract as many as swing voters as they could, therefore, DPP made one TV commercial to remind the public its contribution to Taiwan's democracy in 2000, the twentieth anniversary of Kaohsiung (Formosa) incident. Moreover, among DPP's twenty two TV commercials,

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52 台灣民眾臺灣人/中國人認同趨勢分佈(1992年06月~2016年12月), 政治大學選舉研究中心, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>

53 鈕則勳, 〈總統候選人之競選傳播策略--以公元二〇〇〇年我國總統大選為例〉, 博士論文, 國立政治大學政治學系, 2001

54 Same as above

ten of them were spoken in Taiwanese and Hakka<sup>55</sup>, obviously DPP knew its support was mainly from the grassroots supporters. “Taiwan independence” was not found on DPP’s TV or newspaper advertisements, we can see that in order to attract swing voters, DPP was moving toward to the middle of spectrum, the China Policy White Paper issued on November 15<sup>th</sup>, 1999 was another strategic adjustment it made to accommodate the mainstream national identity at that time.

### **DPP’s New Middle Way (新中間路線)**

In October, 1991, DPP adopted Taiwan Independence Clause to set the tone for the Party’s orientation, the essence of the Clause was to "build a sovereign independent Republic of Taiwan." In May, 1999, DPP passed the “*Resolution on Taiwan's Future*” (台灣前途決議文) in its National Party Congress.

In the Resolution, DPP recognized that Taiwan was a sovereign nation, any alternation regarding Taiwan’s future shall be decided by all Taiwan residents through referendums<sup>56</sup>. Since DPP recognized that Taiwan was a sovereign nation, building a Republic of Taiwan was not necessary. The huge shift made by DPP was a strategy to pave the way for future policy making and attract the majority- the swing voters (zhong jian xuan min) in 2000 Presidential election, therefore, the strategy was called the New Middle Way (xin zhong jian lu xian)<sup>57</sup>.

In order to eliminate voters’ concern regarding DPP’s pro-independence intention might lead to a war with Beijing, DPP further issued the “*China Policy White Paper*” in November, 1999 to reiterate that building a Republic of Taiwan was not DPP’s goal anymore. China Policy White Paper toned down its pro-Taiwan independence position by stating that "*Taiwan is a sovereign country, under current Constitution, the name of*

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55 Same as above

56 《台灣前途決議文》，民進黨，May 9th, 1999

57 余莓莓，〈從民進黨、國民黨報紙競選廣告看台灣意識 vs. 中國意識之發展與變遷—1996 年 vs. 2000 年 vs. 2004 年總統大選〉，台灣師範大學政治學研究所，2006

*the country is the Republic of China....any change concerning the current status of independence shall be decided by all residents in Taiwan.*<sup>58</sup>

On March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2000, Lee Yuan-tseh, Dean of the Academia Sinica, publically endorsed Chen's New Middle Way by expressing his confidence in Chen's ability of dealing cross-strait issues<sup>59</sup>. Dean Lee's endorsement greatly increased Chen's popularity, in order to maintain this hard-earned precedence, DPP cautiously made a low key in responding to the PRC's warning. That was why DPP only released two TV commercials related to the cross-strait issue, and "Taiwan independence" was not found on DPP's TV or newspaper advertisements in 2000 campaign<sup>60</sup>.

KMT's separation increased DPP's chance of winning, but the PRC's intervention and Chen's New Middle Way were equally important for Chen's victory. Chen's New Middle Way weakened DPP's aggressive Taiwan independence-seeking image and pushed the DPP moving toward to the other side of the spectrum which also won him the votes from swing voters. Voters were disgusted with Beijing's "White Paper" on Taiwan and Premier Zhu, Rong-ji's threat more than they were intimidated, many voters felt that succumbing to Beijing's threat would cause bad consequences for Taiwan's democratization<sup>61</sup>. At the end, the DPP received 39.3% of the votes and won the election.

The ethnic card was played in the election, DPP's candidate, Chen Shui-bian, had a strong grass root image which made voters felt close to; Soong Chu-yu's wife, a Taiwanese, also made a good impression with voters and helped Soong to bridge the ethnic gap, however, KMT candidate Lien Chan and his wife made voters felt distanced, their good

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58 陳水扁總統競選指揮中心國家藍圖委員會,〈跨世紀中國政策白皮書〉,中華民國行政院大陸委員會, <http://www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=68311&ctNode=6621&mp=1>

59 李遠哲在扁營晚會現聲影, 中時電子報, March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2000,

<http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/vote2000/main/89031859.htm>

60 鈕則勳,〈總統候選人之競選傳播策略--以公元二〇〇〇年我國總統大選為例〉, 博士論文, 國立政治大學政治學系, 2001

61 Copper, John F., "Taiwan's 2000 Presidential and Vice Presidential Election: Consolidating Democracy and Creating a New Era of Politics", *Maryland Series in Cotemporary Asian Studies*, 2000,

<http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1156&context=mscas>

relationship with business people and the KMT's "black gold" reputation also made voters questioned about KMT's willingness of caring the people's livelihood.

Statistics showed that 69.1% of voters with high level of Taiwan identity voted for DPP and 53.6% of voters with low level of Taiwan identity voted for Soong Chu-yu, therefore, we can see Taiwan identity began to influence Taiwan's Presidential elections<sup>62</sup>.

### 3.2.3 Third Presidential election in 2004

In 2002, President Chen Shui-bian proposed the One Country on Each Side (一邊一國) and in November, 2003, he further raised the idea of having a referendum for making the New Constitution (公投制憲)<sup>63</sup>. Both ideas greatly irritating Beijing, however, with the experiences in 1996 and 2000, Beijing realized that its anti-Taiwan independence comments would only push Taiwanese away, especially during election season. The PRC was afraid that publicly intervening Taiwan's Presidential elections would upset Taiwanese and encourage voters to vote for DPP, the party with strong Taiwan identity. Therefore, Beijing asked the United States to restrain President Chen Shui Bian's pro-independence moves<sup>64,65</sup>.

President Chen's lost a lot of supporters for his poor performance during his first tenure, plus the external pressure did not allow the DPP to operate the pro-independence topic freely in the campaign, therefore, DPP's strategy was to gain support from voters with strong Taiwan identity by promoting its contribution in democratization and protecting Taiwan's sovereignty.

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62 鄭夙芬, 〈族群認同與總統選舉投票抉擇〉, 政治大學 選舉研究中心, 2009

63 陳水扁提出新憲公投時間表, BBC 中文網, November 11th, 2003,  
[http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid\\_3260000/newsid\\_3260500/3260567.stm](http://news.bbc.co.uk/chinese/trad/hi/newsid_3260000/newsid_3260500/3260567.stm)

64 邱泰淵, 〈美中台三邊關係(1996-2005)之研究:從台灣總統選舉因素分析〉, 碩士論文, 國立政治大學東亞研究所, 2005

65 美首度明確表明「反對」台獨公投, TVBS, December 2nd, 2003,  
<http://news.tvbs.com.tw/other/391995>

The DPP organized a rally on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004 to commemorate the tragedy in 1947 which promoted the modern formation of the Taiwanese identity.

Facing the accusation from the opponent that it did not identify with or love Taiwan, the KMT came up with an astonishing idea which showed its love to Taiwan and impressed the public.

### **DPP's 228 Hand in Hand to Protect Taiwan**

On Aug. 23, 1989, the three Baltic States, Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia formed a 2 million-person human chain covering 600km to protest the former Soviet Union's occupation. Following the human chain protest, the three countries successfully held referendums to declare their independence from Russia<sup>66</sup>.

The DPP copied the concept and organized a huge rally on February 28<sup>th</sup>, 2004, the 300-kilometer-long human chain aimed at protecting Taiwan from the intimidation generated by the People's Republic of China. The rally was a big success, a poll conducted shortly after the rally showed that DPP almost caught up with KMT<sup>67</sup>. The rally provided a silver lining for the DPP.

### **KMT's "Kiss the Land" Campaign**

DPP's success on February 28<sup>th</sup> forced KMT to have a counter-event to demonstrate its love for Taiwan as well. On March 13<sup>th</sup>, 2004, KMT organized an anti-Chen Shui-bian demonstration. The event, which took place throughout the nation's 25 cities and counties, reached the climax when the presidential candidate, KMT Chairman Lien Chan (連戰) kissed the ground alongside his wife Lien Fang-yu (連方瑀) and KMT Secretary-General Lin, Fong-cheng (林豐正) in front of the Presidential Office. Shortly before Lien's surprise moment, his vice-President candidate, Soong Chu-yu (宋楚瑜), who led the march in Taichung City, also knelt on the ground with his wife, Chen Wan-shui (陳萬

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66 Two million rally for peace, Taipei Times, Feb 29<sup>th</sup>, 2004,  
<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/02/29/2003100533>

67 228 「牽手護台灣」 引國際媒體關注, TVBS, Feb 29<sup>th</sup>, 2004,  
<http://news.tvbs.com.tw/other/380857>

水), and kissed the ground<sup>68</sup>. The fact that the KMT was threatened by the DPP's rally showed that Taiwan identity was the greatest common factor of the society, and whoever made voters feel they loved Taiwan had the best chance to win the election.

### **March 19<sup>th</sup> Shooting Incident**

In the afternoon of March 19th, 2004, one day before the voting day, President Candidate Chen Shui-bian was shot on the street during his campaign activity. Conspiracies about the shooting were raised and so did the unrest of the society. The next day the Central Election Commission announced the vote would be held as scheduled since Chen only had minor injuries. Chen Shui-bian won the election with a narrow margin 0.228%.<sup>69</sup>

Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study, 2002-2004(III): The Presidential election, 2004 released by TEDS showed that 63.1% of interviewees thought that the March 19th shooting influenced the Presidential election the most, and 34.9% of interviewees were influenced while voting<sup>70</sup>.

Lien Chan's collaboration with Soong, Chu-yu integrated the votes from pan-blue camp and the KMT was ahead of the DPP from the beginning, therefore, it was difficult for pan-blue supporters to accept their lost. But one must say, the reason why the shooting on March 19th was able to receive some sympathy from swing voters and facilitated Chen's victory was because of DPP's effort in cultivating Taiwan identity in the past four years.

Among 80.5% of voters with high Taiwan identity voted for the DPP and 82.6% of voters with low Taiwan identity voted for the KMT, once again the data showed that national identity was still a strong factor in Taiwan's Presidential election<sup>71</sup>. (See Table 1)

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68 Lien, Soong hold dramatic rally, Taipei Times, Mar 14th, 2004,  
<http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2004/03/14/2003102366>

69 第 11 任總統(副總統)選舉 候選人得票數, 中央選舉委員會,  
<http://db.cec.gov.tw/histQuery.jsp?voteCode=20040301P1A1&qryType=ctks>

70 Huang, Shio-w-uan, "Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study, 2002-2004(III): The Presidential election, 2004 (TEDS 2004P)", Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study, 2004

71 鄭夙芬, 〈族群認同與總統選舉投票抉擇〉, 政治大學 選舉研究中心, 2009

Taiwan Identity	DPP	KMT	Samples
Low	17.4%	82.6%	219
Medium	34.2%	65.8%	406
High	80.5%	19.5%	625
Total	54.4%	45.6%	1,250

**Table 1** ↑

### 3.2.4 Fourth Presidential election in 2008

Before the Presidential election in 2008, the PRC's military power was way ahead Taiwan, plus the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, who was favored by Beijing and had the biggest chance to win, hence, the PRC was more confident, it decided not to send aggressive threats but wait patiently for the outcome.

Without Beijing's blatant intervention, the DPP had no choice but promoting its pro-Taiwan identity by attacking Ma's royalty for Taiwan. KMT did not play the national identity game with the DPP, instead, Ma focus on his goals in achieving economic growth and the peaceful relationship with Beijing.

#### **DPP's Taiwan Identity Strategy**

President Chen's reputation was extremely low, and his pro-independence policies not only hurt the mutual trust between the DPP and Washington, but also caused the impasse in cross-strait relation. The situation was unfavorable for the DPP, in order to consolidate its base-voters (voters with high Taiwan identity), its candidate, Hsieh Chang-ting had been attacking Ma's Green card (US permanent residence) and "One China Market" issues to build Ma's unpatriotic image.

During the campaign, Hsieh questioned Ma's possession of Green card, at first Ma denied yet later he held a press release explaining that he obtained Green card in 1977 but he

renounced the US permanent residence twenty years ago. Ma's reworded statement was used against him as the proof of his ethics and honesty issues<sup>72</sup>.

Hsieh heavily criticized Ma's "cross-strait Common Market" policy and called it "One-China market" during the campaign. Hsieh questioned Ma's policy including introducing Chinese labors and agricultural products would harm Taiwan's economy. In fact, Hsieh's goal was to build Ma's disloyalty to Taiwan by discussing the validity of Ma's Green card, Hsieh further labeled Ma as someone selling out Taiwan by questioning Ma's One-China market. DPP's was promoting itself as the protector of Taiwan<sup>73</sup>.

In 2008, DPP's strategy was to make the voters to choose between China and Taiwan, which was DPP's usual tactic in all the Presidential elections.

However, Hsieh's strategies were ineffective, even he received support from 58.7% of high Taiwan identity voters, he received nearly no recognition from moderate voters<sup>74</sup>.

Although using the identity issue as the main campaign strategy helped DPP to solidify its base but also distanced itself from the moderate voters, failing to predict what voters wanted was the reason for DPP's huge setback in 2008<sup>75</sup>.

### **KMT's Centrism**

In 2007, 43.7% of Taiwanese identified themselves as Taiwanese, and 44.7% of Taiwanese identified themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese. KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, knew that he's background as a second-generation mainlander might be his disadvantage and the voters would question his allegiance for Taiwan. Therefore, KMT's

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72 馬英九改口 坦承曾有綠卡, 自由時報, January 29th, 2008, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/185779>

73 謝批馬一中市場 誓言守護台灣, 自由時報, March 18th, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/196836>

74 Same as above

75 藍打經濟牌 攻克南台灣, 自由時報, March 23rd, 2008, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/198200>



strategy was to consolidate its base while attracting those 44.7% of voters with dual identity.

In order to shorten the distance between Ma and the citizens in central and Southern Taiwan, where DPP usually wins, Ma started his “Long Stay” project in July, 2007. He also made comments in Taiwanese quite often during this campaign, his strategies showed that he, just like most people on this island, identified with Taiwan.

To further show his love for Taiwan, Ma declared loudly and clearly his Taiwanese identity (“I am Taiwanese”), and asserted Taiwan’s sovereignty and its independence as the Republic of China<sup>76</sup>. He also committed himself to defending Taiwan’s sovereignty, and pledged that Taiwan’s future could be decided only by Taiwan’s 23 million citizens<sup>77</sup>.

Then Ma reaffirmed his willingness to maintain the status quo with China, promising not to pursue unification in the short or medium term and not to embark on any negotiations on the subject during his term of office. Lastly, he took a firm stand on democracy as the core value of Taiwanese society, setting the democratization of China as the precondition for any future unification<sup>78</sup>.

At the same time, Ma adopted a friendlier attitude toward economic cooperation with Beijing, aiming at improving the economic downturn, so Taiwan can be benefited from PRC’s rapid economic growth.

Based on the social condition and public opinion, Ma proposed a cross-strait policy that aimed at attracting swing voters, his “Centrism” focused on four principles including recognizing the 92 Consensus that implies “One China, respective interpretation”; maintaining the status quo with the PRC, that was “no Taiwan independence, no force invention”; enabling bilateral conversation, trade cooperation and easing the tension;

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76 Mo Yan-chih and Shih Hsiu-chuan, “Defend Taiwan’s Sovereignty, Says Ma,” Taipei Times, 15 March, 2008

77 馬：台灣前途 台灣人說了算, 自由時報, March 15th, 2008,  
<http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/paper/196049>

78 Muyard, Frank, “Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou’s Victory and the KMT’s Return to Power”, *China Perspectives*, 2008

achieving win-win by promoting mutual cultural interaction; making diplomatic breakthrough based on “variable diplomacy”. These four principles were also the common denominator of less aggressive pan-blue and pan-green voters<sup>79</sup>.

### **Taiwan's Referendums on the United Nations**

On the same day of the Presidential election, two important referendums for Taiwan’s international relations were held. The first, held by the DPP, appealed joining the UN under the name of Taiwan. The second, held by the KMT, proposed that Taiwan should return to the UN under the name of the Republic of China (ROC) or any other acceptable name.

Even the both referendums were opposed by the United States and the People’s Republic of China<sup>80</sup>, both the DPP and the KMT were still persistent about it. The DPP called for yes votes in both referendums to make sure that at least one would succeed, however for KMT, the purpose of having its referendum was merely to compete with the DPP on the identity issue, not to anger the U.S. or the PRC, therefore, the KMT decided to actively boycott the DPP proposal and support its own without urging supporters to vote. With a mere 36% turnout for each of the referendums, both were invalidated.

The outcome of this election was considered “doomed” at the beginning when many voters were dissatisfied with Chen Shui-bian and the DPP government, and had the desire for a change after two terms under the green party. DPP’s attempt of playing the national identity card was not successful, Hsieh’s campaign did rally the grassroots of the Pan-Green camp, but it did not convince swing voters or stimulate a higher turnout.

KMT, on the other hand, learnt from its two failures and recognized the importance of Taiwan identity, adopted strategies that closely followed the mainstream. Ma Ying-jeou ran the campaign with his programme for closer economic interactions with the PRC and

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79 李永枝：如何應對馬英九新中間主義路線，南窗風，May 5th, 2007, <http://www.nfcmag.com/article/315.html>

80 Rice reiterates U.S. opposition to "referendum" on Taiwan's UN membership, Xinhua Agency, February 26th, 2008, <http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/zt/twwt/t410157.htm>

for maintaining the political status quo in the Taiwan Strait. Ma's strategies eventually gained huge support from swing voters.

From the 2008 Presidential election, we can see that even nearly 50% of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese, and the pro-independence rate has been raising, but most people prefer maintaining the status quo with the PRC. Voters' weariness of the tension between two sides of the Strait and the desire of being economic benefited from the economic cooperation with the PRC were the two main reasons bringing the KMT back to power.

KMT candidate's declaration of his Taiwanese identity and his commitment of Taiwan's future shall be decided by Taiwan's 23 million citizens and the referendums held by both parties showed that Taiwan identity still influenced Taiwan's Presidential elections.<sup>81</sup> However, Taiwan has been struggling in the global financial crisis since 2007, therefore, the ability to improve the economy was the first consideration for voters. KMT winning the election showed that most voters believed they would be benefited by working with Beijing.

### **3.2.5 Fifth Presidential election in 2012**

Beijing's ways of intervening Taiwan's Presidential elections have evolved over the past decade with the very same goal of preventing the DPP candidates to be elected. Beijing knows that currently it does not have the ability to appoint the President for Taiwan, but it hopes to have the veto power on this matter. The chance for the PRC to have the veto power was given for the first time when then KMT chairperson, Lien Chan, had a meeting with then CCP chairperson, Hu Jing Tao, in the People's Republic of China in 2005.

PRC's veto power started to get real after Ma Ying-jeou was elected as the President in 2008, Beijing had more chances to insert its influence since the KMT became the ruling party again. Beijing was satisfied with President Ma's recognition of the 92 Consensus,

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<sup>81</sup>陳陸輝, 耿曙, 王德育, 〈兩岸關係與 2008 年台灣總統大選:認同 利益 威脅與選民投票取向〉, 陳陸輝等(主編), 《2008 年總統選舉—論二次政黨輪替之關鍵選舉》, 台北: 五南出版社, 2009

and the practice of “Diplomatic truce” (外交休兵), therefore, it offered numerous economic incentives such as cross-strait direct flights, unrestricted tourism for the PRC tourists to visit Taiwan and the signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

President Ma took every chance to show his accomplishment under the 92 Consensus in his first turn, and the 92 Consensus therefore became the most critical issue in the 2012 Presidential election. It was also the first time that the KMT used the 92 Consensus as its main strategy in Presidential elections.

The so-called 92 Consensus was a verbal agreement made by Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) in 1992<sup>82</sup>. For the PRC, the 92 Consensus means both regimes agree the principle of “One China”, for the ROC it means “One China, respective interpretations”. Both side did not recognize nor deny each other’s claims, and by doing so, two sides could engage in negotiations and walk on the path to the future reconciliation.

To counter President Ma’s strategy, Tsai Yin-wen, as the DPP presidential candidate, brought up the idea of “Taiwan Consensus”. Two candidates’ attitude toward the cross-strait issues was critical in this election, and once again, the national identity played a major role in the Presidential election.

### **KMT’s recognition of the 92 Consensus**

After Ma Ying-jeou took office in 2008, the relationship between Taiwan and Beijing has improved based on the foundation of the 92 Consensus which showed that the significance of the 92 Consensus. The KMT assumed Tsai Yin-wen from the DPP would adopt a more flexible China policy to attract swing voters so Ma Ying-jeou had to come up with a strategy that was more flexible than Tsai Yin-wen’s to save his poor popularity.

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<sup>82</sup> Yen, Chen-shen, “Taiwan’s presidential election: a referendum on the 1992 Consensus”, East Asia Forum, February 14<sup>th</sup>, 2012, <http://www.eastasiaforum.org/2012/02/14/taiwan-s-presidential-election-a-referendum-on-the-1992-consensus/>

Therefore, Ma Ying-jeou made a good use of the 92 Consensus under his framework of no unification and no independence.

Based on Ma's strategy, if he could persuade the voters that the 92 Consensus is the key to maintain the status-quo and improve the cross-strait relationship, he could receive more support from the swing voters. On the other hand, it would be very difficult for Tsai Yin-wen to gain recognition from the swing voters if she did not face the 92 Consensus.

Therefore, the KMT took the cross-strait issue as its key to victory, and its 92 Consensus strategy managed to diminish the DPP's hope of receiving support from the swing voters.

King Pu-tung, the executive director of Ma Ying-jeou's re-election campaign office, appointed two young people without election-running experience as the spokespersons to create the image that KMT valued the young generation<sup>83</sup>. In order to attract voters with both national identity, King kept the KMT's "Taiwan First" strategy in 2008, and widely used the R.O.C. image including national anthem and the national flag in the campaign<sup>84</sup>.

On October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011, in the fifth press conference of "Golden Decade, nation's prospect", President Ma raised an idea of signing the "Cross-strait Peace Agreement" with Beijing under the circumstance when the country needs it, the people support it and the Congress supervises it<sup>85</sup>.

Ma's proposal of signing the Cross-strait Peace Agreement upset many citizens, and his supporting rate dropped<sup>86</sup>, therefore an emergent press conference was held by Ma Ying-jeou in the Presidential Hall on October 20<sup>th</sup>. Ma reiterated that there would be no timetable for the signing of the agreement, and the agreement would only be considered when the country needs it, the people support it and the Congress supervises it. Ma also

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<sup>83</sup> 馬英九競選辦公室五月底開始運作 金溥聰任執行長, 今日新聞, May 4<sup>th</sup>, 2011, <https://m.nownews.com/news/530680>

<sup>84</sup> 蕭展正, 馬英九蔡英文經典宣傳大解密: 台灣 2012 總統大選 雙英對決實錄, 台北, 華品文創, 2012

<sup>85</sup> 馬英九: 兩岸洽簽和平協議有前提, BBC 中文網, October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2011, [http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese\\_news/2011/10/111017\\_ma\\_agreement.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2011/10/111017_ma_agreement.shtml)

<sup>86</sup> Narrowing, Economist, November 19<sup>th</sup>, 2011, <http://www.economist.com/node/21538792>

promised a referendum would be held first<sup>87</sup>. Obviously, for the Taiwan society at that time, Beijing's intention was still suspicious.

### **Tsai Yin Wen's Taiwan Consensus**

On August 23<sup>rd</sup>, 2011, Tsai Yin-wen published the cross-strait policy under the Ten-Year Policy Platform<sup>88</sup>. The Ten-Year Policy Platform was Tsai's policies regarding Taiwan's future for the following ten years, and the cross-strait policy adopted the stable centrism based on DPP's *Resolution on Taiwan's Future* that issued in 1991.

However, Tsai's denial of the existence of the 92 Consensus made it the focus of the election since then on. Tsai's campaign team did not expect Beijing to accept their cross-strait policy, they only wanted it to be accepted by most voters in Taiwan.

On October 8<sup>th</sup>, Tsai said "Taiwan is the Republic of China, the Republic of China is Taiwan"<sup>89</sup>, and she further moving toward to the center on October 9<sup>th</sup> by saying that "the Republic of China has be integrated with the land and the people of Taiwan, the government of the Republic of China is the government of Taiwan".

Even her moderate idea was criticized by deep-green supporters, Tsai received a lot of support within the party. In responding Tsai's comment, Ma Ying-jeou oriented the relationship of the Republic of China and Taiwan as "the Republic of China is my country and Taiwan is my home"<sup>90</sup>.

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<sup>87</sup> 馬英九稱兩岸和平協議將先經公投, BBC 中文網, October 20<sup>th</sup>, 2011,

[http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese\\_news/2011/10/111020\\_taiwan\\_maying-jeou.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/chinese_news/2011/10/111020_taiwan_maying-jeou.shtml)

<sup>88</sup> 〈十年政綱-兩岸篇〉, 民主進步黨, 2011 [http://iing10.blogspot.tw/2011/08/blog-post\\_21.html](http://iing10.blogspot.tw/2011/08/blog-post_21.html)

<sup>89</sup> 蔡英文: 中華民國就是台灣, 中央通訊社, October 8th, 2011

<http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201110080060-1.aspx>

<sup>90</sup> 馬英九: 中華民國是國家, 台灣是家園, 今日新聞, October 12th, 2011,

<http://www.nownews.com/n/2011/10/12/474655>

Tsai wanted to replace the 92 Consensus with her Taiwan Consensus, but she did not provide specific details about the concept, only promised that she would gather the domestic consensus through democratic procedures after being elected<sup>91</sup>.

Tsai Yin Wen made Ma Ying-jeou as an extreme unificationist which was the same strategy Hsieh Chang-ting adopted in 2008. Some of the swing voters were worried about Ma pushing the cross-strait interaction too fast, so Tsai should have had more chances to gain support from the swing voters, however, because Tsai was too caught up by the 92 Consensus to provide her own convincing cross-strait policy that could diminish the doubts raised by domestic and international audiences, most swing voters chose to vote for Ma Ying-jeou instead<sup>92</sup>.

### **Interference from Outside**

The PRC sent messages through the Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council by stating that the 92 Consensus is the foundation of the cross-strait interaction, unrecognizing it would discontinue the future cooperation and jeopardize the interests of the compatriots on both sides<sup>93</sup>. Beijing's statement not only warned the DPP but also showed its support to Ma Ying-jeou.

The United States did not want to see another cross-strait crisis taking place, hence it meddled in the election by openly doubted Tsai's Taiwan Consensus, complimented Ma Ying-jeou's promise on the 92 Consensus, and his achievement in maintaining the peace status quo with the PRC<sup>94</sup>. The U.S. further nominated Taiwan to the U.S. Visa Waiver

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<sup>91</sup> 蔡英文：「台灣共識」就是我們要走的路，民主進步黨，September 18th, 2011, [http://www.dpp.org.tw/news\\_content.php?sn=5365](http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=5365)

<sup>92</sup> 小笠原欣幸，〈2012年台灣總統選舉：選戰過程與決定性因素〉，IDE-JETRO 亞洲經濟研究院，2012

<sup>93</sup> 台辦發言人就蔡英文公布「十年政綱」答記者問，中華人民共和國中央人民政府，August 24th, 2011, [http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-08/24/content\\_1932049.htm](http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2011-08/24/content_1932049.htm)

<sup>94</sup> 美前駐台官員表態肯定九二共識，BBC 中文網，January 13th, 2012, [http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world/2012/01/120113\\_taiwan\\_election.shtml](http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/world/2012/01/120113_taiwan_election.shtml)

Program twenty days before the election<sup>95</sup>, the U.S.'s behavior successfully promoted Ma and helped him to win the second term.

2012 election was an election regarding the ability and the ideology of the candidates, Tsai Yin-wen, as DPP's candidate, was given a great chance to win since more than 50% of people on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese and Ma Ying-jeou lost a lot of support due to his poor performance in his first tenure.

However, the fact that Ma Ying-jeou received major support when Taiwan identity dominated the society showed that most of Taiwanese wished to maintain the status-quo, so Taiwan could keep its sovereignty while being benefited from the PRC's economic growth.

Ma Ying-jeou caught the trend, he continued his "Taiwan first" strategy to attract voters with Taiwan identity, promoted the Republic of China to gain support from voters who bonded with the Republic of China. Ma's emphasize on Taiwan/ROC identity attracted swing voters, even pan-green voters and his commitment to the 92 Consensus consolidated pan-blue voters, the strategies eventually helped the KMT winning the election.

The image and strategies of both candidates were similar, hence the national identity issue was not paid too much attention to, however, no candidate was dare to challenge it, either. Although Taiwan identity did not show much influence, it did not mean it had no impact on this election.

### **3.2.6 Fifth Presidential election in 2016**

Several mass-demonstrations such as the Sunflower Movement and the White Shirt Army (a mass protest following the death of army conscript Hung Chung-chu) took place since

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<sup>95</sup> Taiwan Nominated to the U.S. Visa Waiver Program, American Institute in Taiwan, December 22<sup>nd</sup>, 2011, <https://www.ait.org.tw/en/pressrelease-pr1170.html>



2013, these demonstrations were mainly organized by young generation with the purpose of pursuing greater justice in various aspects.

Having demonstration is a good way for the citizens to express their discontent toward the government, and normally, the opposite parties would support the demonstrations for two purposes, first, to take down the ruling government and second, gain support from the demonstrators for the future elections.

The anti-KMT emotion was accumulated since 2013, and reached the peak in Sun Flower movement that took place in 2014, which caused the disastrous failure of KMT in nine-in-one local elections<sup>96</sup> and later again in the Presidential election in 2016.

DPP's effort in supporting these demonstrations was paid back in the 2014 local election and the 2016 Presidential election, with the overwhelming anti-China sentiment and strong distrust toward the KMT, the DPP led all the way in the Presidential campaign. Although all the candidates avoided direct mention the national identity during the campaign, the Chou Tzu-yu incident which inspired half millions of young citizens to vote on January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2016<sup>97</sup> still made Taiwan identity a critical issue in the election.

### **Sun Flower movement in 2014**

The profitable economic prospect promised by Ma administration by signing ECFA with Beijing did not meet with people's expectation, Taiwanese started to realize that over-depending on the PRC's economy was dangerous. Beijing's intention of "promoting unification by economic cooperation" (以經促統) and Ma government's passive resistance were widely sensed by Taiwan citizen, especially the young generation.

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<sup>96</sup> Taiwan's Changing Political Landscape: The KMT's Landslide Defeat in the Nine-in-One Elections, The Brookings Institution, November 8<sup>th</sup>, 2014, <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-changing-political-landscape-the-kmts-landslide-defeat-in-the-nine-in-one-elections/>

<sup>97</sup> TVBS 民調：周子瑜至少催出 50 萬票, TVBS, January 20th, 2016, <http://news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/636079>

Under such background, when the government tried to pass the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA), a bill aimed at liberalizing trade in service industries between two sides, in a way that lacked of transparency, the public's indignation was expected.

Thus, on March 18<sup>th</sup>, 2014, a demonstration organized mainly by students took place to fight against the pass of CSSTA bill. The anti-CSSTA movement protested against the KMT leadership's undemocratic way of negotiating and passing the bill. The protest received a lot of attention from both home and abroad.

The students had four demands: review and renegotiate the trade services pact in the legislature; implement an oversight bill; pass that oversight mechanism before the services deal is reviewed; and hold a citizens' constitutional assembly<sup>98</sup>.

As the protest went on there appeared to be two different views held by the student protesters. Some students claimed that they were protesting against the undemocratic handling of the bill, they called the process "black-box". This group was not fundamentally against the trade deal, they only demanded to first establish a bill to ensure that members of the parliament can directly review the trade pact and the people can directly participate in its process, and conduct the review afterwards.

The "anti-black box" group, much like the student demonstrators of the past generation, was aiming to strengthen the democratic process in Taiwan's legislature.

As the protests continued, there was another group insisted that the CSSTA must be revoked. For this group, contention lied not only with the undemocratic way by which the bill was passed, but also the bill itself. This "anti-CSSTA" group appeared to be more ideological and seemed to oppose the bill either due to feelings of odium towards President Ma and the KMT, or a discretion of any agreement with Beijing.

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<sup>98</sup> 《凱道集會》林飛帆：馬總統，請接受人民指揮！，自由時報，March 30<sup>th</sup>, 2014, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/978654>

The anti-KMT and anti-PRC sentiment grew stronger among the society at that time, anything related to these two parties antagonized the public, indeed a poll carried out by Liberty Times showed that while 80.23% of respondents do not have sufficient knowledge about the pact, 46.21% opposed the CSSTA<sup>99</sup>. The poll sent a message to the KMT that working with the PRC was no longer its panacea.

The movement was a declaration made by the youth generation. The fact President Ma was elected for two times showed that most Taiwanese expected a stable cross-strait relations and their distrust towards the DPP's ideology in dealing with Beijing. We can say that pursuing Taiwan independence was not the priority for most of the residents on this island, however, the Sun Flower Movement indicated one thing, that even most of Taiwanese was not looking for an immediate independence, they would definitely not accept the unification with the PRC.

The protest became the most important collective memory of the young generation, in fact, they've been accumulating the collect memory since Da Pu case (大埔案), Hung Chung Chu incident (洪仲秋案), and eventually, the Sun Flower generation.

They knew the cross-strait interaction would seriously influence their future, they also realized the current leader would try his best to achieve his historical legacy since it was his last tenure and the KMT was the parliamentary majority, therefore, they needed to use their civil rights to protect themselves and this country.

The movement itself was not about fighting against certain politician or party, but to urge for a more democratic society in which every citizen would be respected and the sovereignty of the country could be protected.

A survey conducted by New Brain Trust four months after the movement showed a new development regarding national identity and independence/unification attitude among young citizens. First, 60.4% of interviewees identified themselves as Taiwanese, 4.5%

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<sup>99</sup> 服貿協議 民眾「八成」不知 本報民調：二成三民眾贊成 四成六反對, 自由時報, March 13th, 2014, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/761732>

identified as Chinese and 32.6% identifies as both, however, if the interviewees could only choose between Taiwanese and Chinese, the figure for Taiwan identity was 88.2% and 8.3% for China identity. The result was more or less the same over the past few surveys, yet one thing worth mentioning was that 97.2% of people from age 20 to 29 identified themselves as Taiwanese, and 90.8% of people from age 30 to 39 identifies themselves as Taiwanese, both figures showed that the young generation had a very strong Taiwan identity.

For independence/unification attitude, the pro-independence rate of citizens between age 20 to 29 raised to 44.1% from the 31.8% before the movement. The growth indicted that the Sun Flower Movement encouraged more young people to support Taiwan independence, and in a survey conducted in June, 69.7% of people between age 20 to 29 disliked the PRC. The result of the survey served as an important reference for parties during the cross-strait policy making<sup>100</sup>.

Plenty of DPP politicians were active in the demonstration, certainly, the DPP was fearful that if the KMT's China policy was successful it would endanger the DPP's hope of returning to power, and DPP's effort was paid off in the 2014 municipal election in which it gained a landslide victory and again in the Presidential election in 2016.

### **Tsai Ing Wen's promise of maintaining the status-quo**

On June 3<sup>rd</sup>, 2015, the DPP Presidential candidate, Tsai Ing-wen, gave a speech in the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS). In her speech, she said the maintenance of the status quo was the broad consensus in Taiwan and therefore she promised that she would push for the peaceful and stable development of Cross-strait relations in accordance with the will of the Taiwanese people and the existing constitutional order of the Republic of China<sup>101</sup>.

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<sup>100</sup>太陽花學運後呈現的統獨意識變化, 新台灣智庫, August 26<sup>th</sup>, 2014, [http://www.braintrust.tw/article\\_detail/1964](http://www.braintrust.tw/article_detail/1964)

<sup>101</sup> 蔡英文於 CSIS 演說: 台灣迎向挑戰—打造亞洲新價值的典範, 民主進步黨, June 4<sup>th</sup>, 2015, [http://www.dpp.org.tw/news\\_content.php?sn=7911](http://www.dpp.org.tw/news_content.php?sn=7911)

Tsai knew the national identity and the ethnic issue would only narrow down her chance of winning, therefore, she promised to maintain the status-quo without specifying the definition of the status quo to keep her strategies flexible.

Although the Taiwan identity was the mainstream, most Taiwanese preferred the status quo, therefore, Tsai's promise of maintaining the status-quo diminished most voters' concern about the cross-strait relationship might be deteriorated should Tsai got elected. Tsai's moderate move eventually gained favor of the voters, especially the young ones.

### **KMT replaced its pro-unification candidate**

The KMT's supporting rate dropped drastically after the disastrous defeat in the nine-in-one election in 2014, with the little chance of winning the Presidential election, no senior members were interested in running for the President, meanwhile, then vice Speaker of the Legislative Yuan, Hung Hsiu-chu, became the first member to register for the party's primary for its 2016 presidential candidate, Hung said her intention was only to prompt the other KMT heavyweights to run.

Hung unexpectedly passed the 30 percent threshold in the ruling (KMT) three presidential primary polls on Sunday June 14<sup>th</sup>, with an average approval rating of 46.203 percent.

The KMT officially named Hung Hsiu-chu as its candidate for the January 2016 presidential election at its national party congress on July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015<sup>102</sup>.

However, Hung's approval ratings were lagging far behind those of the DPP candidate Tsai Ing-wen partly because she advocated stronger ties with China when some Taiwanese voters are wary about the island becoming too close to Beijing.

Hung called Taiwan a "model province" of China, and on one occasion characterized reunification with China as inevitable, calling for Taiwanese to take the initiative and self-integrate with the mainland. Her pro-unification preference distanced herself from

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<sup>102</sup> 國民黨全代會通過提名洪秀柱競選總統, BBC 中文網, July 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015, [http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2015/07/150719\\_taiwan\\_election\\_kmt](http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2015/07/150719_taiwan_election_kmt)

many Taiwanese voters which made her polling rate below 20% while the DPP candidate for president, Tsai Ing-wen, was polling above 40 percent<sup>103</sup>.

Hung's pro-unification proposal was not accepted by the majority, and her low supporting rate led many people in the KMT to worry that the party would lose not only the Presidency but its majority in the parliament during the legislative race which would be held at the same time.

On October 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015, at an emergency congress, KMT members voted overwhelmingly to drop Hung Hsiu-chu for her poor ratings in opinion polls. She was replaced by the party's chairman, Eric Chu ten days later<sup>104</sup>.

Hung Hsiu-chu got ditched for her unpopular pro-unification campaign strategy which showed the KMT was well aware of the fact that most voters identified themselves as Taiwanese, and unification was not supported by the public. KMT's replacement of its presidential candidate was also regarded as the primary reason for the KMT's loss since many pan-blue voters refused to vote for a divided KMT.

### **Chou Tzu-yu Incident in 2016**

On January 8<sup>th</sup>, 2016, Huang An accused Chou Tzu-yu, a Taiwanese K-POP girl group member, as a pro-Taiwan independence activist because she held ROC flag on Korean TV show and mentioned several times that she was from Taiwan. Chou's performance in the PRC was cancelled several days later, her group was banned in the PRC which caused a great loss of her company, JPY.

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<sup>103</sup> Laskai, Lorand C., Taiwan's Ruling Party Just Booted Its Own Sarah Palin Off the Ticket, Foreign Policy, October 19<sup>th</sup>, 2015, <http://foreignpolicy.com/2015/10/19/china-taiwan-election-kmt-dpp-democracy-hung-mainland/>

<sup>104</sup> Taiwan's KMT party ditches Hung Hsiu-chu as candidate, BBC News, October 17<sup>th</sup>, 2015, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-34559238>

On January 14<sup>th</sup>, JYP made a public announcement that the “Chou Tzu-yu supports and respects the “One China Policy”<sup>105</sup>, the company also changed Chou’s place of birth into “China Taiwan”<sup>106</sup>.

The night before the election, Chou's company forced her to apologize publicly, the video of her apology dominated the news in Taiwan and stoked widespread sympathy for Chou and anti-PRC sentiment which were widely credited with benefiting the DPP <sup>107</sup>.

The PRC’s suppression on Chou arouse Taiwanese’ nationalism, a lot people took Beijing’s hostility as a threat toward Taiwan’s sovereignty, therefore, young people with strong Taiwan identity chose to punish the pro-Beijing KMT by voting the DPP in the Presidential election the next day.

Since more than half of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese in 2015, the gap between different identities was so narrow that both parties did not take national identity issue as their main campaign strategy, we can even notice that both candidates tend to avoid to discuss the national identity issue or the cross-strait relations.

The voters were well-aware of the consequence if the China-wary opposition party DPP regains power, Taiwan’s trade, tourism and other exchanges might suffer. Whereas a KMT victory could bring more economic integration which might facilitate mutual trust and even reach a lasting peace, but it might also violate Taiwan's sovereignty.

Many were uncomfortable with having the KMT, which supported the idea of “One China”, continue to negotiate deals and develop relations with Beijing, hence these people voted for the opposition the DPP<sup>108</sup>.

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<sup>105</sup>周子瑜被指台獨 JYP 聲明：她支持一中, 中央通訊社, January 15<sup>th</sup>, 2016, <http://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/201601150007-1.aspx>

<sup>106</sup>周子瑜事件持續發酵 兩岸三地反應強烈, BBC 中文網, January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2016, [http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/01/160116\\_taiwan\\_chou\\_tzu\\_yu](http://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/01/160116_taiwan_chou_tzu_yu)

<sup>107</sup> ELECTIONS: Singer’s ‘forced apology’ angers nation, Taipei Times, January 17<sup>th</sup>, 2016, <http://www.taipetimes.com/News/front/archives/2016/01/17/2003637387>

<sup>108</sup> An election battle for the identity of Taiwan, BBC, January 1<sup>st</sup>, 2016, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-35192142>

KMT's two victories made it seem like people cared more about the economy than sovereignty, yet since 2014, the public's attitude towards Beijing has changed. People started to realize that Taiwan worked with Beijing for economic reasons, but Beijing worked with Taiwan for political purposes, therefore, being economically over-dependent on the PRC might cost Taiwan's independence one day.

Nationalist sentiment is usually stirred up when objects facing sovereignty crisis, and at the end, Taiwan identity still played a significant role in the 2016 Presidential election.

This election indicated a fundamental change of Taiwan politics and the sign of the change was shown for the first time in the Sun Flower Movement in 2014, and the first impact it brought was the landslide defeat of the KMT in the nine-in-one local election at the end of 2014. The trigger for this change was the sense of crisis generated from the over-dependence on the PRC during the eight years of Ma Ying-jeou's administration.

In Ma's second term, he expected to leave a historic legacy by building an irreversible close relationship with Beijing. Such urge facilitated many agreements being signed, and pushed the pass of the Cross-strait Service and Trade Agreement (CSSTA).

As mentioned, the hasty pass was called "black box", it stirred a huge discontent of the young population. The meeting between Ma Ying-jeou and Xi Jin-ping on November 7<sup>th</sup>, 2015 was another evident that Beijing factor has been very influential in Taiwan's politics. The public's antipathy against Beijing government was the major reason causing a fundamental change in the domestic politics.

Young voters do not vote according to their party preferences, but for the parties' ability in solving social issues like income inequality, pension reform, food safety and education.



## Chapter 4 - Interview analysis

The purpose of this research is to find out if Taiwan identity has influenced Taiwan's Presidential elections for the past twenty years. From the related studies and surveys conducted by various credible organizations, we can see that Taiwan identity has been one of the factors determining the outcome of the Presidential elections.

However, in order to see if Taiwan identity really serves as a decision-making factor, it is also critical to find out how political parties deal with it. Therefore, four in-depth interviews were conducted to examine how close the opinions from the academic field and the political world are.

### 4.1 Mr. Lin, Cho-shui, master theoretician of the TIM

Former DPP legislator Lin Cho-shui is the chief strategist and master theoretician of the Taiwan independence movement (TIM). As the author of DPP's "Taiwan Independence Clause", Lin said that DPP, as a missionary party, has never changed its basic stand, but it adopted flexible strategies to fulfill the goal of conforming the state system to the reality of sovereign independence (normalization of the country).

Lin further explained that the DPP has claimed that "Taiwan is an independent country" since it published "*Taiwan Independence Clause*" in 1991, the "*Resolution on Taiwan's Future*" and the "*China Policy White Paper*" proposed in 1999 advocated the same principle, the DPP only used the slogan of the "New Middle Way" strategy to gain support from the swing voters for the upcoming Presidential election. The "Four Nos and One Without" (2000) and "One Country on Each Side" (2003) were the adjustments made in accordance with the reality at that time, just like the current low-key Cross-strait policies adopted by Tsai Yin-wen administration, the purpose is to maintain the status-quo for the big picture and also to meet the demand of the mainstream.

Regarding the national identity related strategies and policies made by the DPP specifically for the Presidential elections for the past two decades, Lin said national

identity was not given to much attention back in 1996, since Taiwan identity was not yet the mainstream in that period.

In 2000, the DPP made some adjustments to maximize the vote, it adopted a more moderate cross-strait policy, promoted its fresh and honest image and focused on achieving Taiwan subjectivity. Lin mentioned that “there is no in between when it comes to independence or unification, and concession shall not be made when it comes to sovereignty”, yet Chen Shui-bian needed the “New Middle Way” to reassure those who doubted the DPP’s claim of Taiwan being independent might jeopardize the cross-strait relations, after all, DPP’s goal was to gain the opportunity to be in power.

DPP was a minority government back in 2003, President Chen’s reputation was very low, DPP could only run the campaign by a more neutral means of promoting Taiwan identity to attract vote from people who identified as Taiwanese (43.3%), for instance, *228 Hand in Hand to Protect Taiwan Parade* and *Taiwan name rectification movement*.

Things got better for the DPP after the *228 Hand in Hand to Protect Taiwan Parade*, and the shooting incident took place one day before the election influenced the outcome of the election as well.

In 2008, DPP nominated Hsieh Chang-ting as the Presidential candidate, Hsieh did not follow Chen’s aggressive Taiwan independence route, in fact, he was avoidant about the sovereignty issue, therefore, when the KMT showed its willingness to increase economic cooperation with Beijing, Hsieh mainly attacked Ma’s proposal would sell Taiwan, and called it as “One China Market”.

The referendum of joining the United Nation under the name of Taiwan held by the DPP aimed at arousing DPP’s base supporters just like how it did in 2004’s *228 Hand in Hand to Protect Taiwan Parade*. Lin said the referendum went too far and it did not help the DPP. According to Lin, the DPP was suffering from an internal chaos in that period, so it was unable to set a clear tone for the campaign, plus a lot voters with Taiwan identity refused to vote for the DPP because they hated Chen Shui-bian.

Lin said DPP Presidential candidate, Tsai Yin-wen, hardly talked about her cross-strait policy nor the national identity issue, in order to please the voters with different attitudes, Tsai cautiously used a very safe term “the Taiwan consensus” to clarify her stand. Lin believed Tsai’s avoidance on such topic was to seek the trust from the United States.

In 2015, Tsai Yin-wen eventually gained the trust from the United States, her attitude toward the cross-strait policy remained moderate. Lin explained in Taiwan, the economic nationalism was generated by the cross-strait economic interactions, and the sense of crisis accumulated by this interaction burst during the Sun Flower Movement in 2014.

The main participants of the protest, the Tian Ran Du (Naturally pro-independence) group, was a gift for the DPP. For Lin, Chou Tzu-yu incident brought no major impact on DPP’s victory since DPP was winning anyway. Lin believed Chou’s incident was more influential regarding the Legislative election, because the sovereignty crisis triggered by Chou’s incident consolidated the leadership which encouraged voters to vote for the DPP, and made New Power Party lose considerable votes.

In answering if the young generation’s Taiwan identity would pose fundamental influence in next Presidential election in 2020, Lin said that the national identity issue would still be a critical factor, but not the only one. Lin further suggested the DPP to give up its “Middle Way” mindset and run the campaign based on the principle of pursuing Taiwan independence with a steady speed. The point is not to go against the public opinion nor being constrained by it. Lin said the DPP should promote different level of Taiwan independence in accordance with the reality of conditions at that moment, DPP needs to step on the gas and know when to hit on the breaks. Lin expected the leader would lead the country the way a CEO would lead the company, not a staff that aiming at solving problems.

#### **4.2 Mr. Chang, Jung-kung, former deputy Secretary General of the KMT**

Mr. Chang was a senior KMT member, he served as the former deputy Secretary General and the Director of the Chinese Affairs Department of the KMT, however, he was more

well-known for his position as the aide to former Vice President, Lien Chan, and his contribution in facilitating the Lien-Hu meeting in 2005.

As an experienced brain of the party, Chang explained that the term “Chinese” before the 1990’s meant the residents in the Republic of China (ROC), hence, most of the residents in Lee Teng-hui era identified themselves as Chinese or both Chinese and Taiwanese. Lee’s cross-strait policy thus still targeting “China unification” and he also published “National Unification Guidelines”, however, Lee started to work on the desinicization in his last tenure, and the national identity began the process of reconstruction, two decades later, the term “Chinese” now refers to the citizens of the People’s Republic of China (PRC).

Chang said the KMT’s priority regarding its cross-strait policy has always been seeking peaceful resolutions, and the KMT would not change its “no independence” mindset even more and more citizens identify themselves as Taiwanese and view Taiwan as an independent country, KMT would only change its cross-strait policy when Beijing changes its attitude towards Taiwan one day.

As an opposition party during 2000 to 2004, the KMT had to alter its strategies to counter DPP’s attack on national identity issue. Therefore, in the campaign for 2000 Presidential election, KMT focused more on its ability to achieve the economic cooperation and peaceful interaction with the PRC. Moreover, Lien Chan mentioned “Chinese help Chinese” in his ten point proposal (連十條) to echo the appeal of “Chinese do not fight with Chinese” principle raised by Jiang Ze-ming in 1995.

2000’s failure forced the KMT to reconsider its attitude while dealing with the changing national identity, therefore, during the campaign of 2004 Presidential election, the candidates started to express their love for Taiwan through various ways, for example, Lien Chan and Soong Chu-uu used Taiwanese language in the TV commercials, and they even adopted a dramatic act, kissing the ground.

The localization pushed by Lee Teng-hui administration and Chen Shui-bian administration, the term “Chinese” was gradually regarded as the residents in the People’s Republic of China by 2007, plus the Taiwan identity was unchallenged at that time, hence, the KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, drifted with the mainstream, he did not call himself a Chinese, nor did he publish the White Paper on Cross-strait Policy even he had prepared one. In order to maximize the vote, Ma adopted the 92 Consensus as its foundation of the cross-strait policies and promised to maintain the status-quo.

Chang mentioned President Ma did not like to address on unification/independence issue, therefore, in Ma’s second inauguration speech, he showed his stance with a vague expression by saying “People from both straits belong to the Chinese nation”.

Chang analyzed that the Taiwan identity rate was pretty high by 2012, yet KMT’s two victories showed that Taiwan identity was not the most critical factor for Presidential elections anymore, voters cared more about their living, and that was why they chose the party who had better capability in improving the economy.

The situation was very bad for the KMT after it lost the Municipal election in 2014 and the anti-China sentiment make the KMT unwelcome, especially among the young generation. Chang said the KMT lost its direction in 2016 and it is still looking for it.

Chang believed it would be too early to tell if Taiwan identity would have a huge impact on the Presidential election in 2020, actually its impact would depend on DPP’s attitude in coping with Beijing, and Beijing’s reaction for it.

Chang further suggested the KMT to provide the option that would be in the best interest of the country and let the people understand that pursuing de facto independence would not be the best choice. Chang said pursuing independence could be an option for Taiwan, but KMT should never consider it.

For Chang, Taiwan identity and China identity should not stand on the opposite side, so the KMT’s task is to decrease the hostility between the two identities.

In order to win the next Presidential election, the KMT would need to promote more on its advantage in communicating with the PRC, and lead the people moving toward to the direction for unification, not follow the mainstream, because Taiwan identity does not guarantee the safety for Taiwan.

#### **4.3 Ms. Ho Meng-hua, deputy Director of the Youth Affairs Division of the DPP**

Taiwan identity was indispensable in the forming and development of the DPP, the party received its first generation of supporters with its commitment to pursue Taiwan independence. In 1999, the DPP decided to adopt a more moderate strategy to attract more supporters, therefore, it passed the “*Resolution on Taiwan’s Future*” which set the tone of DPP’s Taiwan independence stance from then on.

The Presidential election campaigns in 2000, 2004 and 2008 were all tough battles for the DPP, to encourage the die hard fans to vote, DPP focused on Taiwan identity while shaping the KMT as an oppressor of Taiwan.

The DPP debuted as a challenger of the KMT regime in 1986, and it was proud of its young and fresh image, however, DPP’s youth policy is still a relatively new issue within the party. Ho recalled that at the end of 2015, the DPP released a TV commercial about young people voluntarily expressing their willingness of going home and vote which was totally different than what the DPP had in the past, in the past, it was seniors encouraging the young generation to vote and protect the democracy.

Ho said since most of the residents have identified themselves as Taiwanese, and most young people think Taiwan is already an independent country, so it would not be effective to attract votes, especially youth votes, by focusing on the unification/independence attitude that tied with the national identity issue.

Ho further shared her opinions regarding the reason why President Tsai Yin-wen has been avoidant in unification/independence issue since 2012, she believed that because such topic would not only receive attacks from the KMT but also provoke the swing voters.

Therefore, the DPP spent more effort in promoting its social policies like bring more equality and justice into the society.

In regards with the Presidential election in 2020, Ho said the identity related issue might not be the core strategy, yet the policy direction would be set after 2018. One thing for sure is that the DPP has to continue its commitment in maintaining the status-quo with the PRC so it can have more time in negotiating with Beijing while working on its ultimate goal of pursuing de facto independence slowly and steadily.

Ho said the priority for the DPP would be making fundamental changes and real achievements, being too attached to the ideology would only impose restriction on itself.

As the deputy Director of Youth Affairs Division, Ho said the DPP would assist the process of orienting the national identity through education and promoting the Taiwan subjectivity.

Speaking of Taiwan subjectivity, Ho further mentioned that they would work on a research on the national identity of the second generation of the new immigrants, especially those with parents from the PRC, at the same time, the DPP is cultivating young talents by opening 11 tentative councilor vacancies from the younger generation for nominations of 2018 local election.

Lastly, Ho added that Tsai's administration should work harder to win voters' support so they would vote for her because they recognize her as a real leader, not because they dislike the KMT.

#### **4.4 Mr. Lin, Choung-sheng, deputy Director of Department of China Affairs, DPP**

After the DPP lost in the presidential election in 2012, its poor relationship with China was seen by many as one of the major causes of the defeat, therefore, then DPP chairperson, Su Tseng-chang, decided to revive the China affairs department to enhance its understanding of China's intentions. The department was meant to be a gesture of goodwill toward China.

In explaining the DPP's cross-strait policies, Mr. Lin said national identity has been a reference for campaign strategies and even policy-making, however, every time when DPP tried to made changes toward the cross-strait relations, the public has always brought it back to the center (maintaining the status-quo).

The DPP realized that Taiwan identity has become the mainstream, yet as a ruling party, the DPP has to keep the balance within the society and respect the fact that the majority prefer the status-quo, hence President Tsai will not challenge this public opinion. Lin further added the PRC has been another power that forced Tsai administration to maintain the status-quo, and the DPP's cross-strait policies would not change unless Beijing alters its attitude towards Taiwan.

Regarding the next Presidential election, Lin believed that Taiwan identity would not be paid too much attention since the situation has changed. In Chen Shu-bian era, the Taiwan identity was used as a hype to consolidate the DPP's royal voters, since most citizens have already identified themselves as Taiwanese now, emphasizing on national identity would only foster the ethnic antagonism and bring no help for the election.

Lin said even President Tsai's might lose deep-green supports' votes for her moderate cross-strait policies, it is still necessary to maintain the status-quo. In order not to be limited by the national identity topic, the DPP would focus more on the social issues that receive more attention from the voters such as pension reform, transitional justice, residence justice...and so on.

When asked if Taiwan could take preemptive moves in the cross-strait relations, Lin answered by saying "it is no way for small countries to make long-term policies, they have to adjust their strategies in accordance with major powers' plans".



## Chapter 5 – Conclusion

### 5.1 The implication of the growing Taiwan Identity

Psychologists have proved that events might trigger the change of attitudes, adults can be influenced by political events, in the same way, children can be affected directly, or indirectly as well. Teenagers' political socialization was connected to their intense political participation. Furthermore, the research showed that most of the events that have posed greater impact were bad and tragic incidents. This theory can be applied in Taiwan's case, the 228 incident (1947) and 1979 Kaohsiung incident were two significant factors in the construction of Taiwan identity, later some controversial events unexpectedly during the Presidential elections unified national consciousness in a short time and formed a great power that brought changes.

The Taiwan Strait Crisis from 1995 to 1996 made Taiwanese realize the peaceful reconnection between two straits was superficial and vulnerable. President Lee's victory stirred up the Taiwan identity among Taiwanese, and the missile confrontation has further made cross-strait relations and national identity the most discussed topics in the following Presidential elections, moreover, one strategy for the candidates to gain support was to claim their "Taiwan identity".

In 2000, the PRC's warning once again provoked Taiwanese voters and indirectly helped the DPP, at the end, the DPP won the election by 39.3% of votes. Statistics showed that 69.1% of voters with high level of Taiwan identity voted for the DPP and 53.6% of voters with low level of Taiwan identity voted for Soong Chu-yu, a former KMT member. Therefore, we can see Taiwan identity began to influence Taiwan's Presidential elections.<sup>109</sup>

In 2004, the KMT realized the grassroots power, both parties demonstrated their love for Taiwan and they both stood on an even chance of winning. The Pan-blue camp believed the 319 Shooting incident was a conspiracy orchestrated by the DPP. The Pan-green camp

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109鄭夙芬, 〈族群認同與總統選舉投票抉擇〉, 政治大學 選舉研究中心, 2009

viewed the consolidation of support after the event as a proof of DPP's achievement in cultivating Taiwan identity in the past four years.

Among 80.5% of voters with high Taiwan identity voted for the DPP and 82.6% of voters with low Taiwan identity voted for the KMT, once again the data showed that national identity was still a strong factor in Taiwan's Presidential election.<sup>110</sup>

In 2008, without Beijing's blatant intervention, the DPP had no choice but promoting its pro-Taiwan identity by attacking Ma's obedience for Taiwan. The KMT did not play along with the DPP, instead, KMT candidate, Ma Ying-jeou, started his "Long Stay" project in July, 2007. He also made comments in Taiwanese often during the campaign, his strategies showed that he, just like most people on this island, identified with Taiwan. To maximize his vote, Ma declared loudly and clearly his Taiwanese identity by saying "I am a Taiwanese" and reaffirmed the democratization of China would be the precondition for future unification.<sup>111</sup>

From the 2008 Presidential election, we can see that even nearly 50% of citizens identified themselves as Taiwanese, and the pro-independence rate has been raising, but most people preferred maintaining the status-quo with the PRC. Voters' weariness of the tension between two sides of the Strait and the desire to be benefited from the economic cooperation with the PRC were the two main reasons brought the KMT back to power.

2012 election was an election regarding the ability and ideology of candidates. Tsai Yin-wen, as DPP's candidate, was given a great chance to win since more than 50% of people on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese<sup>112</sup>, and President Ma Ying-jeou lost a lot of support due to his poor performance in his first tenure.

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110鄭夙芬, 〈族群認同與總統選舉投票抉擇〉, 政治大學 選舉研究中心, 2009

111 Muyard, Frank, "Taiwan Elections 2008: Ma Ying-jeou's Victory and the KMT's Return to Power", *China Perspectives*, 2008

112 台灣民眾臺灣人/中國人認同趨勢分佈(1992年06月~2016年12月), 政治大學選舉研究中心, 2016 <http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>

From the outcome of 2012 Presidential election, we can see national identity was still a critical issue, but other issues were more important, for example, economic downturn, high employment rate, wealth inequality, farmer subsidy and residence justice (居住正義).

The anti-KMT emotion was accumulated since 2013, and reached the peak in Sun Flower movement that took place in 2014 which showed the young generation's dissatisfaction against President Ma's administration, the movement also reflected young generation's distrust towards China. The Sun Flower generation was referred as the "Tian Ran Du" generation, and this naturally pro-independence group gave a new interpretation and image to Taiwan independence.

The term "Taiwan independence" was a taboo before the democratization, back in that time, "Taiwan independence" was an ideology mainly embraced by ben shen ren (local Taiwanese). Even when the DPP was in power for the first time in 2000, "Taiwan independence" was still a controversial noun that indicated potential conflict with Beijing.

The Tian Ran Du generation see Taiwan as their home country and an independent nation, most of them do not pursue a Republic of Taiwan, and therefore, they refused to be labeled as aggressive Taiwan Independence activists. For this generation, pro-independence is their nature, not a result of brain-wash.

"Taiwan independence" is more like a common understanding than a notorious proposal for the Tian Ran Du generation. This generation formed a quite influential political force which all political parties are trying to ally with.

DPP's effort in supporting these demonstrations paid back in the 2016 Presidential election, with the overwhelming anti-China sentiment and strong distrust toward the KMT, the DPP led all the way in the campaign. Although all the candidates avoided direct mention the national identity during the campaign, the Chou, Tzu-yu incident which

inspired half millions of young citizens to vote on January 16<sup>th</sup>, 2016<sup>113</sup> made Taiwan identity still critical in the election.

According to the information collected from the interviews, both parties believe national identity issue would not be the most important strategy but it would still remain influential in the next Presidential election, however, water can carry a boat, it can also sink it, the national identity issue might consolidate voters' patriotism and further support the party with greater Taiwan identity, however, it might endanger the social harmony and invite foreign powers' intervention.

Regarding the reshaping of national identity, the growth of Taiwan identity also means the decrease of China identity. The China identity rate is in proportion to the remaining first and second-generation mainlanders,<sup>114</sup> however, whether the second generation of the new immigrants, especially those with Chinese parents, would identify themselves as Taiwanese is uncertain, and it is a questions deserves to be answered since there will be around 210,000 second generation of the new immigrants turn 18 years old in 2020<sup>115</sup>, if Taiwan successfully lowers the voting age to 18 from the present 20 before 2020, these 210,000 voters would be very significant. Sensing this new source of votes, both the KMT and the DPP established their New Immigrant Affairs Division in the past year<sup>116117</sup>.

Even the interviewees did not think identity issue would receive as much attention as it did before, based on the event-driven socialization theory, I believe Taiwan identity will be the game-changer in the next Presidential election shall Beijing steps in and provokes Taiwanese again. In fact, the PRC's interference has strengthened the Taiwan identity for

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<sup>113</sup> TVBS 民調：周子瑜至少催出 50 萬票, TVBS, January 20<sup>th</sup>, 2016,

<http://news.tvbs.com.tw/politics/636079>

<sup>114</sup> 黃志呈, 在臺灣演變中的中國人認同, 台北, 致知學術出版, 2015

<sup>115</sup> 〈家目錄 夏季號〉, 台南市家庭教育中心, 2016

<http://www.family.tn.edu.tw/UserFiles/File/fa8/ifamily/2016-Summer-OK.pdf>

<sup>116</sup> 國民黨成立 4 族群委員會 洪秀柱要重建社會信心, 今日新聞, August 1st, 2016,

<http://www.nownews.com/n/2016/08/01/2189400>

<sup>117</sup> 加強溝通 民進黨成立新住民委員會, 中央通訊社, January 25th, 2017,

<http://www.cna.com.tw/news/aipl/201701250284-1.aspx>

the past twenty years, the voters tend to vote for the DPP when they felt the sovereignty was challenged by the PRC's warnings.

Identity influences behaviors, since the Taiwan identity has been highly internalized, we now have a strong sense of Taiwanese identity, a growing acceptance that the Republic of China (ROC) is the country's name, a continued preference for the status-quo, a shared commitment to Taiwan's democratic values, and a desire for Taiwan's dignity to be respected abroad. Moreover, the young people who are intensely pro-Taiwan appear more pragmatic than their elders while dealing the cross-strait issues.

Based on the previous elections, we can learn that for the public, especially the young generation, Taiwan is already an independent country, and maintaining the status-quo is more important than pursuing the de facto independence.

Today's youngsters were unlike their predecessors who supported Taiwanese independence because of their political beliefs, the young generation simply see "Taiwan as their natural home country and China as just another state".

## **5.2 Impact on future cross-strait policies brought by the Growing Taiwan Identity**


In past elections, national identity and cross-strait relations were major issues by which parties differentiated themselves from each other, yet the situation has changed in recent elections. The January 2016 Presidential and legislative elections represented a significant shift. In 2016, domestic economic, political reform and other social issues were more remarkable and were used by parties to differentiate themselves. National identity and cross-strait relations played relatively minor roles.

According to the interviewees, the identity issue is expected to be less influential in the future Presidential elections, by 2016, more than 50% of the total population on the island identified themselves as Taiwanese, and for people between age 20-39, the figure is more than 90%. It is clear that the concept of Taiwan is an independent sovereignty has already been highly internalized in both the society and political parties. Most politicians were

born and raised in Taiwan, they all call themselves Taiwanese, in this situation, there would be no need to attack the opponents' descent.

Wu, Nai-teh's research released in 2015 showed that 11% of Taiwanese supported the idea of maintaining the cross-strait status-quo in 1992, and the figure reached 33.5% in 2013<sup>118</sup>. This group of people do not intend to pursue independence even under a peaceful cross-strait relation.

**Figure 5. NCCU survey of changes in the Unification-Independence stances of Taiwanese (1994~2016) ↓**



Moreover, the survey regarding changes in the Unification-Independence stances of Taiwanese conducted by Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University showed

118 Wu, Naiteh, *Political Competition Framed by the China Factor? –Looking beyond the 2012 Presidential election*, *Taiwan and The 'China Impact': Challenges and Opportunities*, New York: Routledge, 2015

that for the past twenty years, maintaining status-quo (for now or for indefinitely) has always been the mainstream even Taiwan identity has been rising.

Based on these statistics, we can tell people with Taiwan identity do not necessarily support Taiwan independence.

This has been the reason why both KMT and DPP embraced status-quo mindset for years even maintaining the status-quo was never the parties' purposes. The KMT believes Taiwan identity does not guarantee the safety for Taiwan, and it has been trying to lead the people moving toward to the direction for unification which is rejected by the mainstream.

The DPP has been promoting different level of Taiwan independence in accordance with the reality in different moment, however, many Taiwanese are worried about the consequence after Taiwan declaring de facto independence.

In order to win in this contradictory social atmosphere, both major parties have moved toward to the center of the spectrum of the independence/unification issues. In 2008, President Ma Ying-jeou sought to re-orient the pro-unification KMT as a pro-status-quo party. In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen also led the pro-independence DPP to a more moderate direction by stating that the goal of her cross-strait policy was to maintain the status-quo. Both the KMT and the DPP focused on their short-term status-quo goals and hardly spoke of their long-term preferences.

Only when status-quo supporting group switch their support to Taiwan independence, shall Taiwan identity has the chance to pose significant effects on the cross-strait policy. Moreover, just like what the interviewees said, both parties would not make major changes regarding the cross-strait policies unless Beijing adopts a different Taiwan policies in the future.

This is exactly what Tsai Ing-wen government has been trying to do for the past year, telling the world that people should not accept Beijing's premise that it is Tsai's fault for not accepting its preconditions and also sending Beijing a message that it should adopt a

more creative approach toward Taiwan since "one country, two systems," has no appeal to the Taiwanese public.

Since Beijing is unlikely to loosen its intention of unification, and unification is not accepted by most Taiwanese, it appears that the future cross-strait relations might reach a dead end so it is necessary for both sides to back out and reach a new consensus. It is expected that the strong Taiwan identity will keep influencing future Presidential elections, and that might encourage Beijing to be more balanced when engaging with different political powers in Taiwan, and remind the political parties in Taiwan to work together for the best interest of the people of Taiwan.

### 5.3 Beijing's reaction toward the growing Taiwan Identity

For the past twenty years, Beijing has been adjusting its Taiwan policy in accordance with the social atmosphere in Taiwan. The PRC leaders have adopted “placing hope on Taiwanese people” (寄希望於人民) and “promoting political ends through economic means” (以商促政) as the main strategies for the goal of the ultimate unification.

**Figure 5. The PRC's Taiwan policies from 1999 to 2004↓**

Year	Speaker	Event	Policies	Key words
1999	Zhu Rong Ji, Premier	The 2nd session of the 9th National People's Congress	Jiang Ze Min's Eight Points	Peaceful unification One Country, two systems Placing hope on Taiwanese people
2000	Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council	Press release after President Chen Shui Bian's inauguration	Jiang Ze Min's Eight Points	One China principle The 92 consensus Taiwan question cannot be postponed indefinitely
			Facilitate the three direct links	
2001	Qian Qi Chen, Vice Premier	6th Anniversary of Jiang Ze Min proposed the Eight Points	Making unification the top three mission for China in the 21st century	Peaceful unification One Country, two systems
			Announcing Taiwan issue as its internal affairs and no foreign shall intervene	
2002	Jiang Ze Min, President	16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China	No give up of force	One Country, two systems Placing hope on Taiwanese people
2003	Qian Qi Chen, Vice Premier	Conference held by Taiwan Affairs Office of the State Council	Enhance the interaction in trade, culture, academics, and tourism	Peaceful unification One Country, two systems The 92 consensus Placing hope on Taiwanese people
2004	State Council	The China White Paper	Chinese people and the army will achieve the unification at all cost	Peaceful unification One Country, two systems



**Figure 6. The PRC's Taiwan policies from 2005 to 2011<sup>119</sup> ↓**

Year	Speaker	Event	Policies	Key words
2005	Hu Jing Tao, President	3rd Session of the 10th CPPCC Conference	Hu's four points	One China principle Peaceful unification Placing hope on Taiwanese people No Taiwan independence
2006	Hu Jing Tao, President	Tea party of the CPPCC Conference	Enhance the interaction in trade, culture	One China principle Peaceful unification
2007	Hu Jing Tao, President	17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China	Facilitate the three direct links	One China principle One Country, two systems
2008	Wang Yi, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office	Forum Western Taiwan Straits Economic Zone (海峽西岸經濟區論壇)	Signing of Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)	The 92 consensus
2009	Wang Yi, Director of the Taiwan Affairs Office	1st Cross-strait Forum	8 Taiwan policies including promoting unification by economic cooperation	The 92 consensus
2010	Jia Qing Lin, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Help Taiwanese business in the PRC Signing of ECFA	Economy first, politics later Placing hope on Taiwanese people
			Enhance interaction with general public	
2011	Jia Qing Lin, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Help Taiwanese business in the PRC	Economy first, politics later Placing hope on Taiwanese people Peaceful unification One Country, two systems
			Signing of ECFA	
			Enhance interaction with general public (especially young generation)	

From 2000 to 2008, facing the ruling party with a strong Taiwan identity and 41% of Taiwan identity rate, Beijing chose to be hard on the government and soft on the people. The PRC kept persuading the DPP government to accept the 92 Consensus so two sides could continue the dialogue and emphasizing its commitment of achieving the unification at all cost, on the other hand, Beijing offered more incentives for Taiwanese to invest, study, visit and do researches in the PRC.

The eight years of Chen Shui-bian era was the Ice Age for the political interaction with Beijing yet the economic and civil exchanges were frequent and intense.

The situation was easier for Beijing after the pro-unification KMT took the ruling power back in 2008, Beijing did not have to spend too much effort constraining KMT since both parties adopted the 92 Consensus as the foundation of their communication. A series of

<sup>119</sup> Information collected from [中華民國行政院大陸委員會](#)、[中共中央台灣工作辦事處](#)

cross-strait economic cooperation projects were carried out by the government of the two sides, once again Beijing intended to win Taiwanese's' hearts by economic means.

Beijing promised to help Taiwanese business investing in the PRC, increase the number of PRC tourists to Taiwan, and institutionalize the cross-strait economic cooperation by signing the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

Beijing's nice gesture did not assimilate the "Taiwan compatriots", the Taiwan identity rate still kept rising, and reached 51.6% in 2009. The PRC worked on a more specific "placing hope on Taiwanese people" strategy, it expanded the interaction with the grassroots and young generation. On the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, President Hu Jin-tao mentioned the goal of increasing the soft power and economic strength of the country and expected by doing so, the Taiwanese people could be less resistant for the unification.

Year	Speaker	Event	Policies	Key words
2012	Hu Jing Tao, President	18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China	Signing of Peaceful Agreement	Placing hope on Taiwanese people Peaceful unification The 92 consensus
2013	Yu Zheng Sheng, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Facilitate the follow-up negotiation of ECFA (CSSTA)	Peaceful unification
			Three Middles and the Youth	
2014	Yu Zheng Sheng, CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Actively promote the follow-up negotiation of ECFA (CSSTA)	The 92 consensus
			Three Middles and the Youth	
2015	Yu Zheng Sheng, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Deepen the Three Middles and the Youth policy	The 92 consensus
2016	Yu Zheng Sheng, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	Deepen the Three Middles and the Youth policy	The 92 consensus
			Expand cultural interactions (religion, local folks)	
2017	Yu Zheng Sheng, Member of the CPC Politburo Standing Committee	Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs	One Generation, One Line	The 92 consensus One China Principle

**Figure 7. The PRC's Taiwan policies from 2012 to 2017<sup>120</sup>↑**

<sup>120</sup> Information collected from [中華民國行政院大陸委員會](#)、[中共中央台灣工作辦事處](#)

Xi Jing-ping took over the leadership in 2012, he adjusted the PRC's Taiwan policy by proposing the "Three Middles and the Youth" (三新一青) outreach plan which focused on the residents of central and southern Taiwan, middle and low income families, small and medium-sized enterprises and the youth. The plan aimed at shortening the distance with the general public in Taiwanese.

To further deepen the relationship between two straits, both governments tried very hard to speed up the follow-up negotiation of ECFA, the Cross-strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA). However, the pass of the bill was considered too speedy, and lack of transparency, at the end, the demonstration (Sun Flower Movement) which was formed to oppose the CSSTA bill managed to not only stop the further negotiation process but also bring down the KMT in the local election at the end of 2014.

A new term was created after the Sun Flower Movement, "Tian Ran Du" (naturally pro-independence) became a new political force in Taiwan, and the Tian Ran Du generation showed Beijing miscalculated the change of the evolving social structure and its hope on Taiwanese people was not very promising. The PRC later realized that the benefit brought by the cross-strait economic interaction was enjoyed mainly by the big corporations, and its Three Middles and the Youth was not as effective as expected.

Another major setback for Beijing's mission on Taiwan work was the victory of the DPP in 2016 Presidential election. The last time the DPP in power was not a very nice experience for Beijing, so this time, Beijing would be tougher to Tsai Ing-wen government, and make no concession on the bottom line of the 92 consensus, the only bargain chip Tsai's administration has is the public will.

On the Working Conference on Taiwan Affairs in 2015, member of the Politburo Standing Committee of the Communist Party of China (PSC), Yu Zheng-sheng (俞正聲), said Beijing must march against difficulty (克難前行) to maintain the peaceful Cross-strait relationship and make new progress. His words implied the cross-strait relations faced obstacles in 2014, and more challenges might be waiting.

In the Conference, Yu stated that Beijing would expand the interaction with big and middle-sized companies, farmers and fishermen, and young people. It is clear that the top leaders in Beijing now believe young Taiwanese and grassroots businesses are the best bet for paving the way for future cross-strait reunification.

This year, Beijing adjusted its Taiwan policy again by replacing the Three Middles and the Youth with “One Generation, One Line” (一代一線). In March, Yu Zheng-sheng said in the Chinese People's Political Consultative Conference that “the PRC will strengthen the interaction with the front line of grassroots (white and blue collar workers) and young generation in Taiwan to gain public support in developing a peaceful cross-strait relation.”<sup>121</sup>

One Generation, One Line is a broader and more comprehensive version of the Three Middles and the Youth (central and southern residents, middle and low income families, small and medium-sized enterprises and the youth). One Generation, One Line targets at the general public on the island, and provides more opportunities for the youth who want to study and work in the PRC. On July 4<sup>th</sup>, 2017, China’s Ministry of Education announced that Taiwanese students reach the average score of the College Entrance Exam can apply for Chinese universities.<sup>122</sup>

Xi’s new approach is like the 2.0 version of “Placing hope on Taiwanese People” policy, yet, instead of passively expecting Taiwanese people to say yes to the unification, Xi chose to encourage Taiwanese to embrace the idea of unification by providing all sorts of incentives while pushing the people and the government on the island to accept the 92 Consensus as the pre-condition for further engagement.

The Sun Flower Movement generation changed Taiwan’s politics, unification was not an option considered by the young people anymore. The young generation do not necessarily

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<sup>121</sup> 陸對台交流 鎖定一代一線, 中時電子報, May 24th, 2017, <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/%E9%99%B8%E5%B0%8D%E5%8F%B0%E4%BA%A4%E6%B5%81-%E9%8E%96%E5%AE%9A-%E4%BB%A3-%E7%B7%9A-215008355.html>

<sup>122</sup> 教育部印發通知放寬台灣高中畢業生憑學測成績申請大陸高校標準, 中華人民共和國外交部, July 4th, 2017, [http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb\\_xwfb/gzdt\\_gzdt/s5987/201707/t20170704\\_308514.html](http://www.moe.gov.cn/jyb_xwfb/gzdt_gzdt/s5987/201707/t20170704_308514.html)

dislike the PRC, they just simply identify themselves as Taiwanese and do not wish to be unified with the PRC. It is expected the future generations will have even stronger Taiwan identity, and the urge for country normalization will be more solid which is the last thing Beijing would want to see.

The young Taiwanese might not be willing to accept Xi's 92 Consensus pre-condition, especially for those who were born after 1992, for them, the 92 Consensus was just too unrealistic. Forcing Taiwan to accept the "One China" principle would only push Taiwanese away while giving the ruling party the legitimacy of defending Taiwan's sovereignty and indirectly encourage the anti-China sentiment.

Beijing knows its Taiwan policy serves as a reference for the neighboring countries to determine if Beijing is a benign rising power. The PRC's military threat to Taiwan would be considered as a provocation to the regional security as well. Since taking over Taiwan by force is too risky, in order to suppress the incumbent government, Beijing adopted the old pattern of establishing diplomatic relationship with Taiwan's allies<sup>123</sup> after the Diplomatic truce was terminated in 2016.

According to the survey conducted by Taiwan Brain Trust, Beijing's diplomatic battle decreased the supporting rate for Taiwan independence, yet the supporting rate for unification did not show any significant growth<sup>124</sup>. Apparently, Beijing's current stick and carrot policy did not bring Taiwanese closer.

It is impossible for the PRC to decide the future cross-strait relations unilaterally, Beijing and the ruling party in Taiwan have to communicate sooner and it is expected the dialogue will take place this fall, shortly before or after the 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China.

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<sup>123</sup> Panama cuts ties with Taiwan in favour of China, BBC, June 13, 2017, <http://www.bbc.com/news/world-latin-america-40256499>

<sup>124</sup> 「國人對巴拿馬斷交與台灣國家定位看法」趨勢調查發佈記者會, 新台灣國策智庫, June 20<sup>th</sup>, 2017, [http://www.braintrust.tw/article\\_detail/2147](http://www.braintrust.tw/article_detail/2147)

Beijing has been aggressively stopping Taiwan from declaring independence, and it would only take tougher actions while dealing with the growing Taiwan identity to nip in the bud. However, the defining factor is Taiwan citizens' determination to fight for Taiwan's sovereignty, as long as Beijing sees the battle is not winnable, Taiwan will have more time and space to negotiate.



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