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印尼軍事改革 (1998-2014)

**Navigating The Indonesia's Military Reform,
1998-2014**

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中華民國 106 年 12 月 December 2017

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Abstract

This dissertation studies military's withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving force of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of normative democratic control over TNI, the disbandment of TNI's business activities, and the reorganization of TNI's territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within the brass, while the struggling disbandment of military's business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI.

This dissertation adopts a within-case comparison to answer the puzzle and focusing on Indonesia which represents the transplacement model of democratization in the third wave of democratization. Since transplacement involves coalition between reformers within the old and the new elites, it allows a process of negotiation in the transition. Hence, it creates a variation of the progress of the reform. Since this dissertation focuses on a single case studies, with three sub-cases, this dissertation is lacking of the power to generalization. However, it allows an in-depth analysis of the case using a process-tracing method. To conduct a proper process-tracing, this dissertation engages in various types of sources such as official documents, meetings' notes, transcripts of in-depth interviews, personal communications, reports from non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and secondary sources from newspapers' reports.

This dissertation concludes that the progress of the reform, in the case of Indonesia, varies according to the interests of the armed forces, and interaction between those interests and other variables such as the interests of civilian groups. It suggests that the organizational interests of the armed forces are the most influential variable to define the progress. Strong organizational interests would lead to a stall in the reform. The case of territorial command structure as well as, to a lesser degree, the second phase of the normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests this claim. In the absence of organizational interests, the existence of strong factional/personal interests would lead to problems in the advancement of the reform. The case of disbandment of military informal business activities supports this claim. Finally, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth in the absence of those two interests and in the guidance of national interests.

Keywords: military reform, military's withdrawal from politics, democratization, Indonesia, democratic control over the armed forces, military business activities, territorial command structure.

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Chapter 1

Introduction

This dissertation studies military's withdrawal from politics. It examines military reform in Indonesia which aiming at withdrawing the Indonesian armed forces, currently known as *Tentara Nasional Indonesia* or TNI¹, from politics following the fall of Suharto in 1998. It seeks to explain the driving forces of the progress of military reform in Indonesia and asks the question of: why has the reform been progressing differently from one agenda to another? It focuses on three agendas of reform, which are: the establishment of democratic control over TNI², the disbandment of TNI's business activities, and the reorganization of TNI's territorial command structure. It argues that variation in the progress of reform in those three agendas is closely related to military interests. The relatively successful establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces has been mostly driven by the primacy of national interests within TNI, while the struggling disbandment of military's business activities is rooted at factional/personal interests within TNI, and the complete failure in the abandonment of territorial command structure is related to strong organizational interests of TNI. This chapter intends to define the puzzle, the argument, to lay out the methodology used in this research and to outline the organization of this dissertation.

1.1. Historical account on Indonesia's military reform

The aim of this part is to provide a short historical explanation on the progress of military reform in Indonesia since the fall of Suharto until the departure of Yudhoyono from power in 2014. A short explanation on the later period under Widodo would also be given, despite the fact that this period is not the focus of this study. While the explanation given in this part will follow chronological order, it also incorporates the concept of military reform and defense transformation as well as first and second

¹ TNI has gone through several changes of name since their establishment in 1945. While the name TNI will be used in this dissertation, other names will sometimes also be given for reference.

² The concept of democratic control over the armed forces in this dissertation is measured according to the existence of normative political regulations.

generations of reform. Hence, a short introductory note on those concepts will be provided at the beginning of this part.

1.1.1. Generation of reform

The concept generation of reform suggests that military reform does not take place in one sequence. Instead, it takes place as a long process with several phases. It is basically in line with the idea of military reform as viewed by the concept civil-military relations. This concept resembles the idea of dynamics. It means that the relationship between civilian and military takes place continuously in which in some period the civilian is taking the lead and in other period the vice versa. In Indonesia, this is commonly referred as *tarik-ulur* (push-and-pull). Those who disagree with this understanding proposes the idea of generation as step-by-step conducts in reforming the armed forces to follow democratic governance.

Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) introduced the concept of generation of reform to tackle the usual stall in establishing democratic control over the armed forces. The main problem with military reform is basically laying in the second rather than the first generation in which the first generation is only focusing on “reforming core institutions for political control of the armed forces” while the second generation focuses on “establishing effective structures for the democratic governance of the defense and security sectors” (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2002, 32). The main problem with the reform is laying at the second rather than the first generation of reform.

This division between the first and second generations of reform is relatively similar to those who argue that there are basically two phases of reform with the first focuses on structural arrangement while the second deals with the behavioral aspect of the main idea of reform—in this case democratic governance (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Widjajanto, *et.al*, 2008). According to this understanding—which can be considered as the second school of generational reform to distinguish it from the first school above, the first phase of reform is basically an attempt to disengage the armed forces from politics while the second phase is aiming at professionalizing the armed forces. Hence, this understanding differentiates the complete reform into the phase of military reform and the phase of defense transformation.

Following this logic, an identification of what constitutes the agendas of the first and second phases should be made. Following the logic developed by Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002), Mietzner (2006) identified that the first generation is more focusing on “dismantling of old power structures” (p. 3). Hence, in the first generation of the reform, the activities are basically creating structural arrangements to place the armed forces under democratic control. Hence, agendas such as the subordination of the armed forces under the civilian-in-nature Ministerial oversighting is among one of the most important steps to be taken to curtail military’s autonomy. Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) suggested that this phase should not only be limited to placing the armed forces under executive oversighting but also legislative and even judiciary oversighting. The establishment of these structures, however, requires agendas to strengthen their institutional capacity which are the focus of the second generation.

The first and second generations of reform within that logic, however, fall within the agendas of the first phase according the latter school. The idea of military reform according to the second school is both covering the establishment of the structure to ensure democratic governance over the armed forces—and defense affairs—and strengthening their capacities. The establishment and strengthening of this arrangement, however, should also be targeted at those who sit within this arrangement. It means that the establishment and strengthening of this arrangement should be followed by the establishment and strengthening of the human resources who organize and run this arrangement. Simply put, the second phase according to this second school means that there must be a change in attitude within both civilian and military to uphold the principle of democratic governing. In some cases, this attitude-making are targeted at the armed forces or defense establishment instead of civilian. One of the argument that support this approach is because military’s involvement in politics does not take place only because the opportunity to intervene but also because the desire to intervene. However, in the case of Indonesia, this attitude-making within civilian is equally important as that within the armed forces.

As will further discussed in the next part, the military reform in Indonesia, especially during the early period of reform, resulted in a civil-military fusion in which groups of civilians were creating alliance with groups within the armed forces while other groups of civilian created alliance with other groups within the armed forces. The

main problem lies in the intra-civilian rivalry in which some of the groups within civilian camp thought that they needed to make an alliance with military officers to strengthen their political position due to various reasons.³ Hence, in the context of Indonesia, the second phase of reform usually refers to the establishment of the “military mind” or military professionalism. This understanding is best captured in the concept of defense transformation.

The idea of defense transformation, or can be referred as military transformation, basically represents the idea of changing the nature of the soldier to be prepared for war. It is in line with Huntington’s (1957) of increasing the expertise of the soldier. Identification of what constitutes defense or military transformation can be challenging due to its paradoxical nature (Stulberg & Salomone, 2007). One of these main paradoxes is the fact that military transformation requires constant change while it also means abandoning previous established practices and hence the desire for change can be unattractive. In addition, there is another question of what should be changed. Hence, Sloan (2008) proposed various focuses of change or transformation ranging from technological-led transformation, doctrinal-led transformation, structural-led transformation, to threat-led transformation (see also Mandeles, 2007; Stulberg & Salomone, 2007). The dominant key point in defense transformation is basically technology, which brought scholars to invest on revolution to military affairs. Loo (in Loo, 2009), however, warned that there is a stark difference between great and small powers in their attitude to and conduct of transformation when technology is the key driver.

In the case of Indonesia, the concept defense transformation basically means to modernization of the armed forces. To be more precise, this modernization means to fulfill the minimum requirement of defense. In the words of Tan (2004) and Bitzinger (2010), Indonesia, as well as other Southeast Asian countries, was involved in maintenance stage of their defense capabilities instead of heading into arm race with one another. This transformation would require military officers and soldiers to focus on increasing their skills in managing violence which would—hopefully—divert their

³ One of these reasons was because support from military officers would be equal with protection to this group of civilians. In addition, the support from military officers would also provide politicians with support from general public as the figure of military officers remained important for general public, especially in rural area (Prasetyono, 2017, interview).

attention from politics. Hence, the idea defense transformation in the context of Indonesia is extremely limited to modernization as a mean to diverting TNI's attention from politics. With such an understanding, military reform in Indonesia basically can be differentiated into two different phases with two different focuses and agendas. During the early period of the reform, the main focus is on disengaging TNI from politics while in the second phase, the main focus is to professionalize TNI.

1.1.2. The progress of military reform in Indonesia

Military reform in Indonesia began in September 1998 when TNI Headquarter, then was ABRI Headquarter, adopted the “new paradigm” to redefine, reposition and re-actualize their role in a changing situation with the introduction of democracy (*Mabes TNI*, 1998). The term “redefinition” in this document referred to a new conception of military's role in society, while the term “reposition” referred to a new position of the armed forces within the society and the term “re-actualization” referred to adaptation of doctrines, policies, strategies and operational arrangements to follow the new defined role. It was clearly written in this document that according to the new paradigm, TNI would conduct its new defined role by changing its position to not always leading in front so that the nature of their involvement in politics would be influencing instead of governing in which they would adopt indirect rather than direct approach and they would share their political role with other components of the society (*Mabes TNI*, 1998, 5). Hence, those three concepts were basically nothing more than just a mere adjustment to the way TNI involved in politics, from taking an active role within the governing bodies into playing a passive role behind the scene. Other words, the reform would be limited to TNI's adaptation to the changing political environment while they continued their influence in politics without having involved in day-to-day matters (Haseman, 2006; Sebastian & Gindarsah in Ruland, Manea & Born, 2013). The basic premise, hence, remained the same: TNI should play a role in politics.

This document, which later was adopted as official guidance for military reform in 2001, also lied out the agendas of the reform, which included: separation of the police force (*Kepolisian Republik Indonesia, Polri*) from military's chain of command, liquidation of the armed forces socio-political roles, withdrawal of military representatives from both national and regional legislatures, restriction for active

military officers to hold civilian bureaucratic positions, neutrality during national elections, and the changing characteristic of relationship between the armed forces and retired officer' organizations (*Mabes TNI, 1998; Mabes TNI, 2001*). In addition to the abovementioned agendas, General Wiranto, then *Panglima*, also pointed out the need to disengage the armed forces from *Golkar* and to adopt new doctrine in accordance with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. Table 1.1 below provides a detail plan of military reform according to the new document.

Table 1.1. Timeline of military reform according to TNI
Taken from Mabes TNI (2001)

Issues	Short term 0-3 years	Medium term 4-7 years	Long term 8-12 years
Dual function role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Abandonment of TNI's sociopolitical roles - Abandonment of TNI's direct involvement in governing (<i>kekaryaan</i>) - Liquidation of sociopolitical institutions 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Liquidation of TNI/Polri faction within DPR - Implementation of new paradigm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Implementation of political right of soldiers - Defense function of the armed forces - Liquidation of TNI/Polri faction within MPR - Complete noninvolvement in politics
Territorial role	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Redefinition of function and structure of territorial command - Internalization the new defined function and structure - Selective implementation of the new defined function and structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Adoption of all regulations related to the new defined function and structure of territorial command - Preparation for a new defined structure - Organizational adaptation to the new defined structure 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Further implementation of the defined function and structure with particular focus on the development of national potential to support defense function of the armed forces
Organizational structure and doctrine	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Separation of Polri from TNI - Adoption of laws related to defense affairs - The making of operational regulations - Finalization of new organizational structure planning - The making of new doctrine - Transition in military tribunal system 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Organizational restructuring of TNI - Liquidation of social communication division - Finalization of the new military tribunal system - Adoption of the law on TNI 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Finalization of the new structure of TNI to reflect the new doctrine - Adoption of the new doctrine with the emphasis on <i>kesemestaan</i> (total warfare) - New posture of TNI

Welfare	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Public accountability to TNI business lines - Empowerment of cooperation 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Reform in TNI business lines 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Availability of soldiers' welfare through a transparent management system
Culture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Socialization of the new role of TNI - Shifting to new paradigm 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Revision in military academy curriculum - Formulation of a more adaptive and contextual changes of military culture 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Professional soldiers that obey the law, follow civilian leadership, and loyal to the Constitution

The first step taken by TNI was the abolishment of their Political and Social Affairs Branch (*Biro Sosial Politik*) and the withdrawal of active military from holding positions in government and bureaucracy in 1998. In addition, in 1999, separation of police force from TNI has also been completed. With this separation, the armed forces began to focus on external defense and the police force dealt with maintaining internal security. The armed forces also declared their neutrality during the 1999 election and officially withdrew from *Golkar*, which then resulted with *Golkar* lost the election to the Indonesian Democratic Party in Struggle (*Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan*, PDIP). The new government under Wahid, then elected Juwono Sudarsono as Minister of Defense, the first civilian defense minister in the last 40 years.⁴ The Ministry itself changed its name from Ministry of Defense and Security. While this ministry was assigned with overseeing the administration of TNI, the police force unfortunately, was not placed under the oversight of civilian ministry. It is important to mention this issue since the placement of TNI under the Ministry of Defense and the independent position of police force has been one of several sources of discontents between the brown (police) and green (TNI) corps.

To further deepen the reform, the military pledged to completely disband the dual function doctrine, a task, according to TNI, completed in 2000. In exchange, the military developed a new doctrine to reflect its external defense orientation, although nominally. In the same year, the sociopolitical offices at the Department of Interior, through which TNI used to manage and oversee internal security issues, were also disbanded. In addition, a military-coordinated agency that focused on internal security

⁴ Since then, this post has been occupied by civilians; with two of them are former military officers. In sequence, they are: Juwono Sudarsono (since 26 July 1999), Mahfud M.D. (since 26 August 2000), Agum Gumelar (retired General, since 20 July 2001), Matori Abdul Djilil (since 9 August 2001), Juwono Sudarsono (since 21 October 2014), Purnomo Yusgiantoro (since 22 October 2009), and Ryamizard Ryacudu (retired General, since 27 October 2014).

known as the Coordinating Agency for Assisting the Consolidation of National Security (*Badan Koordinasi Bantuan Pemantapan Stabilitas Nasional, Bakorstanas*) was also disbanded. *Bakorstanas* was an instrumental tool for the armed forces to coordinate the implementation of security policies through various ministries during the previous years. One of the main tasks of this agency was to conduct special screening (*penelitian khusus, litsus*) to determine whether candidates for public servant positions have recorded their involvement in any activities related to the Indonesian Communist Party (*Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI*) or descendant of those who involved in the 1965 Communist coup.⁵ The disbandment of those offices has significantly limit military's ability to penetrate civilian affairs. Other attempt of reform also took place within the military education curriculum with the exclusion of sociopolitical courses and the introduction of humanitarian law.

With regard to legal arrangements, in 2000, the parliament adopted the Law on Human Rights Court (Law No.26/2000). This law allowed the examination of past human right abuses allegedly done by military officers to be conducted and to be brought into trial. In 2002, the Law on National Defense (Law No.3/2002) was adopted by the parliament. In 2004, the Law on TNI (Law No.34/2004) was also adopted which further ensured control over the armed forces. In addition, the military also agreed to halt their business activities with the conclusion of Presidential Order (*Perpres*) No.43/2009 during Yudhoyono presidency. Finally, the military tribunal system was also put under review and ended with the transfer of military tribunal from TNI Headquarter to the Supreme Court.

The adoption and implementation of the new paradigm was not without criticisms, especially from non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Indonesia. Commission for the Missing Persons and Victims of Violence (*Komisi untuk Orang Hilang dan Tindak Kekerasan, KontraS*), a leading human right NGO in Indonesia, remarked that the new paradigm did not necessarily lead to military's withdrawal from politics since it did not disband military's privileges in many areas, it still considered the armed forces as important actor in politics, and it did not acknowledge that TNI's political involvement in politics in the past was part of the problem (*KontraS, 2008*).

⁵ *Litsus* was also used to make decision over promotion for government employees. For a detail understanding on the practices and consequences of *litsus* is see Heryanto (2006).

They considered the reform as cosmetic efforts to minimally change TNI's political standing.

Despite the above criticisms, it is reasonable to conclude that Indonesia's military reform has resulted in TNI's normative disengagement from politics and nominal noninvolvement from business activities even if the armed forces still committed to the old territorial command structure. TNI differentiates the reform agendas into four different components: dual function, territorial role, organizational structure and doctrine, welfare, and culture (*Mabes TNI*, 2001). A rather different categorization was given by *Pacivis*, a research center affiliated with University of Indonesia which played influential role in the security sector reform, which divided the reform agendas into five components: normative, substantive, oversighting, force structure, defense economics, and organizational agendas (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Widjajanto, *et.al*, 2008). Scholars have suggested that military reform can be simply divided into two different phases, in which during the first phase the reform focuses on establishing structural framework to ensure democratic control over the armed forces and the next phase deals with the behavioral aspect of democratic control (Cottey, Edmunds & Forster, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Widjajanto, *et.al*, 2008). Most of the reform agendas (see figure 1.1 below) were actually dedicated to establishing framework of democratic control over the military while the rest was equally spread between efforts to reorganize the military and to address financial and defense posture issues (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). During 1998-2008, 39% of reform agendas were dedicated to the normative dimension of the reform and 13% dealt with oversighting agendas, while only 16% of reform agendas were privileged to substantive issues.⁶ Hence, it is understandable if the reform has yet to produce significant progress in areas other than the establishment of normative control over the armed forces. Disengaging the armed forces from politics has never been an easy process to go through. TNI noninvolvement in politics was considered as an alien concept since they

⁶ This categorization was first built by *Pacivis*, a leading research center that focused on security sector reform in Indonesia. According to them, reform agendas can be categorized into five different components. The substantive component addresses the necessity to create a new military culture that will strengthen the character of non-political and professional army. The organizational component includes the importance of imposing the democratic norms of civil-military relations into the military organizational structure. The force structure component deals with the necessity to build a future force by initiating a military transformation. And the defense economics component deals with the problem of resource allocations to defense sectors (Widjajanto, *et.al*, 2008).

have played such an influential role during previous era. In fact, throughout the history of Indonesia, TNI and politics are simply inseparable to the extent that one scholar wrote that “the state of the Republic of Indonesia is not viable without the active involvement of the TNI in its political and security activities” (Kingsbury, 2003, 12).




Figure 1.1. Categorization of reform agendas
(adapted from Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008, 66-68)

With the fall of Suharto, TNI was under the pressure from pro-democratic forces to conduct reform to disengage their involvement in politics. However, TNI’s strong political position was not coming to an end despite of the fall of Suharto. They remained as an important actor in political transition in post-Suharto era, which commonly termed as the era of *Reformasi*. The critical role of TNI in political transition in Indonesia can clearly be seen during the last days of Suharto in power. On 18 May 1998, three days prior to his resignation, Suharto presented a Presidential Order to *Panglima Wiranto* to take necessary actions to secure the country (*Kompas*, 21 May 2016). This order provided Wiranto with three different powers: (1) to define nation-wide policies to deal with the incoming crisis, (2) to take preventive measures to ensure public safety or even to eliminate the sources of any possible threat, and (3) to command ministers and local leaders (governors and regents/mayors) in fulfilling the task of ensuring public safety. With those powers, the Order was basically an order to become the President himself. This order was similar to *Supersemar*. Wiranto, however, decided not to follow the

same path taken by Suharto and instead supported the transition of power from Suharto to his Vice President, Habibie.

Wiranto's decision allowed TNI to escape pressures from students and NGOs to immediately return to barrack. His decision was supported by political elites which then allowed TNI to conduct internal reform. Hence, TNI has consistently argued that the Indonesia's military reform basically was an internally-driven reform in which the armed forces had the privilege to set the agendas of the reform with very limited involvement from civilian groups in the process. Elites' inability to put strong pressure to the armed forces and instead chose to make alliance with them indicated their inability to control the armed forces. It also indicated fragmentation within civilian camp with some of them leaning toward the armed forces for support. This fragmentation and alliance became obvious when the reform took place in the later period. Wibisono, Wardoyo, and Kasim (2008) argued that "civil-military fusion," a term first introduced by Finer (1962, 1988), is one of the most important characteristics of military reform in Indonesia. This civil-military fusion took place since the era of Habibie until Yudhoyono.

While the reform had resulted remarkably well during its first phase. Table 1.2 below suggests several achievements of the reform as of today in which most of the progress takes place during the early phase of the reform. That Table shows that most of the agendas of the reform was completed before to 2004 and a handful of them was completed after 2004.

No.	Reform agenda	Year begin	Year completed
1	"New Paradigm" document	1998	1998
2	Disbandment of Socipolitical offices within the armed forces	1998	2005
3	Disengagement from <i>Golkar</i>	1999	1999
4	Disbandment of officers' involvement in non-military positions (excluding those in Ministry of Defense)	1999	2004
5	Disbandment of doctrine <i>kekaryaan</i>	1999	1999
6	Separation of Polri from TNI	1999	1999
7	Reduction of members of military faction within DPR and DPRD (from 75 in DPR to 38 and for DPRD the number is deducted to only 10% of the total number of members DPRD)	1999	1999

8	Commitment of neutrality in elections	1999	Regularly taking place
9	Disbandment of TNI's sociopolitical functions	1999	1999
10	Revision of doctrines	2000	2007
11	Disbandment of <i>Bakortstanas</i> and all of its offices in regional level	2000	2000
12	Commitment of neutrality in Special Session of MPR for the impeachment of Wahid	2001	2001
13	Disbandment of sociopolitical-related courses from TNI's education system and introduction of human rights related courses to TNI's education system	2001	Not yet completed
14	Redefinition and refunctionalization of <i>koter</i>	2002	2002
15	The Law on National Defense	1999	2002
16	Disbandment of military faction in MPR, DPR and DPRD	2004	2004
17	Transfer of authority of military tribunal from TNI headquarter to Supreme Court (<i>Mahkamah Agung</i>)	2004	2004
18	The Law on TNI	1999	2004
19	Disbandment of military business activities	2004	2010

In addition, the success in the progress of the reform mainly takes place in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. Only limited agendas that closely correlated with defense function of TNI has been successfully adopted. Revision of doctrines, for example, had been completed in 2007. However, there are still disappointment to this revision since it still heavily incorporated the inward-looking nature of the TNI (Widjajanto, 2017, interview; Prasetyono, 2017, interview). Another area in which the reform has yet to achieve significant progress is in the officers' education system or curriculum. This progress, and lack of thereof, indicates that significant efforts are required to completely disband the role of TNI in politics through both the making of political arrangement that ensuring democratic control over the armed forces and the cultivation of military professionalism.

An analysis on the Indonesia's military reform can be conducted by differentiates it into two different phases. Separation between first and second generation refers to the work of Cottey, Edmunds and Forster (2002) who differentiate the reform into the making of structural regulations and the changing in the behavioral aspects to follow democratic values or principles. In the case of Indonesia, Mietzner (2006) suggested the period from 1998 to 2004 with the adoption of the Law on TNI is the first phase of the reform. During this period, a number of regulations have been made to ensure that the armed forces would comply with democratic governing.

Widjanto, *et.al* (2008) and Wibisono, Wardoyo and Kasim (2008), on the other hand, suggested that the first phase of reform has yet finished until 2007, when the government adopted RPJP 2005-2025 which contains explanation on the Minimum Requirement Force.⁷ They also suggested that the Minimum Requirement Force document basically indicates the defense transformation or defense modernization process to replace the political reform inherently in the first phase of reform. While the distinction between the first and the second phases of reform, or when the definitive period of each of these phases is, could serve as the basis for measuring the progress of the reform and the reason for it, this dissertation does not consider this separation as that important.

1.2. Research puzzle and argument

In 1998, Suharto's authoritarian rule was ended after more than 3 decades in power. He was forced to resign his presidency following massive demonstrations by student activists and pro-democratic forces within the civil society organizations (CSOs).⁸ His resignation was also due to the increasing economic pressures that stroke Indonesia following the Asian Financial Crisis since 1997 in which the crisis led to public dissatisfaction to the performance of Suharto's government (Eklöf 1999, McLeod 2000). Suharto was also losing support from his civilian and military loyalists who decided to siding with students and pro-democracy activists and call for his resignation (Mydans, 1998; Honna, 2003; Lee, 2015). The rise of opposition parties during the latter period of his presidency also contributed to his diminishing power since these parties were basically the backbone of students and CSOs' protests (Aspinall 2005). His resignation marked a new era in Indonesian politics which then termed as Reform era (*era Reformasi*) which basically was a democratization process. The reform era was not only targeted at changing the political arrangement from that of authoritarianism—also commonly referred as pseudo-democracy or hybrid regime in academic literature—to democracy but also aiming at disbanding activities that might torpedoing the drive to democratic society. Hence, apart from the reform in political institutions, the reform

⁷ See Chapter 6 for detail.

⁸ Several works have been dedicated to assessing the factors that drove Suharto's resignation. While some of these factors will be presented in this paragraph, detail explanation is available on Forrester & May (1998) and Crouch (2010).

was also targeted at changing the nature of *Golongan Karya (Golkar)*⁹—from a shy political party into a real political party¹⁰—and military’s involvement in politics—which then became the main goal of military reform in Indonesia.

1.2.1. Research question

The progress of the military reform in Indonesia since its inception in 1998 has received mix assessments. Some scholars argue that the military reform in Indonesia has been, to certain degree, successful in distancing the armed forces from politics, while others contend it. This dissertation is aiming at assessing the progress of the reform and identifying the most likely determinant that defines this progress. The most advance progress is taking place in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces while in the disbandment of military business activities, the reform has only partially successful in taking over military’s formal business activities and the worst progress takes place in the abandonment of military, especially the Army, territorial command structure. Since this research seeks to explain the variation in the outcomes of the reform from one issue to another, the main question posted in this research is: why has the reform resulted in different outcomes from one issue to another? In details, it also seeks to answer the following questions:

1. How do we measure the progress military reform? What are the most sensible indicators to measure such a progress?
2. Why does the reform quite successful in creating normative framework to ensure democratic control over the armed forces? What are the factors that enabling this success?

⁹ *Golkar* was the main political vehicle of Suharto to win elections. It was founded as a group of professional associations instead of political party. It did not transform into political party until 1998 under the leadership of Akbar Tanjung. He adopted several reform agendas and managed to lead the party amid public’s call for disbandment and eventually gained significant number of votes in 1999 election. Under his leadership, however, *Golkar* suffered from split in which some senior members that were against him opted to established new political parties. None of these new parties, however, performed successfully during the 1999 election. On the transformation of *Golkar* during this period, see Tanjung (2007) or Tomsa (2008).

¹⁰ Since it was never referred as political party during Suharto era, *Golkar* was granted with various benefits including the ability to perform the so-called *pembinaan sepanjang tahun* (year-long coaching). This *pembinaan* provided *Golkar* with indefinite period of campaign in comparison to the other two political parties which were only allowed to do campaign in the designated period—usually few months prior to the election. In addition, it was mandatory for civil servants to be member of *Golkar* and those who did not chose for *Golkar* during the election would be punished.

3. Why does the reform relatively unsuccessful in disbanding military business activities? What are the stumbling blocks?
4. Why does the reform fail to abandon military's territorial command structure? What are the stumbling blocks?

Assessing those questions would give a clear picture of how has the military's withdrawal from politics in Indonesia been taking place, to what extent and why. Assessing the case of military reform in Indonesia also contributes to the debate of civil-military relations studies in Third World countries in which Ruland, Manea and Born (in Ruland, Manea & Born, 2013) have argued that Western classical ideals of civilian control over the armed forces and military professionalism have failed to explain the Third World countries' cases. This research also contributes in understanding the trajectory of democratic transition in post-authoritarian countries since the role of the armed forces in that process is an important one.

To understand the complexity of military reform in Indonesia, three frameworks can be applied to make sense of it. First, the reform can be framed within the concept of transition to democracy. The Indonesian military reform would not take place if Suharto's authoritarian rule did not collapse. Military reform is an important feature of transition to democracy in Indonesia especially since the role of TNI in Indonesian politics during the reign of Suharto was influential. By reforming TNI, especially by departing them from politics, the road to democracy shall be relatively smooth. Opposition from TNI, on the other hand, could significantly recourse the transition to different direction. Hence, within this framework, military reform in Indonesia should be considered as part of a larger socio-political reform. One of the implications to such an understanding is the need to examine relationship between military reform and other reforms, such as justice sector reform, political (institutional) reform, economic reform, etc. It means that the progress of military reform must also consider the progress in other sectors' reform.

Second, military reform in Indonesia should also be considered within a larger Security Sector Reform (SSR). Military reform in Indonesia is aiming at establishing democratic control over the armed forces instead of simply creating civilian control over the armed forces. Traditional civilian control approach focuses on how to strike a balance relationship between civilian leaderships and the armed forces. Feaver (1996),

for example, identified two central yet conflicting principles in finding that balance, which are: while the military must be strong enough to protect the state from external threat, they must be ensured not to use their monopoly of violence against the state and its inhabitant. To what extent does this control should be taking place, according to democratic control school, is subject to democratic governance. The term democratic control, hence, means that the control should be guided by democratic values (Pantev, 2005). Under such values, it is crucial “to reorient and limit the military’s activities to its normative duties, and subordinate it to those democratically elected to take charge of the country’s affairs” (Akonyunlu, 2007, 13). The normative duty of the armed forces in democratic society is to defend the country from external threat and, hence, the armed forces should become a defense tool with externally-oriented task. It would prohibit domination of certain group or groups within civilian camp over the armed forces, which Huntington (1957) referred as subjective control. Democratic control over the armed forces, hence, has a close resonance with Huntington’s ideals of objective control.

An emphasis on democratic control over the armed forces is particularly important due to several reasons. Mietzner (2004, 4) wrote that the armed forces are key factor in successful transition and hence, to minimize their role in shaping the future of the transition period, it is necessary to as soon as possible establish “constitutional mechanisms that put democratically elected, civilian state institutions in charge of all aspects of governance, including the security sector.” What important is that “in some cases, the establishment of civilian control by only one dominant civilian element in the post-authoritarian transition can reinforce the very manipulability of the armed forces that the regime change aimed to removed” (Mietzner, 2004, 4). Coughlan (1998, 519) wrote that the “lack of effective mechanism of civilian control means that the political system is always hostage to the threat of military intervention or of intervention on the part of any societal group that can gain the military’s support.” Hence, she considered democratic control as an effective means of controlling the armed forces since it is not only ensuring military’s submission to democratic values but also preventing part of civilian group to solely control the armed forces for their own benefits. In addition, the word “security” in SSR should not only be associated with the armed forces per se, but also with other security agencies, such as police force and intelligence agencies. The relationship between military reform and police as well as intelligence reforms is,

therefore, important. A dominant focus on certain reform, for example on military reform, would create a sense of jealousy from officers to other security agencies.

Finally, one additional context should also be taken into consideration in understanding military reform in Indonesia. While it is true that the reform would not taking place without the pressures from civilian groups, the decision to initiate reform has been made internally by the armed forces. Hence, military reform in Indonesia is indeed an internally-driven project. The use of this framework has always been contested by non-governmental organizations (NGOs) since according to them acknowledging that military reform is an internally-driven project is basically giving the armed forces an empty cheque. They afraid that the armed forces would easily conclude that the reform has been successful and hence no further reform need to be done, while NGO activists believe that the reform, as of today, has yet to achieve what they desire. To overcome this fear, scholars who involved in military reform in Indonesia proposed two different conceptual frameworks to understand military reform in Indonesia.¹¹ The first concept is military reform, which is similar to the first generation of reform concept introduced by Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster (2002), and the second concept is defense transformation, which basically closely related to Huntington's (1957) identification of military professionalism.¹²

Hence, taking into consideration those three contexts, this research considers the Indonesian case of military reform as an internally-driven effort by the armed forces to disengage from politics during the transition to democracy. It means that the reform should be framed from the perspective of the armed forces which, as any other political actors, their behaviors are taken according to rational calculations. The existence and

¹¹ A handful of scholars involved in military reform in Indonesia and gained trust from defense establishment—TNI and Ministry of Defense. Among these scholars are Kusananto Anggoro, Edy Prasetyono, Rizal Sukma, and Andi Widjajanto who involved in the drafting of various regulations with the defense establishment and had written several—and restricted—documents for the defense establishment.

¹² While various scholarly works can be found with regard to these two concepts, in the context of Indonesia, the main idea is basically distinguishing the political nature and the non-political nature of the reform. During my personal encounters with Widjajanto, Prasetyono, and Anggoro, they laid out at least two main reasons for this separation. The first reason is to prevent military officers from getting tired with critics by acknowledging that military reform has performed tremendously but at the same time—which is the second reason—the concept of military transformation would lead these officers to seriously think about their main business—defense professionalism—instead of about political role of TNI. It is, therefore, a subtle way to redirect their focus from politics.

interests of other actors, however, are also worth considering since they surely have impacts to the armed forces' behaviors.

1.2.2. Argument

This research focuses on military corporate interests. While the dominant thesis on military reform in Indonesia tends to consider the progress of the reform as the function of civil-military dynamics, this dissertation argues that the reform is basically conducted in accordance with the corporate interests of the armed forces and hence on some issues the armed forces were willingly to comply with the reform agendas while on other issues they were reluctantly complying. The concept of military interests in this dissertation is categorized into three different types: the national interest of the armed forces¹³, the organizational interest of the armed forces, and the factional/personal interest within the armed forces. Based on that typology, this dissertation examines the influence of each of those types of interests to the progress of military reform in different issues/agendas.

The making of (normative) regulations to ensure democratic control over the armed forces has been the dominant focus of the military reform. It has close proximity with the basic idea of transition to democracy that swept Indonesia since the fall of Suharto. Public call for transition to democracy has been the dominant idea since the fall of Suharto. The armed forces, with relatively small room for maneuvering their organizational interests, chose to comply with wider public call for democracy. Using the concept of “reposition”, they complied to adopt reform agendas that mostly were concerned with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. TNI placed transition to democracy as their primary concern and agreed to adopt reform agendas which introduce sort of democratic control over themselves albeit cautiously. It is this larger national interest that led TNI to accept the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces.

In the issue of military business activities, the reform has relatively less successful. The taking over of military business activities has been slow or only partially successful. While there has been progress, both in term of regulations and the

¹³ While the term “national interest” can be defined rather widely, this dissertation focuses on a relatively narrower understanding of national interest from the perspective of the armed forces. It sometimes also referred as normative interest.

actual taking over, this taking over only covers the so-called formal business activities of the armed forces. The number of TNI's legal businesses through cooperatives (*koperasi*) and foundations (*yayasan*) was far less in comparison to their informal and illegal businesses. The armed forces showed little refusal over this taking over, but it was the case of factions/persons within the armed forces who owned interests to these businesses. These factions/persons either openly or discreetly refused the taking over as suggested in some cases examined in this dissertation. Hence, it was basically the interests of these factions/persons that led to partial success in this taking over instead of the interests of the whole establishment.

Finally, the reform's performance in the abandonment of military's territorial command structure has been completely stalled. TNI's territorial command structure—especially the Army—has been the most important tool for the armed forces to fully penetrate civilian activities day-by-day in every part of the state. A change in this structure would significantly affect military's ability to penetrate civilian daily life. In addition, the lack of alternatives is also the reason for TNI's strong rejection to abandon their current structure. In this case, organizational interests of TNI define their unwillingness to comply with reform agenda to restructure their territorial command structure. With such a high stake, the reform has been completely failed to create significant change in TNI's territorial command structure. In short, the main argument of this dissertation can be summed up in Figure 1.2 below.




Figure 1.2. Logic of argument

1.3. Methodology, data source, and case selection

In explaining the above argument, this dissertation employs a qualitative approach. In particular, it uses a within-case comparison method to explain the main puzzle. As suggested earlier in this chapter, this dissertation focuses on the military reform in Indonesia's post-Suharto. Since the main aim of military reform in Indonesia is basically military's withdrawal from politics, the main concept used in this dissertation is military's withdrawal from politics. This part presents the methodology used in this dissertation, the data source, and the case selection.

1.3.1. Methodology

A within-case comparison falls within the family of case study method. A case study method can be defined as “the detailed examination of an aspect of a historical episode to develop or test explanations that may be generalizable for other events” (George & Bennett, 2005, 5) or as “an in-depth study of a single unit (a relatively bounded phenomenon) where the scholar's aim is to elucidate features of a larger class of similar phenomena” (Gerring, 2004, 341). To fit in this definition, clear boundaries of historical episode or unit (bounded phenomenon) should first be clarified. The case in this research is military's withdrawal from politics in Indonesia's post-Suharto era. While military's withdrawal from politics serves as substantive boundaries of this case, the temporal boundaries of this research begins with the fall of Suharto in 1998 and ends with the departure of Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono from power. It does not mean, however, that the reform is no longer taking place after SBY era. The temporal boundaries of this research, therefore, cover four different presidencies, from Baharuddin Jusuf Habibie to Abdurrahman Wahid to Megawati Sukarnoputri to SBY.¹⁴

While case study method basically focuses on how to define the case instead of to analyze the case or to model causal relationship, it does not mean that case study method is lacking theory development capability. Scholars employing case study method have categorized case study method into different clusters with each serves

¹⁴ Habibie replaced Suharto after the later resigned from his post in May 1998. He was then replaced by Wahid on October 1999. Wahid was impeached by the parliament on July 2001 and then replaced by his Vice President, Megawati. She lost the presidential election—the first direct presidential election in Indonesia—from Yudhoyono who reigned from October 2004 until October 2014 after winning his second term in October 2009.

different goal. Lipjhart (1971), for example, categorized case study method into atheoretical, interpretive, hypothesis-generating, theory-confirming, theory-informing, and deviant case studies. Similarly, Levy (2008) differentiated case study method into few basic typologies consisted of idiographic case studies which can be either inductive or theory-guided, hypothesis generating case studies, hypothesis testing cases, and plausibility probes case studies. Rohfling (2012) identified three forms of case study based on its function to create general theory into: (1) case study that is aiming at building hypothesis, (2) a case study that is aiming at modifying hypothesis, and (3) a case study that is aiming at refining hypothesis. In short, they can be divided into a theoretical based or empirical based case study (Beach & Pedersen, 2016). George and Bennett (2005, 5) bridged this distinction and argued that case study should “focus on empirical cases to develop logically consistent theories by deriving observable implications from theories and test them against empirical observations or measurements to make inferences on how best to modify the tested theories.”

Despite the fact that this research focuses on a single case—the case of Indonesia’s military reform, it conducts a within-case comparison since it focuses its attention to variation of the outcomes of Indonesia’s military reform. It compares the relatively successful establishment of democratic control over the armed forces in the reform to the least successful military’s withdrawal from business activities to the failure to disband military’s territorial command structure. This research, however, focuses on military interests to explain the variation of the outcomes of Indonesia’s military reform. Hence, this research basically seeks to explain the causal mechanism of single variable, military interests, in influencing another single variable, the progress of reform or withdrawal.

This research focuses on TNI as the unit of analysis. It conducts an in-depth study to examine the interests of TNI in navigating military reform. It considers TNI as a solid entity with a clear line of command but at the same time it does not neglect the fact that there are contestations between factions within TNI. This research, however, does not focus on the existence of split within the brass, as conducted by various scholars in explaining the progress of military reform in Indonesia, but focuses instead on their interests, whether factional or corporate or national interests, in explaining the progress of the military reform. This research also does not assume that the decisions

made by the TNI is solely based on their interests and disregarding their relationship with other civilian groups' interests. Hence, while it focuses on the interests of the armed forces, it also takes into consideration the interests of other groups and how their interests interact. This research also does not neglect the structural factors that influence the decisions and behaviors of the unit under investigation. Hence, this research also seeks the interaction between the primary unit of analysis and the structural preconditions.

Since this research attempts to explain a phenomenon and the variable that influence that phenomenon to occurring, it pays special attention to the method of process-tracing, which attempts to trace the links between possible causes and observed outcomes. The term process tracing has been quite usual used by scholars to refer to how independent variables explain the occurrence of dependent variable. Blatter and Haverland (in Engeli, *et.al*, 2014, 59) argued that process-tracing, or they called it as causal process tracing, is aiming at “revealing the sequential and situational interplay between causal conditions and mechanisms in order to show in detail how these causal factors generate the outcome of interest.” They further argued that in order to perform a logical process tracing, it requires comprehensive storylines, smoking-gun observations, and confessions (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, 110–19).¹⁵ Hence, a good conclusion in process tracing method, “requires that the analyst have: good knowledge of the history of the case, good knowledge of relevant preexisting theories and generalizations, and a strong capacity to carry out sound logical reasoning by combining facts about the case with more general knowledge” (Mahoney, 2015, 202). This research, therefore, examines archival documents, interview transcripts, as well as other primary and secondary sources to see whether the causal relationship of the hypotheses is in line with the evidences in a predicted sequence since process-tracing requires abundant information related to the case under study. Hence, a wide range of sources is required to be able to make a sound judgment.

¹⁵ As comparison, van Evera (1997) and Bennett (2010) argued that smoking-gun observations are the most decisive evidence to support the causal mechanism in a process tracing method. Mahoney (2015) on other hand argued that hoop test and counterfactual analysis could be a good option to assess the logical coherence of causal mechanism in a process tracing (Mahoney, 2015). Critics, however, remained skeptical to this approach (see for example Waldner, 2015). Beach and Pedersen (2016, 311-312) argued that there is basically no answer to the question of whether the proposed causal mechanism has solid enough or not and hence it is up to the researcher to stop.

1.3.2. Data source

The sources worth examined are official documentations and publications. Access to minutes of meetings within the armed forces or Ministry of Defence is quite limited, but official publications are widely available. This dissertation also examines internal reports within the armed forces or the Ministry of Defence, especially those that related to the issue of business activities of TNI. This dissertation also examines transcript of interviews with former military officers within the armed forces, particularly with the highest person in command (*Panglima TNI*). Head of one of the four national teams in charge of the overtaking of military business activities also share his story with regard to the issue of military business activities. Since the reform was also assisted by a small group of scholars, those scholars are also interviewed. In addition, some of those who involved in the reform have published memoirs, which would also be a good source for analysis. In addition, several officers have published their memoirs which are also worth examined. This research also examines sources from newspaper archives, especially *Kompas* and *Tempo*, two of the leading newspapers in Indonesia. Reports from the NGOs are also good sources, especially NGOs that work in human rights and anti-corruption. Hence, despite much criticism to case study method for its lack of theoretical rigor (King, Keohane & Verba, 1996), in particular its ability to draw generalization from a single case or comparison cases, careful process-tracing analysis should be sufficient to help drawing conclusion.

1.3.3. Case selection

In a case study method, case selection has been considered as one of the most important features in research activities. Gerring (2017) suggested that case selection should be made by considering the aim of the research (see also George & Bennett, 2005; Yin, 2009, 2014). Hence, a descriptive and a causal research would have different considerations in case selection. In a causal research, case selection should take into consideration comparison between potential cases as well as comparison through time. In addition, sometimes, case selection requires several levels of elimination process—which is used in selecting the Indonesian case in this dissertation.

This research itself is aiming at finding causal explanation to the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics within the context of transition to democracy. With regard to the issue of transition to democracy, Huntington (1991/1992, 579) introduced the term wave of democratization to refer to “a group of transitions from non-democratic to democratic regimes that occurs within a specified period and that significantly outnumbers transitions in the opposite direction in the same period” in which the world has witnessed three different waves of democratization with the first took place in early nineteenth century until the broke out of the World War I, the second took place following the World War II, and the third took place in early 1970s. There are, off course, criticisms over Huntington’s wave theory as well as his measurement of democracy (Przeworski *et.al*, 2000; Doorenspleet, 2000).

While Huntington’s (1991/1992, 1993) identification of members of the third wave democratization countries is limited to those that experiencing democratization from 1974 to 1991, Geddes, Wright, and Frantz (2014) provided a larger set of countries that experiencing democratization since the year 1970. According to their dataset, there are 72 countries that experiencing democratization in the third wave of democratization. 63 countries—up until 2013—remained democratic and 9 countries bounced back into autocracy. Of those 63 countries, 48 countries have never experiencing a bounced back in their transition tracks and the rest experiencing at least one redirection to non-democratic before eventually went back to democratization. Table 1.3 provides a detail the list of these countries.

Table 1.3. Countries experiencing democratization during the third wave of democratization
(Source: Geddes, Wright & Frantz, 2014, the dataset)

State experiencing wave of democratization		State experiencing both wave and reverse-wave of democratization	
- Albania (1992-2013)	- Malawi (1995-2013)	- Argentina (1974-1976, 1984-2013)	- Madagascar (1994-2009)
- Benin (1992-2013)	- Mali (1993-2013)	- Armenia (1992-1994)	- Nepal (1991-2002, 2007-2013)
- Bolivia (1983-2013)	- Mexico (2001-2013)	- Azerbaijan (1993-1993)	- Niger (1994-1996, 2000-2013)
- Brazil (1986-2013)	- Moldova (1992-2013)	- Bangladesh (19-2007, 2009-2013)	- Nigeria 1980-1983, 2000-2013)
- Bulgaria (1991-2013)	- Mongolia (1994-2013)	- Burundi (1994-1996-2006-2013)	- Pakistan (1972-1975, 1989-1999, 2009-2013)
- Chile (1990-2013)	- Montenegro (2007-2013)	- Central African Republic (1994-2003)	- Peru (1981-1992, 2002-2013)
- Croatia (1992-2013)	- Nicaragua (1991-2013)		
- Dominican Republic (1979-			

- 2013)	- Panama (1990-2013)	- Congo (1993-1997)	- Russia (1992-1993)
- Ecuador (1980-2013)	- Paraguay (1994-2013)	- Czechoslovakia (1990-1993)*	- Sierra Leone (1997-1997, 1999-2013)
- El Salvador (1995-2013)	- The Philippines (1987-2013)	- Ghana (1970-1972, 1980-1981, 2001-2013)	- Sudan (1987-1989)
- Estonia (1992-2013)	- Poland (1990-2013)	- Guinea Bissau (2001-2002, 2006-2013)	- Thailand (1976-1976, 1989-1991, 1993-2006, 2008-2013)
- Georgia (2005-2013)	- Portugal (1977-2013)	- Haiti (1991-1991, 1995-1999, 2007-2013)	- Zambia (1992-1996)
- Greece (1975-2013)	- Romania (1991-2013)	- Honduras (1972-1972, 1982-2013)	
- Guatemala (1996-2013)	- Senegal (2001-2013)		
- Hungary (1991-2013)	- Serbia (2001-2013)		
- Indonesia (1998-2013)	- Slovakia and Czech (1993-2013)*		
- Kenya (2003-2013)	- Slovenia (1992-2013)		
- Korea, South (1988-2013)	- South Africa (1995-2013)		
- Latvia (1992-2013)	- Spain (1978-2013)		
- Lebanon (2003-2013)	- Sri Lanka (1995-2013)		
- Lesotho (1994-2013)	- Taiwan (2001-2013)		
- Liberia (2006-2013)	- Turkey (1984-2013)		
- Lithuania (1992-2013)	- Ukraine (1992-2013)		
- Macedonia (1992-2013)	- Uruguay (1985-2013)		

* Czechoslovakia split into two states—Czech and Slovakia—in 1993

Since this dissertation focuses on military's withdrawal from politics, it should limit the cases to those transitions that come from military regimes or military-backed regimes to democratic society. As a result, there are 16 countries that transitioning from military regimes or military-backed regimes without experiencing any bouncing-back into autocracy. These 16 countries are: Benin, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Greece, Guatemala, Indonesia, South Korea, Lesotho, Panama, Paraguay, Turkey and Uruguay. Of those countries, two countries are African countries, two are Asians, two are Europeans and the rest is Central and Southern Americans. Employing a quantitative measurement,¹⁶ those countries can be categorized into four different degrees of democratic control (Kuehn, *et.al*, 2016; Wardoyo, 2016). Indonesia, Brazil, Greece, South Korea, and Uruguay represent countries with best

¹⁶ These indicators are given in detail in Chapter 2.

democratic control over the armed forces. Turkey, Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Chile, and Paraguay represent countries with good democratic control over the armed forces. Ecuador, El Salvador and Guatemala represent countries with bad democratic control over the armed forces. No country on this list experiences worst democratic control over the armed forces condition and measurement for Benin, Panama and Lesotho cannot be done due to the lack of data.




Figure 1.3. Degree of democratic control over the armed forces

Five countries with the best democratic control over the armed forces can be considered as the least likely case in examining the case of military's withdrawal from politics. They are the least likely since this dissertation considers that the armed forces would be unlikely to succumb to democratic control due to their possession of power. Thus, it basically follows the logic provided by *Finer* (1962, 1988).

The next level of elimination used in this dissertation is by carefully distinguishing the pattern of the transition. *Huntington* (1991/1992, 1993) identified four different patterns of transition from transformation, transplacement, replacement, and intervention. Transformation basically refers to transition process in which the former authoritarian power is the leader of the transition. It is a top down process where the transition to democracy takes place because the former authoritarian leader plays a decisive role in ending its own regime. On the other hand, transition to democracy can also take place as a bottom-process in which the former authoritarian leader is being replaced by a new group of pro-democratic elites. In such a situation, the existence of

reformer group within the former authoritarian regime is small. Transplacement refers to transition process that takes place due to the combined efforts of reformers within former authoritarian regime and the opposition. In such a situation, there would be an alliance of reformers in the old and the new elite groups. Finally, intervention refers to transition process that takes place due to the intervention of foreign group or power. Among the least likely cases listed above, Indonesia, South Korea and Uruguay represent the transplacement model of transition. Brazil is an example of transformation model and Greece is an example of replacement model. In the transformation model, the armed forces are basically the group who lead the transition process and hence the progress of the transition would be very much depending on them. On the other hand, in the replacement model, a contrary different situation occurs in which the progress of the reform is highly depended on the new elite group, which definitely is not the military. Hence, a transplacement model of transition will theoretically provide a dynamic relationship between the armed forces—as well as other old elites—and the new elites. Therefore, three candidates of cases fit the aim of this dissertation, which are: Indonesia, South Korea and Uruguay.

The transition process started in 1985 in Uruguay started in 1985, in 1988 in South Korea, and in 1998 Indonesia.¹⁷ Figure 1.3 suggests that the degree of democratic control in both Uruguay and South Korea have reached a maximum score while in Indonesia has yet to achieve the maximum score. Since the aim of dissertation is not to make comparison between cases but to examine the variation within case, both Uruguayan and South Korean cases would not serve this aim well. Therefore, the case selection for this dissertation falls to the military reform in Indonesia.

1.4. Contribution and limitation

Three contributions of this research can be identified. First, this research seeks to spill out first-hand information from in-depth interviews with those who involved in the reform. In addition, several high-ranking officers have published memoirs which would also enrich this dissertation. This dissertation also managed to dig into information on two sensitive issues such as military business activities and territorial command

¹⁷ In their dataset, Geddes, Wright and Frantz (2014) argued that the beginning of the transition in Indonesia takes place in 2000 instead of 1998. This dissertation uses 1998 as the beginning of the transition.

structure. In addition, this research also seeks to examine various documents, newspapers reports, as well as NGOs' reports on the three cases under investigation. While official documents are relatively difficult to be accessed, the last two sources are publicly available. Digging into sources in local language would produce thorough analysis of the cases. Finally, the focus on military interests, which some scholars considered as vague (Lee, 2011), would contribute to a clearer understanding of this concept. The focus on military interests, on the other hand, would also limit this research. This research, off course, would not neglect the contributions of other variables that shape the progress of military reform. Other limitation comes from the lack of measuring reliable information. As noted above, while official publications are widely available, official documentations are not. It would be difficult, therefore, to counter information from targeted interviewees.

1.5. Outline of chapters

This dissertation is organized as the following. Chapter 1 is an introduction, which basically outlines the puzzle, the argument, the methodology, and the organization of this dissertation. Chapter 2 provides review of previous literatures on military reform in Indonesia and presents the framework which is going to be used in this research. Chapter 3, 4 and 5 examine the three cases, i.e. the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, the disbandment of military's business activities, and the abandonment of the armed forces territorial command structure. In each of these chapters, explanation begins with the progress of reform in each issue and then followed by careful tracing on why such a progress has been made, whether it was successful or failed. Chapter 6 is the conclusion. This chapter lies out comparison between the three cases examined the previous chapters and provides some recommendations for further studies in this issue.

Chapter 2

Explaining military's withdrawal from politics

The aim of this chapter is to provide theoretical framework to examine military's withdrawal from politics. This chapter is divided into three parts. The first part reviews literatures on the role of the armed forces in politics to lay out the spectrum of their involvement in politics. In the second part, a review of literatures that discuss variables that affect military's withdrawal from politics is made available. Building from those two reviews of literatures, this chapter ends with its own modified theoretical framework to understand military withdrawal from politics within the context of transition to democracy that focus on military interests instead of other variables.

2.1. Review literatures on military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics

This first part has three components. First, it discusses the relationship between military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics to military's professionalism. It then sets the indicators to measure involvement and withdrawal based on previous literatures as well the technique used in this measurement. Finally, this part assesses TNI's involvement in and withdrawal from politics since 1945 until today to conclude that in the post-Suharto era there has been military's withdrawal to certain degree.

2.1.1. Relationship between military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics with military's professionalism

The role of the armed forces in politics has long been a subject of debate within the study of political science. Their involvement and non-involvement in politics are related to the concept of military professionalism. Two schools of military professionalism hold different view on the role of the armed forces in politics. The "old professionalism school" argues that military should never involve in politics and their sole assignment is defense (Huntington, 1957; Perlmutter, 1977; Alagappa, 2001). "The new professionalism school", on the contrary, argues that the armed forces are required to play a role in politics especially in maintaining domestic stability (Stepan, 1973, 1988;

Sarkesian, 1981). Both schools, however, agree that the armed forces must be equipped with skills, with the old school argues that skill should be limited to expertise in managing violence while the new school thinks other skills should also be included, and that the armed forces must have strong corporate attachment.

Two notes should be given to the above debate. First, while the old professionalism school develops their framework from the experience of Western countries, in which the armed forces are distinctly different from society since the beginning of state-making, the new professionalism builds their understanding based on the experience of the Third World countries in which the role of the armed forces is crucial as provider of stability. Those different backgrounds produce different military cultures and, hence, different understandings of themselves and their roles. It should be noted, however, that that understanding is not taking place in vacuum. Sarkesian (1981), for example, warned that due to the interaction between military, democratization, and technology, it will be difficult to maintain the concept of old professionalism as the ideals of military professionalism in the years to come. It does not mean, however, that the shift from an old to a new professionalism is and will becoming a trend worldwide.

On the contrary, which is also the second note, a swing from a new to an old professionalism has been taking place in various countries that experiencing transition to democracy since an old professionalism concept is considered as important feature of democratic society. Therefore, the old professionalism school tends to dominate the ideals of professional armed forces in the current times. The last two waves of this shifting were taking place in Eastern Europe and East Asia, particularly in Southeast Asia, since the 1990s. In Southeast Asia, Alagappa (2001) suggested that a shifting toward old professionalism attitudes has taking place in most of its member countries.¹⁸ Mietzner (2011a) debunked Alagappa's conclusion and instead points out to the fact that there has been a political resurgence of the armed forces in this region. Mietzner's assertion is partly correct since there is indeed a swing back to the rise of new professionalism due to resistance from majority members of the armed forces.¹⁹ Thailand represents this case. The introduction of democracy that took place in Thailand

¹⁸ For reference to the Eastern European case see Edmunds, Cottey and Forster (2006).

¹⁹ Mietzner, however, argued that the main reason for such a resurgence, except in Myanmar, is the inability of civilian leaderships to conduct effective governing. In addition, this resurgence does not take place in all countries within the region. SAF (Singapore Armed Forces), for example, remains as non-political entity.

since early 1990s went to a wrong direction with several taking over of governments by the armed forces. Scholars have attributed these coups to the culture of Royal Thai Forces' involvement in politics and the weaknesses within civilian camp (Bunbongkarn in Blair 2013, 165-187; Croissant, et.al, 2013; Kocak & Kode in Heiduk, 2014, 83-101). A closer look to the first factor suggests that there was time when several officers with democratic tendency held relatively strong influence on the government (Bunbongkarn in Blair, 2013, 165-187). The numbers of these officers, however, were relatively small and their ideas were soon to be rejected by majority within the brass. Since then, there has been a lack of continuation of these soft-minded officers within the Royal Thai Forces.

In the case of Indonesia, a closer look on its military history reveals that TNI's conception of professionalism is closer to the new rather than the old professionalism ideals in most of the times. However, during the reform era, there has been a swing toward the old professionalism. It is worth noting that the old professionalism within the Indonesian armed forces is not a new idea. General Tahi Bonar Simatupang and General Abdul Harris Nasution, for example, were known as the vanguard of an old professionalism ideal, in which they dreamed of and actually took steps to create outwardly-oriented armed forces with high degree of expertise in managing violence and possession of modern weaponry while at the same time refraining from politics (Widjajanto, 2017, interview). While this dissertation has no intention to step into the debate over the essence of military professionalism, it takes military's withdrawal from politics, and, hence, a swing from a new to an old ideal, as an important feature of military reform and, therefore, it is essential to understand the term military withdrawal at the first place. To be able to do so, a spectrum of military's involvement in politics must firstly be explained.

Previous works on the role of the armed forces in politics can be summed up as the following. There are basically three roles for the armed forces in politics, i.e. as ruler, as influencer, and as pawn. The two ends of that spectrum can be easily defined since both indicate domination, either by the armed forces or civilian leadership. Condition in which the armed forces become a ruler is also referred as military ruler or military domination, which scholars also termed it as garrison state or praetorian state. On the other hand, condition in which the armed forces serve as pawn to civilian leadership is

known as civilian control or civilian domination²⁰. In a garrison state, condition in which “the specialist of violence is the most powerful group in society” (Laswell, 1941, 455), or praetoritarian state, a condition “in which the military tends to intervene and potentially could dominate the political system” (Perlmutter, 1969, 383), the power solely belong to the armed forces, while in civilian domination the armed forces have no right and power to make policies. Huntington (1957) further distinguishes the latter into two different types: objective and subjective civilian controls. The subjective civilian control means that the armed forces are under the control of certain groups within the civilian camp. On the other hand, under an objective civilian control, the armed forces pledge their loyalty to the state instead of to certain groups within the state. Coughlan (1998) argued that civilian control of the armed forces in a country which previously ruled by the armed forces could very easily lead to entrenched civilian penetration to military internal affairs which indicates a subjective control. In addition, under such a situation, the armed forces usually are a solid entity with strong political position and hence it requires a strong state to be able to fully control them. Hence, creating a democratic governance of the armed forces is a good and viable option to be taken instead of simply creating civilian control. While both ends of spectrum of military’s involvement in politics can be relatively easy to define, the role in between those two ends is highly contested.

2.1.2. Indicators of military’s withdrawal from politics

How to draw the boundaries between those roles is the next question needs to be addressed. Degree of subordination can be used to set the boundaries. For example, in military domination, the armed forces are nowhere subordinated to their civilian counterparts, while on the second and third roles there are degrees of military subordination. The problem with such a way of categorizing the roles is how to clearly differentiate partnership role from pawn-ship role. Welch and Smith (1974) and Welch (in Welch, 1976) categorized the role of the armed forces in politics according to the relative power between the armed forces and civilian institutions in three areas: the enunciation, the development, and the implementation of policies. Welch and Smith

²⁰ Janowitz (1964) differentiated civilian domination into two different types: authoritarian personal and authoritarian mass party. Interestingly, he defined a sort of democratic control within the in-between area, what he termed as democratic-competitive type of civil-military relations.

(1974) divided the role of the armed forces in politics into influencer, intervener, and controller, while Welch (in Welch 1976) latter extended this categorization by dividing the role of controller into two types—with and without partners—and changes the term intervener into participant.²¹

Hence, with regard to the first role, military influence, three preconditions exist in their influencing role, i.e. significant degree of influence remain limited to those holding ranking positions, clear and integral boundaries exist between military and political roles, with officers shying away from the latter, and it takes place within regularized and accepted channels. The second role, military participation, differs from the first role in term of degree. In military participation, the armed forces are very likely to have veto power to certain policies. Military participation in politics is more likely when there is a split within civilian group and some of them turn to the armed forces for backing. Such a situation can lead to military control with partners when the armed forces operate behind the scene while allowing their civilian partners to rule. Alternatively, the armed forces can govern by themselves and hence creates a sort of military junta.

Working on the TNI, Rinakit (2005) used similar indicator to develop his own typology of the roles of the armed forces in politics—in addition to relative benefits gained by the armed forces as the second measurement—which include spoiler, critical supporter, and political tool. His definition of spoiler is when the armed forces oppose civilian leadership's policies when they consider those policies would bring disadvantages to the brass. Under such a situation, the armed forces would rely on rejection and strong-arm tactics to influence civilian leadership's decisions. The role of critical supporter takes place when the armed forces provide inputs and propose policies to civilian leadership while also cautiously offer criticism in the politest way. Finally, the role of political tool takes place when the armed forces simply become the tool of civilian leadership. Laksmana (2008) extended Rinakit's typology by adding the role of uncritical supporter in between critical supporter and political tool. This role can be identified when the armed forces give their unchallenged loyalty and support to civilian leadership in exchange for autonomy in their internal affairs. In addition, he slightly disagrees with Rinakit in identifying a subtle way to show disagreement with civilian

²¹ It should be noted that this framework does not discuss civilian domination whatsoever.

leadership—the strong-arm tactics—within the category of spoiler and tends to argue that it falls within the area in between spoiler and critical supporter.

The abovementioned identifications, however, suffered from one particular weakness. While they do mention relative powers and relative benefits as indicators to measure military's role in politics, the categorization of low-medium-high is rather fuzzy. They do provide examples, but how exactly can we judge the different between those roles is rather arbitrary. To overcome this weakness, division of areas of work between the armed forces and civilian can serve as good indicators. Other words, to clearly measure military's withdrawal, one can take a look at the areas in which the armed forces are playing. Scholars have suggested the division between the so-called civilian areas, areas within politics which supposedly dominated by civilian, from the military-related areas (Welch & Smith, 1974; Colton, 1979; Trinkunas, 1999, 2000; Croissant, 2011; Croissant, *et.al*, 2013; Kuehn, *et.al*, 2016). These areas are elite recruitment, public policy, and internal security matters, external defense and military organization.²² An absolute civilian domination takes place when civilian leadership enjoys high degree of uncontested decision in those five areas.

The area of elite recruitment has two dimensions, i.e. competition for public office and political participation. The former dimension has two indicators, i.e. whether there is a reserved representation for military personnel and whether the armed forces have influence on the rules of political competition. With regard to the first indicator, when there are no formal or informal guarantees for military representation in political bodies, the degree of civilian control can be said as high and, on the contrary, when there are the armed forces have majority of political positions reserved for them then the degree of civilian control is minimal. In between, the degree of civilian control can be said as medium when the armed forces are granted some privileged access to political office. With regard to the second indicator, the degree of civilian control is low when the armed forces dominate rule-setting, process as well as outcomes of elite selection and the degree is high when such domination is absent. It can be said that the degree of civilian control is medium when the armed forces to certain degree still have authority to those three aspects of elite selection. On the meanwhile, the second dimension of elite

²² Croissant, *et.al* (2013, 26-36) provided a detail explanation on assessing the degree of civilian control using this framework. Hence, explanation on this issue in the next few paragraphs will be taken from this work.

recruitment concerns with two indicators, i.e. eligibility of active officers for political office and possession of veto power over formation and dissolution of governments. The degree of civilian control, with regard to the first indicator, is low when military officers are eligible to occupy political office or, despite the fact that regulations to forbid such eligibility are existing, they are simply ignored. On the other hand, it can be said that the degree of civilian control is high when active duty officers are forbidden from taking any political office and medium when they are still allowed to sit in political office on few individual cases. Concerning the second indicator, the degree of civilian control is low when there is formal regulations to grant the armed forces with veto power and high when the armed forces have no power whatsoever on the making and breaking of governments and medium when the armed forces occasionally have a de facto influence.

The area of public policy also has two dimensions, i.e. policy making and policy implementation. With regard to the former dimension, two indicators can be identified, i.e. military influence on state budget and military influence on public policy making. When the armed forces dominate over budgetary process the degree of civilian control can be said as low. The same condition can be said when there is systematic exclusion of civilians from at least one policy field in its policy making. On the contrary, the degree of civilian control is high when the armed forces have no participation in the allocation of state expenditures or they have no institutional prerogatives or even informal interventions in the making of any public policy. In between, the degree of civilian control is medium when the armed forces remain equipped with institutional prerogatives or de facto managed to capture some budget items and, with regard to influence on public policy making, the armed forces possess some isolated participation. When policy implementation of public policy is concerned, the degree of civilian control is low when civilian administrative authorities are under military oversight or when the armed forces have significant parallel structures and the degree is high when there are no military-dominated state-in-state structures. It can be said that the degree of civilian control is medium when the armed forces replace civilian administration in certain functional or geographical areas.

On the area of internal security matters, two dimensions can also be identified which are policy making and control over security agents. The role of the armed forces

in policy making of internal security matters should be absent or there should no institutional prerogatives or informal intervention whatsoever. Under such circumstances, the degree of civilian control can be categorized as high. On the contrary, when there is systematic exclusion of civilians from internal security decision making, the degree of civilian control is low and when there is some institutionalized prerogatives of the armed forces or when there is informal military authority's involvement in the making of internal security policies, the degree of civilian control can be considered as medium. On the second dimension of internal security matters area, two indicators can be used to measure the degree of civilian control. The first indicator is whether there is separation of policy and other security agencies from the armed forces. When there is strict separation between military command from police and other security agencies, with the exception of emergency situation, the degree of civilian control is high. On the contrary, when there is no separation between the armed forces and police/other security agencies or there is police/other security agencies subordination to the armed forces, the degree of civilian control can be said as low. When the latter cases take place in limited geographic areas or missions, the degree of civilian control can be considered as medium.

With regard to the area of external defense, two dimensions can also be identified, i.e. policy making and policy implementation. Concerning the former dimension, a high level of civilian control takes place when civilian has an institutionalized dominance over defense policy, active day-to-day participation in defense policy making, and prerogatives in the making of policies. When civilian is lacking those rights, the degree of civilian control can be considered as medium and when they are excluded from the making of the policy then the degree of civilian control is low. With regard to the implementation of the policy, when civilians in all branches of government are able to monitor military activities, the degree of civilian control can be said as high and when military missions are not subject to any civilian monitoring, the degree of control is low. When the armed forces have the ability to selectively withdraw themselves from civilian oversighting, the degree of civilian control can be considered as medium. Hence, with regard to this area, basically a high degree of civilian control exists when civilians are making the policy and oversighting the implementation. It suggests that the armed forces are basically a tool to defend the

country, that their main duty is to implement the policy and while doing so are subject to civilian monitoring.

The last area is military organization which can also be identified to have two dimensions, i.e. policy making and policy implementation. With regard to the former dimension, high degree of civilian control exists when civilians have full authority over decisions about military organization, including their rules of conducts, the limits of their autonomy, and the guidelines for their corporate identity. When the armed forces have veto power over decisions and civilians are limited in making policy regarding military organization, the degree of civilian control can be said as medium. When the armed forces are the sole determinant to define their organization and the scope of their autonomy, the degree of civilian control can be identified as low. Concerning the second dimension, the degree of civilian control is high if civilians are able to monitor and audit military activities to guarantee that their decisions are implemented accordingly and the degree of civilian control is low when civilians are not granted access to military activities or the armed forces possess full autonomy. In between, when there is a lack of institutionalized oversight mechanisms in which civilians would be able to monitor the armed forces in their conduct to implement policies, the degree of control can be identified as medium.

The above areas, however, could be interpreted differently. The way Trinkunas (1999, 2000) measured the degree of control, for example, is by placing the above areas in a concentric cycle.²³ At the deepest cycle, he placed external defense, followed by, in sequence, internal security, domestic politics (public policy), and state leadership (elite recruitment) on the outer cycles. According to him, a high degree of civilian control took place when there is a shared authority in external defense and full civilian authority over the other three areas. Meanwhile, he defined weak civilian control over the armed forces when there is military domination in the external defense, shared authority in internal security matters, and civilian domination in the other two areas. The second way to measure the degree of civilian control over the armed forces is by simply giving score to each of the above indicators in those five areas and categorizing the total score into three equal sections. This dissertation mixes both ways of measuring the degree of control (Croissant, *et.al*, 2013; Kuehn, *et.al*, 2016; Wardoyo, 2016). It argues that the

²³ Trinkunas, however, excluded military organization in his assessment.

armed forces have a degree of autonomy in the areas of external defense and military organization in which their role is limited to overseeing and making the policies with dominant inputs from the armed forces. Civilian leaderships should not engage in policy implementation on those two areas, while they, off course, have the right of overseeing. This dissertation's main focus is on military's withdrawal and hence it also takes into account the actual withdrawing in each and every indicator given within those five areas.

Working from the above reviewed literatures, this dissertation identifies the role of the armed forces in politics into four categories, i.e. ruler, partner, spoiler, and pawn (see Figure 2.1). In military rule the military plays omnipresent roles, while as a pawn they are completely disengaged from politics. The other two roles exist when military and civilian leadership have roughly equal role, and power, in politics and can be differentiated based on the nature of their relationship (positive versus negative or partnership versus conflictual). Military withdrawal takes place when there are movements from ruler to pawn, either taking the routes of ruler-partner-pawn or ruler-spoiler-pawn or ruler-spoiler/partner-partner/spoiler-pawn.




Figure 2.1. Spectrum of military's role in politics

2.1.3. Identifying TNI's involvement in and withdrawal from politics

Applying the above spectrum in the case of Indonesia suggests that TNI has been through those all four roles in politics since the independence of the Republic. Contrary to what scholars usually argue that TNI has always been deeply involved in politics (Kingsbury, 2003; Crouch, 1978), it turns out that TNI has actually served in a relatively long period as partner (1976-1998) and spoiler (1945-1965) and only a relatively short period as ruler (1966-1976). The latter role in fact is debatable since some scholars would suggest that what actually happened during this particular period was the armed forces played their role as critical supporter (Rinakit, 2005; Laksmana, 2008), in which in this dissertation falls within the category of partnership. Since the fall

of Suharto, TNI have been playing, to different degrees, a role of pawn. The following paragraphs examine rather closely the roles played by TNI in politics.

TNI's involvement in Indonesian politics dated back since the founding of the Republic. Following the declaration of independence on 17 August 1945²⁴, the newly established government, led by Sukarno and Mohammad Hatta, set up an institution to put together various groups of militias under a single agency with the main task of ensuring domestic security. This institution was the People's Security Agency (*Badan Keamanan Rakyat*, BKR), which was civilian institution by nature. On 5 October 1945, BKR was finally transformed into armed forces and named the People's Security Forces (*Tentara Keamanan Rakyat*, TKR). TKR leaderships then adopted a rationalization program to integrate various groups of militias into a unified command under the leadership of charismatic General Sudirman.²⁵ During this process, several groups of militias refused to join TKR (Cribb, 1991). One of these groups was the Indonesian Socialist Youth (*Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia*, *Pesindo*), militias group affiliated with PKI.²⁶ In 1948, *Pesindo* involved in a coup orchestrated by PKI from the city of Madiun in East Java when TKR was busy waging war against Dutch re-colonization. This particular event marked the beginning of TNI's resentment towards PKI.

PKI, however, was not the only groups with which TNI had problem with. During the period of 1945-1949, when the newly declared state was struggling to gain acknowledgement for its sovereignty, including from the Netherland, rivalries between civilian leaderships and the armed forces were quite often taking place. One particular event that created a deep trauma within the brass toward civilian leaderships was when civilian leaderships decided to comply with the Dutch's pressure following the second military aggression in 1948 by allowing the colonial government to capture and to put

²⁴ While Indonesia declared their independence on 17 August 1945, the transfer of sovereignty from the Dutch to Federal Republic of Indonesia (*Republik Indonesia Serikat*, RIS) did not take place until 27 December 1949. RIS itself consisted of Republic of Indonesia (RI, declared independence on 17 August 1945) and 15 other states. In 1950, RIS was disbanded and all 16 states opted to stay together as RI.

²⁵ This transformation was led by Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo. The election of Sudirman as *Panglima* was not made by civilian leaderships. Instead, Sudirman was elected by military officers who attended the meeting held by Soemohardjo. Sutarto (2017, interview) pointed out this fact to suggest that TNI was not created by the government.

²⁶ Other group that refused to join TKR was *Laskar Hisbullah*, who had affiliation with Islamic party, *Masyumi*. In the years to come, some members of *Laskar Hisbullah* decided to join TKR and they became the seed of the green faction within TNI. *Laskar Hisbullah* gained their reputation during the Battle of Surabaya in November 1945 under the leadership of Soetomo.

them on exile.²⁷ General Sudirman refused to comply with the Dutch's pressure and decided to wage guerrilla warfare against the Dutch despite of his worsening health due to tuberculosis. Sudirman's guerrilla warfare was an important hallmark in TNI history since it was not only suggested the warrior spirit of TNI who refused to surrender under any circumstance but also indicated TNI's intimacy with the people.²⁸

The rift between civilian leaderships and the armed forces continued to take place in the years following the transfer of sovereignty. When the newly elected *Panglima*, Simatupang, continued to adopt policy of restructuring and reorganizing the armed forces during early 1950s, civilian leaderships within the parliament were continuously interfering due to fear of the growing strength of a unified and professional armed forces. These civilian leaderships tapped into rivalries within the brass, between those who supported and those who against with *Panglima* policies.²⁹ Fed up with civilian leaderships interfering into what Simatupang, and the then Army Chief of Staff³⁰, Nasution, called as military internal affairs, they set up a subtle coup d'état by pointing the tank turrets toward the palace where President Sukarno resided during troops' demonstration on 17 October 1952. This move, however, was not intended to eject Sukarno from his presidency. The president did not comply with TNI's request. He then discharged both Simatupang and Nasution from their positions soon after the incident. Sukarno even went further by abolishing *Panglima* position before re-installed it again in 1962 and appointed Nasution to occupy this seat.³¹

Another issue that also contributed to a worsening relationship between the armed forces and civilian leaderships was the rampant separatism in Indonesia during 1950s and 1960s. The armed forces accused civilian leaderships as incapable of

²⁷ Prior to surrender to the Dutch, Sukarno and Hatta had already transferred their power to Syafruddin Prawiranegara to act as the President of the Republic. Prawiranegara moved the capital from Yogyakarta to Bukittinggi as the former was under the de facto control of the Dutch.

²⁸ Sudirman and his aides, during this resistance against the Dutch re-colonization, received back up from villagers along the way of his guerrilla routes. Coverage from the people helped Sudirman and his aides to avoid Dutch continuous efforts to capture him.

²⁹ Among those who refused *Panglima* policies was Colonel Zulkifli Lubis.

³⁰ Chief of Staff (*Kepala Staf*) heads each service within the armed forces. The Army Chief of Staff is known as *Kepala Staf Angkatan Darat* (KSAD), while the Navy is known as *Kepala Staf Angkatan Laut* (KSAL), and the Air Force is known as *Kepala Staf Angkatan Udara* (KSAU).

³¹ The decision to appoint Nasution as *Panglima* was intended to weaken his influence and power within the Army. Sukarno then appointed Lieutenant General Ahmad Yani, one of his closest acquaintances, as KSAD to replace Nasution. Yani was awarded General following the 1965 PKI coup d'état. It should be noted that during this period, *Panglima* was not the highest in command and his role was mere coordinating all Chief of Staffs.

maintaining the unity of the state. Indonesia, who adopted a parliamentary system since its establishment, suffered from political quarrels among civilian politicians within the parliament. The rise and fall of governments took place quite often, especially during the 1950-1959.³² As a result, civilian leaderships were becoming too busy with their own quarrels and began to abandon most of government programs, especially those that focused on the development of outer island areas.³³ These intra-civilian quarrels in central government in Jakarta sparked dissatisfaction among regional leaderships, both civilian and military. Guidance from central government was absent and so too those from central military leaderships. As explained in previous paragraphs, the rationalization and reorganization program that Simatupang and Nasution were carried out was not yet completed and hence they had yet to assume full control over many of regional commands. As a result, regional commanders in outer island areas decided to take matters into their own hands and raised their arms against central leaderships. Rebellions then broke out in 1958 in Sulawesi and Sumatera.³⁴

Prior to that, in 1957, as an effort to minimize the intra-civilian quarrels and to reduce tension between the armed forces and civilian leaderships, Sukarno decided to adopt martial law.³⁵ In 1959, Sukarno released a Presidential decree to put into effect the 1945 Constitution, the original constitution of the Republic, which gave bigger role for President to assume power. This decree effectively ended the parliamentary system in Indonesia. It can be considered as victory for the armed forces in their rivalry with civilian leaderships within the parliament. In the first cabinet of Sukarno's Guided Democracy (*Demokrasi Terpimpin*), twelve officers of the armed forces were serving different posts (Lev, 1963-1964) and it marked the beginning of direct military's involvement in governance.

³² After returned to unitary state (RI) from federal state (RIS) in 1950, 7 different cabinets were reigning during the period of 1950-1959. In sequence, these were: Natsir cabinet (since 5 September 1950), Sukiman cabinet (since 27 April 1951), Wilopo cabinet (since 3 April 1952), Ali Sastroamidjojo first cabinet (since 30 July 1953), Burhanuddin Harahap cabinet (since 12 August 1955), Ali Sastroamidjojo second cabinet (since 24 March 1956), and Djuanda cabinet (since 9 April 1957). On 10 July 1959, Sukarno led the cabinet after he adopted Presidential Decree on 5 July 1959 to disband the parliament and changed the political system from parliamentary system into presidential system.

³³ The term outer island areas basically refer to islands other than Java.

³⁴ Sulawesi Regional Command rebelled against Jakarta under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ventje Sumual and Lieutenant Colonel Alex Kawilarang, while Sumatera Regional Command was under the leadership of Lieutenant Colonel Ahmad Husein. Civilians were also involved in these rebellions. Prawiranegara, for example, was involved in the Sumatra rebellion.

³⁵ The adoption of martial law in 1957 also had a direct impact to military's involvement in business activities.

The end of the armed forces regional commands uprisings in early 1960s also had important impact to TNI's solidity. The end of these uprisings brought deeper control of the central command to regional commands. As members of the radical group within the armed forces had successfully been ousted, Nasution can take a firm grip of the armed forces.³⁶ The unity of the armed forces was also important since during the period of Guided Democracy, the armed forces once again faced the threat from growing political role of PKI. Resentment toward PKI had led several officers went hostile against this party and thus created another split the armed forces into two different camps. The radicals within the armed forces were eager to take confrontational stance and harsher actions against PKI, while the moderates opted to silently oppose any of PKI political moves and were of the opinion that under any circumstances Sukarno should not be ousted from power.

The rift between the armed forces and PKI ended in 1965 when TNI successfully crushed the PKI's attempt of civilian coup d'état. Subsequently, the armed forces were also successfully ousted Sukarno from presidential position, which indicated the victory of the radical camp within the armed forces. It then led to TNI's domination in governance. General Suharto, the then Commander of the Army Strategic Reserve Command (*Panglima Komando Cadangan Strategis Angkatan Darat, Pangkostrad*), took decisive role in bringing the armed forces to power.³⁷ After receiving mandate³⁸ from Sukarno in early 1966, then he was still the president, to take all necessary steps to maintain security and stability, Suharto established Operational Command for the Restoration of Security and Order (*Komando Operasi Pemulihan Keamanan dan Ketertiban, Kopkamtib*) as a main vehicle to create order and stability. This agency was later becoming influential in ensuring support to Suharto's presidency

³⁶ Radical group in this context referred to officers who were in favor of the coup/rebellion and opted to oust Sukarno from presidency when his policies did not benefit the armed forces. Moderate group, on the other hand, disagree with coup rebellion since it would create a tradition of coup within the brass in the future and considered Sukarno as a symbol of national unity (Lev, 1963-1964, 354). It should be noted that while some top officers were implicated in the rebellions, the central command officers preferred to re-engage them into the brass instead of putting them on military tribunal.

³⁷ Suharto was still a Major General when he served as *Pangkostrad*.

³⁸ This mandate was known as the March 11 Presidential Order (*Surat Perintah 11 Maret, Supersemar*). Until today, historians disagree on the validity of this letter. Different versions of *Supersemar* have been presented by different groups and no one can clarify which one of those versions is the real one.

until its disbandment in 1988.³⁹ The end of Sukarno's reign marked the beginning of TNI's full involvement in politics and governing.

The influential role of TNI in politics continued with the reign of Suharto until his departure from power on 21 May 1998. Following his resignation, Indonesia underwent a transition to democracy. The changing from authoritarian to democratic society, however, has never been an easy process. Resistances existed especially from those who benefited during the previous authoritarian rule. Hence, the transition became a process in which the new and old elites were competing and making compromise to decide its direction. Referring to Huntington (1991-1992), the Indonesian transition to democracy followed a transplacement model. One of the strongest old elites who involved in this compromise was TNI. During Suharto era, it was quite common to find active military officers holding bureaucratic positions, which was commonly referred as the doctrine of *kekaryaan*. Jenkins (1984) noted that approximately 78% of governors and more than half of regents and mayors were active military officers in 1978. By the end of Suharto era, Bhakti *et.al* (1999) found that approximately 6.800 active military officers were still serving in various bureaucratic positions. Mietzner (2006) suggested that by the end of 1998, all active military officers which previously held bureaucratic positions had been called back to barrack. Military's involvement in bureaucracy lasted until 1999 when the doctrine of *kekaryaan* was finally withdrawn (Basuki, 2007, 141).

In addition to the practice of *kekaryaan*, the armed forces also had their own seats in the People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat*, DPR) and the Regional People's Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah*, DPRD). Military's representatives at the DPR were deducted from 75 to 38 seats in 1999 and complete liquidation took place in 2004. Military's involvement in DPR and DPRD indicated that TNI was not only taking part in the making and implementation of policies but also overseeing the making and implementation of policies. By sitting on both executive and legislative organs, TNI would always capable of ensuring that their interests would be well served.

The legal basis for military's involvement in politics during Suharto era was the so-called dual function doctrine (*Dwifungsi*). This doctrine was originated in the middle

³⁹ It was later replaced by *Bakorstanas*. The role of these two institutions was similar.

way doctrine (*Jalan Tengah*) developed by Nasution during the 1960s.⁴⁰ The middle way doctrine was taken to bridge the debate between officers who wished to develop the Indonesian armed forces toward a Western-style of professionalism and those who wished the armed forces to play its part in politics. This doctrine basically obliged TNI with two tasks of defending the nation from external military threat and maintaining internal stability in order to allow the government to run development programs (Jenkins, 1983; Said, 1987).

What connects the dual function doctrine from the previous understanding within the brass on their involvement in politics is the belief that the armed forces and the society are inseparable and that they were the one who giving birth to the state. The same beliefs remain strong within the brass, even until today. The main theme of the 71th anniversary of TNI in 2016 was “*bersama rakyat, TNI kuat*” [TNI is strong when they stay together with the people]. In his statement given during the ceremony, *Panglima* Gatot Nurmantyo, stated that TNI is inseparable from the people since TNI was born and grew with the people (*Mabes TNI*, 2016). This kind of tones is not new within the brass. It has been the dominant self-perception of the armed forces within TNI establishment in which they tend to consider themselves as “guardian of the state.” This term, however, does not means that TNI is a mere tool for defending the state from external threat, but it also means that TNI holds the responsibility to ensure that the state is doing well at any given moment in any given issue.

What is striking is the fact that the same perception has also been dominant within the mind of the general public, even in recent period. Two survey polls conducted by two different poll institutions, Indo Barometer (IB, released October 2015, the survey was conducted September 2015) and Saiful Mujani Research Consulting (SMRC; released January 2016, the survey was conducted December 2015), placed TNI at one of the top five of the most trusted institutions in Indonesia. IB, for example, placed TNI in second position with 81% of public trust, lacking behind the Anti-Corruption Bureau (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi*, KPK) with 82% of public trust. SMRC placed TNI in the first position with 89.6% of public trust, followed by

⁴⁰ There was, however, huge difference between the middle way and the dual function doctrines. While emphasizing the role of the armed forces in sociopolitical dimension, the middle way did not mention about military’s control of governing. Dual function, on the other hand, clearly referred to military’s control or domination in governing.

Presidential office in second place (83.7%) and KPK (82.9%). Military expert, Edy Prasetyono (2017, interview), also acknowledged that public in general, especially those who live in rural areas, give high respect to the members of the brass. While some might argue that such a perception within the public is a result of a long indoctrination by the armed forces during the New Order era (McGregor, 2007, chapter 4), it reflects a far deeper problem with regard to the role of the armed forces in politics. It basically suggests that TNI's involvement in politics is somehow seen as normalcy, that their role in politics is not a big deal even within democratic society. TNI's self-perception has its roots to their way of defining their history within the Indonesian society. McGregor (2007) investigated the way TNI builds their version of Indonesian history in which their role is depicted as central and concludes that while this is conducted to justify their involvement during the New Order era, since the attempt was conducted during this period, it is also conducted to create unity within the brass.⁴¹

According to Lev (1963-1964), the early generation of TNI's officers was mostly politically defensive up until mid-1950s. The 17 October affair indicates the beginning of the politically active attitudes within the brass and it culminated in the adoption of the 1957 martial law. The political officers were then dominating and occupying several important positions within the brass during the reign of Suharto. Hence, during the years of Suharto, their role in politics grew stronger where they indirectly and directly involved in the parliament and civilian bureaucracy. It allowed them to acquire a relatively a big chunk of budget share. Military personnel serving in several ministerial posts were able to divert the allocated-budget to those ministries to support military's political interests. In addition, the dominant role played by the military also contributed to freedom in their involvement in business activities.

The praetorian state, however, has only once existed during the early period of Suharto presidency.⁴² Indonesia during 1966-1976 fits this identification since during

⁴¹ TNI was indeed suffered from rivalries between services. One particular example that has become public knowledge is how the Air Force and Navy were known to be strong supporter of Sukarno. In particular, the Indonesian Marine Corps (*Korps Marinir*), used to be known as *Korps Komando Angkatan Laut* (KKO AL or KKO), Lieutenant General Hartono, is known as the vanguard of Sukarno to the extent that its Commander during the last days of Sukarno famously said "*hitam kata Bung Karno, hitam kata KKO, putih kata Bung Karno, putih kata KKO*" [if Sukarno says something is white, then KKO follows suit; if Sukarno says something is black, then KKO also follows suit].

⁴² Crouch (1978) and Jenkins (1984) both argued that the period under Suharto can be considered as praetorian state. It should be noted that they wrote their book in late 1970s and early 1980s.

this period since Suharto was still an active officer who assumed presidency. This period, therefore, serves as an example of military domination or the time when the armed forces play a role as ruler. Since a retired officer is not part of the armed forces, the period that follows (1976-1998) could not be considered as military rule and instead should be categorized as partnership. During this period, the armed forces and Suharto basically built an alliance to govern the country. There were, of course, ups and downs in this partnership. Several discontents took place between Suharto and the armed forces. Said (2013), a veteran journalist who turned academic in latter phase of his life, wrote in detail the story behind the nomination of General Try Sutrisno, then was *Panglima*, as Vice President which was an example of the rift between Suharto and the armed forces.⁴³ The armed forces, however, had never spoiling Suharto's policies.

An opposite role from that of partner is spoiler. They, however, have similarity with regard to military's active role in politics. The role of spoiler refers to military's active opposition to civilian authority. Following the Indonesian independence, the military basically played a role as spoiler of civilian authority. Cases of disagreement between military and civilian authority prevailed during the period under Sukarno leadership (1945-1966). Three events are worth noting to justify this claim. The first series of events is numerous cases of disagreement between civilian and military leaderships over the most suitable strategy to deal with Dutch re-colonization (1945-1949) culminating with Sudirman resignation from his post on August 1949.⁴⁴ The second event is the so-called 17 October 1952 affair which basically is a strong-arm tactic to force President to take action against the parliament due to their involvement in technical military affairs. The third event is the June 1955 affair when senior military officers refused Sukarno's decision to install Lubis and Colonel Bambang Utuyo, relatively young officers as KSAD.⁴⁵

⁴³ Said (2013, chapter 12) wrote that the announcement of Sutrisno's nomination by the armed forces was made without consultation with Suharto. It was seen as the armed forces' effort to check the power of Suharto. During this time, the armed forces were still under the influence of General L.B. Moerdhani, the former *Panglima* which, like many close associates of Suharto before him, was sidelined by the President due to fear of his growing influence that might threaten his leadership. While Sutrisno was relatively close to Suharto—he was once served as Suharto aide—the latter also learnt that Sutrisno has been a loyal supporter of Moerdhani during the latter period of his service.

⁴⁴ Sukarno firmly rejected his resignation and Sudirman continued to serve as *Panglima* until his death in 1950.

⁴⁵ Following the 17 October affairs, the Army Chief of Staff position became a hot seat for any officer. The split within the armed forces, between those who supported Simatupang and Nasution policies of

The final role of the armed forces in politics is that of pawn. It is basically referring to military's submission to civilian authority and, hence, could also be termed as civilian supremacy or civilian control. However, the degree of their obedience to civilian authority is not constant throughout the years. It should be noted that this role does not necessarily lead to a firm control over the armed forces by civilian leaderships since it also has different degree of control, such as limited or conditional control and full or un-conditional control. A closer look on this role is made in the next three chapters.



Figure 2.2. The role of TNI in politics

2.2. Factors influencing military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics

This part reviews previous literatures that explain variables that affect military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics. This part is divided into two sub-parts. The first sub-part review major academic works on this topic while the second sub-part focuses specifically on the case of Indonesia.

2.2.1. Four dominant explanations on factors influencing military's involvement in and withdrawal from politics

The issue of military's withdrawal from politics and their involvement in politics is closely related. Previous scholarly research has given tremendous attention to the issue of military's involvement in politics and factors that influence that involvement. Since the focus of this dissertation is on military's withdrawal from politics, this review is also focusing on previous literatures that address the issue of how to control the armed forces. A review of previous literatures, that focus on the issue of the

restructuring and reorganizing the armed forces that those who against these policies, became wider. Sukarno appointed Major General Bambang Sugeng to replace Nasution. Sugeng managed to keep the unity within the Army, but then decided to resign his position in 1955. He was replaced by Lubis. This decision led to another discontent within the Army and, as a result, Sukarno decided to replace Lubis with Utoyo. This decision could not calm the situation until Sukarno decided to reinstall Nasution as KSAD.

establishment of civilian control over the armed forces whether they use the term democratic or objective control, suggests that the independent variables that influence the establishment can be categorized into two broad dimensions. The first is those that work on the structural factors and the second is those that focus on agency-related factors.⁴⁶ Others employed that categorization based on the perspective of the armed forces and hence use the term push and pull factors (Finer, 1988) or endogenous and exogenous factors (Croissant, 2004). Most scholars, however, seldom worked solely on each of those two factors and tended to mix the two factors altogether in their analysis (Kuehn & Lorenz, 2011). The agency-related factors can further be categorized into cultural-based and interest-based explanations, while the structural factors can be categorized into threat environment or threat based analysis and civilian legitimacy explanations that focus heavily in political structure and intra-civilian relations (see Figure 2.3 for detail). This research is siding with the material interest-based explanations.




Figure 2.3. Four dominant schools in examining factors that influence military's withdrawal from politics

⁴⁶ While agency-related factors can be viewed from both civilian and the armed forces' point of views, most literatures focus on the latter rather than the former's point of views.

Previous writings that employ a threat based analysis in explaining military's withdrawal from politics or the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces have not yet reached an agreement on the impact of threat environment to the establishment of civilian control or military's withdrawal from politics. According to Laswell (1941), under a threatening international situation, military would tend to tighten their grip in politics to overcome the incoming uncertainty. Laswell, however, mentions the existence of other variables in influencing military's involvement in politics and why do they decide to take over power from civilian group, which mostly concern with ensuring military effectiveness to tackle the challenging situation. Desch (1999), on the other hand, argued the otherwise. When state is facing high external threat, the armed forces would tend to stay away from politics and focus on their task of defending the state. The armed forces would further themselves from politics if there is a lack of internal threat, in addition to the existence of a high external threat. Again, similar to Laswell, Desch did not deny the existence of other variables in addition to threat that would influence military's submission to civilian authority, such as military organizational structure and military culture.

To overcome the limit of a threat-based analysis on military's withdrawal from politics, other scholars propose intervening variables to explain the relationship between threat environment and military's withdrawal or suggest additional variables in addition to threat environment to explain military's withdrawal. Some of them focus on political structure to seek the answer of military's withdrawal from politics. Perlmutter (1981) argued that the rise of praetorianism is subject to the structural weakness or disorganization in society, the existence of fratricidal classes, and low levels of social action and of mobilization of material resources. The lack of civilian legitimacy, hence, served as good excuse for military involvement in politics. Staniland (2008) proposed legitimacy of civilian authority as well as degree of political institutionalization as two intervening variables that connect threat environment to civilian control. Using the cases of Pakistan and India, Staniland argued that the armed forces' involvement in politics tends to be higher if the legitimacy of the civilian government is low and the level of political institutionalization is also low. They will tend to assume control over the government when the internal threat is high. In addition, despite they have the pretext to take power under threatening international situation or mixed threats from both internal

and external, the armed forces would refrain themselves from doing so. Under such situations, however, civilian control over the armed forces would be very unlikely to take place. McMahon and Slantchev (2015) proposed officers' perception of threat and the degree of their loyalty to the state as the intervening variables that link threat environment to military's involvement in politics. These two variables are basically linking up a threat-based analysis and cultural approach on military's involvement in politics, as argued by the third school bellow.

The military-related explanations mostly focus on the professionalism tradition of the armed forces, or the so called military mind. Huntington (1957) coined the term military professionalism in term of well-trained, solid, and neutral. His understanding prerequisite the military as distinctly separated from the society (Alagappa 2001). The military and society, or civilian groups, each has their own areas and tasks. Clear boundary between military and civilian areas would prevent military penetration into politics (Welch & Smith, 1974; Trinkunas, 2000). In this Huntingtonian way of thinking, the military is solely tasked with defense function. In order to successfully performing this task, the military need to be well-skilled and well-equipped as well as place their loyalty to the state and become a solid and well-organized institution (Alagappa 2001, Mietzner 2011). Huntington thesis has been challenged by Stephan (1971, 1973, 1988) by assessing the case of Latin America. Following Janowitz (1960) and Finer's (1962) understanding of the armed forces as the most advance group within any society, Stephan argued that the armed forces was also tasked with the role of "building the nation." Hence, military's involvement in politics should not be considered as a sign of low level of professionalism.

The military interests' explanation of military's involvement in politics is represented by the debate between Beeson (2007) and Lee (2007). Using Indonesia, the Philippines and Thailand as case studies, Beeson pointed out the political economic interests of the armed forces as the reason why military intervention has been less likely in the cases of Indonesia and the Philippines instead of in Thailand. With TNI remained active in business activities, the Indonesian armed forces had no intention in returning to politics. In the Philippines, the possibility for military involvement in politics is slightly higher since their armed forces had relatively the limited access to resources. In Thailand, military intervention has been fueled by the lack of resources for the armed

forces. Lee rejected Beeson's argument on the basis that the concept of corporate interest has been analytically unclear and the fact that sole attribution to corporate interest is putting other variables in omission.

2.2.2. Review of literatures on military's withdrawal from politics in the case of Indonesia

Previous scholarships on Indonesia's military reform can also be categorized following the same classification. However, they were rarely focusing on single variable. Representing the first approach, Singh (2000), Rabasa and Haseman (2002), and Mietzner (2006) pointed out the existence of internal communal conflicts following the fall of Suharto, especially those in Moluccas and Central Celebes, and the growing threat of terrorism since the Bali bombings in 2002 as the obstacles to military's full withdrawal from politics. Their explanations, however, were not purely based on internal threat variable since they also point out other factors such as military culture, in the case of Singh as well as Rabasa and Haseman, and military factionalism, in the case of Mietzner.

Another structural factor that has been the focus of scholars working on Indonesia's military reform is the performance of civilian authority. Nainggolan (2011) used this variable in examining the progress of military reform from Habibie to Megawati era. He noted that the armed forces were basically responded to civilian authority performance in whether they would decide to adopt certain agendas or not to do so. Military resistance to civilian leaders, hence, is the pivotal role in understanding the progress of military reform. He, however, noticed the existence and influence of individual as well cultural factors in explaining military reform in Indonesia from Habibie to Megawati. Heiduk (2011) and Mietzner (2011b) put forward the intra-civilian dynamics within the context of democratization as the reason why TNI has not yet fully disengaged from politics. Heiduk, for example, emphasized the formation of new alliances of differing social forces and their impact on traditional power structures in order to understand continuity and/or change in the military's attitudes towards democracy, while Mietzner acknowledged the role of political leaders and elites group in the progress of military reform in Indonesia.

The dominant explanation of military reform in Indonesia is those that focus on intra-military rivalry. Honna (2003, 3) used military factionalism as the main variable to assess military's role in politics. He wrote that "the internal power struggle within the military which has persistently been the primary factor influencing its response to democratic demands." Lee (2000, 2007, 2015) shared similar argument in assessing the decision of the military to disobey Suharto request for the military to use violence in crushing student's demonstrations during the last days of Suharto in power and their decisions with regard to reform in the years following the fall of Suharto. In particular, he pointed out that the split within the armed forces was actually possible due to Suharto's own personalization of power. In the beginning of his reign, Suharto created a roughly equal alliance with the armed forces and the technocrats in running the country. Suharto gave autonomy to several military officers, especially those with expertise in economy and intelligence, to make and implement policies. It was basically the period when Suharto tried to consolidate his power and it forced him to share power with his military compatriots. His decision to include the technocrats in policy making was due to both his lack of expertise in technical issues as well as the non-partisan nature of the technocrats. As his power grew stronger, the personalization of power, including within the armed forces, resulted in a split within the armed forces into two camps, those that loyal to Suharto and those that being sidelined during Suharto's era. The latter group found their way to leadership within the armed forces by bandwagoning with students and pro-democratic forces to go against Suharto's wish. The same group was basically the one that made military reform possible. Other scholars that also put emphasis on intra-military rivalry are Chandra and Kanmen (2002), which considered generational gap within the armed forces as the main variable that define the nature of civil-military relations in Indonesia and the armed forces' willingness to engage in reform agendas. Mietzner (2009) pointed out that the rivalry within the armed forces as well civilian groups and how they interact to each other, both within group and inter-group, as two important factors that influence the nature and progress of military reform.

Previous research on the issue of military in Indonesia, as already been explained previously, does include examination on the interests of the armed forces. However, they rarely give central role and focus to this variable. Beeson's work (2007) represented the corporate interest thesis in understanding the Indonesia's military

reform. However, Beeson failed to specifically identify what are the interests of the armed forces. By focusing on military interests and how they interact with civilian groups' interests and structural constraints, this research would provide additional explanation in understanding the progress of the reform.

2.3. A typology of corporate interests of the armed forces

As noted above, the concept of military corporate interests has frequently been used without clear typology. This part provides a typology of military corporate interests into three different types, i.e. national interests of the armed forces, organizational interests of the armed forces, and factional/personal interests within the armed forces.

2.3.1. Organizational interests of TNI

Employing military interests in analyzing military's withdrawal is both challenging and difficult task. When writing on corporate interests of the armed forces, Nordlinger (1977) identified four main interests of defense establishment to include: adequate budgetary support, autonomy in managing internal affairs, preservation of their responsibility vis-a-vis other institutions, and continuity of the brass itself. What is important the most is his assertion that "the defense or enhancement of the military's corporate interests is the most important interventionist motive" (Nordlinger, 1977, 65). Those are basically the armed forces' organizational interests. The armed forces can be regarded as a distinct entity and are required to have a strong sense of esprit de corps due to various reasons. Since they work with violence, they are required to have a strict regulation so that they would not use the instrument of violence at their own wish. They are, therefore, required to follow certain chain of command in deployment and the use of violence. A strict line of command becomes a main feature of the armed forces. This sense of belonging, according to Perlmutter (1977), indicated the degree of professionalism within the armed forces. It is mandatory for their survival during the war.

While the term corporate interests are relatively easy to say, it is far from easy to define what these interests actually are. In the case of TNI, scholars have argued that what matter the most for TNI and led to their involvement in politics in the past is the

security and enhancement of their business interests (McCulloch, 2000; Kingsbury, 2003; Beeson, 2008). Within this logic of thinking, the institutional arrangements of the armed force, including their force structure and the existence of territorial command structure, are developed to support this economic quest of TNI. However, it should be noted that most scholars estimated that the share of the economic activities of the armed forces are only one-third of their overall income (McCulloch, 2000; Evans, 2001; Gunter, 2001; Widjojo, 2002; Kingsbury, 2003; Mietzner, 2008). Considering the relatively small amount of their share, defining security and enhancement of military business activities as the main corporate interests of TNI is a little bit arbitrarily.

2.3.2. National interests of the TNI

Seldom, however, that those interests are placed in front of the normative justifications for military's intervention. In most cases, the normative reasons would be for the greater good of the people. Hence, in addition to the real interests of the armed forces, there are also the interests of the nation involved in military's intervention or involvement in politics. In addition to corporate interests which serve as the basis for military intervention or involvement in politics, there is also possibility of personal interests of the officers that leads to military's intervention or involvement in politics. The latter, however, does not necessarily conflicting with the interests of the corps. Finer (1988) also discussed sectional interests within the armed forces in their intervention or involvement in politics, in which personal interests is only one part of it.

While national interests of the armed forces sound normative, the armed forces have a relatively strong leaning towards national interests in most of their activities. The armed forces are among one of the most nationalistic groups in a country. Huntington (1957, 65) listed "the primacy of the nation state" as one of most fundamental reasons for the armed forces' very existence. The military conservative realism mind "accepts the nation state as the highest form of political organization and recognizes the continuing likelihood of wars among nation state" (Huntington, 1957, 79). Hence, the armed forces must place the interests of the nation state at their very top priority. In any coup attempts, for example, reference to the interests of the nation state always existed (Huntington, 1968; Lutwak, 1968; Decalo, 1976; Horowitz, 1980). The definition of these national interests can be varied, ranging from the worsening economic situation,

or Lutwak (1968) referred it as economic backwardness, to the absence of political legitimacy of the reigning government.

In the case of Indonesia, multiple references have been given to show the nationalistic character of TNI. For example, TNI has consistently used the term “guardian of the nation” to refer to their role throughout the time. The new paradigm document also used the same words in their description of the main reason for adopting reform agendas. Article 3 point (c) of the law on TNI clearly states that TNI is a national military, in which, as the article goes, their loyalty should be pledged to the national interests of the people. Article 3 point (b) of the same law describes TNI as warrior soldiers in which they should, without fear and relentlessly work, to protect the state, its people, and their interests. While during the war against the Dutch re-colonization attempts the main interest of the people was to enjoy freedom from occupation, the armed forces worked hard to force the colonial power to leave Indonesia. During the New Order, where the people was desperately needed economic stability and growth, the armed forces took the lead to maintain stability to ensure that the government could work well to create “*pembangunan dan pemerataan*” (development and equality), two of the most important magic words during the reign of Suharto. It was during this particular period when the armed forces developed the idea of “*kewaspadaan*” (alertness) especially to those radical elements who seek to destabilize the country that potentially might distract the development program (Honna, 1999). Within this line of argument, Sebastian (2006, 307-308) concluded that the military view of nationalism is second to none since they “were not only struggled in the Revolution to give birth to the nation but also safeguarded national unity and the national interests.” Simply put, according to TNI, their nationalistic appeal is simply undeniable.

2.3.3. Factional/personal interests within TNI

The final set of interests is factional or personal interests. While the armed forces have a strict line of command and, in most cases, can be assumed to be a solid entity with distinct esprit de corps, there are certainly divisions within the brass. Three kinds of division can be identified with regard to the armed forces, including TNI, which are: division between services within TNI, division between generations within

TNI, and division between sectional groups within TNI. The following sub-parts explain in detail each of those divisions.

2.3.3.1. Inter-services rivalry within TNI

The first segregation is between services within the armed forces, or often referred as inter-service rivalries. Huntington (1961) pointed out that the root of inter-service rivalries is the establishment of a unified defense organization, which in the case of the United States took place during the post-war period.⁴⁷ This unification led to a competition over organizational position, strategic doctrine, and resources or funding. Inter-service rivalries give a wider chance for civilian leadership to control the armed forces by playing of these services. In many cases, this strategy could significantly damage the civil-military relations since it would not only lead to a split within the already un-unified armed forces but also provoke intervention from the armed forces to politics due to civilian deep penetration to internal military affairs.

In the case of Indonesia, inter-service rivalries have been taken place even before there was effort to integrate the armed forces.⁴⁸ As noted in the first part of this chapter, there was a time when the Army, who traditionally was the dominant service within the armed forces, and the Air Force and the Navy showed their disagreement, such as the case in the departure of Sukarno from power. During the Guided Democracy, Sukarno spent a big chunk of funds for the Air Force and the Navy as he had a vision of making Indonesia as one of the strongest countries in Asia (Sebastian, 2006, 227). A much recent case that indicated inter-service rivalries was the nomination of Nurmantyo as *Panglima*. Since the days of Wahid, there has been a new tradition in which the *Panglima* position would be rotated from one service to another. Within this pattern, when General Moeldoko was approaching his retirement age, the next *Panglima* should be chosen from the Air Force. The President, however, decided to nominate Nurmantyo, who then was KSAD. His decision was soon criticized by

⁴⁷ The unification itself was driven by the development in military technology and the changing nature of warfare (Huntington, 1961, 40-41).

⁴⁸ During the formative years of TNI, each service within TNI had their own autonomy. Prior to Suharto era, the Chief of Staff of services within TNI were members of the cabinet and the role of *Panglima* was simply to coordinate the three services—and in some period, this coordination included the police force as well. The unification of TNI took place as coordinated efforts during Suharto era as suggested by the work of McGregor (2007).

observers and former officers within the Air Force to the point where Air Marshall (retired) Chappy Hakim, former KSAU, called for the disbandment of the Air Force, while the Air Force themselves remained calm with this nomination (Surianto, 2015; Pratomo, 2015; Putra, 2015).

2.3.3.2. Inter-generational rivalry within TNI

The second type of segregation within the armed forces takes place along the generational lines. Muna (1999) and Chrisnandi (2004) differentiated generations within TNI into four different groups. The first generation refers to officers who fought during the war for independence. They depicted themselves as warrior and developed both combat and territorial functions. Sudirman and Lieutenant General Oerip Soemohardjo were among the brightest officers of this generation. The second generation refers to those officers who involved in the war against the Dutch recolonization. These officers experienced the strained civil-military relationship during the parliamentary democracy and considered the armed forces as having a social function. Hence, they tended to consider the armed forces as an element within the society that had to collaborate with civilian elements within the society to develop the society. Nasution represented this generation and his Middle Way concept represents the ideology of this generation. The third generation refers to officer who grew up during the reign of Suharto, which, similar to the previous generation, considered themselves as warrior-soldier (*prajurit pejuang*). They adopted the second generation's ideology and perfected this ideology into dual function doctrine in which the armed forces had to take the lead in developing the society by ruling and controlling civilian elements within society. The fourth generation is the transition generation which while considered the armed forces as having socio-political role decided to drop the need to rule and control. They were keen to share their role in developing the society with their civilian counterpart. Yudhoyono, Widjojo, and Wirahadikusuma represent this generation.

Kanmen and Chandra (2002) specified two different generations that fought over within the brass during the reform. Supporters of reform within the armed forces were dominated by officers who belong to Class 13 of 1973, while opposition comes from

officers who belong to Class 10 of 1970 and Class 11 of 1971.⁴⁹ They argued that this rivalry was basically rooted at monopolization of senior command positions by the latter two classes that potentially blocked the former class from upward movement within the brass. This generational gap, however, fails to explain why there were differences of opinion within the same generation. A study by Said (2013) suggests that there was not only intergenerational rivalry but also intergenerational recruitment as well within the brass. For example, he discusses how Sutrisno, who used to be Suharto's boy, became Moerdhani's boy.

2.3.3.3. Inter-sectional groups rivalry within TNI

The third segregation within the armed forces is based on sectional interests. Two different categorizations can be found with regard to TNI during the reform. The first and more traditional division is between the so-called the green (*kelompok hijau*) versus the red-and-white (*kelompok merah putih*) camps. The reference to green and red-and-white basically indicate those officers which leaning toward Islamic groups or values (green) and those which leaning toward nationalistic sentiment (red-and-white). While serious scholarly works that focus on this division has rarely been made, it has become general knowledge that rivalry between these two factions has taking place since the early establishment of TNI. As noted in previous chapter, TNI is originally consisted of different groups, including civilian militias. Among these groups, two of the most dominant groups were ex-KNIL and ex-PETA.⁵⁰ These two groups shared similarity in their political affiliation towards nationalist cause.⁵¹ In addition to these two groups, other groups with significant number of combatants were various Islamic-

⁴⁹ Class refers to the year of their graduation from Military Academy (*Akademi Militer Nasional*, AMN). The first class of AMN is the class of 1960. There are no classes in the year 1969 and 1979 due to a change in the length of study.

⁵⁰ KNIL, stands for *Koninklijke Nederlands(ch)-Indische Leger*, is basically a legion of Dutch Colonial Army. Consisted of local people, this colonial army's main duty is to maintain security and order in the Netherland Indies territory. PETA, stands for *Pembela Tanah Air* [Defender of the Homeland], is a voluntary militia set up by Japanese imperial power during the World War II. Members of these two groups acquired certain degree of military skills.

⁵¹ The difference between KNIL and PETA lied in their way of training. Influenced by the Western standard textbook, KNIL officers tended to hold a sort of Huntingtonian ideals of professional armed forces. In the meantime, PETA, being trained by Japanese textbook, included both politically and revolutionary ideals of armed forces (Lebra, 1975).

based groups, including *Laskar Hisbullah* (Said 1991).⁵² Lieutenant General Bambang Triantoro, former Deputy of Political and Social Affairs Branch of the armed forces, publicly identified top officers within the brass along this line of split.⁵³ The green faction dominated top positions within the brass during the end of Suharto era due to the President's policy to lean toward Islamic community as effort to minimize the political power of the armed forces which had already indicated dissatisfaction toward his leadership. During the transition period, the then TNI Chief of Staff, Wiranto, was said to have sidestepping members of green faction.

The second division is between the reformers and the traditionalists. In the history of TNI, there have been several references to reformers and traditional rivalries. While the identification for these two groups varied according to the context and time-frame, the division between these two groups revolved around the issue of military's involvement in politics. In the case of reformers-traditionalists division during the end of Suharto era it referred to whether the armed forces should abandon dual function or not. The latter group argued that the armed forces are destined to involve in politics while the former was leaning toward the Huntingtonian ideals of professional soldier. During the reform era, the term reformers referred to a group of officers that supported reform agendas to transform TNI into professional armed forces that do not involve in politics. These officers mostly had experience in studying abroad, either in the United States or European countries. Among these officers were Wirahadikusuma, Widjojo, and Yudhoyono.⁵⁴ Members of this group, however, were split into two different camps. Wirahadikusuma was known as the supporter of radical transformation in which the armed forces should refrain from politics as soon as possible and as far as possible. Widjojo and Yudhoyono, on the other hand, preferred a step-by-step gradualist

⁵² *Masyumi* was a political party based on Islamic ideals. Established in 1945, *Masyumi* was disbanded by Sukarno in 1960 due to their allegedly involvement in PRRI rebellion.

⁵³ Among top officers within the brass, the members of red-and-white factions were: Yudhoyono, Agum Gumelar, A.M. Hendropriyono, Imam Oetomo, Tyasno Sudarto, and Ryamizard Ryacudu. The members of green faction included: Faisal Tanjung, R. Hartono, Soebagyo H.S., Syarwan Hamid, Z.A. Maulani, Prabowo Subianto, Fachrul Razi, Sjafrie Syamsudin, Yunus Yosfiah, Zacky A. Makarim, Djoko Subroto, and Syamsuel Maarif (*Menggeser Jenderal Suap dan Jenderal Lembek* [Removing corrupt and mushy generals] 1999).

⁵⁴ These three officers went to the United States to gain both military and civilian education. Wirahadikusumah was a graduate of Harvard University. Widodo went to George Washington University and also National Defense University. In addition, he also went into US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth. Yudhoyono was an alumnus of Webster University and attended US Army Command and General Staff College, Fort Leavenworth.

approach in disengaging the armed forces from politics. Within the reformists, there were also two different camps. Widjojo and Yudhoyono represented the gradualist within the reformist, while Wirahadikusumah represented the radical (Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). The former thought that military reform should be conducted step by step to prevent disturbances within the brass. They argued that most officers within the brass had not yet prepared for a drastic change. The radicals, on the other hand, were eager for drastic transformation. The term traditionalist, on the contrary, referred to officers who opposed military's noninvolvement in politics, either publicly or silently. Members of this group involved relatively older officers such as Subianto, and his group. Hence, Kanmen and Chandra (2002) suggested that these rivalries were actually a reflection of intergenerational rivalries.

In some cases, it would be difficult to identify those segregations according to a clear line of divisions. Scholars (Lee, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Daves, 2013-2014, chapter 4), for example, attributed the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto during the end of Suharto era and shortly after his fall as intermingling between both ideological-based and reform-based divisions. The core issue in these two officers' rivalry was basically over the control of the armed forces. Wiranto, as *Panglima*, had taken a cautious decision with regard to the role that TNI should play during a fast-changing situation. While he did not want to upset Suharto, he also did not wish to take harsh actions against his oppositions. Subianto, on the other hand, then was still the son-in-law of Suharto, was keen to protect Suharto's position as he considered himself as the future replacement for his father-in-law. As part of his effort to protect Suharto, Subianto who then held a position of Commander of Army Special Force (*Komandan Jenderal Komando Pasukan Khusus, Danjen Kopassus*) conducted covert operations to kidnap members of opposition camps without the consent of *Panglima*. While this move had made Wiranto angry, he remained calm in responding to it. The rivalry between these two officers was further heated with Subianto appointment as *Pangkostrad*.⁵⁵ This appointment was made without the

⁵⁵ In the meanwhile, his position as Commander of *Kopassus* was replaced by his good friend, Major General Muchdi. In addition, his other good friend, Major General Syafrie Syamsuddin was appointed as Regional Commander of Jakarta Area (*Pangdam Jaya*). It basically a move, made by Suharto, to provide full protection of his position when oppositions decided to take further actions. *Kostrad* is the largest combat unit of the Army and *Kopassus*'s largest personnel is based in Cijantung, an outskirt area of Jakarta.

consent of Council of High Ranks and Offices (*Dewan Kepangkatan dan Jabatan Tinggi, Wanjakti*).⁵⁶ While Subianto and his close friends were known to have intimate relationship with several radical Islamic groups, Wiranto was known as nationalist and *abangan*⁵⁷ Muslim. Following the fall of Suharto, the rivalry between Wiranto and Subianto continued until Subianto was finally released from his position in *Kostrad*. He even had to face disciplinary court and was discharged from TNI due to his involvement in kidnapping of pro-democratic activists. This rivalry certainly does not fall within particular distinction as suggested above.

2.4. Conclusion


While this dissertation does not neglect the existence of other variables in explaining the progress of military reform in Indonesia following the fall of Suharto, particular attention is given to military interests. Comparison between different variables might be a good option in explaining inter-cases comparison, but in a within-case comparison, such decision might not be a good option. The limitation comes from the fact that the structural condition for all of the sub-cases examined in this dissertation would be relatively similar. Hence, a structural based explanation might have merits in explaining why military reform in Indonesia has been heading toward certain direction or making comparison between the case of Indonesia and other cases in different countries. But, a structural based explanation would not logical enough to explain the variation between sub-cases within single case since they basically share similar structural factor. Agent-based explanations, on the other hand, seem to be a good option to explain this within-case variation. Hence, this dissertation examines an agent-based from military point of view to explain the variation in the progress of reform. As for the choice to focus on the armed forces' point of view instead other actors is due to the fact that the reform is basically an internal reform. The role of other actors, however,

⁵⁶ *Wanjakti* is a council in which its members are all high-ranking officers (depending on the position to be appointed). It is the main mechanism to propose candidates for certain positions within high-ranking officers within TNI. In many cases, to avoid friction within TNI, *Wanjakti* would simply propose all generals that fit the requirements for certain position. For example, to be considered as *Panglima* or KSAD/KSAU/KSAL, high-ranking officers need to already have three stars. Hence, *Wanjakti* would propose all three-star generals for those positions. There are, however, some cases where lower ranking officers get a speed-up upward ranking, which usually takes place when these officers have a very close relationship to *Panglima* or President.

⁵⁷ *Abangan* refers to nominal Muslim. While they are Muslim according to their citizen identification, they do not perform religious duty and in some cases practice syncretism.

remains crucial as their interactions with the armed forces are among the most important factors that shape the progress of the reform. Therefore, this dissertation also seeks at the other actors and their interests in its analysis.

The framework proposes in this Chapter suits the aim of this dissertation to assess the variation in the progress of military reform. The typology set up in this Chapter is sufficient to explain factors that influence the variation in the progress of the military reform from one issue to the others. As explained above, the categorization of military interests into three categories, i.e. national, organizational and factional/personal will help understanding the case of varied progresses in military reform in Indonesia. The above explanation also provides clear measurement of progress. While this measurement—both the indicators used and the way of measurement—is not completely new, the application of this measurement in the case of Indonesia is relatively new.⁵⁸



⁵⁸ By “relatively” it means that other scholars have used the indicators mentioned in this Chapter and the technique used to measure or to weight these indicators. These works, however, are mostly concerned with inter-cases comparison instead of intra-case comparison.

Chapter 3

The establishment of democratic control over TNI

This chapter examines the progress in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces during the military reform in Indonesia. The progress of the reform in this issue can be considered as one of the most successful in comparison the other areas. This chapter begins with an assessment of this progress. It identifies the achievements as well as the failures of the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces using the indicators that have been set up in previous chapter. The second part of this chapter analyzes the influence of national interests in determining TNI's decisions to execute reform agendas. The findings of this chapter suggest that national interests play a relatively dominant role in TNI's compliance to the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces. It should be noted, however, that there are other variables that play in hand in shaping their decisions including, and most importantly, their own organizational interests. Most of the successes of the reform in this particular issue take place during the early phase of the reform in which pressures from pro-democratic forces, both within and outside TNI, were at their strongest point. The progress of the reform in the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, however, begins to significantly decline during the latter phase due to several reasons. First, there has been considerable degree of resistance within TNI for further reform due to the lack of progress in other areas of reform, especially police reform. In addition, TNI consistently considers operational-technical regulations, especially in external defense and military organization areas, as military's internal affairs so when the reform begins to touch upon these operational-technical regulations, TNI simply resists it. Finally, the lack of civilian experts to assist TNI in the making of these operational-technical regulations also contributes to the dependency of TNI in the making of these operational-technical regulations.

3.1. The progress in the establishment of democratic control over TNI

The agendas of military reform can be categorized into five different components, ranging from normative, substantive, organization, defense posture, and

defense economics. The normative component of military reform refers to the establishment of a set of regulations to create democratic control over the armed forces. It is part of what Cottey, Edmunds, and Foster (2002) called as the establishment of structural framework to ensure democratic control over the armed forces (see also Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). Widjajanto, *et.al* (2008) argued that there are at least three reasons why military reform should focus on the establishment of political regulations. First, political regulations would guarantee the obedience of the armed forces to democratic principles while at the same time they would also ensure that civilian leadership would not politicize the armed forces. Second, political regulations would also fit to the need to reposition the armed forces within the new political structure. Finally, the existence of political regulations would also ensure transparency and accountability of the armed forces, which usually lacking in military domination situation.

3.1.1. The levelling of political regulations in Indonesia

These political regulations should be comprehensive enough to include various levels of governance. They should cover both the regulations that contain general principles as well as those that contain the operational-technical aspects. It is especially important in the case of Indonesia in which its legal system contains different degrees of regulations in which the lower degree regulations shall not collide with the higher degree regulations. In the Indonesian legal system, the Constitution (*Undang-Undang Dasar*, UUD) is the highest regulation. It is the main source of laws and other regulations in the country. In the second layer, there is MPR decree (*Ketetapan MPR*, *Tap MPR*). It should be noted, however, that since the year 2000, MPR has had no right to make regulations concerning the governing and since 2003 MPR has no longer adopted any *Tap MPR*.⁵⁹ Prior to the Reform Era, MPR served as the highest body in Indonesian governance system and its position was above the DPR (legislative body) and the president (executive body). Currently, their position is equal with the DPR and the president. Members of MPR are basically members of DPR and members of Regional Representative Council (*Dewan Perwakilan Daerah*, DPD). In the third layer,

⁵⁹ The current role of MPR is limited to making changes to the Constitution, inaugurating the President and Vice President, and impeaching the President and Vice President. Adopted *Tap MPR*, however, remains considered as a source of law.


there are laws (*Undang-Undang*, UU) and government regulations in lieu of laws (*Peraturan Pemerintah Pengganti Undang-Undang*, *Perpu*). While UU requires consent from DPR to be enacted, the executive branch can also enforce *Perpu* to serve as UU without the consent from DPR in an emergency situation. This *Perpu*, however, should be brought to DPR on the latter's next general assembly. In the case where DPR rejects the *Perpu*, the government is required to propose a new draft of law to revoke the *Perpu*. In the next layer of regulation sits government regulations (*Peraturan Pemerintah*, PP). Since 2007, PP has officially been replaced by presidential orders (*Peraturan Presiden*, *Perpres*) or presidential decrees (*Ketetapan Presiden*, *Kepres*). The different between *Perpres* and *Kepres* lies in their content and function. *Perpres* contains a relatively general term and is subjected to the public at large while *Kepres* regulates a more specific term and has a limited and fixed subject. In addition, there are also ministerial level orders and decrees (*Peraturan Menteri*, *Permen* and *Keputusan Menteri*, *Kepmen*). Since the military reform is basically an internal reform, operational-technical regulations would also include those signed by *Panglima* TNI, either in the form of orders or decrees (usually in the form of *Surat Telegram*, ST or *Surat Telegram Rahasia*, STR). Since *Panglima* TNI is administratively positioned under the coordination of the Minister of Defense, therefore, *Panglima*'s orders or decrees can be considered in a lower position below Ministerial orders or decrees. Regulations that can be considered as general principles are Constitution, Tap MPR and laws while the rests fall within the category of operational-technical regulations.

Table 3.1. Level of regulations in Indonesia's legal system

General principles	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Constitution (UUD 1945) 2. MPR decree (Tap MPR) 3. Laws (UU) 4. Government regulations in lieu of laws (<i>Perpu</i>)
Operational-technical	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 5. Government regulations (PP – no longer exist) 6. Presidential regulations (<i>Perpres</i>) 7. Presidential orders and decrees (<i>Kepres</i> and <i>Inpres</i>) 8. Ministerial orders and decrees (<i>Permen</i>) 9. <i>Panglima</i> TNI orders and decrees (ST, STR, Skep)

What matter the most with these regulations with regard to the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces is that they should be able to draw clear boundaries between civilian areas from military areas. Ahmadi (2015) proposed a set of

laws according to military domain and police force domain, with the latter basically is civilian domain that has close relationship with the armed forces. To clearly differentiate those two types of laws, he added one specific law that regulates the system of national security. In addition, there are also laws that fall within joint domain of TNI and Polri (see Figure 3.1 below).



* The law on the System of National Security should not be confused with the Law on National Security. The former refers to the whole arrangement of all laws related to security issues, including the Law on National Security.

Figure 3.1. Ideal type of laws arrangement (as proposed by Ahmadi) (Ahmadi, 2015, 69)

Ahmadi's proposal reflects the dominant voice within TNI. The main source of contention of this proposal is the laws that fall within joint areas of TNI and Polri, in particular the Law on National Security (*UU Keamanan Nasional*). This law is intended to clearly set the boundaries between defense and security and hence set a clear distinction between the role of TNI and the role of Polri. The debate between defense and security, or in the Indonesian literatures are referred as *pertahanan dan keamanan*, revolves around what can be considered as defense and what can be considered as security. While traditionally defense is usually related to external threat and security has close resonance with internal threat, this distinction is no longer sufficient. The development in the concept of security, for example, has introduced the idea of human security (*keamanan insani*) which sparks a debate on which institution should be dealing with threats to human security. What makes matter worst is the fact that this

conceptual debate, when translated into empirical reality, is intermingling with institutional authority and share of budget. Simply put, if the threats to human security fall within the role of TNI then the share of budget to deal with these threats also belong to the TNI. On the contrary, if they fall within the task of Polri then the share of budget also falls to Polri.

While TNI consistently supports the enactment of the Law on National Security, Polri reluctantly, and often rather harshly, rejects the enactment of this law. *Panglima* TNI Admiral Suhartono, for example, clearly mentioned that the enactment of the Law on National Security would not curtail Polri's authority (Kompas, 9 January 2012) to lure Polri to support the draft of this law. The draft of this law itself was prepared and proposed by the government through the Ministry of Defense, which means that it was developed by the armed forces. The first draft of this law was proposed in 2005 and consisted of 60 Articles.⁶⁰ This draft, however, never reached to DPR due to resistances from both Polri and NGOs. While the former concerned with the possibility in the reduction of their authority, the latter's main concern was the possibility of TNI's involvement in domestic security affairs. A new draft was prepared by the Ministry of Defense in 2009 which then was discussed in Commission I of DPR who in charge of political and security affairs. DPR rejected the draft and asked the government to revise the draft to be included in the next session of meetings due to pressures from Polri and NGOs. The draft to the Law on National Security regularly appeared on DPR legislation list since then, but DPR always fails to reach agreement to pass the draft.

In addition to the distinction between regulations that contain general principles and operational-technical regulations as well as the distinction between military, civilian, and joint domains, another issue that requires clarification is the content of those regulations. As noted before, the aim of the military reform in Indonesia is first and foremost to disengage the armed forces from politics. The second larger aim of the reform is to establish professional armed forces within a Huntingtonian ideal. TNI seems to consider the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces and professional armed forces as two different projects. In 2008, *Panglima* TNI General

⁶⁰ Within the Indonesian law system, the executive branch is the one who develops and proposes the draft of the law. Even though DPR also has that authority, they rarely propose the draft of the law to be enacted. The laws which have already been passed by DPR must gain approval from the government to be fully applied.

Santoso said that TNI had been successfully disengaged themselves from politics and transferred their tribunal system under civilian control (Antara, 9 October 2008). In 2013, *Panglima* TNI Admiral Suhartono also said that TNI's political engagement had practically been non-existence (BBC Indonesia, 16 July 2013). He then asserted that the next reform agendas should then be targeted at increasing military professionalism, something that was deemed impossible without the financial support of the state. Recently, *Panglima* TNI General Nurmantyo had proudly concluded that military reform had officially completed (Liputan 6, 4 October 2015). He also said, as his predecessors had argued, that TNI should focus on defense modernization to further develop their professionalism. While those claims could be debatable, they indicate that TNI has already had a clear vision on how the reform should be conducted in the next phase.

Since the Indonesia's military reform tends to follow Huntingtonian logic, the agendas of the reform can be differentiated into three different aspect of military professionalism. Huntington (1957) wrote that a professional soldier should have three qualities, i.e. expert in managing violence, have a solid esprit de corps, and loyal to the state (see also Janowitz, 1960; Finer, 1988; Alagappa, 2001). Based on this logic, Widjajanto, *et.al* (2008) identified ten different laws to regulate those three qualities as shown in Table 3.2.

Table 4.2. Defense-related regulations
(Widjajanto, *et.al*, 2008, 9)

Military's responsibility	Law on National Security
	Law on National Defense*
	Law on State Secrecy
Military's corporateness	Law on TNI*
	Law on Conscriptions
	Law on Military Tribunal
Military's expertise	Law on State of Emergencies
	Law on Operations Other than War
	Law on Defense Resources
	Law on Civil Mobilization
* has been adopted	

Apart from the debate over the Law on National Security, the reform has been successful in adopting the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI. Other laws,

however, remain contested in DPR or have yet been officially proposed by the government to DPR. In 2002, DPR passed the Law on National Defense (Law No.3/2002). In 2004, DPR passed another law related to defense affairs, the Law on TNI (Law No.34/2004). In 2014, another law, the Law on Military Discipline, was also successfully adopted. The first two laws serve as a basis for military compliance to civilian authority and democratic values. Both laws provide President with full control of the military. The President is tasked with making the defense policy (Article 13 of the Law on National Defense) and his consent is required to deploy the military (Article 14 of the Law on National Defense and Article 3 of the Law on TNI). To assist the President, the Minister of Defense is authorized to enact defense-related policies, including those related to military deployment and defense cooperation, to produce defense white paper, and to allocate defense budget (Article 16 of the Law on National Defense). While President would adopt a General Policy on National Defense (*Kebijakan Umum Pertahanan Negara, Jakum Hanneg*) with a *Perpres*. The Minister of Defense should operationalize this *Jakum Hanneg* into a Policy on the Management of National Defense (*Kebijakan Penyelenggaraan Pertahanan Negara, Jakgar Hanneg*). In addition, the Minister of Defense also has a task to develop a National Defense Strategy (*Strategi Pertahanan Nasional*) and a National Defense Doctrine (*Doktrin Pertahanan Negara*). TNI would follow suit by adopting a TNI Doctrine (*Doktrin TNI*) and each services develop their own services doctrines (*Doktrin Angkatan*). The role of Minister of Defense goes beyond the making of defense doctrine. They also responsible for setting up defense planning which is known as Minimum Essential Force (MEF). TNI then develops an interoperability planning known as *Trimatra Terpadu* based on that planning. Hence, the military is basically tasked with implementing defense policies into technical details (Article 6 of the Law on TNI). In performing those tasks, the military may conduct military (warfare) operations as well as operations other than war (*operasi militer selain perang, OMSP*) as suggested on Article 7 point (2) of the Law on TNI. For detail see Table 3.3.

Table 3.3. Relating operational-technical regulations from general principles regulations

General principles level	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>UU Pertahanan Negara 2002</i> • <i>UU TNI 2004</i> • + 13 RUU
Operational and technical policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • <i>Jakkum Hanneg</i> • <i>Jakgar Hanneg</i> • <i>Strategi Militer Nasional</i> • <i>Doktrin Militer</i>
Posture	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Minimal Essential Forces • <i>Trimatra Terpadu</i>

The final problem with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces is related to the loopholes in the connection between general principles and operational-tactical regulations. Sebastian and Gindarsah (in Ruland, Manea & Born, 2013), for example, argued that the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI only provide general statements concerning defense issues which require additional technical regulations for implementation. Sukma (2006) shared similar concern when discussing the oversight to the formulation and implementation of defense policy by the parliament. Regardless, other scholars have argued that the reform has, to certain degree, successful in establishing normative arrangement to ensure civilian control over the armed forces. Widjajanto, *et.al* (2008), for example, made this conclusion and proposed a new agenda for future reform under the jargon of defense transformation.

3.1.2. Applying the proposed framework to measure the degree of success in the establishment of democratic control

Even if conclusion on this issue remain varies, the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces can serve as a good basis to examine military interests in engaging in reform agendas. Why do the armed forces seem to be relatively supportive in engaging this agenda? What is the nature of their interactions with their civilian counterparts that drive this agenda to relative success? Those are two questions worth researching.

Scholars have argued that the role of TNI in politics has been significantly reduced since the fall of Suharto (Mietzner in Mietzner, 2011b; Croissant, *et.al*, 2013; Mietzner in Kunkler & Stepan, 2013). Mietzner (in Kunkler & Stepan, 2013, 107) boldly wrote that “their veto powers in the new polity were subsequently very limited”

but “it would be misleading to interpret the decline of TNI’s veto powers as evidence of the successful establishment of full democratic civilian control over the Indonesian armed forces.” To provide a clear picture of how far has TNI disengaging themselves from politics, the following paragraphs employ the framework proposed in Chapter 2 by looking at the already established political regulations in various levels of governance. The findings are presented the Table 3.4 below.

Table 3.4. Findings in the establishment of democratic control over TNI

Areas	Results	Category of result
Elite recruitment	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No military representation in political bodies - Military has no influence on the selection of political decision makers - Active duty officers are not eligible for political office - No military influence on the making and breaking of governments 	High
Public policy	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - No military participation in allocation of state expenditures - No institutionalized prerogatives or informal intervention in policy making - Military assists civilian bureaucracy in certain geographical areas and in addition, the armed forces retained their territorial command structure which mimicking civilian bureaucracy despite the fact that they had already taken off the sociopolitical function of this structure 	Medium-high
Internal security	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - While there are no institutionalized prerogatives given to the armed forces in policy making, the armed forces do have strong influence especially in some specific issue or geographical areas - While there is strict separation of military’s involvement in missions, the armed forces gain an upper hand position in some specific issue or geographical areas - There are institutionalized frameworks for civilian oversighting 	Medium
External defense	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military personnel occupy important position within the defense bureaucracy - Civilians in all branches of government are able to monitor military activities 	Medium
Military organization	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - Military remains dominant players in the making of decisions over military organization issues, but civilian has full right of the making of policy - Civilians are able to monitor and audit military activities 	Medium

3.1.2.1. Progress in the indicators of elite recruitment area

With regard to the first area, elite recruitment, the established regulations in both general principles and operational-tactical levels have clearly suggested that the armed forces have no political representation in political bodies, either in legislative, judicative, or executive branches. With regard to TNI’s involvement in the legislative branch, STR

Kasum TNI⁶¹ No.1062/2004 clearly said that the assignment of military personnel to sit in DPR and DPRD will be ended when the 2004-2009 elected-members of DPR and DPRD were inaugurated. It basically means that their representation in all levels of legislative branch will be put to an end in 2004. According to Article 5 point (4) of the Tap MPR/VII/2000, TNI personnel lost their political rights but in exchange their representation in legislative bodies is granted until 2009. The STR *Kasum* TNI No.1062/2004, therefore, concluded the withdrawal of TNI from legislative bodies five years earlier than the original schedule. In an interview with General Endriartono Sutarto (2017), he proudly said that this was part of TNI's willingness to sacrifice for the interest of the whole nation. He, however, also said that this should be seen as temporary condition and that one day the political right of soldiers should be given back to them. There is a stark difference between TNI's (involvement) in politics and soldiers' political right (between *politik TNI* and *politik prajurit*). While the former should never be granted, the latter should be. Recently, General Nurmantyo also pointed out the need to give back soldiers' political right but, according to his own assessment, not within the next one or two years (Kompas, 4 October 2016).

The non-existence of soldiers' political right also indicates that the armed forces practically have no power in the selection of political leaders. It also means that the armed forces as an institution also lose their influence in selection of political leaders. Sutarto (2017, interview) mentioned that this is an important issue since military personnel, especially those at the lower levels officers, could be very easily using their position to support certain candidate upon and impose that preference to their subordinates. Hence, the absence of personnel's political right, including the right to vote and to campaign for certain candidate, is seen as a better option to guarantee TNI's neutrality in politics. He, however, clearly mentioned that while TNI personnel lost their political rights, they would remain loyal to the democratically elected government. TNI's neutrality in politics, especially in elections, has been regularly publicly stated and ensured.

⁶¹ *Kasum* or *Kepala Staf Umum* (General Chief of Staff) is a second highest position non-commanding position within the armed forces. The main task of *Kasum* is to coordinate to communicate the policies of *Panglima*. This position is held by a three-star general (Lieutenant General, Vice Admiral, or Vice Air Marshal).

With regard to the third indicator of elite recruitment area, TNI's personnel are not only losing their voting right but also their right to be elected as political leaders. TNI's personnel are required to take early retirement if they want to run as candidate. Article 39 point (4) of the Law on TNI clearly states that military personnel are not allowed to run as candidate for either legislative member or executive leaders in both national and local levels. The Law on the Election of Governors, Mayors, and Regents (UU No.1/2014, replaced by UU No.1/2015, replaced by UU No.8/2005, replaced by UU No.10/2016) and the Law on the Elections of Members of DPR, DPD, and DPRD (UU No.8/2012) also mentioned that military personnel who want to run as candidate in local election must resign from their service. As a follow up of those regulations, on 9 August 2016, General Nurmantyo published ST *Panglima* TNI No.983/2016 (to replace STR No.222/2005 and STR No.546/2006) which listed six details on TNI personnel's early resignation to run as political candidates, including: the personnel are required to offer early retirement prior to the candidacy, this retirement is subject to their superiors' approval, it cannot be cancelled under any circumstances, when they are not elected they cannot re-join the brass, during the campaign they must not use TNI's attributes, and they will be discharged from TNI with honors.

The last indicator of elite recruitment area, the military's veto power over the making and breaking of governments is also non-existence. According to the Constitution, President can only be impeached from his position if he or she has committed treason, engaged in corruption and bribery, conducted criminal activities, or due to any other reasons could not perform his task as President as stated in Article 7 letter (a). Article 7 letter (b) lies out the mechanism for the impeachment. DPR must first seek legal decision from the Constitutional Court (*Mahkamah Konstitusi*, MK) which states the would-be-impeached President has indeed violated any of the items listed in Article 7 letter (a). After receiving decision from MK, DPR then sends request to MPR to hold a special session to discuss the impeachment. After listening to inputs from various factions within MPR, they then make decision whether they should impeach the President or not. In the history of Indonesia after the fall of Suharto, there is only one case when the President has successfully been impeached from his position. Since the armed forces no longer have representation in the MPR as well as DPR, their involvement in this process, therefore, does not exist. The making of the government,

whether it is the election of the President or the making of the cabinet, does not involve the armed forces as well. The President is directly chosen by the people in a Presidential election as clearly regulated in the Law on Presidential election (UU No.23/2003 and then revised with UU No.42/2008). Prior to the election, TNI is customarily required to declare their neutrality, as in the case of 2004, 2009, and 2014. TNI personnel also could not use their voting right as previously has explained in the above paragraph. Hence, their involvement in the making of the government practically does not exist. Meanwhile, the making of the cabinet is purely the domain of the President. In fact, the appointment of *Panglima* is also the prerogative right of the President although, according to Article 13 point (2) of the Law on TNI.⁶²

3.1.2.2. Progress in the indicators of public policy area

On the public policy area, the progress of the reform in the establishment of normative arrangements has also indicated a relatively high degree of success, albeit not as successful as the first area. With regard to the indicator of state budgetary affair, the allocation of state budget in Indonesia is subject to DPR's approval. With regard to defense budget, the Ministry of Defense is the one who responsible to propose the budget to DPR. Article 16 point (3) of the Law on National Defense clearly states that Minister of Defense has the authority to prepare defense planning in accordance with President's direction and Article 16 point (6) equips Minister of Defense with the authority to allocate budget. However, Article 67 point (1) of the Law on TNI does mention that *Panglima* TNI can submit budget proposal to the Ministry of Defense. In 2012, Minister of Defense adopted *Permenhan* No.38/2012 on Defense Planning Mechanism to operationalize the principles stated on the Law on National Defense. As part of this *Permenhan* is the guidance on the making of defense budget which takes into account a bottom up process from TNI Headquarter to Ministry of Defense. This *Permenhan*, however, was withdrawn in 2015 and replaced by *Permenhan* No.28/2015 which had a relatively top-down process of defense planning, including on budget allocation. Hence, the new *Permenhan* is basically further limiting the role of TNI *Panglima* in budget allocation procedure.

⁶² This issue will further be discussed in the next section.

The source of contention between Ministry of Defense and TNI Headquarter with regard to the issue of budget allocation is the different interpretations of Article 3 point (2) of the Law on TNI which states that “with regard to defense policy and strategy as well as administrative support, TNI is under the coordination of the Ministry of Defense.”⁶³ TNI tends to interpret the word “under the coordination” as working together with the Ministry of Defense instead of following the direction from the Ministry of Defense. They argue that this Article shall not be taken off from Article 3 point (1) which states that *Panglima* is directly under the order of the President. Hence, they suggest that TNI Headquarter has their own autonomy in defense planning including in allocating their defense budget. The role of the Ministry of Defense, accordingly, is simply to coordinate their policies with the policies of the Ministry. On the other hand, Article 16 point (2), (3), (4), (5), (6) and (7) of the Law on National Defense clearly mention that the role of the Ministry of Defense is to make the policies. Hence, the Ministry of Defense tends to interpret their authority as policy makers with assistances and advises from TNI Headquarter. While in the past this debate has been sometimes appeared in closed discussions, it was not until the saga over the purchase of *AugustaWestland* 101 (AW101) helicopter that the debate came into attention into public arena in February 2016.⁶⁴

The second indicator of the public policy area also suggests that there are no institutionalized prerogatives or informal interventions to the policy making by the armed forces. Article 5 of the Law on TNI clearly states that TNI is defense tool. Article 10 point (1) of the Law on National Defense confirms a similar statement. The role of TNI is limited to defense. However, with the consent of President and at the requests of concerned governmental bodies, TNI can provide assistance in fourteen different OMSP.

⁶³ In the original language it is written: “Dalam kebijakan dan strategi pertahanan serta dukungan administrasi, TNI di bawah koordinasi Departemen Pertahanan.”

⁶⁴ During a hearing with DPR, *Panglima* said that he has no knowledge on the Air Force plan to purchase AW 101 which DPR is reluctantly agreeing to. *Panglima* argued that he has lost the authority over defense planning and budget allocation with the release of *Permenhan* No. 28/2015. He accused that the purchase was made by the Ministry of Defense. In the meanwhile, Minister of Defense, Ryamizard Ryacudu, said that the purchase is part of Air Force procurement. In 2015, the Secretariat of the State listed the purchase of AW 101 into their budget planning. This purchase was intended to serve as Presidential helicopter. President Joko Widodo, however, rejected this plan due to the relatively expensive price of AW 101 and asked the Secretariat of the State to drop this procurement item. The Chief of Staff of the Air Force then put the purchase of AW 101 into their procurement plan. He could do so since according to *Permenhan* No. 28/2015 chapter 2, the position of Chief of Staff and *Panglima* are equal with regard to budgetary users.

These fourteen OMSP are: counter-insurgency operations, counter-rebellion operations, counter-terrorism operations, border patrol missions, operations to secure vital object, peace-keeping operation, missions to safeguard President, Vice President, and their immediate family members, reserves or basic military trainings, missions to assist local authority in conducting their tasks, missions to assist Polri in maintaining public order, missions to safeguard visiting foreign head of government/state, disaster relief operations, search and rescue missions, and missions to ensure safe passage and freedom of navigation including conducting counter-piracy operations.

In addition, TNI's relationship with civilian bureaucracy has been severely disbanded as indicated with the disbandment of all sociopolitical offices of the armed forces. In fact, this was among the earliest agendas of military reform. On 10 November 1998, for example, the Minister of Defense and Security⁶⁵ signed a *Kepmenhankam/Pangab*⁶⁶ No.09/P/XI/1998 to rename the Chief of Sociopolitical Affairs (*Kepala Staf Sosial Politik ABRI, Kasospol ABRI*) into the Chief of Territorial Affairs (*Kepala Staf Teritorial ABRI, Kaster ABRI*).⁶⁷ In addition, Minister of Defense and Security also signed *Kepmenhankam/Pangab* No.10/P/XI/1998 to liquidate the Body for Staff Development (*Badan Pembinaan Kekaryaan, Babinkar*) and Officer Staff (*staf karyawan, syawan*) as well as all of their extra-structural organizations. The liquidation of these offices basically meant that the armed forces were no longer processing military deployment to civilian positions (practice of *kekaryaan*). In 1999, Minister of Defense and Security signed *SK Menhankam/Pangab* No.03/P/II/1999 to regulate the status of non-military assignment to military personnel, in which they have to choose between early retirements or changes of status from military personnel into civil servants. Exceptions were given to several non-military positions that required military personnel such as Military Secretary to the President (*Sekretaris Militer, Sekmil*), defense attaches, and others. In addition, there are also several civilian institutions in which active military officers can serve in, such as Ministry of Defense, State Intelligence Bureau, Signal Intelligence Bureau, and others (Article 47 point (1) of the Law on TNI).

⁶⁵ The previous name of the Ministry of Defense.

⁶⁶ During the reign of Suharto and a brief period of Habibie, the post Minister of Defense and Security was held by active military officer and this portfolio was usually given to *Panglima* ABRI.

⁶⁷ This post (*Kaster* TNI) was then disbanded in 2001. Major General Agus Widjojo served as the last *Kaster* TNI.

The final indicator of public policy area is whether the armed forces have an authority over civilian bureaucracy. With TNI administratively has been placed under the Ministry of Defense, as stipulated in Article 3 point (2) of the Law on TNI, the armed forces have been nowhere dominating the state structures. Habibie's cabinet, known as Reform Development Cabinet (*Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan*)⁶⁸, was the last cabinet which had active military officers in it. According to Croissant, *et.al* (2013, 102), 2.9% of the members of Habibie cabinet were active military and 12.5% was retired military officers. The number of retired officers in Wahid's cabinet, or National Unity Cabinet (*Kabinet Persatuan Nasional*), was higher in comparison to that of Habibie's. 13.65% of the members of Wahid's cabinet were retired officers. Retired officers in Megawati's cabinet (*Kabinet Gotong Royong*) were counted for 7.2%. During Yudhoyono's first term (*Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu*), only 6 from 45 members of the cabinet had military background (including police force) and during his second term (*Kabinet Indonesia Bersatu 2*), only 4 from 55 cabinet members had military background.

Despite that progress, the armed forces maintain their territorial command structure that basically mimicking civilian bureaucracy from national to district levels. According to ST Panglima TNI No.142/2002, the reference to the old territorial command (*komando territorial*) should be abandoned and a new reference of territorial command (*komando kewilayahan*) was then introduced.⁶⁹ It basically suggested that the sociopolitical function of territorial command structure was disbanded but the defense function of territorial command structure remain attached.⁷⁰ Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that the territorial command structure itself is important for TNI to the defense of the country and there has not yet any significant changes in the doctrine. TNI's defense

⁶⁸ It is a common practice in Indonesia where each cabinet is given a particular name. In some cases, the name reflects the particular situation when the cabinet is established, but in most cases the name reflects the hope or goal that this cabinet wants to achieve. For example, the name of Habibie's cabinet reflects both the situation and the hope. The name *Reformasi Pembangunan*, according to Habibie, reflects the hope that this cabinet would be able to assist the reform agendas following the fall of Suharto. As quoted by Kompas (23 May 1998), Habibie said during the inauguration of this cabinet that "*Hal ini sejalan dengan semangat dan tekad bangsa Indonesia sebagaimana tercermin dalam tuntutan reformasi konstitusional menyeluruh yang dipelopori oleh mahasiswa dan generasi muda. Maka, kabinet yang saya umumkan ini, saya beri nama Kabinet Reformasi Pembangunan.*"

⁶⁹ The words *teritori* and *wilayah* have the same meaning. It is equal to the words territory and area in English.

⁷⁰ Please take note that dual function doctrine, which served as TNI doctrine, stated that TNI has two different function: defense and sociopolitical.

strategy is basically a total warfare strategy which they called as *sistem pertahanan rakyat semesta (sishanrata)*. In the case of war, TNI would draw the enemies to enter the main islands in the archipelago to conduct guerilla wars against them. Hence, the territorial command structure remains as important as in the past. Moreover, TNI is also equipped with non-defense assignment. With TNI's massive territorial structure, there have been some cases where the lack of civilian bureaucracy capacity was replaced by TNI. In fact, the Minister of Defense Yusgiantoro signed *Permenhan* No.35/2011 to regulate this particular OMSP, especially in areas with significant sense of remoteness.

Hence, with regard to the second area, public policy area, the progress of the reform has indicated a medium to high progress in ensuring military's withdrawal from politics. The main obstacle basically lies in local level rather than in national level. In addition, since the main problem of military withdrawal in this particular area is the existence of TNI's territorial command structure and the relatively easy reasoning to re-engage in politics through OMSP, serious efforts are in a dire need to redefine TNI's structure and doctrine.

3.1.2.3. Progress in the indicators of internal security area

The next area where military's withdrawal can be measured is internal security. While the new professionalism school rejects the absence of military's involvement in internal security matters as a good indicator to measure military professionalism, their involvement in internal security matters would be quite easily provided a pretext for military's involvement in politics. The Law on TNI clearly regulates how OMSP can be conducted. There are at least two requirements that have to be completed to assign the armed forces with internal security matters. First, it has to be at the request of the government, or other governmental bodies. This request can come either from Polri or local government authorities or other security agencies in charge of internal security matters. Second, President's consent is required for an OMSP to take place.

The main problem with the Indonesian case of OMSP is that there has been an increasing number of Memorandum of Understandings (MOU) between TNI and other bodies, both governmental and private organizations, which took place throughout the years. From 2000 to 2015, TNI has signed 37 MOUs detailing their assistances to various bodies, in which 7 of them were extension of previous MOUs. These MOUs,

however, did not include those that were signed with local government authorities. Those 37 MOUs were mostly internally oriented. In fact, only one MOU which can be considered as an externally-oriented mission, which was the one that they signed with UNTAET to assist the return of Timorese refugees from West Timor to Timor Leste. While some of those MOUs can be categorized as fall within the fourteen listed missions regulated by Article 7 point (2) letter (b), some are contested. An example of the latter type of MOUs was TNI's MOU with Ministry of Agriculture. This MOU—firstly signed in 2012 and then extended (re-signed) in 2014—is not referring to Article 7 point (2) letter (b) since it basically stated that Army's soldiers would serve as agricultural counsellor for farmers throughout the country, especially in remote areas.

While the armed forces have no institutionalized prerogatives in policy making and their influence is also extremely limited, they do have a say with regard to certain geographical areas. Two cases can be seen as examples. The first case is Papua. The history of Papua is relatively different from that of other areas in Indonesia. While the Dutch agreed to hand over most of the parts of the Dutch Indies to RIS in the 1949, they were unwilling to give up Papua. It was agreed during the 1949 conference that the final settlement on Papua would be made in the following year. The agreement, however, never came. After a series of military attacks by the Indonesian armed forces were failed, in early 1960 Sukarno called for a full scale war against the Dutch over Papua. Due to the fear of massive scale war in the region, as well as the fear that Indonesia might fall to the Communist camp, in which by that time Indonesia had already established a close relationship with Soviet Union, the US managed to broker a peace deal to integrate Papua to Indonesia. In 1969, a referendum was held to determine whether Papuans wanted to be an independent country or to join with Indonesia. The referendum was in favor of integration with Indonesia, but some groups in Papua accused the Indonesian armed forces had put pressures to Papuans during the vote. As a result, those who against the integration of Papua to Indonesia started to raise arms against central government. Indonesian military's mishandling of these Papuan movements resulted in continuous arms struggle with these groups. Military's involvement in Papua was also intermingling with their economic activities especially with the existence of Grasberg Mine, which is known as one of the largest gold and copper mines in the world. When Wahid took power in 1999, he began to lessen

Jakarta's grip over Papua and introduced special autonomy region to Papua, as well as Aceh.⁷¹ While the Law on the Special Autonomy of Aceh (UU No.44/1999, then revised as UU No.18/2001) had been passed in DPR in 1999, the Law on the Special Autonomy of Papua (UU No.21/2001) was not adopted by DPR until 2001. Chauvel and Bhakti (2004) and McGibbon (2004), however, raised their pessimism that this special autonomy status would be fruitful without a change in security apparatus' attitude toward Papuans. During the debate over the special autonomy law for Papua, the Indonesian Army decided to reestablish Military Command Area (*Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam*) in Papua (known as *Kodam Cendrawasih*) as part of their territorial command structure in 1999. They, however, withdrew all of *Kopassus* personnel from Papua. *Kodam Cendrawasih* took over all activities previously conducted by *Kopassus*. The establishment of *Kodam Cendrawasih* increased the scale of military presence in Papua since, according to Syailendra (2016, 71), the ratio of army personnel to local inhabitants reached 1:168 which made Papua as one of the most militarized area in Indonesia. Their presence in Papua collided with the presence of Polri's personnel which resulted in frequent clashes between these two agencies. To minimize the clash, the Army and Polri conducted several joint counter-separatism operations, especially since 2014. The Papuan case basically suggests that the role of TNI in policy making, especially in the operational-technical levels, remains influential.

The second case where the role of the armed forces remain significant while has indicating a declining trend is Aceh. Mietzner (in Kunkler & Stepan, 2013) suggested that prior to 2005, TNI had been the strongest supporter of military operation area (*Daerah Operasi Militer, DOM*) in Aceh and they had been quite often torpedoed any efforts to reach peace deal with the Aceh Freedom Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, GAM*). While DOM had been lifted soon after the fall of Suharto, peace deal with GAM was not materialized until the reign of Yudhoyono. To be able to successfully reach a peace agreement with GAM, Yudhoyono had to make several changes within the brass, especially in the Army, by replacing conservative generals from command positions with his own loyalists. When Wahid was elected president, there was a wide-spread support to reach deal with GAM due to his close relationship with the Muslim communities, including those in Aceh. Wahid managed to set up negotiation with GAM

⁷¹ Aceh is the second example. See next paragraph for detail explanation.

with the assistance of Henry Dunant Center (HDC). His efforts, however, were met with opposition from TNI who afraid that peace agreement with GAM would result in prosecutions of military officers for past human right abuses during the DOM era (Aspinall & Crouch, 2003; Sukma, 2004). It should be noted that Yudhoyono, who was member of Wahid's cabinet, was known as supporter of this negotiation. Wahid's negotiation efforts were not only met opposition from TNI but also from civilian politicians which problematized Wahid's choice to send Hassan Wirajuda, Indonesia's ambassador for the UN in Geneva, as negotiator. They afraid such a decision could be interpreted as Indonesia's acknowledgement of GAM as an equal partner or, other words, acknowledging GAM as an independent entity. Met with oppositions, Wahid's negotiation process went to stall. When Megawati replaced him as president, prospect for negotiation became dark due to her strong nationalistic ideology.

Those two cases show that while normatively the armed forces had no prerogatives over internal security policy making, their influence remain strong in particular issues or geographical areas. One of the problems with the armed forces' continued influence in internal security policy making basically comes from the lack in operational-technical regulations. While *Jakum Hanneg* and *Jakger Hanneg* have regularly been made, they only mention in glance of OMSP. In 2011, the Ministry of Defense adopted *Permenhan* No.5/2011 on military's involvement in counter-separatism missions. However, by this time, separatism in Aceh had been relatively settled and the settlement of Papuan case had been transferred to Polri.

The final indicator in the internal security area, the availability of institutionalized framework for civilian oversight, has exist as well. The laws on special autonomy regions clearly mention Polri as the institution that responsible for maintaining internal security in both Papua and Aceh. The appointment of Chief of Regional Police Area (*Kepala Polisi Daerah, Kapolda*) in both areas is made by the President with the approval of Papua and Aceh's governors. Governors could also ask TNI to assist their activities in which the details are subject to *Permenhan* No.35/2011 which lists in detail the areas in which TNI could be used to assist local government, time frame of the OMSP, governor's control over the operations and the overseeing (see the Appendix of this *Permenhan*).

3.1.2.4. Progress in the indicators of external defense and military organization areas

The other two areas—external defense and military organization areas—indicate a medium degree of democratic control over the armed forces. With regard to the second indicator in those two areas, civilian groups managed to secure access to transparency of military activities in defense and military organization issues. In fact, on the latter issue, there has been a sort of complaint from military officers with the fact that the candidate for *Panglima* position has to attend a fit and proper session before the DPR (Article 13 point (2), (5), and (6) of the Law on TNI as well as Article 17 of the Law on National Defense). Basically this law only mentions that the candidate has to receive the consent of DPR to be appointed as *Panglima* in which DPR has to answer the nomination from the President within 20 days after the nomination and when they fail to do so then President has the full right to legalize the appointment. One of the mechanisms before DPR makes decision is the need to hold a fit and proper test. Therefore, after receiving letter of notification from the President, Commission I of DPR will hold a fit and proper test session with the candidate of *Panglima* TNI and then Commission I will report their findings and suggestions during the general session of DPR. Ahmadi (2015) criticized this conduct since it might lead to a politicization of *Panglima* position. In addition, as a consequence of this “go through DPR” process, *Panglima* is also subject to DPR questioning sessions when they deem these sessions as necessary.⁷² The latter conduct is also supported by Article 18 point (4) of the Law on National Defense and Article 19 point (2) of the Law on TNI which state that *Panglima* is directly under the President in all military-related activities. This article has been quite often used as reference when DPR want to questioning *Panglima* for any issues, allegedly misconducts, brought by the House’s members. In addition, this particular

⁷² While this fear has never been taking place with the appointment of *Panglima*, it did take place with the appointment of Chief of Polri (*Kepala Kepolisian Indonesia, Kapolri*) when Wahid shockingly dismissed General Bimantoro from his position and replaced him with General Chairuddin Ismail without the consent of DPR. The latter refused the dismissal of Bimantoro and there was a time when Polri had two *Kapolri*, one supported by the President and the other supported by DPR. For detail account on this event see Muradi (2014).

article has also created heated debate between TNI and the Ministry of Defense over different issues related to defense policies and military organization issues.⁷³

The main problem in these two areas lies in the deep involvement of active officers in defense bureaucracy and their domination over the making of policies related to military organization affairs. The latter is basically a consequence to the former. There are various positions within the Ministry of Defense which traditionally have been held by active officers. The Secretary General of the Ministry of Defense is among those top leadership positions that for long belongs to the TNI (three-star general). The Inspector General position also belongs to active military officers (three-star general). In addition, the four Director Generals of the Ministry of Defense have always been held by military officers (two-star generals). Military officers also occupy several other mid-level positions within the Ministry of Defense which practically place the Minister powerless when he or she should face TNI establishment. With most products of the Ministry, especially those that are related to defense policies and military organization issues, are actually made by active military officers, it is understandable if the brass' penetration to defense policies and military organization issues is quite significant. The operational-technical level regulations that deal with the Ministry of Defense itself did not come into being until 2015 when the President adopted *Perpres* No.58/2015 on the Organizational Arrangements of the Ministry of Defense.

3.2. The national interests' dominance within TNI

The term national interest in this dissertation is defined as the interest of the nation with regard to the transition to democracy. It is basically the call for reform to establish democratic society in Indonesia. While the fall of Suharto represented a real action to implement this national interest, Tap MPR No.10/1998 on the Main Agendas of Reform provided the legal justification for implementing democratic values in governance. As part of this transformation, the armed forces were required to step out from politics to focus on defense assignment as suggested in Tap MPR No.6/2000.

As suggested in the previous parts, the progress of reform in the establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces suggests a relatively good result. There are, however, some remaining problems. First, there are only two laws related to

⁷³ See for example the debate over the purchase of AW 101 helicopter in the next chapter.

the armed forces establishment that have successfully been adopted. Table 3.2 shows that there are several laws related to the armed forces establishment that have yet to be adopted. Most of these laws, however, concern with the professionalization of the armed forces, instead of with the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces with the exception of the Law on National Security. These un-adopted laws are crucial in establishing culture of military submission to democratic control. Other words, in a generational approach of military reform point of view, it can be said that the reform has only successfully creating structural framework for establishing democratic control over the armed forces and it has not yet managed to produce the culture of the armed forces to not engage in politics.

Second, there is still a lack in operational-technical regulations to clarify the general principles listed in the already adopted laws. One particular example that shows the lack of operational-technical regulations is the organizational arrangements of the Ministry of Defense. While the Law on National Defense has clearly regulated the role of the Ministry of Defense, there are no operational regulations detailing the institutional capacity that this Ministry has to carry out their tasks and there are no operational regulations that regulate which positions within the Ministry of Defense that should be filled in by active officers and which should be given privileges to civilians or how these assigned-officers should pledge their loyalty to (Sukma in Prihartono, 2006). Even when *Perpres* No.58/2015 was adopted it did not clearly regulate those matters. Hence, while the Ministry of Defense has the full right in decision making, their policies are basically prepared by the brass. The lack of operational-technical regulations also takes place in the disbandment of military business, at least until 2009.

Third, the armed forces still have a strong influence in two areas, external defense and military organization, not only in the implementation of policies related to those two areas but also the decision-making process. In addition, they also tend to argue that civilian overt involvement in these two areas is a sign of intervention to military's internal affairs which used to be the pretext for their involvement in politics. As Welch and Smith (1976) had argued, the non-existence of inter-penetration is crucial in ensuring military's non-involvement in politics. Many cases have suggested that the reason for military's coup d'état is closely linked with civilian intervention in military affairs. Therefore, while this dissertation agrees that military autonomy in their internal

affairs should be granted by existing regulations, the armed forces should also subject to multiple channels of oversighting. The armed forces have to give up their privileges in decision making and allow civilian establishment to take charge of decision making process to focus on their expertise. Hence, the armed forces should never consider civilian involvement in decision making of defense policies as intervention. When civilian leaderships jump into, for example, personnel' tour of duty policies, the armed forces have the right to complaint. The limitation of the so-called military internal affairs, therefore, should be made clear.

Despite those loopholes, a careful reading through the already established regulations suggests that TNI basically conveys to the adoption of general principles of democratic control but they indicate a sign of resistance in the details, especially when they consider that those regulations would harbor their interests—military's internal affairs is one of them. To clearly show that assessment, a careful tracking in the progress is made in the following paragraphs.

It is crucial to clearly differentiate the time-frame of the progress in the establishment of democratic normative control over the armed forces. The two adopted laws were passed by DPR in 2002 and 2004, which are four and six years after the initiation of the reform. The discussion of these laws within the Ministry of Defense took place as early as 2000. In late 2000, *Propatria*⁷⁴ held a closed meeting between scholars and activists to discuss their stance against the new draft of Law on National Defense (*Rancangan Undang-Undang*, RUU).⁷⁵ By the time of the meeting, this draft had yet been made available for public and only a handful of persons knew the existence and the content of this draft. The *Propatria* meeting, which then turned into *Propatria* Working Group, was intended to provide alternative to the draft developed by

⁷⁴ Led by Hari Prihartono, *Propatria* is a leading NGO which specialized in security sector reform. In the later period, their involvement was matched by *Pacivis*. Unlike *Pacivis*, *Propatria* was not based in university and hence, their reputation was slightly declining within the defense establishment. Most key members of *Propatria* Working Group, will be explained latter, was also members of *Pacivis* Working Group. *Pacivis* Working Group, however, managed to set regeneration of scholars who engaged in defense/security affairs, probably due to the fact the members of *Propatria* Working Group who also members of *Pacivis* Working Group were based in academic institutions.

⁷⁵ The transcript of the meetings is not available for public. I have the pleasure of keeping these transcripts due to my close relationship with those who involved in the meetings and organizer of the meetings. However, Lorenz (2015) also used these transcripts in his dissertation manuscript. I do not know how Lorenz managed to have the copy of these transcripts, but he had personally interviewed Hari Prihartono, the director of *Propatria* for his research.

the Ministry of Defense.⁷⁶ Several members⁷⁷ of *Propatria* Working Group involved in the drafting of the Ministry of Defense's version of the Law on National Defense, while as a group they made several meetings with both the Ministry of Defense and DPR, or factions within DPR, to put forward their own version of the draft.⁷⁸ During these meetings, members of the *Propatria* Working Group raised their concern that the Ministry of Defense's draft version was not fully comply with democratic values. The debate revolves around different issues. For example, during one of the meeting between *Propatria* Working Group with officers from defense establishment, both the Ministry of Defense and TNI Headquarter which took place in late 2000, a high ranking military officer that attended the meeting raised his objection to the way *Propatria* Working Group formulated their proposed draft. He said the draft had a tendency to frame TNI as the guilty party and hence needed to be controlled when in fact the main problem is how to find the best possible way to set up the role of both TNI and non-TNI elements within the society to bring the country to prosperity.⁷⁹ That kind of objections had been quite often raised in a meeting between *Propatria* Working Group and defense establishment. It basically indicates that the armed forces agreed to settle to the drafting of the law to the point that the draft would secure their interests. They, however, agreed that the call for democratic control over the armed forces pressured by civilian pro-democratic forces had to be established. The timing of the enactment of those laws plays a crucial role since this process took place during the early stage of the reform when the pressures for military to reform themselves were at its peak. The proposed draft of the Law on National Defense, for example, was brought to DPR with several important revisions after several members of *Propatria* Working Group managed to secure access to the Minister of Defense who represented National Awakening Party

⁷⁶ It should be noted that clearly separating Ministry of Defense from TNI Headquarter was not possible at this time due to the fact that active officers within the Ministry of Defense remained loyal to the interest of the brass.

⁷⁷ In one of my personal communications with Widjanto, he mentioned that at least four members of the *Propatria* Working Group assisted the Ministry of Defense in the drafting of the Law on National Defense. He himself acknowledged that he assisted the Ministry of Defense in the drafting of the Law on TNI. One of these two members that Widjanto mentioned to me acknowledged his involvement in our personal communication. These communications, however, took place before I decided to write this dissertation when I was working as their research assistant in one of *Pacivis* projects.

⁷⁸ These meetings took place since 2000 to 2002 when the Law on National Defense was finally enacted by DPR.

⁷⁹ Full record with the author.

(*Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa*, PKB).⁸⁰ Hence, they basically by passed the officers within defense establishment in the adoption of the Law on National Defense. In the case of the adoption of the Law on TNI in 2004, however, this Working Group was caught by surprise since they claimed that they never had information that the discussion of the draft within the defense establishment had been taken place. The draft had been highly criticized by NGOs and also scholars (ICG, 2004). Sukma (2004), for example, raised his concern that the draft of the Law on TNI contained several points which might jeopardize democratic control.

The above explanation suggests that the armed forces managed to maintain their interests during the drafting process and the discussion of the draft in DPR sessions. They also managed to ensure that the draft would not go through significant changes in the entire process. Hence, while they worked closely with scholars and NGO activists they also maintained close contacts to members of DPR. As the transcript of the meetings hosted by *Propatria* Working Group suggested, contacts between members of the group with members of DPR also took place in several occasions. These contacts helped members of DPR to understand the issue properly. However, members of DPR also had their own interests in which not all of them agreed that full limitation to the armed forces would serve their political interests. Various academic works had been done to suggest that there were basically splits within civilian politician groups in which in order to win their political contestations they agreed to submit to the demand of the armed forces in exchange for support from the brass (Anwar, 2001; Mietzner, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Sebastian & Isgindarsah in Rulland, Manea & Born, 2013). The split within civilian camp resulted in a weak pressures toward the brass in the discussion of draft of the laws.

What is interesting from that process is the fact that the armed forces managed to maintain their unity. Scholars suggested that during the early phase of the reform, there were rivalries within the brass.⁸¹ Those rivalries, however, was not shown outside the brass. Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that it was normal to have different opinions between officers within the brass, but they had their own way of settling these differing

⁸⁰ I gained this information from several members of *Propatria* Working Group during my involvement in *Pacivis* Working Group. I was a junior member of this Working Group which served mostly as research assistant to the senior members of this Working Group. At least three members of this Working Group with whom I had worked with conveyed similar information.

⁸¹ See Chapter 2.

opinions and once they had made decision then all officers would comply with that decision. Hence, he tended to downplay what scholars said as split.

The case of the Law on National Security deserves different explanation since it was not only involved TNI and civilian groups but also Polri. The failed discussion to the draft of the Law on National Security was due to consistent refusal from Polri as they considered that this law would significantly limit their role and authority. In fact, DPR had been several times refused to include this law to their session due to the split between TNI and Polri. They argued that the executive bodies should be able to settle their own disagreements before the draft of the law can be discussed in DPR.⁸²




Figure 3.2. Tracing for the first phase of the establishment of normative framework

The above explanation suggests that there had been a singular interest within the armed forces to support the new democratic arrangement. As a result, they chose to take side with public pressures for military’s withdrawal from politics in a sense that they should no longer taking charge of the governance but retain their role as influencer to important government decisions. TNI, for example, remained as key actor in the making of defense policies and military organization-related decisions through their heavy penetration to the Ministry of Defense. Hence, whenever the pressures from civilian group to these issues grew, the armed forces would not easily submit to these pressures.

⁸² Muradi (2014) provided a detail explanation on this issue.

In the meanwhile, the split within civilian groups led to their disagreement over certain issues. While these disagreement in most times did not related to military or defense/military related issues, civilian groups had the tendency to gain support from the armed forces to strengthen their political position (Mietzner, 2004; Haseman, 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008; Sebastian & Iisgindarsah in Rulland, Manea & Born, 2013). As result, it contributed to the lack of unity in discussing the laws supposedly set to weaken the political influence of TNI. Examples can be drawn from both the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI which relatively beneficial for TNI.

Following the enactment of the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI, little progress has been taking place. In addition to the passing of several operational-technical regulations, no other law, with the exception of the Law on Military Discipline, has ever been adopted. As explained earlier, there were loopholes in the making of operational-technical regulations due to the resistance from the armed forces to what they called as civilian penetration to military affairs. There was, however, additional factor which made civilian groups could not press the armed forces to adopt these required operational-technical regulations, which was the lack of civilian experts in defense and military affairs. Members of DPR, for example, were lacking of sufficient knowledge, even among members of Commission I, on operational-technical details of defense and military affairs. In the discussion of the laws, members of DPR received significant assistance from scholars through, among others, *Propatria*. Civilian authority within the Ministry of Defense also received similar assistance from scholars. The numbers of scholars in defense and military affairs themselves were limited. For example, among those who involved in *Propatria* Working Group, there were only two scholars who hold degree, either master or doctorate, in defense and military studies. Most of them were either political scientist (especially international relations scholar) or jurist.

Regardless of this situation, several normative frameworks in operational-technical regulations have been managed to create. The Ministry of Defense managed to produce Defense Policy, Defense Strategy, Defense Doctrine, and Defense Planning document. All of those documents were made with the assistance from civilian scholars. Their involvement were basically due to the fact that during the making of those

products, the Minister of Defense was held by Sudarsono, a professor in international relations with the University of Indonesia, and most members of *Propatria* and *Pacivis* Working Groups were his former students.⁸³ Sudarsono's long standing relationship with TNI, in which he used to serve as Vice Governor of National Resilience Institute (*Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional, Lemhanas*) during Suharto era, also provided access to these scholars to work closely with TNI. In addition, these scholars also had a long-standing relationship with most of officers due to their involvement in Command and Staff College (*Sekolah Staf dan Komando, Sesko*), either *Sesko TNI*, *Sesko AD*, *Sesko AL* or *Sesko AU*. In many cases, these scholars could not reach an agreement on the detail of certain issues which force them to use other channels, mostly through NGOs, to put pressures to the armed forces in those issues. Widjajanto (2017, interview) argued that the role of academics is basically a bridge between policy makers and society, including NGO activists, and one of the advantages that they had in the context of Indonesia is that they can be accepted by and work with both sides.⁸⁴ Hence, when they fail to propose their ideas directly to policy makers, they can use the other channel in proposing their ideas.

Needless to say, the dominant reason for the lack of progress in the establishment of normative framework of democratic control over the armed forces in the second phase of reform basically lies in the lack of military's intention to put down the details since it has a direct implication to their interests. The early plan of reform that they had does not include these details since the intention of the reform since the very beginning basically was limited to reposition their involvement in politics. To make matters worse, they have the autonomy to decide which areas they should be dealing with due to the lack of alternative advices from civilians. The lack of civilian experts in defense and military affairs had contributed to the lack of discussion as well as pressures to the adoption of other required laws.

The final variable that should also be considered to explain the lack of progress in the second phase is the fact that there was a lack in the progress of other security

⁸³ Anggoro, Prasetyono, and Widjajanto were three examples of scholars who had access to Sudarsono through UI linkage. Anggoro was student of Political Science Department class of 1980, Prasetyono was student of Political Science class of 1982 and Widjajanto was student of International Relations Department class of 1991. Prior to 1985, International Relations Department in UI was part of Political Science Department. It was actually Sudarsono who established International Relations Department in UI.

⁸⁴ Personal communication, 2017.

actors' reform. Since military reform in Indonesia is basically a part of a larger security sector reform, the armed forces always argue that the progress of military reform has been far more satisfying in comparison to Polri and State Intelligence Agencies (*Badan Intelijen Negara*, BIN). As the data from survey conducted by various institutions have suggested, public satisfaction to the performance of TNI is far ahead of other security institutions. Hence, officers usually argue that public attention to reform should be given to other security agencies instead of to TNI (Prasetyono, 2017, interview; Sutarto, 2017, interview).⁸⁵

3.3. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, the above explanation has suggested three important findings. First, the progress of the reform in establishing normative democratic control over the armed forces has reached a considerably high level of achievements. The established regulations have suggested a clear division between military and non-military issues and have been capable of severing the armed forces from political involvement. The established regulations have guarantee that the return of the armed forces would require a difficult road to take. In addition, the established regulations have also been firmly placed the armed forces in an important position within the society despite the fact that this new position is basically similar to those that they wanted since the initiation of reform. The established regulations, however, have yet been completed, either concerning the general principles or, moreover, in the operational-technical details. It basically suggests that when the call for reform, the national interest of the nation, is in line with the armed forces own organizational interest, the progress of the reform would be relatively smooth.

⁸⁵ In addition, during my encounters with them, especially during my involvement in National Defense University, officers quite frankly said this point.

Chapter 4

The abandonment of TNI's business activities

In addition to becoming a political actor, TNI has also been known as an economic actor. While it is not clear whether the economic role of TNI is the independent variable to their political role or vice versa, their involvement in economic activities has contributing to relatively high degree of TNI's autonomy from civilian control in the past. The main revealing argument to TNI's involvement in economic activities always revolves around the government's inability to provide enough funding for the armed forces, especially to provide wealth to the soldiers. Following this argument, TNI's involvement in economic activities, hence, should be absent when the government has managed to provide them with their required budget. Data on Indonesia's expenditure suggests that since 1998 the budget for TNI has been rapidly increasing (see figure 4.1 bellow), but it has yet relinquishing TNI from their business activities.⁸⁶ The taking over of military business lines remained as problematic issue for further reform. In 2009, the President adopted *Perpres* No.43/2009 to regulate the taking over of military's business activities.




Figure 4.1. Indonesia's defense expenditure
(data taken from SIPRI; the number used is the one in local currency in billion)

⁸⁶ It should be noted, however, that TNI has officially left formal business activities in 2009. Critics remain skeptical to this withdrawal since the unofficial business activities of the armed forces' officers still rampant. Further discussion will be made in the next section.

This chapter intends to seek the stumbling blocks in the disbandment of TNI's business activities. It argues that military's business activities is closely related to the factional/personal interests within the brass instead of directly related to the interest of TNI or services within TNI as an institution. The taking over of TNI's business lines tends to be smooth with limited resistance from the brass since it only focused on the formal business of the armed forces and did not touch upon informal and criminal business activities of officers. The problems in the taking over are basically of technical issues. This chapter is divided into two parts. The first part provides a short historical overview on military's involvement in business activities to show the changing pattern of military business throughout the years and identifies efforts that have been taken to disband military's business activities. The next part explores the interests of the armed forces, mainly factional/personal interests, and how they affect the progress of the reform in this issue.

4.1. TNI and their business activities

This part has two aims. First, it lies out a chronological explanation on military's business activities to peel out the myths surrounding this issue.⁸⁷ Second, it also intends to measure the degree of the progress in the disbandment of TNI's business activities since 1998. It should be noted that the way to measure the progress of the reform in this issue is slightly different from the proposed framework in Chapter 2. This chapter focuses on the second area of the proposed framework, but it is not only examining the structural framework, but also assessing the behavioral change.

4.1.1. The evolution of TNI's business activities

TNI's involvement in business activities has a long history. It dated back to the early days of the republic. During these days, TNI engaged in small and local scale business activities to fund their operations. It should be taken into attention that during these days, TNI had yet managed to develop a well-organized country-wide

⁸⁷ Finding a reliable data source for military's business activities is extremely difficult. Hence, in most cases, scholars can only rely on confessions, which usually are only shared by few officers or soldiers to few audiences. Due to the same reason, this chapter relies more on confessions and secondary sources. In addition, this chapter also takes the advantage of several key documents which mostly gained through personal access to those individuals who worked with or involved in this issue. Copy of these documents are with the author.

organizational structure. In late 1950s, their economic activities grew bigger with the nationalization of foreign companies that operated in Indonesia. It began with the taking over of Dutch companies operating in Indonesia, including sugar cane refineries and oil companies, which then legalized with the enactment of UU No.86/1958 on the Nationalization of Dutch Companies Operating in Indonesia. Sukarno handed the management of most of these new state-owned companies to TNI, mostly due to the de facto control over these companies or areas in which these companies were operating by the armed forces. It started an era in which TNI was able to secure funding for themselves outside of the state budget allocation (known as off-budget funding). Since then, TNI's involvement in business activities became massive since these companies were able to diversify their business activities to the point they themselves could no longer handle these companies' activities. Throughout the years, military's business activities became smaller due to mismanagement and fierce competition with civilian groups within the government until its disbandment in 2009. Figure 4.2 shows the evolution of military business activities in Indonesia, which will be dealt in detail in the next few paragraphs.




Figure 4.2. Evolution of TNI's business

Two cases can illustrate TNI's involvement in business activities. First, the story of *Pertamina*, the Indonesia's national oil company, suggests a close affinity between the armed forces and state-owned business ventures. Second, relationship between business tycoons and military officers, as in the case of Suharto friendship with Liem Sioe Liong, also known as Sudono Salim, which was rampant *modus operandi* in TNI's business activities, a practice known as "Ali-Baba alliance" (Samego, *et.al*, 1998, 53) or "patron-client relationship" (Kingsbury, 2003).

The story of *Pertamina* began in 1957. Indonesia's economic following the transfer of power in 1949 was far from good. The new government was struggling to fund their expenses. The Indonesian economy was basically under the control of the Dutch. Thee (2012, 7) noted that only 19% of the invested-capital in non-agriculture sector was owned by Indonesians, which also meant that 81% of non-agriculture sector was at the hand of foreigner. In early 1950s, the Indonesian government took over the ownership of various Dutch companies operating in Indonesia started with the Bank of Java in 1951. While the government faced resistance from the Dutch in the taking over in the early phase, the latter finally agreed to hand over the control over the Bank of Java since they realized that this control would allow the former to take care of their debts.⁸⁸ The wave of the nationalization of Dutch companies operating in Indonesia then grew as the political relationship between the two countries worsened due to the conflict over Papua.

In the meanwhile, the government was facing difficulties in fulfilling funding for the armed forces, while political situation in the new country was at its lowest point due to rampant rebellions throughout the archipelago. In 1957, Sukarno adopted a martial law and declared state of emergency to allow the armed forces to take all necessary actions to put the rebellions off. The armed forces' successful effort in crushing those rebels resulted in their de facto control over the contested areas, which mostly were crucial for economic activities. Their control over Sumatera, for example, allowed them to control important oil and gas field in Riau areas previously cultivated by various foreign companies. The government then decided to nationalize these foreign companies,⁸⁹ including Dutch Royal Shell, which previously operated in those areas and established *Permina*. The government then established *Pertamin* to in charge of the distribution of the products. Later in 1968, *Permina* and *Pertamin* were merged as *Pertamina*. *Permina* and then *Pertamina* were both under the control of Major General

⁸⁸ According to the 1949 agreement, the Indonesian government should take responsibility for all liabilities previously owned by the Dutch Indies. It meant that all foreign debt made by the Dutch Indies (Dutch colonial government) felt to the burden of RIS. In addition, the agreement also mentioned that RIS government would guarantee the operations of Dutch companies and business activities under the new government.

⁸⁹ During the first phase, the nationalization was only targeted at Dutch companies. During the latter stage, it also targeted at several British and American companies. There were, however, two types of nationalization. First, the foreign companies were fully taken over by the government. Second, the government established its own company and the foreign companies operated as contractors (Kuncoro, 2009, chapter 2).

Ibnu Sutowo.⁹⁰ Since then, *Pertamina* became the main source of funding for the armed forces. During the reign of Suharto, he allowed Sutowo to basically do whatever business plan the latter had. Sutowo then developed *Pertamina* into a conglomeration with oil and gas extraction as its core business.⁹¹ Sutowo, however, mismanaged *Pertamina* and involved in massive corruption that nearly brought *Pertamina* into bankruptcy. As a result, Suharto decided to release Sutowo from *Pertamina* in 1975 but he took no further attempt to investigate Sutowo's corruption cases. The role of *Pertamina* as one of main funding sources for TNI, however, remained until the end of Suharto era.

The second and more complicated business activities that the armed forces were involved in were their relationship with business tycoons, as suggested in the case of Suharto. The “beautiful friendship”—borrowing the words of Borsuk and Chng (2014)—between Suharto and Liem dated back since the end of Japanese occupation in 1945. During these times, Liem provided logistics for Suharto regiment in Central Java. The two also engaged in various illegal business activities to fund the armed forces' struggle against the Dutch colonial power. Some officers, however, went too far. Suharto's involvement in business activities was so deep that there was a time when he was taken out from active command in 1959 (Samego, *et.al*, 1998). Suharto argued that the decision to send him to *Sesko AD* (then was SSKAD) had nothing to do with accusation of his misconducts. He, however, acknowledged that he involved in economic activities in order to fulfil his troops' need. He said that “by virtue of my status as War Commander, I took an emergency measures in the interest of the people, too barter sugar for rice. I instructed Bob Hasan to carry out the bartering in Singapore, on the condition that the rice should be delivered first to Semarang before the sugar was to be exported. If the sugar were to be transported first, and, for some reason or other, the rice did not turn up, I would be blamed, and possibly sentenced to hang” (Dwipayana & Ramadhan, 1992, 76).

⁹⁰ Sutowo was then a Colonel when he first time managed *Permina*.

⁹¹ *Pertamina* business activities grew at during the 1970s due to the global oil crisis caused by Saudis oil embargo (1973) and Iranian revolution (1979). It allowed not only the revival of *Pertamina* but also, at a larger scale, an increase in Indonesia's earning. Hence, despite Sutowo's mismanagement and corruption, *Pertamina* remained as important source of funding for the government even if it was no longer under the full control of the armed forces. In addition, *Pertamina* had several business lines that remained at the hand of or closely controlled by the armed forces.

Suharto was by no means the only officer who engaged in business activities. In fact, it has become public knowledge that most officers, especially within the Army, engaged in business activities to a different degree. Rudini, former Army Chief of Staff, admitted that when he was assigned in South Celebes as battalion commander, the supply for food was never enough to fulfill his troop's need. He then received official order from Commander of Wirabuana Regional Command, Sarbini, that "each battalion could seek their own funding through foundations and cooperatives under their command and that they were allowed to use all military equipment except for the weaponries to seek this funding" (Samego, *et.al*, 1998, 52). He then used military vehicles under his command to transport soil for infrastructure project in his nearby headquarter or to transport other goods for various purposes. The funding that he got from these activities was then used to provide cheap goods for his troops and their families. Officers without business skills, on the other hand, usually took a different approach in fulfilling the needs of their troops. Instead of directly involved in business activities, these officers provided protection to traders and businessmen, mostly of Chinese origin, in their business activities or asked them to capitalize military's equipment to do their business in exchange for funding.

This practice still exists until today. Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas (2017, interview), former Deputy of KPK and the head of the National Team to Takeover Military Business Activities (*Tim Nasional Pengambilalihan Bisnis TNI*, TNPBT), said that Tommy Winata, a well-known tycoon in Indonesia, is basically paying all graduates of Military Academy in exchange for their allegiance.⁹² He added that in most cases, public can easily identify which officers who engaged in business activities when they were still in service once they have retired. Those who serve in board of directors or board of commissars of certain companies usually have been involved in business activities when they were active officers.⁹³

⁹² Previously, I have heard similar information from various sources, either officers within TNI or intelligence agencies as well as scholars and NGO activists working on defense issues. This, however, remains as allegation since no one willingly to testify of such an occurrence.

⁹³ Tirto.id, an independent internet-based platform news agency, published four reports in 2016 that focused on military officers' involvement in business activities. One of those reports focused on Brigadier General Slamet Singgih, former Deputy of TNI's Intelligence Agency (*Badan Intelijen Strategis*, BAIS) who acknowledged his long involvement in business activities with several tycoons, including Tomy Winata. He even published his involvement in his memoir in 2014. His account basically confirms Hardjapamekas statement in both patron-client relationship between officers and tycoons and that military

4.1.2. TNI's business prior to Suharto era

As noted in the beginning of this part, TNI's involvement in business activities has a relatively long history. While TNI was established in late 1945, their main source of funding was not coming from the government, as the civilian government was also struggling to seek the funding for themselves. Hence, TNI leaderships allowed each division to seek their own sources of funding. As explained in Chapter 2, TNI was basically formed from ex-KNIL and ex-PETA soldiers as well as various groups of militias. They were independent groups working in certain geographical areas with a loose control from the central command. These groups funded their operations independently. Most of these groups, which then became divisions within the armed forces, got their funding from illegal economic activities such as smuggling. With the Dutch tried to reassert their grip over the new republic, smuggling was seen as the only possible way to transfer goods, including weapons, from abroad. In addition, these smugglers also sold products to foreign market to earn funding for the resistance. Coast (1952, 177-189), a British officer who once was positioned in Singapore during the World War II and its aftermath, wrote in his memoir describing his encounter with several Indonesian tycoons and officers who conducted smuggling activities via Singapore. In addition to smuggling, the armed forces also raised money from population in the area of their operation to get funding. Cribb also (1991) wrote that most divisions during 1945-1949 were involved in opium trading, gambling, and prostitution for funding. Prasetyono (2017, interview) testified that his father, who was intelligence officer of the Army and was already served during this period, used to collect valuables from the people, who voluntarily handed those valuables for funding the soldiers, including farming yields. Said (1991, 107-108) wrote that in early 1949, the Military Governor of Area III covering West Central Java, issued a decree to give directions to the collection of taxes to finance military government and the guerilla warfare that clearly regulated three important sources of funding such as land rent as much as 10% of the price of the harvested paddy, income tax of 10%, and a quarter of forestry products.

officers with business activities background during their service would tend to openly involve companies once they retired. Interestingly, Sutarto is on Tirto.id's list and in our interview (2017), he subtly said so.

Following the transfer of power, the practice of self-funding was supposedly put to an end with the introduction of rationalization and reorganization of the armed forces and they should begin relying on budget allocation from the government. However, dissatisfaction among officers became rampant since civilian politicians in the parliament consistently tried to allocate military budget as low as possible due to fear that the armed forces would be powerful enough to use their power against civilian groups. This growing dissatisfaction led to coup d'état attempt by the armed forces against Sukarno in 1952. However, the fail attempt of the coup d'état did nothing but further worsened their financial condition since the civilian authority decided to reduce budget allocation for the armed forces. Hence, the armed forces kept the practice of extracting funding by their own, especially in regional command areas. Nasution continued to allow regional commanders to seek their own funding to support their operational logistics. Hence, regional commanders were basically not only organizing their troops but also controlling their economic sources. It is worth noting that support of funding to regional commands from central command was extremely limited. In the meanwhile, as an impact of their rivalries with civilian politicians within the parliament during 1950s, central command leaderships continued to suffer from a cut in their budget allocation. Hence, while regional command leaderships became richer and wealthier, central command leaderships were continuously losing their source of funding. It resulted in difficulties to central command to control regional command leaderships.

When regional leaders, both civilian and military, began to lose their trust to central government, they decided to engage in arms struggle against Jakarta. Rebellion broke out in Sumatera and Celebes; both were known for their valuable resources, rubber in Sumatera and copra in Celebes, during late 1950s to early 1960s. Central government took a strong-hand tactic in dealing with these rebellions. In 1957, Sukarno adopted martial law which gave the armed forces two important leverages. First, they finally managed to force the President to abandon the parliament⁹⁴ and they managed to control regional commands. The latter is particularly important for the armed forces since it allowed them to unify all divisions into a solid group. The armed forces

⁹⁴ In 1959, Sukarno released Presidential decree to disband the parliament and implement full Presidential system of governing according to the 1945 Constitution. The armed forces had consistently in favor of this Constitution.

themselves decided to bring those who involved in these rebellions to martial court but instead they chose to integrate the leaders as long as they agreed to follow direction from central command. The armed forces also introduced inter-divisions' tour of duty since then.

Another important result of the armed forces successes in putting the rebellions off was their de facto control over those contested areas. As noted before, these areas were crucial for the economy and hence it basically allowed the armed forces to control the production of these important economic sources. With the government began to nationalize foreign companies operating in Indonesia, the armed forces managed to capitalize their de facto control to gain economic advantages over their civilian counterpart. Hence, the armed forces then controlled some of former Dutch companies operating in Indonesia, which went through nationalization in the first phase. In mid 1960s, a second wave of nationalization took place aiming at British and American companies operating in Indonesia. Control over these companies was also given to the armed forces. The revenues from these companies allowed the armed forces to become more independent than before. Their autonomy in funding made civilian control impossible. The armed forces became an important actor in Indonesian politics. The only civilian group that dared to confront their growing political power was PKI. As noted in Chapter 2, TNI and PKI had a relatively bitter relationship. PKI's group of militias, *Pesindo*, was not only refusing to join TKR but also raising their arms in the 1948 Madiun affairs. When PKI was implicated in the 1965 coup⁹⁵, the armed forces found their chance to further enhance their position in governing by placing Suharto as acting President in MPRS⁹⁶ assembly led by Nasution, two of the highest ranked general survived from the coup.

4.1.3. TNI's business during Suharto era

During Suharto era, military business grew stronger. Each service within the armed forces as well as ABRI Headquarter had their own companies through

⁹⁵ Scholars, however, were split in explaining this event. Some suggested that the 1965 affair was not a coup by PKI, while others hinted that it was a coup. Despite this debate, the affair was resulted in massive killings by the armed forces to those allegedly as members of PKI or their sympathizers.

⁹⁶ MPRS, with the S refers to *Sementara* or Temporary or Interim, was established by Sukarno with the 1959 Presidential decree. Members of MPRS consisted of members of the abandoned DPR and regional envoys and groups' representatives.

cooperatives and foundations affiliated with them. The use of cooperatives and foundations was seen as way out to avoid violation of government regulation in Presidential Order no.6/1974 that stipulated that military officers with the rank of second lieutenant and above are forbidden to own business lines and to conduct business activities or to sit within private or public companies' board of directors or board of commissars. They, however, can sit in any position available in any foundation established or affiliated with the armed forces, which was supposedly established as non-profit organization, with consent from their superiors. With regard to cooperatives, all services within the armed forces as well as the armed forces headquarter established their own cooperatives with business units.

TNI's involvement in business activities during Suharto era was part of their role as, in the word of Crouch (1978, 273), "dynamizer" of national development. As Suharto built his legitimacy upon economic development, his government needed a partner to boost the then worsening economic situation during the end of Sukarno era. To be able to conduct development programs, the government was struggling to maintain internal stability. In addition, the government also required to develop a strong economic actor. The armed forces were chosen to play both roles. Their role as dynamizer of national development allowed them to grow their business activities, either through their involvement in state-owned enterprises or through other channels such as through cooperatives and foundations. Their economic activities, however, also had effects such as the growth of personal economic interests of officers, mostly Army officers, and the rise of corruption (Crouch, 1978, 285-299). Robinson (1986) identified several generals who allegedly involved in business activities during the formative years of Suharto's power such as: Soedjono Hoemardani, Sofjar, Soerjo, Alamsyah, Tirtosudiro, and Suhardiman. The mechanisms in which these generals used in getting benefits from business activities were threefold. First, they took over nationalized companies and placed them under the full control of the armed forces. By mid-1960s, most state owned companies had been transferred to the armed forces' possession. Second, they took over state assets from the government to private sectors affiliated with the armed forces. This was especially rampant in forestry concessions. Third, they provided access for government's contracts to the armed forces especially in import and export activities of various items. It was extremely difficult during this period to clearly

distinguish military's business for military benefits from military business for officers' benefits.⁹⁷

The armed forces' business activities through these big corporations were then widened. For example, *Pertamina* under Sutowo established various business lines in different sectors such as insurance business, trading business, petrochemical sectors, steel industries, and even aircraft industries. In addition, *Pertamina* also built hospitals, television studios, mosques, and presidential office. The armed forces also engaged in other business related activities through state institutions other than state-owned enterprises. Tirtosudiro, for example, was once the director of National Logistic Bureau (*Badan Urusan Logistik, Bulog*) that in charge of maintaining the stability of price for various products, most importantly foods. To secure their operations, *Bulog* received credit from Bank of Indonesia which, instead of using it to purchase harvest from farmers they channeled the credit to private banks to earn the benefits—since Bank of Indonesia charged them with lower interest rate at only 3% while by saving it to private banks they could get 10-15% of interest (Crouch, 1978; Samego, *et.al*, 1999; Widoyoko, *et.al*, 2003).

The armed forces also involved in business through cooperatives and foundations, established under the TNI or services within TNI. Samego, *et.al* (1998) noted that the total number of military business lines up until 1998 was 68.⁹⁸ Yunanto, *et.al* (2005) provided a much detail accounting of the total number of military business lines which was reaching 1,335 in 1998, with 141 were companies under foundations and 1,194 companies under cooperatives.⁹⁹ Widoyoko, *et.al* (2003) suggested that 102 business lines can be found at headquarters level up until in 2002.¹⁰⁰ In 2008, the number dropped into 1,153 companies, with 53 companies under foundations and the rest under cooperatives (Mietzner & Misol in Ruland, Manea & Born 2013). The findings of TNPBT (2008, 32) suggested that only 53 business lines under foundations

⁹⁷ As in the case of *Pertamina*, it was extremely difficult to really find out the share of benefits given by the company to the armed forces in comparison to that of Sutowo's personal benefits. Crouch (1978, 275) wrote that officers responsible for military's business "were permitted to reap off part of the proceeds as a reward for their efforts, provided they did not take 'too much'."

⁹⁸ The number did not include those business lines under the Primary Cooperatives. Primary Cooperatives (*Koperasi Primer, Primkop*) were cooperative established in regional commands downward. For a clear explanation on this leveling, see the explanation of TNI organizational structure in Chapter 5.

⁹⁹ Yunanto, *et.al* (2005) included those companies under Primko.

¹⁰⁰ Similar to Samego, *et.al* (1999), Widoyoko, *et.al* (2003) did not include those at Primko level.

and 2 business lines under cooperatives were found, while total number of foundations was 23 and total number of cooperatives was 1,098. TNPBT (2008, 32) found 742 business activities of the armed forces in the form of the use of assets (*pemanfaatan aset*). Mietzner and Misol (in Ruland, Manea & Born 2013) argued that the reduction in the number of military-affiliated companies throughout the years was not due to any reform taken by the armed forces or civilian authority but due to mismanagement and competition. Widjajanto (2017, interview) and Hardjapamekas (2017, interview) agreed to this observation noting that most of TNI's business lines went to bankruptcy due to mismanagement. In 2009, all of the remaining business lines were transferred to the government under the Ministry of Defense oversighting.

What is striking with this evolution is the fact that their contributions to the armed forces overall budget or to military personnel were not significant at all. While Crouch (1978, 274) assessed that TNI's business contributed to a third to slightly above half of actual defense expenditure in late 1960s and early 1970s, Rieffel and Pramodhawardani (2007) argued that the total amount of military business was only equivalent to 1.5-3% of government defense budget. With regard to personnel's welfare, Hardjapamekas (2017, interview) firmly said that low-level soldiers only received benefits twice a year and earned a relatively low food supply (*jatah pangan*) a small amount of benefits (*siswa hasil usaha*, SHU). His statement contradicts with the rationale for military's involvement in business as once was suggested by Suharto when he first established the Territory IV Development Foundation (*Yayasan Pembangunan Teritorium IV*) back in 1950s which then served as the role model for TNI's foundations and cooperatives when he reigned in late 1960s.¹⁰¹ There is, however, no clear data that indicated the share of TNI's business to soldiers' welfare or to defense budget.

4.1.4. The call for abandonment of TNI's business after Suharto era

The call for the disbandment of TNI's business activities had been made since the 1998 as part of the call for TNI's withdrawal from politics. TNI's business activities had created complex problems including violations of human right in several areas. Kingsbury (2003, 196-198) linked the killing of Theys Eluay, one of the leaders of

¹⁰¹ In his official biography written by Dwipayana and Ramadhan (1992, 73), Suharto said that the establishment of foundation within his command was intended to increase his troops welfare as well as to help the society in his troops resided who had given tremendous assistance to his troops.

OPM who advocated the independence of Papua, in 2001 was not only related to his political activities per se but also due to his decision to block the approval of logging concessions to Army-linked logging company. Theys, who was a local leader in which the forest for logging area is residing, was responsible to grant permission to which company or companies to be given concessions. With several logging companies competed for his permission, it was very likely that owner of company or companies that failed to get concessions took harsh measure against Theys. Some of those companies that fought for Theys' permission had close link to the Army, in particular with *Kopassus*, or retired generals of the Army. Azca, *et.al* (2004) provided an even detail explanation on the impact of military's business activities to violation of human rights in three different places in Indonesia—Poso, Bojonegoro, and Boven Digul—in an investigative research supported by *Kontras*.

During the early phase of the military reform, however, there was no significant progress with regard to this issue. It was not until the enactment of the Law on TNI in 2004 that progress could be reached. Article 76 of the Law on TNI clearly states that the disbandment of military business activities should be completed within five year after the enactment of this law.¹⁰² Following the adoption of this law, the progress on the disbandment of TNI's business activities once again slowed down.

On late August 2005, a team was established to deal with article 76 of this law and to draft a Presidential Order detailing the taking over. This team was led by Said Didu, the then Secretary to the Minister of State-Owned Enterprises, with Minister of Defense, Minister of Finance, and Minister of Law and Human Rights as its members. The team was known as Supervising Team for Military's Business Transformation (*Tim Supervisi Transformasi Bisnis*, TSTB). This team, however, failed to give a clear and coherent recommendation on how is the best possible way to take over military business activities. This failure, according to Widjajanto, is due to the lack of credible base for their works since this team was not established with Presidential mandate (Koran

¹⁰² Two points can be learnt from point 1 of this article. First, it clearly mentions the time limit of the taking over. Second, it also says that these business activities refer to businesses that are directly or indirectly owned and managed by TNI. In the original language point 1 is written "Dalam jangka waktu 5 (lima) tahun sejak berlakunya undang-undang ini, Pemerintah harus mengambil alih seluruh aktivitas bisnis yang dimiliki dan dikelola oleh TNI baik secara langsung maupun tidak langsung." Point 2 of this article clarifies the details of the taking over which will be regulated by Presidential Order. In its original language it is written "Tata cara dan ketentuan lebih lanjut mengenai pelaksanaan ayat (1) diatur dengan keputusan Presiden."

Tempo, 6 February 2006). Hardjapamekas (2017, interview) stated that the main aim of this team is to takeover military business into the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises and hence faced strong resistance from the armed forces. Didu himself denied the existence of resistance from the brass and stated that the slow progress in the work of this team was basically due to technical problems in which identifying whether certain assets belong to the state or not required a long and careful process (Koran Tempo, 6 February 2006).

In the meanwhile, TNI responded to the mandate of the law by organizing their own internal team to assist the work of TSTB. On September 2005, TNI handed over a list of 219 military business activities to TSTB. Six months later, TNI Headquarter released a statement and a document that listed 1.520 business lines owned and managed by the brass. However, this list only included business lines owned and managed by TNI and did not cover business lines owned by officers. According to Pramodhawardani, in December 2006, she received another list of 356 business activities (Kompas, 6 October 2009). She pointed out that prior to 2007 there was no detail information on the number of business lines that were actually owned and managed by the armed forces.

One of the recommendations made by TSTB was the establishment of National Team for Transforming Military Business (*Tim Nasional Transformasi Bisnis Militer*, TNTBM). Human Right Watch (2006) criticized this recommendation since the establishment of new team would only prolong the actual taking over of TNI's business activities. Didu, however, argued that it was a necessary decision since the new team would work under the order of the President. His statement hinted that the previous team, TSTB under his leadership, was basically lacking of official mandate and faced resistance from presumably TNI or Minister of Defense. The new team, however, had never been established.

Progress in the taking over of military business did not materialized until 2008. On 16 April 2008, President Yudhoyono signed *Kepres* No.7/2008 on the establishment of National Team for the Taking-over of TNI's Business Activities (*Tim Nasional Pengambilalihan Aktivitas Bisnis TNI*, TNPABT). This team was led by Hardjapamekas, former Deputy Chief KPK. Two outstanding achievements of this team can be identified. First, they provided categorization of military business activities into four

different types. These were TNI's business activities through foundation, business activities through cooperative, the use of state-owned agency outside its roles and functions, and other activities outside of TNI's roles and functions and. Second, this team managed to identify total assets owned by those businesses that worth of 3.2 trillion rupiahs with net assets worth of 2.1 trillion rupiahs. Both of those achievements were basically the main tasks assigned to this team. This team also recommended the taking over into three different options (TNPBT, 2008, 86-94). The first option was to keep the cooperatives and foundations under the armed forces but all their business activities should be transformed to the Ministries, either Ministry of Defense or Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises. Hence, it basically drove cooperatives and foundations under the armed forces to follow the law on cooperatives and the law on foundations. The second option was to merge all cooperatives as well as foundations under the armed forces into a unit under the Ministry of Defense specifically assigned to ensure the needs of soldiers that previously was fulfilled by those cooperatives and foundations under the armed forces. The last option was to merge cooperatives and foundations under the armed forces with cooperatives and foundations under the Ministry of Defense. This was seen as the most un-preferable option since it would not fully comply with good governance values since it retained the existence of cooperatives and foundations under governmental bodies. Hardjapamekas (2017, interview) said that these three options were basically a result of a compromise between his team, TNI's Headquarter, and the Ministry of Defense. This team finished their task in October 2008 and left the actual taking over

On October 2009, President Yudhoyono released *Perpres* No.43/2009 to regulate the actual taking over of military's business. The Minister of Defense then adopted *Permenhan* No.22/2009 to operationalize the *Perpres* and set up a special team, Team for Controlling TNI's Business (*Tim Pengendali Bisnis TNI*, TPBT) which reported to the Minister of Defense. This team was founded on November 2009 and led by the Director General of Military Power of the Ministry of Defense (*Direktur Jenderal Kekuatan Pertahanan, Dirjen Kuathan*). Members of this team came from five different ministries (Ministry of Defense, Ministry of Finance, Ministry of State Owned Enterprise, Ministry of Law and Human Rights Affairs, and Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises), representatives from TNI Headquarter as well as

the three services' headquarters, and two independent experts. To finalize the taking over of military's business activities, the Minister of Finance (*Menteri Keuangan, Menkeu*) adopted *Permenkeu* No.23/PMK.06/2010 on 28 January 2010 to regulate State's Wealth under TNI's control. It specified the mechanisms of the transfer of all state's capital that previously were used by TNI or cooperatives and foundations under TNI for commercial activities. It also regulated in detail the transfers of business lines owned by TNI through cooperatives and foundations into to the Ministry of State-Owned Enterprises or to Ministry of Cooperative and Small and Medium Enterprises.

Most NGOs remained critical to the work of this team due to several reasons. First, the composition of the team indicated a lack of independence. With most members were government officials and only two were independent experts, which were Silmy Karim and Rahmawati W. Prasodjo, this criticism was well founded. Not to mention that Karim's track record was relatively attached to TNI's business activities in the past. The second reason, and more principle refusal, came from the definition of military business as stated in the *Perpres* which was limited to business activities that legally owned by the armed forces or the three services through their cooperatives and foundations. It did not include the informal as well as the illegal business activities affiliated with TNI. Fourth, the modus operandi for transferring military business to the government listed in the *Permenkeu* was both unclear and non-transparent.

From the above explanations, three conclusions can be drawn with regard to TNI's business activities. First, the evolution of TNI's business activities suggested that the formal business activities of TNI had been significantly declined. Nowadays, the armed forces or services within the armed forces have no longer owned any business line. Second, the reform in this particular issue, however, does not touch upon the informal and criminal business activities of the armed forces. Officers remain involve in business activities despite the fact that such an activity is forbidden by the law. A clear example is when public was shocked by the fact that Agus Harimurti Yudhoyono, the eldest son of President Yudhoyono, own a creative design company called PT Exquisite Indonesia. He himself owned a wealth of 21 billion rupiahs, which was far exceeding the standard wealth of an Army Major. This information was publicly released by Jakarta District Election Council (*Komisi Pemilihan Umum Daerah Jakarta, KPUD Jakarta*) when Major (retired) Agus Yudhoyono run for Jakarta gubernatorial candidacy

in early 2017. Agus Yudhoyono is surely not a deviant case. Finally, while the normative regulations on military's non-involvement in business activities has been available from the general principles to the operational-technical levels, the behavioral aspect of officers', as well as petty soldiers', involvement in business activities has not yet well founded. The next part assesses the obstacles to the disbandment of military's business activities, especially the lack of the behavioral aspect.

4.2. The struggle over the taking over of TNI's business

Human Right Watch (2010, 10) identified several weaknesses in the reform of military's business activities which was "rooted in the false logic that businesses owned by the "private" foundations and member-owned cooperatives organized under each of the branches of the armed forces and TNI headquarters are not really owned by the military." While this assessment is reasonable and it has been public knowledge, it is extremely difficult to clearly connect, especially the "private-owned" cases, that business to the armed forces. As Sutarto (2017, interview) has confessed, the support for funding from the government is extremely small, but the responsibility for officers, especially commanders, is somehow high. Matter will get worst if these commanders receive order to conduct specific mission, which in most cases, is urgent in nature. In a private conversation with one of Navy commander, he explained that in mid-2011 he had to lead a joint operation to save hostages off the coast Somalia without clear understanding when the funding would be delivered.¹⁰³ The first drop of the funding was then delivered when he reached Omani waters. He, however, did not clarify where the funding for his departure from Jakarta to Omani waters came from. Sutarto (2017, interview) confessed that during his days, the common practices to fund an operation were by asking cooperatives and foundations to provide funding. Prasetyono (2017, interview) also said that most commanders who received orders to conduct military operations relied on their personal wealth or collected funding from their business

¹⁰³ The conversation took place in a VIP meeting prior to a seminar held by National Defense University in which I attended as one of the speaker. Since the conversation was basically personal and I did not further pursue his consent, hence no reference to his name and rank would not be made.

associates, in the case where they had one.¹⁰⁴ TNI Headquarter basically allocates contingency fund for these operations, but the amount is relatively low.

During the reign of Suharto, as well as the period prior to his rule, TNI's business activities gave relatively huge share to the armed forces budget. In particular, they provided the soldiers with additional funding for their relatively low salary. In a hearing in front of DPR in 2002, the then KSAD General Ryacudu, presented that in comparison to other countries, the salary of soldier as well as officer in Indonesia was among the lowest (see Table 4.1). The highest salary for a private rank was equivalent to 59.77 USD and the highest was 93.85 USD. The salary for non-commission officer or sub-officer was ranging from 73.82 to 122.25 USD and the salary for officer ranging from 92.4 to 179.31 USD. In 2008, Air Vice-Marshall Sagom Tamboen, the then Head of Information of TNI Headquarter, released a statement detailing the standard salary for soldier ranging from 190 to 272 for private rank, 215 to 322 USD for sub-officer, and 284 to 603 for officer.¹⁰⁵ This statement was released due to the heated debate over officer's involvement in business activities, especially those who were assigned in border areas.

Table 4.1. Comparison of soldiers' monthly salary in 2002 in USD
(Source: Ryacudu, 2002)

	Private		Sub-officer		Officer	
	Lowest	Highest	Lowest	Highest	Lowest	Highest
Indonesia	59.77	93.85	73.82	122.25	92.4	179.31
Singapore	775.28	1224.72	983.15	1,384.83	808.99	12,191
Thailand	122	488	122	732	244	1,220
India	156.25	218.75	225	383.33	318.75	1,145.83
Saudi Arabia	800	1,000	1,100	1,250	1,600	10,200
New Zealand	8,820	9,800	12,250	26,950	24,500	73,500
United States	1,022.7	4,467	2,049	5,478.6	2,097.6	12,324

With such a low salary, the welfare of the soldiers has become one of the most contested issues during the reform era. Leaderships within the brass had been quite often stated the importance of military's business activities, in particular the existence of cooperatives and foundations, to provide wealth for soldiers. Sutarto (2017,

¹⁰⁴ He did mention several names of the officers as example, but asked for anonymity of those officers since most of them are still active officers. I also personally know some of those officers that he talked about.

¹⁰⁵ 1 USD was equal to roughly 9000 rupiahs in 2008. Meanwhile, in 2002, 1 USD was equal to 8900 rupiahs.

interview), for example, mentioned that the main function of these cooperatives and foundations was crucial in the case where soldiers were killed or got an accident that forced them to retire. The support from the government was basically gone away when such an incident took place. In addition, in some cases, the commanders, for humanitarian reasons, allowed the families of the killed soldiers to stay in soldier houses despite the fact that they were no longer entitled. As a result, the new coming soldiers were struggling to get a place to live and hence the armed forces had to find new houses, either built or rented those housings, for the latter. The government would not cover the new houses and it became the task of cooperatives and foundations. In addition, the role of cooperatives and foundations was also crucial to provide the children of fallen soldiers to get access to education. In the words of General Sutarto (2017, interview), “we cannot allow these kids to become criminals” and the best way to ensure that was to provide them with education. It was a common practice in the past where the son and daughter of a fallen soldier would be granted “positive discrimination” to enter the brass. He, however, refused to continue this practice during his term as *Panglima*.

The welfare argument had been one of the most dominant arguments frequently presented by the armed forces. Hardjapamekas (2017, interview) contended that the resistance from the brass to the disbandment of TNI’s business activities was basically due to this reason. He said that *Panglima* Air Marshal Suyanto clearly showed his anger during a meeting with TNPBT and said that the taking over of TNI’s business activities would only provoke anger from soldiers, especially since they had been stripped off from all of their rights.¹⁰⁶ Scholars have long proposed alternative ways to provide welfare to soldiers in addition to through the defense budget. Prasetyono (2017, interview) reminded the need to incorporate different budget posts in various ministries

¹⁰⁶ According to Hardjapamekas (2017, interview), “*Panglima sempat marah waktu kita rapat, dia bilang, dalam bahasa Jawa, tapi kira-kira, kalau semua-semua diambil ya pasti marah lah prajurit. Maksudnya kan hak politiknya sudah diambil, tugas-tugasnya juga banyak yang diambil, masak sumber ekonominya juga mau diambil.*” [JCS showed his anger when we had a meeting. He said, in Javanese language, which is sound like if you take away everything, soldiers definitely will get angry. I think he referred to the fact that TNI personnel have lost their political right, and they also lost many of assignments which used to be theirs, and now the government wanted to take away their economic sources as well]. Again, I have heard similar tone during my encounters with military personnel. Other scholars with whom I have worked with also shared similar story of how military personnel began to develop a sense of jealousy with other security actors, mostly with police force. A declining role, especially in maintaining internal security, also means a lost in share of budget. With those assignments fall to hand of police force, a sum of funding also goes to the police instead of to the brass.

for the soldiers.¹⁰⁷ For example, the burden of the housings for soldiers can be transferred to the budget of the Ministry of Infrastructure and Housings. In addition, the burden for the education of the children of soldiers can be transferred to the budget of the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Research and Higher Education and the burden for health coverage can be transferred to the Ministry of Public Health.

The issue of defense budget has always dominating the debate over TNI's business activities. As suggested above, there seem to be decrease in the share of TNI's business activities to overall defense budget from time to time. Most of defense budget went to personnel salary instead of procurement. Around half of the defense budget was allocated to personnel salary and the rest was split for procurement and operational expenses. While there has been an increase in defense budget (see Figure 4.1), the allocation of those budgets remains the same. Hence, in the last few years, the government has basically focusing on increasing the wealth of the soldiers rather than on modernizing the weaponry systems of the armed forces.¹⁰⁸ With regard to their business activities, the armed forces tend to consider that their business activities have become a burden instead of a benefit. Their share to defense budget or soldiers' welfare has been decreasing over time and it only worsens their image within the society.

Hence, while resistance from TNI as an institution suggests a diminishing trend, it is not the case with resistances from factional groups or persons within the armed forces. The factional or personal interests of military officers can be seen in two cases that reached public attention. The first case is the corruption scandal in *Yayasan Dharma Putra* affiliated with *Kostrad* in 2000. In early 2000, Wirahadikusumah was appointed by President Wahid as *Pangkostrad* to replace Lieutenant General Djaja Suparman. Soon after his instalment, he conducted an inquiry over the financial audit on all foundations under *Kostrad*. This high-profile inquiry came with a report of suspicion financial activities conducted by previous *Pangkostrad*. *Kontras* (2004, 13-14; see also Kingsbury, 2003, 205) reported that Suparman ordered the use of PT Mandala Airlines, one of the companies owned by *Yayasan Dharma Putra Kostrad* as much as 160 billion rupiahs on 1 December 1999, 1 January 2000, and 29 January 2009 for "supporting additional benefits for the troops during Christmas and Ied Mubarak, two important

¹⁰⁷ Prasetyono mentions this idea a couple of during both *Propatria* Working Group meetings and *Pacivis* Working Group meetings. Members of both Working Groups also support this idea.

¹⁰⁸ This issue has a close relationship with military organization.

events for Christian and Muslim communities, and for operational cost of the foundation.” Of that amount, 135 billion rupiahs were failed to be accounted for. Suparman (2013, 254) denied this accusation and the Inspector General of the Army who conducted investigation over this case supported his case by declaring that there was no corruption or misuse of funding as suggested by Wirahadikusumah.¹⁰⁹ The latter was then removed from his position and the next *Pangkostrad*, Lieutenant General Ryamizard Ryacudu, closed the case and cleared the accusation to Suparman.

Another case to suggest the existence and resistance of factional/personal interests in the TNI’s business activities is the case of Papua. While the former case, *Kostrad* case, is closely related to military unit within the armed forces, the Papua case has a much close resonance with personal business activities of the officers. The Papua case appeared to public knowledge when Theys Eluay was killed in 2001. Theys was known for his involvement in OPM and his murder was hence linked to his political activity against Jakarta. Kusranto Anggoro, however, hinted that Theys was murdered as result of Wiranto and Hendropriyono business rivalry.¹¹⁰ He said that the two generals were argued over concession right of forest areas worth of 40 million USD, each through their own affiliated companies. One of the companies involved in this case was PT Hanurata in which Yayasan Kobame, one of Kopassus foundations, had their share on this company.

Officers’ interests in business activities were also commonly taking place in various levels. Azca, *et.al* (2003) and Kontras (2003) identified that the most common form of involvement was protection for certain activities, usually by providing security bodyguards from certain units within the armed forces. In our interview, Widjajanto (2017) mentioned that each unit within the armed forces has the so-called logistics assistant position (*Asisten Logistik, Aslog*). Those who hold this position are basically the one who in charge of managing military business or finding ways to secure funding through various means. Most *Aslog*, hence, have close relationship with business persons.

¹⁰⁹ In 2013, Suparman was convicted for corruption while he served as Commander of *Kodam Brawijaya* in 1998, a year prior to his the *Kostrad* case. In comparison to *Kostrad* case, *Kodam Brawijaya* case was relatively small since in the latter case, Suparman was accused of using 13.3 million rupiahs for personal use.

¹¹⁰ Personal communication, 2017.

In some cases, these officers' involvement in business activities goes into criminal business activities. A case that suggests a close connection to criminal activities which become public attention was the case of Brigadier General Keoesmayadi. In 2004, Koesmayadi was found dead in his house. By the time of his death, he was undergoing an investigation for his alleged involvement in illegal import of weaponry. The military police found more than 100 pieces of weapon of various types with the ammunitions. He was, at that time, the *Deputi Aslog KSAD*. Another case that recently went to martial court was the case of Brigadier General Teddy Hernayadi, the Sub-Director of Financing of the Ministry of Defense, who was convicted of manipulating the cost of procurement purchase for his own benefits. TNI has always argued that officers' involvement in criminal business activities should be considered as personal conduct and that their crime should be brought to justice.¹¹¹ To conclude this chapter, the following Figure 4.3 provides a simple tracing of the shortcomings in reforming TNI's business activities.





Figure 4.3. Tracing for the disbandment of TNI's business activities

4.3. Conclusion

To conclude the above explanation, three important findings are worth considering. First, there have been significant changes in the conduct of TNI's business

¹¹¹ Prasetyono (2017) also agreed with this statement, since it basically had no relations with the brass at all.

activities. These changes include a dispersion mode of TNI's business activities during the late and following the end of Suharto era. During these periods, TNI's business activities were no longer huge in scale and were diversified to various sectors which basically resulted in a small-scale with a small-impact business activities. Second, it leads to a relatively low refusal for the taking over of these business by the government. Finally, the refusal to this taking over is limited to those businesses owned by few officers and those businesses that engaged in critical sectors such as forestry and mining. The main problem in the abandonment of TNI's business activities is related to the fact that the taking over only took place in TNI's formal business activities and did not touch upon TNI's informal and illegal business activities. This decision is understandable since the informal and illegal business activities are not legally related to TNI as an institution.



Chapter 5

The disbandment of territorial command structure

The disbandment of TNI's territorial command structure is one of the most contested issues in military reform in Indonesia. The armed forces have long been developed their territorial command structure as part of their defense strategy. While the TNI doctrine has been changed in 2007, the importance of territorial command structure in the new doctrine remains. TNI has officially disbanded the sociopolitical roles of their territorial command structure and hence left it with a mere defense function. This chapter lays out TNI's territorial command structure and the importance of this structure to TNI's interests. It also examines in detail changes that have been taking place since the beginning of military reform with regard to TNI's doctrine and organization. In the next part, this chapter assesses the corporate interest of TNI that drives to the relatively minimal changes in their territorial command structure. It argues that the lack of alternative is one of the main reasons for the minimum change in TNI's territorial command structure. In addition, the failure of defense modernization program of the armed forces due to the lack of financial sources has also contributed to the difficulties in the reorganization of the armed forces. Another, and more important reason, is the resistance from TNI to completely abandon their current structure since such change, especially a drastic one, would completely change their political power against other groups in the society.

5.1. The importance of *komando teritorial*

The words *komando teritorial* or *koter* is a sacred one for the brass. The term *koter* refers to the territorial command structure of the Indonesian Army. For years, Army has been the most important and the strongest service within the brass. The organization of *koter* itself is a mimicry of civilian bureaucracy from the central to the district or village levels of governance. Figure 5.1 below shows how TNI's territorial command structure is shaped in line with that of civilian bureaucracy. With such a structure, it is understandable if TNI has been fully able to penetrate the governance during the reign of Suharto.




Figure 5.1. Structure of komando teritorial of TNI
(Adapted from Said, 1987, 7)

Note: in the current civilian bureaucratic structure, *Karesidenan* has no longer existed

5.1.1. The evolution of TNI's doctrine

Since the development of TNI's structure has a close affinity with their doctrine, the discussion in this part includes an analysis of the evolution of TNI's doctrine. The TNI's doctrine itself, as in the case of other states, can be differentiated into different types, ranging from defense doctrine, military doctrine and service doctrine. Those three doctrines should be coherent. In the case of Indonesia, however, the making of the doctrines has been usually in a bottom-up rather than top-down process. Hence, basically the doctrines of the three services are the first to be developed and the followed by the military doctrine and the defense doctrine. It happened twice in which the first occurrence took place when the 1966 *Tjatur dharma eka karma (Cadek)* was developed after the 1965 *Eka sasana jaya* of the Navy, the 1965 *Swa buana paksa* of the Air Force and the 1966 *Tri ubaya cakti* of the Army. The defense doctrine known as the 1966 *Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional* was adopted later. In the post Suharto era, the 2008 defense doctrine known as *Doktrin pertahanan nasional* was adopted after the military adopted *Tri dharma eka karma (Tridek)* in 2007. Tridek itself was developed after the Army adopted their *Kartika eka paksi* in 2001, the Navy adopted their *Eka sasana jaya* in 2001 and the Air Force adopted their *Swa buana paksa* in

2001.¹¹² The organization of TNI is basically developed to enable them to carry on missions that are listed on their doctrines. Hence, a change in the doctrines, logically would lead to a change in the organizational structure. In the case of Indonesia, however, there are no significant changes in TNI's doctrine throughout the years and therefore no significant changes in the organizational structure are taking place as well. The evolution of TNI's doctrine can be divided into five different phases, from the war for independence (1945-1949), RIS (1949-1950), internal warfare (1950-1959), Guided Democracy (1959-1967), New Order (1967-1998), and Reform era (1998-today) periods (Widjajanto, 2010, 2013a, 2013b).¹¹³ Widjajanto (2013a, 2013b) identified 23 different doctrines that has been adopted by TNI since 1945.¹¹⁴ Table 5.1 shows these 23 doctrines. These 23 doctrines, sadly, reflect a rather inwardly-orientation.

Table 5.1. Indonesia's military doctrines
(Widjajanto, 2013, 6-7)

Period	Doctrine
1945-1949	1. Defense doctrine 1946: <i>Pertahanan bulat lagi teratur</i>
	2. Defense doctrine 1947: <i>Perang rakyat semesta</i> (total warfare)
1950-1959	3. Military doctrine 1954: <i>Perang rakyat semesta</i>
1960-1965	4. Defense doctrine 1960: <i>Pertahanan semesta</i> (total defense)
	5. Navy doctrine 1965: <i>Eka sasana jaya</i>
	6. Air Force doctrine 1965: <i>Swa buana paksa</i>
1966-1997	7. Army doctrine 1966: <i>Tri ubaya cakti</i>
	8. Military doctrine 1966: <i>Tjatur dharma eka karma</i>
	9. Defense doctrine 1966: <i>Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional</i>
	10. Military doctrine 1970: <i>Doktrin teritorial nusantara</i>
	11. Military doctrine 1972: <i>Darma pusaka '45</i>
	12. Military doctrine 1975: <i>Doktrin kekaryaan ABRI</i>
	13. Military doctrine 1977: <i>Doktrin operasi sosial politik</i>
	14. Military doctrine 1980: <i>Doktrin operasi gabungan ABRI</i>
	15. Military doctrine 1982: <i>Dwifungsi ABRI</i>
	16. Military doctrine 1988: <i>Catur dharma eka karma</i>
	17. Defense doctrine 1991: <i>Doktrin pertahanan dan keamanan</i>
	18. Military doctrine 1991: <i>Sad daya dwi bakti</i>
1998-current	19. Air Force doctrine 2000: <i>Swa buana paksa</i>

¹¹² The Army is the only service that did not change the name of their doctrine from the previous one. The content of all the services' doctrine, however, is different from their previous doctrines.

¹¹³ Rinakit (2005) differentiated the evolution of TNI's doctrines in five stages. The first stage is 1945-1958 which he referred as characterized by no-shared military ideology. The second stage is 1958-1965 in which *Jalan Tengah* became the operational ideology of the armed forces. The third stage is 1965-1966 when *Dwifungsi* became a political ideology of the armed forces. The fourth stage is 1966-1998 in which *Dwifungsi* became the operational ideology of the armed forces. The final stage is post-1998 when *Dwifungsi* became corporate ideology of the armed forces. Rinakit emphasized the development of military's political ideology and did not touch upon other aspects of the doctrines.

¹¹⁴ Widjajanto (2013a, 2013b) included both TNI's and services' doctrines as well as defense doctrines in his assessment.

	20. Navy doctrine 2001: <i>Eka sasana jaya</i>
	21. Army doctrine 2001: <i>Kartika eka paksi</i>
	22. Military doctrine 2007: <i>Tri dharma eka karma</i>
	23. Defense doctrine 2008: <i>Doktrin pertahanan negara</i>
Note: no new doctrine was adopted during RIS period.	

To understand the logic in the making of these doctrines, a historical assessment would be made in the following paragraphs. During the early years after the declaration of independence, TNI adopted a linear defense mechanism with a clear division between enemy's territories and their own territories.¹¹⁵ TNI then adopted a *Wehrkreise* (military regions) defense system in which each region should independently defend their territories. The change from linear defense to military region was driven by TNI's failure to deal with the first military aggression of the Dutch in 1947 in which the latter managed to break TNI's defense mechanism and captured several important areas of the new Republic. Following the second military aggression in 1948, after realizing the stark asymmetry in power, Sudirman added guerilla warfare to support the already established military regions command defense system. Since guerilla warfare would only be effective with the assistance from the population, TNI then developed a total warfare strategy in their war against the Dutch colonial forces.

After the transfer of power in 1949, Indonesia was transformed into RIS. The territory of RIS covered the former Dutch Indies with the exception of Papua which by that time was unsettled yet. The disbandment of RIS in 1950 led to rampant rebellions from several federal states as they rejected to full control of Jakarta. TNI was then forced to develop a new strategy to deal with these rebels. They were required to conduct joint operations that involved Navy, Air Force, and Army. In addition, the Army had to develop a mobile unit to assist the remnants of local command personnel in the areas that suffered from rebellions in crushing the rebels. With an increasing number of rebellions during the 1950s and 1960s, TNI also developed reserves training

¹¹⁵ During the 1945-1949, the de facto territory of Indonesia was constantly changing. Following the independence, the de facto territory of Indonesia was only covering Java and Sumatera. They retained these areas until the Lingardjati agreement with the Dutch colonial power in 1947. After the Dutch conducted military aggression in 1947, the de facto territory of Indonesia was reduced to almost a half of Java Island. It was officially concluded with the signing of the 1948 Renville Agreement brokered by the United Nations. As a consequence of this agreement, Indonesia lost Jakarta and most of Western Java areas which force the *Siliwangi* regional command to conduct long march to Yogyakarta, the new capital city of Indonesia. It is considered as an important event for the brass since it was basically during this period when Sudirman and Nasution managed to unify the ex-PETA and ex-KNIL officers within the brass.

program to increase the number of personnel in case of emergency. The scale became larger when, during the Guided Democracy period, Indonesia engaged in two major military operations in Papua and Malaya.

During the New Order period, TNI remained rely on the Army territorial command structure that had been developed during the previous periods to deal with internal security problems. With regard to external threats, they developed what is now known as layered defense system which basically divided the defense in three different areas. On the outermost area, TNI relies on intelligence operations to deter the threat (deterrence strategy). On the outer area, Navy and Air Force hold the responsibility to conduct both offensive and defensive operations to prevent the enemy from entering the main islands. On the third layer, the inner areas, TNI adopts a total warfare with the Army as the main combat force. TNI's layered defense system does not only reflects a weak-state mentality as argued by Widjajanto (2010, 2013a, 2013b), but also was adopted due to the constraints that come from infrastructural weaknesses as well (Sutarto, 2017, interview). From time to time, TNI's capability to deal with external threats has never been sufficient. In comparison with Indonesia's neighboring states, Indonesia is still lacking behind in term of weaponry possession as well as military preparedness. Hence, efforts to increase TNI's capability have been an important agenda of the reform, especially in the second phase of the reform.

Finally, during the Reform era, TNI made adjustment in their doctrines by transferring the internal security assignment to police force. The current TNI's doctrine, *Tridek*, was adopted by TNI according to SKep *Panglima* TNI No. Kep/21/I/2007. This doctrine lists the possible threats that might endanger the survival of the Republic and how to deal with them. It lies out the three strategies adopted by TNI which are deterrence, punitive, and recovery strategies with the first conducted in the outermost and outer areas of defense while the second and the third are conducted in the inner area of defense. The layered defense system is designed to deal with external rather than internal threat. In dealing with internal threats, *Tridek* lists the war operations and operations other than war (OMSP) depending on the required missions. Hence, while this doctrine officially transfers the maintenance of internal security to Polri, it still opens the possibility of their involvement in internal security operations.

Comparing *Tridek* from TNI's previous doctrines, there is a slight change in which in previous doctrines, for example in TNI's 1991 *Sad Daya Dwi Bakti* or TNI's 1988 *Catur Darma Eka Karma (Cadek)* TNI was clearly identified their engagement in defense (from external threat), (internal) security, and sociopolitical affairs. *Sad* and *Cadek* were basically a continuation of TNI's 1982 *Dwifungsi* doctrine. While *Dwifungsi* was officially adopted in 1982, TNI's 1966 *Doktrin pertahanan keamanan nasional* had already identified the roles of the armed forces as defense as well as sociopolitical tools. *Dwifungsi* itself was a redefinition of TNI's *Jalan Tengah* developed by Nasution in 1958. *Jalan Tengah* itself was never been an official doctrine of the armed forces. Hence, the evolution of TNI's doctrines basically suggests that there has been a changing in the nature of their relationship with politics from influencing politics to controlling politics to subtly influencing politics. Figure 5.2 below suggests the development of TNI's doctrine from *Jalan Tengah* to *Tridek*.




Figure 5.2. Evolution of TNI's doctrine (selected main documents)

In addition to the disbandment of military's involvement in governance (from controlling to subtly influencing), there is no significant change taken by TNI with regard to their doctrines. As suggested in Chapter 3, most regulations that were adopted during the reform period were concerned with the disbandment of military's direct involvement in politics while efforts to professionalize the armed forces came at second in priority. In the word of Sutarto (2017, interview), the idea of reform was basically to elevate the sociopolitical function of TNI. It was not meant to completely change the

organizational structure of the armed forces. As a result, the reform did not really disrupt TNI's organizational structure.

5.1.2. The evolution of TNI territorial command structure

After examining the evolution of their doctrines, the following paragraphs examine into detail the evolution of TNI's organizational structure. Following the establishment of TKR, Soemohardjo proposed to divide TKR into 4 regional commands (known as *komandemen*), which were West Java, Central Java, East Java, and Sumatera. The *komandemen* system was heavily relied on linear defense system. However, TKR also developed mobile units within these *komandemen*. The existence of both linear defense system and mobile units represented the influence of both ex-KNIL (Dutch educated) officers and ex-PETA (Japanese educated) officers.¹¹⁶ In 1946, when TKR transformed into TRI, a new structure of the Army was introduced. TRI abandoned the *komandemen* system and established 10 divisions covering the Java (7 divisions) and Sumatera (3 divisions) areas. Previously, under the *komandemen* system, TKR was divided into 16 divisions. In 1947, when TRI was renamed into TNI, the structure was also changed. TNI had 7 divisions with no division was available in Sumatera and divisions covering Java. In 1948, Nasution, then was chief-of-staff replacing Soemohardjo who passed away due to illness, received an order from Sudirman to reorganize the armed forces to able to engage in war against the Dutch colonial forces.¹¹⁷ In late 1949, Nasution divided the Army, which was the backbone of TNI, into seven different military governments (known as *Tentara dan Teritorium* or T&T). These seven T&T were Northern Sumatera, Southern Sumatera, West Java (including Jakarta), Central Java, East Java, Borneo, and Eastern Indonesia. When developing this

¹¹⁶ The rivalry was represented in the dualism of leadership between Sudirman (ex-PETA) and Soemohardjo (ex-KNIL). Sukarno was in favor of Soemohardjo as *Panglima* of TKR, but most regional leaders opted to choose Sudirman as *Panglima*. Soemohardjo was then elected as chief-of-staff by Sudirman to bridge the two rivals. The two however held different views over various issues within the brass. Sudirman, for example, was not in favor of the integration of *laskar* to TKR. He thought that *laskar* can be an independent militia whenever they wanted, while Soemohardjo thought the otherwise. For a detail explanation on this period see Said (1991).

¹¹⁷ Sudirman was not interested in organizational structure. It has been argued by scholars that ex-PETA officers were lacking interest in organizational structure unlike ex-KNIL officers. Nasution, on the other hand, had a keen interest in developing TNI as professional armed forces (Penders & Sundhausen, 1985; Said, 1991).

structure, Nasution thought that this would be a temporary structure until they managed to defeat the Dutch colonial forces.

The T&T structure laid out the foundation for the Army territorial command structure. In 1959, the Army established Military Command Area (*Komando Daerah Militer, Kodam*) to replace T&T. The main reason for this change was that there was a significant change in the nature of threat from external threat (Dutch colonial forces) to internal threat (rebellion from separatist movements). At the beginning, there were 16 *Kodam*, which then became 17 with the establishment of *Kodam Cendrawasih* in Papua. Those 17 *Kodam* were: *Kodam I/Iskandar Muda* (Aceh), *Kodam II/Bukit Barisan* (North Sumatera), *Kodam III/17 Agustus* (West Sumatera), *Kodam IV/Sriwijaya* (South Sumatera), *Kodam V/Jakarta Raya (Jaya)* overseeing Jakarta and its outskirt areas, *Kodam VI/Siliwangi* (West Java), *Kodam VII/Diponegoro* (Central Java and Yogyakarta), *Kodam VIII/Brawijaya* (East Java), *Kodam IX/Mulawarman* (Eastern Borneo), *Kodam X/Lambung Mangkurat* (Southern Borneo), *Kodam XI/Tambun Bungai* (Central Borneo), *Kodam XII/Tanjungpura* (West Borneo), *Kodam XIII/Merdeka* (Northern and Central Celebes), *Kodam XIV/Hasanuddin* (Southern Celebes), *Kodam XV/Pattimura* (Moluccas Islands), *Kodam XVI/Udayana* (Bali and Southeastern Islands), and *Kodam XVII/Cendrawasih* (Papua). Those *Kodam* were established in 1957, 1958 and 1959, with the exception of *Kodam Cendrawasih* which was established in 1962. In 1985, the Army simplified their organizational structure and reduced the number of *Kodam* into 7 *Kodam*. These were *Kodam Bukit Barisan* and *Kodam Sriwijaya* in Sumatera, *Kodam Jaya*, *Kodam Siliwangi*, *Kodam Diponegoro*, and *Kodam Brawijaya* in Java, *Kodam Tanjungpura* in Borneo, *Kodam Wirabuana* in Celebes, *Kodam Trikora* (Moluccas Islands and Papua), and *Kodam Udayana* (Bali and Southeastern Islands).

In the post Suharto era, the Army increased the number of *Kodam*. In 1999, *Kodam Pattimura* was reestablished by the Army. The reason for this reestablishment was to deal with ethnic conflict in Moluccas Islands following the fall of Suharto. At the same time, *Kodam Cendrawasih* was reestablished and *Kodam Wirabuana* was disbanded. In 2002, the Army reestablished *Kodam Iskandar Muda* in Aceh. *Kodam Iskandar Muda* was reestablished to minimize the impact of GAM activities. In addition, the armed forces also afraid that efforts to make peace deal with GAM which

had been taken place since the reign of Wahid would significantly harm their officers. In 2010, *Kodam Tanjungpura* was divided into two *Kodam*, *Kodam Tanjungpura* for Western Borneo and *Kodam Mulawarman* for Eastern Borneo. In 2016, two other *Kodam* were established. *Kodam Merdeka* was reestablished and a new *Kodam*, *Kodam Kasuari*, was established to oversee West Papua. Hence, currently there are 15 *Kodam* in Indonesia, with Sumatera divided into 3 *Kodam* (*Iskandar Muda*, *Bukit Barisan*, and *Sriwijaya*), 4 *Kodam* in Java (*Jaya*, *Siliwangi*, *Diponegoro*, and *Brawijaya*), 2 *Kodam* in Borneo (*Mulawarman* and *Tanjungpura*), 2 *Kodam* in Celebes (*Hasanuddin* and *Merdeka*), 1 *Kodam* covering Bali and Southeastern Islands (*Udayana*), 1 *Kodam* in Moluccas Islands (*Pattimura*), and 2 *Kodam* in Papua (*Cendrawasih* and *Kasuari*).

Each *Kodam* has several *Korem* and each *Korem* oversees several *Kodim*. There are, however, several separated *Kodim* which are independent and directly under the supervision of *Kodam*. These separated *Kodim* are: *Kodim 0201/Medan* (under *Kodam Bukit Barisan*), *Kodim 0501/Central Jakarta* (under *Kodam Jaya*), *Kodim 0618/Bandung* (under *Kodam Siliwangi*), *Kodim 0733/Semarang* (under *Kodam Diponegoro*), *Kodim 1207/Pontianak* (under *Kodam Tanjungpura*), and *Kodim 1408/Makassar* (under *Kodam Hasanuddin*). The number of *Korem* in each *Kodam* varies (see Table 5.2 for detail). *Korem* is led by either Brigadier General or Colonel while *Kodim* is led by Lieutenant Colonel or Major (senior) but the separated *Kodim* is led by Colonel. As comparison, *Kodam* is led by a Major General. The Army structure goes lower into the sub-district and village levels. Each *Kodim* oversees several *Koramil*, while each *Koramil* oversees several *Babinsa* at the village level. *Koramil* is led by Major or Captain, while *Babinsa* is led by Sergeant Major.

Table 5.2. The number of *Korem* and *Kodim*

<i>Kodam</i>	<i>Korem</i>	<i>Kodim</i>	District
<i>Iskandar Muda</i>	2	14	23
<i>Bukit Barisan</i>	5	34	71
<i>Sriwijaya</i>	5	27	60
<i>Jaya</i>	2	8	9
<i>Siliwangi</i>	4	22	32
<i>Diponegoro</i>	4	36	40
<i>Brawijaya</i>	4	32	38
<i>Tanjungpura</i>	2	13	28
<i>Mulawarman</i>	2	21	28
<i>Hasanuddin</i>	3	26	47
<i>Merdeka</i>	2	12	34

<i>Udayana</i>	3	26	42
<i>Pattimura</i>	2	9	21
<i>Cendrawasih</i>	2	6	29
<i>Kasuari</i>	2	8	13
Note: the number of <i>Kodim</i> listed includes the separated <i>Kodim</i> ; the number of district refers to district in civilian bureaucracy			

What is striking from this structure is the existence of Army intelligence staff in all offices from *Kodam* to *Koramil*. Each *Kodam* has both *Asintel Pangdam* (Assistant for Intelligence to the *Kodam* Commander) and *Danden Intel* (Intelligence Detachment Commander). Each *Korem* has *Danton Intel* (Intelligence Platoon Commander) and *Kasi Intelrem* (Head of *Korem* Intelligence Section), while each *Kodim* has *Si Inteldem* (*Kodim* Intelligence Section Officer). Finally, each *Koramil* has *Bawanra* (People's Resistance Training NCO), *Bakonsos* (Social Conditions NCO) as well as *Babinsa* (Village NCO). The main duty of *Babinsa* is actually to collect information from their area of operation related to various issues. Hence, they are basically performing intelligence collection assignment.

This structure allows the Army to penetrate civilian bureaucracy. Their clear line of command allows TNI's leaderships to gain knowledge on any significant occurrences in the country faster than the civilian bureaucracy. Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that TNI's territorial command structure allows the armed forces to prevent any potential threats. These threats are not only coming from within the state, but also those that penetrated from abroad. TNI has been quite often referred to external penetration (or propaganda) as one of the main threats to Indonesia's security. This view has its root on the PKI rebellion in 1948 and 1965. TNI considers PKI as being used by foreign power (the Communist camp) to bring down *Pancasila*.¹¹⁸ It is in this logic that TNI's territorial command structure plays its defense role. There is, however, another significant consequence from this structure. Sebastian (2006) described in detail how TNI's massive intelligence gathering system has allowed them to basically overshadow civilian bureaucracy in any dimensions. With their deep penetration into the society, it was the armed forces instead of civilian bureaucracy that basically run the country. Moreover, prior to the Reform era, in the three lowest levels of governance, there was a Regional Leadership Committee (*Musyawaharah Pimpinan Daerah, Muspida* for district

¹¹⁸ *Pancasila* or the Five Pillars is the ideology of Indonesia. It has five basic tenets (belief in God, humanity, national unity, democracy, and social justice).

level, *Musyawarah Pimpinan Kecamatan*, *Muspika* for sub-district level, and *Musyawarah Pimpinan Desa*) in which civilian and military regional leaders regularly discuss current security threats and problems and how to deal with them. These committees basically give a platform for military regional commander to “direct” civilian leadership on what policies that they should have taken. While these committees are no longer regulated in the latest Law on Regional Governance, their existence remains.

The above evolution of the Army’s territorial command structure suggests that there have been very limited changes in the structure and the nature of *koter*. The main change is taking place only in the nature of *koter*, in which the sociopolitical functions of *koter* has been declared in-existence. The disbandment of these sociopolitical functions is part of the withdrawal of military’s political role as explained in Chapter 3. The structure, however, remains until today. In fact, there has been expansion of this structure due to several considerations, which mostly are related to internal security concerns. The reestablishment of *Kodam Pattimura* was due to the increasing ethnic tension in Moluccas in 1998-1999. During these times, Moluccas suffered from conflict between Muslim and Christian communities to the extent that President Wahid declared civilian emergency, one level below a martial law status. Wahid even sealed the Moluccas areas to prevent the flow of radical Islamic groups from other parts of the country to conduct jihad in Moluccas which he considered as an obstacle for peace deal. While the conflict in Moluccas was finally managed, it had already spread to other areas, including Central Celebes. The establishment of *Kodam Merdeka* as separated *Kodam* from *Kodam Hasanuddin* was due to the ethnic conflict in Central Celebes which followed by the existence of various terrorist groups with close connection with Mindanao Islamic resistance groups. In fact, the religious-based ethnic conflicts in Moluccas and Central Celebes provided the radical Islamic groups with a cause to conduct terror in the whole country, including the 2002 Bali Bombings which claimed more than 200 casualties. The reestablishment of *Kodam Pattimura* also meant that *Kodam Cendrawasih* was also reestablished to specifically oversee Papua. As explained in Chapter 4, the reestablishment of *Kodam Cendrawasih* gave the Army a relatively larger manpower to deal with OPM. Similar reasoning was also driving the reestablishment of *Kodam Iskandar Muda* overseeing Aceh. The decision to further

separate *Kodam Kasuari* from *Kodam Cendrawasih* was also driven by the need to tackle the problem from OPM. Western Papua has been relatively secured from OPM activities hence the establishment of *Kodam Kasuari* would allow *Kodam Cendrawasih* to have a smaller area of responsibility and they could focus on dealing with OPM. The division of *Kodam Tanjungpura* and *Kodam Mulawarman* also had its reason in the ethnic conflict that took place quite regularly in West Borneo and Central Borneo between indigenous Dayak people and Malay as well as Madurese settlers. There is, however, another explanation on the expansion of *Kodam* as an effort to accommodate the rising number of military officers, especially generals. A recent study by Laksmana (2016) suggested there has been stagnancy in the promotion within the armed forces due to the disbandment of TNI's *kekaryaan*. With the limited number of position that military officers could hold in civilian bureaucracy, the armed forces have to create a new position in the brass. The establishment of new *Kodam* (as well *Korem* and *Kodim*) would serve this need quite well.

Unlike the complex Army structure, the Navy organizational structure is relatively simple. With such a vast territorial water—twice of its land-area, including the Exclusive Economic Zone—the Navy only has two regional commands, i.e. the Western Command (*Komando Armada Barat, Koarmabar*) and the Eastern Command (*Komando Armada Timur, Koarmatim*), each led by Rear Admiral (*Laksmana Muda, Laksda*). *Koarmabar* has 5 Main Naval Bases (*Pangkalan utama, Lantamal*) and *Koarmatim* has 9 *Lantamal*. Each *Lantamal* is led by Junior Rear Admiral or Commodore (*Laksamana Pertama, Laksma*). The number of *Lantamal* in the *Koarmatim* is larger than in the *Koarmabar* since the eastern part of Indonesia has a relatively wider territorial water with the number of islands far exceeding the western part of Indonesia. The making of these two commands, as well as the Naval base, is based on the possible hotspots in the Indonesian waters. Hence, it is basically driven by the threat environment which, in this case, none of them are internally oriented. Among all of those *Lantamal*, only three *Lantamal* that their areas of operation are in internal waters which are *Lantamal III* in Jakarta, *Lantamal V* in Surabaya, and *Lantamal VI* in Makassar. These *Lantamal*, however, oversee two major sea lines, with *Lantamal III* oversees the Strait of Sunda, *Lantamal V* oversees the Strait of Lombok—together with *Lantamal VII* in Kupang—and *Lantamal VI* oversees the Strait of Celebes. Finally, the

Indonesian Air Force also has a relatively simple structure.¹¹⁹ TNI AU has two regional commands (*Komando Operasi Angkatan Udara, Koops AU*), one is based in Jakarta (*Koops AU I*) and the other is based in Makassar (*Koops AU II*). *Koops AU I* has three combat squadrons and 3 transport and logistic squadrons, while *Koops AU II* has 5 combat squadrons and 3 transport and logistic squadrons. Each *Koops AU* is led by Air-Vice Marshal.

5.2. TNI's corporate interests at stake

As suggested in previous part, an important progress in the disbandment of TNI's territorial command structure is the abandonment of their sociopolitical roles, especially the one previously conducted by the Army. Chapter 3 has examined in detail the documents that would ensure the abandonment of these sociopolitical roles, including the abandonment of *kekaryaan* doctrine. Currently, TNI's officers are only allowed to hold certain positions within civilian bureaucracy which have close affinity with national security issues. The abandonment of these sociopolitical roles, however, was not accompanied by a change in TNI's organizational structure. TNI's structure remains the same mostly due to resistance from the brass which considers the existing structure as vital for the defense of the state. It should be noted that TNI believes that the main source to the security of the state is basically coming from internal rather than external and hence the TNI's organizational structure should be aiming at enabling them to detect possible threat as early as possible. In addition, the lack in TNI's weaponry system does not allow TNI to engage external threats in the outermost areas of defense. It further complicates the efforts to redirect TNI's orientation from an inward-looking to an outward-looking. The combination of those two problems has led TNI to maintain their internal-oriented military culture, while, on the other hand and supposedly, a non-political TNI is expected to focus on their defense assignment and hence should have an external-oriented military culture.

To bridge the gap between the current TNI's internally-oriented military culture and the ideal externally-oriented military culture, efforts have been done to redefine TNI's organizational structure through various channels. At least two channels are

¹¹⁹ For comparison of Army, Navy, and Air Force territorial command structure and their areas of operation, see maps in Appendix.

worth examining. The first is the defense modernization program and the second is the making of joint defense zone. Defense modernization program is intended to make TNI to focus on increasing their skills in weapon-management. It is expected that TNI would grow their (Huntingtonian) professional attitude and focus on their defense assignment rather than on politics. The latter effort, the creation of joint defense zone, has two objectives: to reduce the reliance to the Army and its structure as well as to increase inter-services unity. Sutarto (2017, interview), however, criticized those efforts as an “American-wannabe” attitude and considered that it did not match with the Indonesian situation. According to him, it would take hundreds of years for Indonesia to match the US military structure. Indonesia, on his view, did not have enough capital to pursue this dream. He contended that the government should instead invest on increasing people’s needs instead of building a strong military. It was a matter of priority. He further argued that there is no point of having a strong military but the people lives in poverty. He used North Korea as comparison. On personal note, he also stated that he would love to see a powerful TNI and that the government should work relentlessly to achieve modern and well-equipped military but not at the stake of people’s welfare. Human Right Watch (2006) also criticized the massive defense modernization program since it, at the same time, also opens the chance for massive corruption. According to their report, the practice of marking up the price of weaponry system has been one of the most common practices that takes place during weapon procurement. In 1999, Minister Sudarsono acknowledged that this practice was extremely difficult to be fought due to the involvement of various parties in the process (Wall Street Journal, 8 December 1999). Prasetyono (2017, interview) and Widjajanto (2017, interview) also confessed that this practice did take place in most of weapon procurement process. The case of Brigadier General Hernayadi, as explained in Chapter 4, confirmed the existence of this practice. Another case that suggest the existence of this practice of marking up are the Scorpion tank case in 2004 (*Detik*, 16 December 2004) and the Sukhoi case in 2012 (*Kompas*, 1 March 2012).

The Indonesian defense modernization program started with the adoption of the Long-Term Development Plan 2005-2025 (*Rencana Pembangunan Jangka Panjang 2005-2025*, RPJP 2005-2025). This document laid out, among others, defense planning program that Indonesia would take to ensure its security. The RPJP was then adopted as

Law No.17/2007 to provide legal justification for the allocation of state's budget. The Ministry of Defense followed suit by adopted *Permenhan* on Defense Development Plan (*Permenhan* No.3/2010; *Permenhan* No.26/2012¹²⁰). In addition, Minister of Defense also adopted *Permenhan* on Minimum Essential Force which outlines the Indonesian defense planning (*Permenhan* No.2/2010; *Permenhan* No.19/2012; *Permenhan* No.78/2014; *Permenhan* No.39/2015).¹²¹ This planning, however, was failed to be fulfilled due to budget constraint. Figure 5.3 below shows the gap in Indonesia's defense budget from 2003 to 2011.




Figure 5.3. The gap in Indonesia's defense budget, 2003-2011

Sources: Sebastian & Gindarsah in Rulland, Manea & Born, 2013; *Permenhan* No.19/2012 (Appendix)
The number is in trillion rupiahs

As part of this defense planning, the government allocated defense budget to purchase new weaponry systems for all three services, despite the fact that these purchases were not taking place as planned. With regard to the Navy, for example, TNI was aiming at developing a green-water navy in the next two decades. The MEF document laid out the procurement plan in detail up to 2024 including the plan to purchase 8 submarines of various classes from South Korea, the Netherlands, France, and Russian Federation—with the first two were planned as joint development project. Indonesia signed a contract with South Korea for developing three Chang-Bogo class submarines which was scheduled to be delivered in 2015, 2016 and 2018. The first-two would be fully built in South Korea, while the third would be built in Indonesia. Due to

¹²⁰ The latter is a revised version of the former.

¹²¹ The MEF document focused on defense planning, while the Defense Development Plan document was a broader defense-related planning.

financial and technical problems, the plan was rescheduled and the first submarine was finally delivered in March 2017. In 2010, TNI AL reached an agreement with the Dutch's Damen Schelde to build Sigma-class destroyer—which is actually a light frigate rather than a destroyer—by 2017/2018. Three year later, another agreement was signed to build the second ship. One of the most successful progresses with regard to the Navy's procurement program takes place in the purchase of small patrol boats and fast attack guided-missile boats. The Navy managed to secure a deal with local company—PT PAL—to build 60 patrol vessels and 24 guided-missile fast attack KCR-40. TNI AL also managed to reach a deal with China for developing their 120-kilometre range C-705 surface-to-surface missiles for their KCR-40. So far, the modernization plan of the Navy remained lacking behind and scholars remain skeptical that TNI AL would be able to accomplish their goal by 2024 (Schreer, 2013; Koh, 2016). With regard to the Air Force, in 2011, Indonesia requested 24 F-16/D fighters from the US and 6 Sukhoi Su-30MK2 from Russia. The latter were delivered in 2015. Indonesia and South Korea also reached an agreement to build the fourth-generation KFX/IFX in 2012, but the project was then postponed to an unclarified time-frame in 2013. In 2011, the two countries also successfully signed an agreement on the purchase of T-50 Golden Eagle jet-trainers from South Korea. In addition, the Indonesian Army has also secured the purchase of 103 Leopard 2A6 main battle tanks from Germany as well as 50 Marder 1A3 infantry fighting vehicles and 10 support vehicles. 50 of these Leopard MBTs were delivered in May 2016.

The Indonesia's defense modernization program, in conclusion, has yet to achieve the intended purpose. Figure 5.4 shows the gap in the Indonesian main defense systems. Sutarto (2017, interview) argued that the lack in the Indonesian weaponry systems have been so deep to the extent that, with the exception of the Army, it would need huge resources to actually fulfill the minimum requirement. He further said that what really happened in the Navy and the Air Force was that while they had two command areas, the weaponry systems were only enough to cover one area. When discussed the Navy, he said that when *Koarmabar* conducted an operation in their area, *Koarmatim* could not conduct similar activities and vice versa. The failure of this defense modernization program brings a dire consequence to the disbandment of TNI's territorial command structure. The defense modernization program was actually aiming

at creating an outwardly oriented culture within the brass to provide rationale for the restructuring of TNI's territorial structure. With the defense modernization program stalled due to the lack of funding, this rationale has been put on hold.




Figure 5.4. The gap in Indonesian weapon systems (selected systems)
Adopted from various sources by the author

The second effort to reorganize TNI's organizational structure is by introducing a joint defense zone known as *Komando Gabungan Wilayah Pertahanan (Kogabwilhan)*. In 2010, President Yudhoyono adopted *Perpres No.10/2010* on the Organization of TNI which served as the basis for the establishment of *Kogabwilhan*. The plan was to establish three *Kogabwilhan*—the Western Command, the Central Command, and the Eastern Command. Detail on the plan, however, has yet available. Sutarto (2017, interview) criticized the plan since it basically has no use whatsoever. He thought that this plan would only create complication to the already established territorial structure. Widjajanto (2017, interview), on the other hand, argued that this plan would provide the armed forces to conduct special defense missions unlike the usual activities conducted by territorial forces. Since the plan to establish *Kogabwilhan* has yet available, operational details of it has also unavailable.

While defense modernization as well as the incomplete plan to establish *Kogabwilhan* fails to lead to the reorganization of TNI's structure, the armed forces also register their own resistance. The armed forces consistently point out the need to retain


the current territorial command structure due to their importance in defending the state from possible threats, either internal or external threats. There is, however, other reason that stems from their own resistance to completely disengage from politics. As suggested in Chapter 1 that the initial aim of the reform was basically to reposition the role of TNI in politics from controlling to indirectly influencing. In doing so, the armed forces released some of their previous roles to civilian groups. The removal of the sociopolitical roles of TNI's territorial command structure, or the Army territorial command structure to be exact, does not guarantee that military would not involve in daily politics in all levels of governance. In the Army Headquarter publication (2014, 40) on the transformation of Army's territorial roles (*pembinaan teritorial, binter*), it was clearly stated that territorial command is being prepared to persuade, to influence, to assist, and to drive to the establishment of resiliency in national ideology, politics, economy, social, and psychology. Its further explanation led to the conclusion that the Army's territorial command structure is aiming at preserving stability within the society, which has no correlation at all with its defense function. It did argue that the reason for that is due to a high possibility of separatism and terrorism. This document confirms the fear of civilian society that the disbandment of TNI's sociopolitical roles without the abandonment of their territorial command structure is meaningless. To conclude, Figure 5.4 provides a simple tracing of the failure in the disbandment of TNI's territorial command structure.



Figure 5.5. Tracing for the disbandment of TNI's territorial command structure

5.3. Conclusion

To conclude this chapter, the above explanation suggests three findings. First, the issue of territorial command structure has a close relationship with the adopted doctrine. Hence, a change in the structure would also require a change in the doctrine. Since these two are usually considered as the domain of the armed forces, where intervention from civilian should be kept limited, efforts to change both TNI doctrines and structure become difficult. Second, changes in both TNI's doctrines and structure would face opposition since they are closely related with the interests of the armed forces. Changes in these two components might harm or significantly curtail the role played by TNI in decision making. Finally, two additional problems also contribute to the failure to reorganize TNI's structure. These two are the lack of proposed alternatives to the current structure and the lack of financial support to professionalize TNI—with the latter is required to force TNI to be outwardly-oriented armed forces.



Chapter 6

Conclusion

To complete the analysis provided in Chapter 3, 4 and 5, this chapter aims at two things. First, it compares the findings in those three chapters to answer the main question posted in Chapter 1: why has the reform progressing differently from one issue to another. In order to do so, this chapter employs a simple Mill's method of difference. In addition to the variable of military interests, other variables that have been assessed by other scholars as suggested in Chapter 2 are also taken into consideration. It suggests that the other variables are all present in the three cases without variation. Hence, they could not be used to explain the variation of the progress of military reform in Indonesia. Second, this chapter also ends with recommendations for further research in the topic of military reform, in particular the armed forces' withdrawal from politics. In addition, while it is not intended to provide generalization, lessons learned are also drawn from the Indonesian case. The analysis in this dissertation suggests that a successful armed forces' withdrawal from politics, as well as successful military reform, depends on the interests of the armed forces.

6.1. Within-case comparison analysis

This dissertation argues that military interests can serve as good predictor to the progress of military's withdrawal from politics. Using the case of Indonesia, it shows that other variables that previously have been assessed by scholars were somehow lacking in explaining why there has been variation in the progress of the reform from one issue to another. Table 6.1 below shows that all variables as listed in Chapter 2 present in the Indonesian case of military reform. There are, however, no differences in variable threat environment, political legitimacy and military culture.

Table 6.1. Mill's method of difference in analyzing the progress of the reform

Threat environment	Political legitimacy	Military culture	Military interest	Progress in military reform
Mostly internal	Increasing trust from society	Internally oriented	National interest in line with corporate interest with limited influence from factional/personal interest	Relatively successful progress in establishment of normative democratic control of the armed forces (further progress is lacking due to resistance coming from corporate interest)
Mostly internal	Increasing trust from society	Internally oriented	Dominance of factional/personal interest even if corporate interest and national interest slightly in line	Partly successful progress in abandonment of military business (successful in formal business abandonment)
Mostly internal	Increasing trust from society	Internally oriented	Corporate interest plays a dominant role	Lack of progress in disbandment of territorial structure command
Constant	Constant	Constant	Varies	Varies

The threat environment to the Indonesian security has mostly been dominated by internal rather than external threats. The Indonesian defense white papers (*Mabes TNI*, 2003, 2008, 2015) were all listed various kinds of internal threat as the main source to Indonesia's security. While those documents also listed several external threats, both military and non-military threats, the documents also wrote that the possibility of those threats to occur is highly unlikely. In fact, the same documents also suggested that the possible flashpoints that TNI would have to deal with in the future are foreign intervention to domestic-related issues. The Indonesian defense white papers identified five different scenarios of possible flashpoints, ranging from: cross-border assistances to domestic separatist movements, border clashes and skirmishes, foreign interventions to maintain access to Indonesia's energy resources, foreign interventions to sustain free navigation in Indonesian waters, and foreign interventions in counterterrorism missions. Only one of those five possible flashpoints are directly related to external threats, which is border clashes and skirmishes.

Table 6.2. Possible threats as listed in defense white papers

	External	Internal
Military	Aggression or border incursion, disruption to maritime security	Separatism
Non-military	Foreign political intervention, energy crisis, global warming, global economic crises	Acts of terror, radicalism and Communism, communal conflicts, natural disasters

With regard to the variable of political legitimacy, there has been an increasing trust from the society to democratic governance. As suggested by scholars, the democratization process in Indonesia has been suggesting an increasing trend toward democratic consolidation. Croissant and Bunte (Croissant & Bunte in Croissant & Bunte, 2011) claimed that Indonesia can be regarded as one of the most well performed new democracies in Southeast Asia. Similarly, Bunte and Ufen (2009, 22) wrote that according to Dahl's framework, "without a doubt, Indonesia can be described as a democracy." Similarly, when constitutional democracy is the standard, Indonesia can also be included as an example of democratic society (Croissant & Bunte in Croissant & Bunte, 2011, p. 252). Freedman (2006, 138-139) also concluded that Indonesia has already met the criteria of Linz and Stepan's consolidated democracy standard. Others, however, criticized the transition in Indonesia which created predatory democracy (Robison, 2002) or patrimonial democracy (Webber, 2006). Regardless of the debate, since the beginning of transition period, Indonesia has experienced four party turnovers and three peaceful direct presidential elections. With regard to legislative elections, Figure 6.1 shows the result of legislative elections in Indonesia since the Reform era (only national level elections are listed). The figure shows that the winner of the election is always changing from election to election. In 1999, PDIP won the election only to be defeated by Golkar party in 2004 election. In 2009, PD won the election, but their position was soon replaced by PDIP in 2014 election.




Figure 6.1. Result of legislative elections in Indonesia's post Suharto

(Note: in 1999 election, PKS participated as PK; PD did not participate in 1999 election; Gerindra was not participated in 1999 and 2004 elections)

The third variable, military culture, also suggests that the culture of Indonesian armed forces remain internally-oriented. Chapter 5 has provided a clear explanation on the Indonesian military culture. It basically concludes that there has been no significant change in Indonesian internally oriented defense culture since the establishment of the Republic. The Indonesia internally-oriented strategic culture of TNI has been shaped by its history of guerilla warfare (the war against far stronger Dutch colonial forces), rampant separatist movements, especially during the 1950s and 1960s, and the lack of military capability. While the doctrine has been constantly changing, the main characteristic of those doctrines is total warfare which reflects those three shaping factors.

Mill's method of difference basically suggests that two occurrences are significantly influenced by a certain independent variable when this variable varies in both occurrences while the other independent variables remain as constant. While Mill's method of difference requires a condition of "equifinality" which is highly unlikely in real life circumstance, and hence Bennet (in Sprinz & Wolinsky-Nahmias, 2004, 31-32) suggested to use Mill's method of difference with other methods, it still useful in determining which independent variable has the dominant influence on a dependent

variable over the other independent variables. Table 6.3 shows a simple explanation of Mill's method of difference. Using this method, as suggested in Table 7.1, this dissertation concludes that the variable of military interest is the only independent variable under investigation that actually varies. The variation in the dependent variable, hence, is a result of the variation in this independent variable since other variables remain constant.

In addition, another issue that needs further explanation is the impact of split within the armed forces as defining variable to influence progress of reform. Previous works on Indonesian military reform have suggested that the split within the armed forces contributed to the progress of the reform (Kanmen & Chandra, 2002; Mietzner 2006; Wibisono, Wardoyo & Kasim, 2008). However, this dissertation that split within the armed forces has constantly been taking place and only when these groups' interests overshadow either the national interests of the brass or, more importantly, the corporate interests was the split within the armed forces influenced the progress of the reform.

6.2. Lesson learned, recommendation and current progress

Hence, several lessons learned can be drawn from the Indonesian case. First, since the progress of the armed forces has a close affinity with the interests of the armed forces, putting their interests in the equation is mandatory to have a successful reform. This is especially crucial when the reform takes place within transition towards democracy characterized by transplacement in which the old elites, including the armed forces, still has strong influence within the political arena. In such a situation, the interests of the old elite groups remain as an important factor for successful transformation.

Second, the main problem of military reform and the withdrawal of the armed forces from politics basically lies in the establishment of detail arrangements as well as the changing of behavior towards a more democratic attitude. These two problems fall within the second "non-structural arrangement" phase of the reform. Hence, to successfully disengage the armed forces from politics, a different term could be a good option. Successful reform, therefore, requires the making of structural arrangement of military reform and defense modernization which focuses closely on detail arrangement and the changing of behaviors. The case of Indonesia suggests that with regard with

territorial command structure, which has a huge impact on military's departure from politics, the failure in defense modernization program was one of the reasons for the failure in the disbandment. Even within what is most-considered as successful withdrawal, the establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces, the problem of detailing the general principles remains lingering.

Third, the pattern of military's withdrawal in the case of Indonesia suggests that they both serve as partner or spoiler to the civilian authority depending on which role their interests the best. During the early period of the reform, while accepting the call for the establishment of democratic control over the armed forces, TNI maintained their oppositional position in certain issues, such as the peace deal with GAM or rapprochement with proponents of Papuan freedom movement. In addition, the armed forces did agree to engage in the making of general principles regulations such as the Law on National Defense and the Law on TNI but remained critical to any passages within these laws that might endanger their interests. In the latter phase of the reform, the armed forces showed limited resistance to the taking over of their formal business activities, but retained their informal business activities. In addition, they also managed to influence the taking over of their formal business to Ministry of Defense in which they remained as powerful stakeholder.

In addition to those lessons learned, several theoretical and methodological lessons learned could also be drawn from this research. First, this dissertation has shown the evolution or transformation of "a military as government" to "a military as stakeholder" roles that takes place along with military reform within the context of democratization process in the case of Indonesia. It suggests that the armed forces can actually transform themselves in their withdrawal from politics. In addition, while the role of the armed forces remains influential in politics, the institutionalization of that role within the political arrangement has been an important factor in limiting their re-intervention into politics in the near future. There are, off course cases of retired military officers, especially those within the leadership positions, which are keen to get into politics by benefiting from their previous leadership position.

Second, this dissertation provides alternative mechanism in examining the military interests, rather than providing a list of interests. By differentiating military interests into national, organizational, and factional interests, this dissertation further

clarifies the influence of the so-called military interests to their involvement or non-involvement in politics. It does not engage in a long list of interests. It identifies that organizational interests of the armed forces is basically the most important interest of the armed forces in which their involvement and non-involvement would be a function of it. In particular, it also suggests that military autonomy is on the top list of those organizational interests. The degree of their autonomy varies from country to country and from time to time. From the three cases examined in Chapter 3, 4, and 5, the corporate interests of the armed forces tend to be constant in the case of territorial command structure, tend to be limited in the disbandment of military business activities, and tend to be limited in the establishment of normative democratic control over the armed forces only when such an effort is directly touching upon the details.

Third, while this dissertation conducts a careful mapping on the split within the armed forces and how they manage their inter-rivalries over time to serve as a better basis for understanding military interests and their withdrawal from politics, it does not provide similar mapping within the civilian groups. Hence, future research should also include the latter's mapping of interests to provide a better understanding of successful pattern of military's withdrawal. The weaknesses of the agency-related approach applied in this research is that it does not deeply examine the other agents and is only committing to the main agent under observation. This research, however, takes into account the relationship between agents as well as between the main agent under observation and larger structural circumstances.

Finally, a comparison between cases could serve as a good basis to make generalization. This dissertation focuses on a single within-case comparison and hence the power of generalization is somehow limited. This dissertation has its own strength in explaining the variation within a single case. It manages to provide an alternative mechanism to explain military's withdrawal from politics and points out the most probable *explanan* to that withdrawal. Taking the case of Indonesia, which represents one of the most successful cases in the Third Wave Democratization, it shows the importance of examining military interests over the other variables. However, cross-cases comparison focusing on military interests would offer a better basis for making generalization.

To end this dissertation, few words on the current situation is also important to assess future development of military reform in Indonesia. The change in power from President Yudhoyono, who himself is retired Army general, to Presiden Widodo, who off course is civilian with limited ties to the armed forces, places the reform on trial. The departure of *Panglima* Army General Moeldoko and the appointment of the new *Panglima* Army General Gatot Nurmantyo in 2014 was met with critics. While the changing of *Panglima* position between two generals from the same service has been depicted as the practice of the Suharto regime, the new *Panglima* has managed to keep the unity of the armed forces. The handing-over of the armed forces leadership position in 2017 once again suggests that there has been strong degree of institutionalization with the departure of Army General Gatot Nurmantyo and the arrival of Air Marshall Hadi Tjahjanto. Those two cases of transfer of top leadership within the armed forces basically suggests that the control of the civilian authority over the armed forces has been strongly established.

It does not mean, however, that there are absence of ups and downs in the establishment of civilian control over the armed forces. The relationship between retired Army General Moeldoko and President Widodo was said to strain after the former departure from TNI leadership. Moeldoko was not even considered to hold political portfolio after his retirement, which was not a common practice in Indonesian politics since the role of retired generals are still relatively strong. As Moeldoko struggled to get into politics, his activities following his retirement was practically unheard. It was not until 2017 when he was appointed to represent President Widodo in the wedding of the President's daughter to give speech on his behalf. In Javanese tradition, representative of the host, in this case the bride's family, is a symbol that the appointed person is someone who is dearly at the heart of the bride's family. It was a coincidence that this appointment came when the relationship between President Widodo and the then current *Panglima* Army General Nurmantyo was tense. General Nurmantyo had been involved in a series of political debacle due to his keen involvement in day-to-day politics especially surrounding the local election in Jakarta. His decisions and behaviors have been under critics from NGOs activists that finally led them to call for early retirement of General Nurmantyo from his post. He was in fact replaced from his position few months before his retirement age, a practice that is uncommon in Indonesia.

As also noted in this dissertations, several scandals involving high-level of the armed forces leadership or the armed forces as an organization also suggests the ups and downs in civilian control over the armed forces. The case of the purchase of AW101 suggests that when it comes to their organizational needs and plans, the armed forces can be very stubborn in following orders from civilian leaderships. While this cannot be simply seen as a sign of insubordination, this off course can be interpreted as resistance. Hence, to end this study, this dissertation has shown that the progress of the military reform has its limitation on the interests of the armed forces.



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Appendix 1.

List of interviews

1. Andi Widjajanto

Widjajanto is one among few scholars with close relationship with the armed forces. He was involved in the drafting of the Law on TNI, the Minimum Essential Force document, the Defense White Paper 2003 and 2008, as well as the Defense Doctrine. He served as Secretary of the Cabinet of the Joko Widodo administration in 2014-2015. The interview was conducted in Jakarta in January 2017 in the Indonesian language. In addition to this interview, we also exchanged views in separated occasions due to our close personal relationship.

2. Edy Prasetyono

Prasetyono is also one among few scholars with close relationship with the armed forces. He was involved in the drafting of the Law on National Defense, the Defense White Paper 2003, 2008, and 2015 as well as the Minimum Essential Force document. The interview was conducted in Jakarta in January 2017 in the Indonesian language. In addition to this interview, we also exchanged views in separated occasions due to our close personal relationship.

3. General Endriartono Sutarto

Sutarto was *Panglima* TNI during 2002-2006. He served under both Megawati and Yudhoyono presidencies. He was known as traditionalist within the Army and TNI. The interview was conducted in Jakarta in April 2017 in the Indonesian language.

4. Erry Riyana Hardjapamekas

Hardjapamekas used to serve as Deputy Director of KPK before he was appointed as the Head of TNPBT in 2008. The interview was conducted in Jakarta in April 2017 in the Indonesian language.

(Note: All records of the interview (recording) are with the author. Due to some sensitive contents, disclosure of the records should be conducted by permission of the author. Interviews were conducted unstructured in which all resource-persons agree to be clearly identified.)

Appendix 2.

A short history of TNI (Timeline)


23 August 1945	Badan Keamanan Rakyat (BKR)
5 October 1945	Tentara Keamanan Rakyat (TKR)
7 January 1946	Tentara Keselamatan Rakyat (TKR)
26 January 1946	Tentara Republik Indonesia (TRI)
3 June 1947	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)
5 March 1948	Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (APRI)
1949 (no clear date)	Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia Serikat (APRIS)
1950 (no clear date)	Angkatan Perang Republik Indonesia (APRI)
21 June 1962	Angkatan Bersenjata Republik Indonesia (ABRI)
1 April 1999	Tentara Nasional Indonesia (TNI)



Appendix 3.


Territorial command structure of TNI

TNI AD



Note: The latest mapping of the Army territorial command structure has yet officially been released. Celebes has been divided into two Kodam and Papua has also been divided into two Kodam

TNI AL



TNI AU

