THE DIALOGUE OVER WAR AND PEACE IN THE UNITED STATES

A Discursive Institutionalist Analysis

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How should we analyze the dialogue over war and peace in the United States? If, as many studies hold, an important part of the debate is about justifying and rebutting justifications of martial policies, how do those attempts work in terms of argument types and strategies? Furthermore, what are those strategies, and how do they function to mobilize support for either side? Extant research on the details involved in such questions is surprisingly scant. To rectify this, the present work analyzes the dialogue and typologizes the arguments used by proponents and opponents by organizing them into categories. I deploy a discursive institutionalist methodology, combining new research on the arguments used by proponents of war with previous work on opposition to wars. The study provides a new understanding of the constituent arguments, norms, and typologies of recent political discussions concerning war and peace in the United States. In so doing, this article offers a new explanation of the dynamics of the debate as well as a thorough rendering of the positions participants take when supporting and opposing the use of armed force.

Keywords: foreign policy, United States, discursive institutionalist analysis, opposition to war, understanding political dialogues on war, explaining dynamics of war debates.

¿Cómo debemos analizar el diálogo sobre la guerra y la paz en los Estados Unidos? Si, como muchos estudios sostienen, una parte importante del debate trata de justificar y refutar los argumentos de las políticas marciales, ¿cuál es el resultado de

esos intentos en términos de tipos de argumentos y estrategias? Además, ¿cuáles son esas estrategias, y cómo funcionan para movilizar apoyo hacia ambas partes? La literatura existente sobre los detalles involucrados en estos temas es sorprendentemente escasa. Para corregir esto, el presente trabajo analiza el diálogo y clasifica los argumentos utilizados por los proponentes y opositores organizándolos en categorías. Se implementa una metodología discursiva institucionalista, combinando investigaciones recientes sobre los argumentos utilizados por los defensores del conflicto armado con trabajos anteriores con posturas opuestas a las guerras. El estudio proporciona una nueva perspectiva de los argumentos constituyentes, las normas y las tipologías de las discusiones políticas recientes sobre la guerra y la paz en los Estados Unidos. Al hacerlo, este artículo ofrece una nueva explicación de la dinámica del debate, así como una representación exhaustiva de las posiciones que toman los participantes al apoyar y oponerse al uso de la fuerza armada.

Palabras clave: Política Exterior, Estados Unidos, Análisis de Institucionalismo Discursivo, Oposición a la Guerra, Entendiendo Diálogos Políticos sobre la Guerra, Explicación de la Dinámica de Debates sobre la Guerra.

美国战争与和平对话：话语性制度主义分析

我们应如何分析美国战争与和平对话？如果像许多研究的观点一样,辩论主要是关于军事政治证词的维护和反驳,那么这些维护和反驳的论点类型及策略又是如何进行的呢？再者,策略是什么,如何发挥作用支持各自的观点？令人惊讶的是,关于这些细节的现有研究寥寥无几。为探索这一问题,当前的工作分析了对话,并将对话中正方和反方所持的不同论点进行组织分类。本文将关于正方(支持战争)论点的新研究和以往对反方(反对战争)的研究结合在一起,同时运用了话语性制度主义(*discursive institutionalist*) 的方法论。本文提供新观点,用于理解近期有关美国战争与和平政治讨论中的选民观点、规范和类型。为此,本文提供了该政治辩论动态的最新解释,同时还呈现了参与者在支持和反对使用武力时的政治立场。

关键词：外交政策，美国，话语性制度主义分析,反对战争,理解战争政治对话,解释战争辩论动态.

A public dialogue over war and peace in the United States takes place among elites every time government officials contemplate the use of military force. How should we understand this dialogue? What is its substance? What are its contours and strategies? What arguments do the participants use? What are the functions of those arguments? How can

we classify the various participants in the debate in a way that makes sense of their positions on issues of war and peace? And what insight can we derive from the example of an experienced figure like Richard Haass (2009), who supported the First Gulf War by labeling it a conflict characterized by "necessity," but then opposed the Second Gulf War, arguing that it was a war of "choice"?

This study addresses these queries by drawing upon a database of over 400 arguments used by approximately 150 elite participants in debates over the use of military force that have taken place in the United States since the early 1800s. It holds that the discursive institutionalist approach developed here best allows us to make sense of and account for the workings of this debate over time. Specifically, I identify four norms as the foundational ground over which debates are conducted as well as identify, classify, and explain the functions of particular arguments. The article covers the general strategies used by proponents and opponents of wars and armed interventions and provides a different categorization of participants in the debate than previously identified. Finally, I offer reasons for the complicated nature of the debate that extend beyond alluding to the entrenched positions of its participants.

Background

Understanding the nature of the debates that take place among political elites addressing questions of war and peace in the United States is an important project. Nowhere have such debates been more hotly contested than in the United States, or have lately had more global impact. However, important questions regarding this dialogue remain open.

We do know the following. We know that there is a public conversation among political elites regarding decisions to use military force. Policy makers do not make decisions to use force without publicly discussing their merits. Officials and other elites put much time and effort into these public discussions and appear to believe they are important. Moreover, they have engaged in such discussions since the beginning of the American state and have continued to do so consistently (Hunt 2009). We likewise know that this dialogue encompasses more than one side. Participants include policy makers and their supporters who defend the decision to use force, and various critics who attack that decision. Decisions to use the military are invariably marked by disagreement and often by sharp conflict (see Huntington 1982; Kupchan and Trubowitz 2007; Mayers 2007; Polner and Woods 2008; Scanlon 2013; Weston 2005).

We also know that the debate is characterized by the presence of identifiable arguments which often reoccur over time, and that a wide variety of arguments have been used over the course of American history (see Dumbrell 1999; Hilfrich 2012; Johnstone 2011; Mayers 2007; Mead 2003; Polner and Woods 2008). Various scholars have suggested that this dialogue and the arguments within it serve important functional purposes. One observation is that these arguments are part of the policy-making process. Khong (1992) holds that arguments which incorporate historical analogies perform significant cognitive functions that are important for making policy decisions, but we can also see that the functions Khong associates with analogies shed light on the roles played by various types of arguments in the larger dialogue. These functions include (1) defining the situation and problem, (2) identifying the stakes involved, (3) identifying possible solutions and policies, (4) assessing proposed solutions in terms of probable success, (5) evaluating policy solutions by means of moral standards, and (6) identifying possible dangers associated with policy solutions.

Another observation regarding function is the proposition that both proponents and opponents of martial policies must employ public arguments to mobilize support for their position(s) among a pluralistic elite and general public and in the context of a fragmented political system. Officials cannot implement martial policies without support from various national institutions, and to gain that support, they must appeal to fellow elites and to the general public. Yet opponents must also appeal to other elites and the general public to block those policies, particularly in the face of the structural advantages and power of initiative which government officials possess (see Chan and Safran 2006; Elman 2000; Schroeder 1973; Weston 2005). A third proposition regarding function is that the dialogue and the arguments within it are important in setting the strength of the public support for a military action that has been taken. The stronger the support, the more willing the public is to back such endeavors in the face of casualties, and vice versa. Ongoing support or lack thereof, in turn, is determined by the degree to which supporters are able persuade the public that the action is justified and that there is a plan of action which promises success (Chan and Safran 2006; Gelpi *et al.* 2009).

But beyond these findings and propositions, important questions remain. A central problem is the absence of a convincing account of the grounds over which elite arguments take place and make the dialogue a dialogue with meaningful political outcomes. What is the

common ground over which arguments are deployed, and how might it be accessed in ways that allow people with different positions on particular martial policies to employ strategies through which the support of fellow elites and the general public can be gained? If, as the preceding studies hold, an important part of the debate is about justifying and rebutting justifications of martial policies, how do those attempts work and what are the discursive strategies involved? Furthermore, how do arguments function to mobilize support for either side?

One problematic set of attempts to grapple with this question depicts that common ground as understandings of American exceptionalism, and thus the dialogue as consisting of competing attempts to lay claim to a position that accords with that characteristic. For Davis and Lynn-Jones (1987), McCartney (2004), Patman (2006), and B. C. Schmidt and Williams (2008), meaningful arguments and participants in foreign policy debates assume some form of exceptionalism. Differences among influential participants arise because of the variety of ways that exceptionalism is understood. Yet this is unsatisfactory on several levels. Substantively, as B. C. Schmidt and Williams (2008) recognize, not all participants in the debate understand the United States in terms of exceptionalism, and it is not the case that those who do not do so have no political influence. Various realist arguments, some arguments that depict military action as having ironic effects, as well as many arguments invoking values, understand the world in universalist terms. Among proponents, it is clear that modern elites following Woodrow Wilson, and more contemporary figures such as both George Bushes and Barack Obama embraced universalism in terms of values, while Richard Nixon supported the war in Vietnam in the mid-1960s on decidedly nonexceptionalist realist grounds. Likewise, J. William Fulbright, Martin Luther King, and Ron Paul, among others, have opposed military actions by referring to nonexceptionalist reasons, and one cannot credibly claim that these figures have not been important voices in this dialogue.

The second problem with this line of analysis is that in understanding the foundations of the debate in such narrowly ideological terms, one loses the ability to recognize all the arguments that are used and subsequently one loses the ability to grasp the political strategies and overall positions of the various participants. Without a full understanding of the types of arguments deployed, we cannot grasp how supporters and opponents of wars and interventions systematically appraise the use of military force, how they go about the job of mobilizing support for

their policy positions, and how, in larger terms, participants approach the problem of winning political encounters over martial policies.

Similar problems affect the attempt to ground proponents' arguments in fear (Thrall and Cramer 2009), patriotism (Schroeder 1973), or deception (Schuessler 2015). Such analyses can account for some arguments in the dialogue, and also outline important parts of proponents' tactics. But these approaches cannot account for all proponent arguments—particularly those that reference values—nor for any of the arguments of opponents of military action. Thus, these studies, like those noted above, are useful for fleshing out the effectiveness of particular arguments, but not for the task of accounting for the overall debate, for understanding the mechanics of justification and rebuttal, or for understanding strategies.

A third approach finds participants in the dialogue dealing in various values and traditions. Most of this literature attempts to grasp general foreign policy understandings in ways that emphasize differences in foreign policy positions and the foundational bases for those differences. For Walter Mead (2003), foreign policy debates are informed by the use of four foreign policy orientations grounded in distinctive understandings of the United States, the world, power, politics, and economics derived from an integrated set of social and intellectual orientations: Jeffersonianism, Hamiltonianism, Jacksonianism, and Wilsonianism inform particular positions which Americans take on foreign policy issues (Mead 2003). Likewise, Nau (2016) points to nationalism, internationalism, and realism as relevant, timeless American foreign policy traditions, while Rubenstein (2010) identifies an American civil religion that supplies virtues which inform a set of acceptable reasons for war.

Wittkopf (1986) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990) set the general foreign policy debate in terms of particular orientations the public have to the outside world, dominated by a fundamental division between two understandings. First is a welcoming understanding of "cooperative internationalism," in which the world is seen as relatively benign and the United States best operates by means of joint ventures with allies and international organizations. In contrast is "militant internationalism." This understanding views the world in more Hobbesian terms, privileges immediate security concerns, and tends toward unilateralism. Rathbun and others (2016) build on this basic analysis by turning to social psychology and the individual political values that people hold to perform functions related to group interactions, intergroup

interactions, and self-actualization. Members of the general public take the divergent positions identified by Wittkopf (1986) and Holsti and Rosenau (1990) (as well as an isolationist tendency identified in other literature); this analysis holds, because they use the same divergent values—identified by the social psychologist Shalom Schwartz (1992, 1994; see also Schwartz *et al.* 2010)—that inform their sociopolitical analysis of domestic and personal matters to understand foreign affairs.

Like Mead's contribution, one can grasp from this social values-based analysis certain elements of the debate over martial policies. Indeed, the traditions and social values approach might account better for the range of arguments than any of the other approaches surveyed here. Mead (2003) usefully identifies Jeffersonian warnings against the erosion of the republic, Jacksonian insistence on the primacy of security, Hamiltonian defenses of trade, and Wilsonian attempts to spread values. Meanwhile, as Rathbun and others (2016) note, invocations of deterrence and credibility flow easily from the position occupied by militant internationalists and the values associated with conservation (security, tradition, and conformity), while ironic arguments regarding the inevitable failure of unilateral military actions, or the undesirable and unintended consequences of such policies, can be accounted for by cooperative internationalism and the value of universalism. It is also the case that this analysis (along with Nau's 2016 analysis and the exceptionalist literature) exposes important fault lines in the debate, particularly those associated with differences over exceptionalism versus universalism, and nationalism versus multilateralism.

Nonetheless, much of the debate is still left out by both these approaches. Mead's discussion cannot account for any of the realist justifications for action, nor for the non-Jeffersonian denunciations of the policy-making process (such as references to special interests or psychologically distorted environments). The social values approach misses many of the same arguments on both sides of the debate. This general literature—whether based on public opinion analyses, the assessment of traditions, or social values analyses—also greatly simplifies the variety of grounds on which elites either support or oppose military action. The division of the entire universe of elites into four groups (Mead 2003) or citizens into three (Rathbun *et al.* 2016) inevitably must group together in a single category people who do not agree on why military action is undesirable, as well as various people who may support some military actions but oppose others. So, for example, both Richard Nixon and Lyndon Johnson supported the war in Vietnam in the mid-1960s. Does

it significantly further our analysis to place them in a single militant internationalist category? Likewise, Ron Paul (2007, 2013) and Noam Chomsky (2002, 2004, 2007, 2010) oppose almost all contemporary American military interventions. Is it sufficient to understand their positions to hold that they both embrace the value of universalism? In which category should we place Richard Haass? Even if these analyses fit understandings of the general public, they do not fit well the elite participants in the debate.

But more importantly, the overall impression one gains from studies that fixate only on positions, traditions, or social values is that debates over issues of war and peace consist of disconnected arguments flung out amid random encounters among the participants, who either occupy, or are faced by, isolated islands of intellectual orientations or values and are confined by that political geography to only speaking to strictly like-minded citizens. One can discern no larger discourse community encompassing the American polity within which the debate takes place, and at best, the dialogue in this understanding is only about mobilizing those who are already predisposed to one's position (see Patman 2006; Rathbun *et al.* 2016).

But this is surely an overstatement of the actual situation. While it is true that proponents and opponents often talk past one another (as do opponents among themselves, but for other reasons), and opponents of military campaigns in particular sometimes use arguments that are most useful for mobilizing the faithful, there is a discernible dialogue in which interlocutors engage one another. Barack Obama's (2013a) acknowledgment of arguments against his proposal to intervene in Libya is but one instance in which an elite proponent directly addressed objections to a martial policy (see also Cass 1847; Polk 1846). Moreover, an important political strategy in any pluralistic political system is the attempt to maximize support in a zero-sum political environment and therefore the attempt to capture support from the uncommitted and those in the opposing camp who might be persuaded to change their position on any particular military action. Government officials have particularly strong electoral incentives to appeal to wide audiences. There is little room in the positions literature for recognition of such a strategy, nor the tactics by which participants would engage in such a strategy. So while such studies are useful for understanding the broad contours of foreign policy orientations, and in the case of the Rathbun and others' (2016) analysis, the particular foreign policy moorings of ordinary citizens, they do not provide sufficient foundations for

completely grasping the content, strategies, and dynamics of the elite dialogue over issues of war and peace.

Hunt's (2009) understanding of ideology escapes some of these problems, but poses another. Hunt holds that justifications for policies, and increasingly over time the policies themselves, are informed by a set of values and concepts that have become tightly integrated and largely accepted. These coalesced into three large themes: the greatness of the United States, racial hierarchy, and opposition to revolution. Such an understanding usefully allows Hunt to look at the substance of justifications and to trace that substance back through time and downward into a common foundation of ideological elements. He also identifies many oppositional arguments, particularly those deployed against the Mexican War. But this analysis does not permit identification of all the arguments in the dialogue (importantly those that criticize martial policies by denouncing the policy-making process), nor does it account for the clash of arguments in the dialogue that comes in the form of justifications and rebuttals. In short, Hunt's descriptions of those arguments do not allow us to understand the dynamics of the debate. In particular, how do those arguments attempt to establish or undermine the case for war? Hunt (2009, 69–77, 92–97) refers merely to the rehearsal of accepted ideas on both sides of the debate, one side pushing military action by referencing one variant of the themes he identifies and the other pushing a different variant. But he does not clearly identify the means by which such rehearsals function to justify those policies or rebut those justifications.

Moreover, Hunt's (2009) discussion does not take into account the complexities of the debate, particularly situations in which participants do not directly engage the other side's arguments. I argue that those complexities are not created by the presence of people who cannot speak to one another, but due to the fact that (1) people argue differently depending on which side of the dialogue they are on (even when they are on the other side at other times) and (2) each side of the dialogue is, itself, complex.

Understanding the Dialogue through Discursive Institutionalism

Given these problems, I argue that we should turn elsewhere for ways to understand this dialogue. In particular, we need an alternative method that allows us to understand the basis for the debate, the strategies and tactics used, and the breadth of arguments that are employed. Given that we know the dialogue takes place in the form of various types of justifications of martial policies and rebuttals of those justifications, I

turn to discursive institutionalism (see V. Schmidt 2010) as the method for identifying the foundations of those activities.

Discursive institutionalism focuses on how arguments within a dialogue invoke generally accepted norms in the form of rules or principles. Postulating that the debate operates through references to norms furnishes us with an understanding of a common ground that accounts for the power and function of invocations. To justify a policy in this conception does not merely mean referencing a set of values or a cultural theme; it is to demonstrate that the policy meets particular requirements that are binding on policy makers due to the general acceptance of deep, comprehensive political rules or principles. Likewise, to rebut a justification does not necessarily entail the invocation of a value different from those that policy makers claim for the policy. Rather, it entails a demonstration that a policy does not meet, or violates, some set of binding requirements. This method leads us to conceptualize the dialogue as composed of attempts at legitimation and delegitimation, as well as the deployment of practical advocacies and critiques. To legitimize a policy or engage in advocacy means to provide a case that a policy conforms to a norm or norms. Legitimations entail the claim that the policy abides by what can be called the "ought of the norm"; advocacy holds that the policy will attain the end the norm demands. Delegitimizations claim that a policy violates the ought of the norm; critiques are constituted by claims that the action will not attain the end demanded by the norm, either by falling short or by creating conditions contrary to those it demands.

Exploring arguments as legitimations, delegitimations, advocacies, and critiques allows us to grasp the assumptions, judgments, and issues that both proponents and opponents bring to the policy debate by focusing our attention on how the elements of particular arguments match up with particular norms, and how arguments are used to invoke particular norms. Such an exploration also helps us make sense of the various positions that participants take when they support or oppose the use of military force. Participants are political elites: members of the federal executive branch, members of Congress, and important national opinion leaders.

Arguments and Typologies

The first step in using this methodology is to identify all the most important and relevant arguments. Assuming a foundation of norms frees us in this endeavor; we need not be confined by the constraints imposed by assuming the existence of traditions, values, or emotional states. Here a qualitative method is used that takes sentences and paragraphs as the unit

of analysis. We look for contentions that provide an independent reason for supporting or opposing a military action. An example of a separate, identifiable argument is this justification by Rep. Burr (2002) of G. W. Bush's proposal to invade Iraq:

> No matter how well we protect our borders, increase our military spending, and strengthen our intelligence community, we cannot secure our homeland without eliminating the threat Saddam Hussein's weapons present to America and to the world.

While Burr does not argue at great length in this example, he alludes to a recognizable "Forward Defense" argument. He holds that American security can only be maintained by projecting American military power beyond its borders, and that threats to American security should be understood to entail more than direct attacks on American territory and citizens.

The next step is to typologize the arguments used by proponents and opponents by organizing them into categories. In examining arguments found in the sample, three broad categories are found on each side of the dialogue. These categories are not the same. Proponents' arguments are susceptible to a straightforward exercise in cataloging by referencing their substance. *Realist* arguments all refer to the importance of securing the state, its citizens, and its territory.[1] *Nationalist* arguments reference the importance of politically subordinating individual preferences to the protection of the state and its prosperity, while the *American Values* category references the importance of defending and furthering American values. The categorization of opponents' arguments is somewhat more complex. Understanding how they hold together entails looking beyond their immediate substance to larger characteristics. The first category of arguments examines the *Contexts of Policy Making*. The second attacks policies based on their *Nature and Outcomes*. The third justifies opposition by characterizing the contexts in which policies are implemented by references to the *Nature of the Outside World*.[2] Types of proponent and opposition arguments, respectively, are listed in Tables 1 and 2 below. For more details, see the Appendices, Tables A1 and A2.

[1]This label is not meant to indicate that these arguments accord in full with any specific understanding of realism understood in academic terms.

[2]Racist arguments holding that other peoples were too uncivilized or unruly to be allowed to rule themselves were also used as justifications. For an overview, see Hunt (2009, chap. 3).

Table 1.
Proponents' Arguments.

Realist Arguments
Security: Military action is necessary because American territories or citizens have been or are in immediate danger of being attacked.
Deterrence: Military action is necessary to resolve a current conflict to directly discourage through demonstrations of power and will current actual or potential foes from attacking the United States.
Reputation: Military action is necessary to resolve a current conflict to establish American willingness to use force to defend its interests.
Domino Theory: Military action in defense of a friend or ally is necessary because the loss of one state will alter the balance of power and, by the addition of territory and resources to the control of opponents, lead to further losses.
Credibility: Military action in defense of a friend or ally is necessary to encourage allies and discourage foes through instances of promise keeping.
Forward Defense: The defense of American territories, borders, citizens, and interests cannot be achieved without venturing further into the world to confront and defeat threats through military force and the defense of allies and friends.
Diplomacy Is Futile: Military action is necessary because all peaceful diplomatic means for settling a dispute that threatens American security have been tried and failed.
Existing Hostilities: Military action is necessary because an opponent has already attacked the United States and a state of war exists.
Aggression: Armed conflict is necessary to stop aggressors before they gain momentum.
Realist Advocacy: Sufficient material, unity, spirit, and strategies are available to believe that a military endeavor will be successful.
Nationalist Arguments
Majority: A majority of Americans approve of the military action.
Trade: Military action is necessary to protect American trade and commerce.
Patriotism: Everyone must support officials in their decision to use military force to resolve a conflict.
Partisanship: Opposition to martial policies must cease because it is motivated by the desire to score political points.
Domestic Benefits: The war will bring the United States tangible goods such as territory or natural resources.
Constitutional: Policy makers have followed all relevant Constitutional procedures.
American Value Arguments
Democracy: Military action is needed to defend and promote democracy in the world.
Freedom: Military action is needed to defend and promote freedom in the world.
Human Rights: Military action is needed to defend human rights.
Peace: Military action is needed to eliminate aggressors and bring about peace.
Self Determination: All nations have the right to determine their own affairs.
International Law and Order: Military action is needed for purposes of creating a world order or supporting civilization.

Table 2.
Opposition Arguments.

Procedural Objections
Constitutional: The process by which the decision to use military force was made violated Constitutional strictures.
Democracy: The decision to use military force is opposed by the majority of Americans.
Special Interests: The decision to use military force was dictated by parties who profit from wars.
Psychological Atmosphere: The environment in which the decision to use military force was taken was contaminated by unreasonable fear, prejudice, or arrogance such that policy makers and even the general public is unbalanced.
Objections to the Nature and Outcomes of Policies
Jeffersonian: The use of military force and the accompanying developments fatally erode the republic's institutions and politics.
Irony: Military action in the present circumstances will achieve the opposite of its stated objectives.
Futility: Military action as a policy choice will never achieve the stated objectives.
Just War: The proposed military action violates just war principles.
Kantian Practical: The proposed military action is too expensive in terms of material provisions or America lives.
Blowback: Military action will harm American security by creating enemies.
America First: The proposed military action will divert important attention and resources away from more important objectives, such as defense of the homeland or domestic reform.
Moral: The proposed military action represents an immoral way of attempting to resolve the present dispute given the availability of other means of resolution.
Jacksonian: The proposed military action does not involve the immediate defense of American territory or American lives.
Sovereignty: The proposed military action will violate the sovereignty of another state.
Objections Based on the Nature of the Outside World
Futility II: No type of outside action can solve the problems or achieve the objectives of the military action.
The World Is a Jungle: The world is and always will be filled with conflicts and problems. Either the decision to intervene will be arbitrary, or the decision to intervene in one must be based on criteria so broad that there will be equal reason to intervene in all, which is an impossible task.
Defensive Realist: The decision to use military force will create a security dilemma in which another state must react to the American use of force by undertaking actions that will threaten American security.
Laissez-faire: The use of any outside force to improve the conditions of a country is unnecessary and harmful because populations must be left alone to find their way to a better life.

Identifying Norms

The next move is to identify similar arguments from both proponents and opponents as a way of identifying relevant norms. Looking over the history of the debate, what themes have been the focus of legitimation, delegitimation, advocacy, and critique? Unsurprisingly, the most immediately identifiable group of arguments to be found among both proponents and opponents references security. On the proponents' side, one finds straightforward arguments holding that security is endangered, contentions that armed force is necessary because diplomatic efforts to resolve a dangerous conflict are useless (Kennedy 1962; McKinley 1898; Polk 1846; Wilson 1917), references to evidence that armed hostilities are already ongoing (Polk 1846; Wilson 1917), discussions of deterrence (Goldwater 1964; Polk 1846), and propositions regarding the need to bolster a reputation for strength and willingness to use force in defense of national interests (House Report 1812; Kennedy 1961, 1962; Polk 1846). Alternatively, the opposition sometimes opposes policy by referring to the undesirable outcomes of martial policies that invoke security dilemmas and other ironic results involving American security (Hoover 1938; Paul 2007; D.D. B 1847). This points to the relevance of a *Security Norm*: policy makers have a responsibility to defend the territory, sovereignty, citizens, and interests of the United States. Everyone must support leaders who are engaged in policies that further and protect American security, and likewise must oppose policies that endanger that security.[3]

Another group of arguments refers to political procedures and related elements of the political environment. These are predominantly found on the oppositional side. These include Jeffersonian laments regarding the erosion of republican institutions and politics (e.g., Boutwell 1900; Garrett 1953; Hoover 1938; King 1967; McCarthy 1967; Paul 2007, 2013), accusations of interference by special interests in the policy-making process (Keller 1916; Paul 2007, 2013; Taggert 1812; Thoreau 1849 [1993]), arguments that military force is opposed by the majority of citizens (Boutwell 1900; Chomsky 2010; Thoreau 1849), and

[3]Independent verification of the existence of this norm can be found in the Preamble; Article I, section 8; Article II, section 2, and Article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution. Also, references can be found in the Declaration of Independence to the duty of a government to provide security.

references to a distorted psychological atmosphere that has warped the policy decision (Fulbright 1967; Garrett 1953; King 1967; Taggert 1812). On the proponent side are assertions that the right procedures have been followed, officials are correctly discharging their duties, and that the majority supports the conflict. These indicate the relevance of a *Constitutional Norm*: everyone has the responsibility to follow the procedures set out by the Constitution and to protect the constitutional, democratic, and liberal order of the United States when formulating and implementing martial policies.[4]

A third group of arguments references explicit ideological values. On both sides, we find allusions to freedom, democracy, self-determination, human rights, and peace (see Anonymous 1852; Fulbright 1967; Kennedy 1962; King 1967; Lodge 1899; Paul 2007; Taggert 1812; Wilson 1917). These indicate the relevance of an *American Values Norm*: everyone has the duty to respect, implement, and further American values, including those of democracy and freedom, and to oppose policies which harm or erode those values.[5] A fourth group of arguments is comprised of practical critiques of war policies (which hold that armed force is useless or counterproductive) (Boutwell 1900; King 1967; Paul 2007) and references to the need to use the resources that would be expended elsewhere (for national defense, social programs, to repay the debt, or to concentrate on political reform as a whole) (see King 1967; Paul 2007, 2013; Taggert 1812). Proponents in turn sometimes reference the need to protect trade and other economic interests and also occasionally argue that military operations will be successful and will bring tangible benefits to the United States (see House Report 1812). These all point to the relevance of a *General Welfare Norm*: everyone has the responsibility to defend and further the material and other interests of the United States, including increasing and protecting its trade, protecting and enhancing the happiness and well-being of its citizens, and acting as a careful steward of its resources.[6]

[4]Article II, section 1; Article IV, section 4 of the U.S. Constitution.

[5]Preamble; Article I, section 9; Article I, section 10; Article III, section 3; Article III, section 4; Article III, section 6; Amendments 1-10, 13-15, 24, and 26. Also, the list of rights found in the Declaration of Independence.

[6]Preamble and Article I section 8 of the Constitution; the Declaration of Independence also contains language stipulating the duties of government regarding the general welfare.

Table 3.
Proponents' Arguments and Norms.

Security Norm	All arguments in the Realist category, along with Patriotism and Partisan arguments
Constitutional Norm	Constitutional and Majority arguments
American Values Norm	All American Values arguments
General Welfare Norm	Trade (legitimation), Realist Advocacy, and Domestic Benefits arguments

These four norms set out the contours of the dialogue over war and peace in the United States. The Security and Value norms supply most of the primary substantive "oughts" and goals which proponents reference when attempting to justify military action (trade, which is informed by the General Welfare Norm, is the outlier). When opponents attack the substance and goals of such policies, it is the oughts and goals associated with securing the United States and respecting or spreading American values that they most often reference. The Constitutional and General Welfare Norms, in elevating the importance of procedure, material resources, or prosperity, for the most part, supply oughts and goals relevant to *how* security and values are to be, or should be, defended and furthered. Opponents rather than proponents predominantly reference these norms.

The Functions of Types of Arguments

We can now go further and identify which arguments perform which function in terms of legitimation, delegitimation, advocacy, and critique. All but two of the proponents' arguments discussed here are legitimations. They hold that military action meets important oughts contained in one or more of the norms, as listed in Table 3.

Proponent arguments are concentrated in references to the Security and American Values Norms. In Khong's (1992, 20–46) terms, Security, Existing Hostilities, Deterrence, Domino Theory, Credibility, and Forward Defense identify the problem and the stakes at hand by reference to the Security Norm, and Diplomacy Is Futile arguments dismiss alternatives to a martial policy due to the difficulties involved. Realist Advocacy and Domestic Benefits as advocacy arguments address the chances for success and the stakes involved.

In contrast, oppositional arguments are more diverse in their functions, being split more evenly between delegitimations and practical critiques and among the four norms. Let us look first to the delegitimations, as presented in Table 4.

Table 4.
Delegitimation and Norms.

Security Norm	Jacksonian, Defensive Realist arguments
Constitutional Norm	Jeffersonian and all Procedural arguments
American Values Norm	Moral, Sovereignty, Democracy, Freedom, Just War, Laissez-faire, and Futility I arguments
General Welfare Norm	America First and Kantian Practical arguments

Table 5.
Critiques and Norms.

Security Norm	Futility II, The World Is a Jungle, and Irony arguments
General Welfare Norm	Futility II, Defensive Realism, The World Is a Jungle, and Irony Arguments

Delegitimations mostly address the Constitutional and American Values Norms, but can also invoke the Security Norm. With regard to the latter, Defensive Realist and Jacksonian arguments identify the problem and the stakes involved. Those addressing the Constitutional and American Values Norm assess the proposed problem morally as well as identify the stakes involved.

Critiques are concentrated in the Security and General Welfare Norms and generally identify the difficulties associated with proposed policy solutions, as listed in Table 5.

This analysis tells us several additional things. First, we see one reason why opponents and proponents do not always use arguments that directly oppose each other. The functions of legitimation and advocacy on the one side, and delegitimation and practical critiques on the other, are performed by arguments whose substance conforms to somewhat different patterns. These patterns indicate different strategies and tactics. Proponents supply arguments that focus on the circumstances of the conflict, what is at stake in the conflict, and the duties of citizens and officials in the context of the conflict. The conflict which gives rise to the military policy is therefore at the center of their arguments, and they attempt to keep the focus of the dialogue on that conflict and related topics. They hold that military action is necessary and urgent by maintaining that war has already begun, that diplomacy is useless for favorably settling the dispute, and that foes must be deterred, allies

reassured, and values upheld. They also sometimes argue that critics and political opponents have patriotic obligations to support their policy stance. They tend to refer to policy-making processes only defensively, and increasingly rarely. Thus, as noted above, their arguments invoke the Security and American Values Norms much more often than they do the Constitutional and General Welfare Norms.

Opponents in contrast refuse to be tied to discussions of the conflict itself. They will discuss the conflict and its implications as well as the substance of the martial policy, but also turn their attention to matters that proponents deem extraneous, most importantly, the environments of policy making and policy implementation. How officials in the United States react to conflicts on the front end and how people outside the United States react to military actions on the back end of military actions are not superfluous topics to opponents; on the contrary, they often see those subjects as crucial because they shed light on important political dimensions related to current and future conflicts. Many opponents seek to broaden discussions of the future beyond the narrow references to reputation, deterrence, and credibility which proponents supply in the international context by referencing the irony and futility of operating militarily abroad, including the possibility of generating dangerous blowback. In turn, when condemning domestic policy-making processes as antidemocratic, populated by psychologically unbalanced participants, or driven by special interests, opponents not only question the connection of a particular policy with the issues of security or values proponents seek to establish; by querying those processes, they also attempt to disperse the pressure to act immediately which proponents generate when they argue that military action is necessary and urgent. Opponents are therefore just as comfortable referencing the Constitutional and General Welfare Norms as they are the Realist and American Values Norms.

Strategies

The preceding analysis can be extended to generate a consideration of strategies. In examining proponents' arguments, two patterns emerge: arguments overwhelmingly focus on legitimations, and legitimations mostly reference the Security and American Values Norms. Why is this the case?

In referencing the nature of the conflict and what is at stake, proponents attempt to establish that military action is absolutely necessary, in the sense that it is both urgent and the only means by which the Security

or American Values Norm can be satisfied. One dimension of this strategy is to convince the public that the danger is real, is important, and requires immediate action. Propositions such as the Security, Credibility, and Deterrence arguments, along with those which hold that Diplomacy Is Futile and various American Values arguments establish that military action is the only viable policy option and that it must be implemented immediately. Proponents variously put forward arguments that American territory, personnel, trade, or allies are under attack and must be protected in the short and long terms (House Report 1812; Kennedy 1962). Diplomacy has been tried and failed; international opponents cannot be trusted (Kennedy 1962; Polk 1846; Wilson 1917). Freedom, democracy, and peace are all immediately imperiled (Wilson 1917). Further negotiations will only worsen the security and political situations by signaling weakness (Polk 1846). Opponents must be confronted lest allies and resources be lost and competitors encouraged to engage in further aggressions (Goldwater 1964). In contrast, the other dimension establishes necessity by stating or implying that officials are not rushing into war, but have been pushed into using military force as a last resort after negotiations and other peaceful means for settling the dispute have been tried and failed (Polk 1846; Wilson 1917). They are not eagerly seeking to use military force, but must resort to it in order to fulfill their duties. This is where Existing Hostilities and Diplomacy Is Futile arguments are particularly important.

This necessity strategy, as it is generally played by proponents, creates a specific dynamic. By predominantly using Realist and American Values arguments and (as time has gone on) largely avoiding the Constitutional and General Welfare Norms except in defensive references, proponents pursue a hurry-up strategy. They provide knock-down arguments meant to end the debate before it starts. Contemporary proponents, it seems, do not want an extended discussion of the merits of the proposal, to be compelled to defend its legitimacy, or to have to drag through detailed plans to demonstrate the chances of success. Rather, they hold that there is no choice: military action must be taken, and it must be successful. Inaction and failure are not options (House Report 1812; Wilson 1917). Energy should be put into preparations for the action and deploying the materiel and will necessary to win the encounter rather than in continuing to debate the policy's merits.

Arguments establishing the necessity of the case for wars or interventions have changed somewhat over time. In the past, they have been informed by the large themes that Hunt (2009) identified, with national greatness and

racial hierarchies as well as patriotic arguments particularly apparent in justifications of the Spanish War. It is worth pointing out, however, that references to these nevertheless diminished in the twentieth century as opening gambits. They have been replaced not so much by the antirevolutionary paradigm Hunt (2009, chap. 4) references as by increasing resort to the Realist category of arguments invoking security, deterrence, and credibility (particularly in the form of the Munich paradigm), and those in the Values category invoking democracy, freedom, and human rights (G. W. Bush 2003; Obama 2014). It is also increasingly the case that among high-level elites (particularly administration members), references to Patriotism and Partisanship are rare, and are generally brought out only once military force has been used, the war or intervention has begun to drag on, and oppositional arguments have begun to gain traction (Nixon 1969). They are more often employed to rally support by emphasizing national unity rather than to provide independent justifications for military action (see Scanlon 2013, chap. 5). These developments are of a kind: elites have either eschewed or delayed using Patriotic and Partisanship arguments because they now serve as distractions, themselves becoming the subject of controversy. Controversy prolongs rather than ends debate. Closure is best attained by sticking to arguments that underline necessity and urgency, and these are contributed by arguments in the Realist and Values categories listed in Table A1. For this reason, it is now better that references to patriotism or partisanship are left to nonelite outlets.

In contrast, oppositional arguments spread the discussion around many different topics. They attack the policy-making process by questioning adherence to correct procedures (Fulbright 1967; Paul 2007), querying the sanity of decision makers (Fulbright 1967; Garrett 1953), identifying special interests who allegedly distort the process in their quest for power and profits (Chomsky 2002, 2004, 2007, 2010; C. Johnson 2004), insisting that military operations contribute to the erosion of the republic or distract from other priorities (Fulbright 1967; C. Johnson 2004; King 1967; Paul 2007), and holding that the public opposes the military option, or has been tricked and its true wishes and interests have been ignored (Chomsky 2010; King 1967; Paul 2007). None of these contentions directly address the case for war that proponents predominantly make.[7] Instead of addressing the Security Norm, these arguments invoke the Constitutional or

[7]Occasionally, proponents will hold that the public supports the martial policy in question, but these are secondary and defensive references.

General Welfare Norm. Other arguments do address the Security Norm, but instead of contesting arguments that a conflict exists, opponents argue that the conflict is overblown (Paul 2007), that it is the product of imperialist activities or originated in an American-produced security dilemma (C. Johnson 2004; Pax Christi 2002), that military action will not resolve it and instead will deepen the conflict and harm American security due to blowback (C. Johnson 2004; Paul 2007, 2013), or more bluntly that military action is not necessary (Haass 2009). These arguments focus on both the front and the back end of military action, on the outcome of action, and not just events or conditions relevant to the front end.

Opposition arguments do more to directly undermine the case for military action when they attack the substance of policies and reference the nature of the outside world in the name of the Security, Values, and aspects of the General Welfare Norms. In these contributions, opponents delegitimize martial policies by holding that they will harm American security, result in less democracy and freedom and contribute to the denial of human rights at the scene of the intervention, as well as indirectly critique them as representing a waste of effort and resources. For the most part, opponents do not deny that security, order, democracy, freedom, and human rights are good and rightful objects of American policy. They instead insist that those goals will not be attained (C. Johnson 2004). Some opponents, such as Chomsky (2002, 2004, 2007, 2010), even contend that the martial policies in question are not intended to attain those goals. Instead, American hegemony or private profit are the true agenda items, and policy makers are acting in bad faith when they hold otherwise. Other opponents hold that, even if those goals were on the agenda, they cannot be attained by using military force (Paul 2007, 2013), or that they cannot be attained at all due to the nature of the outside world (Bacevich 2009).

These observations reveal the difference in strategies between proponents and opponents. Opponents are not trying to end the conversation, but to prolong it. They do have substantive arguments to deploy, but none possess the knock-down power of those that proponents have at hand. Opponents often do not appear to believe they can immediately overcome cries that the nation or important values are in peril and quickly dissuade fellow elites or the public to reject martial policies. Instead, they work to keep the question open,

to introduce doubts and caveats, and to stall the decision by drawing out the discussion, hoping that by continually querying officials their audience will come to appreciate the force of their objections, and that new weaknesses in the policy and policy-making process will be revealed. This strategy is exposed in arguments for slowing down the process and refraining from rushing to war.[8] Every day the discussion is prolonged and military action delayed is a victory for and a benefit to their side. Maybe objections will accumulate such that a critical tipping point is reached and the population turns against the operation. Perhaps a diplomatic breakthrough will occur. Not least of these benefits is the fact that delay works against the assertions of necessity and urgency which proponents so strenuously push. On balance, the longer catastrophe is averted despite the absence of military action, the less essential and exigent such action appears. This logic also holds in part after military operations begin. The longer the debate is kept alive as a serious dialogue, the more opportunity there is for the opposition to chip away at the case for war and to achieve an early end to military activities.

Positions and the Character of Proponents and Proponents

While the number and divergence of oppositional argument can importantly be explained by this overall strategy, it is important to understand that those features are also a function of the larger political agendas that opponents bring to the dialogue. Even more so than proponents, long-standing opponents of the use of military force will ground their opposition to particular armed conflicts in their overall domestic political vision, be it fundamental political reform, the conservation of American institutions, or the necessity of following international law. These divergent agendas provide another set of reasons why participants in a debate often appear to talk past one another. Opponents generally have political purposes other than opposition alone to further. When direct responses are forthcoming in the course of a debate, they more

[8]Examples include arguments by senators Ted Kennedy and Robert Byrd in reference to the Second Gulf War, and Rand Paul regarding Syria. See http://www.tedkennedy.org/ownwords/event/sais_iraq, http://www.antiwar.com/orig/byrd1.html and http://www.foxnews.com/opinion/2017/04/07/sen-rand-paul-syria-trump-and-another-unconstitutional-rush-to-war.html.

often come from proponents, who are seeking to sweep aside objections as quickly as possible. This was Obama's purpose in addressing the arguments of those who opposed his Libyan policy (Obama 2013a). But proponents are not always eager to directly engage all arguments on the other side of the dialogue. As time has gone on, proponents have become less willing to rebut arguments addressing topics of success, or to do more than the minimum to defend the policy-making process (Obama 2013b). To engage in such disputes is to enter a quagmire that bogs down the discussion with demands for proof, impedes the mobilization of support, and delays military action.

This brings us to the final piece related to this dialogue—the positions taken by a large number of the participants—that can be derived from this analysis. By understanding the dialogue as grounded in norms that might be variously interpreted and employed, we can approach the task of identifying positions in a way that creates more useful results than has hitherto been the case. First, by allowing us to grasp the entire universe of arguments on both sides of the dialogue, we are able to recognize the existence of more positions and categories than previously. The present analysis identifies six positions when examining oppositional arguments alone and (when taking subcategories into account) six additional positions when viewing the dialogue from the viewpoint of those supporting military action. These additional positions allow us to understand more clearly where any particular individual may stand in the dialogue. But second, while significant overlaps between these two sets of positions can be identified, one is also able to resist the impulse to create a single, unified schema. This is possible because, by entering in a dialogue founded on norms that are broad and open to interpretation, participants may participate in both sides of the dialogue at any particular time, and will engage in the dialogue differently depending on which side of the dialogue they currently occupy. These differences are connected to, but not exhausted by, the differences in strategies discussed above and are related to the reasons why the opposition tends to be less united than proponents. Namely, proponents focus on pushing through martial policies by providing reasons that invoke the situation of the United States in the world in terms of power, security, and values. In other words, they use the norms discussed here to focus on a particular set of relationships: those between citizens and the existence of the state (House Report 1812), citizens and the fulfillment and spread of

values (Wilson 1917), and citizens and the outside world in general (G. W. Bush 2003). These relationships in turn situate participants by reference to the goals of the proposed military action and the degree of military involvement in the world participants accept. The opposition, by contrast, references foundational norms through arguments varying with regard to orientations toward exceptionalism, between predominantly moral and predominantly practical analyses, and between attitudes toward the projects of political reform versus the task of political conservation. They insist on the relevance of the relationships which proponents push *and* additional relationships: those between citizens and the desired character of the American state (Paul 2007), between citizens and the impact and effectiveness of military action (Lindbergh 1939a, 1939b), and between citizens and their moral duties (King 1967). Not only are the intellectual structures of the two sides of the dialogue different, but when in opposition, participants (even those who may support other martial endeavors) often set the proposed martial policy within an enlarged set of relationships and concepts, most importantly, those that address the internal character of the United States.

The first set of positions described below sets forth participants' overall attitudes toward the use of armed force in terms of the type of military actions they are willing to support. These positions represent the most extensive use of force they will back, a use that roughly correlates with the degree of military involvement in the world they are willing to sanction. In general, if they are convinced that a military action fits with the position they adopt, participants will sanction the use of force and may insist that military action be taken by utilizing one or more of the arguments of proponents outlined above. The exception is the first position, filled by those who obviously recognize no use of military force as legitimate or useful. The rest of the participants can be located in one of three main categories, two of which in turn are divided into several subcategories.

General Positions on the Use of Military Force

Pacifists

These participants hold that no military action is ever acceptable. All conflicts can and must be settled through peaceful means. Examples include Pax Christi (2002) and Jane Addams (2003).

Reactive Proponents of Defensive Military Action

These participants justify military action solely on the grounds that American territories or citizens are under immediate threat. They will use or accept Security and Existing Hostilities arguments, and at times Diplomacy Is Futile and Reputation arguments in proposing or accepting military action. But they will not go further to hold that foes must be met outside the boundaries of a tightly drawn security perimeter and will generally not support military action with those ends (Brown 1915; Polk 1846; Lindbergh 1939a, 1939b).

Proponents of Forward Defense

These participants will justify military action in defense of an enlarged security perimeter that may span the globe. They understand the security needs of friends and allies as importantly caught up with American security, and sometimes also with American commitments to the defense and propagation of freedom, democracy, sovereignty, and human rights. They hold that Security, Reputation, and Deterrence must be understood in broad terms to include confronting foes while they still operate far from American shores. Friends and allies must be defended from aggression to stop aggressors from gaining further territory and resources, to preserve allies as important security partners, and to prevent aggressors from ultimately threatening American territories and citizens. Such logic has since the mid-twentieth century been embodied in arguments which reference the "lessons of the 1930s" or the "lessons of Munich" (Lewis 1990; *The* New York Times 1950), including arguments that military action is justified by the need to uphold American credibility given the importance of allies, and to defend strategic territories and prevent a domino effect. They sometimes see security as a zero-sum affair in the context of the world's division into two or more hostile blocs animated by different goals, values, and ways of life and assume (even if they do not always articulate) a balance of power analysis. They do not grant that the world is capable of being permanently ordered. They therefore oppose military actions that they understand as attempts to create or defend such an order.

These proponents can be divided into several subcategories. First are *National Unilateralists*, which include Barry Goldwater, Richard Cheney, and Donald Trump. These figures argue that the enlarged security perimeter and the development of an alliance system should be understood in strictly American terms. American interests must be at their

center, and commitments to that perimeter make sense only so long as sustaining that perimeter serves identifiably American purposes, most importantly, American security (see Cheney 2002; Goldwater 1964; Trump 2016).

Second are *Multilateralists*, which include George Kennan, John Foster Dulles, Richard Haass, and probably Hillary Clinton. These hold that an enlarged security perimeter and alliance system are an important part of a collective security arrangement which must recognize as a matter of both prudence and principle the rough equality of friends and allies. Partners also have national interests that must be protected; the United States should move at least some way toward equally prioritizing their needs and interests (see Clinton 2015; Dulles 1954; Haass 2009).

Third are *Realists*, encompassing Richard Nixon and Henry Kissinger. These hold that the world is inevitably characterized by shifting coalitions, such that security perimeters and allies might change over time. Only interests are permanent, not allies. So while they often agree with nationalists that American interests should be prioritized when necessary and are not necessarily deeply attached to specific allies, they do understand that other states have interests to defend and may prudently move to grant them concessions if necessary to sustain the alliance system (see Kissinger 1979; Nixon 1978).

Proponents of a World Order

These participants will justify the use of force based on understandings that American security and values are importantly caught up with the creation of a world order. Such an order may be based on norms, international organizations, values, understandings of collective security, or civilization. They go beyond the defense of security perimeters to hold that vital American interests are implicated in creating and defending a universal pattern of international interactions. They might justify military actions on grounds that do not appear at first to have a bearing on American security. For example, military interventions to prevent massacres, punish egregious violations of human rights, or deal with man-made humanitarian disasters would be acceptable to some of these proponents, while others might support wars meant to establish American supremacy, or missions to topple governments in favor of a democratic opposition.

This category can likewise be divided into several subtypes. The first are again *Nationalists*: they depict this world order in American terms,

either as the expression of American values or the product of American power and will. This group includes Theodore Roosevelt (n.d.) in *The Strenuous Life* and Barry Goldwater (1964).

The second category is made up of *Internationalists*. They depict their preferred world order in more cooperative and multilateralist terms, and are more willing to subordinate some American actions to a larger regime of international processes or norms than are Nationalists, and to intervene in the name of upholding or enforcing international norms and international law. This group includes Franklin Roosevelt; many mainstream backers of Cold War military action such as Harry Truman (1947), Dwight Eisenhower (1957), John Kennedy (1961, 1962), Lyndon Johnson (1964, 1966); and post–Cold War figures such as George H. W. Bush (1991) and Barack Obama (2013a, 2013b, 2014).

The flip side of these positions involves those that participants in the dialogue take when they oppose military action. Participants will adopt one of these positions when they are unwilling to sanction military force that extends beyond the goals they accept or if the martial policy otherwise does not meet the understanding of acceptable military action they embrace, and will deploy the oppositional arguments discussed above. Sometimes they do so in an *ad hoc* fashion, given that they are at odds only on occasion with the political establishment and proposed military actions (see Haass 2009). Others find themselves in conflict with policy makers much more regularly. In either case, it is possible to discern patterns in the arguments participants use to oppose the use of military force and thus to understand them as occupying various and different grounds upon which their objections are based. I have elsewhere put forward a typology of these oppositional stances that accounts for these differences. I recapitulate this typology below.

Types of Opponents of Military Action

Defensive Nationalists

These elites oppose military action by arguing that the most important purpose of foreign policy is the defense of the United States, and that moving beyond a limited defensive perimeter is beset with a host of problems affecting that goal. They generally portray the outside world as dangerous, unpredictable, politically backward, and thus fundamentally different from the United States. Their primary objection to

specific wars and interventions is that those projects are not related to or endanger a defensive modest perimeter and/or entail entanglement in outsiders' quarrels. Thus, they will be skeptical of military actions meant to defend allies or an international order. Examples include Herbert Hoover (1938), Charles Lindbergh (1939a, 1939b), and the early John Kerry (1971).

Defensive Pragmatists

Defensive pragmatists also display a practical concern for defense and security, favoring the use of force only when it can be demonstrated that national security is necessarily involved. Where they differ from nationalists is in their rejection of exceptionalism. They embed the United States in a sea of nations that are also security minded and which react in what they argue is precisely the same manner as would the United States in the face of similar actions. They employ a universalist analysis which emphasizes security dilemmas, arms races, blowback, and other ironic phenomena. To become more secure, the United States must be prudent, take into consideration the security interests of other nations, and generally do less rather than more in terms of interventions and military operations. They may also be skeptical of commitments that might drag the United States into war by means of alliances or participation in international ordering structures. Examples include George Washington, Eugene McCarthy (1967), and the early Chalmers Johnson (2004).

Moral Exceptionalists

Like defensive nationalists, moral exceptionalists portray the United States as special due to its nature and mission, but unlike them they leverage that exceptionalist understanding in a moral rather than a practical direction. They hold that because the United States is different, it ought to deploy its values in its dealings with the rest of the world despite the fact that the world does not practice them. In short, these figures argue that moral imperatives should guide U.S. policy given that the United States is called to a higher standard of behavior that is violated when the United States uses force or interferes with other countries in any circumstances other than strictly defined cases of self-defense. An example is the text of the Spanish war era Anti-Imperialist League (1899) manifesto.

Moral Universalists

Moral universalists reject wars and interventions for reasons that extend beyond American identity and found their opposition on moral rather than practical grounds. They generally argue that natural law, international law, religious teachings, or just war principles fundamentally apply to the United States. For these critics, the United States is special in neither its general status nor its security needs. All countries possess the same universal rights to sovereignty, security, territorial integrity, and human dignity; the United States must honor those claims by largely or completely eschewing the use of military force. Examples here are Robert La Follette, Martin Luther King (1967), and Pax Christi (2002).

Noninterventionist Reformers

These critics share nonexceptionalist understandings in that they portray other nations as reacting to conditions and threats in the same way as would the United States, while providing both practical and moral arguments. In their analysis, interventions are generally harmful to the United States and to the outside world, often eroding American security and violating American and other values. But the foundation of their critique focuses on the origins of interventionist policies: they blame important structural characteristics of the U.S. system and advocate for fundamental changes to that system. Their discussions of war and peace are ancillary to a more important reformist project of changing the American state and political system, and they are generally skeptical of all types of military policies due to their distrust of motives. Examples include Henry Thoreau (1849), the Students for a Democratic Society (1962), Ron Paul, and Noam Chomsky.

Noninterventionist Traditionalists

These participants reside on the other side of the exceptionalist-universalist spectrum from noninterventionist reformers. Their arguments are most concerned with the impact of activist military policies on the United States. Thus, their objections hold that wars and interventions subvert what traditionally is and continues to be a normatively good and functionally desirable system. In their critique, they insist that the system is not fundamentally the problem. Their underlying project is to defend the U.S. system, preventing any fundamental changes from being

wrought either by means of martial policies or through the activities of other critics who push a reformist agenda. They will sanction the use of military force only with great reluctance and only in bare defense of the nation. D.D. B (1847), Henry Boutwell (1900), and Garett Garrett (1953) are located in this category.

Conclusions and Implications

Discursive institutionalism provides us with a superior methodological grounding upon which to explore, understand, and explain the dialogue over war and peace in the United States. By focusing on the relationship of arguments with norms instead of concentrating primarily on values, traditions, positions, or emotions, we are able to identify all relevant arguments, explain why they are used, grasp their functions, classify them, and connect them with various strategies. We are also able to identify many more relevant positions and to differentiate those positions in relation to participation in the dialogue.

This study holds that the grounds of this dialogue are founded in four norms that all elites accept: Security, Constitutional, American Values, and General Welfare. These norms provide the grounds for efforts to legitimize, delegitimize, advocate, and critique martial policies. In turn, they also supply the overall contours of the dialogue. They authoritatively set the duties and goals by which policy makers are bound to abide. It is these norms that make the dialogue possible because they provide the expectations that proponents hold military actions meet, and opponents hold they fail to meet. These expectations create the debate as more than the utterances of unconnected arguments meant to mobilize completely disconnected sets of followers.

This analysis underlines the importance of the dialogue for elites. Decisions to support or oppose a military action can be influenced by the arguments each side makes. Proponents attempt to situate the action as closely as possible to American security and values to gather the maximum amount of support. Opponents seek to distance the action from those goods, painting it as esoteric, responsive to special interests, overreaching, counterproductive, and contrary to American values. So, for example, in the case of the Second Gulf War, proponents held that Hussein's possession of weapons of mass destruction made his regime not just a danger to American allies, but to the United States itself (G. W. Bush 2003; Cheney 2002). Removing Saddam from power was necessary to the protection of American

territory and citizens as well as of American allies in the region (see Powell 2003; Rice 2003). Richard Haass (2009) for one did not buy those arguments, and dwelt instead on other proponents' assertions that it was about the attempt to create an America-centered world order. He agreed with opponents' ironic and skeptical arguments which attacked that goal as counterproductive and unattainable (see Paul 2007). Having backed the First Gulf War as in keeping with his position as an Internationalist Proponent of Forward Defense, Haass opposed the Second on grounds that it was not necessary for Forward Defense and adopted the language of universalist critics.

To put this in a broader context, those elites who support military actions always have some larger security project in mind that acts as a limit on their support. This means that arguments in isolation are not dispositive. Not security alone, but the strategy which informs military actions aimed at security plays an important role in their understanding. For some, the immediate defense of the homeland is both necessary and sufficient. For others, venturing abroad to help allies and take on foes is mandatory. This mindset in part echoes the general position of those who resist military ventures. For the most part, they are not opposed to the alleged goals of the action; they disagree that (in this instance, or in many instances) military force is the correct tool for the job, or hold that the true goal is not what has been publicly stated.

Given this understanding, we see that today's policy makers must think carefully about how they put their case when building their case on security and related arguments. A minimalist discussion appears to best serve their purposes (even if it does not best serve the cause of deliberative democracy); that is, they maximize support by supplying only those arguments sufficient to ground the contention that military force is immediately necessary for security purposes. To go further and discuss at length a project which implicates a specific understanding of forward defense, or a specific type of world ordering project, risks alienating potential supporters. Yet many do so anyway. Alternatively, opponents appear to better understand the politics of the debate, possibly because they find it difficult to prevail given the advantages their opponents hold. It behooves them not only to undermine the grounds for holding that a military venture is necessary; critics best serve their cause by claiming to identify larger projects lurking at the bottom of any military proposal. This move assists their efforts to peel away support for military action by frightening away those who may support a limited

military action on security grounds (but who are averse to forward defense positions and/or the construction and maintenance of a world order) with the specter of unending or overly ambitious military ventures (see Chomsky 2002; Paul 2007).

The prolonged and persistent use of the same strategies and arguments on the part of proponents and opponents may also have permanent effects on American political culture when it comes to questions of war and peace. Such use gestures toward the development of additional rules which may also guide the dialogue.

First, the gist of both proponent and opponent arguments suggests a rule pertaining to the burden of proof when it comes to the use of armed force. Norms are generally utilized as tests of policies. These tests can be either difficult or easy to pass. We can use the analogy of tests used by the federal courts in applying constitutional law to understand how these arguments use the norms discussed here as tests. When considering the constitutionality of policies falling under the Necessary and Proper Clause, courts usually proceed by employing an easy test for a policy to pass—the Rationality Test (see, for instance, *McCulloch vs. Maryland* 17 U.S. 316 [1819]). This test merely asks whether the policy is intended to attain a constitutionally allowable goal, and whether the policy is rationally related to that goal. The burden of proof is on those challenging the government to establish that the policy is irrational. The test is permissive from the standpoint of policy; passing the test stamps the policy as an acceptable alternative within a possibly long menu of allowable policy options.

In contrast, when judging policies rights as embodied in the first several Amendments, courts proceed by using a very difficult test for a policy to pass—the Strict Scrutiny Test. This test establishes that a policy is constitutional only if it pursues a necessary governmental goal, is the only way in which that goal can be reached, and is not otherwise prohibited. Here the burden of proof is on the government to prove that there is no alternative to the policy and that the government is obligated to act. This test is not permissive, but restrictive. Having proposed and defended the policy, the government must use it (see, for example, *Korematsu vs. US* 323 U.S. 214 [1944]).

In this dialogue, the tests used by both sides of the debate look much more like the Strict Scrutiny test than the Rationality test. When it comes to using norms as a test for a martial proposal, proponents hold that using military force is a necessary means for attaining an essential end. There is no alternative to the martial policy, and attaining that end

is obligatory and urgent. In contrast, opponents make the following moves: (1) they argue that the policy is not aimed at an essential goal; (2) they argue that military force is not the best or the only means of reaching an essential goal; (3) they argue that military force is not even a rational, much less necessary, way of attaining an essential goal; and/or (4) they argue that the policy of using military force is a product of a process which violates an essential goal, and thus is not permissible.

From these observations, we can discern the development of the following rule: *the use of force should be a last resort for attaining an essential goal, unless there is a compelling reason for not exhausting all peaceful means for attaining the goal in question.*

Another possible rule has to do with interactions with democratic and liberal states. A consistent proponent argument is that military action defends such states, and that such defense is both pragmatically and normatively imperative. They also tend to identify foes as nondemocratic and illiberal. Opponents sometimes question whether putative allies really are democratic or liberal, and whether foes are really authoritarians rather than different types of democrats: *The United States has an obligation to defend (by military action if necessary) other liberal democratic states, and to refrain from attacking or harming such states.*

A third possible rule has to do with a particular understanding of success. When proponents identify not only victory but the achievement of peace, security, democratization, liberation, or humanitarian objectives as compelling reasons for the use of force in their own right and insist that they must be achieved, opponents object that such projects are not feasible, either because the use of force cannot achieve them, or because those goals are unattainable due to the nature of the outside world. This suggests the emergence of the rule that *military force must not be used unless the larger goals of the action (in addition to victory in a military sense) can be achieved.*

Looking forward, one should be able to characterize future debates and their participants using this methodology. It assists prediction of the arguments participants will use as well as deepening an understanding of why they use particular arguments and foresight concerning the strategies they will employ. One is also better able to grasp the political power of the arguments used to support or oppose a particular martial policy and identify the points of direct contestation, as well as where and why participants speak past one another. Finally, the model offered here permits a solid basis for predictions on who will support or oppose particular uses of military force, and why.

Appendix

Table A1.
Arguments Made by Proponents of Military Action.

	Realist										Nationalist						Values					
	Sec	Det	Host	Rep	DT	Cred	Fut	Agg	Forw	Adv	Pat	Maj	Part	Con	Trade	DB	Dem	Free	Pea	SD	I/O	HR
Jefferson			P											P								
Madison			P				P			P	P			P	P							
House Report	P	P		P			P				P				P							
Clay		P	P	P			P			P	P					P						
NWR										P												
Monroe									P													
Polk	P	P	P	P			P				P			P		P	P	P				
Douglas	P		P								P		P									
Cass		P	P				P							P								
Haralson	P		P				P				P	P	P			P						
Crisis									P							P	P	P				
Mahan									P						P							
H.C. Lodge				P			P			P	P		P	P		P	P	P		P	P	P
T. Roosevelt											P					P		P	P			P
McKinley	P						P								P							P
Wilson	P		P	P			P			P	P	P		P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P
Gompers	P									P							P	P	P			
Taft	P						P			P										P		
Brown																	P					
Harvey							P	P		P						P	P	P		P	P	P
Wilkie							P			P							P					

(continued)

Table A1. (continued)

	Realist										Nationalist						Values					
	Sec	Det	Host	Rep	DT	Cred	Fut	Agg	Forw	Adv	Pat	Maj	Part	Con	Trade	DB	Dem	Free	Pea	SD	I/O	HR
Connolly							P							P	P		P	P			P	P
F. Roosevelt	P		P				P			P	P				P		P	P				
NYTimes I	P			P		P	P	P									P	P			P	
Truman	P				P			P	P								P	P	P	P	P	
Kennan									P												P	
DSCC		P				P					P		P				P	P			P	
Eisenhower		P		P	P	P	P		P	P				P			P	P		P	P	
Dulles										P				P				P		P		
Kennedy	P	P		P		P	P	P		P				P			P	P		P	P	
Rusk	P	P		P		P	P	P	P					P					P			
Goldwater		P		P				P										P				
Johnson					P		P	P	P					P			P	P	P	P	P	P
Humphrey						P		P												P		
Hubbell										P												
Bundy																				P	P	
Nixon	P	P			P	P	P	P		P	P	P						P	P	P		P
Carter	P																				P	
G.W.H. Bush	P		P				P							P			P					
NYTimes II	P		P				P															
Rosenthal	P					P		P														
Lewis								P														
Solarz	P						P						P								P	
Clinton							P										P		P			P

(continued)

Table A1. (continued)

	Realist										Nationalist						Values					
	Sec	Det	Host	Rep	DT	Cred	Fut	Agg	Forw	Adv	Pat	Maj	Part	Con	Trade	DB	Dem	Free	Pea	SD	I/O	HR
O'Hanlon																						P
Wieseltier	P						P						P									P
PNAC	P						P			P												P
Soderberg			P			P	P			P							P		P			P
G.W. Bush	P		P				P		P													
Cheney	P	P					P		P	P				P			P		P	P		
Powell	P						P														P	P
TNR										P												
Edwards							P			P												
McCain	P						P										P			P		P
CONGRESS								P	P								P	P				
Obama	P	P		P	P		P		P		P			P			P	P			P	P
H. Clinton	P								P													P

Note. Realist: Sec = Security; Dt = Deterrence; Host = Existing Hostilities; Rep = Reputation; DT = Domino Theory; Cred = Credibility; Fut = Futility of Diplomacy; Agg = Aggression; Forw = Forward Defense; Adv = Advocacy. Nationalist: Pat = Patriotism; Maj = Majority; Part = Partisanship; Sov = Sovereignty; Con = Constitutional; Trade = Trade; NBV = Nationalist Basis for Victory; DB = Domestic Benefits. American Values: Dem = Democracy; Free = Freedom; Pea = Peace; SD = Self Determination; I/O = International Law and Order; HR = Human Rights; NWR = *Niles Weekly Register*; DSCC = Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; PNAC = Project for a New American Century; TNR = *The New Republic*.

Table A2.
Arguments Opposing Wars and Interventions in the American Context.

	Contexts of policy-making process						Character and effects of the policy											Nature of the world				
	Lib	Dem	Const	SpecInt	Psyc	Unil	Am. 1st	Plur	Jack	Sov	Jeff	Kant Prac	Irony	Futil I	Just War	Moral	Def Real	Futil 1I	Univ Lais	Isol	Race
Washington		P		P		P					P						P				
Jefferson																				P	
Taggert		P		P	P				P		P	P				P		P			
Webster		P							P		P	P				P					
Whigs			P													P	P				
Thoreau	P	P		P																	
Calhoun											P	P	P	P		P		P			P
AIL		P									P					P			P		
Boutwell		P	P								P							P			P
Schurz		P	P					P			P		P			P	P				
Swift		P		P		P					P					P					
Keller			P		P		P		P							P					
Addams		P									P			P							
LoFollette		P		P								P					P	P			
Norris				P	P							P					P				
Debs		P									P	P		P							

(continued)

Table A2. (continued)

	Contexts of policy-making process						Character and effects of the policy										Nature of the world				
	Lib	Dem	Const	SpecInt	Psyc	Unil	Am. 1st	Plur	Jack	Sov	Jeff	Kant Prac	Irony	Futil I	Just War	Moral	Def Real	Futil II	Univ Lais	Isol	Race
Borah				P			P				P	P					P	P			
Lindbergh		P		P			P	P	P		P			P							P
Hoover									P		P						P	P	P		
Chase							P				P		P	P		P		P			
Garrett	P				P				P		P	P	P				P				
Mumford					P						P		P				P				
SDS		P		P	P						P		P			P	P				
Fulbright					P			P	P		P							P	P		
King		P		P	P		P	P			P	P		P							
McCarthy			P	P								P				P	P	P			
Kerry									P		P	P	P	P			P				
Pax Christi													P		P	P	P				
Libya				P			P		P		P	P	P	P				P	P		
Bacevich					P		P				P		P	P		P		P			
Paul	P		P	P		P	P		P	P	P	P	P	P		P	P	P	P		
Johnson			P	P			P		P		P	P	P			P	P	P			
Chomsky		P		P							P		P	P		P	P				

Note. Lib = Libertarian; Dem = Democratic; Con = Constitutional; SI = Special Interests; Psyc = Psychological; Unil = Unilateral; Am 1st = America First; Plur = Pluralist; Jack = Jacksonian; Sov = Sovereignty; Jeff = Jeffersonian; Kant Prac = Kantian Practical; Irony = Irony; Futil I = Futility of Military Action; Just War = Just War; Moral = Moral; Def Real = Defensive Realist; Futile II = Futility of Action; LF = Laissez-faire; Isol = Isolationist; Race = Racist; AIL = Anti-Imperialist League; SDS = Students for a Democratic Society.

About the Author

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