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AGENCY, CULTURE, MODERNITY: TOWARDS A NEW UNDERSTANDING OF CONFUCIAN PRACTICAL REASONING

Abstract

In this essay, I argue for a historical-critical perspective on rationality. In our global age, we in the West need to come to terms with the fact that non-Western traditions have developed complex forms of practical rationality. I will first give an overview of what I call the "Confucian standards of reasoning." Secondly, I will explain how the Neo-Confucian thinker Zhu Xi 朱熹 (1130–1200) has rearticulated the earlier understanding of practical reasoning. Thirdly, I will demonstrate why a comparative perspective may enrich our reasoned engagement with individuals in the Chinese-speaking world. In developing forms of global reasoning, we should make sure that these are neither parochial nor difference-blind.

I. Introduction: A Few Methodological Thoughts

What is *reason*, and what do we mean when we talk about how we think and behave *rationally*? What do we mean by *rationality*? Does *rational choice* merely consist in the clever promotion of self-interest? What is the role of *reasoning* in moral judgments? Lastly, what are the *standards of rationality* beyond the simple notion of logical consistency? The issue of rationality—and its opposite, irrationality—lies at the heart of Western philosophy and it has long preoccupied philosophers in North America and Europe. Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle already described the very activity of philosophizing as a kind of *rational inquiry* that eventually will help us discover a unified conception of reason.

Philosophy has always had its skeptics, however. Even Socrates apparently had profound doubts about whether the most crucial questions could be settled for everyone and for all time (think of early aporetic dialogues like the *Meno*). Another famously skeptical philosopher, Immanuel Kant, challenged the traditional and highly

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optimistic understanding of philosophy (and reason) to its core. His new account not only recognized autonomy as an essential aspect of reason, but also distinguished sharply between theoretical and practical reason, the realm of reasons, and the realm of natural causes. He aimed to determine the *limits* of reason, suggesting that reason might in fact be powerless in the face of the most important issues of human existence.

Kant's Transcendental Idealism and his critique of earlier rationalist philosophers like Leibniz and Descartes represents a crucial breakthrough in the history of European philosophy. In the two centuries after his death in 1804, it has become more and more difficult to see reason as self-transparent, non-temporal, and unbound by cultural and social factors. The writings of countless philosophers and thinkers can thus be interpreted as having radicalized the Kantian project. It has been variously argued that reason is constituted by and through language (Herder, Hegel, Heidegger); it is always immersed in cultural and historical contexts (Weber, Gadamer, Foucault); and it is social and communal (Marx, Wittgenstein, Rorty).[1] Unlike the Enlightenment torchbearer from Königsberg, who still believed in the project of social and political progress through the enlightened use of human reason, many contemporary Continental philosophers have since proved unwilling to commit to such a universalistic project. They tend to stress the brute contingency of social and political change and are generally interested in reflecting on the particularities and historicity of agency. Summarizing Isaiah Berlin's observations on the plurality of human experience, the Italian philosopher Giacomo Marramao provides us with a succinct statement about the problem of reason in our global age:

> In contrast to the utopia of history understood as the progressive (linear or dialectical) transition towards the transparency of Reason there stands the "healthy" opacity of cultural *differences* understood in their incommensurable individuality. No ethics or rationality of action is formed independently of the riverbed of tradition and language, i.e. in accordance with a specific *symbolism*.[2]

This will sound like a rather extreme stance to many philosophers in the Analytic tradition. Those committed either to Utilitarian or Kantian models of practical rationality will typically allude to the danger of relativism: Is there any way of defining standards of rationality at all, if we concentrate so closely on the actual or perceived differences between traditions and discourses? Even Kwame Anthony Appiah (who, like few other philosophers in the Anglo-American world, is willing to consider how social identities constrain and empower us and how group identification may affect our

practical reasoning) has expressed fundamental doubts about the idea that different cultures set different authoritative horizons within which individuals determine their life plans and reason about certain issues.[3] While I do not understand cultures as "holistic entities," I want to argue, following Berlin and Marramao, that our task in thinking about practical reasoning today is to tackle more directly the dynamic interaction of different cultures in a globalized world and to deepen our awareness for the radical contingency experienced by individuals who are immersed in a multiverse of pictures of the world. This requires that we open our inquiry to other ways of reasoning and to move beyond (albeit carefully) the horizon of existing "Western" approaches.

What I want to broadly defend is a *hermeneutic* conception of rationality, which takes any practice of reason to be culturally, historically and linguistically mediated. According to a widely shared understanding of practical rationality, the task of practical reasoning is to think about the question of what one is to do in a detached way. Following the model of theoretical reasoning (as described, for example, in the natural sciences), philosophers often undertake their inquiry into practical rationality from the famous "view from nowhere" perspective. While they may be no longer obsessed with the problem of absolute foundations, most are clearly unwilling to acknowledge the situated nature of the process of practical reasoning. Another reason why many philosophers have difficulty admitting that practical reasoning is mediated by various, often quite contingent, factors is their belief in personal autonomy and self-creation. Only agents who are independent of coercion and manipulation by others can begin to reason clearly and consistently. I do not intend to deny that such a free-standing inquiry is important in its own right (although one could argue that the *experience* of such universal perspective is always culturally determined). Instead, I want to move the discussion to another level. Specifically, in order to think more seriously about the deep plurality of worldviews in our global age—or what Marramao calls the "pluralism of values and identities"—we need to address the very contingency of "Western" philosophical concerns about rationality.[4] Instead of dismissing certain arguments and ways of thinking as irrational, confused, or plainly wrong, we need to rethink the relation between forms of practical reasoning and forms of life or, better, social practices.

Charles Taylor has proposed such a hermeneutic perspective on practical reasoning. In his article "Explanation and Practical Reason," he distinguishes between an apodictic and an ad hominem model of practical reasoning. Whereas the first essentially determines the process of practical reasoning in accordance with the

model of the natural sciences (neutral and disengaged, relying on procedures and formal requirements instead of intuitions, disputed facts or pre-understandings), the second entails intuitions and implicit claims and beliefs that are part of comprehensive world-views. Further, whereas the apodictic model aims at achieving absolute certainty, the ad hominem model merely leads to provisional, comparative conclusions. Its goal is mainly to find criteria that can be accepted by the parties in a dispute, and not to appeal to some external standards. Practical reasoning is "reasoning in transitions," that is the two disputants searching for common ground compare how they could move from one standpoint to another. Ultimately, their aim is to identify the transition that constitutes an improvement and may also clear up any confusion in their previous standpoint.[5]

I suggest, then, following Taylor that in our culturally plural world there can be no single conception of practical reasoning, but only a plurality of conceptions that become more diverse over time. This claim partially reflects the unavoidable contingency of our own form of life (e.g., as philosophers from Europe or North America). Human reasoning can take on very different forms. While philosophers can obviously shed *some* light on the process and the nature of practical reasoning, their self-understandings and their conceptions of practical reasoning are determined, at least to some extent, by factors that are beyond their control: for instance, as Taylor points out, the wish to resist moral skepticism has shaped modern conceptions of practical reasoning in the West; yet, the intellectual culture that leads to moral skepticism seems to be limited to certain areas of the planet and its premises may not be self-evident to many philosophers in non-Western countries.[6] The term rationality itself has a history and is certainly linked *in some way* to our particular historical horizon (i.e., the wider culture of Western individualism). In reflecting on the history of "Occidental rationalism" (Max Weber), we may come closer to acknowledging the particularity of our own preconceptions. My thinking of myself as having a reason to do something and my understanding of my autonomy in the sense of having a right to justification may look like a purely rational reflection; but are there not in reality often deeper commitments at work that are far from being purely and simply self-evident? And are these commitments not the direct result of particular *historical processes* that inform my understanding of practical reasoning (a list of these may include, among other things, the Protestant Reformation and the process of secularization, the emergence of capitalism and technology, the formation of liberal-democratic societies in most countries in North America and Europe, and, finally, the dominance

of calculating *ratio* and strategic-instrumental behavior in the West)?[7]

Moreover, the question of what we ought to do often arises in particular situations and contexts. Thus, it is by no means clear that a satisfying answer to this question can be found from a detached or purely theoretical perspective. As soon as we take into account the very real complexity of human behavior, "the diagnosis of irrationality," as Amartya Sen observes, "may be a far more complex exercise than it might at first appear."[8] And here it is often disputed as to what can count as standards of rationality beyond the simple principle of non-contradiction (though even this principle is not *beyond doubt*, as Wittgenstein has argued).[9] In order to develop a broader and ultimately more convincing understanding of practical reasoning, it is necessary to critically reflect on the way in which forms of reasoning and social practices are intertwined. Reasonableness is inextricably linked to certain kinds of practices: we are rational in our interactions with others, but not by ourselves (think of exams, discussions, games); we use reasons that we have learned by reading books written by other people; and, finally, what counts as reasonable in a particular situation often depends on larger contexts.[10]

All of these are broad claims, and there is no doubt that they are partially aimed at destabilizing our (Western) commitment to our own norms of rationality. I do not believe that we have to accept Jürgen Habermas's famous claim that pre-modern worldviews, which were based on "substantive" (i.e., formally and semantically integrated) modes of rationality, have somehow been replaced by our modern worldview, which is divided into three purely "formal" realms (cognitive-instrumental reason, moral-practical reason, and aesthetic-expressive reason).[11] Moreover, I find that judgments about non-Western cultures have too often been influenced by an explicit or implicit belief in the superiority of modern, Western forms of practical reasoning. There is of course a long history of philosophical engagement with alternative ways of thinking. For instance, in his famous article on the Azande, Peter Winch tried to demonstrate that the Azande way of thinking represents an alternative mode of rationality that cannot be evaluated through an appeal to our own form of practical reasoning.[12] Human rationality is thus perceived as entirely culture bound. Winch's position has been challenged, however; and I do not think that we need to endorse all of his claims, especially his overly holistic conception of human cultures.[13] Yet, I find his willingness to address other practices of reasoning on their own terms highly instructive.

In comparison with the Azande, the case of China and Confucian culture seems to be even more intriguing in many aspects. Before the encounter with European culture, the Chinese were not a "primitive society" (Winch's term for the Azande), but rather rivaled the Europeans in their claim for civilizational supremacy. And, whereas the Azande were hardly political and economic competitors with the West, the opposite was true of Eighteenth-Century China and, again, is true of today's China. Thus, Western scholars actually have a chance to engage with Chinese and Chinese-speaking interlocutors on equal footing. Finally, the Chinese have developed an extremely complex philosophical, spiritual, and political worldview using their own written language (namely, Classical Chinese).

Not many ethnologists or philosophers would argue that the natural languages of groups like the Azande comprise an independent moral discourse. By contrast, the pre-modern Chinese (before, broadly speaking, the year 1860) have developed not only their own practices of reasoning and being reasonable, but have articulated an alternative corpus of well-developed moral inquiry with its own standards of practical reasoning. This ethical discourse has been developed independently from the Western traditions of moral and political philosophy (while integrating a number of Buddhist and Daoist insights). Although the Confucian discourse has clearly sometimes served as a sort of *ideological veil* in order to conceal the true interests of social agents, there is no reason to deny that, in Wei Shang's words, "Confucian discourse participates in constituting social-political reality by providing a vision of a Confucian moral community that allows one to define one's relationship with others as well as oneself."[14]

Contemporary China is, of course, not Imperial China. Nonetheless, when we encounter Chinese social agents today who justify their actions in terms of a broader Confucian "Way" (*Dao* 道) or by using the special term "Mandate" or "Destiny" (*ming* 命), we cannot simply dismiss the use of such justificatory terms as irrelevant or derivative. An example of this attitude is found in Gananath Obeyesekere's famous debate with Marshall Sahlins. Obeyesekere contended that the reasons why the Hawaiians killed and ate Captain Cook in February 1779 were not provided by their non-Western world-view, as Sahlins had thought (their belief in Cook being a manifestation of the god Lono and the cosmological crisis provoked by his sudden reappearance), but rather reflected universal requirements of "practical reason" (namely the fact that Cook had been exploiting the Hawaiian people, had tried to kidnap one of their chiefs and was thus seen as a threat).[15] I disagree with Obeyesekere, however. He fails to take into account the possibility that these

social agents, though possibly influenced by means-ends calculation, may still be committed to a form of practical reasoning that is not easily understood, let alone able to be evaluated, by a Kantian or Utilitarian perspective.

II. Early Confucianism and Practical Reasoning

Did the Chinese possess a conception of rationality? Were pre-modern Chinese thinkers interested in the issue of rationality? Or, put differently, do Daoist, Confucian, or Buddhist texts contain an implicit or explicit understanding of agency that can be construed in terms of practical reasoning? These are quite confusing questions. We therefore need to properly define our terms or else risk indulging in the kind of shadow boxing that is all-too-common in comparative philosophy.

Clearly, the pre-modern Chinese were not merely enmeshed in a "web of belief" (as Evans-Pritchard thought the Azande were).[16] Thinkers like Mencius (Mengzi) 孟子, Xunzi 荀子 or Zhuangzi 莊子 were involved in some sort of shared, reflective endeavor. Moreover, they were also undoubtedly interested in questions of human agency (as I will demonstrate immediately, there is simply too much evidence pointing into this direction). Thanks to recent research, we now have a much better understanding of the distinctive nature of reasoning and argumentation in China. On closer inspection, Chinese philosophical, religious, and literary texts often demonstrate very particular forms of argumentation that cannot be easily categorized under schematic structures like the practical syllogism described in Aristotle's *Nicomachean Ethics.* Nor can they be characterized as being radically different from "Western" modes of reasoning. In a way very similar to Platonic dialogues, the authors of a recent monograph argue, "the method of *doing* philosophy by poetically blending the content of an argument and its literary form is also a typical feature of many early Chinese texts."[17] The often observed absence of propositional arguments and logical rigor in Early Chinese texts is not due to some deeper structural feature of the "Chinese mind," but reflects a privileging of different argumentative and rhetorical structures. As this is a cultural achievement that has deeply shaped the conditions of agency in Chinese-speaking societies, it needs to be addressed on its own terms.

So what about Confucius and Confucianism? The idea of summarizing Confucius's understanding of practical reasoning on a few pages may seem like a fool's errand. After all, Kongzi 孔子 (551–479 BCE) can certainly be counted as one of the most erratic,

and most misunderstood, figures in world history. To be clear: I certainly do not intend to claim that Confucius was interested in adequately *describing* the form of practical reasoning or *modeling* the behavior of agents under specific sets of conditions. In Ancient China, questions of human agency are often construed in purely pragmatic terms. What is more, if there is a model of practical reasoning in Confucianism, Confucius does not clearly define it as such. Therefore, rather than a "model" of practical reasoning, it may be better to speak of an ethical ideal of what being a reasonable person is all about.[18]

At some point in his life, Confucius apparently considered the question "What shall I do?" (*ru zhi he* 如之何) to be a necessary starting point for the kind of educational process he was interested in.[19] Also, in many passages of the *Analects*, Confucius emphasizes that his teaching is essentially about reflecting and thinking on ethical issues.[20] In fact, Confucius would probably have appreciated Socrates's emphatic claim that the unexamined life is not worth living. According to him, it is essential that we constantly examine ourselves and subject our actions and thoughts to some sort of critical scrutiny. We should not blindly follow existing customs, but only adhere to those practices that we can approve of and are befitting of the Confucian way of life. Nonetheless, the question "What shall I do?" was never meant to be a *global* criterion for any ethical inquiry (as it is often thought to be by modern philosophers in the West). Rather, it has to be understood in the context of Confucius's basic commitment to restore the past. Like all latter-day Confucians, he was convinced that the early Zhou period (c. 1050–771 BCE), its ethical ideal, institutions, and social and political order, offered a normative model for the present.[21]

Rationality can be described in terms of self-control, mental clarity, and disengagement. Confucius was undoubtedly interested in rationality insofar as it had these implications and wanted his disciples to be reasonable.[22] An important aspect of the kind of detached mindset that Confucius wants to transmit to his disciples is the ability to be consistent as an ethical agent. A person's words, for instance, should not exceed his or her actions, and if they do, he is ashamed.[23] The *Analects* also contain a number of passages where Confucius emphasizes the incompatibility of contradictory properties (for example, "being unbending" *gang* 剛 versus "being full of desires" *yu* 慾).[24] While his disciples are occasionally eager to point out their Master's inconsistencies, Confucius once claims that his teachings were unified by one principle or conviction, the famous single "thread"(*guan* 貫).[25] When, in this particular passage, one of his disciples wants to learn more about this, Confucius's disciple

Zeng Shen 曾參 refers him to the virtues of *zhong* 忠 and *shu* 恕. This is, however, a rather vague answer (and these are actually *two* things, not one); Confucius himself has by now left the stage, so we cannot know for sure how he would have replied.

There has been much discussion about how to understand *zhong* and *shu.* The former has often been translated as "loyalty" or "doing one's best," but Paul Goldin's "being honest with oneself in dealing with others" may be the most precise translation; the latter is often rendered as "reciprocity," "forgiveness," or "empathy."[26] Traditionally, these virtues have been linked to the Golden Rule, that is—in its negative formulation—the idea of not doing to others what one does not want done to oneself.[27] A number of modern interpreters in the West have found that the Golden Rule represents the core of Confucius's moral thinking. David Nivison, for instance, claims that the Golden Rule denotes a particular form of argument, namely that one should treat another as one would wish to be treated oneself in a given situation. He understands this argument not merely as being prudential (in the sense that one would benefit from treating others well), but as expressing what it means to act morally and to become a moral person. Nivison even asserts that the Golden Rule, in China as in other cultures, represents "the very ground of community, without which no morality could develop at all." Heiner Roetz takes this reading even further. The Confucian Golden Rule, he argues, represents a breakthrough to a form of non-conventional, moral universalism based on "a universalizable and non-strategic principle of action" (*ein universalisierbares und nicht-strategisches Handlungsprinzip*). Moral agents were required to engage with others on terms of mutual respect and in the spirit of equality and solidarity. Roetz further argues that the corresponding virtues of *zhong* and *shu* helped Early Confucians to embody the moral consciousness derived from such an entirely formal principle.[28]

In my opinion, there is sufficient evidence to make us doubt the plausibility of such interpretations of the Confucian Golden Rule. First, it is by no means clear that the Golden Rule is as crucial to Confucius's understanding of practical reasoning as Nivison and Roetz would have it. A careful reading of the *Analects* raises the question as to why Confucius's disciples never take up this argument or ask him for further explanation (even in the famous passage 4:15, the Master seems rather unwilling to explain himself). Also, when Confucius criticizes other people's beliefs or actions, he does not refer to an abstract principle like the Golden Rule, but rather blames them for their flawed characters.[29] His emphasis is upon improving one's actual behavior, not upon knowing rules or principles. Sometimes his criticism is so harsh and oblique that it is not

easy to see how it could be based on the idea of reciprocity.[30] Second, it is questionable whether later Chinese commentators would have agreed with Nivison and Roetz that this formula as essential. Indeed, the effective history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*) of the *Analects* does not seem to have met the high expectations of Western scholarship: think of the fact that the circle of moral concern was never thought to include women and children. Against this backdrop, is it plausible to assume that Confucians have understood formulations of the Golden Rule like the one in *Analects* 15: 24 as *formal* and *non-contextual* principles? Third, as Martha Nussbaum has pointed out in a very insightful essay on the Confucian Golden Rule, these readings of the Golden Rule do not sufficiently take into account the fact that the Confucian Golden Rule was never meant to put to rest the concerns derived from the existing ritual, ethical, and political hierarchy. Unlike Greek thinkers, Nussbaum further argues, Confucius and his followers never thought deeply about the contingency and vulnerability of human existence, but instead always presupposed what she calls a "fixed hierarchy of fortunes and ranks."[31] To be sure, according to a more convincing interpretation of Confucius's Golden Rule and the associated virtues of *zhong* and *shu*, hierarchical distinctions clearly put limits on the extent of one's obligations to others.[32] Thus, as Nussbaum summarizes, the Confucian Golden Rule should rather be understood to mean the following: "Treat another as you would have anyone else related to you as you are to that other treat you."

In fact, Confucius's primary goal (as most interpreters of the *Analects* have understood) was to convince his followers of the need to emulate his ethical ideal. Its major aspects are embodied in the person of the *junzi* 君子 (the "superior person" or "gentleman"). Learning takes place when the exemplary actions of the "superior person"—or, for lack of a better alternative, of one's parents or teachers—are emulated. In this way, it is possible to develop a truly ethical character comprising virtues like *ren* 仁 ("benevolence," "humaneness," "goodness") and *zhi* 智 ("wisdom," "knowledge").[33] The Confucian discourse is, first and foremost, transformative: We need to engage in self-cultivation, internalize various ritual prescriptions, and balance our desires in order to become responsible members of our community. In other words, the Confucian ideal world is realized precisely through a process of transformation that begins with each individual. One only needs to "rectify" (*zheng* 正) one's beliefs and emotions and attune them to the "Way" (*Dao*). Then, one should help others who have not yet studied Confucian texts or rituals to do the same.[34] In this ideal world, a son will necessarily act like a son in relation to his parents (similar to the minister in

relation to his ruler). Obedience, though never unconditional, is required as a part of this role. Thus, moral and political order arises not through theoretical contemplation (e.g., the study of mathematics), but the ritualization and normalization of almost all aspects of daily life. In short, the question of social integration has been central to Confucian discourse from the very beginning.

Where does all this leave us with regard to the "Confucian standards of reasoning"? Clearly, the ability of each individual to think about what he or she should do figures prominently in the Confucian discourse (which, by the way, has traditionally been a male-centered discourse). Confucius wanted his disciples to understand that genuine reasoning is important for solving ethical issues like conflicts between social roles or for making difficult choices. But aside from a number of ethical maxims (like the Confucian Golden Rule) and certain ritual prescriptions, Confucius apparently thought there are no fixed rules or more abstract moral principles; and even these maxims and ritual prescriptions sometimes need to be altered.[35] The ability to form correct, moral judgments about what one ought to do in a specific situation is thus identified by Confucius with the situational responsiveness of the "superior person."[36] Finding the right solution is also described as a matter of taking "what is near at hand" as an "analogy" when thinking of others (*neng jin qu pi* 能近取譬 in *Analects* 6: 30). Still, everyone also needs to understand the value of harmonious cooperation, especially in family life.[37] Therefore, one may want to conclude, the criteria for appropriate reasoning are often intrinsic to particular practices and are not pre-given, but dependent on contextual interpretation. However, this does not imply that each individual can interpret Confucian teachings according to his or her own preferences.

Arguably, unlike in Platonic thought (and later rationalistic schools in European philosophy), the ability to "give an account" (*lógon didónai*) through a process of isolating what is more fundamental or breaking something down into its components is not central to the Confucian understanding of practical reasoning.[38] Confucius's disciples rarely ever ask for reasons; at most, they expect their Master to offer some sort of reasoned explanation.[39] Typically, they do not articulate their disagreement with the Master (if they ever have a disagreement, as in *Analects* 11: 11 regarding Yan Hui's funeral), and they never reject a statement by Confucius outright. Confucius was sometimes critical of authority and probably did not want his disciples to follow authority unconditionally. On the other hand, he clearly assumed a paternal role vis-à-vis his disciples, expecting from them at least some deference and a basic affirmation of the existing ritual order.[40] This may explain the general

lack of explicitness in the *Analects* and even the deep-seated distrust expressed there in dialogical communication. In a number of passages, the dialogue between Confucius and his disciples breaks down or is replaced by silence or some ironic gestures.[41] Often, Confucius seems to assume that his teachings are beyond most of his followers' grasp.[42]

Later thinkers who were committed to Confucius's teachings and the Confucian way of life developed a more detailed understanding of these standards, albeit not in the straightforward manner contemporary Western readers would expect. Mencius and Xunzi are of particular importance here, as both have written comprehensive accounts of practical agency in the Confucian sense and also developed new forms of argumentation and reasoning that had an enduring influence on social and political practices in Chinese-speaking societies.[43] Both emphasize the individual's capacity for self-reflection and self-evaluation, and, following certain hints in the *Analects*, both locate the center of moral inquiry and reflection in each individual's "heart-mind" (*xin* 心). They agree that it is by reflecting and concentrating on our heart-mind that we are able to shape our character in the appropriate way. At the same time, however, it has often been noticed that neither Mencius, nor Xunzi, pay much attention to the intensive deliberation or painful weighing of options which people often experience and which may also be described in terms of a struggle between reason and emotion (think, for example, of Aristotle's famous analysis of the weakness of will). Instead, like Confucius himself, they favor the model of "effortless action" (*wuwei* 無為): Through an integrated training of our mind, emotions, and habits, we supposedly can achieve a harmonious state in which our actions flow freely and spontaneously from our natural inclinations.[44] Therefore, instead of comparing and calculating different goods or options, Mencius and Xunzi portray the ideal ethical agent (the "superior person," and even the "wise person" *shengren* 聖人) as possessing virtues that emerge naturally. By contrast, they constantly disparage self-doubt, prolonged inner struggle, and overly conscious reflection.[45] This does not necessarily imply that there is no latitude for individual agency, but rather that an ethical bearing is to be achieved effortlessly, not through the use of calculative reason.

Mencius maintains that right action is generally motivated by particular feeling reactions of the "heart-mind" that cannot be easily silenced (nor can they be coerced). These feeling reactions can be traced back to those "sprouts" or innate tendencies (*duan* 端) that all human beings share. Moreover, Mencius tries to demonstrate in numerous passages why a reasonable person, the Confucian

"superior person," needs to cultivate these feeling reactions.[46] His understanding of reasoning is undoubtedly *practical* insofar as he is concerned, not with the truth of propositions, but with the desirability or value of actions. This said, it is also clearly not entirely non-rational and non-discursive. In some respects, Mencius even puts more emphasis on the process of reasoning and speaking than Confucius. There is, for instance, a long and very dense passage on the importance of "words" (*yan* 言; alternative translation: "teachings") and why we need to know "words" and to reflect upon them in order to cultivate our ethical potential.[47] Paying attention to "words," which includes all kinds of utterances by ourselves and by others, will help us to refine our sensibility for the world in its complexity. It is only through our refined perception of particular situations that can we hope to trigger appropriate feeling reactions and spontaneously make the right judgments.[48]

David Wong has argued that the text of the *Mengzi* contains "a conception of ethical reflection that gives justificatory priority to the particular and that this conception is about a form of ethical *reasoning* that involves careful comparison of particulars."[49] Wong further ascribes to Mencius a form of *analogical reasoning*, which involves the study of certain paradigmatic cases. Ordinary cases range from those that are unambiguous to those that are less clear; however, we can hope to find a satisfying answer by comparing them to those paradigmatic cases. Thus, there is no need to appeal to general principles; the answer is found intuitively, not by use of logical inference. Thus, recognizing that an ox should be spared from suffering, the king in *Mengzi* 1A/7 is to make a similar conclusion about the suffering of people. According to *Mengzi* 3A/5, rather than subscribe to the idea of equal and impartial concern, one should conclude from one's greater affection for a family member over a stranger that natural relations do indeed have priority over all other relations. Finally, the acute perception of a particular situation can give us a good reason to suspend even the rule of propriety.[50] But this is clearly not an *abstract* reason (though it may not be as particular as say the name "Caius" in Tolstoy's novel *The Death of Ivan Ilych*). In other words, the cognitive aspect of the reason-giving activity is always embedded in non-cognitive practices. It may be the case that Mencius's form of practical reasoning admits that certain general rules have normative pull over us, yet the idea of consistency with these rules is not especially important to him. Much more central to his thought is our concrete understanding of certain paradigmatic cases and our ability to decide how new cases are similar.

In my view, Wong's interpretation is based on a convincing and subtle reading of major passages in the *Mengzi*. I also do not think

that we have any reason from the outset to think of such reasoning as being irrational or less rational than norm- or principle-guided reasoning.

Xunzi, the third important Confucian thinker in Early China, developed a similar ideal of practical reasoning. While it has been argued that Xunzi wants the agent to think about the "balance of reasons" achieved in different cases,[51] I think that there is no clear distinction even in his thought between the faculties of reason and emotion, the activity of reason-giving and more affective modes of communication. In other words, the abstract, purely cognitive aspect of argumentation is not isolated anywhere from its more contextual aspects, namely metaphorical language, emotional involvement, rhetoric stylization, and the habituation of ritual on the part of the individual. We now finally have a clearer picture of what practical reasoning means to the Confucian tradition. In what follows, we will consider how this picture has been transformed by Zhu Xi and also attempt to understand how certain social practices shaped by the Confucian discourse continue to influence Chinese societies.

III. Neo-Confucian Practical Reasoning and The (Early) Modern World

One might easily suspect that the "Confucian standards of reasoning" were unintelligible to most social agents, in traditional China, but much more so in modern Chinese societies. This is because whoever wanted to master these standards and use them to construct a meaningful argument needed to undergo extensive training in Confucian texts and internalize a great number of difficult canonical passages and commentarial remarks. Few, however, have in fact been able to successfully complete such a process. However, there can be no doubt that the Neo-Confucian mode of thinking (in particular as it is articulated by Zhu Xi) has deeply influenced Chinese society as a whole, its social practices, institutions, and normative standards. As Max Weber has powerfully described, institutions in Imperial and Late Imperial China rested on relationships and networks among a small cultural elite of scholar-officials, not jurisdictions.[52] And some scholars argue that Neo-Confucianism has also directly shaped China's particular path to modernity (e.g., the process of urbanization and industrialization between the twelfth- and twentieth century, the logic of market expansion and collective action like social protests and revolutions).[53]

As I have said before, I am convinced that Confucian and Neo-Confucian ways of thinking cut across ours, as Westerners, in

disconcerting ways. Indeed, we have sufficient reason to admit that at least some of the social practices that we can observe in contemporary Chinese societies are still influenced by these ways of thinking: think of the role of discipline and exemplary norms in the Chinese education system, the normative power of historical analogies, or the often assumed connection between individual fate and morality: a good person is simply not expected to die prematurely.

To give another example, think of the important role played by the Neo-Confucian official Chen Hongmou 陳宏謀 (1696–1771): not only did Chen, during his long career in various Chinese provinces, work relentlessly for the general welfare of the population and promote universal education (including women and non-Chinese tribes), but he also demonstrated, more generally, a secular belief in economic and cultural progress.[54] It would be mistaken to not see him as a sober, reasonable person, and to not admit that reasoned judgments *were* indeed possible on the normative basis of Neo-Confucian teachings. And one may even wonder whether the optimistic mindset which lies at the basis of China's ongoing modernization process is not somehow inspired by Chen's and other Neo-Confucian officials' administrative legacy.

Chen Hongmou, in fact, considered himself to be a disciple of Zhu Xi (1130–1200); and it is hard to deny that Zhu's thinking demonstrates a number of strikingly rational and modern aspects, among others, his confident belief in the intelligibility of the self and the world, his skeptical attitude towards ghosts and other supernatural elements, and his emphasis on self-discipline and the attainment of a broad range of specialist knowledge. Beyond this, however, it is difficult to give an overview of Zhu Xi's textured and rich modes of thinking. In fact, this might already be a central characteristic of Zhu's thought, namely that it fails to converge on a single conclusion. Zhu never attempted to write down his own thought in a single treatise or set of statements, but preferred to express himself by means of highly contextualized arguments (mostly through the genre of commentary). In my view, we can understand this particular feature of Zhu's thinking as a direct manifestation of Mencius's "analogical reasoning." In a culture that had deeply internalized the Confucian emphasis on the contextual and the particular, there was no need to articulate one's thinking in a free-standing way or to be innovative. Still, Zhu Xi's thinking was innovative in at least three ways:

1. If one had to isolate a single concept related to the matter of rationality in Zhu Xi's writings, this would certainly be *li* 理, a term that has been variously translated as "pattern," "principle,"

"rationale," "normativity," and "coherence." In many passages, the word *li* indeed refers to certain aspects of rational behavior and thought; and since Zhu Xi emphasizes the abstract, transcendent dimension of *li,* while stressing at the same time that the ideal ethical agent has embodied its normative potential, a certain tension between reason and emotion arises in his thinking that has no precedent in the writings of Earlier Confucians like Mengzi or Xunzi.[55]

2. Zhu Xi ultimately believes in the fundamental unity of the "heart-mind" (combining cognitive and emotional aspects) and urges the ethical agent to achieve the sort of effortless ease that has already been described by Confucius and Mencius, and also the Daoist Zhuangzi. Ideally, one is entirely immersed in this particular situation while still being able to achieve a sense of detachment.[56] Such detachment comes very close to the Buddhist notion of "no-self" (it is thus strictly opposed to the pursuit of self-interest). It is achieved not in goal-oriented intentions, but rather through a holistic, pre-reflective awareness of the self as being part of the world. In the words of another Neo-Confucian thinker, if one wants to count the pillars in a room correctly, one is better off not being overly aware of one's goal (what he calls *zhuoxin bazhuo* 著心把捉)—otherwise, one easily gets the number wrong.[57] This perspective does not allow a clear distinction between intrinsic and instrumental value to emerge; it may also explain why, up to the twentieth century, Chinese philosophers have never been very concerned about the Is-Ought problem.

3. Mencius's "analogical reasoning" is re-articulated in an even more sophisticated way, namely as "analogical extension" (*leitui* 類推). In order to acquire knowledge about one thing, it is crucial for the agent to understand how this thing is related to other things of the same class and even, at least potentially, to *any* other thing. This method leads Zhu to privilege a sort of proto-scientific inquiry into the natural world. Yet, "analogical extension" is in no way comparable to logical inference or induction. Although Zhu collected a huge number of empirical observations, he treats natural phenomena in a "particularistic" way and never draws abstract conclusions from his observations (for example, regarding the phenomenon of gravitation).[58]

In sum, the Neo-Confucian ethical agent was always embedded in particular contexts and part of a comprehensive, social and political order. Whereas, in liberal modernity, it is generally speaking the individual *qua* individual who reasons, Neo-Confucian practical

reasoning was exercised within a determinately structured form of community.

What does all this mean for the problem of practical reasoning in our global age? The modern science-based worldview was first introduced systematically in China in the late nineteenth century; and it clearly represents a challenge to Neo-Confucianism. Few in China, Hong Kong, or Taiwan would argue today that the traditional Chinese worldview can simply be restored with no need of revision. And yet, the science-based worldview is not uncontroversial today; people continue to debate about its meaning even in Western societies. And if we observe more closely how Chinese-speaking agents organize their lives, how they argue about moral issues like the death penalty or abortion, and how they justify certain social practices, we will encounter quite a number of repercussions of this kind of particularistic, analogical way of thinking. For instance, when individuals in China, but also in societies like Hong Kong or Taiwan, express their value orientations, certain Confucian tenets often come into play even today.[59] While this does not imply that their reasons are necessarily internal to their culture, their judgments based on such reasons may nevertheless not be entirely intelligible without reference to this particular context. Incommensurability is never absolute; yet, if we are willing to observe the others' practices and beliefs closely enough, we may find that they are indeed unfamiliar to "us." Our practices could be more local than we thought them to be.

As I have already argued, a culture of moral skepticism has shaped many inquiries into rationality in the West. What is more, there is also the idea in the West of a "view from nowhere" (maybe derived from the idea of a God-like viewpoint central to Judeo-Christian civilization). I do not think that these concerns are central to Confucian or Neo-Confucian or traditional East Asian attempts to define practical reasoning. At the very least, we can be sure that an optimistic outlook on the possibility of ethical improvement and the restoration of social harmony is characteristic even of many contemporary Chinese.[60]

The issue of reason remains controversial, even today. We may easily become ensnared by the idea that past traditions can provide us with the normative resources to counteract the alienating effects of global capitalism, liberalized economies, and the barrage of more and more powerful technology. Instrumental reason is so corrosive to human agency that the tendency to fall back on the "'nostalgic' paradigm" (Giacomo Marramao), that is, "the tendency to look at the present with the eyes of the past," may only increase.[61] Many social practices in today's China are influenced by an almost

unlimited prioritization of instrumental efficacy in the name of scientific progress and technological mastery. But, as I have said before, on the level of individual life plans, the picture may be different. In certain cases, a life plan derived from the sort of holistic awareness described by Zhu Xi may actually prove to be more "rational" than one based on the idea of fulfilling the interests of those involved in a particular action. Paradoxically, the very contingency in the reproduction of contemporary social relations—the changeability and variation between atomized individuals—may undermine any attempt to determine clear criteria for practical reasoning in our global age.

This certainly does not mean that we should stop trying to identify and evaluate rational arguments. It is rather that we cannot be sure anymore that the theoretical culture of Western philosophical inquiry alone will be able to help us to make sense of the value of rationality. If we want to reimagine the emancipatory potential of rationality today, we need to think harder about the variability of practical reasoning around the globe.

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ENDNOTES

1. A more detailed account of this development is presented in Karl Ameriks, *Kant and the Historical Turn: Philosophy as Critical Interpretation* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006).

2. Giacomo Marramao, *The Passage West. Philosophy after the Age of the Nation State* (London: Verso, 2012), 167.

3. Kwame Anthony Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2004). Here is one of Appiah's most powerful statements: "It should be obvious, in any case, that the Argument from Other Cultures is a bit of a red herring. Indeed, what has been dramatized in terms of Us and Them, the West and the Rest, really plays out familiar conflicts between liberals and communitarians, between 'atomistic' and 'holistic' conceptions of society, conflicts that are *internal* to the West" (Appiah, *The Ethics of Identity*, 45). I am nonetheless doubtful whether the very distinction between "external" and "internal" to the West can be easily drawn in our global age.

4. Marramao, *The Passage West*, 42.

5. See Charles Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," in Charles Taylor, *Philosophical Arguments* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1995), 34–60; compare also Charles Taylor, "Rationality," in *Rationality and Relativism*, ed. Martin Hollis and Steven Lukes (Cambridge: MIT Press, 1982), 87–105. To be clear: I am not claiming that Confucianism can provide such a perspective; instead, I think, there is a certain tension between hermeneutics and the Confucian traditions of thought (compare Kathleen Wright, "Gadamer's Philosophical Hermeneutics and New Confucianism," in *Gadamer and Ricoeur: Critical Horizons for Contemporary Hermeneutics*, ed. Francis J. Mootz III and George H. Taylor [London: Continuum, 2011], 241–64).

6. Taylor, "Explanation and Practical Reason," 34.

7. Compare Marramao, *The Passage West*, 226–30; see also Wolfgang Schluchter, "Rationalität—das Spezifikum Europas?" in *Die kulturellen Werte Europas*, ed. Hans Joas and Klaus Wiegandt (Frankfurt: Fischer Taschenbuch Verlag, 2005), 237–64.

8. Amartya Sen, *The Idea of Justice* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2009), 178.

9. See, for example, *Ludwig Wittgenstein and the Vienna Circle: Conversations*, recorded by Friedrich Waismann (Oxford: Blackwell, 1979), 125.

10. A number of contemporary philosophers have developed social conceptions of reason, among them Alasdair MacIntyre and Charles Taylor. For an attempt to defend such a conception from an intercultural perspective, see Maria-Sibylla Lotter, *Scham, Schuld, Verantwortung: Über die kulturellen Grundlagen der Moral* (Berlin: Suhrkamp, 2012).

11. See Jürgen Habermas, *The Theory of Communicative Action: Vol. I: Reason and the Rationalization of Society*, trans. Thomas McCarthy (Boston: Beacon, 1984). For a thorough critique of Habermas's view, see Nikolas Kompridis, *Critique and Disclosure: Critical Theory between Past and Future* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2006).

12. Peter Winch, "Understanding a Primitive Society," *American Philosophical Quarterly* 1, no. 4 (1964): 307–24.

13. See, in particular, Michelle M. Moody-Adam's critical discussion of the idea that cultures represent "integrated, fully individuated, and self-contained moral wholes" (Michele M. Moody-Adams, *Fieldwork in Familiar Places. Morality, Culture, and Philosophy* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1997).

14. See Wei Shang, *Rulin waishi and Cultural Transformation in Late Imperial China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2003), 65.

15. See Marshall Sahlins, *How "Natives" Think about Captain Cook, For Example* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1995); and Gananath Obeyesekere, *The Apotheosis of Captain Cook: European Mythmaking in the Pacific* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1997).

16. Edward Evan Evans-Pritchard, *Witchcraft, Oracles, and Magic among the Azande* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1976 [originally 1937]), 109.

17. Joachim Gentz and Dirk Meyer (eds.), *Literary Forms of Argument in Early China* (Leiden: Brill, 2015), "Introduction," 6.

18. In this essay, I take the *Analects* (*Lunyu* 〈〈論語〉〉) as my primary source for understanding Confucius's thinking. I am aware, however, of the limited value of such an approach. The *Analects* purports to record the thought of Confucius; it is also a famously difficult text—consisting mostly of short sayings and scattered remarks—that allows for countless interpretations over which commentators have contested for more than two millennia. A collection of traditional readings of the *Analects* can be found in Cheng Shude 程樹德 (ed. Cheng Junying 程俊英/Jiang Jianyuan 蔣見元), *Lunyu Jishi* 〈〈論語集釋〉〉 (Beijing: Zhonghua shuju, 1990). For an iconoclastic reading of the *Analects*, see E. Bruce Brooks/A. Taeko Brooks, *The Original Analects: Sayings of Confucius and His Successors* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1998).

19. *Lunyu* 15: 16 (I have used Edward Slingerland's translation of the *Analects*; see *Confucius, Analects: With Selections from Traditional Commentaries*, trans. Slingerland (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2003).

20. *Lunyu* 1: 4, 2: 15, 4: 17, 7: 8, passim.

21. *Lunyu* 3: 14, 3: 25, 7: 1, and 9: 5.

22. *Lunyu* 6: 11, 7: 37, 12: 4, 9: 29, 14: 28, and 15: 32.

23. *Lunyu* 14: 27; cf. also 2: 13, 4: 22, 4: 24, 12: 3, and 14: 20.

24. *Lunyu* 5: 11; cf. also 2: 14, 4: 16, 13: 23, and 17: 4.

25. For a famous example of his disciples' criticism, see *Lunyu* 17: 4; but compare 11: 25 and 17: 7; for *guan*, see *Lunyu* 4: 15.

26. See Paul R. Goldin's article, "When *Zhong* 忠 Does Not Mean 'Loyalty,'" *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 7, no. 2 (2008): 165–74.

27. See also *Lunyu* 5: 12, 12:2, and 15: 24; cf. also 6: 30. Compare Cheng Shude, *Lunyu jishi*, 257–67.

28. See David Nivison, "Golden Rule Arguments in Chinese Philosophy," in *The Ways of Confucianism*, ed. Bryan W. Van Norden (Chicago: Open Court, 1996), 59–76; and Heiner Roetz, *Die chinesische Ethik der Achsenzeit. Eine Rekonstruktion unter dem Aspekt des Durchbruchs zu postkonventionellem Denken* (Frankfurt: Suhrkamp, 1992), 219–41.

29. See, for example, *Lunyu* 3: 22, 4: 7, 5: 10, and 14: 10; cf. 6: 13, 13: 18, and 17: 19.

30. Think in particular of the Master's famous admonishment of Zai Wo 宰我 in *Lunyu* 17: 21.

31. Martha C. Nussbaum, "Golden Rule Arguments: A Missing Thought?" in *The Moral Circle and the Self: Chinese and Western Approaches*, ed. Kim-chong Chong, Sor-hoon Tan, and Chin Liew Ten (Chicago: Open Court, 2003), 3–16.

32. See also Christoph Harbsmeier, "Forgiveness and Forbearance in Ancient China," in *The Ethics of Forgiveness: A Collection of Essays*, ed. Christel Fricke (New York: Routledge, 2011), 13–29.

33. On the importance of exemplars for the Confucian process of learning, cf. Amy Olberding, *Moral Exemplars in the Analects: The Good Person Is That* (New York: Routledge, 2012).

34. See *Lunyu* 2: 3, 7: 3, and 15: 39; compare 12: 17, 12: 19, and 13: 3.

35. See *Lunyu* 9: 3.

36. *Lunyu* 4: 10.

37. *Lunyu* 1: 12, 3: 7, 4: 19–21, and 15: 22.

38. Here I am not saying that Early Confucian or, more broadly, Chinese thinkers did not know certain analytic forms of argumentation. For example, as Joachim Gentz has demonstrated, a number of Early Confucian thinkers were able to draw boundaries between various concepts by creating enumerative catalogues and contrasting oppositional chains of terms (see his "Defining Boundaries and Relations of Textual Units: Examples from the Literary Tool-Kit of Early Chinese Argumentation," in Gentz and Meyer, *Literary Forms of Argument in Early China*, 112–57).

39. See, in particular, *Lunyu* 2: 5, 4: 15, and 12: 1.

40. A fine analysis of the Confucian Master–student relationship can be found in David Elstein, "The Authority of the Master in the *Analects*," *Philosophy East and West* 59, no. 2 (2009): 142–72.

41. See, for example, *Lunyu* 5: 13, 7: 21, 17: 4, 17: 19, and 17: 20.

42. See *Lunyu* 5: 12, 6: 21, or 11: 26.

43. Compare Eric Hutton "Moral Reasoning in Aristotle and Xunzi," *Journal of Chinese Philosophy* 29, no. 3 (2002): 355–84.

44. See, for example, *Lunyu* 2: 1, 15: 15, and 17: 19; cf. *Mengzi* 1A/7, 2A/6, and 6A/8.

45. Compare, in particular, Edward Slingerland, *Effortless Action: Wu-wei as Conceptual Metaphor and Spiritual Ideal in Early China* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003).

46. See esp. *Mengzi* 2A/6.

47. *Mengzi* 2A/2.

48. In my understanding of "intuition," I am following David Wong; see his subtle analysis in "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi," in *Essays on the Moral Philosophy of Mengzi*, ed. Xiusheng Liu and Philip J. Ivanhoe (Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002), 187–220; here, 202–3.

49. See Wong, "Reasons and Analogical Reasoning in Mengzi," 188.

50. *Mengzi* 4A/17.

51. See, for example, Hutton, "Moral Reasoning in Aristotle and Xunzi," 372.

52. See Max Weber, *The Religion of China: Confucianism and Taoism* (New York: Free Press, 1951) (German edition first published in 1915; revised version 1920). Following Weber, Confucian practical reasoning may appear as the principal cultural obstacle to the rationalization and disenchantment of Chinese societies, in other words, to the very process initiated by the Protestant Reformation in Europe. Not coincidentally, some Chinese intellectuals still doubt whether the Chinese equivalent of the Protestant Reformation has ever taken place (see Ci Jiwei, *Moral China in the Age of Reform* [Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014], 103). Yet, Weber's interpretation of China is quite controversial, and I think that Marramao makes a valid

point when he argues that Weber is unable to understand Confucian discourse, not merely as "*antecedent* to Modernity," but rather as "its *counterpoint*" (Marramao, *The Passage West*, 58).

53. Compare R. Bin Wong, *China Transformed. Historical Change and the Limits of European Experience* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1997).

54. Compare the excellent monograph by William T. Rowe, *Saving the World: Chen Hongmou and Elite Consciousness in Eighteenth-Century China* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2001).

55. Compare the succinct analysis in Stephen C. Angle, *Sagehood. The Contemporary Significance of Neo-Confucian Philosophy* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012), 31–50.

56. Zhu Xi frequently emphasizes the need to unify one's consciousness (or "heart-mind," *xin* 心) in the present and sometimes expresses his fear that one may lose the unity of one's consciousness by focusing too much on one's past self, thereby dividing one's consciousness into two or even three different entities (see Chen Lai 陳來, *Zhuzi Zhexue Yanjiu* 〈〈朱子哲學研究〉〉 [Shanghai: Huadong Shifan Daxue Press, 2000], 230–32).

57. See *Jinsilu* 〈〈近思錄〉〉 (*Remarks on Things at Hand*) 4: 20, compare also 4: 24.

58. See Yung Sik Kim, *The Natural Philosophy of Chu Hsi* (1130–1200) (Philadelphia: Memoirs of the American Philosophical Society, 2000), 298–99. For a helpful analysis of Zhu Xi's conception of history and historical reasoning, see Tsong-han Lee, "Making Moral Decisions: Zhu Xi's 'Outline and Details of the Comprehensive Mirror for Aid in Government,'" *Journal of Song-Yuan Studies* 39 (2009): 43–84.

59. Among the vast literature on social practices in contemporary Chinese-speaking societies, I shall only mention here Arthur Kleinman, Yunxiang Yan, Jing Jun, Sing Lee, Everett Zhang, Pan Tianshu, Wu Fei, and Jinhua Go, *Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2011); and Everett Zhang, Arthur Kleinman, and Tu Weiming (eds.), *Governance of Life in Chinese Moral Experience: The Quest for an Adequate Life* (London: Routledge, 2011).

60. On the God-like viewpoint, cf. Lotter, *Scham, Schuld, Verantwortung*, 115, 169–74.

61. Marramao, *The Passage West*, 63.