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Worth the Sacrifice?
Security Measures at the Olympic Games
and the Infringements on Civil Liberties

犧牲值得嗎？
奧運安全措施與侵犯公民自由

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Abstract

Despite being considered an international sporting event that brings all nations closer together, the Olympic Games in particular have a long history of dealing with a seemingly omnipresent security threat. That is, given the global prominence of the Games, they also attract individuals and groups who aim to utilize the Olympics as a platform for terrorists acts in order to bring their intended message to the world stage. Thus, there is tremendous pressure involved for every host nation to guarantee and deliver safe Games. Interestingly, in recent years and especially following the 9/11 attacks, the international security environment in general has seen a major shift towards an understanding of security, which may be summarized as highly visible measures result in high levels of security. Strict and blatant security measures are therefore being implemented and, in turn, civil liberties and the personal freedom of the people are increasingly being sacrificed for a (fallacious) sense of security. This research demonstrates that similar mechanisms are at work when it comes to international sporting events. By having taken the 2008 Summer Olympics in Beijing and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi as its two case studies, this thesis answers how security is being guaranteed during mega-sport events. Additionally, this paper tackles the question of whether the identified actions taken by the respective governments can be deemed reasonable, particularly in the light of the possible reductions in civil liberties and personal freedom that often go hand in hand. Ultimately, as the analysis examined the security measures taken, it assists in holding the individual strategies and implemented security measures accountable for their achievements as well as their negative side effects. In a final step, a comparative analysis between both cases has been conducted through the lens of the securitization approach and the critical application of securitization theory. The researcher was thereby able to identify major disparities as well as a smaller number of overlaps in how the two authoritarian regimes have engaged in securing the Olympics, respectively. Hence, providing evidence that regime type may not be a main indicator for securitization behavior. While this thesis nevertheless reveals how both host nations have utilized the Games for their own political purposes and agenda, it remains important to note that the researcher has intentionally aimed at placing special emphasis on the individual perspectives of both host nations. This included focusing on how both nations understand themselves, their own history, and how they perceive the international community around them.

Keywords: Securitization, Civil Liberties, International Sporting Events, Olympic Games

摘要

儘管歷屆國際奧林匹克運動會一向被視為是和平團結各國的象徵，還是無法免除會期間無所不在的安全威脅。換句話說，正由於奧運名氣眾所週知，因此也樹大招風，容易成為某些個人或團體，為了對全世界表達其訴求，而進行恐怖攻擊的目標。因此，對奧運主辦國來說，確保奧運會期的安全是至關重要的。有趣的是，在 911 攻擊後至今，國際上對安全維持的想法有了很大的轉變。總結來說，高外部可視性可等同於高安全性。也就是說，措施越容易讓人察覺，其造成的震懾度越能提高安全。然而，要施行嚴格並明顯易察覺的安全措施的代價是對個人自由與公眾權益的犧牲。安全，是由自由交換而來。本研究演示了相似的安全理論轉變如何實現在國際賽事上。本研究選擇分析 2008 年的北京奧運以及 2014 年的索契冬奧，以及兩場奧運主辦國如何確保會期間的安全。除此之外，本篇論文也旨在研究兩國政府所施行的安全舉措是否合理正當，尤其是這些舉措多大程度的影響了兩國公民的權益和自由。研究結果更進一步助於理解論文中的兩國政府有責於其安全策略與實施的措施為所帶來的結果與負面影響。本研究在論文最後以國際安全理論中的安全化研究的角度去對兩項案例研究進行比較分析。研究者由此能識別出兩個威權型政體的政府在奧運的安全策略上的主要的差異以及少數的相似點。研究者最終的結論是政體類型並沒有足夠的證據作為政府在針對奧運的安全化行為中的主要因素。雖然本研究論文的确顯示兩國皆將奧運會視為達成其政治目的與政治宣傳的工具，研究者仍然有意強調兩主辦國本身的出發點。也就是說，研究者有意在文本中從兩國自己的歷史與敘事脈絡中分析他們對自身以外的國際社會的認知與反應。

關鍵字：安全化、公民自由、國際運動賽事、奧林匹克運動會

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Chapter 1. Introduction

Drawing a connection between the Olympic Games and the topic of security issues might at first glance appear to be rather farfetched or even counterintuitive, particularly when considering that athletes from 204 National Olympic Committees (NOCs)¹ participated and competed peacefully against one another in international sporting events such as the Summer Olympic Games held in Beijing in 2008. The Olympics; in fact, are commonly being regarded as an occasion that actively brings nations together, and are often even attested with the potential to (at the very least temporally) ease disputes and the capability to initiate peace. Former UN General Secretary, Ban Ki-Moon; for instance, pointed out in this respect that “[t]he Olympic Truce is rooted in the hope that if people and nations can put aside their differences for one day, they can build on that to establish more lasting ceasefires and find paths towards durable peace” (Ban 2014). The author of this present study certainly does not intend to repudiate the importance of international events, such as the Olympic Games, to foster security on a global level. However, a specific form of a security threat concerning international sporting events has been identified and will hence be addressed in this study. Namely, the security of the host nation. More precisely, this paper aims to look at how exactly countries guarantee security during times when large-scale international events are being held within their borders. That is, ensuring a secure and peaceful sporting event certainly falls within the main responsibilities of a host nation. However, this present thesis also examines what consequences come along with the security measures taken in terms of the civil liberties granted to its people. A particular focus has thereby been set on investigating the occurrence of possible reductions in civil liberties and personal freedom,

¹ The number of National Olympic Committees involved in the Beijing Summer Olympics (namely, 204); for example, exceeds the number of officially recognized countries. In order to avoid potential confusion, the author of this study therefore points out that several territories of the United States, the United Kingdom, the Netherlands, New Zealand and China, such as Hong Kong or Guam, are not recognized as countries, yet they do represent themselves separately in the Olympics.

publicly justified in the name of security. Two distinct cases; the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi, have therefore been carefully selected for a variety of reasons, as shall be further elaborated on the following pages.

1.1 Motivation and Purpose

Investigating whether or not public and individual security during the Olympic Games represents a quid pro quo for the relinquishment of individual rights and civil liberties, demonstrates something that has not yet been thoroughly examined. Hence, it promises to generate new insights that could further be applied to similar mass events all over the world. As it shall be shown, the Chinese as well as the Russian government utilized the extraordinariness of the Olympic events to effectively, and to some extent even sustainably, curb the civil liberties and rights of its own people. The critical lens through which the analysis of the designated empirical cases will be conducted is formed by the securitization approach. Yet, as the author delved deeper into the subject, it became quite apparent that also the Critical Application of Securitization Theory (CAST), based on; among others, Charrett (2009) would greatly inform this academic endeavor. Both of them are thus planned to be linked in order to establish the solid theoretical foundation of this study. The decision to rely on those two specific approaches will further be explained and justified within the section of this paper entitled “analytical framework and research method”. For now, it shall however be pointed out that particularly CAST is concerned with deconstructing the institutional power of the securitizing actor. In fact, it puts an emphasis on the notion that socially constructed threats, such as the one of terrorist attacks during the Olympic Games; for example, strengthen state power more than they undermine it (Charrett 2009, p. 27). That is, the state is able to use the securitization process as a tool for their political

agenda and to reinforce bureaucratic decisions related to security, such as the extensive use of technologies for the purpose of surveillance. All of which appear highly relevant for the study of the actions taken during the Beijing Olympics as well as the Sochi Winter Olympics for the ultimate objective of ensuring security.

Returning once more to the question of significance and purpose of this thesis, the author wants to highlight that identifying the mechanisms exercised in the name of security – security itself being a goal that can generally be characterized as positive since every individual instinctively seeks to be safe from any harm - eventually serves the function of holding those individual strategies accountable for their achievements as well as their negative side effects. As will be pointed out within the next section, the threats of violent attacks during the Olympic Games are certainly real. Nonetheless, one shall critically question what price a society is willing to pay for its own safety and whether or not those security measures; in fact, do more harm than good.

1.2 Statement of the Problem and Research Questions

The decision to focus on the Olympic Games as an example for international sporting events in general, and the 2008 Summer Olympic Games in Beijing and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi in particular as two demonstrative cases for this purpose, is motivated by a variety of reasons. First of all, the Olympics represent the most famous and prestigious athlete games in the world. Attracting hundreds of thousands of tourists, including world leaders, and a staggering amount of media coverage, aired and broadcasted all over the globe. Especially the Olympic opening ceremony constitutes one of the most watched events on world television. Yet, with this enormous amount of attention given also comes the ancillary effect of posing a highly

compelling and enticing target for protests and terrorist attacks. Richards et al.; for instance, stress that terrorism in itself is a form of communication and therefore the Olympics with its large-scale media storm provide a perfect platform to bring the intended message across (2011, p. 15). That such a threat can materialize itself rather abruptly becomes quite clear when recalling the events of the 1972 Summer Olympics in Munich, during which eleven Israeli athletes were kidnapped and murdered by Black September Palestinian terrorists. Thus, strikingly proving that securing the game's athletes, its staff² and spectators is imperative. While simultaneously also delivering evidence for the fact that terrorist groups recklessly utilize such events to achieve their political, religious, or ideological goals. In this particular case, the Black September fraction of the Palestine Liberation Organization commanded the release of over 200 prisoners incarcerated in Israel and Germany, or otherwise would proceed to kill their Israeli hostages. The West German Olympic security forces during that time; however, had to be deemed largely unprepared for such a hostage crisis, as conveyed by the circumstance that most of them were unarmed.

Furthermore, also the rescue attempt carried out by local police forces was highly unorganized³ and ultimately turned out disastrous with what is now known as the so-called Munich Massacre. This level of unpreparedness can also be partly attested to West Germany's objective during the Games of erasing the highly militarized image of the country's Nazi past. That is, especially with regards to the 1936 Olympics in Berlin and Garmisch-Partenkirchen, which had been used to propagate the Nazi government and its ideologies. In fact, the Olympic Games in 1972 hosted by West Germany had therefore deliberately renounced heavy security and were hosted under the official slogan of “the carefree games”.

² Apart from the Israeli athletes, a German police officer was also killed during the fire exchange.

³ As the police forces were preparing for their rescue mission, they had been filmed by television channels and thus the terrorists had the opportunity to watch the security forces approaching live on broadcasting media. Hence, eventually causing the police to retreat its initial rescue attempt.

The introduction of the above case has been thought of as being especially noteworthy as it clearly pinpoints the major impact that each individual host nations' own historical background has on how the country may host the event. The intended image each nation would like to display of itself to the world by hosting such a mega-sporting event also certainly differs from country to country, and so do the security measures taken. Furthermore, the example above also highlights the existing and real security threats during the Olympics. Therefore, one of the bitter lessons learned from the past are the realization that preventive security measures during the Olympic Games are absolutely necessary. Toohey and Taylor even go so far as to argue that “[s]ince 1972, there has been an association between terrorism, violence, and the Olympic Games” (2008, p. 451). In fact, the tragedy of 1972 actually attested that terrorist attacks during the Olympic Games could be a powerful method to challenge governments and to achieve massive international awareness of one's mission (cf. Johnson 2001). The Palestine Liberation Organization, who had orchestrated the massacre, did so with the intention to bring their conflict with Israel to the international forefront. Even more worrisome may be that, at least according to the PLO's own judgement, they had succeeded in reaching their goals:

In our assessment, and in light of the result, we have made one of the best achievements of Palestinian commando action. A bomb in the White House, a mine in the Vatican, the death of Mao Tse-tung, an earthquake in Paris could not have echoed through the consciousness of every man in the world like the operation in Munich. The Olympiad aroused the people's interest and attention more than anything else in the world. The choice of the Olympics, from the purely propagandistic viewpoint was 100% successful. It was like painting the name of Palestine on a mountain that can be seen from the four corners of the earth. (Dershowitz 2002, p. 46).

The quote had been uttered by Black September members shortly after the attack and was published in Al-Sayad, a Beirut newspaper. Although one may be inclined to deny this gruesome statement - for very good reasons the author would like to add - one cannot hide the fact that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict had barely received any global attention in the years directly prior to the attack. Yet, following the Munich massacre, the issue had captured a great amount of awareness and the chairman of the Palestine Liberation Organization at that time, Yasser Arafat, was subsequently being invited to talks with many of the world leaders of his era. In fact, Arafat even addressed a plenary session of the UN General Assembly in 1974 and the PLO had been recognized as the legitimate representative of Palestine and had further been granted its observer status in the UN in that very year.

It is due to the conditions outlined above that large international sporting events do represent preferred targets for terrorist attacks. Certainly having recognized this issue, security measures for every Olympic Games following the 1972 incident have been elevated to new heights and cannot compare to the security standards of the Munich Summer Olympics anymore.

Interestingly; however, a second proliferation point in security can be pinpointed, which had been reached in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Although the incident itself was unrelated to sporting events, it nevertheless entailed serious consequences with regards to the perception of security in all layers of society nearly world-wide. The subsequent Winter Olympics in 2002, held on American soil in Salt Lake City, noticeably provided additional evidence to this. In fact, the White House itself highlighted in a press statement entitled 'Preparing for the World: Homeland Security and Winter Olympics' that a new approach to security would be taken. In essence, the new understanding of security that was pursued meant "highly visible = highly secure". An approach that is geared towards the aim of deterring any

potential terrorist threats through highly visible security measures (White House 2002). The succeeding trend of increasingly tighter and stricter security measures also characterize the environment in which the two selected cases for this present study are situated. The implemented security arrangements during the 2008 Beijing Summer Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, as well as their respective implications for civil liberties, will serve as the prime elements of attention for this current endeavor.

The study's first empirical case of the Beijing Olympics is extremely worthwhile investigating with respect to the questions the researcher tries to address. That is, due to the absolute prioritization of the success of the Beijing Games over its own people's rights. Examples for this include; for instance, the forceful eviction of over 300,000 Chinese residents from their homes in order to make way for the Olympics. While the Beijing case's immense security budget, which, for its time, was unparalleled, also plays a major role. Therefore, analyzing the security measures taken by the Chinese government with the support of these extensive amounts of financial means appears to be extremely interesting. This will be done; however, with the disturbing global post-9/11 trend in security in mind⁴, which is characterized by a tendency towards an increase in security going hand in hand with the privation of civil liberties. That is, as the level of security rises, the degree of civil liberties is drastically being reduced.

Examples for the establishment of such thoughts can be found globally, even in countries that are widely believed to be one of the main advocates for liberties and individual rights. The United States of America; for instance, had passed the "Stop and Frisk Policy". This policy

⁴ The 9/11 attacks and the following anti-terror discourse have fundamentally changed the way security is being understood. Within the United States; for instance, the so-called Patriot Act was signed into law and consequently heavily infringed civil liberties and personal freedom under the veil of national security. For a more exhaustive discussion on the subject in the context of the U.S., the author refers to Darmer et al. "Civil Liberties Versus National Security in a Post-9/11 World" (2004).

allows police officers to question and frisk pedestrians for weapons or other illegal objects without having previously inquired any concrete evidence. A second, and perhaps even more famous example is the so-called Patriot Act. The latter, so can be argued, actually goes directly against the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, which states that everyone shall be secured from unreasonable searches and seizures of property by the government. The Patriot Act allowed law enforcement officers to conduct searches in people's homes and businesses without the owner's consent or knowledge. Measures like these, although implemented with the intention of providing security, have significantly curbed civil liberties of the citizens of the United States.

Although this recent development can be traced back to have originated from (or at least was intensified by) the United States in the aftermath of the 9/11 terror attacks as indicated above, this research will demonstrate that similar mechanisms are at work when it comes to international sporting events. This current study is therefore situated in an emergent research subgenre as it seeks to explore and furthermore ultimately answers the following research questions:

1. How is security guaranteed during international sporting events with a focus on the 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing and the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi?
2. Additionally, are the identified actions taken by the governments reasonable, particularly in the light of possible reductions in civil liberties and personal freedom in order to ensure security?

Apart from the 2008 Beijing Olympics, it is planned to conduct a comparison with the second selected international sporting event above, namely the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. As the 2008 and the 2014 Olympics were held in different countries, as it is common with

regards to the Olympic hosts, the author is able to generate a comparative analysis between the security measures taken in China and Russia. This is promising as it appears to the author of this study at the current research stage that a number of the processes involved in securitizing international sporting events are; in fact, uniform and consistent. Hence, including a comparison between those two events will help provide evidence for such an argumentation. Yet, simultaneously, it additionally allows this thesis to demonstrate differences, that might exist (or not) due to cultural, historical, and governmental aspects, for example.

In this respect, the case of the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics has been chosen due to the government's authoritarian nature⁵ and the large amount of criticism the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as well as the Russian government have received on how the Games had been organized. That is, particularly when keeping the then current international debate in mind on whether or not to boycott the Sochi Winter Olympics altogether. Factors such as the two anti-LGBT laws passed in 2013 and the thus caused alleged safety risks for LGTB spectators and athletes were serious concerns. The tension with the ethnic minority group of Circassians added another layer of objections and hesitations. Additionally, and also closely related to the security issue are the number of inherent security risks that the location of Sochi poses. That is, due to the neighboring Republic of Abkhazia⁶ and the Chechen Republic. All these aspects, along with the wave of terrorist attacks in major Russian metropolises, such as the suicide bombings targeting public transportation in Volgograd in 2013, or the bombing at the Domodedovo International

⁵ Although on paper, Russia is a clearly democratic nation with respect to its constitution, it can be argued that Putin has taken advantage of the loose constitutional control and has gradually turned Russia increasingly towards an authoritarian regime. Shevtsova (2015) in “The Authoritarian Resurgence: Forward to the Past in Russia”; for instance, impressively elaborates on this issue.

⁶ Abkhazia, a separatist state which is recognized by Russia, yet is considered to be part of Georgia by the United Nations and most other countries.

Airport in Moscow in 2011, impacted the security measures taken during the Games. Eventually leading up to the establishment of forbidden security zones and the restrictions of demonstrations, protests and meetings four weeks prior, during, and after the Sochi Olympics Games via presidential decree, for example.

Hence, both cases constitute an excellent ground to examine and compare the potential reductions in civil liberties experienced by the people of the two nations and whether the measures adopted by the Russian and Chinese government, respectively, can be deemed reasonable.

1.3 Literature Review

Before approaching the actual analytical framework that has been generated for the purpose of this study, this section first introduces a comprehensive literature review on the three main elements crucial to the two posed research questions of this thesis. The literature review has therefore been divided into three distinct sub-categories:

- Literature Review on International Sporting Events and the Rise of Security
- Review of the Two Selected Cases – Background on the Beijing and Sochi Olympics
- Discussion on Civil Liberties

Within the first sub-section a historical overview of the connection between international sporting events and terrorism (as the main cause for the elevation of security measures) will be presented. Thereby allowing the reader to comprehend the link between the two and shedding light into what exactly within the nature of the Olympic Games causes them to be determined as one of terrorists' preferred targets. In this context, a substantial amount of efforts is also being

invested on understanding the terrorists' minds and goals. That is, in order to further clarify the selection of potential targets for terrorist acts and the driving forces for such crimes in the first place. Ultimately, this first sub-section is intended to reveal the increasing intensity and progression of security arrangements over the past 50 years of Olympic Games history.

Certainly, not only the security measures have amplified. In fact, the former has been a consequence; at least in part, of the steep increase in the (perceived) security threats during the past years. These trends have of course not remained unnoticed by the academic community, and therefore a number of studies dealing with the seemingly omnipresent security threat in mass sporting events have been generated, and will hereinafter be reviewed to further inform this present study.

As the first research question of this paper is directed towards answering how security has been ensured during the two selected Olympic cases, a background of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Olympics will be provided in the second sub-section of this literature review. This will, among other things, address the way the Chinese and Russian governments have perceived their tasks and responsibilities as a host. While this second sub-section of the literature review will also focus on the internal circumstances of both nations prior and during the Olympics and outline each country's prime goals for the Olympic Games. The author of this present study further realized the need to understand how both host nations see themselves and the world around them, in order to be able to truly assess their respective actions. All of this assists the researcher in understanding what has led the respective host nation to pursue specific security strategies and implement the measures that have been taken. Moreover, the segment is further destined to function as a potential lead-in to identify some of the underlying objectives of the wide-ranging security operations adopted by both nations. Throughout the review, the author

of this present study will justify the selection of the two Olympic cases and provide sound reasons for having chosen each one of them and in that particular constellation.

As a last component of this literature review, civil liberties are being extensively discussed in the third sub-section. The sub-section is of paramount importance due to the fact that this study is not solely interested in how security is being guaranteed, but also in the consequences that the applied measures may result in. That is, as particular attention will be paid on the potential reduction of civil liberties conditioned by the necessity to ensure security. Security and civil liberties, at least superficially, thereby appear to be on opposite sides of the spectrum. Governments as well as the media attempt to convey the message that in order to secure the public during the Olympic events, individuals have to renounce and surrender their civil liberties to a certain extent. Yet, this also poses the question of what exactly civil liberties are comprised of. This final sub-section will hence take on the rather difficult task to define civil liberties and further elaborate on the distinction between the term and civil rights by drawing on related scholarly work. Furthermore, the overall approach to civil liberties of this thesis will be explained, while highlighting that the assessment will not be conducted from a Western-centric perspective. Literature and official reports on the situation in China and Russia in terms of civil liberties will be introduced. The review then concludes with carving out the civil liberties most relevant to the aims of this study (thus narrowing down the scope from a vast number of civil liberties available), which will then serve as reference points and leads for the proceedings of this thesis.

1.3.1 Literature Review on International Sporting Events and the Rise of Security

As international sporting events attract the attention of millions of people, it shall be no surprise that also the academic community has spent a significant amount of time investigating on this subject. While being advertised as family-friendly mass events, which bring all nations closer together, these gigantic gatherings of people also always bring along a security threat for its attendees and participants. This particular fear for one's own security has been most prominently escalated by the September 11 events in 2001. Yet, even more recently, fears have grown to new heights with the November 2015 Paris attacks. During the latter, a number of coordinated terrorist attacks - including suicide bombings and mass shootings – had taken place on November 13. The attacks had been carried out during a large-scale football match and targeted, among other things, a concert by the band “Eagles of Death Metal”.

Hence, given the topic's actuality, the academic world has and is still producing significant amounts of literature concerned with the security threat during mass events, as well as the reasons for (and consequences of) terrorism in connection to tourism and mega events in general (cf. Hall, Tomothy, Duval 2003). This is certainly rightly so, as according to Clark, there have been 168 terrorist attacks of different scale and scope during sporting events between the years 1972 and 2004 alone (2004, p. 34). However, particularly the 9/11 incident and the wealth of media reports in the years after the attacks – actively engaging in scaremongering (cf. Monahan 2010, p. 171) - suggest that mass events are no longer safe. Certainly it has to be remembered that, as Kertzer has accurately put it, “[a]lthough terrorism was not born on the morning of 11 September 2001, the stark calculation and symbolism of the attacks renewed its salience on the public agenda” (2007, p. 964). Thus, in response, this has brought a number of new and stricter security measures for mega-sporting events and tougher safety standards for organizers. In fact, security measures nowadays do not only entail what had been implemented by the Olympic committee

following the 1972 tragedy, namely regulatory management, fortification, and surveillance in order to divide and control Olympic sites. Instead, and among other things, a ring of steel strategy is being put to the forefront. This involves counterterrorism measures, a massive use of digital surveillance, the utilization of complex technology to control people's access into restricted areas, and dispersing security responsibilities to a variety of different agencies such as the army, navy, air force, and the Olympic police. Thus, due to the nature of these measures, event organizers are forced to cooperate a lot more closely with the government's security agencies and in some cases even with the security agencies of other states.

According to experts, such as Atkinson and Young, especially mega-sporting events seem to represent a particularly attractive target to terrorists and terrorist organizations. Partly due to the fact that they involve a considerable amount of international audience (2002, p. 54). However, when attempting to understand why terrorists select certain targets over others, one first has to grasp what terrorism actually is. Phabha rightly highlights in this context that despite terrorism representing a global phenomenon, it “is easy to recognize but difficult to define” (2000, p. 125). While scholars have been arguing for many years on a concrete, universal, and legal definition of ‘terrorism’, the endeavor has remained without major success. That is, as various definitions appear to be correct and suitable in their individual perspective, yet quite obviously miss other components of terrorism. Given this dilemma, one can nevertheless agree on a number of common characteristics that can be linked with acts of terror and thus at least establish a working definition. This thesis therefore adopts the following characteristics as core elements of terrorism and has further elaborated these features in detail in order to be able to differentiate between terrorist perpetrators and the often used label of ‘freedom fighters’ as a disguise.

Terrorism is generally committed by individuals and groups that lack the (political) power to alter the policies and conditions they strive against. Furthermore, they ground their logic on a certain ideology or religion, and in that way make members believe that common law does not apply to them. In fact, this is also used in order to cast off feelings of guilt and to justify their crimes, as they are convinced that the actions taken serve a greater overarching good (cf. Drake 1998, p. 56). Terrorist also select targets that will ensure maximized attention and getting their message across to a particularly wide audience. Yet, terrorists mostly engage in violence against random civilians, who often lose their lives although they do not represent the actual 'enemy'. Instead, the victims tend to merely serve as message generators (cf. Schmid and Jongmann 1988, p. 28). Ultimately, through this, an omnipresent fear is being sparked, as the public is ought to believe that they can as well fall victim to terrorist attacks at all times.

Given these circumstances, it shall be no surprise that mega-sporting events represent one of the preferred sites for such terrorist acts, particularly since great media exposure is guaranteed. Another element that makes sporting events a popular target is the aforementioned large number of spectators at a single space, which simultaneously makes it nearly impossible to identify potential terrorists. In addition, as transportation near stadiums and other big sporting venues has to provide sufficient services for millions of people, this simultaneously means that multiple convenient getaway routes for the culprits are also made available.

Atkinson and Young furthermore included an additional interesting layer in their argumentation on how mega-sporting events and terrorism may be connected. Both scholars noted that during international sporting events, the respective audiences are already divided by countries, and often situated in the context of viewing a competition between different nations. An element that also perfectly illustrates the nature of the Olympic Games; for example, as over

200 different territories and nations regularly participate and contest with one another. Thus according to Atkinson and Young, “sport can [easily] be utilized as a vehicle for political sparring, and waging and disseminating forms of political violence against others” (2002, p. 54), since the environment in such international sporting competitions encourages confrontation through its rivalrous and vying atmosphere.

Even apart from terrorism, sport events in general possess a link to violence, as emotions among athletes and the spectators tend to be quite heated. For this very reasons, a variety of studies have been conducted on sport, safety, and risk management and on feasible strategies for crowd control in the sphere of sports. As a matter of fact, studies on these issues have been circulating for multiple decades, while Steve Frosdick has to be named as one of the pioneers and most distinguished experts in the field in recent years.⁷

It is important to note that especially post-9/11, a very strong financial commitment in terms of the provision of security during sporting events can be observed. That is, host nations and organizers invest in large-scale and wide-ranging risk management activities that exceed anything that has been seen before. Thus, as Stura et al. confirm “costs of security and safety have increased significantly” (2017, p. 28). While one can detect that the costs have generally spiraled upwards for all recent Olympic hosts (due to the perceived threat of terrorist attacks), there are a number of other key factors that are at work. Most relevant for the aim of this present study, as a comparison between different host nations is being drawn, is therefore the component of national identity and culture. Frosdick in this respect highlights that the specific cultural

⁷ Steve Frosdick is considered one of the most celebrated experts in the areas of stadium and arena safety and security. He has published ‘Sport and Safety Management’ in cooperation with Lynne Walley in 1997, and joined Jim Chalmers in writing the textbook ‘Safety and Security at Sports Grounds’, which appeared in 2005. Both of his works have thoroughly informed the research carried out in this study.

background plays a major role in how public safety and order is being ensured and maintained (1997). In that sense, it is mentioned that the security risk - or rather the perception of this risk along with the source and level of threat and danger - is, among other things, highly dependent on culture and national identity. Thus, carefully assessing the measures that have been taken by the Chinese as well as the Russian government in order to prevent potential attacks and to deal with the seemingly omnipresent security threat, promises to be quite fruitful. Through this, this current study may be able to stress that a nation's individual characteristics, history, and culture represents a falsely neglected and certainly underrated component impacting security policies. As of now, the researcher of this present thesis is unaware of studies conducted that particularly focus on comparing security measures taken by different nations for similar sporting events, while including a cultural, political, and historical component.

There are however, studies that slightly touch on these factors. One of the undoubtedly most interesting studies regarding the issue of security during international sporting events is the one by Klauser (2012). Klauser used the 2008 European Soccer Championship in Switzerland and Austria as an example and focused, among other things, on the level of autonomy of the state and local stakeholders with respect to the securitization process. The results of his study have therefore been extremely informative and thought-provoking for the construction of this current study. That is, particularly in terms of research questions 1, which focuses on the similarities and differences in the ways that China and Russia have guaranteed safe Olympic Games. Klauser highlights in his paper, that there are; in fact, numerous fixed norms outlined by the soccer association that have to be fulfilled by the host country. Additionally, there is a certain pressure involved for the host nation to rely on international security professionals and their securitization strategies. That is, so they argue, since these strategies have been proven to be successful and thus shall be adopted once again (p. 255). When following Klauser's argument and applying it to

the two selected cases of the Olympic Games in Beijing and Sochi, this would suggest that the securitization shall be largely the same in both cases despite political, cultural, and historical differences. However, interestingly, also Klauser's study ultimately seems to fall into a vacillation or indetermination. On the one hand, he emphasizes the high level of external influence when it comes to the security measures implemented, which results in an overall conformity. Yet, on the other hand, he clearly identified major securitization differences among the two host nations of the same tournament (Switzerland and Austria). Switzerland's use of drones and mobile fingerprints could be named as such an example (p. 255). Thus, at least in the eye of this current researcher, leaving the reader with no clear answers to the originally posed question. Also, while Klauser is not overly concerned with the implications of the taken security measures on civil liberties, it remains to be said that the fixed norms outlined by the Soccer Association and the ones by the International Olympic Committee (IOC), do differ quite substantially. Interestingly, Klauser; in fact, points out that the level of autonomy for local stakeholders with regards to security measures at the European Football Championship is much higher than the more standardized procedures at the Olympic Games (p. 256). A statement with which the author of this current study strongly disagrees and which will hence be counter-argued in the following chapters.

Perhaps even more closely related to the subject and aims of this present thesis is Donnelly (2016), who focuses on reframing the understanding of the Olympic Games from a fixed place of peace to a space of contestation, political protest and existential threats. As her study is clearly situated within the context of the securitization approach, it is particularly relevant for the investigation intended in this current research. A number of implications with regards to how the feeling of exceptionalism of the events is fabricated as well as how the securitized story is being conveyed to the public, and by whom it is believed, have been adopted and build upon for this

present study based on Donnelly's work. Especially relevant has been the discussed balance within the discourse of the Olympics being an event of peace on the one hand, and yet the communicated necessity to resort to heavy securitization measures on the other hand (p. 200). Donnelly, however, lacks of the component of civil liberties, and instead puts her mind on Michel de Certeau's writings on spatial practices and the theorization of space in opposition to place. That is, admittedly something clearly outside of the targeted field of interest of this present paper.

Of vital concern for this thesis is unquestionably also an understanding of what security is. What first comes to mind to most people when being confronted with the term 'security' tend to be security providers, such as the police or even the military. Yet, the police; for example, basically solely represents a constituted body of individuals that are predestined by the state to enforce the domestic law. The law, on the other hand, serves, among other things, the function of protecting people and property and ensuring civil order. The question yet remains from what people need to be protected and who is to determine what constitutes a security threat. This current study therefore employs an understanding of security that is highly related to the Copenhagen School of security studies and draws on the research of scholars such as Buzan, Wæver and de Wilde (1998). Security in this sense has to be understood within social aspects and can be considered a speech act. To be more precise, the perception of safety or danger are generated and can be manipulated by the state; for instance, through speech acts and the release or withholding of certain information about existential threats. While such an understanding is tightly linked with the securitization approach, a more detailed elaboration on the concept will be provided in the analytical framework section.

1.3.2 Review of the Two Selected Cases – Background on the Beijing and Sochi Olympics

The 2008 Beijing Olympics in China

Although the Beijing Olympics are being set 7 years after the terrorist attacks of 9/11, a number of scholars have connected all Olympic Games succeeding the year 2001, and its respective host countries' approaches to security, with what has been coined by Crelinsten as 'September 12 thinking' (2009). This particular mentality incorporates the notion of a constant terrorist threat, which is intended to be countered by truly massive security operations. Athens, holding the summer Olympics of 2004 and preceding the Beijing summer Olympics, was initially being thought of as not reliable to host the event and to face this immense threat. Greece was thus pressured by the international community and various stakeholders to establish an international security alliance. Furthermore, Athens was urged to buy the most cutting-edge security and surveillance equipment made in the United States and several European nations (Samatas 2007, p. 222). Thus, the Greek organizers had to accept security planning and training by the newly created Olympic Advisory Group (OAG), essentially being an international security committee. All these measures drastically increased the security budget, which eventually amounted to a total sum twice as high as the one of the Olympics 4 year before, with a total of approximately US\$ 1,5 billion (cf. Zimbalist 2016).

Being subject to the same pressure, and furthermore as a first-time host country, China followed the path paved by Greece and is believed⁸ to have even clearly surpassed Greece's budget on security (cf. Lei Lei et al. 2005). According to estimates by Roche, the number for

⁸ The Chinese officials have, unfortunately, not released any official information concerning the exact amount of the security budget spent for the event. As a result, the author can only rely on estimates of the actual spending.

Beijing's security expenditure is located around US\$ 6,5 billion (2017, p.134) and hence more than 4 times as high as the Greek Olympics 4 years prior. As a result, the incredible amount spent on security alone makes it a highly interesting case with regards to an exploration of security measures taken for the purpose of this current study.

Besides the pressure to assure the peaceful course of the events, there are always also other factors involved that push host countries to extreme measures. While mass events, such as the Olympic Games, pose a number of economic opportunities, particularly for China the aspect of polishing up its image on the international stage can be regarded as one of the other driving forces. An image that had long been suffering. Partly due to a tendency of a negative global perception on the (allegedly) poor quality of Chinese products (cf. Wang 2013, p. 36). But more prominently, due to the highly contested topic of human rights violations in China, including the frequent arrest of government critics. Thus, presenting an utterly progressive, competent, open, and extensively beautified Beijing⁹ to a global audience, gives an incredible momentum to the city, and the country as a whole. Driven by those re-branding efforts and the desire for the large amount of favorable publicity to remodel the country's international image, all possibilities of potential protests or violent attacks that could overshadow the events had to be prevented. Yet, during the conducted urban beautification, initially the opposite had been achieved when the government decided to clear entire neighborhoods, predominantly those of lower social status and migrant workers, in order to create sufficient space for the Olympic facilities, or merely for the

⁹ Beijing has undergone an extreme Olympic face-lift, with; for instance, the creation of forests, temporary shut-downs of factories to increase air quality, and the imposition of "etiquette trainings" on certain parts of its population. Hence, literally creating a 'New Beijing, Great Olympics', as one of the official slogans of the event goes.

purpose of beautification alone. Having affected at least 300,000 people - who have not been properly reimbursed and whose rights have been heavily infringed upon - the actions created an international outcry even before the Olympics had started (cf. Human Rights Watch 2007, p. 267). Hence, at least indicating a rather bumpy start to the Beijing Olympics as this further damaged China's public image globally.

It is important to keep in mind however, that the Beijing Olympics examined in this paper took place in the year 2008. Thus, prominent international issues that have occurred more recently cannot be directly considered in this study, since they simply had not taken place yet at the time of the Olympic events. Thus, unless the future events stand in close relations with the discourses and actions taken during the Beijing Olympics, they may not be assessed in detail in this paper. These may include the institution-building activities of China, first and foremost with the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank. The AIIB was officially launched at the end of 2015 and stands in competition with the World Bank, currently counting 87 states from across the globe as its members. Another event that may not be thoroughly considered for the same reason represents China's military proceedings in establishing a military base on a contested island in the South China Sea.

Yet, what is important is that all these past and more recent events have taken place under the overarching strategy of China's rise and within the context of the so-called 'China Dream'. In fact, Callahan links both of them (the nation's rise and the fulfillment of the China Dream) directly to the Beijing Olympics when he states the following about the Beijing Olympics' opening ceremony:

At 8:08 pm on August 8, 2008 the world's gaze focused on China. What it saw was the birth of a new superpower, which emerged in a novel way through a stunning cultural performance, as opposed to a decisive military victory. For a global television audience,

Beijing asserted its power through fireworks rather than firepower, presenting the Chinese nation to the world as young and beautiful, wise and strong. (2010, p. 1)

Given the attested importance of the Olympic Games as a symbol for, or even displayed birth of, China as a new superpower, one may also understand why the government considered the hosting of safe and disturbance-free games paramount. Therefore, security in this particular case cannot solely be understood as national security provided for the spectators and participants of the Beijing Olympic Games. Instead, it also includes nationalist security in order to guarantee that the aims of promoting China globally can be met; the element of regime security as to protect its governmental form from protests and criticism, as well as the aspect of cultural security (cf. Callahan 2010, p.1).

In this sense, it is also essential to understand how China has intentionally presented itself throughout the Olympic Games and what messages it aimed to convey. That is, because it is necessary to acknowledge how a country sees itself and the world when assessing its actions. The Olympics' opening ceremony in Beijing; for instance, included the performance of 56 children carrying the Chinese flag, who were understood to represent the 56 ethnic groups recognized in China¹⁰. Thus, illustrating openness and harmony internally, although there may be reasons to believe that such harmony and tolerance towards the different ethnic minorities in China does not truly exist as will be shown later. Another element focused on telling the history of the 5,000 years of Chinese civilization and thus carried a strong notion of pride. Overall, China intended to display itself as an unthreatening and peaceful superpower to a foreign audience.

Internally, on the other hand, the main focus was set on exemplifying the extraordinary power of the state and proving to its people that China does not need to rely on Western models.

¹⁰ China represents a multi-ethnic state, with the majority of the population are being classified as Han (over 90%). Other minority ethnic groups with a significantly large population are the Zhuang, Hui, Manchu, Uyghur, Miao, Yi, Tujia, Tibetan, and Mongols.

In fact, as stated by Ye (2008), the Games had been organized with an obvious absence of direct control by the International Olympic Committee (IOC). Instead, the event was governed by the Chinese Communist Party and central government officials, following their own Chinese values. This is important, since China actively tried to distinguish itself from the previous non-Western host nations, such as Japan (1964) and South Korea (1988). The latter have strongly adhered to the guidelines proposed and initiated by the former western Olympic hosts and the IOC. That being something that China vehemently refused. Ye states further that:

this is exactly what surprised some Westerners. They thought the Beijing Olympics would bring some changes to this East Asian nation, but to their disappointment, it did not. The Games proved not only the existence of the China model, but also its success. (2008).

As it is the case that China did not directly follow the standards and guidelines provided by the IOC, it complied to its own values and generated its own Chinese model instead. Therefore, with respect to research question 1 and 2 posed for the conduct of this present study, it is extremely attractive and worthwhile to examine the implemented 'Chinese model' in terms of its adopted security measures and the consequences thereof. That is, particularly also in the light of comparing it with the arrangements made in the second selected case. Due to this, the Beijing Olympics have been reasonably selected as one of the two empirical studies to be investigated in this thesis.

The 2014 Sochi Olympics in Russia

Quite similar to China, also Russia has viewed the Sochi Winter Olympics as a unique opportunity to portray the nation in a very specific way. That is, paying particular attention on demonstrating that it has regained its great power status, geopolitically and geoeconomically speaking. Hence undoubtedly tying it to the glory days of the former USSR. The Union of Soviet

Socialist Republics (USSR) had faced its dissolution on December 26 in 1991 and the independence of the former Soviet republics had been declared through declaration 142-H. While the Russian Federation represented the biggest republic within the USSR, it also dominated militarily, politically, and economically. Thus, following the dissolution, Russia served as the successor state of the former USSR. However, what followed shortly after was Russia's constitutional crisis in 1993 and Russia's fall into a deep economic depression by the middle of the 1990s. The Russian Federation's economy was further struck by the financial crash of 1998 and years of reorganization and hardship followed. In addition, also Russia's international image, a picture that had most strongly been affected by North American and European voices, can be regarded as relatively negative. This may lead back to several factors, such as the historically perceived threat of its communistic traditions against the West's capitalistic values. Also the USSR's (Eastern Bloc) cold war with the United States and its allies, seems to still play a role. While more recent events, such as an increase of accusations of human rights violation in Russia, especially following the year 2008, can be identified to have contributed to this perception. To be more precise, these include torture and death of people in custody and the suspected killings of journalists and opposition politicians.

Thus, Russia's leadership showed itself highly interested in changing this perception of the nation and presenting itself in a new light. In fact, Putin himself voiced out that he “would like the participants, fans, journalists and all those who watch the Games on television to see a new Russia, see its face and possibilities, take a fresh and unbiased look at the country” (The Sydney Morning Herald 2016).

According to Orttung and Zhemukhow, Russia's development policy of the previous years was based on, among other things, a multitude of mega-projects (2017, p. 1). The Sochi Olympics therefore of course represented one of them, which aimed at further cultivating Russia.

While prestigious and breathtaking projects have been realized through this approach, it also led to downfalls. Both authors mention in this regard that “the path that Putin chose facilitated widespread corruption, the development of extensive security forces, and a crackdown on civil society” (p. 1).

Nevertheless, representing a particular interest for Russian leader Vladimir Putin, he nearly single-handedly determined Sochi to represent the Russian host candidate and meant the Sochi Olympics to become his “crowning achievement as Russian leader” (Heritage 2014). Essentially, by the means of hosting the Olympics, it was planned to reshape the international image of Russia, to bring the country closer together internally, and to display Russia’s recouped strength and esteem. Sochi itself - a formerly popular summer resort that had been on its declining years - could thereby be revitalized. The very notion of Sochi being described as a summer resort should therefore raise a number of eyebrows, as the Sochi Olympics of 2014 were the Winter Olympics. Indeed, Sochi’s climate can be classified as sub-tropical and temperatures may reach 10 to 12 degrees Celsius in February, during which the Sochi Olympics were being held (February 7 to February 23). As a result, having casted many doubts on whether having awarded Sochi as the host city had been well thought out.

With this overall grand mission outlined above and Russia aspiration for the events, however, also comes the pressure to conform with the expectations of what Persson and Petersson call the great power myth (2014, p. 192). If one wants to present oneself in a fashion of a figurative resurrection in terms of power and glory through such a sporting event, it is essential to avoid any mishaps, political protests or (terrorist) attacks from occurring. That is, since such events would debunk the desired image and challenge the country in terms of its capabilities. However, what one has to keep in mind is that as Donnelly has put it, “history clearly

demonstrates, the Olympics are not immune from boycotts, protest, violence and even death” (2016, p. 199). Therefore, the Russian government's solution to this uneasy truth was to respond with a large-scale security concept, which will be further elaborated in the subsequent sections of this thesis.

Nevertheless, throughout the seven years of preparation before the Olympic Games, there have been debates on whether or not the decision of selecting Sochi as the host of the Winter Olympics should be reversed. Among a multitude of factors, most noteworthy appears to be Russia's stance on the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transsexual (LGBT) community. In point of fact, a law had been introduced in 2013 which actively banned the positive portrayal of LGBT members. Those actions were publicly justified by arguing that such “propaganda” would influence children in thinking of homosexuality as a behavioral norm (cf. Travers and Shearman 2017, p. 43). A second law followed shortly after that, which prohibited Russian orphans to be adopted by members of the LGBT community on a global scale. Travers and Shearman in this regard have analyzed the response of the LGBT community in the United States and Canada, which predominantly called for peaceful protests and international boycott of the Games (2017, p. 57). Besides ensuring the well-being of the local Russian LGBT community, the safety of Olympic spectators and journalists with an LGBT background was a major concern during the Olympics Games in Sochi.

Another controversial issue concerning security risks, protests and demands for boycotts is the one surrounding the Circassian people, who represent an ethnic group from the Northwest Caucasus. Due to the international attention on Russia and Sochi in particular, the Circassian people had been mobilized to voice their demands about what had happened during the Caucasian war. That is, thus far Russia refuses to admit the historically committed genocide

against Circassians in 1864. However, apart from these long-burning discriminatory issues, it quite saliently stands out when reviewing the academic literatures on the Sochi Olympics that many researchers have focused on the component of corruption. Scholars like Foxall (2014) have highlighted that the preparations for the Sochi Winter Olympics included some of the largest construction projects the region had seen. In fact, in combination with the related infrastructure projects, the Sochi Olympics have been deemed the most expensive Winter Olympics to date. Furthermore, with the main investors to this sporting event, such as Gazprom and Sberbank of Russia, and the corporation in charge of planning and constructing the Olympic venues (Olympstroy), being owned or co-owned by the government, corruption within the sphere of government officials appears to be highly plausible according to Foxall (ibid., p. 3). Such allegations, although for the most part remaining unconfirmed by Russian officials, are founded in the overall budget. That is to say, the budget was originally set to be US\$ 12 billion, yet eventually amounted to more than four times the estimate. Moreover, Olympstroy (the State Corporation for Construction of Olympic Venues and Sochi Development as Alpine Resort); for instance, had seen a change in managers three times during the preparation process. This was caused by criminal cases with charges of corruption and other criminal acts filed against them. Hence, leaving little doubt that corruption certainly was an issue.

All these instances and elements listed above – of which most of them had already taken place before the Sochi Olympics had officially been launched – have certainly sparked the interest of this current research to delve deeply into the case of the Sochi Olympics for this thesis project. After all, with such a substantial number of concerns and controversies prior to the event, it presents itself very interesting to investigate how Russia has dealt with these issues and guaranteed security (research question 1) throughout the Olympics.

The deliberate choice of focusing on two rather authoritarian nations as case studies for this research endeavor is grounded on the firm belief that the comparison between the selected nations will put forth more clear and concrete findings. The author of this present study could certainly have compared a Western democratic nation – for instance the 2010 Winter Olympics in Vancouver, Canada – with the Russian or Chinese case. However, it is quite obvious that the results obtained in that way would rather be shallow, indistinct, and un-allocatable. That is, since there would be too many arbitrary factors at hand that could have possibly contributed to, and influenced, the potentially diverging results in the two cases.

On the other hand, by focusing on two nations, both with an authoritarian regime form - which are even in geographical proximity to one another - differences detected among them are deemed to be much more valuable and actually relatable to the variables tested in this study. Hence, more argumentative power can therefore be put behind the discovered differences or similarities with regards to the applied security measures between the two nations. That is to say, that although both cases follow an authoritarian regime type, they may secure the events by very different means. This would then clearly argue against the idea of uniform and consistent processes in securitizing international sporting events. In fact, both nations' hosting conditions were further similar, since China as well as Russia actually experienced a lot of internal and international pressure hosting the events. They both also had to manage and counter the generally more negative international image that has been attached to them through the international community. While having to ensure that they meet their own expectations for the Olympic events. Moreover, it will be striking and beneficial to explore what these (different) applications of security measures have meant with regards to the people's civil liberties and personal freedoms (research question 2).

1.3.3 Discussions on Civil Liberties

As civil liberties represent a main aspect within this study, the matter also certainly needs to be discussed and operationalized. Although it is absolutely desirable to establish a common understanding of what civil liberties are and what they constitute of, defining them represents a much disputed issue in academia. The difficulty of such a task is perfectly illustrated by Skaaning (2006) in his paper “Defining and Founding Civil Liberty”, for example. Despite the fact that there is thus far no consensus on how to define and what and what not to incorporate in its definition¹¹, traces of elements that protect what can commonly be considered civil liberties can be found in virtually every nation's constitution. Civil liberties are, and this is safe to say, meant to limit the government's power to dictate the actions of its people and thus prevent government tyranny. They therefore grant people a number of basic freedoms and usually are founded and anchored in a constitutional basis, such as the Bill of Rights of the United States of America, or the Constitution of the People's Republic of China and the Constitution of the Russian Federation for the specific purpose of this present study, respectively.

Despite the slightly blurry definition, it is nonetheless crucial to make a distinction between ‘civil liberties’ and ‘civil rights’. That is particularly so, as both terms are often times being used interchangeably, which however is a serious mistake. In fact, both terms carry a very distinct and peculiar meaning that shall not be confused. Civil rights, which will not be the main topic of this study, represent a set of basic rights that *protect people from* unequal treatment based on specific properties, features, and traits. This include discrimination of individuals or entire groups on the basis of their gender, race, religion, disability and so forth. Civil liberties on the other hand, rather

¹¹ Particularly controversial are reproductive and property rights in this respect. While other scholars blend human rights, civil rights, and civil liberties all together.

than representing a protection from something, has to be understood as *providing a freedom to do something*. Thus, civil liberties include the right to express oneself through free speech, it grants people the right to privacy, to move freely, to a fair court trial or to be free from unjustified searches of one's home or business; for example. Farber in this respect additional highlights the inclusion of the "restrictions on government surveillance" (2008, p. 2), which shall also be incorporated into the definition of this present study. As stated and confirmed by Ewing and Gearty, civil liberties are "about freedom *to* rather than freedom *from*" (2001, p.33). In that sense, civil liberties also actively encourage and enable people to participate in the political life through the provided freedom to assembly, freedom of expression and speech, and thus to protest.


As highlighted, there are; however, differences concerning the granted civil liberties depending on which country one refers to. The guaranteed civil liberties in a state such as China and Russia are thus certainly not as broad as the ones granted by New Zealand; for example, which has been ranked the freest country in the State of World Liberty Index in 2018. Yet, it is important not to apply a certain Western-centric standard on the civil liberties terminology and the assessment of civil liberties around the globe. Instead, an international standard shall be used to engage in this discussion. Simultaneously, it is not assumed that the freest country of any ranking has a perfect civil liberties record. All countries are rather imagined to be placed on a continuum of degrees of civil liberties, within which all nations can either further improve or deteriorate.

Nevertheless, the researcher may still be forced to, at least partly, rely on data gathered by institutions and organizations headquartered in the West. Freedom House, a critically acclaimed non-governmental organization, is regularly ranking China and Russia as 'not free' countries in their Freedom Reports (see chart 1.1 and chart 1.2 below). In fact, in the most recent report for the year 2018, China has only accumulated 14 out of 60 points in terms of their civil liberties

(Freedom House China Report 2018). Particularly harshly criticizing its restrictive media environment and censorship, religious persecution of Protestant Christians, Tibetan Buddhists, Uyghur Muslims and Falun Gong practitioners; as well as the extensive monitoring and surveillance of citizens and their communication. Thus, there certainly are rather harsh limitations in place. In the context of the preparation of the Beijing Olympics (as mentioned above) particularly Chinese property law in connection with forced evictions and involuntary land requisitions from citizens; for example, is also worth mentioning. Under Chinese law there is, in principle, no privately owned land. Instead, urban as well as rural land is owned by the state (or rural collectives in the case of rural property) and simply leased for a definite amount of years. China has; however, ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR) of the United Nations General Assembly, which clearly prohibits forced evictions. The identified and utilized loophole within the Chinese Constitution in this context is the exceptional approval of forced evictions if it is done with the purpose of benefiting the overall public interest. Thus, the eviction of over 300,000 Chinese from their homes in the forerun of the 2008 Olympics may as well has been interpreted according to this principle.

Chart 1.1 Freedom Report of China for the Year 2018


Freedom in the World 2018   



Source: Freedom House (2018)

Chart 1.2 Freedom Report of Russia for the Year 2018

Freedom in the World 2018   



Source: Freedom House (2018)

A pivotal factor to bear in mind is also the divide between what is stated on paper and to what extent those civil liberties can be enjoyed by the public in practice. On a related note, one may actually be surprised to find out that the latest Constitution of the Russian Federation, which was officially adopted in 1993, quite remarkably grants its citizens a substantive amount of civil liberties and does by no means rank behind praised constitutions like the one of the United States in this regard. However, non-governmental organizations such as Freedom House; for example, have also attested a number of civil liberty violations in their annual reports on Russia¹². In essence, threats and attacks against journalists and the increase in government surveillance of the internet, opposition members, as well as activists have been pointed out (Freedom House Russia Report 2018). Hence, the actual extent to which civil liberties can practically be utilized may still remain questionable. Thus, instead of judging by, and comparing on the basis of different Constitutions, such as the one of China and Russia, it appears far more promising to harness actual real cases such as the Olympic Games. Analyzing how the Olympic Games and the taken

¹² Russia has only reached 15 out of 60 possible points with regards to their practically enjoyable civil liberties in the most recent Freedom in the World 2018 report by Freedom House. Ultimately causing Russia to be labeled a “not free” country.

security measures may contribute to the process of curbing civil liberties and comparing different Olympic hosts regarding this matter, represents a strategy that will enable the current researcher to gain new insights.

While a plethora of civil liberties exist and since their formulation and extent vary from country to country, it may be first necessary to set a focus on particular civil liberties that will be examined. That is, selecting those that are most relevant in accordance with the two selected cases and the subject of security measures and international sporting events. Based on the author's observations of the two cases, particularly the right to privacy, the right to restrictions on government surveillance, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of movement play an important role with respect to the security measures taken in Beijing and Sochi. Hence, these four components will be given particular attention during the creation of an analytical framework and the subsequently conducted analysis.

1.4. Analytical Framework and Research Method

The systematic plan for the conduct of this study follows the principles of a predominantly qualitative analysis and hence will thoroughly examine data stemming from a variety of different reports. Sources that will assist the researcher to generate an in-depth comparative analysis between the two selected cases, and thus will foster a better understanding of the subject, include but are not limited to, accounts of the respective governments, the reports issued by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) as well as media and press releases.

The analytical perspective chosen particularly for the analysis of the two research questions guiding this study, is an interdisciplinary one. It is comprised of the utilization of the securitization approach of the Copenhagen School and the so-called Critical Application of Securitization Theory (CAST) on the basis of, among others, Charrett (2009). By combining the

two approaches, the author believes that a more comprehensive and increasingly informed picture of the Chinese and Russian securitization process, as well as the carried out actions to eliminate the presumed existential threat, may emerge. That is, as it allows not only to understand how governments convince the related audiences of the existence of an existential threat and how they implement the selected security measures through the utilization of the securitization approach. But also enables the researcher to analyze the given policy implementations and measures themselves through the insights provided by the Critical Application of Securitization Theory. It is only after those two aspects have been thoroughly analyzed and (hence research question 1 has been answered)¹³, that this study can then approach its second research question. A question concerned with whether or not the actions taken by the Chinese and Russian governments are reasonable, particularly in the light of possible reductions in civil liberties and personal freedom in order to ensure security.

Ultimately, this thesis follows a three dimensional approach, whose stages will be further introduced one by one in the following paragraphs. The securitization approach – representing the first stage - will be applied in order to assess the various speech acts generated by Chinese and Russian officials, the respective governments, the IOC, and by the media. For this purpose, identified press releases, media articles and official reports related to the manufactured security discourse in the forerun of the Beijing and Sochi Olympics will be carefully examined through a form of textual analysis. This is done with the objective to understand how and under what circumstances they have ‘produced’ the impression of a security threat surrounding the Olympic Games. In that sense and under these premises, security here has to be comprehended as a

¹³ Those two aspects, namely what are the imposed security measures and how are they being successfully implemented with the acceptance of the audience, represent the answer of the first research question posed in this paper.

practice that is self-referential. It is noteworthy to point out that once something is successfully thematized as a security issue, it does not really matter whether this threat is real or not. The mere perception of its existence is the crux of the matter. Securitizing an issue nevertheless requires the persuasion of the targeted audience. Therefore, speech acts are of prime importance. Eventually, through this investigation, it can thereby be revealed how the governments have legitimized the application of their intended extraordinary security measures. In a nutshell, the securitization approach or securitization stresses that speech acts can be tools to securitize a specific referent object. Meaning, to label it as being in danger of an existential threat (securitizing move) and hence calling for extraordinary measures (change in behavior for security practice). When the relevant audience is convinced through those speech acts, the measures (that would under normal conditions be unacceptable) are being taken into action (cf. Buzan, Waever, and Wilde 1998, p. 21). One has to keep in mind that these so-called extraordinary measures however, often involve breaking rules and not following the original outlined procedures (cf. Diskaya 2013).

Eventually, the securitization approach functions as a tool to assess the first out of the three constructed stages that may eventually lead to infringements on civil liberties. In fact, according to the analytical framework designed for the purpose of this current study, the securitization process - the persuasion of the audience of an impending existential threat – represents the foundation that successfully paves the way for the succeeding second and third stage.


The Critical Application of Securitization Theory (CAST) approach, on the other hand, will be employed to study and dissect stage two and three. That is, in order to deconstruct the institutional power of the securitizing actor, to cast doubt on and challenging institutions, to address dissident security voices, and to analyze the observed exceptional security arrangements themselves critically. These security arrangements have been categorized into two separate

categories (stage 2 and stage 3) after the researcher had initially evaluated the measures carried out by the Chinese officials in a pilot study. Thus, including the aforementioned category of the securitization process (stage 1), this study operates with a total of three distinct divisions to structure its analysis (see figure 1.1 below). One sub-category within the CAST approach has been labeled “technologicalization” (stage 2) and is highly concerned with the infringements on civil liberties such as the right to privacy, the freedom of assembly, and the right to restrictions on government surveillance. To define and operationalize the technologicalization category, it can be stated that all aspects related to high-tech applications, for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests and surveillance fall within this category. These applications, such as surveillance cameras, basically serve twofold functions. First of all, they are used to detect possible security risks. Secondly, and probably more surprisingly, they also regulate the behavior of the observed. That is, once individuals believe that they are being watched (whether this is actually the case or not does not really play a role) they will control their own behavior. In that sense, as Fussey et al. notice, surveillance through the use of large numbers of surveillance cameras has become an effective key feature of Olympic security in order to control the masses (2016, p. 177).

The last category (stage 3), on the other hand, has been termed “warfare during periods of peace”. This component includes the amplified military presence in areas where they would traditionally not be found, such as international sport events. That is to say, the researcher defines this element as the utilization of armed forces, their military techniques and strategies, which have left their rough imprints on the Olympic ground in recent years. Additionally, this extensive military presence is further used to establish security zones, which then, in turn, limit the peoples’ freedom of movement. Noteworthy is, that by applying CAST, the researcher is also able to discuss the voices calling for resistance against these processes, and the acts taken in order to

counter the procedures.

Figure 1.1 Analytical Framework: The 3 Elements of Infringements on Civil Liberties



Through the elaborations presented in this section, the author hopes to have sufficiently demonstrated the valuable insights that can be gained through the addition of the CAST theoretical framework to the theoretical research approach of this present empirical study. In the next segment, the applicability of the generated analytical framework will be demonstrated with regards to the intended comparison between the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Olympics. That is to say, the established 3 stages/categories (1. The securitization process, 2. Technologicalization, 3. Warfare during periods of peace) will be filled with specific data and information from the selected two Olympic events and consequently analyzed and compared. Thereby, it may be revealed that the exceptional nature of the Olympic Games helps governments to justify extraordinary and often times illiberal security measures. Since the security measures taken will subsequently be identified and examined in the course of this study, the author will be

able to assess whether the balance between security and civil liberties has been preserved. At the same time, through this study, individual strategies and implemented security measures by the respective governments can be held accountable for their achievements as well as their negative side effects (for instance benefitting certain stakeholders or causing a misbalance in favor of tight security).

1.5 Thesis Structure

The basic organization of this thesis is its division into a total of 5 chapters. Chapter 1 thereby serves as a lead-in to the complex of themes to be covered in this paper. It first introduces the background of the identified problem, namely, the Olympic Games as a massive international sporting event and the necessity to secure it. The author then moves on by highlighting that with the extensive securitization of the events – justified by the perceived omnipresent terrorist threat and the extraordinariness of the Olympic Games - civil liberties are in danger to be reduced. Subsequently, the researcher's motivation and the purpose of this study are being elaborated, as new insights gained through this thesis could be applied to future mass sporting events and will help to hold individual strategies and security measures accountable. A notion that directly guides the reader to the two research questions posed in this paper.

The researcher then accurately situates this present study within the existing literature, while the literature review itself is divided into three main elements crucial to the two posed research questions. The first sub-section of the literature review denotes the increasing intensity of security arrangements over the past 50 years of Olympic Games history and its connection to terrorism. Thereafter, sub-section two elaborates on the internal circumstances of both host nations, outlines each country's main objectives for the Olympics, and ultimately justifies the

selection of the two respective cases. The last element within the literature review then focuses on the definition of civil liberties for the means of this study. Explanations on the paper's research design and analytical framework then follow. Ultimately, the decision to apply, and the development of, the established framework is being reasoned, and will thereafter be demonstrated in the following chapters.

Chapter 2 focuses specifically on the first case study of this paper. The 2008 Beijing Olympics are being thoroughly analyzed in accordance with the 3 established categories of the analytical framework. In order to ensure a well-organized structure of this chapter, the securitization process as well as the grouped security measures, such as technologicalization, and the 'warfare during periods of peace' component, have been divided into sub-sections. Within the first category entitled 'securitization process', the speech acts uttered by Chinese government officials and media reports surrounding the Beijing Olympics are being analyzed. Based on the analyzed security discourse, the most frequently mentioned (alleged) threats are being identified and separately discussed. Simultaneously, and through this process, the underlying power structures facilitating the securitization process itself are being revealed. The two remaining sub-sections of chapter 2 critically assess and challenge the implemented security measures and policies, while also introducing dissenting opinions.

Quite similarly, Chapter 3 operates likewise. However, instead of the Beijing Olympics, close attention is being drawn to the 2014 Sochi Olympics. In order to ensure comparability, the case is also evaluated in consistency with the established framework. Following the outlined formula above, the researcher dissects Russia's securitization process in the forerun and during the Sochi Winter Olympics. Afterwards, the author looks closer into the carried out security arrangements and their respective consequences and implications for the Russian people.

Chapter 4 serves as one of the most crucial sections in the study, as it essentially brings together both cases and allows the researcher to draw a comparison. Hence, once again, in order to keep clarity and maintain order, the chapter is being organized according to the three elements of the analytical framework generated for the purpose of this study. Differences and similarities between the two cases in terms of the securitization process as well as the implemented security measures and the adverse consequences to civil liberties are being placed side by side. All this has been done while keeping the respective host nations' objectives and intentions in mind. The results can be regarded extremely insightful, since they allow to confirm/refute notions of uniformity and consistency regarding the processes involved in securitizing international sporting events. Simultaneously, the comparison further enables this thesis to demonstrate differences, that exist (or do not exist) due to cultural, historical, and governmental aspects of the host nations.

Lastly, Chapter 5 provides closing remarks and summarizes the main findings of this paper. Apart from that, the significance and the implications of these findings will be elaborated. This might be particularly important for the people in countries which will host international sporting events in the future. Enabling them to hold the implemented securitization strategies of their governments accountable and to protect their civil liberties. By being informed about the possible infringements on civil liberties through the tool of the securitization process, the public may more actively voice their respective opinion with regards to the balance between security and civil liberties. Finally, the limitations of this study are being pointed out and suggestions for future studies in the field are being made.

Chapter 2. Beijing Olympics – Security Measures and Civil Liberties

The subsequent discussion and analysis within chapter 2 will exclusively focus on the selected case of the 2008 Beijing Olympics. By deeply examining the securitization process of the Games and its surrounding circumstances as well as internal factors that have directed the discourse on security, new insights will be generated on how China; and its government in particular, has shaped the perception of security and on potential security threats. A number of speech acts, mostly communicated through official press releases and news articles, will therefore be examined as a first step of this analysis. Thereafter, once having developed a thorough understanding of the generated sense of the security environment at that time, the corresponding security measures implemented by the Chinese government to counter these alleged threats will be critically evaluated and questioned, if necessary. The latter will be done by continuously relying on the established analytical framework, which entails dividing the examination of the security arrangements in ‘technologicalization’ and ‘warfare during periods of peace’ (sub-section 2.2 and 2.3, respectively).

2.1 The Securitization Process

The intended securitization process and the subsequently performed security measures by the Chinese government were legitimized by a variety of speech acts deeming the Olympic Games as well as Beijing to be under threat and in danger. Starting from the beginning of 2008, numerous statistics had been released by Chinese local media, such as the official press agency of the PRC, the Xinhua News Agency, emphasizing on the (supposedly) high crime rates in Beijing. Calling for a stark increase in police forces even long before the hosting of the Beijing Olympics. Furthermore, extensive concerns about possible terrorist attacks during the Olympic Games in

Beijing had been repetitively expressed by media outlets and Chinese authorities alike. Chinese Security official Tian Yixiang; for instance, pointed towards three specific groups posing the biggest danger to security and which thus urgently have to be dealt with: Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong¹⁴, and terrorists from the East Turkestan region/Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region, which is home to the Chinese minority group called Uyghurs (Taipei Times 2008). On a similar note, Li Wei, a counterterrorism expert from the China Institute of Contemporary International Relations, who consults the Chinese government, highlighted that “I believe that Beijing’s Olympics are now facing real threats from terrorist attacks” (Wang and Bradsher 2008). China Daily, a newspaper operating under the Publicity Department of the Communist Party of China, also reported frequently on the ‘big threat’ of terrorism for the Beijing Olympics. For instance, China’s Minister of Public Security Zhou Youngkang officially stated in one of the reports that “we still face the challenges of terrorism, separatism, and extremism [...] [t]errorism, in particular, poses the biggest threat” (China Daily 2007). While Liu Jing, Vice Minister of Public Security of China, had stressed during the International Conference on Security Cooperation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics that ethnic and regional disputes are likely to trigger interference with the Beijing Olympic Games (ibid.).

As it has already been accurately summarized by the Chinese Security official Tian Yixiang above, the author of this present study has found that the discourse on the creation and communication of an existential threat surrounding the Beijing Olympics can be divided into three main threats that are being repeatedly expressed and conveyed. Namely, Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and terrorists from the East Turkestan region/Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. Therefore, it certainly makes sense to discuss each one of them separately on the

¹⁴ The Falun Gong is a Chinese movement practicing a specific form of meditation and following a moral philosophy influenced by Buddhist traditions.

following pages. In addition, it is important to recall the notion which had been introduced earlier in chapter one concerning one of China's main internal goals for the Beijing Olympics. That is, China intended to demonstrate the extraordinary power of the state to its people. Keeping this in mind, it shall already be quite obvious to see that through the Olympic event the new superpower has particularly targeted and imposed harsh crackdowns on exactly those three internal forces/groups, which they had perceived as a thorn in their side for decades:

Tibetan Separatists and the 3-14 Riots:

In March 2008, just 5 months before the official opening of the Beijing Olympics, protests and riots emerged in the Tibet Autonomous Region (TAR), and even beyond, against China's rule. The unrest originated in the city of Lhasa during the Tibetan Uprising Day, which is being held every year on March 10 in order to commemorate the upheaval of Tibetans against China in 1959. While the day usually involves peaceful demonstrations, a group of approximately 500 Tibetan monks from the Drepung monastery had been denied access to the city of Lhasa by Chinese police forces. There are accounts that verify that at least some of the 500 monks had been beaten and incarcerated on that day directly following the episode (cf. Smith 2010, p. 2). A similar incident also occurred to monks from the Sera monastery, who demanded the liberation of their imprisoned brothers on the very next day. This culminated in the police surrounding the respective monasteries in Lhasa and adjacent areas, which further increased the tension. On March 14 this tension then finally erupted in the burning of police cars, houses and government facilities; robberies of stores not owned by Tibetans, and attacks against Han and Hui residents in Lhasa.

China's security forces were quick to respond, as the protests were understood as an attempt by the Tibetans to deteriorate China's international reputation and to ruin the Beijing

Olympics. Further violence was then triggered between the Chinese security forces and the Tibetans on that day, which is eventually being remembered as the 3-14 riots. The riots and clashes with police forces, which had originated in the Tibet Autonomous Region, did not solely remain there, but also spread beyond its borders to Gansu province and Sichuan province. Ultimately leaving an estimate of around 200 Tibetan protesters dead (according to the claims made by the Tibetan exile government), among many of which had been shot by the police. Moreover, also a smaller number of civilians and police officers did lose their lives during the riots (based on chart 2.1).

Chart 2.1 Estimates of Protest Deaths: March – April 2008

Deaths in 2008 protests		estimates		
		PRC officials	International Campaign for Tibet	Tibetan Exile Government
Tibetan protestors	killed by security forces	8	140 ¹	219
Bystanders/civilians	killed by protestors	18	18	[not given]
Security personnel	killed by protestors	1	2	1

Source: Barnett (2009)

Consequently, and since it was tried to put a definite end to the unrests and to stop further spreading of the protests, the People’s Armed Police was deployed in large numbers. The additional security forces tightly monitored several monasteries in the Tibet Autonomous Region. Particularly Lhasa saw heavily armed security forces, seemingly putting the entire city under interdiction. Barnett; for instance, calls what followed March 2008 a “paramilitary presence in the streets of Lhasa and other Tibetan areas” (2009, p. 6.) and hence definitely a demonstration of

power from the side of the Chinese government. Hillman confirms this and also highlights the continuity of the newly implemented security measures even years after the riots and the Olympic Games in 2008:

China's 'stability maintenance' (weiwen) approach to governing Tibet has involved a dramatic scaling up of security forces and surveillance infrastructure. Police numbers have been increased in all Tibetan areas and People's Armed Police reinforcements that were sent as a resource to the 2008 riots have been made permanent. (2014, p. 53)

Apart from the myriad arrests of Tibetans by the Chinese government that followed, also internet services and other forms of communication in the TAR have been extremely limited. Extreme supervision of internet usage has been imposed, which is often only available via selected internet cafés in the TAR (cf. *ibid.*, p. 7).

While foreign media was immediately banned in the region during the unrest, Chinese media inflated the security discourse once Han Chinese civilians had been attacked and injured during the riots. The Xinhua News Agency reported that the violence had been orchestrated and organized by the Dalai Lama and his followers in order to split China and to fight for Tibet's independence. According to Xinhua, monks and violent rioters also "torched shops and vehicles, attacked innocent passers-by on the streets [...] on March 14" (China Daily 2008a). Based on the report by Yi Duo, "[t]he violence on March 14 was related to the instigation of the 'security department' of the 'Tibetan government-in-exile'" (Permanent Mission of the People's Republic of China to the UN 2008). Thus, contrary to the notion of representing a spontaneous peaceful protest by the Tibetans, Xinhua claims that it has concrete evidence that the riots had been planned for months. In fact, the process is said to have included four distinct stages, in which protesters had been carefully selected and recruited, and further violent actions in other regions of

China had been planned (ibid.). Thus, from the Chinese government's point of view (or at least the one that is being publicly portrayed) the Dalai Lama and his followers are regarded as violent separatists. That is, while China itself is said to have tried to defend the unity of its country. Such messages undoubtedly cause a lot of anger and fear within the Chinese public, while the claims also certainly make sense when delving deeper into the historic perception of many Chinese with regards to the relationship between China and Tibet. Among the Chinese population, it is commonly accepted that China has peacefully liberated Tibet from the feudal rule in the 1950s, which in turn has allowed the TAR to prosper. Prior to this, Tibet had supposedly been a horrible and barbaric place, which was seeking for help.¹⁵ The Tibetan Uprising in 1959, on the other hand, is being seen as an attempt to reinstall the tyranny of the feudal serfdom through the Dalai Lama and his followers, consisting of previous serf owners (Smith 2010, p. 5). Given this understanding of history, it shall be no surprise that large parts of the Chinese population viewed the actions of the Tibetans as ungrateful behavior and were easily convinced to implement drastic measures against the rioters.

Globally, the issue had been perceived quite differently. In fact, the riots had provoked a vast amount of international attention, as a number of politicians and well-known celebrities had subsequently voiced their discontent with China's position and actions against Tibet. For instance, and most prominently, the Japanese government declared in April 2008 that the Japanese royal family will not accept the invitation to join the Olympic opening ceremony due to, among other things, the committed violence against Tibetans (cf. Japan Today 2008). Interestingly, also former Taiwan president Ma Ying-jeou had mentioned the possibility of an

¹⁵ Such argumentation is quite commonly found in imperialist's reasoning on why a takeover by a foreign force is favorable over the leadership by the original and native power.

Olympic boycott – days before his presidential election - in view of the increasingly worsen unrests in Tibet just months before the Beijing Olympics (Macau Daily Times 2008). Apart from global leaders, also several pro-Tibetan independence groups arranged protests for their respective missions and called for boycotts of the Beijing Olympics in order to put the Beijing government further under fire. Certainly, also their historic understanding of the China-Tibet relationship differs quite a lot from the narrative that is being told by the Chinese government. Advocates for a Tibetan independence argue that several hundred thousands of Tibetans have died during the process of enforcing Chinese rule over Tibet in the 1950s due to experienced famines, the involvement in rebellious activities, as well as imprisonment and torture. Moreover, with respect to the incidents of 2008, it is viewed as the Chinese government having forcibly repressed the protests and thereafter having gone on a violent crackdown on Tibetans. What the protests of the Tibetans in 2008 has nevertheless shown, is a clear challenge to the legitimization claims of China's rule over Tibet.

Thus, given the concerns voiced above, it is remarkable to see how differently the issue has been perceived by various sides. Protests and demonstrations certainly existed in the forerun of the Beijing Olympics, yet whether these had actually been systematically provoked by the Chinese government and its treatment of the Tibetans may be questionable, although quite likely. Furthermore, the actual security threat that such (violent) protests by the Tibetans is causing to the Chinese people and the hosting of the Beijing Olympics is also debatable, if not doubtful. Nevertheless, the Chinese government has managed to alarm its population about the supposed seriousness and great danger of the situation via its respective media outlets as introduced above. In fact, substantially further radicalizing their concept of the Tibetans only months before it was China's much-anticipated time to portray its power and glory to the world. China's Public

Security Ministry spokesman Wu Heping even stated that “[t]o our knowledge, the next plan of the Tibetan independence forces is to organize suicide squads to launch violent attacks” (cf. Bristow 2008a). In that way, the imposed security mechanisms and measures had been thoroughly justified to – and had been accepted by – the Chinese people. That is, despite the fact that the securitization of the issue and the uttered speech acts did not convince the international audience. Quite to the contrary, “it cemented an international perception of China as authoritarian at a moment when it seemed about to step beyond that at the Beijing Olympics that August” (Barnett 2009, p. 6.).

The Religious Movement of the Falun Gong

Although having been identified in various speech acts of Chinese government officials as one of the main security threats to the Beijing Olympics, no clear evidence that would justify such claims do exist. The Falun Gong, a banned spiritual discipline and religious movement, actually originated from China in the early 1990s. It draws on elements such as meditations, breathing exercises and slow body movements, while also incorporating a set of theological concepts and a stark focus on morality. Although the Falun Gong had been in good terms with the Chinese government in the past, this abruptly changed when the Communist Party started to fear the movements impact and influence. A notion that developed because of the Falun Gong’s enormous membership size and it having no affiliation with the government. This was then viewed as a dangerous competition to the latter. The tensions further elevated in the year 1999 when the religious group requested formal acknowledgement by the state and being freed from the government’s interference in a gigantic protest movement in front of the Communist Party headquarter. The protest attracted over 10,000 protesters. However, especially the timing of the protest carried out a bold message, as it was close to the date of the June Forth Incident, also

known as the 1989 Tiananmen Square protests. Thereafter, the Communist Party felt that the line had been crossed and actively pursued its mission to eliminate the religious practice. This was done, among other things, through the creation of an extrajudicial security apparatus entitled '6-10 Office' responsible for this specific 'issue'.

China's Director of the Center for Counterterrorism Studies, Li Wei, listed the Falun Gong as one of the main threats for the Beijing Olympics despite their general non-violent behavior. To be precise, he mentioned the possibility of self-immolation, poisonings and similar acts to cause disturbance (Hutton 2008). However, the researcher of this present study has found that a realistic risks for China in this context would merely be the provided opportunities for banned groups like the Falun Gong to have their voices being heard. That is, due to the fact that the world's eyes are focusing on China during the Olympics. Interestingly, the Falun Gong indeed used this opportunity remarkably well. The Falun Gong had actually prepared a series of videos on topics such as the cruel practice of organ harvesting of Falun Gong followers. These acts of cruelty are said to take place inside Chinese labor camps, to which Falun Gong practitioners are being sent. The Falun Gong therefore strategically released these videos during the Beijing Olympics on multiple video sharing platforms. Unsurprisingly, the content turned particularly popular online and reached multiple million views due to the international attention given to China at that time (cf. Business Insider 2008). Yet, apart from tarnishing China's international images through such video campaigns, there is a lack of evidence that would hint towards the potential security threat that the religious organization is said to be posing. On the other hand, there are various voices that claim a significant increase in crackdowns on members of the Falun Gong. Arrangements imposed by Chinese authorities against the religious movement prior to the Beijing Olympics have been on the rise, while utilizing the Olympic event as an excuse (cf. Patel 2008).

Based on a report by the Xinhua News Agency from the 17th national congress of the Communist Party of China, China's Minister of Public Security Zhou Youngkang stressed that: [a]ll police should strengthen information collecting work to closely monitor and strike hard on overseas and domestic hostile forces, ethnic splittists, religious extremists, violent terrorists and the Falun Gong Cult so as to safeguard national security and social stability. (China Digital Times 2007).

The Chinese government indeed followed the given instructions by strongly reinforcing its acts of persecution toward Falun Gong members in the forerun to the Beijing Olympics. According to the Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Annual Report by the United States, the "Chinese security forces continued to detain and imprison Falun Gong practitioners and subjected some who refused to disavow the practice to torture and other forms of abuse in reeducation through labor (RTL) camps and other detention facilities" (2008, p. 87). In fact, besides the police force, also the general public was being incentivized and incited to report Falun Gong practitioners to the Chinese authorities, as they would receive a reward of 5,000 Chinese yuan in return (ibid., p. 88). Since the Chinese media simultaneously and repeatedly connected the Falun Gong with the concept of terrorism, the initiative can be deemed highly successful on the part of the Chinese government. The Falun Dafa Information Center (FDI) reported that based on their internal member information approximately 8,000 arrests in the timespan from December 2007 to July 2008 have occurred. On that note, it has to be further pointed out that many of these 'offenders' had received conviction without any trial (Coalition to Investigate the Persecution of Falun Gong in China 2008). FDI spokesperson Erping Zhang rejected the idea that these arrests align with the stated goal of providing safe Olympic Games. Quite to the contrary, according to him, Falun Gong followers do not represent a security threat in any way and the Olympic Games simply serve as a smokescreen to incarcerate and mistreat his fellow practitioners for years to

come (ibid.).

The voice of the FDI however stands against one of the most largest - and one may even be tempted to label it as impressive - propaganda campaigns in modern times. In fact, China's 6-10 Office had released a directive to all local governments within China commanding them to engage in propaganda activities. This includes raising public awareness and informing its citizens on the alleged bad intents of the Falun Gong at universities, schools, through TV stations, government owned businesses and even parks (Congressional-Executive Commission on China's Annual Report by the United States 2008, p. 91). While a truly massive surveillance initiative had simultaneously been carried out, during which it was advised that security officials and local police officers shall engage in home visits to Falun Gong members three times a day (ibid. p. 89).

Islamic Terrorists and Separatists from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region:

Chapter 1 previously elaborated on the fact that the Olympic opening ceremony in Beijing had incorporated a section specifically in order to represent the 56 ethnic groups recognized in China. Hence, while one cannot deny that this unambiguously suggested openness, tolerance, and harmony towards the different ethnic minorities in China, this can at least not be claimed for the full spectrum of ethnic groups present in the country. Xinjiang, located in the northwest of China, represents an autonomous region and is momentarily China's main region in terms of the production of natural gas. The region is also known for its ethnic diversity, being home to a number of ethnic minorities, among others, Uyghurs, Kazakhs, and Tibetans. In fact, Xinjiang is populated with 12 million people of Turkic ethnicity with Islamic belief (accounting for approximately half of the region's population), most of which are Uyghurs.

There are; however, forces that fight for an independent and fundamentalist Muslim state of the Uyghur people. Most prominently is thereby the so-called East Turkestan Islamic

Movement (ETIM), which had also received increasing news coverage in China in the months prior to the Olympic Games in Beijing (Reed and Raschke 2010, p. 1). Allegedly the ETIM is having ties with al-Qaeda, plans to overthrow the regional Chinese government and attempts to create an independent state. According to the political commissar of the Xinjiang Armed Police Regiment, Hou Xiaoqin, the ETIM has to be considered a big threat and has to be tightly controlled, particularly since “Xinjiang’s anti-terrorism fight is of crucial importance to the stability of the whole country” (China Daily 2008b). Most noteworthy in this respect is also that government officials, the Chinese Ministry of Public Security specifically, and the media alike, continuously mentioned ETIM’s affiliation with terrorist groups outside of China. By drawing this connection with terrorist organizations globally, the perceived threat that the ETIM may pose is maximized. In this regard it is also interesting to note that although the ETIM itself has been in existence for over 30 years and the Chinese government and police forces had good control over the organization, a counterterrorism partnership with the United States had been established in the years following the 9/11 tragedy. However, according to Reed and Raschke, the true extent of the terrorism threat in northwestern China is very difficult to estimate. That is since:

[t]he Chinese government clearly manipulates information about its domestic terrorism problem, and about the ETIM in particular, to suit its own policy objectives. The PRC blurs distinctions between the ETIM, other Uyghur militants, and nonviolent Uyghur human rights advocates. (2010, p. 2)

The perceived threat of the ETIM and Uyghur separatists had even further been intensified after reports of a terrorist hijacking attempt had surfaced in March 2008, just around 5 months before the start of the Olympic Games. According to the chairman of the Xinjiang regional government, Muslim-separatists from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region had planned to

take control over China Southern flight CZ6901 bound to Beijing (Elegant 2008). Among other things, the hijackers had also managed to bring gasoline on the aircraft and are suspected to have intended to cause an explosion on board. The event, although successfully prevented, stirred up more concerns within the public, who, in turn, anticipated that more potential attacks are being planned from the ETIM and Uyghur militants. One may yet also have to say that very little details about the specific incident have been released to the public, apart from the successful prevention of the attack itself. In fact, even at the current stage and hence 10 years later, solely limited information is available in Chinese and in the English language. As a result, having led to significant doubt on the seriousness or even occurrence of the event by experts outside of China, such as Steve Tsang. Some scholars further noted that it was highly suspicious that the plane continued its journey to Beijing just after a quick stopover in Lanzhou, without further investigations on board or thorough interviews being conducted with the eyewitnesses (Elegant 2008).

More dissident voices against the intense securitization towards the alleged threat of the Uyghurs come from the Uyghurs themselves. Political activist and Uyghur leader Rebiya Kadeer advises to read such news and reports with the utmost caution and due care. Kadeer, who had previously served as a delegate of the Chinese National People's Congress (NPC), claims that these allegations have been fabricated by Chinese government officials in order to justify their drastic measures against the Uyghur population (Taipei Times 2008). Kadeer herself had fled to the United States in 2005, following accusations and an arrest for having supposedly provided her husband with confidential information during her politician career in China.

When observing and assessing the three outlined security discourses, one notices that although all of the mentioned groups have a rather tensed relationship with the Chinese

Communist Party, security threats on the scale that they have been voiced by government officials nevertheless appear utterly exaggerated. In actual fact, it might have even been more plausible that the Olympic Games would have been interrupted by local or foreign human rights activists or other forms of non-violent protests instead of terrorist attacks. That is, especially given due to the previously mentioned forced eviction of large numbers of impoverished Beijing residents and migrant workers for the purpose of the beautification of the city. In the context of exaggerated security threats and securitizing terrorism, Buzan fittingly stresses the ability of state officials to reveal, withhold, and to forge evidence with the intention to either cause escalation or reduction of the given threat (Buzan 2006, p. 1107). Governments with an interest to securitize terrorism may apply what Buzan labels as so-called *agent provocateur* actions. These represent a mechanism that appears to match China's situation quite well. Agent provocateur actions are being utilized for the purpose of "strengthen a terrorist 'threat' that had itself become too weak to serve the political purposes of maintaining [...] securitization" (ibid.). The tensions between the Chinese government and the Falun Gong, the Tibetans, as well as the Uyghur separatists and ETIM have been in existence for many years and the conflicts can be understood as being tightly controlled by China's government. Thus, although the tensions are real, they nonetheless are too weak to justify any significant policy implementations or drastic measures.

As a result, what became quite obvious when examining the speech acts and the messages they entail, is that the government and certain stakeholders deliberately attempted to elevate and skyrocket existing weak security threats to a much higher level. Taking such manipulative actions is, in fact, much more easy than one would initially assume, since the government agencies responsible for counterterrorism are themselves quite secluded and extremely secretive. Thus, giving them substantial room to overstate, feign, and simulate information concerning the extent of the respective threats. Furthermore, especially when talking about terrorism, an important

component that highly affects the scale and magnitude of an alleged terrorist threat are the capabilities a terrorist group is believed to possess. Once again, these estimates are however based on often times vague and hard to prove evidences, which can easily be altered or entirely fabricated to one's liking. Many of the speech acts in the forerun of the 2008 Beijing Olympics have been found to generate a sense of fear for one's life, which seem to have been intended to spread among the public. That is, so that the extraordinary security measures which the Chinese government had planned to employ, would not meet any resistance and would widely be accepted. Through this securitization process, the government has gained support for its large-scale security operations - including the truly enormous initiative of installing a massive amount of CCTV cameras all over Beijing - and the crackdowns on the demonized three groups above. The government thereby seems to have been motivated by three determining factors: Namely, ensuring a smooth and secure sequence of the Olympic Games for China's own benefits and due to the international pressure involved¹⁶, the polishing up of China's image on the international stage, as well as gaining more control over antagonistic forces and dissidents.

Most interesting in retrospect is particularly the very successful thematization of the security issue concerned with the Uyghur separatists prior and during the Beijing Olympics as discussed above. Having securitized the issue and thus having convinced most of China's population of the allegedly enormous threat this group poses, could be seen as the very onset of what is currently happening in the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region in the year 2018. Even though the Beijing Olympics have taken place in the year 2008, the recent developments

¹⁶ Apart from the international pressure mentioned in the previous sections, induced by counter-terrorism efforts after the 9/11 attacks, the International Olympic Committee (IOC) itself is setting a multitude of requirements that have to be fulfilled by the host nation.

have to be understood to be closely linked with the processes initiated during the preparation phase of the Beijing Olympics, despite the gap of 10 years in between. At the time of writing, China is being rigorously criticized for its treatment of the Uyghur Muslims in Xinjiang by various international media outlets and scholars, who call for sanctions and warn that “a failure to act would signal acceptance of ‘psychological torture of innocent civilians’” (Reuters 2018). It is estimated that over a million Uyghurs along with other minorities have been imprisoned for the purpose of political indoctrination in what is officially called ‘re-education camps’. While even those Uyghurs who are not incarcerated are nevertheless living under strict surveillance, quarantined in a heavily policed area, and are barely allowed to move freely within their own respective hometowns in Xinjiang.

The Chinese government responded to the pressure of the international community by declaring that these camps serve as a mechanism to fight (religious) extremism and Uyghur separatism. In particular, the camps are said to be intended to stop terrorist attacks from being carried out by the ETIM through education. At the same time, it has been emphasized that the religion of the people is being protected and respected. Yet, at this juncture, the author of this current study would like to underline that China’s more and more stringent policies against Muslims had actually resulted in riots and ethnic violence between Muslim Uyghurs and Han residents in Xinjiang in 2009, which left 140 people dead (cf. Branigan 2009). Moreover, many voices can be heard highlighting that the Uyghur’s religion and lifestyle is being actively and drastically suppressed. Measures taken include the necessity to apply for a ‘People’s Convenient Card’ in order to leave one’s hometown in 2015 (cf. Kuo 2017). While many elements and customs ingrained in the religion of the Islam itself, such as wearing a full-face cover for women, have gotten criminalized. As these measures are carried out only on a specific segment of China’s population, the actions are motivated and directly targeted at people of a certain ethnicity and

religion, hence representing serious civil rights violations.

The example above has been briefly outlined in order to demonstrate the impact that a successful securitization of an issue and its subsequent measures may have. The securitizing actor, the respective government and its representatives, thereby occupy a dangerously powerful position. That is, since they can shape public opinion regarding the degree of danger a potential threat may have and thereafter determine what constitute the necessary measures to be taken. Due to these conditions, scholars should not simply accept a security threat to be given or solely rely on and analyze the respective speech acts uttered by the individual governments. But instead he/she has to reveal the underlying power structures that facilitate the securitization process. Furthermore, scholars should take a step further and deconstruct the institutional power of the securitizing actor, as has been tried to be done in this section thus far. It shall furthermore be the responsibility of this thesis to use the Critical Application of Securitization Theory (CAST) approach in order to critically assess and challenge implemented security measures and policies, and introduce dissenting opinions. All of which will be addressed within the following sections of chapter 2.

2.2 Technologicalization and Civil Liberties

Technologicalization represents the second stage to be analyzed in the process of potential civil liberty infringements, following the successful persuasion of the public about the existence of a supposedly existential threat through the securitization process. Since the established category of technologicalization is incorporating all elements related to high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests, and surveillance; it is closely associated

with reductions of people's right to privacy, the freedom of assembly, and the right to restrictions on government surveillance, accordingly

Technologicalization indeed was heavily promoted by the Chinese government as soon as Beijing was elected as the Olympic host city in 2001. Primarily highlighted and expressed was the further empowerment of local police forces through the use of high-tech security technologies and the increased capability to counter terrorist threats during the Beijing Olympics. The equipment itself was predominantly provided by private companies such as the European Aeronautic Defense and Space Company, Nortel, IBM, and Philips. In particular, a proliferation of observation cameras with an increase of thousands of devices within what was entitled the 'Grand Beijing Safeguard Sphere' occurred during the years preceding the Beijing Olympics. It has to be noted that official numbers of the exact amount of additionally installed CCTV devices have never been disclosed by the Chinese government. Yet, based on estimates by Roche, approximately 300,000 CCTV cameras had been installed (2017, p. 134).

The use of applications such as surveillance cameras undoubtedly represent a common practice in terms of securing Olympic events. They thereby generally serve two functions. First, since they allow security forces to monitor all important and critical areas of the Olympic facilities - and in some cases also the host city itself - potential threats and risks can be detected immediately. Thus, enabling security personnel to avert disasters and attacks before they can occur. Secondly, and probably more surprisingly, they also regulate the behavior of the observed. That is, once individuals believe that they are being watched (whether this is actually the case or not), they will control their own behavior. Yet, apart from these two functions, there certainly are also further aspects for which the surveillance system may be utilized, as will be further elaborated below.

Especially interesting in this regard is that the new surveillance system for the Beijing Olympics had been intended to be fully integrated into the already existing 'Golden Shield Project' and its 'Great Firewall of China' right from the very beginning. In that sense augmenting the existing system and adding an additional layer to its capabilities. Therefore, not only accounting for extensive censorship of content that is regarded as undesirable and subversive online through China's great firewall, and being able to intercept phone calls and other forms of communication. But also assisting in closely monitoring nearly the entire city of Beijing due to the gigantic number of CCTV cameras. Furthermore, although being based on cutting-edge technology from the early 2000s, the system was nevertheless sufficient enough to automatically detect unusual movements, such as running individuals, according to the claims made by its manufacturers.

Following the introduced notion earlier about the multifunctionality of such a comprehensive surveillance system, it is quite striking that these massive numbers of CCTV cameras - originally argued to serve security purposes during the Beijing Olympic events – have not been solely purchased for the declared cause. One of the main fears of the Chinese government had been the organization of anti-government protests, which would be visible to the entire world. Particularly the Falun Gong, which had initiated one of the largest non-violent protests in recent Chinese history in the year 1999, was expected to take the opportunity to do likewise once again. Such assumptions became even further plausible during the Beijing Olympics, given the aggressive online campaign of the Falun Gong addressing organ harvesting, the reeducation camps, and other related matters. Thus, multiple measures in order to prevent protests from occurring had been arranged by the Chinese government officials. First of all, the Chinese government prohibited all kinds of protests, apart from those, that had previously acquired one of the new permits, which authorized individuals to demonstrate in specifically

assigned locations (so-called protest parks). The number of issued permits; however, appears to have been extremely low or close to none. In fact, according to BBC reports, “China has received a total of 77 applications to stage protests during the Olympic Games period – but none has been approved” (Bristow 2008b). Interestingly, 74 applications had been withdrawn, which might not be surprising, because it had been reported that applicants were threatened to be sentenced to undergo reeducation in labor camps, or have been put under house arrest (cf. Embassy of Switzerland in Beijing 2008). Secondly, the surveillance system itself would account for a rapid detection, and thereafter quickly initiate the following dispersion of the unauthorized protests. Collectively, both measures represent a strong violation against the freedom of assembly, namely the right of individuals to come together and collectively express their ideas. This civil liberty is however officially granted in Article 35 of the State Constitution from 1982, in which it is stated that the “[c]itizens of the People’s Republic of China enjoy freedom of speech, of the press, of assembly, of association, of procession and of demonstration” (The State Council of the People’s Republic of China 2014).

Another indicator for the concealed intentions behind the establishment of such an immense surveillance system is the fact that the entire system remained in place after the Beijing Olympics. Not only that, but the high-tech system even saw further enhancements with the result that by the year 2015 it was claimed that a hundred percent of Beijing's public spaces are being covered by surveillance cameras (cf. Mudie 2015). This specific measure certainly assists local police forces to detect potential security threats. While in the aftermath of the Olympics, it may serve the reasonable purpose of reducing the number of crimes being committed. Yet, it nonetheless represent a significant decline in civil liberties in terms of people’s right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance, since the Chinese government was then able to track nearly every step one takes within the city.

Being exposed to surveillance almost everywhere, apart from one's own home, inevitably raises the notion of an absolute police state. While this impression may not be commonly shared among the majority of the Chinese citizens, this nonetheless is highly relevant to a number of marginalized groups. That is even more so, when one believes the many critics who claim that the surveillance systems are primarily being used to track down dissidents and disperse protests against the Chinese political system and its Communist Party (cf. South China Morning Post 2012). Particularly when recalling the previous section of this thesis concerned with the securitization process, a connection between the surveillance system and the identified three groups, which are seen to represent a threat to the Chinese government and its people, can be drawn. The Chinese government can utilize the implemented system not only to secure the Olympics, but simultaneously also its regime.

To be more precise, the advances made in terms of policing capabilities through the expertise and technology of the mostly western tech giants, can be used against the separatist Uyghurs, the Tibetans, and the Falun Gong. In fact, the surveillance system has not only remained in Beijing, but has been expanded to other major Chinese cities and deemed problematic areas as well. Earlier in 2018, the Chinese government had installed around 1,000 facial recognition cameras at various mosques within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The efforts are part of a \$46 million project to increase surveillance in Xinjiang's Moyu County, which will be integrated into China's security apparatus (Financial Times 2018). However, the ambitions certainly do not stop here, as China is pushing forward its 'Sharp Eyes' or 'Xue Liang' surveillance initiative. The system is planned to operate nation-wide, including the most rural areas of the country. While it is publicly claimed to assist in reducing crime rates and being one of the pillars for a 'social credit system' – applying a person's personal data including criminal records and financial data in order to rank an individual – it almost inevitably has to result in

harsh cuts to civil liberties and basic freedoms (cf. South China Morning Post 2018).

Returning once more to the Beijing Olympics themselves and in order to illustrate the magnitude of the surveillance operation at that time, it may also be helpful to briefly compare it to the preceding summer Olympics in Athens just four years before. For this purpose, quite an extensive surveillance system with the name C4I had been implemented, consisting of around 1,660 CCTV cameras (Samatas 2011, p. 3353). However, despite the number being significantly lower than the 300,000 CCTV cameras at the Beijing Olympics, it nevertheless evoked memories of the Greek Regime of the Colonels in the late 1960s and early 1970s, which was a far-right military rule. Thus, the idea of maintaining the surveillance system after the Olympic event resulted in strong rejections from the Greek public (cf. Samatas 2011, p. 3347). Even though it is still partially operating today to manage traffic control. The comparison between Greece and China thereby strongly highlights the differences in the perception of surveillance based on the historical background and current regime type of a nation.

This becomes even more obvious when referring to the comments made by the International Olympic Committee (IOC) Marketing Manager Geirhard Heiberg, who criticized the extensive and highly visible presence of ‘sinister’ looking police and military forces during the Beijing Olympics. A situation that he deems to be frightening and unwanted (ICE News 2008). Similarly, according to Roche, Beijing had failed to find a desirable balance between maintaining security and the festive nature of the Olympic events (2017, p. 134).

Lastly, other technology-related security mechanisms that have caused raised eyebrows among the international audience of the Beijing Olympics was the use of Radio Frequency Identification tags incorporated within the Olympic Games' tickets themselves (Fussey et al. 2016, p. 184). This chip, developed by Beijing's Tsinghua University, incorporated the ticket owner's personal details and allowed for tracking the individual's current location and

consequently his/her movement around the city.

2.3 Warfare During Periods of Peace and Civil Liberties

Lastly, stage 3 is concerned with the factual impression of a ‘warfare during periods of peace’. This involves an amplified military presence in areas where they would traditionally not be found during peace times, such as at international sporting events or residential areas in inner cities. The element further entails the deployment of heavily armed forces, their military techniques and strategies, and the creation of special security zones, which then, in turn, limit the peoples’ freedom of movement. A particular concept, which is also known as the so-called mobility right. It encompasses the ‘privilege’ of a citizen to go and reside in any area of one’s home state, as long as he/she does not infringe on the liberties and well-being of others. This does of course not equal to a permission to enter someone else’s private property – which is certainly excluded from this definition - but refers to public property used for public purposes, such as parks and public streets.

China was quite eager to establish a small but high-quality network of professionals on securitization from a plurality of nations with experience of similar events, such as the G8 summit. Apart from that, nearly all aspects concerning security had been dealt with internally in China and under the decision-making power of the Communist Party. As mentioned in chapter one, the Chinese government intended to showcase its extraordinary power and thus rejected to adopt any of the ‘Western’ models of security applied by previous Olympic hosts. That meant, doing things by following the Chinese model (Ye 2008), while the International Olympic Committee (IOC) lacked direct control over the proceedings.

Hence, China involved its own forces to an unprecedented extent, including the Chinese

People's Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF), the PLA Navy, and the People's Liberation Army's Ground Force service branch. By doing so, all of them had been merged closer together in order to collaborate on the security efforts. Altogether amounting to a number of 100,000 soldiers and anti-terror forces (cf. Schiller 2008). Besides that, according to the Xinhua News Agency, additional 150,000 security personnel and 290,000 volunteers were on duty and patrolling Beijing during the Olympics (cf. Embassy of the People's Republic of China in the United States of America 2008). These so-called volunteers were especially recruited by the Chinese government among regular civilians, such as waiters in restaurants, taxi drivers, and hotel staff, in order to surveil and report any suspicious people or activities. Lastly, one should not forget to mention the presence of the special police operations. The latter consist of 300 people and is known as the 'Snow Wolf Commando Unit' (SWCU). This commando is made up of experts with regards to riot control, counter-terrorism, and bomb disposal (ibid.).

With the full spectrum of military forces involved in the process, the security measures taken were marked by the creation of security zones and the usage of military techniques, strategies, and equipment. This included, among other things, fighter jets, military helicopters, and PLA Navy warships (cf. Chan 2008). Reuters reported the presence of camouflaged missile launchers, a vast number of other military vehicles and uniformed army personnel in close vicinity to the Olympic venues (Laurence 2008). A fact that, surprisingly or not, did not seem to have caused much raised eyebrows among the Chinese public, even though their international counterparts have been significantly more baffled. The overall tendency of a more and more visual and steadily growing military presence during the Olympics is; however, worrisome to say the least.

The trend of deploying a small number of armed forces, who did not only protect the Olympic facility itself, but also other parts of the host city, actually started during the Montreal

Olympics in 1976. That is, following the Munich massacre four years before. However, unlike what is known from the public in China, the Canadian public was not pleased with these measures and expressed their concerns even before the onset of the Olympic Games. Their main fear, according to the report of the Organizing Committee for the Olympic Games (COJO) was that the security was too severe and rigorous. Thus, allowing the security agencies to possibly abuse their power and hence violating people's civil rights and liberties (1978, p. 570). That is, even despite the efforts of the CPSP JO (Comité Principal de Sécurité Publique des Jeux Olympiques) “to persuade the public to look favorably on the overall security program, and, therefore, to set up an effective dialogue between the media and the Olympic security forces” (p. 570). Ultimately, and as stated in the recommendation and conclusion section of the report, it was pointed out that there were no major rampages or violent acts committed during the Games. The security measures and its machinery appear to have been “disproportionate” (p. 571). Interestingly; however, the deployed 17,000 police and military forces during the 1976 Olympics merely represent a very small number when compared to the 250,000 anti-terror forces and security personnel of the Beijing Olympics. In fact, even the 41,000 security staff at the Athens Olympics, four years prior to the Beijing Olympics, can hardly compare.

In terms of mobility restrictions, every Chinese who did live outside of Beijing was ordered to acquire an approval to enter Beijing. That is, otherwise his/her access was denied at one of the over 100 security checkpoints at all highways and main roads leading into the city (cf. China Internet Information Center 2008b). In fact, police authorities had announced that every vehicle attempting to enter the city is undergoing careful security inspection. For this purpose, 3 security circles around the city had been established, upon which drivers had to identify themselves, present respective documents (in case they originated from other Chinese provinces), and had to endure vehicle inspections. While the same was being done with regards to trains arriving at

Beijing's rail stations (cf. China Internet Information Center 2008a) Interesting to note is also that no trucks with a license plate from outside of Beijing were allowed to enter the city for the time of the Olympics. Thus, having caused several businesses to close for the time of the Games. As a consequence, without work, large numbers of migrant workers were also forced to leave Beijing as they do not hold a residence permit. In comparison, the security arrangements with regards to mobility taken at the Salt Lake City Winter Olympics in 2002; for example, appear rather loose. Although having taken place just one year after the 9/11 attacks. During the Olympics in Salt Lake City, cars were not permitted within an area of 300 feet from the Olympic facilities, while several air exclusion zones in close proximity to the venues and other important institutions had been set up. Yet, despite these reasonable measures, no further restrictions regarding mobility had been imposed.

2.4 Conclusion

By applying the generated analytical framework for the purpose of this study, chapter two has shed light on the three stages of the process, which ultimately has led to infringements on civil liberties before, during, and after the Beijing Olympics. Its core and foundation is thereby based on the securitization process. As demonstrated above, a plethora of speech acts – many of which issued via government officials and various government media channels – have successfully installed the notion of the existence of an existential security threat due to the hosting of the Beijing Olympics. In this respect, particularly the threat ensuing from three specific groups had been mentioned. Namely, Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and Islamic 'Terrorists' from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. The three created security discourses regarding each of the groups has been studied and dissected in detail above. In that way, this

chapter has portrayed under what premise (or even smokescreen) the Beijing Olympics had been exceptionally heavily secured.

Once the foundation for further actions had been established through the securitization process, the Chinese government was able to implement a number of security arrangements, measures and even crackdowns, which would have resulted in greater opposition under different circumstances. Furthermore, as it has been shown, certain aspects with regards to the two investigated security measure categories - 'technologicalization' and the 'warfare during periods of peace' - have not only served the purpose of keeping the Olympic Games safe. Instead, many of the arrangements have also been used, or in fact were directly intended, to crack down on the three groups that represent thorns in the side of the Chinese government. That is, primarily due to the fact that they constitute dissenting and counteractive voices to the Chinese Communist Party, and only secondarily because of the actual rather limited threat that they may pose. In connection with the security actions taken, this thesis has detected a number of civil liberty infringements and reductions, for the specifically targeted groups above, and the Chinese population overall. Some of which were only in place temporarily before and during the Olympics, such as the limitations on the freedom of mobility. Others, on the other hand, especially with regards to the right to restrictions on government surveillance, the freedom of assembly, and the right to privacy, have to a great extent remained permanent. Given this fruitful analysis of the Beijing Olympics case, a similar approach will be followed for the examination of Russia's 2014 Sochi Olympics in chapter three.

Chapter 3: Sochi Olympics – Security Measures and Civil Liberties

Chapter 3 is destined to provide a thorough examination of the second selected case of this study, namely the 2014 Winter Olympics in Sochi. It will commence by accurately situating the discourse surrounding the securitization process of the Games into context and perspective, while further highlighting and explaining the role the Russian government has taken throughout the proceedings. Russia's prime objectives for the Games as well as its concerns will additionally be identified, as both are of paramount importance for understanding why the government has secured the Olympics Games in the specific way that it did. Subsequently, the individual security measures taken during, and even before the official start of the Sochi Olympics will be determined, investigated upon, and assessed. That is, particularly with regards to the respective use and intentions behind, as well as potential infringements on civil liberties that have occurred in consequence of the arrangements.

3.1 The Securitization Process

Following the introduced and established background information in section 1.3.2 of this thesis, one of Russia's underlying Olympic objectives was to showcase to the world that it had regained its great power status. A connection thereby is purposely established between today's Russian Federation and the former Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), of which Russia views itself as the righteous successor state after the dissolution of the USSR in December 26 in 1991. Yet, Russia itself experienced quite significant distress and burden following the dissolution. This included economic and financial difficulties as well as a constitutional crisis in 1993. Combined with a rather negative international image, primarily in the West, while perceptions vary in Eastern Europe and Asia; reshaping the view on the nation and its tremendous

capabilities was desirable. Putin was thus eager to demonstrate a 'new Russia' to the Olympic participants, the journalists, and the international audience (The Sydney Morning Herald 2016).

Petersson agreed in this regards that:

hosting the Winter Olympics in 2014 provides Russia with an opportunity to show that it has reestablished itself among the world's great powers after the social turmoil and economic upheaval that followed the dissolution of the Soviet Union in the 1990s.

(2014, p. 31)

While successful Sochi Winter Olympics would also guarantee the re-strengthening of Vladimir Putin's leadership and could further allow the formerly popular resort of Sochi to be revitalized. Part of doing so, and hence achieving all these goals, is therefore undoubtedly the provision of secure, peaceful, and undisturbed Games.

Thus, security - and implementing harsh measures to ensure the former - was of vital importance. Yet, before getting to this specific element, it may be interesting to further delve into why Russia emphasized and cared so much about its recognition as a great power externally (and internally). This, in fact, is strongly linked with how Russia views itself and what many Russians themselves would claim as their nation's identity. Every country possesses a number of specific ideas about themselves or recalls certain events that bind its people together as one. To exemplify this for the case of Germany; for example, this would include its reunification in 1990 after decades of separation. Another element is the nation's long tradition in having produced core teachings and works in the fields of science, music, and philosophy in the past. Thus, Germany is also called 'the land of poets and thinkers' (cf. Kitsou 2013, p. 25). At the same time, one component of Greece's national identity; for instance, is represented by it being one of the ancient birthplaces for democracy and civilization. With regards to Russia, its status as a superpower is one of the key aspects that define Russian identity. Putin himself pointed out that

“Russia has been a great power for centuries, and remains so” (BBC 2014b), while also Petersson speaks of the widespread belief that centers around “Russia as a nature-given great power” (2013, p. 303). On this note, one may then wonder how Russia could be possibly elevated (if it is not actually already at that level) to the status of a great power by simply hosting the Olympics. The author would thus highlight at this point that while Russia’s capabilities do matter in this context, the focus here is definitely set on being recognized by other nations as well as by its own people as such a power. Therefore, by hosting the Olympics, Russia’s capabilities may not be altered or increased, yet the perception of it might very well.

Thus, when attempting to analyze the various speech acts that have been initiated prior to the hosting of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, it has to be understood that the events had quite obviously been substantially politicized. Furthermore, as any kind of mishap or incident would have destroyed the image of Russia that was intended to be portrayed, anti-government protests, revolts, as well as terrorist attacks had to be prevented by all means. The implementation of extensive security measures had therefore been planned and was justified through a number of potential security threats.

Quite surprisingly; however, especially when compared to the Beijing Olympics, Russia’s leadership could mostly be seen rather downplaying the security threats than inflating them. Putin assured in an interview with Irada Zeynalova, an Azerbaijani-Russian journalist, that:

[w]e do everything with understanding, with clear understanding of the operational situation developing around Sochi and in the region as a whole; we have a perfect understanding of what it is, what is that threat, how to stop it, how to combat it. (The Embassy of the Russian Federation to the Republic of Kazakhstan 2014)

While the threat of a potential terrorist attack was being acknowledge, “extremists are always

trying to make a name for themselves, especially in the run-up to some major events” (ibid.), Russia constantly confirmed that it was in control of the situation and thoroughly prepared. As a result, instead of actively trying to convince the people of the existing threats and elevating fear, Russian authorities provided reassurance and highlighted that there was no need for concerns. Putin stated in a joint interview with ABC News, CCTV and Rossiya-1 that “[o]ur task and that of the organizers is to ensure the security of the athletes and guests at this major sports event, and we will do everything to ensure this” (Around the Rings 2014). To provide a stronger sense of security, speech acts furthermore often referred to Russia’s past experience of having successfully secured other large-scale events, such as the 2013 G20 Saint Petersburg summit at the Constantine Palace. Even Alexei Navalny, a Russian political activist and one of Putin’s harshest critics, expressed that “the security measures which are in place will guarantee security in Sochi” (BBC 2014a). While he also did not fail to highlight that Putin’s summer residence is located in Sochi, and thus it may be a good indicator for the level of safety in the city. In that way, among other things, trying to address and appease international fears and concerns.

Indeed, it has been primarily foreign media which have spread the notion of severe security threats and danger for the Sochi Olympics. Such notions even received further support and gained popularity following the terrorist attacks in major Russian metropolises, such as the suicide bombings targeting public transportation in Volgograd in Southern Russia at the end of 2013. CNN, for instance, published an article with the headline ‘Russia bombings raise questions about Sochi Olympics security’ (Cohen and Mullen 2014). The incidents at a train station (December 29) and in bus No. 1233 bound to the downtown area of Volgograd (December 30), had caused 34 deaths in 2013, barely two months before the Games. Following initial misallocations of the terrorist attack, an Islamist terrorist group with the name Vilayat Dagestan (part of the Caucasus Emirate) claimed to have been responsible for the bombings.

Nevertheless, Russia's leader and security experts showed themselves quite confident about the security measures that had been in place in Sochi. In fact, it was assumed that terrorist attacks, if occurring at all during the Sochi Olympics, would likely be carried out outside of the established safety zones surrounding the city. To be more precise, attacks were intrinsically more probable in the North Caucasus. This, in fact, seemed likely since the North Caucasus had seen a militant uprising of Islamist groups for years, first and foremost, by the so-called Caucasus Emirate.

Islamic Insurgencies in the North Caucasus

Following the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the North Caucasus region has been suffering from numerous ethnic conflicts. In order to be able to elaborate on the background and causes of these terrorist threats for the Sochi Olympics, a brief historical overview will be provided. Violence started to surface in the North Caucasus with the First Chechen War¹⁷ from 1994 to 1996 between Russia and the unrecognized secessionist government of the Chechen Republic. The conflicts ended positively for the separatists, since the Russian forces had experienced a defeat in the battle of Grozny. Thus, the Chechen Republic subsequently gained its independence from the Russian Federation. However, Chechnya's independence severely lacked international recognition. Furthermore, although the Chechen war had ended, different forces within Chechnya kept fighting for power and hence violent conflicts reemerged in the already war-torn region. Shortly after the end of the First Chechen War, Chechnya then declared itself as an Islamic Republic in 1997.

The Second Chechen War followed quickly afterwards in 1999, having been triggered by

¹⁷ It shall be remarked at this point that from Russia's perspective, the conflicts in Chechnya cannot be labeled as a 'war', but merely represent an armed conflict in the Chechen Republic and neighboring territories.

Islamist forces from Chechnya proclaiming the Russian Dagestan region as an independent state. Russia immediately sent forces and the following active battles lasted for less than a year. By the middle of the year 2000, Chechnya's independence was being revoked and Russia took once again control over Chechnya. Nonetheless, insurgencies of a certain level remained throughout the years.

Bearing the historic circumstances in mind, a militant Jihadist organization developed in 2007 under the leadership of former President of the Chechen Republic (2006 to 2007), Dokka Umarov. The group referred to itself as the 'Caucasus Emirate' and pursued its mission towards an independent Islamic state and the expulsion of Russian forces from the North Caucasus. In fact, the Caucasus Emirates did not solely incorporate parts of Chechnya, but actually drew from support in a number of provinces in North Ossetia, Ingushetia, Adygea, and Dagestan. Indeed, also Dagestan and Ingushetia had seen many years of militant Islamist uprisings, involving suicide bombings and attacks on the local police.

Dokku Umarov himself, leader of the Caucasus Emirate, had released a statement in a video just half a year before the Sochi Olympics that his organization would conduct brutal attacks during the Olympic events. Umarov further stated that the Sochi Olympics were being hosted on the graveyard of many Muslims, who had fought against the Russians in the 19th century in the region. He thereby further highlighted that this very territory would belong to his people, and all means necessary will be applied in order to prevent the Olympics from taking place (Corcoran 2014). In fact, much of the North Caucasus region used to be the land of the Circassians (a predominantly Sunni Muslim group, indigenous to the North Caucasus). That is, prior to having been displaced or murdered by the Russian Imperial Forces during the Caucasian War from 1817 to 1864. The Caucasus Emirate therefore requested violence against the Russians

by stating that:

I call on you, every mujahid, either in Tatarstan, Bashkortostan or on the territory of the Caucasus to use maximum force on the path of Allah to disrupt this Satanic dancing on the bones of our ancestors. (Grove 2013)

However, despite these threats and the Caucasus Emirate's affiliation with Al-Qaeda, Putin stands by his promise for safety. Chief Executive of Intelligent Risks, Neil Fergus, considered the fulfillment of the promise highly credible. Fergus actually further downplayed the threat ensuing from the Caucasus Emirate by underlining that the organization does not possess a supportive network in Sochi. Thus, it will be nearly impossible to slip through the extensive security apparatus in place (Corcoran 2014). The author of this present study would like to further dwell on this, as it is believed to be an important point. Sochi, although situated near the Georgian border, nevertheless has a significant distance to the Dagestan Republic and Chechnya. For this very reason, it may render itself quite difficult for Caucasus Emirate terrorists to operate in Sochi without local support.

Apart from the inherent threats that the Sochi Olympics pose due to its location, the intention to host the events exactly here is quite strategic. Knowing that it is a critical area, naturally more security forces would have to be deployed to the region. This, in turn, could already account for more stability in the North Caucasus. Furthermore, the Olympics, as a gigantic project, also assist in developing the region's infrastructure, helps the local economy, and constitutes a factor that increases tourism in the area during the Olympics and afterwards. All of this was seen as possibly easing the existing tensions

Secondary Security Threats: The Circassians and Gay Rights Activists

Apart from the most salient security threat for the 2014 Sochi Winter Olympics, two other aspects have been identified during the process of this thesis, as they have also received attention within the security discourse. As mentioned above, Sochi and the North Caucasus region have a special meaning to Circassians. In fact, Nichol et al. indicate that “Sochi was historically the capital of an area populated by the Circassians (encompassing the Adyghes, Kabardians, Shapsugs, and Cherkess), peoples of the North Caucasus who speak dialects of the Circassian language” (2014, p. 4). However, during the Caucasian War from 1817 to 1864 the Russia Empire had incorporated the region as its own. Most noteworthy in this regard is yet what happened in the final year of the war, which is (at least from the side of the Circassians) understood as a genocide on its people. It is estimated that around 400,000 Circassian have lost their lives, while many more had been forced to migrate.

Moreover, the 2014 Sochi Olympics unfortunately fall in the year of the 150 years’ anniversary of the tragic incident of 1884. While one of the Olympic venues is located at Krasnaya Polyana, the very location at which Russian soldiers had celebrated over the victory of the Caucasian War. Hence, all in all, representing a powder keg, which could have exploded and could then have caused violent protests at any moment, particularly since Russia had received a tremendous amount of international attention during the events. The Circassians themselves voiced their demands for a boycott of the Olympics, unless Russia publicly admits and apologized for the Circassian genocide, which it still does not acknowledge at the time of this writing. A member of the Circassian Cultural Institute, Zack Barsik, had reasonably stressed that “[w]e don’t want the Sochi Olympics to happen on our ancestors graves’ (CBC News 2012).

At the same time, Russia also feared abundant protests from the Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual,

and Transsexual (LGBT) community and foreign gay right activists, which could tarnish the positive image Russia would like to portray. The former had been outraged over two laws that had been introduced in Russia in 2013. The first one actively banned the positive portrayal of LGBT members in public (to children). This therefore included a dire restriction of LGBT visibility in Russia. The Russian government justified having taken these actions by arguing that such “propaganda” would influence children in thinking of homosexuality as a behavioral norm (cf. Travers and Shearman 2017, p. 43). However, particularly because the law was so vaguely defined, the LGBT community feared discrimination in Russia. That is, since the law stated that the following would be prohibited:

[any] activity for purposeful and uncontrollable dissemination of information capable of damaging the health, morals and spiritual development of the under-aged as well as forming a distorted understanding of the social equivalence of traditional and non-traditional marriage relations. (Lenskyj 2014)

Violations against this law ranged from fines to arrests and deportation of foreigners.

Furthermore, a second law had been implemented in the same year, illegalizing the adoption of Russian orphans by LGBT individuals and couples on a global scale. In response, Travers and Shearman conducted an analysis of the different reactions from the LGBT communities in the United States and Canada at that time. According to their research, violent threats were not common, and most communities engaged in peaceful protests or called for an international boycott of the Sochi Olympics (2017, p. 57). Noteworthy is however that Putin had responded to the increased international concerns over the laws prior to the Sochi Olympics, in order to ease the tensions. Putin pointed out, among other things, that LGBT people will not be subject to discrimination or harassment in Russia. He further clarified that:

[w]e do not have a ban on non-traditional sexual partnerships. [...] [w]e have a ban on the

propaganda of homosexuality and pedophilia. I want to underline this. Propaganda among children. These are absolutely different things – a ban on something or a ban on the propaganda of that thing. (cf. Walker 2014b)

After having examined the respective speech acts voiced in the forerun of the 2014 Sochi Olympics, a clear distinction to what has been found in the analysis of the Beijing Olympics can be detected. The securitization process in Russia was primarily driven by foreign media and speech acts by the terrorist organizations themselves (through recorded threats on video tape, for instance). The Russian government, quite contrary to what was perhaps expected, did not engage in the acts of further elevating the perceived security risks. If anything, Putin and his government authorities have spent significant efforts to reassure the public and international community of Russia's capabilities to keep the Sochi Olympics safe. Thus, indicating that the government's behavior is strongly related to one of Russia's overall goals for the Olympics. That is, being recognized as one of the great powers. Consequently, wanting to be perceived as such a power undoubtedly entails to be able to cope with dissident internal voices, such as the Caucasus Emirate in Russia's North Caucasus region. Hence, Russia was eager to demonstrate control over its own territories to observers abroad and at home alike.

3.2 Technologicalization and Civil Liberties

Despite Russia's limited engagement in raising security concerns, the Russian government nevertheless highly secured the Olympic Games. That is particularly by also involving a number of high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests, and surveillance, which will be assessed in this section of the paper. Prime concern during the

analysis are furthermore the caused potential side effects of such measures in terms of reductions of people's rights to privacy, the freedom of assembly, and the right to restrictions on government surveillance.

Interestingly, a number of Western media outlets demonized the Sochi Olympics and its host by warning its readers that Russia had set up "the most invasive security measures the Games have ever seen" (Ayed 2014). The author of this present study however deems such allegations as unfounded and barely credible. There certainly have been a number of measures that spark concerns and are unacceptable, as will be pointed out in the following paragraphs. Yet, the history of Olympics had unfortunately experienced events of similar peculiarity before, thus although Russia's security measures may be invasive, they are not the most invasive of its kind in the Olympic tradition.

At first glance, Russia, similar to China, also focused on surveillance through CCTV cameras in order to keep the Games safe. Hence, a total of 1,400 additional cameras had been installed at the Olympic venues and around the city prior to the Sochi Olympics (BBC 2014a). This form of surveillance certainly generates the notion of an invasion into one's personal privacy and the challenging question of which entity will supervise the group that is themselves in charge of evaluating the footage recorded. However, given the relatively moderate number of CCTV cameras in comparison to former Olympics, it can be determined that the surveillance cameras alone do not pose a substantial reduction in the civil liberties of the spectators and the Sochi residents at that time. Apart from that, a much more worrying concern is the fact that various accounts have confirmed that phone calls, email communication, and social media activities had been wire-tapped and spied upon by the Russian Federal Security Service (FSB) in the entire Olympic city. That is, without a recognizable focus on specific individuals who may classify as a potential threat, but rather as a general rule of procedure. The FSB, in fact,

represents the successor of the former KGB, of which Putin himself was part of. Through the highly sophisticated and constantly updated Russian system for communication interception with the name 'Sorm', "[a]ll electronic transmissions are subject to possible interceptions (Nichol et al. 2014, p. 8). Nichol et al. further pointed out that the electronic surveillance would also allow for movement tracking and the collection of various personal data (ibid. p. 13). Thus, certainly accounting for an intolerable act of violation against people's right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance.

Nonetheless, compared to the truly massive monitoring operation of an entire city like Beijing during the Olympics in China – with a population of 17 million people in 2008 – Sochi only accounts for a very small portion of what has been seen in Beijing. Indeed, Sochi's population only roughly amounts to 360,000 people. Hence, naturally representing an operation of significantly smaller scale. What furthermore has to be kept in mind is that Beijing was led by the intention to keep the surveillance system in place and even further expanding it to the greater Beijing area and beyond. In Sochi, such plans are simply not practical and feasible. That is, the relatively small city at the Black sea does not require such high security attention once the Olympics have ended. Moreover, even an expansion and incorporation of the surveillance system to neighboring Russian cities did not make much sense, given Sochi's rather isolated and mountainous location. Hence, the very foundation on which the two surveillance systems had been built upon are inherently different.

Russia; however, used surveillance drones during the Games, which represents the very first time that such technology had been utilized for the Olympics. The very purpose of this measure seems yet dubious to the researcher of this present study. Particularly so, since as demonstrated in section 3.1. of this thesis, Russia's prime security concerns constituted threats from terrorists, which had in the past overwhelmingly attacked by means of suicide bombings in

Russia. Surveillance drones, being high up in the air, are thus of no real use in order to counter such attacks. A primary function of drones is however the detection of gradually forming protests on the ground. The author of this paper had mentioned before that protests against the Russian government for a number of possible reasons - such as its laws against LGBT propaganda or the historic genocide on the Circassians - could ruin the image Russia wanted to portray. Naturally, Russia and certainly Putin were aware of this risk. Originally, Putin had therefore effectively banned all protests and demonstrations from the Olympic sites. In fact, via presidential decree in August 2013, Putin actually implemented a ban for the duration of four weeks prior, during, and after the Sochi Games. Interestingly, he then shifted course just one month prior to the Sochi Games in January and allowed protests to take place at a designated protest site in Khosta. The latter being situated roughly half an hour away from the Olympic location.

Yet, despite the rather remoted location of the protest area, all demonstrations had to be registered with, and authorized by, Sochi officials and the FSB. Thus, reasonably having cast doubts on the actual feasibility to organize a protest at the said location. In point of fact, no protests had been carried out. The result is yet quite surprising, especially since there had been a large number of dissident voices eager to express their opinions in the forerun of the Olympics. Solely a single group had been reported to have received the authorization to protest. The Environmental Watch group from the North Caucasus was yet later informed that their authorization had been revoked and that Sochi's mayor would instead be willing to listen and discuss the group's demands in private (cf. Walker 2014a). Despite the fact that information on this particular subject is only scarcely available, all indications point at a heavily infringed freedom of assembly. That is, as it was impossible to follow the government's created route to 'legally' demonstrate, while unauthorized protests were to be detected via surveillance drones and dispersed within minutes.

3.3 A Warfare During Periods of Peace and Civil Liberties

Assessing stage 3 incorporated in the developed analytical framework for the case of Russia, namely the occurrence of a ‘warfare during periods of peace’, will once more shift attention to the greatly intensified armed military presence in inner city areas. These troops bring along military techniques and strategies, and the creation of special security zones, which then consequently restrict the mobility right of the people. As determined by Putin and the Russian government, the Russia Federal Security Service (FSB) was appointed the prime body entrusted with the task of securing the Sochi Olympics. Despite that, the FSB received further support by collaborating with the Russian Defense Ministry, the Emergencies Ministry, and the Interior Police Ministry on this onerous task. Ultimately being able to maneuver and utilize the security power of well over 100,000 security personnel. This staggering number included over 22,000 military armed forces, approximately 40,000 police forces, 8,900 Emergency Ministry personnel, and around 30,000 FSB uniformed staff and special forces troops (cf. Nichon et al. 2014, p. 8). Furthermore, the sky was secured with 72 airplanes, while speed boats were constantly patrolling around the coastal line of Sochi. The Russian government had also mandated strict security surrounding the Olympic venues themselves, Sochi International Airport, Sochi’s railway stations, and the city’s harbor. Other critical areas, such as the mountainous belt stretching from Sochi to Mineralnye Vody was guarded by Russian special military forces of 10,000 troops called ‘Operation Group Sochi’. While the nearby border to Georgia and its adjacent areas was backed and protected by Russia’s 58th Combined Arms Army headquartered in North Ossetia-Alania. Hence, altogether constituting a very comprehensive and truly omnifarious military operation on land, at sea, in the air, and at the heights of the mountains.

Intriguingly; however, as demonstrated in chapter two, China’s strategy was to conspicuously militarize the streets with visible and highly armed military forces, machinery and

even strategically placed Hongqi 7 missile launchers (short-range air defense missiles) in close proximity to the famous Beijing National Stadium (the bird's nest). In that way ensuring maximum exposure to all Olympic spectators and the public in general. That is, as the stadium hosted the opening as well as the closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics, while also having served as the venue for the football final and other events. Russia, on the other hand, attempted a quite opposite strategy. Certainly also Russia put emphasis on securing the events, yet paid particular attention to not disturb the events by doing so. Putin in this regards highlighted that “[w]e will try to make certain that the security measures are not intrusive or too conspicuous, so they are not too noticeable for the athletes, the Olympics’ guests and journalists” (Smith-Spark and Shoichet 2014). Although military machinery had been in use as medium range surface-to-air missile systems and military aircrafts had been on duty, they nevertheless were purposely located in hidden and less attention-seeking areas. This was done with the intention not to trigger unease or to fan fear among the visitors. In addition, since Sochi is situated by the Black Sea, Russia had deployed navy destroyers, which could however only be occasionally spotted by the public.

In the context of potential restrictions to people’s freedom of mobility, Vladimir Putin had signed a decree which arranged the creation of two security zones starting from January 2014 (cf. Nichol et al. 2014, p. 8). Both of which caused rigorous restrictions on transportation and travelling. One of them is labeled as a so-called ‘controlled zone’, spanning approximately 100 km along the coast line of the Olympic city as well as partly inland. Entrance into this ‘controlled zone’ by road or via maritime route demanded a local registration number, or respective documents for the Sochi Olympics themselves, in order to get through. An extensive number of security checks had also to be undergone at the various arranged security checkpoints, involving procedures such as mandatory X-rays of individuals’ luggage and vehicles, as well as identification document checks. According to Coaffee, the security zones “severely restricted

access to and freedom of movement in Sochi and effectively banned all vehicles from the city with the exception of locally owned or specifically accredited vehicles” (2016, p. 26). The measures caught the attention of a number of human rights activists, who labelled these arrangements as ‘unconstitutional’, as they were only justifiable in case of a declared state of emergency (ibid.). Apart from the ‘controlled zone’ mentioned above, also a ‘forbidden zone’ had been established. The latter encompassed Russia’s border to Abkhazia (globally mostly recognized as a part of Georgia, yet nevertheless also a de facto independent republic) and large territories of the Sochi national park.

3.4 Conclusion

The applied analytical framework, consisting of three distinct stages, has provided numerous insights on the discourse which surrounded and enabled the process of heavily securitizing the events as well as on the implemented measures themselves. Similar to the case analyzed in chapter two, also the Sochi Olympics have resulted in a cutback on civil liberties enjoyed by the people. Although this was done to a lesser extent as in the previous case. However, the factor that has ultimately and significantly shaped and narrated the securitization processes was Russia’s prime intention of the Sochi Olympics to mark its figurative resurrection as an international great power to the world stage. While the Olympic Games have a long history regarding the promotion of national imagery and nationalism staged by the respective hosts, each case yet still brings its very unique set of factors along. These specific factors then, in turn, determine the behavior of, and choices made by, the host nation.

In terms of Russia, with its particular international image corrupted by its Soviet and Cold War past (at least from the perspective of most Western nations), this has led to an eagerness to

not wanting to confront the international audience with a militarized Russia during such an occasion. At the same time, as Russia intended to show its tremendous capabilities to the world by hosting the Olympics, this also had very specific consequences on how the discourse surrounding the event's security has been led and constructed. As mentioned in chapter 3.1, Russia's leadership was not at all involved in the inflation of potential security threats, but; in fact, eagerly downplayed the latter. In that sense, of course, signaling that Russia is in control and competent to handle any potential dangers. This is even more so, since the identified security threats for the Sochi Olympics were predominantly internal, such as potential Islamic insurgencies originating from the North Caucasus, most notably by the Caucasus Emirate. Hence, in order to reinforce the great power image, Russia undoubtedly had to demonstrate that it is the master of the situation within its own territory and can successfully manage inner Russian conflicts.

The implementation of tighter security, on the other hand, has, at least partly, been pushed by the international community challenging and questioning Russia's capability in hosting safe Games. That was particularly the case following a series of terrorist attacks in other Russian cities prior to the Sochi Olympics, and due to a video message by the Caucasus Emirate that had surfaced, announcing further attacks directed at Sochi. The Russian government responded with a substantial amount of security personnel and a grand security initiative covering land, sea, and air. The Federal Security Service (FSB) had also implemented a comprehensive bugging and intercepting operation against all attendees and residents of Sochi. In turn, having resulted in intolerable violations of the people's rights to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance.

Lastly, particular attention had been directed toward the prohibition of any form of protests, although publicly not being admitted. Instead, potential protestors were systematically

hindered in engaging, in assembling, and in voicing their dissident opinions through various mechanisms and layers. Not only the freedom of assembly was being denied, designated restricted areas also caused severe limitations to the people's freedom of mobility. Nevertheless, although abundant military personnel and machinery had accompanied the Olympic event in Russia, they were yet discretely placed as to not disrupt the Games.



Chapter 4. A Comparison Between the Beijing and the Sochi Olympics

While this study's prime research questions have already been thoroughly addressed throughout the three chapters above, chapter four is designated to elaborate on the different findings, to bring them face to face, and to contrast the results obtained in both distinct cases. This serves the purpose of being able to provide insights on which particular processes in place, and security measures taken, are either strongly linked with, or on the other hand independent from, the regime type of a nation. This has been made possible since two countries under an authoritarian rule have been chosen for the investigation of this study. Through this, so it can be inferred and reasoned, detected major disparities in securitizing behavior and security arrangements among the two, strongly indicate that other factors must be at work. In fact, various alternative elements that play a major role have been identified, consisting of, among others, a country's history, national identity, cultural components, and the hosting nation's individual objectives and motivations for organizing the Olympic Games.

4.1 A Comparison with Regards to the Securitization Process

Concerning the securitization process of the 2008 Beijing Olympics and the 2014 Sochi Olympics, the researcher has detected and carved out fundamental differences among the two. Rather surprisingly, both host nations have approached the securitizing discourse in opposite terms, despite both countries' authoritarian regime type. China has been observed to be actively and aggressively involved in conveying the notion that China's Olympics as well as China's public is being under an enormous threat due to the Games. A vast number of speech acts issued by Chinese authorities and government officials emphasized the high probability of a series of terrorist attacks and called for a stark increase in security forces and security arrangements.

Particularly three groups have repeatedly been labeled as the biggest danger to security: Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and terrorists from the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous region. In the case of the Tibetan separatists and the riots that had raised between Tibetans and Chinese police forces primarily in the Tibet Autonomous Region, foreign media was immediately banned from the site. Local media, on the other hand, focused on exaggerating the security threat once Han Chinese civilians had been hurt. In fact, several implications have been made by Chinese authorities and government officials that the riots had long been planned by the Dalai Lama himself in order to split China at a vulnerable moment. Internationally, of course, the issue had been portrayed quite differently and the actual security threat of Tibetan protests has been classified minimal. Yet, regardless of the global concerns and doubts, the Chinese government successfully startled its people with the supposedly great security risk and further radicalized their perception on the Tibetans.

Similarly, Chinese government officials also established a strong association between the Falun Gong and the concept of ‘terrorists’. That is, despite the lack of evidence and the mere risk of Falun Gong members potentially tarnishing China’s global image through peaceful protests. In fact, the Chinese government had strongly increased its crackdown of Falun Gong practitioners throughout the preparation phase of the Beijing Olympics by using the event as an excuse, and even incentivizing the public to assist in the persecution by offering rewards. Moreover, also the terrorist threat posed by the ETIM had been greatly intensified, since the actual problem had long been stemmed by Chinese security forces in the past. All in all, one therefore has to highlight that all three security discourses have been purposely escalated and manipulated in order to serve China’s political aspiration for drastic measures and the extensive crackdowns on the targeted three anti-government groups above. What thus certainly has to be stressed is the underlying power structure that dangerously overpowers governments and its representatives, as it enables

them to excessively blur the lines between facts and fabrication.

In the case of Russia, it has not primarily been the state actor that has actively pushed the securitization and hence the exceptionality of the events. Rather, foreign media outlets and local terrorist groups, predominantly the Caucasus Emirate, have dominated the act of fueling fear among the public in Russia and abroad. This, in turn, leads once more to the still largely underanalyzed role of mass media in the securitization process (cf. Dolinec 2010, p. 9) and to what McCombs and Shaw have coined as ‘agenda-setting’ (cf. McCombs and Shaw 1972). That is, the truly and often underestimated massive influence of media to channel public attention on specific public issues and thereby setting the agenda of attention. One certainly has to bear in mind that these alleged ‘issues’ may very well pose a serious threat, while they may also be simply fabricated by the news agencies or other influential entities. Russia’s government; however, kept belittling the security threats under discussion and constantly reassured the global audiences and its own people alike, that everything was under control. As indicated in the previous chapter, such behavior is reasonable given Russia’s main objectives for hosting the Sochi Olympics. That is to say, since organizing the Games was aimed at showcasing Russia’s act of regaining its great power status. Hence, admitting the existence of severe security threats, most of which were internal, would generate an image of a Russian nation that is not able to manage conflicts within its own borders. As a result, the securitization process of both Olympics was based on diverging conditions. Thus, although China and Russia are regarded as authoritarian nations, other factors have surpassed this aspect and have taken key positions in determining how security shall be guaranteed. In that way and in this context, the study proves not the importance of a country’s regime form, but rather the significance of its individual history, culture, and set goals.

This argument can even further be strengthened by returning once more to the notion of national identity introduced in chapter three. For Russia this concept is tightly linked with being considered a nature-given great power. It is thereby really interesting to briefly look at what has happened immediately after the Sochi Olympics. Namely, the start of the annexation of Crimea at the end of February, less than a week after the conclusion of the Sochi Olympics. Many researchers have been baffled by the seemingly inconsistent behavior of Russia, turning from a hospitable and welcoming Olympic host for all nations of the world, to an aggressive, calculative, and hostile international player within the matter of a few days. However, the researcher of this current study would like to stress in this regards that it was not Russia's prime Olympic intention to improve its international image in general. Instead, the country wanted to be regarded once again as a great power, referring back to its former USSR times. Thus, it could be argued that following the successful organization of the Sochi Olympics, and therefore having proven its great capabilities, the next step was initiated. That is, following the recapture of its power status, as a second step also parts of its former territory were tried to be reclaimed (cf. Petersson 2014, p. 30).

4.2 A Comparison with Regards to Technologicalization and Civil Liberties

Both host nations relied heavily on the use of high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests, and surveillance. However, while conducting the intended comparison, there are striking differences between the two, which immediately caught the researcher's eyes. Most salient is naturally the great disparity in size and scope of the respective security operations. Russia primarily focused on a rather narrow area for its CCTV surveillance initiative, in total having installed 1,400 cameras. A number that can be considered sufficient in

order to monitor the Olympic venues as well as the proceedings in the city of Sochi. However, simply by contrasting Sochi's city area of 176 km² to Beijing's 16,800 km², the truly massive mismatch shall become obvious. With a total population of 17 million people in 2008, the Chinese government utilized the surveillance power of around 300,000 CCTV cameras. Hence, more than 200 times the amount that was used in Sochi. Consequently, accounting for one CCTV camera for every 56 Beijing residents in 2008. Thus, although functions of the CCTV cameras used are similar, Sochi solely amounts to a tiny fraction of the monitoring efforts observed in China.

With such a heavy investment on security technology on the part of Beijing, then certainly also comes a difference in motivation and intended use. While Russia's communication interception system was mainly directed towards foreign visitors and remained only in place for the duration of the Sochi Olympics themselves, China's plans were long-term, entailed an inward focus, and are directed towards a nation-wide expansion of the system. As has been discussed previously, even by the year 2008, China had already set its ultimate objective to what it is likely to achieve in the years ahead. Namely, its 'Sharp Eyes' or 'Skynet' initiative. A system that will cover the entire Chinese territory and, in fact, accounts for facial recognition. Under these circumstances, it shall further not be a surprise that all 300,000 CCTV cameras connected and equipped with an immense control system have remained in place following the Beijing Olympics. They were actually also further integrated in the already existing 'Golden Shield Project'

As one can then may already reasonably infer by having had a closer look at the discourses surrounding China's securitization process prior to the Beijing Olympics, the newly acquired technology was predominantly applied to target the three identified dissident groups. While being publicly claimed to prevent terrorist attacks, the system assisted in tracking down and

subsequently carrying out harsh and vigorous actions not only against Falun Gong practitioners, Tibetans, and Uyghurs, but, in fact, against anyone not aligning with the government's policies and values. Consequently, representing violations against civil liberties in terms of people's right to privacy, the right to restrictions on government surveillance, and even further against numerous civil rights, such as the right of protection from discrimination based on ethnicity and religion. Samatas, in this respect, correctly highlighted that "states which adopt excessive security and surveillance technologies to combat terrorism, as well as to address social problems, ultimately threaten their own human rights, [and] civil liberties" (2011, p. 3361). Based on the perspective of the Chinese government, it saw the Olympics, and the responsibility of providing safe Games, as an opportunity to not only secure to Beijing Olympics, but also its regime.

Although also Russia was subject to Islamic insurgencies and ethnic conflicts, particularly in the North Caucasus, plans of similar type had not been considered. In fact, the Russian governing style does not suit such a measure. Simultaneously, enforcing such a large-scale surveillance operation in Sochi did not appear to be practical and beneficial. The city of Sochi itself does usually not require such high security standards, and an extension of the system into the North Caucasus did not make much sense, given its rough and difficult terrain.

A striking similarity; however, can be detected when comparing how both host nations have dealt with the risk of anti-government protests. In fact, at least on paper, both countries made the opportunity to protest available and provided designated - often rural and isolated - protest areas. However, those who were brave enough to actually file an application for a protest authorization were either declined, persecuted, or even put under arrest. Therefore, both Russia and China did not grant its people the freedom of assembly. Despite the fact that all eyes of the international community were gazing on them. and this particular liberty actually being firmly

established in both nation's constitutions (Article 35 of China's State Constitution from 1982, and Article 31 of the Constitution of the Russian Federation from 1993).

4.3 Comparison with Regards to Warfare During Periods of Peace and Civil Liberties

Military presence during the Olympic Games has been a rather common practice since the Munich massacre of 1972. Yet, the extent of such practice and under what circumstances military is being deployed is essential. South Korea's Olympics in 1988 have; for instance, seen large numbers of military personnel. However, this had occurred and was thoroughly justified by the fact that North Korea had actively tried to sabotage the Games during its preparation phase by launching several attacks, including the bombing of a Korean Air flight bounding to Seoul. In the same way, also the 1996 Atlanta Olympics had experienced a pipe bombing at the Centennial Olympic park, executed by an American anti-abortion religionist. As a result, making the presence of military personnel at an international sporting event vindicable.

By reason of the alleged security threats posed by Tibetan separatists, the Falun Gong, and Islamic Uyghurs, the Chinese government allocated 100,000 military troops and anti-terror forces to the Olympic site. Another 150,000 security personnel and nearly 290,000 volunteers were also assigned to guarantee security for the Beijing Olympics. Hence, totaled up, the number of security staff at the Beijing Olympics is higher than the number of the entire population of Sochi. Nonetheless, also Russia's government has resorted to the use of military forces. Among the full amount of 100,000 security forces, 22,000 military troops had been on duty. Apart from Russia's significantly lower numbers in terms of military personnel, also the way the militarization of the host cities was presented differed quite substantially. Russia attempted to expose its military staff and machinery to as little civilians as possible, having made the concealment of its military

involvement paramount. In stark contrast, China purposely made its military the center of attention, by visibly militarizing the streets of Beijing and having positioned short-range air defense missiles nearby one of the most popular and iconic Olympic venues of the Beijing Games. This major difference leads back to each host nation's prime intentions and objectives. Once again, while Russia and China both represent authoritarian regimes, their way of securitizing the events varies considerably. Russia was eager to present its capabilities as a great power, while it did not want to reveal its large military presence to manage threats, that are principally internal. China, on the other hand, wanted to visualize its birth as a superpower and thus was eager to assert and portray its military might. At the same time conspicuous military presence also functions as a way to deter potential attacks.

Concerning the establishment of restricted security zones and thus an infringement of people's mobility rights, China as well as Russia acted in conformable ways. Both banned people who were not residents of the Olympic city and not affiliated with the Olympics from entering Beijing and Sochi, respectively (ticket holders, staff, journalists, and athletes were naturally excluded). A large number of security checkpoints had been set up on all major roads and railway stations leading into the cities. While attempting to pass one of them required intensive security inspections, such as X-rays of luggage and vehicles, as well as identification checks. In fact, even trucks registered outside of the city were not permitted to enter, causing local businesses to complain about not being able to receive nor ship their products. Russia additionally created a 'forbidden zone', even further restricting mobility as no civilian was allowed in these territories.

4.4 Conclusion

The implementation of strict security measures, such as the installment of additional

monitoring devices as well as an increase in security personnel, are undoubtedly understandable, if being done with a balance between security and civil liberties in mind. That is, given that successfully held Olympics, while on-going, generate a lot of interest, but the latter quickly vanishes once the events have concluded. Yet, failing to provide safe Games will haunt the host city, and likely even the entire nation, for decades. Thus, putting an immense amount of pressure on the respective two governments. Nevertheless, despite the fact that both countries have experienced the same kind of international pressure and both being under an authoritarian rule, a number of interesting disparities between the two have been detected. Hence, strongly suggesting that regime type is not the only nor prime factor to determine how a nation is guaranteeing security. In this respect, it further does not represent the main element determining to what extent civil liberties will be infringed upon in the process either. In fact, as it has been demonstrated in the comparison drawn within the three sections above, factors such as a country's history, national identity, cultural components, and specific objectives that have motivated the nation to serve as an Olympic host in the first place, play key roles.

Major differences have been noticed among the two country's course of conduct. Including oppositional roles and messages being conveyed during the securitization process, a sharp distinction in the visible militarization of the host cities, and significant variations concerning the aggressive violations of people's right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance through the implementation of gigantic monitoring systems.

Nevertheless, a number of the processes involved in securitizing international sporting events are; in fact, uniform and consistent. At least among authoritarian nations, that is. The establishment of large-scale restricted zones including the successive infringement of people's mobility rights, and the strategic curbing of people's freedom of assembly to organize protests, represent actions that have been observed from both nations in remarkably similar ways.

Chapter 5. Conclusion

5.1 Significance and Implications of this Study

Considering that the state and the development of civil liberties within China and Russia had been under fire and close scrutiny even long before the hosting of the Olympic Games, many experts have hoped and suggested that the allocation as the Olympic host would provide authoritarian regimes with the motivation and incentive to improve its provision of basic civil liberties. Including, among others, the right to privacy and the freedom of assembly. However, as has been thoroughly demonstrated within the entirety of this thesis, this has not proven to be the case. Ye confirms this with remarkable honesty and directness:

this is exactly what surprised some Westerners. They thought the Beijing Olympics would bring some changes to this East Asian nation, but to their disappointment, it did not. The Games proved not only the existence of the China model, but also its success. (2008)

It is thereby important to note that a great variety of civil liberties are, in fact, granted to the people of China and Russia within the two states' respective constitutions. Yet, many of them solely exist on paper, but not in practice.

Returning to the initially posed research questions of this paper on a) how security has been guaranteed and b) whether the identified actions taken by the governments are reasonable, particularly in the light of possible reductions in civil liberties; this study has adequately demonstrated how the Chinese government has first convinced the relevant audience of an existential threat through, so it appears, particularly for this purpose designed speech acts. Subsequently, extraordinary security mechanisms have been carried out, subcategorized by the author as measures regarding 'technologicalization'; as well as the usage of military personnel, warfare machinery and techniques at times of peace. In the case of the Sochi Olympics, the Russian government authorities have noticeably avoided spreading fear or intensifying security

threats. Quite to the contrary, it was intended to belittle the existing security risks and thus to give the impression of a competent and capable Russian state. Nevertheless, also Russia has used high-tech applications for the purpose of data collection, the dispersal of protests and surveillance; while having further utilized its military might.

What is crucial in understanding why the host nations have acted in their distinct ways; and thus being able to dig deeper into the subject matter, is the realization that both Olympic hosts had their own agenda and motivation for serving as the organizer of the Games. For the Russian government, this was represented by its overarching goal to regain its former great power status on a global stage. A characteristic of utmost importance for Russia and its people, since the status is deeply linked with the national identity of the country, as previously outline in this thesis. Thus, given Russia's targeted goals and the immense pressure of the international community to deliver safe Games (particularly in a post-9/11 security environment), Russia fell back into old patterns of conduct. That is, despite Putin having had previously claimed that the country would represent itself in a new light (The Sydney Morning Herald, 2016). Given its rather deficient record on civil liberties in the past, the Russian government kept – in fact perhaps unsurprisingly – suppressing civil liberties even further in order to ensure security. That is, by; for instance, strategically preventing its people to access their right to freedom of assembly or infringing on people's right to privacy through wiretapping and intensive surveillance. However, it is essential to point out that the amplification of such civil liberty violating measures had only been implemented and operated shortly before and during the 2014 Sochi Olympics. Upon conclusion of the events, the Russian government returned to its approach on civil liberties that it had carried out prior to the Games. That is, an approach that nonetheless violates civil liberties, but to a lesser extent, because the additional measures implemented for the purpose of the Olympics had been revoked. Nonetheless, when expanding one's gaze beyond the sphere of the Olympic Games and

the focus on civil liberties, by applying a broader perspective, the researcher has detected a strong connection between Russia's goals for the Sochi Olympics (including its gained confidence) and the country's hostile actions, just days after the Games, by annexing Crimea.

China's motivation for serving as the organizer of the Games, on the other hand, is comprised of its desire to globally showcase its birth as a new superpower. However, this thesis has found that doing so was not the only intention. China, while already having a rather notorious record on the subject of civil liberties and human rights, also used the Olympic occasion to harshly and systematically crack down on all internal forces that it considered hostile to the government. Rather harmless oppositional groups, such as the Tibetans or the ethnic minority of Uyghurs, and even strictly non-violent entities like the Falun Gong, have repeatedly been brought in connection with attacks and the label of terrorism through an intensively fabricated and manipulated discourse during the securitization process. In that way, the Chinese government has justified the implementation of drastic measures. The latter included arranging the absolute surveillance of all public areas of a 17 million people city – Beijing. Moreover, violence was inflicted and unjust incarcerations into what is officially labelled as 're-education camps' have been made without any proper and legal reasoning behind.

Even more worrisome is the fact that many of these 'security measures' have remained in place, even after the end of the Beijing Olympics. In fact, this thesis has argued and provided evidence that a number of arrangements had been implemented with the intent, and were designed in a way, that they would be able to serve a permanent function. Beijing's massive new surveillance system with an additional 300,000 CCTV cameras; for instance, had been incorporated in the already existing former system right from the very beginning. While it has subsequently continuously seen further expansions even since, with the ultimate goal of eventually covering the entire territory of China by what is called the 'Skynet' initiative. The

nation-wide surveillance system is expected to be operational within a few years of this writing, and represents an enormous addition to what had been started being built under the pretext of the Beijing Olympics. In that sense, China has utilized the Olympic Games as a subterfuge to not only curb its peoples' right to privacy and the right to restrictions on government surveillance temporarily, but permanently. Furthermore, the extreme propaganda and the intentional radicalization of public opinion against the Uyghur minority in the forerun of the Olympics also had long-term consequences. While it initially enabled the government to receive broader public support for its crackdown on the ethnic group, the actions in 2008 merely represented the pre-stage of what one can currently observe happening to the Uyghur population in China, primarily within the Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region. That is, it is estimated that over a million Uyghurs along with other minorities have been imprisoned for the purpose of political indoctrination, while those that are not incarcerated are nevertheless quarantined in a heavily policed area, and are barely allowed to move freely within their own respective hometowns. Specific practices, essential for practitioners of the Islam, are further being prohibited by the government. Thus, depicting a strong form of discrimination against a specific segment of China's population. In fact, measures taken are unmistakably motivated on the basis of ethnicity and religion, and hence do not only represent serious violations against civil liberties, but also against civil rights.

Considering the above, this thesis has shed light on the three stages of the process towards securing the Olympic Games (and to some extent simultaneously the two country's regimes), which ultimately has led to severe infringements on civil liberties before, during, and occasionally even after having hosted the Olympic events. It has additionally been illustrated that the two investigated security measure categories - 'technologicalization' and the 'warfare during

periods of peace' - have not only served the purpose of keeping the Olympic Games safe. Instead, various arrangements have also been carried out, or in fact were directly intended, to crack down on groupings which are in disfavor with the respective governments. For the case of Russia, this primarily involved anti-government protesters, while it certainly included a much broader range of entities for the Chinese government, as shown above. Interestingly, although both investigated cases are under an authoritarian rule and have both endured the same level of pressure from the international community to ensure safe Games, a multitude of differences with regards to their securitizing behavior have been discovered. These include the occupation of totally opposing roles within the securitization process and the messages conveyed to the public and the international audience. Furthermore, China resorted to highly visible urban militarization, while Russia attempted to conceal the military presence by all available means. Lastly, Russia used available high-tech applications for the purpose of surveillance to a rather limited extent and only within small areas of the Olympic locations. Although still having infringed people's right to privacy by intercepting phone call and online communication, it does not compare to the gigantic surveillance operation carried out in China during the Beijing Olympics. Therefore, given these major differences in how both Olympics have been secured, it is clear that the factor of regime type cannot be called the main determinant of a nation's securitizing conduct and with regards to the expected degree to which civil liberties will be infringed during the process. Instead, other factors such as each nation's specific objectives for the Olympics, its national identity, and history are also of paramount importance.

Despite the large disparities elaborated on above, this thesis has also found noteworthy overlaps and uniform ways of behavior among authoritarian regimes. First, a strong tendency towards a strategic interference and prevention of the organization of protests, which have been observed in remarkably similar manners for both cases. That is, by exiling protests from the

Olympic areas, requiring unobtainable permits for the organization of a protest, as well as by threatening and incarcerating individuals who express their willingness to engage in demonstrations. Thus, denying its people the basic civil liberty of the freedom of assembly. Secondly, both hosts heavily engaged in the creation of exhaustive restricted zones, only accessible to individuals fulfilling a set of criteria or, on some occasions, banning civilians altogether. A measure, which, in turn, equals to a significant limitation to people's mobility rights.

Having thoroughly analyzed how security is guaranteed during international sport events with the support of this paper's theoretical framework, the evidence found in the two cases reveal that a large part of those measures; in fact, stand in marked contrast to civil liberties. That is, despite the significant differences detected in terms of the degree of infringements among the two nations, most security arrangements nevertheless severely violate the right of privacy, the right to restrictions on government surveillance, the freedom of assembly, and the freedom of movement. Furthermore, they often do not adhere to the standard practice of presumption of innocence. Quite to the contrary, with CCTV cameras being placed in every corner of Beijing; for instance, one inevitably associates the notion of being guilty until proven innocent. Such practices, especially when they are kept in place after the event, as in the case of the massive and expanding surveillance initiative in China, significantly reduces the quality of life for its citizens. That is, even although the installment of those cameras may substantially reduce the crime rate in return. Particularly in the case of the Beijing Olympics, the security actions taken by the government are not reasonable, since the actual security threat in form of (terrorist) attacks carried out by the Uyghur minority, Tibetans, or the Falun Gong is relatively small, if not completely fabricated by the Chinese government officials. Hence, this research paper advocates for stronger resistance

against civil liberty limiting mechanism, as infringements will otherwise become integrated through the argument of exceptionality, and in the following step by step intensified, until nothing of the former civil liberties remain.

Yet, this study certainly understands the often experienced powerlessness of the people to enforce their will and receive what is officially granted to them on paper within the host nation's constitutions. More advocacy and new strategies are therefore needed on the side of the international community to assist citizens of countries with a deficient civil liberty record to gain access to their freedoms. Yet, certainly, the allocation of a nation to serve as the Olympic host has been found to even further reduce the degree to which civil liberties are being enjoyed, although originally thought of doing the opposite.

Lastly, it shall be said that the researcher of this study undoubtedly agrees that security measures have to be taken in order to protect the people and to prevent disruptions of the sporting event. Most prominently due to existing security threats, such as terrorist attacks. The specific measures taken in Beijing and Sochi were successful in doing so. However, a balance between granting civil liberties and ensuring security has to be achieved. Doing so, does represent a difficult, yet not impossible task. However, what is crucial in this respect is that the exceptionality of the Olympic Games shall not be misused by the host nation's government to pursue their own (often illiberal and hostile) political agenda. That is, by making use of the existing or fabricated threat of terrorism; for example, in order to strengthen state power or enhancing its system to oppress and control its own population. A calculated move, which is only possible, due to the existing power structure and the government's advantageous position within the security processes.

5.2 Research Limitations and Suggestions for Future Studies

Every researcher is also encouraged to admit the limitations to one's study, which undoubtedly also exist in this present thesis. In this context, the author would like to point out that it has been realized that this research endeavor could have easily been turned into a PhD dissertation, given its scope and complexity. Doing so would have allowed to even delve deeper into the subject matter and the respective sub-topics. Furthermore, due to the length restrictions for a master thesis, solely two cases have been investigated. Despite the fact that the researcher is convinced that the case selections made have ensured that this project has delivered great significance, the addition of a democratic or Western Olympic host nation is likely to further inform the findings of this research. Therefore, incorporating such an additional case or involving a greater number of distinguished cases from the very beginning, is suggested for potential future studies. That is, by further building upon the results obtained through this present study with a focus on two authoritarian regimes, and thus now being aware of elements that are allocable to this specific regime type and those that are not. Future researchers; or myself, could then analyze other cases of international sporting events in the same manner, so that a broader comparison could be drawn. Meaning that, not only surrounding the factor of government form, but also concerning the other identified elements such as, national identity, the host nation's prime motivation for hosting the events, and its individual history and culture.

Although having spent significant efforts to engage in an analysis of the two countries' respective media and its portrayal of the security threats, a language barrier was nevertheless in existence. Hence, limited Russian and Chinese language skills have affected the research of this study. However, as the Olympics are events of extraordinary global attention, translations of related reports, press conferences, and press releases to English were plentiful available. In that sense, even though having played a role, the former has not caused a major obstacle to the

conduct of this investigation.

The author additionally noticed that the security measures taken in preparation of the Olympic Games are always open for criticism, particularly with regards to the Games in which no attacks have occurred. Enabling one to label security measures as exaggerated, which might be a more difficult task to do once an attack had actually been successfully launched. Thus, by having chosen two cases in which no major disturbances of the Games have been witnessed, the Beijing and Sochi Olympics may intrinsically have directed the course of this thesis towards being rather critical of the implemented security measures. However, the author has put utmost importance on remaining unbiased and primarily only assessing both nation's performances on their own grounds and in comparison to one another.

Interesting suggestions for further studies, which have emerged throughout the working process of this paper, represent the shift of the Olympic spirit throughout the past decades. The author has realized that the Games and the surrounding discourse have quite noticeably moved from an international event that brings the world closer together, to an indicator of the security status in the world. Therefore, future investigations could examine what overall messages the Olympic Games convey to the public, especially with a focus on the changes following the post-9/11 security environment.

Other elements that may constitute insightful studies could partly draw from aspects that have already been generated in this thesis. That is, examining the changes that have occurred in respect to civil liberties in the aftermath of the Olympics, instead of during the event itself. As a result, focusing on restrictions to the freedom of assembly or the implementation of a massive surveillance system and its subsequent expansions. Lastly, there is a dire need to re-conceptualize the security measures used for international sporting events, in order to ensure that a more appropriate balance between security and freedom can be achieved in the future. In that way also

putting a halt to the ever-increasing and truly staggering security budget spent by Olympic hosts, which is out of proportion to say the least.



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