

Field of Dreams: An Overview of the Practice and Study of Taiwan's Foreign Policy*

WEI-CHIN LEE

Taiwan has used its stable democratic transition and consolidation as a basis upon which to build international support for its legitimate sovereign existence. In addition, Taipei has also transformed its economic power into diplomatic tools, such as foreign aid and investment policies, in an attempt to consolidate its relations with allies and friends. Moreover, in order to strengthen the island's security, Taiwan's foreign policy has concentrated on the island's relations with the United States as the main means to deter China's military threat. This survey will focus on issues related to three primary areas of Taiwan's foreign policy endeavors—democracy, economics, and security—and explore the strengths and weaknesses of scholarly research in each issue area.

KEYWORDS: foreign policy; cross-Straits relations; democracy; security; Taiwan-U.S. relations.

WEI-CHIN LEE (李偉欽) is Professor of Political Science at Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, North Carolina. His recent research interests include national security, identity politics, and Taiwan's foreign policy. He can be reached at <leewe@wfu.edu>.

*The author would like to thank three anonymous reviewers for their valuable comments and suggestions. The opinions and errors found in this study are, of course, completely the author's responsibility.

©Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan (ROC).

* * *



"What country, friends, is this?"—a question posed in Shakespeare's *Twelfth Night*—appears to be appropriate in addressing Taiwan's awkward status in the international community. A quick glimpse at Taiwan's international relations will lead anyone to a paradoxical impression of this island. The Republic of China (ROC) on Taiwan maintains full diplomatic relations with twenty-seven countries as of 2003, none of which, however, are heavyweight players in world politics. Taiwan maintains ninety representative offices in fifty-eight countries, but sometimes these offices have difficulty even in displaying the official ROC title as they carry out their diplomatic functions. Among the numerous intergovernmental organizations (IGOs), as of 2004 Taiwan is only a regular member of eighteen and an observer in but ten others.¹ Taiwan has pushed its campaign for U.N. membership steadily since 1993, but has achieved little except both to conjure a sense of sadness among the Taiwanese people and to fuel a media expose of international injustice and unfairness. While perhaps sympathetic to Taiwan's cause and demands, U.N. members are primarily concerned with potential backlash from China over any Taiwan-friendly policies. The desire of these countries to protect and expand their business interests in China, when coupled with Beijing's increasingly powerful role in world politics, overshadows their relations with Taiwan.

Diplomatic setbacks have not, however, deterred Taiwan from strengthening its economic performance. Taiwan stood as the world's 14th largest exporter and 16th largest importer in 2001.² Take the crown jewel of Taiwan's industrial powerhouse—the information technology (IT) industry—as an example. In 2001, in laptop computers alone, Taiwanese companies had captured 54 percent of the world market. All major brand laptops (with the exception of Toshiba) are made by Taiwan's contract

¹Government Information Office (GIO), *Taiwan Yearbook 2003* (Taipei: GIO, 2004), <http://www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/chpt08.htm#3> (accessed June 28, 2004).

²*Ibid.*

manufacturers who design and manufacture hardware but leave marketing to companies with well-known brand names.³ Overall, Taiwan's output of IT hardware ranks third in the world, behind the United States and Japan.⁴ Meanwhile, that Taiwan usually ranks third (after Japan and China) in foreign currency exchange reserves holdings is a testimony to the island's economic achievements. Another example of Taiwan's economic resilience is its trading relationship with the European Union. Ash's careful review of economic relations between Taiwan and Europe showed that, despite the size difference between Taiwan and China and notwithstanding China's dramatic trade expansion since the mid-1980s, Taiwan's two-way trade with EU-15 in 1999 equaled an astonishing 60 percent of that of the PRC.⁵ These dynamic economic relations with various regions of the world have thus constituted a substitute to bilateral diplomatic relations. The benefits, privileges, and guarantees awarded to states in normal international relations have usually been truncated, however—even in the case of Taiwan-EU relations, as has been demonstrated in Mengin's study.⁶ Bilateral economic closeness does not automatically translate into upgraded diplomatic relations.

The paradox is clear: despite having a vibrant economy and lively democratic nature, Taiwan is belittled in international political transactions. Accordingly, the key goal for Taiwan's foreign policy is to achieve "normalcy" in the international community. Such efforts inevitably meet with China's suppression (打壓, *daya*)—which has become a standard explanation for Taiwan's policy failures.

³*The Economist*, July 13, 2002, 58. In 2000, Taiwan's IT industry accounted for a substantial portion of the world market share, including notebook computers (49 percent), computer mice (58 percent), image scanners (91 percent), keyboards (68 percent), monitors (58 percent), and motherboards (64 percent).

⁴Kelly Her, "Technical Knockouts," *Taipei Review*, February 2001, 20. China is quickly catching up in high-tech production, too. See also *Nikkei Weekly* (Japan), August 26, 2002, 20.

⁵Robert Ash, "Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe," *The China Quarterly*, no. 169 (March 2002): 178-79.

⁶Francoise Mengin, "A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties," *ibid.*, 136-53.

A quantitative comparison of tangible resources available to the People's Republic of China (PRC) and Taiwan—whether by such measures as territory, population, economic strength, or military forces—easily reveals Taiwan's inferiority to China.⁷ As an island only 0.375 percent of China's size and with 1.9 percent of China's population, Taiwan is like David facing Goliath. The Taiwan Strait, which separates China and Taiwan by about one hundred miles, offers some protection from the PRC military threat. Indeed, power projection necessarily suffers from the effect of the loss of strength gradient, as Kenneth Boulding has explained.⁸ Still, such a quantitative superiority does convey a not-so-optimistic picture of Taiwan's security situation. As a perceived weak state facing China's economic and security challenges, Taiwan must depend on careful strategic planning and shrewd policy design in order to ensure its survival. Indeed, Taiwan has managed to do so despite such events as U.S. abandonment during the critical historical juncture of 1949-50; Richard Nixon's 1971 decision to seek an alliance with China, which culminated in formal normalization under Jimmy Carter almost ten years later; and a series of crises, turbulences, and shifting tides since 1979.⁹ Simply put, Taiwan's

⁷For such an in-depth comparison, see Larry M. Wortzel, "U.S.-Chinese Military Relations in the 21st Century," in *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M. Wortzel (Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War College, 1999), 220.

⁸Kenneth Boulding, *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory* (New York: Harper & Row, 1963), 231.

⁹These events have been covered by both scholars and policy practitioners. Examples include Robert G. Sutter, *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1983); Martin L. Lasater, *Policy in Evolution: The U.S. Role in China's Reunification* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press, 1989); David M. Finkelstein, *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950* (Fairfax, Va.: George Mason, 1993); Thomas J. Christensen, *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996); John H. Holdridge, *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1997); Patrick Tyler, *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China* (New York: Public Affairs, 1999); James Mann, *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relations with China, from Nixon to Clinton* (New York: Vintage Books, 2000); Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2001); Robert L. Suettinger, *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 2003); and Richard C. Bush, *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942* (Ammonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2004). As for Chinese

will to survive is fueled by the fear of succumbing to China's rule. Taiwan's economic prosperity has not completely soothed public anxiety over both the potential security threat from China and international isolation.

With the paramount goals of achieving real security and prosperity, Taiwan has adopted an omni-directional approach in its foreign policy. Therefore, any attempt to survey Taiwan's foreign policy immediately faces problems of blurry analytical boundaries. The general field of foreign policy, moreover, straddles both domestic and international politics, which makes it difficult to distinguish the component parts of the field and differentiate its research agenda from other research arenas.¹⁰ In this particular case, Taiwan's unique security environment means that a topic usually categorized clearly within the confines of military defense in other countries may be viewed as a foreign policy issue in Taiwan because of the island's desperate need for defense assistance from abroad. Also, because of the fast pace of both Taiwan's domestic political changes and external interactions with China and the United States, one is forced to reevaluate the state of Taiwan's foreign policy on a frequent basis.

Scholarship on Taiwan's international relations is also increasingly rich in theoretical perspectives and empirical sophistication, as exemplified by the infusion and diffusion of new approaches.¹¹ No doubt, Taiwan's

analysis of Sino-U.S. relations, please see a special issue edited by Jun Niu in *Social Sciences in China* (Beijing) 25, no. 2 (Summer 2004): 95-173.

¹⁰Walter Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," in *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons (Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage, 2002), 334-35.

¹¹Examples of the discussion and application of new approaches in Taiwan's scholarly community are I Yuan, "Duiyu Alexander Wendt youguan guojia shenfen yu liyi fenxi zhi pipan: yi guoji fang kuosan jianzhi weili" (A critique of Alexander Wendt's analysis of identities and interests of states: the case of international non-proliferation regimes), *Meiou jikan* (America and Europe Quarterly) 15, no. 2 (Summer 2001): 265-91 (Yuan's article is one of the articles on constructivism in this special issue of *Meiou jikan*); Yeh Dingguo, "Wenhua, rentong, yu guojia anquan" (Culture, identity, and national security), *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* (Prospect Quarterly) 5, no. 1 (January 2004): 125-56; Chen Hsin-chih, "Guoji anquan yanjiu zhi lilun bianqian yu tiaozhan" (Evolution of the security studies and its challenges), *ibid.* 4, no. 3 (July 2003): 1-40; and Chen Hongming, "Xianshi zhuyi dianfan de jinbu huo tuihua: yi Vasquez cai Lakatos kexue yanjiu gangling de lunzhan wei jiaodian" (The progression or degeneration of the realist paradigm: a focus on the debate on Vasquez's adoption of Lakatos' scientific research principles), *Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao* (Soochow Journal of Political Science), no. 17 (September 2003): 53-91.

diplomatic experience and predicament offer an excellent opportunity both to examine various theoretical paradigms found within the field of international relations and to test the application and limits of each theoretical approach. However, much of the research—probably due to constraints on the availability of data and empirical evidence—usually adopts a qualitative rather than a quantitative approach. Works of a historical nature have tended to offer a path-dependence approach to examining why and how Taiwan has come to its current situation and where the future of the island lies. Because the United States is indisputably the country most important to Taiwan's security, Taiwan-U.S. relations appear to have attracted overwhelming attention in scholarly research. Finally, any discussion of Taiwan's foreign policy cannot escape the incorporation of the ups and downs of cross-Straits relations, which inevitably influence the effectiveness of Taiwan's policy practice (whether directly or indirectly). In other words, the intensity of Taiwan's foreign policy challenge is very much conditioned by the nature of the island's relations with China.

Several variables deserve consideration prior to our evaluation of various topic areas related to Taiwan's foreign policy. First, the international system has been rocked by the end of the Cold War, the demise of both communist ideology and socialist regimes, the opening up of the PRC, and the U.S.-led war on terrorism that was launched after the events of September 11, 2001. Though the end of the Cold War placed the United States in a hegemonic position, the 9-11 attacks illustrated its Achilles' heel. The PRC has accelerated its integration into the world economy, yet continues to rely on nationalism to sustain political stability. The twists and turns of international politics dictate and constrain Taipei's policy imagination and implementation. This leads to another consideration. Volatile domestic politics in the United States, PRC, and Taiwan all mutually affect agenda setting and policy within this triangular relationship. This dynamic raises the level of uncertainty, risk, and unpredictability in both policymaking and implementation. Finally, the beliefs, convictions, and idiosyncratic personalities of political leaders are crucial to the strategies of each country's policy. New leaders arrive with a fresh vision and policies to replace or adjust previous ones, as recent studies on the

Bush administration and the Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) regime by Bruce J. Dickson, Robert G. Sutter, and Ralph A. Cossa demonstrate.¹² China's policymaking might not be seriously influenced by popular sentiments, but leaders in the United States and Taiwan must be sensitive to the swing of public opinion in order to ensure that policies are effective and resulting popular satisfaction can then lead to electoral gains. As a fledging democracy with a widespread populist approach to election campaigning, the growing pains that the island has experienced during its democratic transition and consolidation—including the demand for Taiwan's independent sovereignty—have made Taiwanese politics livelier and, at the same time, less predictable.

With the above considerations in mind, there are numerous issues for comparison and contrast in foreign policy studies.¹³ However, individual preference, cognitive restraints, and time considerations preclude a perfect and comprehensive approach to cover every aspect and issue of Taiwan's foreign policy. A painful, but necessary, decision has to be made in order to offer a decent survey of the field within the space limits provided. This survey will therefore concentrate on three primary areas of Taiwan's foreign policy endeavors—democracy, economics, and security. These three topics are the focus of the first three sections of this paper, respectively. A final section offers suggestions for the direction of future research on Taiwan's foreign policy.

Finally, one must be aware that scholarly publications cited in the notes or mentioned in the text are only a small sample of the enormous collection of excellent works that comprise the field. Anyone who follows the field closely can testify to the impossibility of incorporating all of

¹²Ralph A. Cossa, "The Bush Administration's 'Alliance-Based' East Asia Policy," *Asia-Pacific Review* 8, no. 2 (November 2001): 66-80; Bruce J. Dickson, "New Presidents Adjust Old Policies: U.S.-Taiwan Relations under Chen and Bush," *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 33 (2002): 645-56; and Robert G. Sutter, "Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei," *ibid.* 12, no. 36 (August 2003): 477-92.

¹³For a general introduction to foreign policy studies, see Mohammed Yunus, *Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003); and Carlsnaes, "Foreign Policy," 331-49.

such research in any one survey. As such, my wish is that this piece will serve as an entry point to readers for their own further investigation.

Democracy: Universal Values vs. Realist Concerns

With a top-down push by elite bargaining combined with bottom-up pressure from a nascent civil society that began in the late 1980s, Taiwan has experienced a steady and stable democratic transition. This laudable transition has led to a belief, held widely among both the elite and the public, in the omnipotence of democracy and the ability of this form of government to ensure Taiwan's survival.¹⁴ This line of logic indeed fits well with the recently propagated democratic peace theory, which holds that democratic states tend to avoid entering into military conflicts with each other due to both institutional constraints and a democratic ethos that is deeply embedded in society. Numerous empirical analyses of historical cases have been presented to support the validity of the democratic peace theory.¹⁵ Taiwan's rush to endorse democratic peace serves multiple purposes: enhancing Taiwan's legitimacy in terms of self-determination, self-rule, and independence as based on the (actual or potential) collective choices made by the people. The focus on this liberal ideal preempts an "undemocratic" China from assuming any right over a democratic Taiwan and precludes the dire possibility of the "Hongkongization" of Taiwan. By invoking the international yearning for continuous democratization,

¹⁴Ramon H. Myers, "How the Republic of China's Democracy Can Ensure Its Survival," in *The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined*, ed. Chien-min Chao and Cal Clark (Baltimore, Md.: School of Law, University of Maryland, 1999), *Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, no. 5 (1999) (no. 154): 13-29.

¹⁵Exemplary studies on this subject include Michael W. Doyle, "Liberalism and World Politics," *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4 (1986): 1151-69; Christopher Layne, "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace," *International Security* 19, no. 2 (1994): 5-49; and William J. Dixon, "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict," *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1 (1994): 14-32.

democracy becomes "an essential ingredient of Taiwan's national security" as concluded by Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu.¹⁶ Such a conviction in democratic values is further stressed by the proposition that democracies simply fight wars more effectively than do other kinds of states. Once democratic states pass through domestic institutional mechanisms to enter into international commitments either to fight a war or to form "bonds of friendship" in war, the same institutional constraints make reversing these commitments extremely difficult. In contrast to the cases of non-democracies, the transparency and accountability embedded in democratic systems reduce levels of uncertainty in wartime cooperation. Better communication and greater accessibility within the democratic coalition facilitate the coalition's ability to monitor its members and reduce incentives to free ride, as democratic triumphalists would argue.¹⁷

The stress on the universality of democratic values not only directs Taiwan's foreign policy but also is apparent in the related scholarly research. Lang Kao, Chen Jie, Samuel Ku, Michael Leifer, T.Y. Wang, and Michael Yahuda's studies of "pragmatic," "flexible," and "vacation" diplomacy describe and analyze Taiwan's policy "as it is/was."¹⁸ Moreover, a proliferation of research on low politics issues and diplomatic break-

¹⁶Hung-mao Tien and Yun-han Chu, "Building Democracy in Taiwan," in *Contemporary Taiwan*, ed. David Shambaugh (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998), 126.

¹⁷Some representative works exploring the democratic triumph thesis are David A. Lake, "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War," *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (March 1992): 24-37; Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, III, "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory," *ibid.* 92, no. 2 (June 1998): 377-89; and Dan Reiter and Allan C. Stam, *Democracies at War* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).

¹⁸See, for instance: Lang Kao, *Zhonghua minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian (1972-1992)* (The development and change of the Republic of China's foreign relations, 1972-1992) (Taipei: Wunan, 1994); Chen Jie, *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia* (Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar, 2002); Samuel C.Y. Ku, "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Malaysia: Opportunities and Challenges," *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35, no. 1 (2000): 133-57; Michael Leifer, "Taiwan and Southeast Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy," in *Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View*, ed. Richard Louis Edmonds and Steven M. Goldstein (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 173-85; T.Y. Wang, "Taiwan's Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui's Rule, 1988-2000," in *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*, ed. Wei-chin Lee and T.Y. Wang (Lanham, Md.: University Press of America, 2003), 245-75; and Michael Yahuda, "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan," in Shambaugh, *Contemporary Taiwan*, 275-95.

throughs via non-governmental organizations (NGOs) by many scholars has been added to the body of literature, showing a tint of normative justification for Taiwan's democracy "as it ought to be" in international society.¹⁹ The stress on normative concerns in research platforms illuminates both Taiwan's democratic progress and Taiwan's appeals to the global community that the island is one of the world's "good states" and thus deserves to play a role in international governance. The shift to NGOs and human rights regimes in Taiwan's external relations is a continuation and expansion of Lee Teng-hui's (李登輝) foreign policy objective to show the world that Taiwan—rather than being a "troublemaker"—wishes to sincerely and actively participate in the international order. This "troublemaker" image and Taiwan's saber-rattling diplomatic style, in combination with George W. Bush's "whatever it took" remarks made in 2001, might cause alarmist fears of a "Taiwan threat"—i.e., that the ROC is deliberately attempting to bring the United States into a conflict with China; Andrew D. Marble's edited special issue of *Issues & Studies* evaluated the validity of such a proposition from different dimensions.²⁰

The search for a diplomatic breakthrough via NGOs and human rights regimes is actually an attempt to construct international discourse and cultivate a favorable environment toward Taiwan. Similar to the piling up of building blocks, the accumulation of small changes should hopefully lead to an eventual shift in the epistemic understanding of actors in the international community, just as John Ruggie's "dynamic density," Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink's "transnational advocacy networks," and Alexander Wendt's "social construct" all emphasize the significance of shared values and seek to reframe a common discourse.²¹ When regular,

¹⁹See, for instance, Longzhi Chen, "Haiwai Taiwanren tuidong Taiwan jiaru Lianheguo de huigu yu zhanwang, 1950-1991" (Retrospect of, and prospects for, overseas Taiwanese pushing forward Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, 1950-1991), *Xinshiji zhiku luntan* (New Century Foundation Forum), no. 25 (March 2004): 88-90.

²⁰The special issue on the "Taiwan threat" appeared as *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March 2002). For an introduction, see Andrew D. Marble, "Introduction: The 'Taiwan Threat' Hypothesis," *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March 2002): 1-16.

²¹John G. Ruggie, "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis," *World Politics* 35, no. 2 (January 1983): 261-85; John G. Ruggie, *Constructing*

official channels between Taiwan and other governments are blocked, alternative transnational routes are created to overcome the rigidity of the state system and appeal for international allies based on the common tie of democratic values. Topics for investigation in this area include NGOs, global civil society, and human rights diplomacy, which have been the focus of work by Zhizheng Luo, Xuewen Song, Sujen Mao and Kunling Wu, and others.²² Joseph Wong phrased the issue concisely when he wrote that "Taiwan's connectedness with increasingly dense transnational networks has promoted both 'normative transmission' outwards and the politics of 'emulation' inwards."²³

Indeed, as a small, dependent, and vulnerable state, Taiwan has both attempted to boost its meta-power by shaping the global discourse and sought to acquire "normal" status in the international community. Here, we encounter the classic competition between theoretical paradigms in academic pursuits. Has traditional realism, with its emphasis on brute force, lost its applicability to current international politics? Has the new paradigm emphasizing transnationalism and a global civil society replaced the power struggle and the usual assumption of anarchy/conflict in international politics? The stress on democratic values in Taiwan's foreign policy is undoubtedly crucial to Taiwan's image as a peace-loving state. As Friedman and McCormick's edited volume aptly elaborated, if China does not democratize, what would be the possible solutions to the Taiwan

the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization (London: Routledge, 1998); Margaret E. Keck and Kathryn Sikkink, *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1998); Alexander Wendt, "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics," *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring 1992): 391-426; and Alexander Wendt, "Constructing International Politics," *International Security* 20 (Summer 1995): 71-81.

²²Zhizheng Luo, "Quanmin waijiao yu guoji canyu" (People's diplomacy and international participation), in *Waijiao zhanlüe* (Diplomatic strategy), ed. Zhengfeng Shi (Taipei: Guojia zhanwang wenjiao jijinhui, Taiwan xinhui, 2004), 57-86; Xuewen Song, "Renquan yu waijiao" (Human rights and diplomacy), *ibid.*, 87-109; and Sujen Mao and Kunling Wu, "Taiwan feizhengfu zuzhi yu zhengfu waijiao shi wu de jiaose yu gongneng" (The roles and functions of Taiwanese NGOs in governmental diplomatic affairs), *Guojia zhengce jikan* (National Policy Quarterly) 3, no. 1 (March 2004): 175-200.

²³Joseph Wong, "Deepening Democracy in Taiwan," *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 2 (Summer 2003): 254.

issue?²⁴ If China embarks on its own version of democratic transition, will playing the democracy card lose its magic power? Mansfield and Snyder have demonstrated quite convincingly that, although the democratic peace theory might hold true, during transitions toward democracy previously authoritarian states tend to become belligerent as a means both to maintain regime stability and to secure elite interests through a combination of mass politics and rising nationalism.²⁵ Therefore, as Vincent Wang has pointed out, "building Taiwan's security entirely upon the underpinnings of the democratic peace theory ... is untenable."²⁶ Will the over-emphasis on regime type under the democratic peace theory not only encounter the single-variable fallacy, but also prematurely block further pursuit of other potential possibilities in a Taiwan-China dyad, which is full of case-specific situational variables and path-dependent factors?²⁷ Furthermore, with the emerging claim of the rise of a peaceful China, is peace without a democratic China possible? In this case, are democracy and peace intrinsically and inevitably correlated in logical deduction as well as in empirical fact in the exploration of Taiwan's foreign policy? The Athenian's comment in the "Melian Dialogue" during the Peloponnesian War that "right, as the world goes, is only in question between equals in power, while the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must" still resonates loudly in the international community and has countless believers in foreign policy practice.²⁸

²⁴Edward Friedman and Barrett L. McCormick, eds., *What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace* (Ammonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2000).

²⁵Edward D. Mansfield and Jack Snyder, "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June 1995): 79-97.

²⁶Vincent Wang, "Does Democratization Enhance or Reduce Taiwan's Security? A Democratic-Peace Inquiry," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 23, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 15.

²⁷For debates on democratic peace theory, see Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller, *Debating the Democratic Peace* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996). An example of the application of this theory in Taiwan's situation is Yuan-kang Wang, "Taiwan's Democratization and Cross-Strait Security," *Orbis* 48, no. 2 (Spring 2004): 293-304.

²⁸Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley (New York: The Modern Library, 1934), Book V, Chapter XVII, 331. Translation may vary. Also see Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Benjamin Jowett (New York: Bantam Books, 1960), 342.

Economic Extension: Purchasing Power

Money does matter in Taiwan's foreign policy initiatives, as seen in the island's foreign aid programs to diplomatic allies, economic investments in Southeast Asia and Central America, and grants and contributions to regional and multilateral organizations as enumerated in studies by both Chien-min Chao and this author.²⁹ Aid, investments, and contributions are employed to facilitate Taiwan's diplomatic needs. If diplomatic recognition and official representation are unavailable, then substituting trade representatives and material incentives may carry economic interdependence across borders as established in John Herz's work on "territorial states."³⁰ The attempt to circumvent political barriers by adopting a pragmatic policy based on economic forces is addressed with mixed results in many of the existing scholarly assessments. On the one hand, dollar diplomacy did convince cash-strapped states to support Taiwan's diplomatic claims. On the other hand, this policy strategy also prompted criticism for coming at the expense of domestic needs. Moreover, critics also cast doubt on the effectiveness of economic-oriented pragmatic policy. By taking advantage of the bidding war between China and Taiwan, recipients of Taiwan's aid and investment occasionally demanded further offerings from both.

Taiwan's marathon effort to gain membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) has given rise to research by Huiwan Zhuo and Greg Mastel, among others.³¹ WTO membership manifests several diplomatic purposes: it is a demonstration of Taiwan's desperately needed "connection

²⁹Chien-min Chao, "The Republic of China's Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui: A Balance Sheet," in *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics*, ed. Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao (Amonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe, 2002), 177-203; and Weichin Lee, "Taiwan's Foreign Aid Policy," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 20, no. 1 (Spring 1993): 43-62.

³⁰John H. Herz, "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State," *World Politics* 9, no. 4 (July 1957): 473-93.

³¹Huiwan Zhuo, "WTO gongtong huiji yu liang'an zhenghe zhi tantao" (A study on the China-Taiwan WTO co-membership and integration), *Quanqiu zhengzhi pinglun* (Review of Global Politics), no. 5 (January 2004): 33-58; and Greg Mastel, "China, Taiwan, and the World Trade Organization," *The Washington Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (Summer 2001): 45-56.

with the international community" (國際接軌, *guoji jiegui*), a willingness to participate in international organizations as a non-state actor, a recognition of economic mandates in diplomacy, and an attempt to bring cross-Strait economic interactions under international scrutiny. After bilateral, direct bargaining and negotiation appeared to be futile, Taiwan seized the opportunity provided by multilateralism to pave the way for future communication. Such exploration also provides Taiwan, as well as China, with venues to, and lessons in, integration as two equally independent sovereign entities (i.e., the opportunity to follow in the footsteps of European integration). Even so, as Zhuo has demonstrated, the political motives and strategic moves of both Taiwan and China have prevented the WTO forum from serving as a lubricant for smooth cross-Strait trade interaction or as a beneficial mechanism to narrow the political divide across the Strait.³² Even so, this optimistic viewpoint of employing the WTO trade forum as a means to bridge the political gap across the Strait has at times been found to be of use by politicians. Some political elite view this mechanism as a way to pressure China to entertain the concepts of pooled sovereignty and spill-over effect between low and high politics issues, and thus resolve cross-Strait disputes and Taiwan's international status.

Prime examples of using integration analysis for the resolution of cross-Strait sovereign disputes are David W.F. Huang's consecutive studies of the integration process of the EU and Chen-yuan Tung's exploration of the impact of cross-Strait interactions on Taiwan's foreign policy design.³³ Taiwan's active effort to merge itself with the world economy helps the island grab global market shares. At the same time, Taiwan can also thus

³²Zhuo, "WTO gongtong huiji yu liang'an zhenghe zhi tantao," 55-56.

³³David W.F. Huang, "Oumeng zhengzhi yanjiu zhong lilun fangfa zhi fenlei yu bijiao" (Classifying and comparing theories and approaches to the politics of the European Union), *Renwen ji shehui kexue jikan* (Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy) 15, no. 4 (December 2003): 539-94; David W.F. Huang, "Oumeng zhenghe moshi yu liang'an zhuquan zhengyi zhi jixi" (European integration models and cross-Strait sovereignty disputes), *Oumei yanjiu* (EurAmerica: A Journal of European and American Studies) 31, no. 1 (March 2001): 129-73; and Chen-yuan Tung, "Liang'anjingji zhenghe yu Taiwan de guojia anquan gulu" (Cross-Strait economic integration and Taiwan's national security concerns), *Yuanjing jijinhuai jikan* 4, no. 3 (July 2003): 41-58.

use its deepening economic ties with the international economy as diplomatic leverage to gain assurance that the world would not sit idly by if any action by the People's Liberation Army (PLA) hurt Taiwan's economy and thus world economic fortunes. From the standpoint of neoliberalism, with its emphasis on peace, prosperity, and progress, Taiwan's advocacy of commercial ties as an alternative to conflict resolution surely is leading to considerable diplomatic rewards.

Still, the extant literature has consistently pointed out the many complexities of the intertwining relationship between economics and politics in Taiwan's foreign policy. Taiwan's commercial purchases of Boeing or Airbus, for example, must be examined in terms of both economic calculations and diplomatic maneuvering. Optimism derived from the logic of neoliberalism or integration studies must therefore be qualified, an argument that has been articulated in Gowa and Mansfield's insights on "security externalities." The gains in efficiency as a result of international commerce and trade permit states mutually hostile toward each other to release and reallocate more resources for defense than would otherwise be possible. Gowa and Mansfield conclude the result to be that "trade enhances the potential military power of any country that engages in it."³⁴ This is less of a concern when trading with an ally, but is important when conducting economic transactions with a potential adversary or "enemy," as China is often alluded to by the officials in Taiwan.

Thus, the concern over "relative gains" that an adversary acquires through trade can lead a country to entertain the possibility of reducing, restricting, or even terminating economic transactions with that adversary. Taiwan tries to avoid having a great percentage of its exports go to the China market, a condition that may enhance China's power.³⁵ This hidden concern was expressed in the discussion of the "go slow, be patient" (戒急

³⁴Joanne Gowa and Edward D. Mansfield, "Power Politics and International Trade," *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (June 1993): 408.

³⁵In the general literature, Walter Russell Mead has recently pointed out the stickiness of economic interdependence. See Walter Russell Mead, "America's Sticky Power," *Foreign Policy*, no. 141 (March-April 2004): 46-53.

用忍) policy adopted by Taiwan during the Lee Teng-hui era and the current "active opening, effective management" (積極開放,有效管理) policy adopted by the new ruling party to deal with cross-Straits economic transactions. Simply stated, Taiwan can be a "defensive positionalist," playing it safe for the purpose of guaranteeing its own existence, particularly when increasing asymmetry in cross-Straits trade dependence heightens anxiety and insecurity on the island.

Such anxiety is also reflected in electoral politics. If asymmetry in trade translates into an important voting issue in a democratic society, then how should the Taiwanese government respond? For example, if more and more labor-intensive jobs in Taiwan are relocated to mainland China, will this shift create an electoral imbalance in Taiwan as a result of high unemployment rates in the island's labor-intensive sectors? After all, labor-intensive industries form a crucial voting bloc that most of Taiwan's political elites wish to capture. At the same time, Taiwanese capital-driven investors and corporations have frequently demanded direct cross-Straits links and are inclined to support a more open policy toward cross-Straits economic ties. As Rogowski and Hiscox have separately shown, factor mobility (land, labor, and capital) in trade politics does play a significant role in the formation of political coalitions and does shape policy outcomes.³⁶ This "fatal attraction vs. cautious courtship" phenomenon with regard to cross-Straits economic transactions has been a perennial issue in Taiwan's mainland and foreign policy conduct. Here, we can witness the operation of Putnam's two-level game in Taiwan's foreign policy, as was carried out in Teh-chang Lin's observation of Taiwan's "southward" (南向) policy from a domestic perspective.³⁷ Domestic politicking assumes

³⁶Ronald Rogowski, *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1990); and Michael J. Hiscox, *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2002).

³⁷Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-level Games," *International Organization* 42, no. 3 (1988): 427-60; Teh-chang Lin, "Taiwan's Investment Policy in Mainland China: A Domestic Perspective," *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 3, no. 2 (Fall 1997): 25-45; and Teh-chang Lin, "State versus Market: Taiwan's Trade, Investment, and Aid Politics in Mainland China and Southeast Asia in the Post-Deng Period,"

a key role in foreign policymaking and practice; as Moravcsik argues, "The state is not an actor but a representative institution constantly subject to capture and recapture, construction and reconstruction by coalitions of social actors."³⁸ Taiwan's foreign policy is closely tied to the ups and downs of cross-Strait relations.

A final note is in order. China's seemingly unstoppable market growth and the resulting magnetic pull on foreign investment now stands in sharp contrast to Taiwan's relative decline in economic competitiveness. Taiwan may thus increasingly find playing its "trade" card to be less effective of a foreign policy strategy. It will be increasingly difficult to convince the world of the island's "economic worth" as an incentive to encourage others to help Taiwan deal with the threat from China.

Dependent Security: "Stand by Me, Please!"

If economic coercion fails, China can always rely on aggressive political and military strategies to accomplish unification. Most security assessments have pointed out that Taiwan lacks the sufficient capabilities to expel Chinese invaders in any protracted war, and would therefore require either direct or indirect military assistance from such third parties as Japan and/or the United States.³⁹ One primary goal of Taiwan's foreign policy has thus been to boost the island's security by firming up bilateral relations with those third parties. For example, Philip Yang has shown the importance of the Taiwan issue in Japan's security considerations since the 1990s, arguing that this prominence is a result of both geographical proximity and the

ibid. 5, no. 2 (Fall 1999): 83-113. See also Antonio C. Hsiang, "Taiwan dui Lading Meizhou waijiao guanxi zhi huigu yu zhanwang" (Retrospect of, and prospects for, Taiwan's relations with Latin America), *Quanqiu zhengzhi pinglun*, no. 5 (January 2004): 17-31.

³⁸Andrew Moravcsik, "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics," in *Theory and Structure in International Political Economy*, ed. Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1999), 38.

³⁹Michael D. Swaine, *Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Process* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 1999), 31.

requirements of the U.S.-Japan security treaty. Taiwan has attempted to establish its security ties with Japan by jointly participating in a proposed regional missile defense system.⁴⁰ Even so, as Satoshi Amako has stated, Japan has tended to focus on the widening of its private-sector pipeline with Taiwan, instead of on upgrading Taiwan-Japan diplomatic relations.⁴¹ Qingxin Wang as well as Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon also assert that Taiwan should not place too much hope on Japanese military assistance in the event of a Taiwan-China conflict because of Japan's lack of both commitment and offensive capabilities.⁴² According to David C. Kang, most Asian countries have chosen a bandwagoning strategy to deal with the rise of China.⁴³ Thus, Japan has been reluctant to become actively involved in the Taiwan issue. If push ever comes to shove, Taiwan's savior would unquestionably be the United States, who provides security assistance via both arms supplies and coordinated defense.⁴⁴

The United States has been the primary supplier of Taiwan's weapons systems since 1949. U.S. arms transfers tend to be determined by a variety of external and internal factors: competition between interest groups and agencies domestically, conciliation between commercial profits and political considerations, and the regional and global balance of power. Arms transfers also involve "burden sharing" between recipients and suppliers, with both a division of labor within alliances as well as cooperation in armaments R&D. In terms of the Taiwan case, works by John P. McClaran

⁴⁰Philip Y.M. Yang, "Ribei zai Mei-Tai anquan guanxi zhong suo banyan de jiaose" (The role played by Japan in U.S.-Taiwan security relations), in *Zhong-Mei guanxi zhuanli yanjiu: 2001-2003, xueshu yantaohui* (Topic studies on Sino-U.S. relations, 2001-2003, academic seminars) (Taipei: Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica, 2003).

⁴¹Satoshi Amako, "Japan and Taiwan: A Neglected Friendship," *Japan Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (Spring 2001): 36-51.

⁴²Qingxin Ken Wang, "Japan's Balancing Act in the Taiwan Strait," *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 3 (September 2000): 337-42; and Michael D. Swaine and James C. Mulvenon, *Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants* (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand, 2001), 142-47.

⁴³David C. Kang, "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks," *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring 2003): 57-85.

⁴⁴Hsing-chou Song, "The Breakthrough in Cross-Strait Relations: From Risk to Trust, and toward Reconciliation," *Quanqiu zhengzhi pinglun*, no. 6 (April 2004): 65.

and this author have shown that the U.S. goal is to ensure Taiwan's self-defense capability without seriously disturbing the delicate cross-Strait balance.⁴⁵ What has driven Taiwan's foreign policy has been the constant forging of an imagined security alliance through arms transfer deals. The Theater Missile Defense (TMD) plan is a good example. There are widespread concerns about TMD's extremely huge price tag and drain on budgetary resource allocation. Many also have serious doubts about the shield's technological effectiveness and reliability. These concerns and doubts might, however, eventually have to succumb to the consideration of creating an impression of a U.S.-Taiwan military alliance.⁴⁶

Even so, there is no doubt that the relationship between the supplier and the recipient has been asymmetrical. What Taiwan demands is not necessarily what it will receive. The United States reserves the right to have the final say in what equipment and technologies to sell and what to deliver. Common characteristics of asymmetry and conditionality in the international political economy are vividly demonstrated by Taiwan's arms deals with the United States. Such a mode of dependency and asymmetrical interactions between the United States and Taiwan can be easily and frequently spotted in numerous government-sponsored studies and scholarly works on Taiwan's military strategy, defense posture, and military readiness against the threat from China.⁴⁷

⁴⁵John P. McClaran, "U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship," *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (July-August 2000): 622-40; and Wei-chin Lee, "U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton," *Journal of Contemporary China* 9, no. 23 (2000): 53-75.

⁴⁶For the TMD debate, see Thomas J. Christensen, "Theatre Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security," *Orbis* 44, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 79-90; Wei-chin Lee, "Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense," *Nonproliferation Review* 8, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2001): 107-22; and Jing-dong Yuan, "Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security," *ibid.* 10, no. 1 (Spring 2003): 75-96. Of course, the United States is aware that any weapons, including TMD, sold to Taiwan have the potential to fall into China's hands, if China ever assumes control of Taiwan. See James Clay Moltz, "Viewpoint: Missile Proliferation in East Asia: Arms Control vs. TMD Responses," *ibid.* 4, no. 3 (1997): 71 n. 34.

⁴⁷For example, Taiwan purchased four E-2Ts for the improvement of air surveillance and advanced warning capabilities in the 1990s. Due to a U.S. decision to withhold its direct air-to-air information operating system, however, Taiwan's E-2T was unable to command and coordinate directly with fighters in the air and must first transmit information back to

Meanwhile, such a realist picture of U.S. policy is further complicated by Taiwan's inability to achieve self-sufficiency in military modernization, as Richard A. Bitzinger's work has shown.⁴⁸ Without U.S. arms sales, Taiwan's technological advantage would erode quickly given China's vigorous hunt for foreign technology and weapons. If current trends continue, the cross-Strait military balance, in David Shambaugh's opinion, will eventually tip in China's favor.⁴⁹ Even with the flow of U.S. arms, Taiwan still encounters problems with the integration of weapons systems and training.

Moreover, Taiwan has encountered a typical "guns vs. butter" debate, as the government has recently had to allocate more budgetary resources for education, welfare, and the environment—and thus less on defense.⁵⁰ Such budgetary constraint on any continued defense buildup might not relax any time soon due to the lengthy legislative screening and inter-agency bureaucratic deliberation processes.⁵¹ Although scholars, politi-

the ground. This technical restriction was finally lifted after the United States agreed to the sale of an air-to-air system in early 1998. Similar restrictions occurred in the purchase of missiles for F-16s and the design of Taiwan's indigenous fighter plane (IDF). See Xijun Hua, *Zhanji de tiankong* (The sky of fighter plane) (Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian, 1999); and Lee, "U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan," 72-73.

⁴⁸Richard A. Bitzinger, "Taiwan's Elusive Quest for Self-Sufficiency in Military Modernization," in *The United States, China, and Taiwan: Bridges for a New Millennium*, ed. Paul H. Tai (Carbondale, Ill.: Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University, 1999), 77-96; and Richard A. Bitzinger, "The Eclipse of Taiwan's Defense Industry and Growing Dependencies on the United States for Advanced Armaments: Implications for U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations," *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March 2002): 101-29.

⁴⁹David Shambaugh, "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 119-34. For Shambaugh's view on China's military capabilities and implications for the Taiwan issue and U.S. policy, see his *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2002), 307-53. For a slightly different view of China's capability to take Taiwan, see Michael O'Hanlon, "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan," *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall 2000): 51-86.

⁵⁰For example, according to Jim Boyce, the military's share of the national budget has seen a decline from 25.3 percent in 1993 to 17.2 percent in 2002. The proportion of GDP devoted to military spending has similarly declined, dropping from 4.7 percent to 2.6 percent over the same period. See Jim Boyce, "Marching to a Different Tune," *Topics* (American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei) 32, no. 7 (September 2002): 20.

⁵¹Tsung-chi Yu, "The Impact of U.S.-China Relations on Taiwan's Military Spending, 1966-92: An Analytical Error Correction Model," *Issues & Studies* 39, no. 2 (June 2003): 145-87; and Richard A. Bitzinger, "Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisition by the PRC

cians, and the public all debate whether or not Taiwan's arms buildup is the best option for achieving its foreign policy goals (i.e., peace and security), most also accept the fact that the U.S. variable has to be figured into Taiwan's defense plans.

A critical question is thus how committed the United States is to coming to the rescue if and when a cross-Strait crisis arises. U.S. strategic interests clearly center on keeping the Taiwan Strait calm, and Washington has sought to achieve this goal via double deterrence: U.S. pressure to stop either any PRC use of force or any rush by Taiwan toward *de jure* independence—all while avoiding any unnecessarily heavy engagement of U.S. forces. As a result, academic debate has centered on the suitability and feasibility of strategic ambiguity, strategic clarity, or even a mix of the two as a means to maintain the delicate cross-Strait peace.⁵² On the one hand, strategic ambiguity permits the United States to maintain policy flexibility and operational cleverness, but the vagueness of the U.S. position lures each side to test Washington's limits. This ambiguity thus sometimes creates misjudgment, miscalculation, and mistakes that are difficult to reverse, and also increases the likelihood of unintended and dangerous arms races. Strategic clarity, on the other hand, would set clear guidelines, expectations, and consequences, but would fail to adjust well to the rapid changes not only in the international system but also in the domestic politics of each player. Any such rigidity would not handle very well the wide changes in public sentiment that occur in Taiwan as idiosyncratic

and Taiwan," in *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait*, ed. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs (Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University Press, 1997), 73-103.

⁵²Roy Pinsker, "Drawing a Line in the Taiwan Strait: 'Strategic Ambiguity' and Its Discontents," *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no. 2 (July 2003): 353-68; Zhongqi Pan, "U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of Deterrence," *Journal of Contemporary China* 12, no. 35 (May 2003): 387-407; and Emerson Niou and Brett Benson, "The U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan Should Remain Ambiguous," in *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications*, ed. Carolyn W. Pumphrey (Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002), 191-96. June Teufel Dreyer cited a U.S. official's statement that U.S. policy was actually "strategic clarity but tactical ambiguity." See June Teufel Dreyer, "Flashpoint in the Taiwan Strait," *Orbis* 44, no. 4 (Fall 2000): 615-29.

political elites manipulate popular feelings for not only electoral gains but also for the politician's own individual commitment to Taiwan's independence.⁵³

Indeed, one major challenge to the U.S. approach to the Taiwan issue comes from this awakening of Taiwanese consciousness. Taiwan is more vocal and assertive in foreign policy than before. The public belief within Taiwan that "We shall overcome!", coinciding as it does with the popularity of democratic peace belief on the international stage, seems to affirm the Taiwanese conviction that democracy will triumph over any threat or challenge made by a non-democratic state. Michael D. Swaine has cautioned that Taiwan's foreign policy should instead be based on a sober reading of the true geopolitical situation.⁵⁴ Nevertheless, the status quo has gradually evolved and been redefined in Taiwan in recent years.

Philip Yang's analysis shows that the definition of the status quo has become an issue of disagreement among Taiwan, China, and the United States.⁵⁵ With a surge of support among the Taiwanese people for a *de facto* (or even *de jure*) state identity, the Taipei government reasons that the status quo has "progressed" away from the confines of the three Sino-U.S. communiqués (February 28, 1972; December 15, 1978; and August 17, 1982) that were set up during the Cold War era and analyzed in John F. Copper's excellent 1992 study.⁵⁶ As Jacques deLisle has pointed out, political transformation—as a result of the de-alignment and realignment of political parties, elite shuffling through repeated elections, and revisions of social discourse—has made the claim of Taiwan's statehood more and

⁵³A good example is Taiwan's mainland China policy in the Lee Teng-hui era. When Lee Teng-hui changed his decision, many political players in Taiwan also changed their positions. See John Fuh-sheng Hsieh, "Taiwan's Mainland China Policy under Lee Teng-hui," in Lee and Wang, *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era*, 185-99.

⁵⁴Michael D. Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March/April 2004): 45-47.

⁵⁵Philip Y.M. Yang, "Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: U.S. Strategies towards China and Taiwan" (Paper presented at the Peace Forum International Conference on Prospects of the Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations After the Presidential Election, Taipei, May 23, 2004).

⁵⁶John F. Copper, *China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle* (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1992).

more convincing.⁵⁷ Facing an issue of such complexity, China has steadfastly chosen to ignore and neglect Taiwan's surge of indigenous nationalism by upholding its uncompromising "one China" policy and treating Taiwan as an "internal" issue which would thus be insulated from any intervention by the international community. This conservative approach certainly contradicts somewhat China's recently proclaimed emphasis on multilateralism and the "peaceful rise of China."⁵⁸ Taiwan's "status quo" approach increasingly marginalizes China's idea of reunification, and Bernier and Gold have shown that Beijing's sense of urgency to resolve the thorny Taiwan issue via several plausible attack scenarios might be higher in this decade than in the next.⁵⁹

In a nutshell, the key to Taiwan's security thus lies in U.S. assistance, a form of security "outsourcing." Accordingly, one key goal of Taiwan's foreign policy is to ensure that the United States remains an unwavering supporter of the island's security, a firm check on any Chinese aggression, and a facilitator of Taiwan's international status.

Countless studies have addressed U.S. policy toward Taiwan or Taiwan's policy toward the United States. Legal treatments of the competition between the 1979 Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) and the three Sino-U.S. communiqués—the "sacred texts" of Taiwan-U.S.-China relations—have, in Richard Bush's words, been well researched, though a final verdict of the policy priority in their application is far from being authoritatively reached by the academic community.⁶⁰ For example, China has issued numerous

⁵⁷Jacques deLisle, "The Chinese Puzzle of Taiwan's Status," *Orbis* 40, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 35-62.

⁵⁸Y.K. Ting, "Heping jueqi' yu liang'an guanxi" ("Peaceful rise" and cross-Straits relations), *Peace Forum*, July 12, 2004, www.peaceforum.org.tw (accessed July 20, 2004).

⁵⁹Justin Bernier and Stuart Gold, "China's Closing Window of Opportunity," *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3 (2003): 72-95. See also Michael A. Glosny, "Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan," *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring 2004): 125-60.

⁶⁰Bush, *At Cross Purposes*, 177. For a discussion of the competition between international law and municipal law in the United States as applied to the Taiwan case, see Thomas W. Robinson, "America in Taiwan's Post-Cold War Foreign Relations," *The China Quarterly*, no. 148 (December 1996): 1349 n. 25. For an examination of the TRA, see Hungdah Chiu, Hsing-wei Lee, and Chih-yu T. Wu, eds., *Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: An*

protests against U.S. arms sales to Taiwan. Scholars in China have often concluded that the 1982 Sino-U.S. Communiqué has been repeatedly subordinated to the 1979 TRA due to domestic political pressure.⁶¹ However, Goldstein and Schriver have noted that such a conclusion might fail to take into account the complexity of American politics and public sentiment. The wax and wane of the TRA's impact on U.S. policy depends not only both on Congressional attention to Taiwan's economic prosperity and democratization and on the competition between the legislative and executive branches in the United States, but also on the U.S. perception of the security environment in Asia.⁶² Indeed, the United States has exploited the ambiguities between the communiqués and the TRA in order to justify "situational gains" in the advancement of the U.S. interests, as Joanne J.L. Chang has argued.⁶³

The legal and political complexity thus embodied in the three Sino-U.S. communiqués and the TRA means that Taiwan's foreign security policy must be placed within the triangular Taiwan-U.S.-China framework. Research findings presented by David Shambaugh, John W. Garver, Gary Klintworth, William Carpenter, and many others have clearly shown that any one actor's move—depending on the magnitude of the issue involved—inevitably sends a ripple effect or even a shock wave throughout

Examination After Twenty Years (Baltimore, Md.: School of Law, University of Maryland, 2001), Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 2 (163).

⁶¹Chu Shulong, *Lengzhan hou Zhong-Mei guanxi de zouxiang* (The trend of Sino-U.S. relations after the Cold War) (Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe, 2001), 287-89. Even some scholars in the United States hold that arms sales to Taiwan are a clear violation of the 1982 Communiqué. See Robert R. Ross, "The Bush Administration: The Origins of Engagement," in *Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations*, ed. Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 2001), 38.

⁶²Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver, "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act," in Edmonds and Goldstein, *Taiwan in the Twentieth Century*, 146-72. See also James Mann, "Congress and Taiwan: Understanding the Bond," in Myers, Oksenberg, and Shambaugh, *Making China Policy*, 201-19; and Richard C. Bush, "Taiwan's Policy Making since Tiananmen: Navigating through Shifting Waters," *ibid.*, 179-99.

⁶³Joanne J.L. Chang, "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act," *Orbis* 40, no. 1 (Winter 2000): 63-78.

the triangle.⁶⁴ According to Christensen, triangular relations are so delicate that—given the difficulty of discerning defensive from offensive weapons, the ambiguous reading of alliance commitment, and the capability and credibility of deterrence—any deployment of even defensive forces by Taiwan may exacerbate the cross-Strait security dilemma, increase the likelihood for confusion and miscommunication, and thus lead to serious conflict.⁶⁵ The delicacy of the situation has been reflected in the robust debate occurring in and among U.S. policy circles and China watchers over whether or not there exists a "China threat" and what is the best strategy (containment, engagement, coercive engagement, or constructive engagement) to adopt when setting U.S. foreign policy to deal with China.⁶⁶

All these point to the speculative question concerning the depth of the U.S. commitment to Taiwan's security.⁶⁷ Some argue that the United

⁶⁴David Shambaugh, "Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence Amid Political Accountability," in Shambaugh, *Contemporary Taiwan*, 240-74; John W. Garver, *Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1997); John W. Garver, "Sino-American Relations in 2001," *International Journal* 57, no. 2 (Spring 2002): 283-310; Gary Klintworth, "China, Taiwan, and the United States," *Pacific Review* 13, no. 1 (February 2001): 41-59; and William M. Carpenter, "The Taiwan Strait Triangle," *Comparative Strategy* 19, no. 4 (October-December 2000): 329-40.

⁶⁵Thomas J. Christensen, "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia," *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring 1999): 49-80; and Thomas J. Christensen, "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict," *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (Autumn 2002): 7-21.

⁶⁶Arthur Waldron, "Deterring China," *Commentary* 100, no. 4 (October 1995): 17-21; Kenneth Lieberthal, "A New China Strategy," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 6 (November/December 1995): 35-49; Michael J. Mazarr, "The Problems of a Rising Power: Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century," *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 7, no. 2 (Winter 1995): 7-40; Gerald Segal, "East Asia and the 'Constraint' of China," *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring 1996): 107-35; David Shambaugh, "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses," *ibid.* 21, no. 2 (Fall 1996): 180-209; Gideon Rachman, "Containing China," *The Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter 1996): 129-40; James Shinn, ed., *Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China* (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996); Richard Bernstein and Ross H. Munro, "China I: The Coming Conflict with America," *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April 1997): 18-32; Gerald Segal, "Does China Matter?" *ibid.* 78, no. 5 (September/October 1999): 24-36; Special Issue: "The 'China Threat' Debate," *Issues & Studies* 36, no. 1 (January/February 2000); and Wang Enbao, "Engagement or Containment? Americans' Views on China and Sino-U.S. Relations," *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 31 (May 2002): 381-92. A brief summary of these claims concerning China's threat can be seen in Peter Hays Gries and Thomas J. Christensen, "Correspondence: Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy," *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall 2001): 155-65. This debate cooled in the late 1990s.

⁶⁷A brief overview of the two main opposing views of the U.S. commitment toward Taiwan

States would definitely stand by Taiwan's side out of "enlightened self-interest" because Taiwan does matter both politically and economically in the U.S.-dominated liberal international order. Strategically speaking, according to Chris Rahman, a change in Taiwan's geopolitical situation, even a peaceful one, would imply the alteration of the correlation of forces in East Asia, therefore damaging the regional security regime long underwritten by the United States.⁶⁸ Taiwan not only has a crucial role to play, but the United States is best served by making good use of cross-Straits bickering in order to curb China's rise. In this line of thinking, Taiwan is a thorn in Beijing's side. The rapid rise of an undemocratic China fits into the structural imperative for a high risk of war between the United States, the dominant state in the current international hierarchy, and China, a perfect candidate for challenger; this is the scenario projected by A.F.K. Organski's power transition theory, George Modelski's long cycle theory, and John J. Mearsheimer's offensive realism. All these approaches have been brilliantly analyzed within the security situation between China and Taiwan by Steve Chan and by Bernier and Gold.⁶⁹

Others hold a different view. The power positions of the three actors in this triangular relationship are not equal. Taiwan, as an inferior player, could be easily sacrificed by Washington, in the name of the U.S. national interest, for a better deal with China. Unless a Chinese attack on Taiwan leads to such morally repugnant activities as ethnic cleansing or mass rape and slaughter that shock the human conscience enough to warrant inter-

can be found in Shih Chih-yu, "Qishou wuhui dazhangfu—mishi zai yifuze nengdongxing zhong de Mei-Zhong zhanlue qipan" (No play, no game—Sino-U.S. strategic calculus lost in Taiwan), *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* 4, no. 2 (April 2003): 41-42.

⁶⁸Chris Rahman, "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters," *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn 2001): 70-72.

⁶⁹A.F.K. Organski, *World Politics* (New York: Knopf, 1958); A.F.K. Organski, *The War Ledger* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980); Ronald L. Tammen et al., *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century* (New York: Chatham House, 2000); George Modelski, *Long Cycles in World Politics* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 1987); and John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (New York: W.W. Norton, 2001). For cases related to Taiwan, see Steve Chan, "Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait," *World Affairs* 166, no. 2 (Fall 2003): 109-25; and Bernier and Gold, "China's Closing Window of Opportunity," 72-95.

vention, there is—as Swaine and Carpenter contend—no reason to expect that the United States would risk military intervention.⁷⁰ In the realist view of world politics, Taiwan's exuberant claim of democracy is apparently not a cure-all prescription for the island's security concerns.

Indeed, some analysts—such as Swaine and Mulvenon, Andrew Nathan, Chang-sheng Lin and Emerson Niou, and Alan Wachman—have unambiguously warned that U.S. interests may not perfectly match Taiwan's interests due not only to rapid internal and external changes in both societies but also because the United States is not necessarily obligated by law to assist Taiwan should cross-Strait conflict occur; relying on U.S. assistance in support of Taiwan's defense is thus risky.⁷¹ Moreover, the 9-11 terrorist attack and the resulting war in Iraq have profoundly changed U.S. global strategy, as Vincent Wang and Jiemian Yang have both pointed out.⁷² U.S. global efforts against terrorism require cooperation from many countries—including China, who is both a major player in world politics and a permanent member (with veto power) of the U.N. Security Council. As many have pointed out, given China's rapid rise in the global economy and its economic interdependence with the United States, domestic balancing among various constituencies in the United States is crucial in formu-

⁷⁰Swaine, "Trouble in Taiwan," 39-49; and Ted Galen Carpenter, "President Bush's Muddled Policy on Taiwan," *Foreign Policy Briefing* (CATO Institute), no. 82 (March 15, 2004): 5.

⁷¹Swaine and Mulvenon, *Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies*, 6-7; Andrew J. Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (Spring 2000): 93-106; Chang-sheng Lin and Emerson M.S. Niou, "Lun Zhonggong xiazu Meijun jieru Taihai chongtu de junshi zunbei ji qi yingxiang" (On the military preparation and influence of China's deterrence against U.S. military intervention in Taiwan Strait conflict), *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (Mainland China Studies) 46, no. 6 (November-December 2003): 59-73; and Alan M. Wachman, "Credibility and the U.S. Defense of Taiwan: Nullifying the Notion of a 'Taiwan Threat'," *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March 2002): 200-229. See also Guoce yanjiuyuan wenjiao jijinhui (Culture and Education Foundation, Institute for National Policy Research, primary project investigator: Luo Zhizheng), *Jiu yi yi shijian hou Meiguo yu liang'an anquan celue zhi yanjiu* (A study of U.S. and cross-Strait security strategy after the 9-11 event) (Taipei: Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan, 2003), RDEC-RES-091-005.

⁷²Vincent Wei-cheng Wang, "U.S. Policy toward Strategic Asia since September 11: Expanding Power or Promoting Values?" *Issues & Studies* 39, no. 4 (December 2003): 169-81; and Jiemian Yang, "Sino-U.S. and Cross-Strait Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings," *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 33 (2002): 657-72.

lating Washington's policy toward Taipei and Beijing; this is true in terms of both long-range strategic planning and immediate crisis management.⁷³ Shifts in coalition building and variable agendas create a degree of uncertainty about U.S. policy direction.

Accordingly, there is a perennial U.S. concern over "entrapment" in security arrangements. The United States might have to downgrade or sacrifice the security needs of Taiwan in order for Washington to avoid being caught up in a dangerous showdown with Beijing, or in order to prioritize its global/self-interests over the parochial interests of its regional allies. In contrast, the fear of "abandonment" has prompted Taiwan to look after its own best interests.⁷⁴ To the United States, on the one hand a close relationship with Taiwan can be a useful tool to restrain its adventurism toward independence from China; on the other hand, an overzealous collaboration with the Taiwanese military and excessive arms sales may be deciphered as an endorsement of any Taiwanese policy move, including a declaration of independence.

One fundamental element of this interplay of entrapment and abandonment in alliance formation is mutual trust. Suspicion of Taiwan's creeping moves toward independence and elite manipulation of identity politics has led the United States to take a cautious stand. This fact was demonstrated in Nancy B. Tucker's examination of Chen Shui-bian's ambiguous policy stands in honoring his pledge of the "five no's" and his moves toward an independence agenda without any prior consultation with

⁷³Phillip C. Saunders, "Supping with a Long Spoon: Dependence and Interdependence in Sino-American Relations," *The China Journal*, no. 43 (January 2000): 55-81; David Aikman, "Taiwanese Takeout: The Coming U.S.-China Showdown," *The American Spectator* 29, no. 4 (1996): 20-31; Nathan, "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy," 93-108; Robert G. Sutter, *U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups* (Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield, 1998); Lynn T. White, III, *Taiwan's China Problem: After a Decade or Two, Can There Be a Solution?* (Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University 1998), SAIS Policy Forum Series Report no. 6; and Liping Zhang, "The Models of Power Shifts: An Explanation for the Cycle of Ups-and-Downs in Sino-U.S. Relations," *Pacific Focus* 19, no. 1 (Spring 2004): 5-36.

⁷⁴For an excellent study of the interaction between security providers and recipients, see Avery Goldstein, *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century* (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 2000).

the United States during his first term of presidency.⁷⁵ Joanne J.L. Chang has called for a cautious approach to mend the eroding bilateral relationship between Taipei and Washington. Chang has further suggested that Taipei closely collaborate in the U.S. war on terrorism and employ international and domestic public opinion to facilitate its bargaining with China.⁷⁶

Does Taiwan have any way to break away from its security dependence on the United States? Regrettably, at this moment there appears to be no resounding "yes" among scholars or politicians. What, then, is Taiwan's foreign security policy supposed to be? The answer to this question has to be approached from various viewpoints, including those of China and the United States, and therefore no clear, concrete answer can be ventured without debate or rebuttal. However, this does not—and should not—prevent scholars from creative curiosity or from asking difficult questions. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification" with China, as Nancy B. Tucker's daring article title asked in 2002, "Should the United States Care?"⁷⁷ Would such a move on Taiwan's part result in great frustration, cause a sense of betrayal, and lead to a potential shift of the U.S. East Asian security arrangement? Although the exploration might not be to everyone's liking, the question does lead us to retool our thinking within a larger realm of possibilities.

Seeds and Sowing in the Field

Taiwan's frequent use of the "democracy card," which both advocates that a democratic Taiwan deserves nurturing in a protected environment

⁷⁵Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Four Years of Commitment and Crisis," *Comparative Connections: An E-Journal of East Asian Bilateral Relations* 6, no. 1 (April 2004): 137-50, www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejjournal.html.

⁷⁶Joanne J.L. Chang, "Mei-Yi zhanhou Mei-Zhong-Tai weilai guanxi zhi zhanwang" (Prospects for future U.S.-China-Taiwan relations after the U.S.-Iraqi war), in Shi, *Waijiao zhanlüe*, 179-208.

⁷⁷Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer 2002): 15-28.

and portrays China's threatening actions as dispositional rather than situational, may outlive its usefulness. While such liberal perspectives based on democratic values may convince the United States to continue assistance for Taiwan's sake, one should not forget the enticement of realism in international politics. Almost every president since Nixon has come to the conclusion that China is very significant in U.S. global strategy, even though some U.S. heads of state have acted as China bashers while they were campaigning for the job. As a result, liberalism is definitely relevant to Taiwan's foreign policy, but is still insufficient to deal with the inherent anarchical problems of the post-Cold War era: economic interdependence, rivalry, power shifts, alliance reformation, and the persistent security dilemmas caused by perception and misperception in cross-Straits relations. The same applies to Taiwan's attempt to employ the constructivist approach to its foreign policy by reinterpreting and reshaping socially constructed world views, hoping to one day affirm Taiwan's identity and sovereignty among international society.

This should not imply that realism—and its neorealist revision—offers a perfect answer to Taiwan's predicament in international politics. Essential to realism are two distinct theories—balance of power and hegemonic stability.⁷⁸ In the application of either theory, Taiwan has less overall material capability to co-opt or counterbalance in comparison to the other actors in this highly asymmetrical triangular situation. Still, expectations based on the high moral ground embedded in liberalism and constructivism must face a reality check in a world where power and national interests are still prevalent in a state's cost-and-benefit calculation in foreign policy-making. Taiwan, like other states, is no exception. The consequence is that Taiwan's foreign policy is probably best suited to a mix of various approaches, instead of falling into the trap of following extremes determined by a single viewpoint. This is not to suggest that Taiwan should abandon its democratic statecraft. Rather, a major challenge for Taiwan's

⁷⁸For recent debates on realism, please see Steve Chan, "Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers," *Issues & Studies* 40, no. 1 (March 2004): 135-72; and Yuan-kang Wang, "Offensive Realism and the Rise of China," *ibid.*, 173-201.

foreign policy is how to employ democratic statecraft skillfully in order to make it possible for the international community and the United States, Taiwan's primary security guarantor, to adopt a liberal/normative framework to defend Taiwan as part of their realist/instrumental interests.

Like any field of scholarly investigation and research, the field of Taiwan's foreign policy could benefit by further endeavors in some areas. One area conspicuously lacking is research on Taiwan's foreign policy-making process vis-à-vis the intriguing interaction between bureaucratic agencies. For example, Graham Allison's well-known models of bureaucratic politics and the trade-off between players have seldom been applied to the Taiwan case in a substantial and systematic fashion.⁷⁹ While the usual suspect of confidentiality in foreign policy is a convenient excuse for such negligence, Taiwan's unique political design might have put its foreign policy under the shadow of its "great leader"—the president—and, as a result, obscured Taiwan's micro- and macro-policymaking process. If so, what role does the Minister (or the Ministry) of Foreign Affairs play in the decision-making process? We are still waiting for a better and systematic clarification of who is in charge of what issues—and under what circumstances—in Taiwan's foreign policymaking process. With increasing "in-and-out" personnel shifts and the relative openness of the system to outside researchers in recent years, the prospect for a greater interest in and probing of the foreign policymaking process looks promising. This may also stimulate mutual learning between academics and practitioners.

These developments should lead Taiwanese scholars to boost their systematic research and publications in English that focus on the linkage between domestic politics and foreign policy in Taiwan. If where you stand depends on where you sit, then the views presented and the visions projected may be qualified by one's sentimental experience and sympathetic understanding of the native circumstances. First-hand knowledge

⁷⁹Graham Allison and Philip Zelikow, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, second edition (New York: Longman, 1999).

and a sentimental grasp of Taiwan's domestic mood might serve as distinct advantages for scholars in Taiwan not only to see the obvious linkage between foreign policy and the domestic political agenda but also to transmit public sentiments to readers abroad in a better way than do analysts who hold a distant view. This does not imply that outside observers lack integrity and shrewdness in their policy analyses. Rather, the incorporation of the analyses of Taiwanese scholars can complement views from abroad.

The effect of culture on Taiwan's foreign policy is another area of significance for future research ventures due to the impact of culturally specific notions of temporality and space in policy behavior or negotiation style. Given the island's geographical separation from China, divergent path in both historical development and political governance, and increasing call for "state identity," Taiwan's culture as shared meaning, value preferences, and a template for political action is at variance with Chinese popular as well as elite culture. Which cultural characteristics and what level of analysis (e.g., idiosyncratic perception of the leader or the general populace) are more relevant to the study of foreign policy? How do cultural variations help us generalize patterns of interaction between states? Given the interesting insights illustrated by Lawrence C. Katzenstein's work on the "Koxinga myth" in cross-Strait relations, we look forward to reading more studies of the effects of cultural traits on policy choice—similar to the works on China's foreign policy and perspectives of international relations by Chih-yu Shih, Hongying Wang, and Gerald Chan, or Alastair Iain Johnston and Andrew Scobell's contributions to the study of China's strategic culture.⁸⁰

⁸⁰Lawrence C. Katzenstein, "Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China," in *Culture and Foreign Policy*, ed. Valerie M. Hudson (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner, 1997), 45-71; Chih-yu Shih, *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy* (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1993); Hongying Wang, "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism," in *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, ed. Robert W. Cox (New York: United Nations University Press, 1997), 145-61; Gerald Chan, *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1999), 55-61; Alastair Iain Johnston, *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995); Alastair Iain Johnston, "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China," in *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein (New York: Columbia University Press, 1996), 216-68;

Another area waiting for scholarly attention is Taiwan-Japan relations. The wealth of research on, and the analytical preoccupation with, the United States stand in stark contrast to the relative paucity of studies on Taiwan-Japan relations. Japan lost its strategic legitimacy after World War II because of such events as: Article 9 of its 1947 peace Constitution which banned the Japanese from re-arming, its notorious past colonial expansion, and its reliance on the U.S. security umbrella. Yet, Japan's phoenix-like economic rise, its call for the restoration of national pride, its political desire to gain "normalcy" in its international status, the gradual formulation of a public and political consensus for the constitutional revision of Article 9, the quiet and subtle improvement of Japanese self-defense forces, and the larger role that Japan plays in the defense guidelines of the U.S.-Japanese security treaty all indicate that Japan is now taking a greater interest in East Asian regional security. Any instability in East Asia, including the cross-Strait flash point, would be a serious concern for Japanese security. Japan's colonial legacy in Taiwan also serves as a key factor behind Tokyo's treatment of China and Taiwan as different entities. Taiwanese political elites and political leaders, who have had experience with Japanese colonialism and regard Japan highly, have also pushed strongly for closer ties to Japan and consider Japan a counterbalance to China's security and diplomatic threats.⁸¹ In light of these new trends, Japan deserves more attention from scholars in the field of Taiwan's foreign policy. The Japan Research Institute in Taiwan (台灣日本綜合研究所, *Taiwan Riben zonghe yanjiusuo*), located in Taipei, has pioneered the effort, but further pursuits are warranted. Such an expansion of the research agenda does not imply the marginalization of the current research effort on Taiwan's policy that focuses on other areas—like Southeast Asia, Central and South America, and Africa. One should note, however, that these countries have less a chance to reverse Taiwan's diplomatic isolation.

and Andrew Scobell, *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003).

⁸¹One such example is Lee Teng-hui.

Finally, one should not forget Fredrick Chien's (錢復) claim of the primacy of cross-Strait relations over every aspect of Taiwan's foreign policy.⁸² On the one hand, China appears determined to do whatever it takes to prohibit the realization of Taiwan independence. On the other hand, Taiwan's turn away from the "one China" policy makes China increasingly pessimistic about the prospects for a peaceful resolution of the Taiwan issue. Actors in competitive interaction tend to socialize similar reaction and strategies, or, as Kenneth Waltz puts it, "The fate of each state depends on its responses to what other states do."⁸³ If antagonism across the Strait continues, then so will diplomatic competition between Taiwan and China. If so, studies of Taiwan's foreign policy and cross-Strait relations must contend with this symbiotic relationship. The growth of the field on cross-Strait relations will immensely enhance our understanding of Taiwan's foreign policy.

Bibliography

- Aikman, David. 1996. "Taiwanese Takeout: The Coming U.S.-China Showdown." *The American Spectator* 29, no. 4:20-31.
- Allison, Graham, and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, second edition. New York: Longman.
- Amako, Satoshi. 2001. "Japan and Taiwan: A Neglected Friendship." *Japan Review of International Affairs* 15, no. 1 (Spring): 36-51.
- Ash, Robert. 2002. "Economic Relations between Taiwan and Europe." *The China Quarterly*, no. 169 (March): 154-80.
- Bernier, Justin, and Stuart Gold. 2003. "China's Closing Window of Opportunity." *Naval War College Review* 56, no. 3:72-95.

⁸²"Tuidong wushi wajiao, liang'an guanxi mianlin tiaozhan" (Push forward pragmatic foreign policy, cross-Strait relations face challenges), *Zili zaobao* (Independence Daily News) (Taipei), December 12, 1996, www.scu.edu.tw/politics/member/lowww/news/news96h.htm.

⁸³Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1979), 127.

- Bernstein, Richard, and Ross H. Munro. 1997. "China I: The Coming Conflict with America." *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 2 (March/April): 18-32.
- Bitzinger, Richard A. 1997. "Military Spending and Foreign Military Acquisition by the PRC and Taiwan." In *Crisis in the Taiwan Strait*, ed. James R. Lilley and Chuck Downs, 73-103. Washington, D.C.: American Enterprise Institute and National Defense University Press.
- . 1999. "Taiwan's Elusive Quest for Self-Sufficiency in Military Modernization." In *The United States, China, and Taiwan: Bridges for a New Millennium*, ed. Paul H. Tai, 77-96. Carbondale, Ill.: Public Policy Institute, Southern Illinois University.
- . 2002. "The Eclipse of Taiwan's Defense Industry and Growing Dependencies on the United States for Advanced Armaments: Implications for U.S.-Taiwan-China Relations." *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March): 101-29.
- Boulding, Kenneth. 1963. *Conflict and Defense: A General Theory*. New York: Harper & Row.
- Boyce, Jim. 2002. "Marching to a Different Tune." *Topics* (American Chamber of Commerce in Taipei) 32, no. 7 (September): 20.
- Brown, Michael E., Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven E. Miller. 1996. *Debating the Democratic Peace*. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
- Bush, Richard C. 2001. "Taiwan's Policy Making since Tiananmen: Navigating through Shifting Waters." In *Making China Policy: Lessons from the Bush and Clinton Administrations*, ed. Ramon H. Myers, Michel C. Oksenberg, and David Shambaugh, 179-99. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- . 2004. *At Cross Purposes: U.S.-Taiwan Relations Since 1942*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Carlsnaes, Walter. 2002. "Foreign Policy." In *Handbook of International Relations*, ed. Walter Carlsnaes, Thomas Risse, and Beth A. Simmons, 334-35. Thousand Oaks, Calif.: Sage.
- Carpenter, Ted Galen. 2004. "President Bush's Muddled Policy on Taiwan." *Foreign Policy Briefing* (CATO Institute), no. 82 (March 15): 1-6.
- Carpenter, William M. 2000. "The Taiwan Strait Triangle." *Comparative Strategy* 19, no. 4 (October-December): 329-40.
- Chan, Gerald. 1999. *Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for Analysis*. New York: St. Martin's Press.
- Chan, Steve. 2003. "Extended Deterrence in the Taiwan Strait." *World Affairs* 166,

no. 2 (Fall): 109-25.

_____. 2004. "Realism, Revisionism, and the Great Powers." *Issues & Studies* 40, no. 1 (March): 135-72.

Chang, Joanne J.L. 2000. "Lessons from the Taiwan Relations Act." *Orbis* 40, no. 1 (Winter): 63-78.

_____. 2004. "Mei-Yi zhanhou Mei-Zhong-Tai weilai guanxi zhi zhanwang" (Prospects for future U.S.-China-Taiwan relations after the U.S.-Iraqi war). In *Waijiao zhanlie* (外交戰略, Diplomatic strategy), ed. Zhengfeng Shi, 179-208. Taipei: Guojia zhanwang wenjiao jijinhui, Taiwan xinhui.

Chao, Chien-min. 2002. "The Republic of China's Foreign Relations under President Lee Teng-hui: A Balance Sheet." In *Assessing the Lee Teng-hui Legacy in Taiwan's Politics*, ed. Bruce J. Dickson and Chien-min Chao, 177-203. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Chen, Hongming. 2003. "Xianshi zhuyi dianfan de jinbu huo tuihua: yi Vasquez cai Lakatos kexue yanjiu gangling de lunzhan wei jiaodian" (The progression or degeneration of the realist paradigm: the focus on the debate of Vasquez's adoption of Lakatos's scientific research principles). *Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao* (東吳政治學報, Soochow Journal of Political Science), no. 17 (September): 53-91.

Chen, Hsinchih. 2003. "Guoji anquan yanjiu zhi lilun bianqian yu tiaozhan" (Evolution of the security studies and its challenges). *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* (遠景基金會季刊, Prospect Quarterly) 4, no. 3 (July): 1-40.

Chen, Jie. 2002. *Foreign Policy of the New Taiwan: Pragmatic Diplomacy in Southeast Asia*. Northampton, Mass.: Edward Elgar.

Chen, Longzhi. 2004. "Haiwai Taiwanren tuidong Taiwan jiaru Lianheguo de huigu yu zhanwang, 1950-1991" (Retrospect of and prospects for overseas Taiwanese pushing forward Taiwan's participation in the United Nations, 1950-1991), *Xinshiji zhiku luntan* (新世紀智庫論壇, New Century Foundation Forum), no. 25 (March): 88-90.

Chiu, Hungdah, Hsing-wei Lee, and Chih-yu T. Wu, eds. 2001. *Implementation of the Taiwan Relations Act: An Examination After Twenty Years*. Baltimore, Md.: School of Law, University of Maryland. Maryland Series in Contemporary Asian Studies, no. 2 (163).

Christensen, Thomas J. 1996. *Useful Adversaries: Grand Strategy, Domestic Mobilization, and Sino-American Conflict, 1947-1958*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.

- _____. 1999. "China, the U.S.-Japan Alliance, and the Security Dilemma in East Asia." *International Security* 23, no. 4 (Spring): 49-80.
- _____. 2000. "Theatre Missile Defense and Taiwan's Security." *Orbis* 44, no. 1 (Winter): 79-90.
- _____. 2002. "The Contemporary Security Dilemma: Deterring a Taiwan Conflict." *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 4 (Autumn): 7-21.
- Chu, Shulong. 2001. *Lengzhan hou Zhong-Mei guanxi de zouxiang* (冷戰後中美關係的走向, The trend of Sino-U.S. relations after the Cold War). Beijing: Zhongguo shehui kexue chubanshe.
- Copper, John F. 1992. *China Diplomacy: The Washington-Taipei-Beijing Triangle*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview.
- Cossa, Ralph A. 2001. "The Bush Administration's 'Alliance-Based' East Asia Policy." *Asia-Pacific Review* 8, no. 2 (November): 66-80.
- deLisle, Jacques. 2000. "The Chinese Puzzle of Taiwan's Status." *Orbis* 40, no. 1 (Winter): 35-62.
- Dickson, Bruce J. 2002. "New Presidents Adjust Old Policies: U.S.-Taiwan Relations under Chen and Bush." *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 33: 645-56.
- Dixon, William J. 1994. "Democracy and the Peaceful Settlement of International Conflict." *American Political Science Review* 88, no. 1:14-32.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1986. "Liberalism and World Politics." *American Political Science Review* 80, no. 4:1151-69.
- Dreyer, June Teufel. 2000. "Flashpoint in the Taiwan Strait." *Orbis* 44, no. 4 (Fall): 615-29.
- Finkelstein, David M. 1993. *Washington's Taiwan Dilemma, 1949-1950*. Fairfax, Va.: George Mason.
- Friedman, Edward, and Barrett L. McCormick, eds. 2000. *What If China Doesn't Democratize? Implications for War and Peace*. Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.
- Garver, John W. 1997. *Face Off: China, the United States, and Taiwan's Democratization*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- _____. 2002. "Sino-American Relations in 2001." *International Journal* 57, no. 2 (Spring): 283-310.
- Glosny, Michael A. 2004. "Strangulation from the Sea? A PRC Submarine Blockade of Taiwan." *International Security* 28, no. 4 (Spring): 125-60.

- Goldstein, Avery. 2000. *Deterrence and Security in the 21st Century*. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
- Goldstein, Steven M., and Randall Schriver. 2001. "An Uncertain Relationship: The United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act." In *Taiwan in the Twentieth Century: A Retrospective View*, ed. Richard Louis Edmonds and Steven M. Goldstein, 146-72. New York: Cambridge University Press.
- Government Information Office. 2004. *Taiwan Yearbook 2003*. www.gio.gov.tw/taiwan-website/5-gp/yearbook/chpt08.htm.
- Gowa, Joanne, and Edward D. Mansfield. 1993. "Power Politics and International Trade." *American Political Science Review* 87, no. 2 (June): 408-20.
- Gries, Peter Hays, and Thomas J. Christensen. 2001. "Correspondence: Power and Resolve in U.S. China Policy." *International Security* 26, no. 2 (Fall): 155-65.
- Guoce yanjiuyuan wenjiao jijinhui (Culture and Education Foundation, Institute for National Policy Research, primary project investigator: Luo Zhizheng). 2003. *911 shijian hou Meiguo yu liang'an anquan celue zhi yanjiu* (九一一事件後美國與兩岸安全策略之研究, A study of U.S. and cross-Straits security strategy after the 9-11 event). Taipei: Research, Development, and Evaluation Commission, Executive Yuan. RDEC-RES-091-005.
- Her, Kelly. 2001. "Technical Knockouts." *Taipei Review*, February.
- Herz, John H. 1957. "Rise and Demise of the Territorial State." *World Politics* 9, no. 4 (July): 473-93.
- Hiscox, Michael J. 2002. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Holdridge, John H. 1997. *Crossing the Divide: An Insider's Account of Normalization of U.S.-China Relations*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Hsiang, Antonio C. 2004. "Taiwan dui Lading Meizhou waijiao guanxi zhi huigu yu zhanwang" (Retrospect of, and prospects for, Taiwan's relations with Latin America). *Quanguo zhengzhi pinglun* (全球政治評論, Review of Global Politics), no. 5 (January): 17-31.
- Hsieh, John Fuh-sheng. 2003. "Taiwan's Mainland China Policy under Lee Teng-hui." In *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era: Politics in Taiwan, 1988-2000*, ed. Wei-chin Lee and T.Y. Wang, 185-99. Lanham, Md.: University Press of America.
- Hua, Xijun. 1999. *Zhanji de tiankong* (戰機的天空, The sky of fighter plane). Taipei: Tianxia yuanjian.

- Huang, David W.F. 2001. "Oumeng zhenghe moshi yu liang'an zhuquan zhengyi zhi jixi" (European integration models and cross-Straits sovereignty disputes). *Oumei yanjiu* (歐美研究, EurAmerica: A Journal of European and American Studies) 31, no. 1 (March): 129-73.
- . 2003. "Oumeng zhengzhi yanjiu zhong lilun fangfa zhi fenlei yu bijiao" (Classifying and comparing theories and approaches to the politics of the European Union). *Renwen ji shehui kexue jikan* (人文及社會科學集刊, Journal of Social Sciences and Philosophy) 15, no. 4 (December): 539-94.
- Johnston, Alastair Iain. 1995. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- . 1996. "Cultural Realism and Strategy in Maoist China." In *The Culture of National Security*, ed. Peter J. Katzenstein, 216-68. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Kang, David C. 2003. "Getting Asia Wrong: The Need for New Analytical Frameworks." *International Security* 27, no. 4 (Spring): 57-85.
- Kao, Lang. 1994. *Zhonghua minguo waijiao guanxi zhi yanbian* (1972-1992) (中華民國外交關係之演變, The development and change of the Republic of China's foreign relations, 1972-1992). Taipei: Wunan.
- Katzenstein, Lawrence C. 1997. "Change, Myth, and the Reunification of China." In *Culture and Foreign Policy*, ed. Valerie M. Hudson, 45-71. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- Keck, Margaret E., and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. *Activists beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in International Politics*. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press.
- Klintworth, Gary. 2001. "China, Taiwan, and the United States." *Pacific Review* 13, no. 1 (February): 41-59.
- Ku, Samuel C.Y. 2000. "The Political Economy of Taiwan's Relations with Malaysia: Opportunities and Challenges." *Journal of Asian and African Studies* 35, no. 1:133-57.
- Lake, David A. 1992. "Powerful Pacifists: Democratic States and War." *American Political Science Review* 86, no. 1 (March): 24-37.
- Lasater, Martin L. 1989. *Policy in Evolution: The U.S. Role in China's Reunification*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- Layne, Christopher. 1994. "Kant or Cant: The Myth of the Democratic Peace." *International Security* 19, no. 2:5-49.

- Lee, Wei-chin. 1993. "Taiwan's Foreign Aid Policy." *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 20, no. 1 (Spring): 43-62.
- _____. 2000. "U.S. Arms Transfer Policy to Taiwan: From Carter to Clinton." *Journal of Contemporary China* 9, no. 23:53-75.
- _____. 2001. "Thunder in the Air: Taiwan and Theater Missile Defense." *Non-proliferation Review* 8, no. 3 (Fall-Winter): 107-22.
- Leifer, Michael. 2001. "Taiwan and Southeast Asia: The Limits to Pragmatic Diplomacy." In Edmonds and Goldstein, *Taiwan in the Twentieth Century*, 173-85.
- Lieberthal, Kenneth. 1995. "A New China Strategy." *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 6 (November/December): 35-49.
- Lin, Chang-sheng, and Emerson M.S. Niu. 2003. "Lun Zhonggong xiazu Meijun jieru Taihai chongtu de junshi zhunbei ji qi yingxiang" (On the military preparation and influence of China's deterrence against U.S. military intervention in Taiwan Strait conflict). *Zhongguo dalu yanjiu* (中國大陸研究, Mainland China Studies) 46, no. 6 (November-December): 59-73.
- Lin, Teh-chang. 1997. "Taiwan's Investment Policy in Mainland China: A Domestic Perspective." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 3, no. 2 (Fall): 25-45.
- _____. 1999. "State versus Market: Taiwan's Trade, Investment and Aid Politics in Mainland China and Southeast Asia in the Post-Deng Period." *Journal of Chinese Political Science* 5, no. 2 (Fall): 83-113.
- Luo, Zhizheng. 2004. "Quanmin waijiao yu guoji canyu" (People's diplomacy and international participation), in Shi, *Waijiao zhanlie*, 57-86.
- McClaran, John P. 2000. "U.S. Arms Sales to Taiwan: Implications for the Future of the Sino-U.S. Relationship." *Asian Survey* 40, no. 4 (July-August): 622-40.
- Mann, James. 2000. *About Face: A History of America's Curious Relations with China, from Nixon to Clinton*. New York: Vintage Books.
- _____. 2001. "Congress and Taiwan: Understanding the Bond." In Myers, Oksenberg, and Shambaugh, *Making China Policy*, 201-19.
- Mansfield, Edward D., and Jack Snyder. 1995. "Democratization and War," *Foreign Affairs* 74, no. 3 (May/June): 79-97.
- Mao, Sujen, and Kunling Wu. 2004. "Taiwan feizhengfu zuzhi yu zhengfu waijiao shiwu de jiaose yu gongneng" (The roles and functions of Taiwanese NGOs in governmental diplomatic affairs). *Guojia zhengce jikan* (國家政策季刊, National Policy Quarterly) 3, no. 1 (March): 175-200.

- Marble, Andrew D., ed. 2000. "The 'China Threat' Debate." A special issue of *Issues & Studies* 36, no. 1 (January/February).
- . 2002. "Introduction: The 'Taiwan Threat' Hypothesis." *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March): 1-16.
- Mastel, Greg. 2001. "China, Taiwan, and the World Trade Organization." *The Washington Quarterly* 24, no. 3 (Summer): 45-56.
- Mazarr, Michael J. 1995. "The Problems of a Rising Power: Sino-American Relations in the 21st Century." *Korean Journal of Defense Analysis* 7, no. 2 (Winter): 7-40.
- Mead, Walter Russell. 2004. "America's Sticky Power." *Foreign Policy*, no. 141 (March-April): 46-53.
- Mearsheimer, John J. 2001. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics*. New York: W. W. Norton.
- Mengin, Francoise. 2002. "A Functional Relationship: Political Extensions to Europe-Taiwan Economic Ties." *The China Quarterly*, no. 169 (March): 136-53.
- Modelski, George. 1987. *Long Cycles in World Politics*. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Moltz, James Clay. 1997. "Viewpoint: Missile Proliferation in East Asia: Arms Control vs. TMD Responses." *Nonproliferation Review* 4, no. 3:63-71.
- Moravcsik, Andrew. 1999. "Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics." In *Theory and Structure in International Political Economy*, ed. Charles Lipson and Benjamin J. Cohen, 33-73. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press. Originally published in *International Organization* 51, no. 4 (1997): 513-53.
- Myers, Ramon H. 1999. "How the Republic of China's Democracy Can Ensure Its Survival." In *The ROC on the Threshold of the 21st Century: A Paradigm Reexamined*, ed. Chien-min Chao and Cal Clark, 13-29. Baltimore, Md.: School of Law, University of Maryland. *Occasional Papers/Reprint Series in Contemporary Asian Studies*, no. 5 (no. 154).
- Nathan, Andrew J. 2000. "What's Wrong with American Taiwan Policy." *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (Spring): 93-106.
- Niou, Emerson, and Brett Benson. 2002. "The U.S. Security Commitment to Taiwan Should Remain Ambiguous." In *The Rise of China in Asia: Security Implications*, ed. Carolyn W. Pumphrey, 191-96. Carlisle, Penn.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College.

- Niu, Jun, ed. 2004. *Social Sciences in China* (Beijing) 25, no. 2 (Summer): 95-173.
- O'Hanlon, Michael. 2000. "Why China Cannot Conquer Taiwan." *International Security* 25, no. 2 (Fall): 51-86.
- Organski, A.F.K. 1958. *World Politics*. New York: Knopf.
- _____. 1980. *The War Ledger*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Pan, Zhongqi. 2003. "U.S. Taiwan Policy of Strategic Ambiguity: A Dilemma of Deterrence." *Journal of Contemporary China* 12, no. 35 (May): 387-407.
- Pinsker, Roy. 2003. "Drawing a Line in the Taiwan Strait: 'Strategic Ambiguity' and Its Discontents." *Australian Journal of International Affairs* 57, no. 2 (July): 353-68.
- Putnam, Robert D. 1988. "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games." *International Organization* 42, no. 3:427-60.
- Rachman, Gideon. 1996. "Containing China." *The Washington Quarterly* 19, no. 1 (Winter): 129-40.
- Rahman, Chris. 2001. "Defending Taiwan, and Why It Matters." *Naval War College Review* 54, no. 4 (Autumn): 70-72.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam, III. 1998. "Democracy, War Initiation, and Victory." *American Political Science Review* 92, no. 2 (June): 377-89.
- Reiter, Dan, and Allan C. Stam. 2002. *Democracies at War*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Robinson, Thomas W. 1996. "America in Taiwan's Post-Cold War Foreign Relations." *The China Quarterly*, no. 148 (December): 1340-61.
- Rogowski, Ronald. 1990. *Commerce and Coalitions: How Trade Affects Domestic Political Alignments*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press.
- Ross, Robert R. 2001. "The Bush Administration: The Origins of Engagement." In Myers, Oksenberg, and Shambaugh, *Making China Policy*, 21-44.
- Ruggie, John G. 1983. "Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist Synthesis." *World Politics* 35 no. 2 (January): 261-85.
- _____. 1998. *Constructing the World Polity: Essays on International Institutionalization*. London: Routledge.
- Saunders, Phillip C. 2000. "Supping with a Long Spoon: Dependence and Interdependence in Sino-American Relations." *The China Journal*, no. 43 (January): 55-81.

- Scobell, Andrew. 2003. *China's Use of Military Force: Beyond the Great Wall and the Long March*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
- Segal, Gerald. 1996. "East Asia and the 'Constrainment' of China." *International Security* 20, no. 4 (Spring): 107-35.
- _____. 1999. "Does China Matter?" *Foreign Affairs* 78, no. 5 (September/October): 24-36.
- Shambaugh, David. 1996. "Containment or Engagement of China? Calculating Beijing's Responses." *International Security* 21, no. 2 (Fall): 180-209.
- _____. 1998. "Taiwan's Security: Maintaining Deterrence Amid Political Accountability." In *Contemporary Taiwan*, ed. David Shambaugh, 240-70. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- _____. 2000. "A Matter of Time: Taiwan's Eroding Military Advantage." *The Washington Quarterly* 23, no. 2 (Spring): 119-34.
- _____. 2002. *Modernizing China's Military: Progress, Problems, and Prospects*. Berkeley: University of California Press.
- Shih, Chih-yu. 1993. *China's Just World: The Morality of Chinese Foreign Policy*. Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner.
- _____. 2003. "Qishou wuhui dazhangfu—mishi zai yifuze nengdongxing zhong de Mei-Zhong zhanlue qipan" (No play, no game—Sino-U.S. strategic calculus lost in Taiwan). *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* 4, no. 2 (April): 41-42.
- Shinn, James, ed. 1996. *Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China*. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.
- Song, Hsing-chou. 2004. "The Breakthrough in Cross-Strait Relations: From Risk to Trust, and toward Reconciliation." *Quanguo zhengzhi pinglun*, no. 6 (April): 65.
- Song, Xuewen. 2004. "Renquan yu waijiao" (Human rights and diplomacy). In Shi, *Waijiao zhanlue*, 87-109.
- Suettinger, Robert L. 2003. *Beyond Tiananmen: The Politics of U.S.-China Relations, 1989-2000*. Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution.
- Sutter, Robert G. 1983. *The China Quandary: Domestic Determinants of U.S. China Policy, 1972-1982*. Boulder, Colo.: Westview Press.
- _____. 1998. *U.S. Policy toward China: An Introduction to the Role of Interest Groups*. Lanham, Md.: Rowman & Littlefield.
- _____. 2003. "Bush Administration Policy toward Beijing and Taipei." *Journal*

of Contemporary China 12, no. 36 (August): 477-92.

Swaine, Michael D. 1999. *Taiwan's National Security, Defense Policy, and Weapons Procurement Process*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand.

_____. 2004. "Trouble in Taiwan." *Foreign Affairs* 83, no. 2 (March/April): 39-49.

_____, and James C. Mulvenon. 2001. *Taiwan's Foreign and Defense Policies: Features and Determinants*. Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand.

Tammen, Ronald L., et al. 2000. *Power Transitions: Strategies for the 21st Century*. New York: Chatham House.

Thucydides. *The Peloponnesian War*, trans. Richard Crawley, New York: The Modern Library, 1934. Translation may vary. See Thucydides, *The Peloponnesian War*, translated by Benjamin Jowett. New York: Bantam Books, 1960.

Tien, Hung-mao, and Yun-han Chu. 1998. "Building Democracy in Taiwan." In Shambaugh, *Contemporary Taiwan*, 97-126.

Ting, Y.K. 2004. "'Heping jueqi' yu liang'an guanxi" ("Peaceful rise" and cross-strait relations). *Peace Forum*, July 12. www.peaceforum.org.tw.

Tucker, Nancy Bernkopf. 2001. *China Confidential: American Diplomats and Sino-American Relations, 1945-1996*. New York: Columbia University Press.

_____. 2002. "If Taiwan Chooses Unification, Should the United States Care?" *The Washington Quarterly* 25, no. 3 (Summer): 15-28.

_____. 2004. "U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Four Years of Commitment and Crisis." *Comparative Connections: An E-Journal of East Asian Bilateral Relations* 6, no. 1 (April): 137-50. www.csis.org/pacfor/ccejjournal.html.

Tung, Chen-yuan. 2003. "Liang'an jingji zhenghe yu Taiwan de guojia anquan gulu" (Cross-strait economic integration and Taiwan's national security concerns). *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* 4, no. 3 (July): 41-58.

Tyler, Patrick. 1999. *A Great Wall: Six Presidents and China*. New York: Public Affairs.

Wachman, Alan M. 2002. "Credibility and the U.S. Defense of Taiwan: Nullifying the Notion of a 'Taiwan Threat'." *Issues & Studies* 38, no. 1 (March): 200-229.

Waldron, Arthur. 1995. "Deterring China." *Commentary* 100, no. 4 (October): 17-21.

Waltz, Kenneth N. 1979. *Theory of International Politics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.

- Wang, Enbao. 2002. "Engagement or Containment? Americans' Views on China and Sino-U.S. Relations." *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 31 (May): 381-92.
- Wang, Hongying. 1997. "Chinese Culture and Multilateralism." In *The New Realism: Perspectives on Multilateralism and World Order*, ed. Robert W. Cox, 145-61. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Wang, Qingxin Ken. 2000. "Japan's Balancing Act in the Taiwan Strait." *Security Dialogue* 31, no. 3 (September): 337-42.
- Wang, T.Y. 2003. "Taiwan's Foreign Relations under Lee Teng-hui's Rule, 1988-2000." In Lee and Wang, *Sayonara to the Lee Teng-hui Era*, 245-75.
- Wang, Vincent Wei-cheng. 1996. "Does Democratization Enhance or Reduce Taiwan's Security? A Democratic-Peace Inquiry," *Asian Affairs: An American Review* 23, no. 1 (Spring): 3-19.
- _____. 2003. "U.S. Policy toward Strategic Asia since September 11: Expanding Power or Promoting Values?" *Issues & Studies* 39, no. 4 (December): 169-81.
- Wang, Yuan-kang. 2004. "Taiwan's Democratization and Cross-Strait Security." *Orbis* 48, no. 2 (Spring): 293-304.
- _____. 2004. "Offensive Realism and the Rise of China." *Issues & Studies* 40, no. 1 (March): 173-201.
- Wendt, Alexander. 1992. "Anarchy is What States Make of It: The Social Construction of Power Politics." *International Organization* 46, no. 2 (Spring): 391-426.
- _____. 1995. "Constructing International Politics." *International Security* 20 (Summer): 71-81.
- White, Lynn T., III. 1998. *Taiwan's China Problem: After a Decade or Two, Can There Be a Solution?* Washington D.C.: Johns Hopkins University Press. SAIS Policy Forum Series Report no. 6.
- Wong, Joseph. 2003. "Deepening Democracy in Taiwan." *Pacific Affairs* 76, no. 2 (Summer): 235-57.
- Wortzel, Larry M. 1999. "U.S.-Chinese Military Relations in the 21st Century." In *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, ed. Larry M. Wortzel, 217-52. Carlisle, Penn.: U.S. Army War College.
- Yahuda, Michael. 1998. "The International Standing of the Republic of China on Taiwan." In Shambaugh, *Contemporary Taiwan*, 275-95.

- Yang, Jiemian. 2002. "Sino-U.S. and Cross-Straits Relations under the Post-'11 September' Strategic Settings." *Journal of Contemporary China* 11, no. 33: 657-72.
- Yang, Philip Y.M. 2003. "Ribei zai Mei-Tai anquan guanxi zhong suo banyan de jiaose" (The role played by Japan in U.S.-Taiwan security relations). In *Zhong-Mei guanxi zhuanqi yanjiu: 2001-2003, xueshu yantaohui* (Topic studies on Sino-U.S. relations, 2001-2003, academic seminars). Taipei: Institute of European and American Studies, Academic Sinica.
- . 2004. "Doubly Dualistic Dilemma: U.S. Strategies towards China and Taiwan." Paper presented at the Peace Forum International Conference on Prospects of the Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations After the Presidential Election, Taipei, May 23.
- Yeh, Dingguo. 2004. "Wenhua, rentong, yu guojia anquan" (Culture, identity, and national security). *Yuanjing jijinhui jikan* 5, no. 1 (January): 125-56.
- Yu, Tsung-chi. 2003. "The Impact of U.S.-China Relations on Taiwan's Military Spending, 1966-92: An Analytical Error Correction Model." *Issues & Studies* 39, no. 2 (June): 145-87.
- Yuan, I. 2001. "Duiyu Alexander Wendt youguan guojia shenfen yu liyi fenxi zhi piban: yi guoji fang kuosan jianzhi weili" (A critique of Alexander Wendt's analysis of identities and interests of states: The case of international non-proliferation regimes). *Meiou jikan* (美歐季刊, Americas and Europe Quarterly) 15, no. 2 (Summer): 265-91.
- Yuan, Jing-dong. 2003. "Chinese Responses to U.S. Missile Defenses: Implications for Arms Control and Regional Security." *Nonproliferation Review* 10, no. 1 (Spring): 75-96.
- Yunus, Mohammed. 2003. *Foreign Policy: A Theoretical Introduction*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Zhang, Liping. 2004. "The Models of Power Shifts: An Explanation for the Cycle of Ups-and-Downs in Sino-U.S. Relations." *Pacific Focus* 19, no. 1 (Spring): 5-36.
- Zhuo, Huiwan. 2004. "WTO gongtong huiji yu liang'an zhenghe zhi tantao" (A study on the China-Taiwan WTO co-membership and integration). *Quanguo zhengzhi pinglun*, no. 5 (January): 33-58.