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National Chengchi University



INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, TAIPEI, TAIWAN (ROC)

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A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

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Media Exposure and National Identity Formation among College Youth in Postcolonial Macau

HONGYU WANG

Using survey method, this study compares the relative importance of exposure to Chinese media, pro-China local media, pro-democracy local media, and new media (e.g., Weibo, Facebook) on the building of national identity among Macau college students. We argue that the effect of media exposure on national identity formation is not uniform, owing to the political leanings of the media and the platform on which the information is transmitted (new media vs. traditional media). We find that getting news about China on Facebook is the most important predictor of the formation of national identity among college youth in Macau, followed by getting news on Weibo and exposure to traditional Chinese media. Conversely, exposure to pro-democracy local media and frequent use of Facebook exert a negative effect on national identity building among college youth in Macau. Positive sentiment toward China and trust in the central government act as mediators and fully explain the relationship between exposure to traditional pro-China media and national identity but cannot explain the positive effect of exposure to new media on national identity formation.

KEYWORDS: Media exposure; traditional media; new media; national identity formation; college students; Macau.

* * *



Macau was a Portuguese colony for 400 years. At the time of the Colonial Period, the overwhelming majority of Macau's population (96%) were Chinese, but they were systematically excluded from the political system

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because of language and cultural barriers. After the signing of the Sino-Portuguese Joint Declaration in April 1987, Macau began the process of transforming from a Portuguese colony to a Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People's Republic of China. The return of sovereignty to China enhanced a sense of belonging and identity among the Chinese population, leading to increased interest in politics and a higher level of political efficacy (Wang & Hung, 2012). Even before the handover, Beijing exerted some influence over Macau by building collegial relationships with the Portuguese colonial government and supporting local pro-Beijing groups acting as important intermediaries between the government and the general populace in Macau (Lam, 2010). As such, Macau was widely regarded as a nationalistic society and Chinese identity was seen as an integral and defining feature even before the handover of Macau (Kaeding, 2010; Lam, 2010). The majority of older people in Macau were born in mainland China and have stayed close to their Chinese roots. Unlike their parents, however, most Macau youth were born in Macau, and their understanding of China and its people comes mainly from media reports on China's economic, social, and political development. Previous studies have shown that most people in Macau identify themselves as Chinese (Kaeding, 2010; Lam, 2010), but to our knowledge, no studies have examined the issue of identity among college youth in Macau. As most young people in Macau have never lived in China, they are not naturally inclined to identify with China culturally or socially as their parents are. Young people in Macau were born around the time of the handover of Macau to China and therefore are more inclined to develop a local identity. Both the Macau and Chinese governments encourage the development of Macau identity through preservation of the city's colonial landmarks and cultural heritage, in an effort to diversify local industries and promote connections between China and the Portuguese-speaking world after the handover (Kaeding, 2010). Thus, a much smaller proportion of Macau college youth is likely to identify with China than their parents' generation. The lack of empirical data makes it impossible for us to understand the identification process among college youth in Macau.

The construction of a national identity in Macau is crucial for strengthening Macau people's political allegiance to the state and heightening identification with the territory and their fellow citizens (Lam, 2010). The aim of developing a national identity is to consolidate a sense of we-ness built on common history, collective memories, and a shared cultural heritage (Lee & Chan, 2005). The development of a national identity is likely to shape Macau people's understanding of the relationship between Macau and China and the direction of its future development (Lam, 2010). In this study, we provide empirical evidence of the identity

commitment of college youth in Macau and explore the relationship between media exposure and national identity formation in postcolonial Macau using the survey method. Quantitative studies on the development of national identity in Macau are rare in general and virtually non-existent among college youth in particular. Unlike their parents, young people in Macau have little direct contact with mainland China, and their knowledge of China mainly comes from their mediated contact with China through both traditional and new media. We believe that our study is the first to explore the relationship between media exposure and national identity formation among college youth in Macau.

Media Exposure and the Formation of National Identity

Most previous studies have demonstrated that mass media in the form of newspapers, television, and radio play a fundamental role in promoting national identity at the symbolic level by generating “an imagined political community” (Anderson, 1983, p. 6; Kaeding, 2010; Smith & Phillips, 2006) and jumping political and cultural borders to enable the development of social bonds and collective identities not tied to the immediacy of locality (Waisbord, 1998). The emergence of mass media has eliminated place as the basic anchor for national identity and has separated identity from space (Waisbord, 1998). Nothing can match media when it comes to diluting the sense of territory and building imagined communities beyond geographic boundaries (Waisbord, 1998). The notion that media can transcend space has become the backbone of all theories that explore the relationship between media exposure and national identity. By promoting a common culture to people living in different parts of the state, the media blur the distinction between different cultures and piece together a unifying national culture from the patchwork of local cultures. The “massification” of culture enabled by mass media has become an indispensable component of nation building and national identification (Waisbord, 1998). Exposure to distant events occurring within one’s own state borders generates an awareness of common belonging to the nation-state among people living in different parts of the state (Waisbord, 1998).

We argue that the impact of media exposure on national identification is not uniform because of the political leanings of the media (pro-China media vs. pro-democracy media) and the platform on which messages are delivered (traditional media vs. new media). Pro-China media intuitively promote the process of national identification, while pro-democracy media emphasize the cultural and political differences between Macau and mainland China, which in turn nurture the development

of a local identity. Before we review the relationship between different types of media exposure and national identity formation, a discussion on media environment in Macau is in order.

Media Environment in Macau and Hong Kong

The media industry is far more developed in Hong Kong than in Macau, and as a result, Macau people tend to prefer media products that are made in Hong Kong to local media products. For example, they prefer watching Hong Kong television news to local television news and prefer reading *Apply Daily*, a widely circulated daily newspaper in Hong Kong, to *Macau Daily*. Thus, it is important to review the media environment in both Macau and Hong Kong. Macau and Hong Kong are semi-democratic and liberal societies, given that they enjoy full freedom of speech, but they still cannot elect the chief executive by universal suffrage (Yung & Leung, 2014). Official censorship is not implemented in Macau and Hong Kong under the principle of “one country, two systems,” and the Chinese central government has no institutional power over personnel decisions of mass-media organizations and cannot shutter news outlets there (Lee, 2007a). As a result, Macau and Hong Kong feature a rich and diversified media environment, with Hong Kong having the most diversified newsstands in the world (Chan, 2016; Guo, 2011). Instead of implementing outright censorship, the Chinese central government relies on covert, indirect, and subtle methods to domesticate the Hong Kong and Macau media by concentrating the ownership of media organizations in the hands of business people who have either extensive economic interests or formal political appointments in China (Chan & Lee, 2007; Lee & Chan, 2009; Ma, 2007). Consequently, most mass-appeal newspapers in Macau and Hong Kong take a pro-establishment stance or a centrist position; the only exception is *Apply Daily*, which has become a major platform for people to criticize the local and Chinese governments (Chan & Lee, 2007; Chan, 2016).

Unlike mainland China where all media carry monopolistic media content with an aim to promote government policies and flex its political and economic muscle, the media in Macau and Hong Kong are more diversified and can be categorized into two groups on the basis of their political leanings (Kwong, 2015; Lee & Lin, 2006). As we discussed previously, most mainstream media in Macau and Hong Kong, including *Macau Daily*, *Ta Kung Pao*, *Sing Tao Daily*, *Oriental Daily News*, *The Sun*, and *Exmoo* news, are politically conservative, with a vested interest in supporting the

current political-economic system in China due to extensive business or political connections with the Chinese government (Kwong, 2015; Lee & Chan, 2009). Some of these media even receive state subsidies to cover their operational losses, which further strengthens their pro-China stance (Guo, 2011). It is well agreed that *Macau Daily*, *Sing Tao Daily*, *Oriental Daily*, *The Sun* and *Exmoo news* fall into the pro-China/pro-establishment camp.

Although the majority of mainstream media takes a pro-establishment stance, many pro-democracy media (traditional and new) are still around. *Apple Daily* and other radical media outlets have become a major platform for opposition and dissent (Leung & Lee, 2014). Those that publish pro-democracy material position themselves as the true defenders of local interests and have openly criticized the Hong Kong government on many occasions (Lee & Lin, 2006). In doing so, they are striving to protect Hong Kong's institutions, freedoms, and autonomy from mainland encroachment and to promote local identity. In addition to *Apple Daily*, other liberal media outlets such as *All about Macau*, *Stand News*, *100Most/TVMost*, and Western news media can be categorized into the pro-democracy camp (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012).

The Differential Effect of Pro-China Media and Pro-Democracy Media on the Formation of National Identity

As discussed previously, owners of pro-China media in Macau and Hong Kong choose to ingratiate themselves with the Chinese government in exchange for economic benefits (Fung, 2007). Pro-China newspaper editors and reporters, consciously or unconsciously, engage in self-censorship and refrain from criticizing both the local and the Chinese government for fear that negative reports about China would be destructive to the principle of "one country, two systems" (So & Chan, 2007). Pro-China media also avoid covering sensitive or controversial political issues, such as the democratization in Macau/Hong Kong, Tibetan independence, Falun Gong, and the 1989 Tiananmen Square student movement, simply because those issues have been implicitly known as taboo areas for both Macau and Hong Kong press (Lee, 2007b).

In addition to avoiding negative reports about the Chinese government, coverage in local pro-China media is full of patriotic discourse and positive reports on China's economic and social development, as well as the rise of China as a global power. The pro-China media in Macau and Hong Kong regard themselves as the mouthpieces

of the local and Chinese governments and view it as their proper mission to provide the general public with abundant symbolic resources for building a stronger national identity (Ma & Fung, 2007). For example, *Macau Daily*, a pro-China newspaper with the largest circulation in town, plays a crucial role in increasing the visibility of the nation-state by reporting on China's great achievements in economic growth, poverty reduction, and new space exploration and on the significance of China's "One Belt, One Road" foreign policy (Lam, 2010). The propaganda of China's great success in sports, economics, the space program, and foreign policies substantially stimulates patriotic feelings among Macau people, which in turn strengthens the process of national identification.

Beyond media coverage, the lexical and grammatical choices of pro-China media also demonstrate their stances toward Chinese national identity (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). Pro-China media sponsored by government or owned by business tycoons with both political and economic interests in China are more inclined to use "China" as a generic and all-inclusive term that includes both Macau and Hong Kong, and they tend to avoid discussing the relationship between mainland China and Hong Kong/Macau (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). When they must address this relationship, they usually portray people from Hong Kong and Macau in passive terms and describe the two special administrative regions (SARs) as integral parts of China (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012).

In addition to local pro-China media, both Hong Kong and Macau people can have access to Chinese media such as Chinese newspapers, Chinese television news, Weibo, and WeChat. The major differences between Chinese media and local pro-China media are the proportion of their coverage about Chinese economic, social and political development, with local pro-China media emphasizing the reporting of local rather than national issues. Chinese media users are expected to be well informed about all ongoing events in China. Chinese media have always been considered the mouthpiece of the party and an instrument of state policy (Brady, 2008). In the past, the Chinese Communist Party had more ideological tools at its disposal to strengthen its regime such as Marxism–Leninism and Mao Zedong Thought. Today, nationalism has become the predominant ideology for the party-state to unite people from different regions of China, including Macau and Hong Kong. Thus, exposure to Chinese media facilitates the formation of national identity. We generate the following hypothesis:

H1: Exposure to either local pro-China media or Chinese media strengthens Chinese national identity, and the effect is stronger with Chinese media exposure.

Pro-democracy media such as *Apple Daily* and other radical media have become a major platform for the public to publicly criticize both the local and Chinese governments. Pro-democracy media are detrimental to the building of national identity in several ways. First, pro-democracy media emphasize the cultural differences between Hong Kong/Macau and China by consistently portraying a negative image of mainlanders, thus nurturing a sense of cultural superiority to mainlanders among local people (Ma & Fung, 2007). In recent years, mainlanders have been portrayed as “uncivilized” outsiders, in sharp contrast to modern and cosmopolitan Hong Kong and Macau people (Ma & Fung, 2007). Pro-democracy media also have played an important role in portraying Hong Kong/Macau as democratized and modernized societies and China as a backward and authoritarian society (Ma & Fung, 2007; Wilkins & Siegenthaler, 1997). The exaggeration of this deep-seated sentiment against mainlanders and amplified cultural differences between Hong Kong/Macau and China remain a major obstacle for building national identity among local people (Fung, 2004).

Second, pro-democracy media do not hesitate to report negatively about the Chinese government’s corruption and brutality, such as reporting on the 1989 Tiananmen Square incidents, brutality toward Falun Gong, and zero tolerance of Taiwan and Tibetan independence, even though the Chinese government has explicitly categorized these issues as taboo areas for the Hong Kong and Macau press (Chou, 2014; Lee, 2007b). The negative images of China created by pro-democracy media substantially dampen local people’s feeling of being proud to be Chinese and pose psychological obstacles for them to embrace a Chinese national identity (Chou, 2014).

Third, pro-democracy media pinpoint the contradictions in the “one country, two systems” principle by emphasizing the conflicts between local and national interests (Lee, 2007b; So & Chan, 2007). When conflicts between local and national interests arise, the pro-democracy media do not hesitate to confront the Chinese government in an effort to protect local interests at the expense of national interests (Lee & Lin, 2006). For example, during the Article 23 debate on national security law, the pro-democracy media stressed that the implementation of Article 23, which states that the Hong Kong SAR government should enact anti-secession laws on its own, would inevitably encroach on the rights and freedoms of the local people, leading to a weakening of their civic identity (Kaeding, 2010; Lee, 2007b). Pro-democracy media’s severe criticism of Article 23 has not only damaged the local government’s credibility, but also emphasized the political differences between Hong Kong/Macau and China, contributing to the development and strengthening of the local identity (Lee, 2007b).

During the Umbrella Movement, *Apple Daily* and other pro-democracy media gave positive coverage to the movement and positioned themselves as the true defenders of local interests (Lee & Lin, 2006). Their aim was to try to protect Hong Kong's institutions, freedoms, and autonomy from mainland encroachment. Pro-democracy media's support of the Umbrella Movement has strengthened the local consciousness, to the detriment of the development of national identity.

Last, the lexical approach in pro-democracy media also illustrates their key role in facilitating the development of a local identity. Pro-democracy newspapers are more inclined to use the term "China" to refer to mainland China exclusively (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). In pro-democracy media, Hong Kong and Macau are not portrayed as being subordinate to or integrated into China; on the contrary, they exist in parallel with China (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). More importantly, when discussing the relationship between Hong Kong and China, they contend that Hong Kong serves as an indispensable agent in mediating the relationship between China and the rest of the world. Without Hong Kong and Macau, it is difficult for China to enter the international stage (Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). We generate the following hypothesis:

H2: Exposure to local pro-democracy media is detrimental to the development of a national identity.

The Differential Effects of Traditional Media Use and New Media Use on National Identity Formation

In addition to traditional media, social networking sites such as Facebook, Weibo, and WeChat have become major sources of news among youth where they gather information from friends, family members, and opinion leaders or online version of traditional media in mainland China, Macau and Hong Kong (Boulianne, 2015; Gil de Zúñiga, Copeland, & Bimber, 2013; Towner, 2013). Unlike traditional mainstream media, most of which have vested business and political interests in appeasing the central government, new media, such as Facebook, are relatively free of political interference from mainland China (Kwong, 2015; Zhang & Mihelj, 2012). New media are substantially different from the traditional media in information production and distribution, and no previous studies have examined the impact of new media on identity formation, let alone compared the relative importance of traditional media and new media in shaping national identity. We discuss the differences between traditional media and new media before focusing on the impact of new media on national identity formation. Negroponte (1995) was the first to characterize traditional media as "push

media.” The decisions on what finite pieces of content to be delivered to the general public and how, where, and when to do so are determined by media elites in the push media environment (Holbert, Garrett, & Gleason, 2010). The centralized control of media content and gatekeeping by media elites are defining features of push media given that traditional media must deal with finite amounts of space and firm publishing deadlines (Holbert et al., 2010). Given high barriers to entry and the physical scarcity of media channels, the average person has no opportunity to spread self-expression to a mass audience in the push media environment (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). The top-down process characteristic of traditional media is likely to result in a mismatch between what issues the media elites want to spread and what issues the audience want to know, which in turn leads to low audience motivation to consume mass media (Holbert et al., 2010). Such lack of motivation reduces the persuasive power of traditional media in shaping national identity (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001).

In contrast, new media such as Facebook, Weibo, and WeChat are “pull media,” in that it is the users who determine the media coverage in new media (Holbert et al., 2010). The rapid development of new media has transformed the supply of information (Bennett & Iyengar, 2008). The power of gatekeeping is substantially weakened, given that the low barriers to entry in new media make it possible for individuals or organizations with modest means to become content producers and distributors in their own right (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). The new media are providing an unprecedented volume of user-generated content and give users the choice to select what they want to consume, at what time, and in the format that best matches their learning styles (Holbert et al., 2010). Unlike in the traditional push media, users of new media actively seek news and information that interest them, thus strengthens the impact of media exposure on the formation of political attitudes, including the building of national identity (Holbert et al., 2010). More importantly, new media can do a better job than traditional media at jumping political and cultural borders and furthering the disassociation between identity building and locality (Waisbord, 1998). People living in different parts of the country but technologically interconnected via social media can create a common identity as well as interpersonal bonds through exposure to the same news and information beyond their geographic boundaries (Waisbord, 1998). The time–space compression facilitates the development of new consciousness and brings the nation closer (Waisbord, 1998). The technological affordances of social media promote efficacious development of common ties that are not limited by the immediacy of space (Waisbord, 1998). In addition, the model of information transmission going from time-specific, one-way communication prevalent in traditional

media to two-way, interactive exchange of information in new media also facilitates bond formation among new media users (Chaffee & Metzger, 2001). Information received from Facebook news feeds or Weibo is mostly generated by well-known people, such as opinion leaders and acquaintances, including colleagues, classmates, friends, and family members. Information that comes from trusted others is deemed more credible and trustworthy and is more likely to be taken seriously, and thus it exerts a greater impact on attitude formation (Bode, 2016; Boulianne, 2015; Tang & Lee, 2013).

Thus, we generate the following hypothesis:

H3a: The relationship between media exposure and national identity formation is stronger for new media use than for the use of traditional media in the form of newspaper reading.

Moreover, traditional media and new media differ greatly in their stance toward political and public authority with traditional media being more pro-establishment and new media being more anti-government (Lee, So, & Leung, 2015). As mentioned earlier, both local and Chinese government have made great efforts to regulate or control content in traditional media in an effort to strengthen their legitimacy (Ceron, 2015). As a result, traditional media is characterized by its conformity and deference to authority and its tendency to choose news topics and interpretations favored by government officials to the extent that it completely ignores alternative opinions (Ceron, 2015). Governments have an intrinsic interest in exploiting the top-down approach of traditional media to portray themselves in a positive light and build support for the regime (Ceron, 2015). Not surprisingly, seeking news from traditional media is positively associated with political trust and pro-establishment attitudes (Ceron, 2015; Ceron & Memoli, 2015).

Because alternative views, free discussions or debates on controversial public issues are strictly filtered and monitored in traditional media, the individuated networked new media such as Facebook and Weibo provide a much-needed platform for netizens to express dissenting or alternative views in the absence of editorial filtering, yet with great potential for reaching large audiences through private and public networks (Lee et al., 2015). The decentralized, unmediated and interactive nature of social media makes it particularly difficult for government to monitor, filter or censor social media content (Loader & Mercea, 2011), thus, increases users' likelihood of being exposed to alternative facts and non-mainstream viewpoints that are substantially different from the official accounts of the same event in traditional media (Ceron, 2015; Hermida, 2010). Moreover,

during controversial times, social media such as Facebook would quickly emerge as an insurgent public sphere where dissidents and marginalized groups publicize their alternative anti-establishment messages and discourses and galvanize into collective action against public authorities and established institutions (Lee et al., 2015). More notably, getting news on social media increases students' chances of being exposed to unmediated information emphasizing the importance and necessity of maintaining local identity which has been rarely seen in mainstream news media in postcolonial periods (since 1997 for Hong Kong, and 1999 for Macau) (Lee et al., 2015). Constant exposure to anti-establishment arguments and negative news through social media can lead to skepticism and anti-government sentiments and undermine political trust and satisfaction with government performance (Ceron, 2015). We generate the following hypothesis:

H3b: Getting news on Facebook exerts a negative effect on national identity formation given that its anti-establishment orientation undermines political trust and dampens pro-China feelings among users.

Facing the increasing influence of social media in the political realm, the regime strives to control and infiltrates social media through posting positive news about China's economic achievement and international recognition on Weibo and Facebook (Ceron, 2015). The Chinese government is good at using Weibo to bolster the regime's legitimacy and to sustain its rule (Sullivan, 2013). For instance, the Chinese governments recruit "50 cent" commentators in an effort to manipulate online discussion and guide public opinion on Weibo and other social media. The Chinese central government requests local governments and officials to build an expansive web presence to communicate directly with netizens (Sullivan, 2013). We generate the following hypotheses:

H3c: Getting news on Weibo exerts a positive effect on national identity formation given that its pro-establishment orientation enhances political trust and increases satisfaction with government performance.

H3d: Getting information about China on Facebook exerts a positive effect on national identity formation given that positive information about China enhances political trust and increases satisfaction with government performance.

Other factors other than media exposure, such as birthplace, education, and direct contact with mainlanders, have been linked to the choice of identity. We control for these established social correlates to attain the net effect of media exposure on national identity formation.

Methodology

Sample

We collected a representative sample of second- and third-year college students studying in Macau in April 2016. Specifically, we randomly collected one-sixth of a compulsory general education course taken by all second- and third-year college students in one of the largest public universities in Macau. Informed consent from the students was solicited before questionnaire administration, and respondents were assured of confidentiality and anonymity before answering the questionnaire during class time in the presence of two trained research assistants. The response rate was highly given that almost all selected students agreed to participate in this study. The final sample size consisted of 605 Macau college students. Of the students, 59% were women, 17% were majoring in science, 22% were born in China, and 43.8% attended at least one pro-Beijing middle school in Macau. Approximately 10% had a college-educated father.

Measurement

Our major dependent variable is students' identity status. Students were asked questions such as whether they identified as "Macau people," "Macau people but also Chinese," "Chinese but also Macau people" and "Chinese." Given that few local students identified as Chinese, we combined the three choices "Macau people but also Chinese," "Chinese but also Macau people" and "Chinese" to generate one "pan-Chinese identity."

The key independent variables are exposure to Chinese media, local pro-China media, local pro-democracy media, and new media. Exposure to Chinese media was an additive scale created by summing three dichotomous measures of Chinese media usage, including frequent exposure to Chinese television news, Phoenix Television news, and other Chinese print media. We assessed exposure to local pro-China media by summing three dichotomous measures of pro-China media usage (1) *Macau Daily/Ta Kung Pao*, (2) *Sing Tao Daily*, and (3) *Oriental Daily News/The Sun/Exmoo News*. To assess exposure to local pro-democracy media, we summed up five dichotomous measures of pro-democracy media usage: (1) *All about Macau*, (2) *Stand News*, (3) *Apple Daily/Apple Daily APP*, (4) *100Most/TVMost*, and (5) foreign media. With respect to new media exposure, the frequency of using Weibo, one of China's most widely used social media platforms, measured exposure to new media that mainly provides information about China, and the frequency of using Facebook, widely used

in Macau and Hong Kong, measured exposure to new media on which local news clearly predominated. We also asked users about their frequency of using Facebook to seek information about China's social and economic development.

Mediators

We use positive sentiment toward China and trust in the central government as mediators to explain the relationship between media exposure and the formation of national identity. We measured positive sentiment toward China as the sum of students' affirmative answers to the following questions: (1) "Macau's development is closely linked to the change and development in China," (2) "Macau's development should be integrated into national development," (3) "Macau has become better economically after the handover in 1999," (4) "I am proud of China's social and economic change in recent years," and (5) "I and my family are willing to invest in mainland China." We measured trust in the central government with one question that asked students the extent of their trust in the central government.

Control variables

We use gender, father's level of education, students' academic performance, study major, living in the college's residential housing, direct contact with mainlanders, being born in China, and attending pro-Beijing middle schools as control variables.

Analytical Models

We conducted logistic regression analysis to compare the relative importance of exposure to Chinese media, pro-China local media, pro-democracy local media, exposure to Weibo, exposure to Facebook, and use of Facebook to seek information about China on the building of national identity among Macau college students. We standardized all variables in our model to generate standardized coefficient estimates for logistic regression, which enabled us to compare the relative importance of traditional media and new media use on the formation of national identity.

Results

Descriptive Information on Students' Identity Status and Media Usage Patterns

Regarding Macau college students' identity, as Table 1 shows, the majority identify with Macau (56.4%), while only a small percentage (4.5%) identify with China and a

Table 1.
Descriptive Information on Students' Identity Status and Media Usage Patterns

Identity and Media Exposure	Percentage (%)
Identity	
Macau people	56.4
Chinese	4.5
Chinese but also Macau people	8.7
Macau people but also Chinese	28.3
Other identity	2.2
Media exposure	
<i>Chinese media</i>	
Chinese television news	15.6
Phoenix Television news	13.8
Chinese newspapers	12.5
<i>Local pro-China media</i>	
<i>Macau Daily/Ta Kung Pao</i>	33.4
<i>Sing Tao Daily</i>	13.6
<i>Oriental Daily News/The Sun/Exmoo News</i>	29.0
<i>Local pro-democracy media</i>	
<i>All about Macau</i>	37.8
<i>Stand News</i>	16.8
<i>Apple Daily/Apple Daily App</i>	74.7
<i>100Most (100毛)/TVMost (毛季電視)</i>	59.5
Western news media	43.6
<i>New media</i>	
Getting news from Weibo	55
Getting news on Facebook	97
Getting news about China on Facebook	80

sizable number of students identify with both China and Macau, with an emphasis on being Chinese (8.7%) and an emphasis on being Macau people (28.3%). We combined the Chinese identity and the two mixed identities as a pan-Chinese identity (43.6%).

With respect to media usage patterns, again as Table 1 shows, the majority of local students get news from local pro-democracy media such as *Apple Daily* (74.7%), *100Most* (59.5%), foreign media (43.6%), and *All about Macau* (37.8%). The percentage of Macau students who consume pro-China media is relatively low. Specifically, 33.4% of local students get news from *Macau Daily* or *Ta King Pao* frequently; 29% get news from *Oriental Daily News*, *The Sun*, and *Exmoo News*; and 13.6% get news from *Sing Dao Daily*, all of which belong to the pro-establishment camp. Even

fewer local students get news from Chinese media, including Chinese television news (15.6%), Phoenix Television news (13.8%), and Chinese newspapers (12.5%). In contrast, a sizable number of local students use Weibo as their information source (55%), with 27% getting news from Weibo at least once a week. Almost everyone uses Facebook as their information source (97%), with 72% getting information on Facebook on a daily basis. More than 80% of local students read news about China on Facebook, 9.5% read Chinese news on Facebook frequently, and 40% learn news about China via Facebook now and then.

The Effects of Media Exposure on National Identity Formation

We standardized all variables in our analytical model to compare the relative importance of exposure to different types of media on national identity formation, with large beta values indicating larger effects on national identity building. As Table 2 shows, exposure to Chinese media in the form of watching Chinese television news and reading Chinese newspapers significantly strengthens national identity ($\beta = 0.25$, $p = 0.043$), net of other confounding effects such as direct contact with non-student mainlanders in Macau, attending pro-Beijing middle schools, being born in China, and living in residential housing, all of which are significant social correlates of national identity building. We find that seeking news from local pro-China media such as *Macau Daily* is not a significant predictor of national identity. Thus, Hypothesis 1 is partially supported; exposure to Chinese media indeed strengthens national identity, while exposure to pro-China local media does not facilitate the building of national identity.

In contrast, exposure to pro-democracy local media exerts a significant, negative effect on national identity building ($\beta = -0.40$, $p = 0.002$), net of other confounding effects. Thus, the data provide full support for Hypothesis 2. Note that the negative effect on national identity building caused by exposure to pro-democracy local media (-0.40) is much stronger than the positive effect caused by exposure to Chinese media (0.25).

Regarding the effect of exposure to new media, we find that exposure to Weibo significantly strengthens the building of national identity among local students ($\beta = 0.31$, $p = 0.015$), net of other confounding effects. Thus, Hypothesis 3c is supported by the data. At the same time, getting news from Facebook exerts a significant, negative effect on national identity building ($\beta = -0.39$, $p = 0.013$), net of other confounding effects. Thus, Hypothesis 3b is supported by the data. Of note, getting news about China from Facebook exerts a significant, positive effect on the

Table 2.

The Effects of Exposure to Traditional and New Media on the Formation of National Identity

	Model 1		Model 2	
	β	SE	β	SE
Media exposure				
Exposure to Chinese media	0.25*	0.12	0.08	0.13
Exposure to pro-democracy local media	-0.40**	0.13	-0.24 [#]	0.14
Exposure to pro-China local media	-0.11	0.11	-0.17	0.12
Getting news from Weibo	0.31*	0.13	0.29*	0.14
Getting news from Facebook	-0.39*	0.16	-0.42*	0.16
Getting news about China on Facebook	0.42***	0.13	0.35*	0.13
Mediators				
Positive sentiment toward China			0.87***	0.17
Trust in the central government			0.25*	0.13
Control variables				
Female	-0.20 [#]	0.12	-0.23 [#]	0.13
Father's level of education	-0.09	0.13	-0.11	0.13
GPA	0.13	0.12	0.10	0.12
Majored in Science	-0.14	0.11	-0.15	0.12
Living in residential housing	0.20 [#]	0.11	0.21 [#]	0.11
Born in China	0.80***	0.14	0.72***	0.15
Attending pro-Beijing middle schools	0.15	0.10	0.07	0.11
Direct contact with mainlanders in Macau	0.20 [#]	0.11	0.13	0.12

Note: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [#] $p < 0.10$.

formation of national identity among local students ($\beta = 0.42$, $p = 0.001$), net of other confounding effects. Thus, Hypothesis 3d is supported by the data.

Exposure to both Chinese traditional media and new media exerts a significant impact on national identity, but the impact of new media in the form of Weibo ($\beta = 0.31$) and Facebook ($\beta = 0.42$) is much stronger than the influence of traditional Chinese media ($\beta = 0.24$) on national identity formation, net of other confounding effect. At the same time, the negative effect of exposure to traditional pro-democracy media and local social media (Facebook) is more or less the same (-0.39 vs. -0.40). Thus, the data provide partial support for Hypothesis 3a; exposure to pro-China social media (Weibo) and getting news about China on local social media (Facebook) exert a stronger effect on national identity than exposure to traditional Chinese media.

We also find that being born in China significantly increases the likelihood of local college students identifying with China ($\beta = 0.80$, $p = 0.0001$) and increases their trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.72$, $p = 0.0001$). Direct contact with

mainlanders in Macau increases the likelihood that local students identify with China ($\beta = 0.20, p = 0.07$), though the effect is only marginally significant. Attending pro-Beijing middle schools is not predictive of local students' national identity.

Mechanisms Underlying the Relationship between Media Exposure and National Identity

In the next step, we aimed to find the mechanisms that explain the relationship between media exposure and national identity by adding two mediators in our analytical model: positive sentiment toward China and trust in the central government. Three conditions must be satisfied before we can consider them as potential mediators. First, media exposure must be significantly predictive of positive sentiment toward China and trust in the central government. Second, both mediators must be predictive of national identity building. Third, the entry of the two mediators must significantly reduce the coefficient estimates of media exposure.

We examined whether media exposure facilitates or dampens the development of positive sentiment toward China or trust in the central government. As Table 3 shows, exposure to Chinese media significantly cultivates positive sentiment toward China among local students ($\beta = 0.18, p = 0.0001$) but is not predictive of their trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.06, p = 0.18$), net of other confounding effects. In contrast, exposure to pro-democracy local media significantly reduces the likelihood of developing positive sentiment toward China ($\beta = -0.14, p = 0.001$) and is detrimental to building trust in the central government ($\beta = -0.25, p = 0.0001$), net of other confounding effects. Of note, exposure to pro-China local media exerts no effect on the development of positive sentiment toward China but significantly increases local college students' trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.11, p = 0.01$), net of other confounding effects. At the same time, exposure to Weibo exerts no effect on the development of positive sentiment toward China but increases trust in the central government, though the effect is marginally significant ($\beta = 0.08, p = 0.098$). In general, getting news on Facebook is not associated with either positive sentiment toward China or trust in the central government, but getting news about China on Facebook is positively and significantly associated with positive sentiment toward China ($\beta = 0.11, p = 0.01$) and trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.08, p = 0.08$), with the effect of the latter being marginally significant. In addition, direct contact with mainlanders in Macau significantly increases local college students' positive sentiment toward China ($\beta = 0.12, p = 0.002$) and their trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.07, p = 0.099$). Being born in China is predictive of positive sentiment toward

Table 3.

The Effects of Media Exposure on Positive Sentiment toward China and Trust in the Central Government

	Positive Sentiment toward China		Trust in the Central Government	
	β	SE	β	SE
Media exposure				
Constant	-0.14**	0.04	-0.06	0.06
Exposure to Chinese media	0.18***	0.04	0.06	0.05
Exposure to pro-democracy local media	-0.14**	0.04	-0.25***	0.05
Exposure to pro-China local media	0.03	0.04	0.11*	0.04
Getting news from Weibo	0.06	0.04	0.08 [#]	0.05
Getting news from Facebook	-0.04	0.05	-0.05	0.06
Getting news about China on Facebook	0.11**	0.04	0.08 [#]	0.05
Control variables				
Female	0.00	0.04	0.05	0.05
Father's level of education	0.03	0.04	0.04	0.05
GPA	0.01	0.04	0.03	0.05
Majored in Science	-0.02	0.04	0.01	0.04
Living in residential housing	0.01	0.04	0.02	0.04
Born in China	0.14**	0.05	0.07	0.06
Attending pro-Beijing middle schools	0.08*	0.03	0.08*	0.04
Direct contact with mainlanders in Macau	0.12**	0.04	0.07 [#]	0.04

Note: *** $p < 0.001$; ** $p < 0.01$; * $p < 0.05$; [#] $p < 0.10$.

China ($\beta = 0.14$, $p = 0.004$) but not trust in the central government, and attending pro-Beijing middle schools in Macau is positively associated with both positive sentiment toward China ($\beta = 0.08$, $p = 0.015$) and trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.08$, $p = 0.04$). In summary, the first condition for mediation is satisfied; exposure to both traditional media (Chinese media vs. pro-democracy local media) and new media (Weibo and Facebook) significantly influences local college students' positive sentiment toward China and their trust in the central government to different extents.

Second, both positive sentiment toward China ($\beta = 0.87$, $p = 0.0001$) and trust in the central government ($\beta = 0.25$, $p = 0.047$) are predictive of the formation of national identity, net of other confounding effects. Thus, the second condition for mediation is satisfied as well.

After entering the two mediators, we find that the effect of exposure to Chinese media turns non-significant ($p = 0.52$) and the β value reduces from 0.25 to 0.08. At the same time, the negative effect of exposure to pro-democracy local media

becomes only marginally significant ($p = 0.095$), and the β value decreases considerably from -0.40 to -0.24 . In contrast, the β values for new media (Weibo and Facebook) do not change much after entry of the two mediators. In other words, positive sentiment toward China and trust in the central government almost fully mediate the relationship between exposure to traditional media and national identity, but they cannot explain the relationship between exposure to new media and national identity.

Discussion and Conclusion

Contrary to common wisdom, we find that the majority of local college students do not have identity with China as predicted by many scholars in the field of national identity. Most scholars argue that the majority of Macau people continue to identify with China (Kaeding, 2010). As we discussed previously, the oldest people in Macau were born in China and are naturally inclined to be attached to China, but things are quite different with the young generation, the majority of whom were born in Macau. Unlike their parents, younger people's knowledge about China comes mainly from mediated contact, such as media exposure. Both the local and Chinese governments are aware of the importance of building national identity among young people in Macau in an effort to facilitate the social and economic integration between mainland China and Macau. Few studies provide quantitative information on the identity status among youth in Macau, and the sample they use is not representative. To our knowledge, no previous studies have collected a representative sample to examine the identity issue among educated youth in Macau. Thus, our study is the first to shed light on identity status among college students in Macau. More importantly, we aimed to compare the relative importance of exposure to traditional and new media on the process of national identification among college youth in Macau. The gradual detachment of younger generations from their Chinese roots may lead to a major identity crisis in Macau, especially as local pro-democracy media spare no effort to create a local consciousness by emphasizing the cultural and political differences among mainland China, Hong Kong, and Macau and the potential conflict between local and national public interests.

According to the descriptive information, Macau college students are less likely to consume traditional media in the form of television and newspapers and more likely to consume new media such as Facebook and Weibo. Among those who consume traditional print media, they are more likely to read pro-democracy newspapers than

pro-China newspapers. Almost all the students get news on Facebook, and a sizable number get news from Weibo. New media has become a primary information source among local college students, and an overview of Facebook shows that a large portion of information on Facebook pertains to local issues. However, adding classmates from mainland China as friends substantially broadens students' chances of developing positive sentiment toward China, considering that most overseas Chinese students are generally more patriotic than their counterparts studying in China (Han & Cheng, 2016) and are inclined to create a positive image of China on Facebook. We also find that getting news about China on Facebook is an important predictor of national identity among local students when compared with other forms of media exposure, including exposure to Chinese traditional media and Weibo. Although local students receive positive news about China from Chinese newspapers and Facebook, the impact of news exposure on national identity formation differs depending on the nature of media through which the messages reach the public. News from newspapers is created and distributed by media elites, who are unknown and unrelated to ordinary readers; the time-specific, one-way communication of newspapers also excludes interaction between media gatekeepers and ordinary readers. In contrast, Facebook is very popular among local college youth and has become a major channel to keep in touch with friends and get news from friends and acquaintances. The two-way communication and interaction enabled by Facebook facilitate the generation of a common identity that goes beyond geographic boundaries. More importantly, people generally perceive information received from other known people as more credible and trustworthy and take it more seriously, resulting in a greater impact on national identity building (Bode, 2016; Tang & Lee, 2013). Users of Weibo can also interact with others, but their relationships are more casual and looser than those they create on Facebook, though more meaningful than those between readers and newspaper editors. Not surprisingly, getting news about China from Facebook exerts the most positive impact on national identity building, followed by getting information about China from Weibo and Chinese newspapers. Our study suggests that the most effective way to build national identity among local students is to encourage more mainland Chinese students to use Facebook to spread positive information about China.

We also find that exposure to Chinese newspapers or Chinese television news facilitates the development of positive sentiment toward China and increases local students' trust in the central government, which in turn strengthens the process of national identity building. Future studies are still necessary to uncover the factors that explain the relationship between exposure to new media and national identity. The finding that exposure to local pro-China media is not predictive of national identity

formation is surprising. We speculate that this null effect is due to the local pro-China media's predominant coverage of local issues, which does not facilitate the formation of national identity.

Among all the factors that influence national identity building, being born in China stands out as the most influential factor ($\beta = 0.80$, $p = 0.0001$), followed by getting news about China on Facebook ($\beta = 0.42$, $p = 0.001$), getting news about China on Weibo ($\beta = 0.31$, $p = 0.015$), and reading Chinese newspapers and watching Chinese television news ($\beta = 0.25$, $p = 0.043$). We want to emphasize the significant effect of getting news about China on Facebook, Weibo, and Chinese newspapers even after controlling for whether the students were born in China or not. Pro-China media exposure in general and exposure to new media in particular are important predictors of the building of national identity among college youth in Macau.

There are some limitations in our study that should be considered in interpreting our results. First, we conducted a cross-sectional study to explore the relationship between media exposure and national identity formation in Macau. One problem with cross-sectional study is that it can demonstrate association but it cannot establish causality. As a result, findings from this study cannot be interpreted as a causal relationship. Second, we collected the data from college students attending the same university and we should be cautious when generalizing our findings to students from other universities in general and non-college-educated population in particular.

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Merger and Takeover Attempts in Taiwanese Party Politics

DAFYDD FELL

Taiwan has experienced a number of party splits and attempted mergers since democratization. These have played a critical role in the development of the country's party system. While a number of studies have looked at the emergence of Taiwan's splinter parties, party mergers have not received academic attention. This study aims to systematically examine the process of party mergers and takeovers. We examine four cases of attempted mergers and takeovers. In each case, we focus the analysis around three core questions: (1) How should we best classify the actual outcomes? (2) How we can best explain the variation in outcomes? (3) How can we assess the success of merger/takeover attempts? Unlike earlier studies, we examine a variety of merger outcomes rather than just successful cases. In addition to mergers, we propose the terms negotiated takeovers and hostile takeovers. Our classification scheme is based on relative party power and the inter-party relationship. To explain the variation in outcome, we applied a framework stressing the interplay of contextual, inter-party and inner-party factors. We found key contextual variables were electoral results, relative party sizes and the electoral system. The most important inter-party variables were ideological proximity and inter-party trust following successful cooperation. Lastly, the inner-party balance of power was also critical, particularly, the strength of leaders with favorable attitudes toward the merger project. We assess the success and failure of merger/takeover attempts with reference to election results, post-merger party unity and whether the post-takeover relationship was cooperative.

KEYWORDS: Taiwan; party politics; party mergers; takeovers.

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It is often assumed that in mature democracies, party mergers are rare. Mair's (1990) study of Western European parties found only 18 cases between 1945 and 1987, with almost half of them taking place in just two countries, Italy

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and Finland. Since the Second World War, the only merger of relevant political parties in the United Kingdom was between the Social Democratic Party and Liberal Party in 1988. Unsurprisingly, the literature on party merging was until recently quite limited. However, party mergers in consolidated democracies such as in Canada, the Netherlands and Germany in the post-Cold War period have led to a renewed interest in the phenomenon (Belanger & Godbout, 2010; Coffe & Torenvlied, 2008; Lee, Hough, & Keith, 2010; Patton, 2013). In fact, a recent study that found 94 European party merger cases in the post-war period suggests that mergers are becoming more common (Ibenskas, 2016, p. 343).

Party mergers are more frequent in new democracies where the party system is not yet fully institutionalized. Since the early 1990s, the South Korean party system has featured a seemingly endless pattern of party splits and mergers (Park, 2010). In another Asian democracy, Japan, party mergers have played a critical role in the development of its party system. For instance, after a period of extensive party splinters and new party start-ups, a major party merger between 1997 and 1998 allowed the Democratic Party of Japan to become a viable challenger to the Liberal Democratic Party for government (Koellner, 2011).

Taiwan has experienced a more stable party system than its East Asian democratic neighbors. Although it has had periods when third parties have won significant vote and seat shares in the national parliaments, two parties, the Kuomintang (KMT) and Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) have dominated the party system since democratization began in the late 1980s. The relevant third parties have tended to be splinters that broke away from these mainstream parties. Belanger and Godbout define party mergers as “the fusion of two (or more) political parties into a single new party organization. As a result of the fusion, the former parties must cease to exist, to be replaced by a new political formation” (Belanger & Godbout, 2010, p. 41). If we adopt this definition, then unlike its neighbors, Taiwan has not yet experienced a single case of party merging.

Nevertheless, we cannot just drop the topic simply because Taiwan’s case does not fit nicely into this strict definition. Firstly, party mergers have received significant media attention in Taiwan in certain periods since democratization. Moreover, there have been numerous cases of inter-party cooperation and negotiations with a view to party mergers. Thirdly, after party splits, there have been a number of *de facto* mergers or partial takeovers. These have seen new or mainstream parties attracting sufficient numbers of politicians to switch affiliation to almost wipe out the victim parties. Fourthly, though these victim parties were decimated by what were either hostile or negotiated takeover bids, generally these smaller parties were able to survive and in some cases, even recovered much of their former electoral strength. This suggests that

new concepts are required to understand these attempted mergers and takeovers. We also show that a number of these merger processes would have major impacts on the development of Taiwan's party system, particularly, the KMT's return to power in 2008. Therefore, we hope to make a contribution to the literature on political parties with the first comprehensive examination of party merger attempts in Taiwan.

Literature Review

One of our motivations for this study is that the Taiwanese literature on party mergers is very limited. For instance, Liao (2004) and Tien and Liu (2005) examine cooperation between the KMT and its splinter party, the People First Party (PFP), but these papers were written at a time when the outcome of the process was still inconclusive.

Beyond Taiwan, most studies of party merging are based on single cases and also single-country cases. These have tended to generate country-specific explanations. We are interested to see how well these approaches fit the Taiwan case. For example, Belanger and Godbout (2010) argue that the case of the Conservative Party of Canada shows how key factors leading to party merger were vote-seat disproportionality, the desire to access new resources and the hope to rebrand the party. Lee et al. (2010) particularly focus on the definable steps and processes leading to mergers. A first ingredient for a merger requires party elites to have a degree of mutual trust to allow the merger process to be initiated. They expect a gradual transition from first cooperation toward merger. However, they also propose that the key players in a successful merger are not the party leaders but the working group made up of cross-party representatives tasked with establishing the practicalities of the merger. They also argue that there will need to be growing trust in the development team, increasingly delegation and reduced monitoring from the party leadership.

According to Coffe and Torenvlied (2008, p. 1), the most common explanation for party mergers is a response to poor election results and the expectation that merging will improve future performance. However, Mair's (1990, p. 140) study found a mixed picture on this point, noting that "the most striking impression is that fission and fusion have very limited electoral consequences." In approximately half of his examined cases in the previous election, at least one of the merging parties had lost support and the other gained support. Out of the cases of merged parties, Mair (1990) found that rather than receiving an electoral payoff, they tended to lose. Therefore to understand the causes of party mergers, we need to look beyond just electoral factors.

Thus far, only two studies have attempted to develop an integrated framework for understanding party mergers. In the first large cross-national study of party mergers,

Ibenskas (2016, p. 354) proposes an explanatory framework that emphasizes the costs (such as ideological differences) and benefits (such as overcoming electoral thresholds or becoming a major player in the party system) of mergers. Coffe and Torenvlied (2008) suggest focusing on the interplay between inner-party, inter-party and contextual factors. Contextual factors that could promote the environment for mergers include changes to the electoral system, as well as electoral results. For example, they suggest that electoral systems with high thresholds should enhance the willingness of smaller parties to consider merging as they would struggle to be competitive on their own (Coffe & Torenvlied, 2008, p. 4). A further contextual variable are electoral support levels. They note that electoral losses or the expectation of electoral losses will raise the interest in merging. Coffe and Torenvlied (2008, p. 4) also argue that important inter-party factors include ideological proximity, as well as inter-party levels of trust or friendship. They note that “[p]arties will opt for a partner in a merger only if the partner is similar in some salient respects.” In addition, Mair (1990, p. 140) notes that “[m]ergers derive from elite behavior, prompted by cross-party friendships.” In terms of inner party variables, Coffe and Torenvlied (2008, p. 5) argue that “the relative power of the dominant party faction and the party leader in combination with their attitude towards a merger and potential merger partners determine the probability of a merger.” A final inner-party factor they suggest are the parties’ primary goals. They propose that vote or office-seeking parties are more likely to opt for mergers than policy-oriented parties.

Research Questions and Framework

To better understand the phenomenon, we examine four cases where party mergers or takeovers were attempted. We address three core questions: (1) How should we best classify the actual outcomes? (2) How we can best explain the variation in outcomes? (3) How can we assess the success of merger/takeover attempts?

The four cases we examine are (1) the Chinese Social Democratic Party (CSDP) and the New Party (NP) (1993–1994), (2) PFP and NP (2000–2001), (3) KMT and NP (2001–2005), and (4) KMT and PFP (2002–2008). Readers familiar with Taiwanese politics will immediately notice all but one are Pan Blue parties. While the KMT has experienced a number of party splits, the DPP has not suffered serious splits leading to the formation of new parties or featured in party mergers.¹ Although there were some

¹Although two small parties did split off from the DPP in the mid-1990s, they had very limited impacts on the party system.

Table 1
Merger/Takeover Classification Scheme

Relative Power		Fusion Outcomes
Equal/Similar power	Merger (NP–CSDP)	Failed merger (KMT–PFP 1)
Unequal power	Negotiated takeover (KMT–NP & KMT–PFP 2)	Hostile takeover (PFP–NP) or failed takeover
	Cordial	Hostile
Inter-party relationship		

politicians defecting from the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) to the DPP in 2007 and some election cooperation, it is quite distinct from the cases examined here as there were not any negotiations with a view to a merger. In each case study, we will classify the outcome of the process, attempt to explain the outcome, and assess the success of the merger/takeover.

We believe that more nuanced categories are required to better capture and understand the processes. We have adopted a classification scheme that incorporates the following five outcomes: (1) merger, (2) failed merger, (3) negotiated takeover, (4) hostile takeover, and (5) failed takeover. The classification scheme is illustrated in Table 1, with our classification for our case studies. We consider the relative power of parties and the relationship between different parties to classify the outcome. The two extremes for the first factor are equal/similar power and unequal power while the two extremes for the second one are cordial relationship and hostile inter-party relationship. In terms of classification types, we first distinguish between mergers and takeovers. We adopt a broader understanding of a merger than Belanger and Godbout (2010), thus we define a merger as the fusion of two or more parties of similar sizes and where the process is defined as a merger by the parties themselves. Thus, it is not essential that the former parties cease to exist or that a new party is created. We define a *takeover* as where one party essentially annexes a weaker or smaller political party. Thus, the distinguishing feature of these two types is relative party power. However, we also distinguish between *negotiated takeovers* and *hostile takeovers*. In the former, relatively cordial negotiations lead to the stronger party taking control of the smaller party’s core assets (usually politicians), while hostile takeovers tend to feature high levels of antagonism as the large party attempts to poach and cherry pick the weaker parties’ assets.² Our classification scheme also includes the possibility that the talks are

²Warc (2009) calls the latter unbargained mergers.

unsuccessful and the parties remain largely intact. We term these outcomes as failed mergers or takeovers. Thus, we take up the challenge posed by Lee et al. (2010, p. 1315) to also bring failed merger attempts into the scope of analysis. They argue that “the inclusion of more cases of party merger — be they successful or unsuccessful — is essential if our framework is to be tested with the aim of it having predictive as well as explanatory value.”

In order to explain success and failure of attempted mergers, we apply the framework proposed by Coffe and Torenvlied (2008). Key contextual factors examined include the electoral system, electoral results and the relative size of the parties. In terms of the relative party sizes, we find that where party size is similar the environment will be more favorable for merger talks but where one party is far larger than a takeover is more likely. When it comes to inter-party variables, our cases show the importance of ideological proximity as well as the development of inter-party trust through previous cooperation. Lastly, we find that the key inner-party variable was the strength of party leaders supportive of mergers.

We also consider how to assess the success of a merger or takeover. In the short term, a merger may allow a party to boost its electoral fortunes and expand its human resources. However, the long-term effect may be different. If the merger leads to a new party that is unified and has a coherent identity and ideology, then it can be deemed a success. However, if the new party later suffers bitter factional infighting and is ideologically divided, it is likely to damage its reputation and may lead to a breakup of the new party. Thus, we also build on Bolleyer, Ibenskas, and Keith’s (2016) study on patterns of survival or termination of party mergers in Europe.

Case 1: The CSDP and NP: *Taiwan’s Only Party Merger*

On December 28, 1994, the CSDP announced at a press conference that the party had been dissolved and merged into the NP.³ Both were new parties, as the CSDP had been established in January 1991 and the NP only in August 1993. This brought to an end a process that had begun in the autumn of the previous year, 1993. However, the final outcome was rather different from what had been envisaged by some actors in the early negotiations. There was a hope on the part of the CSDP that they and the NP would be equal partners and that the CSDP’s party charter would represent the basis

³United Daily News (UDN) (1994, December 29, p. 4).

for the merged party's policy platform.⁴ Moreover, it was hoped that the party would also be able to incorporate the other leftist parties such as the Labor Party (LP).⁵ Also, some in the CSDP had thought that the merged party might have a new name rather than continuing to use the NP label.⁶ However, when the formal merger did take place in December 1994, the CSDP was undoubtedly the junior partner in the merger and there was no longer any mention of the other leftist parties joining. Even on the issue of the party platform, the CSDP was to be disappointed. As the CSDP founder Chu Kao-cheng (朱高正) explained,

From my standpoint, it was hard for me to refuse (to merge). We had internal meetings, the NP had agreed to adopt the CSDP's party program and so what was the problem of us accepting their party name? But later, the NP broke their original promise. I never imagined how terrible the NP could be.⁷

Nevertheless, among our four cases, this is the closest to our definition of a party merger due to the relatively similar party power and cordial inter-party relations.

Contextual Factors

The first place to start to explain the outcome of this process is election results. The CSDP had nominated extensively in the National Assembly elections in 1991 and the 1992 Legislative Yuan elections, with 58 and 25 candidates, respectively. However, apart from the CSDP's leader Chu Kao-cheng retaining his legislative seat, no other CSDP politicians were elected. The other leftist parties had even worse electoral records. In contrast, though the NP had not yet been formed in the previous round of national elections in 1992, its founders had performed well winning election either representing the KMT or as KMT rebels. At the time of negotiations, the NP had six sitting legislators to the CSDP's one. There was the expectation that under the single non-transferable vote (SNTV) electoral system used for parliamentary elections, the merged party would be able to become established in the party system.

Previous election results and human resources gave the NP a clear advantage in the merger negotiations. This meant that the LP held little attraction to the NP and soon became forgotten in the merger process. For Chu, the merger was particularly attractive as the CSDP had failed electorally and his ability to influence national affairs

⁴UDN (1993, November 13, p. 1).

⁵UDN (1993, November 13, p. 1).

⁶UDN (1993, October 19, p. 2).

⁷Interview, Kaohsiung, October 9, 2001.

was likely to be limited if he chose to persist with the CSDP. However, the parties' relative size was critical to why the process was officially described as a merger rather than a simple takeover. In other words, the CSDP had enough resources to negotiate a merger and the key lay in Chu himself. Chu was one of the most charismatic and well-known Taiwanese politicians of the late 1980s and early 1990s. He had been educated in Germany and a founding member of the DPP. Chu's strengths were the NP's weaknesses. While most of the NP's founders were Mainlanders who could not speak Taiwanese, and whose political base was Taipei, Chu was Taiwanese and had been based initially in the south central county of Yunlin. NP Convenor Hsieh Chi-ta (謝啟大) explained the attraction that Chu held for their party initially, "The NP felt that at the time no one was paying attention to the NP, so we thought let's let Chu Kao-cheng stand for us. We brought in an important controversial politician, this was a crucial moment."⁸

Inter-Party Factors

The prospects of party merging are greater where there are high levels of ideological similarity between parties. On the surface, a merger between a leftist party and a party perceived as a conservative Chinese nationalist grouping in Taiwan may seem quite challenging. In fact, when soon after the NP was formed, Chu was asked whether he would join the party, he responded he would not because "when you have different ideals, it can be miserable to share the same bed but have different dreams."⁹ However, they shared much common ground on the core political dimension of national identity. When he was asked why he left the DPP in 1989, Chu explained, "It was because I disagreed with Taiwan Independence."¹⁰ The NP's most frequently used appeal has been opposing Taiwan independence (Fell, 2005, p. 93). On the question of how to resolve cross-Strait relations, the two parties were also ideologically closely matched. For a while, the NP supported Chinese unification, the CSDP called for a Chinese Federal Republic (中華聯邦共和國) after China's democratization.¹¹

Beyond ideological proximity is the critical issue of inter-party trust. This needed to be built from scratch as originally in their former parties, the NP founders and Chu had been at opposite ends of the political spectrum. As suggested by Lee et al. (2010), trust was accumulated between the parties during an initial cooperation phase. Within

⁸Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

⁹UDN (1993, July 31, p. 2).

¹⁰Interview, Kaohsiung, October 9, 2001.

¹¹See CSDP newspaper ad, China Times (1991, December 20, p. 8).

weeks of the NP being formed, there were discussions about cooperation between the parties at the local level in Taichung.¹² More importantly, behind the scenes, a trusted go-between played a key role in bringing the two sides together. Although Yao Li-ming (姚立明) had not joined the NP initially, he had got to know many of the NP founders when he was in the KMT. Yao explained the process,

I introduced Chu Kao-cheng into the NP, and the other was Huang Kuo-chung (黃國鐘). Why did I introduce these two? They were both from the CSDP, party founders. They were both very professional and studied law and philosophy. They were friends I knew from my time in Germany.¹³

By September, NP founder Lee Ching-hua (李慶華) had openly invited Chu to join the NP.¹⁴ As negotiations progressed, Chu explained that they would need to first cooperate before merging.¹⁵ The parties were able to build up trust as in the 1993 local elections Chu personally campaigning and mobilizing supporters to help the NP campaigns. This trust was further strengthened in the build up to the formal merger in 1994. Chu resigned as CSDP Chair and joined the NP to stand as their candidate for the Provincial Governor race of 1994. According to Chu, this campaign was critical in helping the NP to develop beyond Taipei, “The problem was they (NP) didn’t have any power in Taiwan Province, we had to rely on the hard work of CSDP cadres. And at the time I got a lot of votes, almost half a million.”¹⁶ After over a year of pre-merger cooperation, the relationship between the parties had developed well. Thus, a week before the formal merger, the NP’s Convenor Wang Chien-hsuan (王建煊) stated that “[i]f the CSDP completes the legal process of dissolving itself, then the NP and CSDP will be effectively married.”¹⁷

Inner-Party Factors

The final element of the framework examines inner-party variables. Here, particularly important is the attitude of the dominant party leaders and factions toward mergers. In the cases of both the NP and the CSDP, there was some disquiet about the proposed merger. As the relative strength of the two parties widened in the NP’s favor, some in the party felt that there was no longer a need to merge the parties, but instead it

¹²UDN (1993, August 10, p. 2).

¹³Interview, Kaohsiung, December 3, 2004.

¹⁴UDN (1993, September 22, p. 4).

¹⁵UDN (1993, October 19, p. 2).

¹⁶Interview, Kaohsiung, October 9, 2001.

¹⁷Interview, Kaohsiung, October 9, 2001.

would be best just to allow individual CSDP members to join. Just days before the actual marriage, NP founder Yu Mu-ming (郁慕明) stated that “there should absolutely not be a merger (of the two).”¹⁸ In contrast opposition toward merger was more common at the grassroots level in the CSDP. The main concern was how they saw the NP as renegeing on the merger agreement from the previous year, in particular, its promise to make the CSDP’s charter the basis for its policy platform.¹⁹ However, the internal power dynamics in both parties ensured that the merger was completed.

When the NP was established, it did not have a single dominant leader. Instead, the party was dominated by six to seven figures of similar stature. Despite the relatively small size of the party, it has tended to be highly factionalized and for much of the 1990s, the party experienced very bitter internal fighting centered on these rival personal factions. However, when it came to the CSDP merger, enough of the founding leaders were supportive to prevent the process becoming derailed in 1994. In contrast, the CSDP was widely seen as a one-man party. Chu was so dominant within the party that the CSDP was unimaginable without him. Even though he was no longer holding party office at the time of the merger, Chu was influential enough to ensure that the party went along with the merger agreement and brought in significant human resources into the merged party.

Success of the Merger

This was at least initially a relatively complete merger, as unlike the subsequent three cases the CSDP did actually dissolve itself. Chu brought with him a core group of CSDP cadres and six former CSDP politicians later stood for the NP. If we consider that the CSDP had 58 candidates in 1991, then it should be clear that the vast majority did not follow Chu into the NP, but instead most simply left politics. One famous example is the Taiwanese film director Hou Hsiao-hsien (侯孝賢), who was listed second on the CSDP’s party list in 1992.

Electorally, the merger did have a significant impact on the party system, as the NP made a major breakthrough in the 1995 and 1996 national elections. After a number of failed attempts at establishing a relevant third party, the merger enabled the NP to break the DPP/KMT monopoly of the party system. The impact of the CSDP was revealed when Chu and his former CSDP Chairman Huang Kuo-chung were able to develop the NP’s base in the southern city of Kaohsiung after the party merger, with both winning legislative races in the city in 1995.

¹⁸UDN (1994, December 10, p. 3).

¹⁹UDN (1994, December 24, p. 4).

While the merger was initially quite successful, in the longer term, it can be regarded as a failure. Chu and the CSDP group remained a small faction in the NP and were often marginalized by party founders. Chu engaged in bitter disputes with a number of NP figures and in March 1997, the NP expelled Chu for damaging the party's reputation.²⁰ Rather than being deselected, Huang chose to switch to the KMT. By the 1998 elections, the CSDP component of the NP had been lost.²¹ To borrow Bolleyer et al.'s (2016, p. 642) terminology, the merged party had been terminated. In fact, according to former NP Convenor Hsieh Chi-ta,

The NP's problems began from that time (when Chu joined)...The problem with Chu Kao-cheng is that he cannot get along with others. Probably, the two people that did the most damage to the NP are Chu Kao-cheng and Lee Ching-hua.²²

Case 2: The PFP and the NP: *A Hostile Takeover*

Our second case stands in stark contrast with the NP–CSDP merger. This time though there were some negotiations, it was essentially an attempt by the PFP to carry out a *hostile takeover* of the NP. The PFP's objective was to become the largest party in the Pan Blue camp and it aimed to do this by recruiting politicians from both the KMT and the NP. The process toward this hostile takeover began in the run up to the 2000 presidential election. The NP had been deeply divided over how to handle this election. Although the NP had its own presidential candidate in Li Ao (李敖), the party's factional leaders were divided over whether to support the official KMT candidate Lien Chan (連戰) or the KMT rebel James Soong (宋楚瑜). On the day before the election, NP Convenor Lee Ching-hua suddenly announced his open support for Soong. Although Soong narrowly lost the presidential election, he formed the PFP in April 2000. As soon as the election was over, the media was speculating over whether the NP would merge with the new party that Soong was preparing to establish.²³ With a range of upcoming national and local elections, the PFP needed large numbers of candidates and began actively recruiting KMT, NP and non-affiliated politicians. One study of party switching found 22 cases of politicians making the switch from the NP to PFP between 2000 and 2002 (Fell, 2014). The defections from the KMT to the PFP were even higher but to a small party like the NP such a level of outswitching was devastating.

²⁰UDN (1997, March 10, p. 1).

²¹Even the matchmaker Yao had been forced out of the party and stood independent in 1998.

²²Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

²³UDN (2000, March 20, p. 4).

Initially, the relationship between the NP and the PFP was friendly but relations began to sour as the PFP became more aggressive in its attitude toward the NP in early 2001. Rather than working together, the two parties became highly antagonistic in the run up to the December 2001 legislative election. The election marked the end of the wave of NP to PFP defections. Although the NP was not completely taken over by the PFP, the scale of defections and the inter-party antagonism leads us to categorize this case as a *hostile takeover*.

Contextual Factors

The first place to start explaining this takeover is electoral patterns and the electoral system. In 1998, the NP had suffered a severe electoral setback. The party lost half of its legislators, falling from 21 to 11.²⁴ The NP's disastrous handling of the 2000 presidential election also severely damaged the party's morale and reputation. In contrast, the PFP was a party clearly on the rise. While the NP had only been relevant in SNTV elections, Soong's performance in the 2000 presidential election gave his new party a major advantage over the NP. Moreover, high PFP party identification in 2000 and 2001 and high number of politicians switching to the PFP from other parties had given the PFP a high degree of confidence. Hsieh's comment gives a sense of the mood among NP politicians at the time the PFP was established, "Many of our opportunists switched to the PFP. Out of the 100 candidates the NP had cultivated, four-fifths switched to the PFP. He (Soong) seemed to take it for granted he could take our people."²⁵ This relative size advantage partly accounts for the aggressive stance the PFP took in dealing with the NP. This aggressive style would later backfire and push the NP closer to the KMT. While in the previous case, the merger was motivated by the desire to enter the party system, the PFP's takeover bid was designed to make it the largest opposition party and potentially even to control central government on the back of a presidential election.

Inter-Party Factors

On paper, it would seem that the PFP and NP were ideologically much closer than the first merger case. Both were splinters from the KMT and relied on a similar core set of voters. However, ideology was something that actually kept the parties

²⁴The seat share decline was worse than the reduction in the number of seats because the overall size of parliament had been expanded in 1998 to 225 seats.

²⁵Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

apart in the takeover period. Many vote-seeking NP politicians were happy to switch on to the PFP bandwagon in the wake of Soong's almost successful presidential campaign. However, politicians at the center of the NP in 2000–2001 were not satisfied with Soong's position on unification with China and even issued a newspaper advertisement in July 2001 demanding Soong to make his position clearer. The ad brought the NP–PFP tensions into public attention and provoked an angry response from PFP Vice Chair Chang Chao-hsiung (張昭雄).²⁶ As Hsieh explained,

Some say James Soong is fine, he can do this job. But James Soong has a problem. James Soong still wants to be president, so to be president he can't just rely on Pan KMT votes. He wants to get middle, even Taiwan independence votes. So, on this point, he can't be clear on China policy, he dares not state his position, he always takes the middle line. So, I think this is bad.²⁷

The NP had been satisfied with being a small ideologically pure Chinese nationalist party and had been able to survive in its heartland in SNTV elections. In contrast, Soong needed to take a more ambiguous stance on China relations in order to appeal to a broader support base. Public opinion trends meant that the market for extreme Chinese nationalism had been on the decline since the mid-1990s, thus Soong's stance was rational from an electoral point of view, but this created distrust among the NP leaders. This also partly explains how Soong was selective in which NP politicians the PFP tried to poach. As Hsieh explained, "Some people James Soong liked he brought into his party. Others James Soong did not want. He didn't want those too close to Mainland China, like Elmer Feng (馮滄祥)."²⁸

As we saw in the previous case, inter-party trust is important in successful party mergers. Although the PFP and NP came from the same party, their experience of working together in the KMT in the early 1990s and late 1980s had left lingering bad feeling. Soong had been a close ally of Lee Teng-hui in this period, serving as KMT Secretary-General. This meant that he was viewed as being part of the effort to marginalize mainlanders and the forerunner of the NP, the New KMT Alliance. This was a factor in why some NP members had preferred to support Lien over Soong in the presidential race and still distrusted Soong. Thus, unlike the CSDP–NP, the NP and PFP did not have experience of trust-building pre-merger cooperation. The negotiations between the two parties in 2000–2001 also revealed the aggressive approach coming from the Soong camp and this explains the lack of trust toward the PFP on the NP's part.

²⁶UDN (2001, July 29, p. 18).

²⁷Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

²⁸Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001. Feng is the only elected Taiwanese politicians to have spoken positively about the PRC's proposal for unification One Country Two Systems.

Inner-Party Factors

Lastly, despite the aforementioned electoral and inter-party factors, it is possible that if there had been a different leadership within the NP, the eventual outcome could have been quite different. For instance, if Lee Ching-hua had remained NP Convenor, it is quite likely that he would have tried to engineer some kind of negotiated takeover. Similarly after Lee Ching-hua left, under the new Convenor Hau Lung-bin (郝龍斌), the NP maintained quite cordial relations with the PFP, with numerous party-level meetings.²⁹ In late 2000, the NP also announced that it would be willing to support KMT and PFP local executive candidates in the next year's elections.³⁰ According to Hsieh, Hau's convenorship offered some protection to the NP against the PFP, "Under Hau Lung-bin, it was felt that the NP, KMT, and PFP could work together, as Hao Lung-bin is (former premier) Hau Pei-tsun's son. He (Soong) wouldn't dare bully Hau Pei-tsun's son."³¹

The turning point in the NP-PFP relations came with the sudden decision by Hau Lung-bin to quit as NP Convenor and join the DPP cabinet as Environment Minister in March 2001. In his place, Hsieh became convenor and she worked closely with Kao Hsin-wu (高新武). Hsieh described the new mood, "James Soong went to Kao Hsin-wu's house the night Hau Lung-bin decided to leave. He wanted to make the NP his own party. . . . Mr. Kao told him the NP would not collapse. So, then he left."³²

In April 2001, Soong visited the NP for negotiations that amounted to an attempted hostile takeover. NP figures accused Soong of demanding that the NP lend him their generals (借將) in the form of giving them key party figures such as Wang Chien-hsuan, Chou Yang-shan (周陽山) and Kao for the PFP party list. However, NP sources stated that he was flatly turned down.³³ Hsieh's comments give an insight into the party interaction,

He (Soong) said he wanted Feng Ting-kuo (馮定國) in Taichung County. We told him you cannot do this as the NP is already small, you can't do this. We said you want seats and we want votes. Since Feng Ting-kuo has decided to go, we'll let him go. Before the election he counts as ours, he'll keep the NP label and James Soong can speak for him at the rally and after the election we'll give him to you.³⁴

²⁹UDN (2000, October 31, p. 2).

³⁰UDN (2000, December 3, p. 2).

³¹Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

³²Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

³³UDN (2001, April 14, p. 4).

³⁴Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

Neither this proposal nor NP proposed nomination cooperation in Kinmen was acceptable to Soong. As Hsieh recalled, “It’s terrible. He wanted everything. In the negotiations, he wanted the best and to give us the leftovers.”³⁵ So, in the end the negotiations failed.

This initial clash between the new NP leadership and the PFP set the tone for the rest of the campaign in 2001. As Hsieh recalled, “We decided after the Feng Ting-kuo incident to counterattack, we scolded Feng Ting-kuo and James Soong. We felt that before we were good to you, why do you take our property when we are at our lowest point?”³⁶ Similarly, in August 2001, the PFP Vice Chairman accused the NP leadership of being selfish and argued that the NP’s bid to exceed 5% by nominating extensively could undermine the overall Pan Blue prospects and lead the camp to lose 35 seats. In response, the NP’s Kao Hsin-wu argued that “the PFP’s attitude endangered the three-party cooperation, the Republic of China and the PFP itself and even promoted the momentum of Taiwan independence.”³⁷ In short, hostile leadership attitudes played a key role in the way the process developed.

Success of the PFP Takeover

On some levels, the PFP’s takeover bid was initially a success. There was the high number of NP–PFP defections. In addition, the PFP did extremely well in the 2001 campaign, winning an impressive 46 seats or the highest ever won by a non-mainstream party. This election saw the NP reduced to a single legislator out of its 41 candidates. However, the NP fiercely resisted the PFP’s takeover bid and was able to maintain its independent status as many on the PFP’s poaching wish list stayed put. Moreover, the NP nominated very extensively in 2001 particularly where the PFP had strong candidates, seemingly with the aim of undermining the chances of PFP candidates. If the PFP had taken a more negotiated approach, it is possible that the party could have performed even better in 2001, allowing it to potentially overtake the KMT as the largest opposition party. In the longer term, the takeover can also be seen as a failed one. The relative strength of the KMT and PFP would later have implications over who would be the Pan Blue presidential candidate in 2004. In fact, in the period between 2000 and 2002, the PFP had higher levels of party identification than the KMT. The KMT’s higher numbers of legislators (as well as financial resources) gave it an advantage over the PFP when it came to deciding who would be their joint

³⁵Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

³⁶Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

³⁷UDN (2001, August 6, p. 2).

presidential candidate in 2004. Moreover, the PFP's takeover attempt turned its potential allies into bitter enemies and contributed toward the NP's subsequent drift back toward the KMT. This is the topic of the next case study.

Case 3: The KMT and NP: *A Negotiated Takeover*

After splitting away from the KMT in 1993, the NP had an antagonistic relationship with the KMT until 2000. The party was highly damaging to the KMT, as it tended to target KMT voters and politicians to defect. However, NP-KMT relations gradually warmed after the KMT had lost power in 2000 and Lien replaced Lee Teng-hui as KMT Chairman. The first fruit of this cooperation for the NP was the agreement of the KMT (and PFP) to support an NP candidate, party founder Wang Chien-hsuan as the joint Pan Blue candidate using the NP label for Taipei County local executive in 2001.

The first calls for an NP-KMT merger came from NP legislative candidates in the run up to the 2001 elections. In November, NP founder Yu Mu-ming proposed a three into one (三合一) merging of the KMT-NP-PFP. It was reported that the post-merger party name would be the New KMT (新國民黨).³⁸ Two weeks later on the eve of the elections, another NP candidate Alex Fai (費鴻泰) announced that under certain conditions, he would return to the KMT. This was viewed by analysts as going further than Yu, as Yu's vision was of the three parties coming together on the basis of equal status.³⁹ The NP Convenor Hsieh responded to Fai's announcement by explaining that if Fai joined the KMT, he would immediately be expelled from the NP.⁴⁰ The KMT also reacted cautiously to suggestions of merger. For instance, the KMT's Chao Shou-po (趙守博) argued that this was not the right time for talking about mergers in the midst of the campaign. Also, he stated that though the KMT welcomed politicians to return to the KMT, the party would not be willing to lose its name for the sake of a merger.⁴¹

Following the NP's disastrous defeat in 2001, talk of an NP-KMT merger faded from attention. Hsieh was replaced as party chair by Yu and the priority for the NP became survival. The NP came out strongly in support of a joint Pan Blue ticket for the 2004 presidential election led by Lien. However, Yu made it clear that he favoured cooperation rather than a merger.⁴² Yu explained that he was supportive of the

³⁸UDN (2001, November 16, p. 3).

³⁹UDN (2001, November, 27, p. 4).

⁴⁰UDN (2001, December 5, p. 2).

⁴¹UDN (2001, November 17, p. 2).

⁴²UDN (2003, January 27, p. 6).

idea of a PFP–KMT merger, but that the NP preferred to go its own way for the time being.

Despite Yu's reservation, the process toward NP–KMT integration moved forward in the second half of 2004. An electoral alliance was agreed in September that allowed eight NP members to stand as KMT candidates in the December 2004 legislative elections.⁴³ In addition, the NP explained that after winning election, the legislators would revert to NP affiliation and become an independent party caucus.⁴⁴

Out of the NP candidates standing under the KMT banner, three were successfully elected in 2004. After Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) became KMT chairman in July 2005, talk of a party merger again disappeared. Instead, the KMT began a clearer takeover of NP assets. For instance, the three legislators ended their dual membership in August.⁴⁵ Since 2005, there have been occasional defections toward the KMT such as Hau Lung-bin in order to stand for the KMT as Taipei mayoral candidate in 2006 and even a smaller number of defecting in the opposite direction.⁴⁶ However, unlike in the past, these switches have not affected the collaborative relationship between the parties. Therefore, we have classified this case as a negotiated takeover.

Contextual Factors

Elections and the electoral system again played a role in the KMT's negotiated takeover of the NP. The emergence of the DPP as the ruling party in 2000, the NP–PFP hostility and the DPP's retention of power in 2004 served to bring the NP and KMT closer together. The 2001 legislative elections also had a major effect on the integration process. The NP candidates raising merger or returning to the KMT prior to the election suggests that they were clearly aware of the danger of losing under an NP banner. Moreover, the experience of the total defeat of its candidates in 2001 made the NP more open to the idea of the negotiated takeover for the 2004 legislative elections. The relative sizes of the KMT and NP meant that the KMT could dominate the takeover process. Lastly, the new Single Member District two-vote electoral system that was approved in 2005 squeezed the space for all smaller parties, including the NP. This explains why after 2005, the party has only been able to focus its efforts on the

⁴³UDN (2004, September 9, A10).

⁴⁴UDN (2004, September 27, p. 4).

⁴⁵UDN (2005, August 17, p. 4).

⁴⁶In 2008, Lee Sheng-feng (李勝峰) and Joanna Lci (雷倩) returned to stand for the NP for its party list.

SNTV Taipei city council and the proportional party list component of legislative elections.

Inter-Party Factors

The NP is perhaps the closest Taiwanese example of a primarily policy-seeking party, thus we should expect policy matters to be especially influential in its return to the KMT. For instance, Elmer Feng had argued a reason for calling for a merger in late 2001 was that the “KMT had bid farewell to the Lee Teng-hui line” (Fell, 2005, p. 109). Here, Feng is referring to the KMT’s shift back toward Chinese nationalist positions after Lee Teng-hui left in 2000. The KMT continued to move closer ideologically to the NP while in opposition. As a former KMT Propaganda Chief Huang Hui-chen (黃輝珍) explained in late 2001, “At present, those controlling the KMT’s ideology are inclined towards the NP force.”⁴⁷ After 2001, this convergence continued. For instance, the KMT visits to China in 2005 followed the precedent set by the NP’s talks with the Chinese Communist Party in 2001. Ma’s China policy prior to and after coming to power in 2008 essentially followed a blueprint left by the NP in the late 1990s and early post-2000s. In the summer of 2004, Yu remarked that once the KMT made a clean break from the localization line, he would no longer object to a merger.⁴⁸ Hsieh even liked the changed relationship to the story of Snow White,

We left because the KMT chairman (Lee Teng-hui) wasn’t Chinese. He bullied Chinese, we could see it. It was like in Snow White where the father marries a stepmother and the stepmother kicks out Snow White. We were like Snow White. We had been kicked out. But, after the stepmother was kicked out, we could have a good relationship with the family again.⁴⁹

However, as in the PFP–NP case, ideology was also something that kept the KMT–NP from fully merging. The KMT needed to take a relatively moderate line on relations with China in order to win national power and thus fully absorbing the NP risked giving it the reputation for extremism. Thus, it was safer from a KMT perspective to keep the NP as a separate, but allied party.

Inter-party trust and friendships have also been critical to the renewed embrace of the two parties. In other words, first Lien and then Ma were able to build up a good working relationship and election campaign cooperation with the NP leadership after 2001, and this has largely been maintained to this day.

⁴⁷Interview, Taipei, September 26, 2001; UDN (2004, August 14, A4).

⁴⁸UDN (2004, August 14, A4).

⁴⁹Interview, Kaohsiung, September 7, 2001.

Inner-Party Factors

Lastly, changing inner party variables contributed to the closer relationship. In addition to Lee's departure from the KMT, the passing of NP leadership from Hsieh to Yu was central to the more cooperative relationship between the NP and KMT. Yu was willing to allow the KMT to take over NP assets in 2005. The NP had originally been an element in the KMT non-mainstream faction that had been marginalized in the party in the mid-1990s. However, after Lien became KMT chairman in 2000, the non-mainstream faction again became influential in the KMT party headquarters, making it easier for the NP to be brought back into the fold. Similarly, there was a difference in the attitudes of Lien and Ma toward the NP, in that while the former was much more open to the idea of party merger, Ma preferred a friendly but *de facto* takeover of the NP.

Success of the Takeover

Generally, it is assumed that the smaller party in a merger will be assimilated by the larger party. At least ideologically, this NP–KMT takeover case challenges that assumption as over time the KMT has moved closer to the NP's positions since 2001. In fact, following the KMT's nomination of Hung Hsiu-chu (洪秀柱) as its 2016 presidential candidate, some analysts spoke of a NPization (新黨化) of the KMT.⁵⁰ If we consider how damaging the NP was to the KMT in the 1990s, then the transformation of the party's relationship must be considered a long-term success. The KMT has been able to reintegrate many of the NP's strongest politicians, but at the same time maintain a close working relationship. Even where the NP does nominate such as Taipei city council, it no longer appears to threaten the KMT and in return the NP actively campaigns for KMT candidates such as recently in the 2014 Taipei mayoral and 2016 presidential elections. In other words, the NP operates as somewhere between a friendly allied party and a party faction. Lastly, the partial takeover of the NP was a crucial step in the KMT's struggle to create a unified Pan Blue camp in the run up to its return to power in 2008. The model the KMT adopted for reintegrating the NP in 2004 was one that would subsequently be employed for the more complex task of re-absorbing the larger splinter, the PFP. This is the focus of the fourth and final case study.

⁵⁰Liberty Times (2015, June 29).

Case 4: The KMT and PFP: *From a Failed Merger to a Negotiated Takeover*

The fourth case should have been the easiest merger. The PFP and KMT were similar in size for much of the DPP era and after the departure of Lee Teng-hui from the KMT, the two were ideologically much closer. In addition, the two party chairs Lien and Soong were able to get over their earlier bitter rivalry from the 2000 presidential election and develop a close working relationship. However, despite the extensive merger talks, the eventual outcome was essentially a KMT *negotiated takeover*. Between the establishment of the PFP in April 2000 and the KMT's virtual takeover of the PFP in late 2007, the relationship between the parties went through a number of stages. The first phase that lasted through until the December 2002 local elections featured intense competition over which would be the dominant Pan Blue party.

A new phase of cooperation emerged in the aftermath of the 2002 elections. The parties were able to reach agreement for a joint presidential ticket with Lien as the presidential and Soong as vice presidential candidate. At this time, the KMT's Lien first raised the idea of a party merger arguing that Taiwan was already moving toward a two-party system and that the PFP, NP and KMT should discuss the steps toward a merger.⁵¹ The PFP immediately rejected this KMT suggestion, with the PFP's Chang Hsien-yao (張顯耀) explaining "[a] party merger before the election is impossible and impossible after the election."⁵²

Following the joint presidential ticket's narrow defeat in March 2004, the KMT attempted to hasten the merger process. In May, Lien tabled a KMT-PFP merger proposal that would see a merger working group set up and aimed to see the parties merged in July. However, Soong explained that there was not yet a timetable for a merger and an agreement on post-merger name as well as that the KMT needed to deal with its political corruption problems and that the parties still had major differences on localization.⁵³ Nevertheless, the first merger working group meetings were held in July, though it was agreed to delay the merger until after the December 2004 legislative election.⁵⁴

Pressure for a merger grew as the 2004 election campaign hotted up. The difference was that for the first time, calls for merger came from the PFP. In September, Soong proposed a merger timetable, calling for the creation of a new party in February

⁵¹UDN (2002, December 19, p. 4).

⁵²UDN (2003, January 25, p. 6).

⁵³UDN (2004, May 20, A3).

⁵⁴UDN (2004, July 15, p. 4).

2005, noting that the new party's name was something to be discussed.⁵⁵ Then on September 21, PFP legislators Lee Ching-hua and Diane Lee (李慶安) called on the parties to merge prior to the National Day (October 10), describing this as the best birthday present for the Republic of China.⁵⁶

The February target set by Soong was however not met. While the KMT was celebrating its December 2004 election victory, Soong argued that the KMT had broken its promises and that “[t]hey have closed the gates (to merger).”⁵⁷ At this time of growing PFP–KMT tensions a key precedent was set when PFP legislator Chou Hsi-wei (周錫璋) rejoined the KMT in order to contest the KMT's primary for Taipei County in April 2005. The PFP's response was to immediately suspend his membership.⁵⁸

It was not until the aftermath of the December 2005 local elections that the merger issue returned to the agenda. However, the urgency to merge now mainly came from the large pro-merger faction within the PFP. Working group meetings were held between PFP and KMT, with Ma (but not Soong) joining the discussions on December 8.⁵⁹ However, it was clear that the long awaited Ma–Soong meeting would be decisive; this tense four hour meeting was held on December 13.⁶⁰ Although they agreed to leave specifics on future nomination for later discussion, there was no breakthrough on a party merger.

We regard the aborted merger talks of December 2005 as the cutoff point between a failed merger and the new process of a negotiated takeover that would play out through to 2008. What had been a trickle of defections in 2005 became a major wave as the merger faction in the PFP switched to the KMT in 2006–2007. As the 2008 Legislative elections approached, KMT–PFP discussions revived in 2007. The challenge was what to do with the remaining PFP legislators that had not defected. In September, it was announced that a new target for party merger would be after the Legislative Yuan elections in February 2008.⁶¹ After negotiations between KMT Chair Wu Po-hsiung (吳伯雄) and Soong, it was announced that the remaining PFP legislators would return to the KMT and six would stand as district candidates with full KMT support.⁶² Former KMT Secretary-General Wu Tun-yi (吳敦義) explained his

⁵⁵UDN (2004, September 1, A4).

⁵⁶UDN (2004, September 22, A10).

⁵⁷UDN (2004, December 13, A5).

⁵⁸UDN (2005, April 14, A1).

⁵⁹UDN (2005, December 9, A3).

⁶⁰UDN (2005, December 13, A2).

⁶¹UDN (2007, September 23, A4).

⁶²UDN (2007, November 15, A4).

understanding of these negotiations, “So in reality, the two parties have become one. Although the names are still separate, as we still maintain Chairman Soong’s position as a party chairman.”⁶³ Once again, though a merger target was missed, this was not achieved in February 2008. The election results left the KMT with three quarters of the seats in parliament and the PFP just one. As Wu suggested that the two parties had effectively become one, it was more a negotiated takeover than a merger.

Contextual Factors

Electoral factors and the electoral system played a key role in the development of the integration process between the KMT and PFP after 2000. Soong’s almost successful presidential bid in 2000, high levels of party identification and remarkable election results in 2001, gave it the confidence to go it alone initially. The PFP thrived in the SNTV electoral system. After 2002, the party identification trend shifted in the KMT’s favor with PFP party identification down to 9.6 compared to the KMT’s 21.2 in 2004.

In 2004, the KMT again responded to a second presidential defeat with the call for a merger and the PFP’s reduced support levels meant it did not reject this proposal outright, the PFP still had the strength to make clear its preference for cooperation rather than merger. However, December 2004 legislative election results served to undermine the merger project. Although the Pan Blue camp retained its majority, the KMT had risen from 68 to 79 seats and the PFP fell from 46 to 34 seats. Thus, the PFP broke off talks believing that the KMT had deliberately profited at the PFP’s expense. However, by late 2005, party identification shifts made the PFP more willing to talk about a merger and PFP politicians began to defect. The new electoral system did have a mechanical effect as the challenge of the Single Member District two-vote system not only encouraged the defection toward the larger party, but also put pressure on the PFP to find a way out for its remaining politicians. By 2006, the relative party identification was 2.7 for the PFP to 35.5 for the KMT, giving the KMT much greater ability to dominate the integration process. According to KMT Secretary-General Wu, both sides stood to benefit from the nomination agreement in 2008,

That is because if they didn’t use the KMT flag, they wouldn’t be able to get elected. So, they had to join the KMT. In some places, our people might not win, and they had strong candidates. They needed our nomination and flag and we needed their talented politicians to join our party.⁶⁴

⁶³Interview, Taipei, July 25, 2008.

⁶⁴Interview, Taipei, July 25, 2008.

However, relative party sizes and electoral system factors cannot tell the whole story, as in late 2005, the PFP had sufficient numbers of strong legislators to survive as an independent entity even in the new electoral system.

Inter-Party Factors

Of the four cases examined, ideology was the least important in the KMT–PFP integration process. One of the key selling points of the PFP had been its relatively vague ideological positions compared to the NP. However, one interesting pattern in the negotiations process was that the PFP repeatedly raised policy issues as a means to stall negotiations. For instance, on separate occasions, the PFP demanded the KMT first deal with its China policy, its party assets and political corruption problems before the PFP would consider a merger.⁶⁵

Trust is a core ingredient of a successful merger, however, this was clearly often lacking. For instance, though Lien and Soong were able to get over the animosity left over from the 2000 campaign, trust was often broken down by open criticism of negotiations coming from both camps. Although many in the PFP had originated from the KMT, a faction of the PFP held highly hostile positions regarding the KMT. A representative figure whose criticisms of the KMT often undermined cross-party trust was PFP Vice Chair Chang Chao-hsiung. This is apparent from his comments after the December 2004 elections, “The first time we were tricked (by the KMT) we were honest and did not understand, the second time we were tricked we were honest and tolerant (忠厚), if we get tricked for a third time, we have to admit to being idiots.”⁶⁶

When we consider Lee et al. (2010) arguments on merger negotiations, we can see how the merger working groups were never allowed to fully function in this case. Not only were they subject to open criticism from fellow partisans opposed to merger, but also party leaders took hands-on roles rather than delegating power to the working groups. For instance, KMT Chair Ma personally joined the working group discussions in December 2005 and the Ma–Soong meeting later that week overrode any agreements the working groups reached.

Inner-Party Factors

Lastly, inner-party factors were critical in shaping the direction of integration. On paper, there was far less change within the PFP. Throughout the period, Soong was

⁶⁵UDN (2005, May 19, A4).

⁶⁶UDN (2005, May 19, A4).

Chair and Chang Vice Chair of the party. While Chang was consistently hostile toward the KMT, Soong's position on merger did change and soften over time as his own and the PFP's strength ebbed. Thus, once Soong's popularity had steeply declined by early 2005, his cautious attitude was being openly challenged by the merger faction in the PFP and these were the first politicians to defect in 2006. However, KMT sources tended to blame Soong's changeable attitude toward merger as the key factor preventing the merger taking place.⁶⁷

When it came to the KMT, Lien played a key role promoting integration with the PFP despite the internal criticism. Presidential advisor Hsu Li-teh (徐立德) who acted as a go-between in PFP-KMT negotiations described in his autobiography how Lien tried to create the right conditions for Soong to return to the KMT.⁶⁸ However, he did not have the same power within the KMT as Lee Teng-hui and this was made clear when internal opposition played a key role in the shelving of the May 2004 merger proposal. It is quite likely that if Lien had been able to serve a second term as KMT Chair, then a more equal format of integration could have been achieved. However, once Ma became KMT Chair, the takeover process began in the earnest. The atmosphere of the May 2005 Ma-Soong merger talks reflects the deep animosity between these two party leaders. This was apparent when after the meeting Ma even joked to reporters, "we do not need to call an ambulance."⁶⁹ It is also noteworthy that the parties were able to reach an agreement in 2007 to resolve the PFP's remaining legislators when Wu Po-hsiung temporarily replaced Ma as KMT Chairman in February 2007. Wu's more conciliatory style helped the parties overcome their differences to reach this agreement.

Success of the Takeover

If we take the electoral results in 2008 as a measure, then initially the takeover of the PFP was a remarkable success. The KMT won historic presidential and legislative election victories that stand in sharp contrast to 2004 when there were two separate parties. The party system was transformed as there was now a unified Pan Blue party more dominant than at any time since democratization. From the perspective of party unity, it was also successful as the new members were well integrated into the KMT and did not form an independent faction or switch back to the PFP. From the

⁶⁷UDN (2010, September 4, A4).

⁶⁸UDN (2010, September 4, A4).

⁶⁹UDN (2005, December 14, A4).

perspective of the PFP politicians' career, it was also very successful as the majority won election after rejoining the KMT and most won re-election in 2012 as well. Ideologically, they also fitted in well with the Ma-led KMT and its new Chinese nationalist appeals. In the long term, however, the takeover would have negative consequences for the KMT. Unlike the case of the NP, the PFP ended up taking an adversarial stance toward the KMT after 2010. This was apparent during the 2012 and 2016 national elections when Soong stood as presidential candidate and the party nominated district candidates (mainly against KMT incumbents) and a party list. This on its own way did pay off as the PFP was able to win three seats and get back into the Legislative Yuan in 2012. Moreover, in the 2016 national elections, Soong's PFP was even more damaging to the KMT and for part of the campaign, it looked as if Soong might even win more votes than the KMT presidential candidate. In other words, of all the four cases, the PFP has proved the most successful at post-takeover recovery.

Conclusion

This study represents the first attempt to systematically examine the process of party mergers and takeovers in Taiwan's party system. This has been achieved by examining four cases. We hope our study not only offers some contribution to the Taiwanese party literature, but also to the broader literature on party merging and takeovers. We have summarized our findings in Table 2.

Firstly, the study has shown the importance of examining a variety of merger outcomes rather than just successful cases. This approach allows us to examine a wider set of cases and also offers greater insights into how to explain variation in outcomes. We employed a classification scheme that used relative party power and the inter-party relationship to classify the types of outcome. We proposed five possible outcomes and our case studies included four of these: merger (NP-CSDP), failed merger (KMT-PFP stage 1), hostile takeover (PFP-NP), and negotiated takeover (KMT-NP & KMT-PFP stage 2).

We attempted to contribute to the discussion on how to explain the outcome of attempted mergers and takeovers by applying the framework suggested by Coffe & Torenvlied (2008) that looks at the process through the interplay of contextual, inter-party and inner party factors. We found that the best conditions for merger included similar relative party power, closer ideological positions, successful pre-merger cooperation, and supportive leadership. In contrast, though the PFP-KMT had some of these conditions (similar size and ideological positions), poor cooperation experience and changeable leadership positions on mergers led to the failed merger (stage 1).

Table 2
Summary of Cases

Classification	Contextual Factors	Inter-Party Factors	Inner-Party Factors	Success Evaluation
CSDP-NP A merger	Poor electoral results (CSDP); Similar relative sizes	Close ideological positions; Successful cooperation	Leadership supportive	Short-term success; Long-term failure
PPP-NP A hostile takeover	Different relative sizes	Lack of trust; Ideological differences	Hostile leadership	Short-term mixed success; Long-term failure
KMT-NP A negotiated takeover	Poor electoral results; Different relative sizes; Electoral system	Close ideological positions; Successful cooperation	Leadership supportive	Short- and long-term success
KMT-PPP From a failed merger to a negotiated takeover	New electoral system; From similar relative sizes to one dominant	Mixed cooperation experience	Leadership positions fluctuate (2002-2005) then leadership supportive (2007-2008)	Short-term success; Long-term failure

Large relative size advantage determined whether the process developed into a takeover rather than a merger. However, our cases revealed that other inter-party and inner party variables would determine whether the outcome was a negotiated or hostile takeover. In particular, we found that closer ideological positions, inter-party trust and leadership supportive of integration made a negotiated takeover more likely (KMT–NP & KMT–PFP stage 2). In contrast, low trust or aggressive attitudes in negotiations could backfire with potentially negative consequences, as was seen in the NP–PFP hostile takeover.

We were also interested in how to assess the impact of mergers or takeovers. We also have shown how the merger outcomes had a major influence on the shaping of Taiwan's party system. We made a distinction between long- and short-term impacts of mergers/takeovers. In the short term, we found that all four of our cases featured significant benefits in gaining human resources and improved post-fusion election results. Nevertheless, we have categorized three out of our four cases as long-term failures. For instance, the PFP was able to recover sufficiently to undermine the KMT electorally after 2010, while the CSDP faction within the NP had been entirely lost within three years of the merger.

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Why Is China Unwelcome in Taiwan? Cultural Alienation, Democratic Anxiety or Economic Loss in Explaining Taiwanese Resistance to China

WEI-FENG TZENG, KUAN-CHEN LEE
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This paper explores the factors that affect Taiwanese citizens' resistance to closer relations with China. Elements in Taiwanese society have recently exhibited a strong sense of anxiety in the face of a rising China. Distinct from the past military confrontation between China and Taiwan, more recently, Taiwanese citizens have been subject to a strengthening of cross-strait relations and interactions, which makes their rising resistance to China puzzling. To empirically and theoretically explain why Taiwanese are resistant to closer ties with the mainland, we discuss three potential sources: cultural alienation, democratic anxiety, and economic interest. We test the effects of these three attitudinal factors on Taiwanese resistance to Chinese tourists, students, and workers using the China Impact Survey 2012 data set. The findings suggest that democratic anxiety, economic interest, and cultural alienation are all strong predictors in accounting for the public's resistance to Chinese tourists and students, while economic interest is the most powerful factor in Taiwanese attitudes toward policies regarding Chinese workers. The findings provide important policy implications for policy makers in dealing with cross-strait relations.

KEYWORDS: Taiwan; China; cross-strait relations; resistance to China.

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This paper explores the factors that affect Taiwanese citizens' resistance to China. Elements in Taiwanese society have recently exhibited a strong sense of anxiety in the face of a rising China. We anatomize the so-called "Sinophobia syndrome" (恐中症)¹ by theorizing three important facets of individual fear of a foreign country—culture, political institutions and economic ties. In common political discourse, the public's fear of China has been depicted as an irrational opposition to China, since China's economic and industrial growth would benefit its neighbors through trade. Our comparison of the three factors provides evidence against this statement: the public in Taiwan fears China for legitimate reasons, especially for their own economic interests and political beliefs.

Among East Asian societies that are haunted by the recent rise of China, Taiwanese society has exhibited some of the greatest resistance to China, in large part due to its tense historical relations and strong historical ties. Since the Kuomintang (KMT) returned to power in 2008 and established a relationship with China closer than ever before in its history, the Taiwanese public has responded to this engagement with strong popular resistance. The public resistance has frustrated the cross-Strait relations considerably. A series of social movements² were launched by social groups who tried to halt the government's continuing pro-China policies and the fear of China is sometimes considered as irrational by media and politicians, who have dubbed it "Sinophobia syndrome" or opposition against everything involving China (逢中必反).³ The rising resistance to China also posed a challenge to Taipei in both domestic policies and bilateral negotiations with China. The public preferences on China policy become extremely unclear and hard to follow. Many Taiwanese long for

¹The term Sinophobia has been adopted as a political language in Taiwan. In 2009, a Taiwanese magazine survey has shown around three-quarters of Taiwanese have Sinophobia, which indicates this phenomenon has been rising for years in Taiwanese society. See Lai (2009).

²For instance, in 2014, students went to the streets and briefly occupied the Legislative Yuan to oppose the cursory passage of a trade agreement with China. At about the same time, citizens angrily criticized the government's consideration in bringing Chinese laborers into Taiwan and strongly disagreed with the healthcare policy that would cover Chinese students studying in Taiwan under the National Health Insurance. In 2015, a number of high school students rejected the revision of high school textbooks by the Ministry of Education, blaming the government for clandestinely inserting the "Great China" image in the content of history textbooks. In 2016, the public's resistance to China reached an apex, when voters replaced the pro-China incumbent party, the KMT, by bringing the opposition party Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) back to power in the presidential election.

³Indeed, unlike the past hatred toward China, the resistance does not involve in the historical defeat in the civil war, nor has it anything to do with the anti-Communist patriotism that the KMT has propagandized since 1949. Instead, today's resistance to China appears to be the public backlash against the uncertainty over the cross-Strait interactions. Since 1987 when cross-Strait interaction began, the Taiwanese public has gone through a period of Chinese military threats, then a short rapprochement, and now deepening cooperation. This historical development formulated the mentality of the Taiwanese public's attitudes toward China.

the economic benefits from engaging with China economically, while other groups are averse to take the risk of overreliance in China. The dilemma seems so far impossible to be solved. As such, Taiwan's policies with regard to China are regular hot button issues. The public's resistance to China has made Taipei's position and attempts at rapprochement awkward in its cross-Strait relationship.⁴

Why are Taiwanese citizens resistant to closer ties with China? The current scholarship seems to offer an ambiguous picture about the public's negative feelings on a rising China (Aldrich, Lu, & Kang 2014; Chu, Kang, & Huang, 2014; Kang & Chu, 2014; Kotler, Sugawara, & Yamada, 2007; Lee, 2009; Linley, Reilly, & Goldsmith, 2012; Shearer, 2010). According to survey research, public opinions on the influence of the rise of China vary across the world. Citizens in some countries, such as Singapore or the Philippines, view China as playing a positive role in the world while people in other countries, such as Japan and Mongolia, see China as harmful to their regions (Aldrich et al., 2014; Kang & Chu, 2014). From the same survey, Taiwanese are found to be generally positive toward the rise of China (Chu et al., 2014). Research also reports that frequent contacts with China significantly enhance Taiwanese positive impressions of China (Wu, Su, & Tsui, 2014). If this is the case, why does Taiwanese resistance to China grow rapidly when cross-Strait social contacts increase?

We believe that existing Taiwanese resistance to China requires further examination for two reasons. First, average citizens' negative evaluations on the rise of China may not necessarily lead to resistance to China. Indeed, many Taiwanese, for example, Taiwanese entrepreneurs, may view China or the Chinese people negatively, but they do not decline the opportunity to deepen ties or make business with them. Therefore, to understand the roots of Taiwanese resistance to China, it is insufficient to just look at the public's favorable attitude toward China. We need to further investigate the public's disposition to specific policies involving China. Second, the extant research on Taiwanese public opinion has experienced a certain paradigmatic shift, from emphasis on political cleavages, such as party identification, national identity, or political stance on independence or unification, to searching for causal theories for explaining the dynamic of the public's policy preferences (Chen, Chen, & Wang, 2012; Chu, 2004; Dittmer, 2004; Gries & Su, 2013; Hsieh & Niou, 2005; Niou, 2004,

⁴China exploits Taiwanese public's hostility to China as an excuse to limit the number of Chinese tourists for bargaining chips in pressing the new DPP leader Tsai Ing-wen to accept the "1992 consensus" that puts the cross-Strait relationships under a "One-China framework." See <<http://www.chinapost.com.tw/taiwan/china-taiwan-relations/2016/06/11/469010/Beijing-to.htm>> (accessed on September 10, 2016).

2008; Wang & Liu, 2004; Wang, 2013; Wu et al., 2014; Wu, 2005, 2012). In this process, the theoretical mechanisms through which Taiwanese form their China policy preferences are still under development and await empirical examination. Comparing different theoretical arguments in explaining Taiwanese resistance to China contributes to the current strand of theoretical building.

This paper contributes to the current research on Taiwanese public opinion under the current shaky cross-Strait relationship that characterizes and defines Chinese–Taiwanese relations. We propose that the Taiwanese resistance to China may be attributed to the Taiwanese public’s cultural alienation from China, their intention to defend their democratic institutions, and their motivation to protect their own economic interests. Each factor is developed from existing social science theories concerning the public’s resistance toward foreign countries. We then derive three hypotheses for empirical testing. In our empirical analysis, instead of using the general disposition toward China as a measure for the public’s feelings toward China, we directly examine individual evaluations on the government’s policy in introducing Chinese tourists, students, and laborers, which allow us to draw more policy implications from the analysis than using a single-dimensional measurement of fear of China or Chinese people. Our findings, by comparing the three factors, indicate that people’s negative evaluation on China’s impact on Taiwan’s democracy, and their personal economic interests, both strongly drive Taiwanese citizens to consistently resist an increase in Chinese tourists, students and workers coming to Taiwan. Their belief in cultural differences between Taiwan and China, by contrast, can only explain Taiwanese resistance toward an increase in Chinese tourists and students. This implies that, while cultural familiarity with China may slow down Taiwanese resistance to China, the resistance could not be truly alleviated without a convergence of political institutions of the two sides. Nor could it be solved without an improved economy under the economic integration between China and Taiwan, and attention to the winners and losers of any such integration. These economic and political factors will continue to be the most difficult problems facing leaders of China and Taiwan seeking closer ties.

The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. In the next section, theoretical arguments will be elaborated and a set of hypotheses are generated. We link three theoretical arguments to the Taiwanese public’s resistance to China and Chinese citizens. Following our theoretical discussions, we test these hypotheses using survey data collected in 2012. The data, empirical results, and models are presented in the next section. Concluding remarks on the implications of our findings are discussed at the end of this paper.

Roots of the Taiwanese Public's Resistance to China

In this section, we propose three theoretical arguments that explain the growing Taiwanese resistance to China. The three arguments are based on theories regarding cultural conflict, the democratic peace, and trade politics, all of which have been used to explain the public's negative attitude and resistance to foreign countries. We discuss the theoretical foundations and apply them to the understanding of formation of Taiwanese public's resistance to China.

Cultural Differences

One source that could arouse Taiwanese resistance to China is the long-term separation of the two societies and the resulting cultural divergence. Despite their similar language and traditions, Taiwan has developed a subculture that is distinct from China. Taiwan has been undergoing a process of cultural detachment from China since 1949. During the Cold War, Taiwan's governing party, the KMT, cut all formal and societal relationships with Communist China, which caused Taiwan to diverge considerably from the experience of mainland China. When China went through the Cultural Revolution in the 1960s, Taiwan was experiencing a process of cultural fusion of traditional Chinese culture under Japanese colonialism and Taiwan's own popular culture. As such, Japan's colonization also contributed the cultural detachment. Today, Taiwanese still have strong cultural affinity with Japan, and their economic experiences during this period more closely mirrored Japan's own economic experiences, and Taiwanese remain avid consumers of Japanese pop culture. For example, a survey shows that a majority of Taiwanese chose Japan, instead of China, as their favorite culture.⁵ Moreover, recent survey data show that two-thirds of younger Taiwanese believe that Taiwan and China do not share the same culture and ethnicity.⁶

There are many cases where different subgroups within a mainstream culture are resistant or hostile to each other. For instance, conflicts between Sunni and Shia in Islam, Protestants and Catholics in Christianity, and subnational cultures like Scottish in the United Kingdom or Catalonia in Spain, are all examples of how subculture may trigger mutual antagonism between two societies. In East Asia, Chinese, Japanese, Koreans, and as we argue, Taiwanese, do not share the same cultural identity either,

⁵See <<http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/world/breakingnews/1772621>> (accessed on July 30, 2016).

⁶See <<http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20160708000858-260301>> (accessed on July 30, 2016).

although they may have been categorized by a large cultural group with a common Confucian past.

This cultural separation can be an underlying force driving individual unfavorable reactions to other groups and a source of group conflict, as Huntington famously points out: “the most important conflicts of the future will occur along the cultural fault lines” (Huntington, 1993a, p. 25). Constructivist scholars of international politics have also argued that the public opinion on foreign policies in a country are largely predetermined by the society’s cultural preferences (Jepperson, Wendt, & Katzenstein, 1996; Moravcsik, 1997; Wendt, 1994). For instance, the long-term friendship and alliance established by the United States and the UK is due in large part to their cultural affinity. Empirical evidence from survey research also shows that culture is usually a cue for the public when they see foreign countries and sense threats from foreigners (Baumgartner, Francia, & Morris, 2008; Lacina & Lee, 2013; Sulfaro & Crislip, 1997).

This cultural separation is observed in Taiwanese choice on national identity as well. More and more citizens prefer to be called Taiwanese rather than Chinese. This has been a long-term trend confirmed by a number of rigorous analyses and survey data for multiple years (Chen et al., 2012; Liao, Chen, & Huang, 2013).⁷ When Taiwanese see themselves as Taiwanese and categorize Chinese as “others,” conflict between the two groups may arise. As research has demonstrated, once group identity is formed, individual behaviors manifest in-group favoritism and intergroup discrimination (Billig & Tajfel, 1973), which guides individual behaviors toward others. Because group identity rarely changes, once the identity of being “Taiwanese” is established, it will inevitably influence the public behaviors. As Huntington (1993a, p. 27) also points out that “cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily to compromise and resolve than political and economic ones.” Many intractable, long-lasting conflicts that are hard to address, such as the ethnic and religious violence in India, are mostly cultural/identity conflicts.

With culture acting as a source of individual resistance to people from outside groups, we expect that Taiwan’s cultural detachment from China has facilitated the formation of Taiwanese resistant attitude toward China. In other words, Taiwanese are resistant to China or its citizens for they see China as foreign or exogenous culture. In addition, because of the inherent reluctance to contact China and Chinese, Taiwanese people would prefer any policies that would decrease the chance of them having direct

⁷The latest trends of Taiwanese identity can also be seen in a national survey data from National Chengchi University (NCCU) in 2015. See <<http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/app/news.php?Sn=166#>> (accessed on January 10, 2016).

contact with Chinese citizens. The cultural detachment thus could be a reason that Taiwanese resist different groups of Chinese citizens. For instance, Taiwanese who believe that Chinese culture is a foreign culture would like to be in contact with Chinese people as infrequently as possible, since they mentally consider Chinese citizens as “others,” to whom they naturally will develop a resistant attitude. In fact, this phenomenon can be easily seen in Taiwanese society, where people frequently and sometimes discriminately complain about Chinese citizens’ rudeness, impoliteness, or disrespect.

If cultural differences form individuals’ fear and distaste toward Chinese citizens, we would predict that people who considered China as a foreign culture will manifest the resistant attitude toward Chinese citizens, and they will reject an increase in the number of Chinese citizens in Taiwan, whatever purposes these Chinese would have in staying in this island. More specifically, we should be able to observe that those who believe Taiwan and China are culturally different will prefer a policy that restricts Chinese citizens entering Taiwan for tourism, education, or even for work because they just dislike the alien group of people, as suggested by cultural conflict theory. They may also be skeptical of such programs as a means to further Chinese–Taiwanese ties to re-establish cross-Strait cultural linkages that erode their unique Taiwanese identity. To examine this argument, we propose the following hypothesis.

Cultural differences hypothesis: All else being equal, Taiwanese who believe China and Taiwan do not belong to the same culture are more likely to approve of closer ties to China and Chinese citizens; on the other hand, those who believe they are the same culture will be less likely to approve of closer ties to China and Chinese citizens. Specifically, Taiwanese who strongly believe in the cultural differences between Taiwan and China will be more likely to reject an increase of Chinese tourists, students, and workers, and approve a decrease of Chinese citizens. Those who strongly reject any cultural differences between China and Taiwan will be more likely to prefer such an increase and reject a decrease of Chinese tourists, students, and workers.

Democratic Anxiety

The differences of political institutions may also explain the formation of Taiwanese resistance toward China, particularly when Taiwanese live with the fear of military invasion from an aggressive regional power. Traditional wisdom has posited that citizens in democracies see authoritarian countries as more threatening than the countries with democratic institutions because, as widely known, democracies usually do not fight each other while autocracies and democracies often do (Benoit, 1996; Maoz & Abdolali, 1989; Maoz & Russett, 1993; Rummel, 1983). The reasoning behind democratic peace lies in the inherent institutional differences (Bueno de

Mesquita, Morrow, Siverson, & Smith, 1999; Fearon, 1994). Many empirical studies have demonstrated that regime type is heuristic for ordinary citizens to evaluate threat from foreign countries (Johns & Davies, 2012, p. 1040; Mintz & Geva, 1993; Tomz & Weeks, 2013).

It is thus reasonable to expect that many Taiwanese are resistant to Chinese influence or the arrival of Chinese citizens in Taiwan in order to protect Taiwan's democratic institutions from Chinese encroachment. China's growing military capacity has posed an unwelcome threat to Taiwan for some time (Ross, 2005), and China continuously claims Taiwan's territory as inseparable.⁸ Most Taiwanese share experiences on military confrontations with mainland China, not to mention the past deadly civil war between the KMT and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). In 1995 and 1996, China launched several missiles into the waters around Taiwan to intimidate the possible cooperation of Taiwan and the US during Taiwan's potential pursuit of independence.

Moreover, the resistance of citizens to autocracies might be further stiffened as democratic values are strongly rooted in a society. Maoz and Russett (1993) have reported that when a country has full-fledged democracy, which is measured by the year of being a democratic regime, the probability that it will fight other democracies is extremely low while the chance being against autocracies is relatively high. Started from the late 1980s, Taiwan gradually transitioned from a single-party-dominated regime into a multiparty liberal democracy. In the 2000 presidential election, Taiwanese elected Chen Shui-bian as their first non-KMT and native Taiwanese president. In 2008, the second turnover for the government shows that Taiwan's democracy is gradually consolidated (Huntington, 1993b). There is no doubt that Taiwan has been a democratic regime⁹ and the public's appreciation of democracy has also been constantly growing since democratization (Yu & Hsiao, 2007).

Recent social movements against China illustrate why the Taiwanese public's resistance to China can be aroused by the motivation to defend democratic institutions. In these social movements, "defending Taiwan's sovereignty" and "persevering Taiwan's democracy" have been the two major anti-China slogans. In the 2014 Sunflower Movement, students who occupied the legislature called for the people to

⁸In 2005, China ratified its "Anti-Secession Law" with a clear purpose written in Article 1 that "This Law is... for the purpose of opposing and checking Taiwan's secession from China by secessionists in the name of 'Taiwan independence.'" See <<http://www.china.org.cn/english/2005lh/122724.htm>> (accessed on May 15, 2016).

⁹According to the Freedom House rankings in 2015, Taiwan is identified as free and scores better in political rights measures compared to China.

“save democracy” in Taiwan¹⁰ by linking the ratification of economic agreement with China to a sale of sovereignty and the impairment of democratic institutions. The protesters argue that any policies regarding engagement with China should be deliberative and transparent. Also, one of the reasons that citizens engaged in protests against the trade agreement with China is that the KMT tried to pass the trade agreement with minimum supervision by the Legislative Yuan. Citizens thus were motivated to join the demonstration to stave off further sabotage of democratic process by the KMT.

Since democratic values have been implanted in society, Taiwanese have inherently developed a resistant attitude toward China because they have reason to worry about China’s negative influence on Taiwan’s democracy. This represents a “democratic anxiety” among the population — a fear that closer integration with China could threaten their democratic institutions, and result in an encroachment of authoritarianism in the style of mainland China.

As such, a reasonable proposition is that Taiwanese individuals are fearful of China or Chinese citizens in defense of any negative impact China would bring to the politics and institutions of Taiwan. This inherent concern developed as the current generation of Taiwanese mostly grew up in a democratic setting and have been exposed to the contrasting aggressive, undemocratic mainland Chinese regime. The political institutional differences between Taiwan and China give rise to Taiwanese fear of China and Chinese citizens’ potential harmful impact on Taiwan’s well-established democratic institutions. Increasing engagement with China and the incoming Chinese citizens thus will be targeted by those who believe Taiwan’s democracy will be eroded as China’s influence becomes larger in this island. If this is the case, we should be able to see that the Taiwanese who believe engaging China will damage Taiwan’s democracy will also be wary of closer ties to China.

Moreover, those who dislike China because of the dubiety of China’s influence on Taiwan’s democracy will also be skeptical of Chinese citizens. For instance, some Taiwanese people questioned the purpose of Chinese tourists visiting places nearby Taiwan’s military base, such as Hualien or Kaohsiung. They believe that certain Chinese citizens were involved in espionage, particularly collecting military information for future use in attacking Taiwan. The same logic is applied to Chinese students and workers. Those who believe China’s negative impact on Taiwan’s democratic institutions will also worry about the infiltration of Chinese people in

¹⁰Students are still calling public attention on this. See *New York Times*, 2015 March 18, <http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/03/18/world/asia/ap-as-taiwan-sunflower-movement.html?_r=0>.

schools or industries. It is believed that Chinese students and workers, whose qualifications require official approval from the Chinese government, can serve the political goal in influencing Taiwanese public opinion. The increase of Chinese students and workers, for those Taiwanese who distrust China's political institutions, will be considered as an incoming damage of Taiwan's democracy as well. For the same token, the group of Taiwanese will prefer a gradual decrease of Chinese students and workers, or even a direct close of any importing of labor forces from China. To examine whether the mentality of democratic anxiety lies in Taiwanese resistance to China and Chinese citizens, we test the following hypothesis.

Democratic anxiety hypothesis: All else being equal, Taiwanese who believe engagement with China will sabotage Taiwan's democracy are more likely to resist closer ties with China and Chinese citizens; on the other hand, those who do not believe so will be less likely to resist closer ties with China and Chinese citizens. Specifically, Taiwanese who agree that China has a very negative impact on Taiwan's democracy will be more likely to reject an increase of Chinese tourists, students, and workers, and approve of a decrease of these Chinese citizens, while those who agree that China has a very positive impact on Taiwan's democracy will be more likely to prefer such an increase and reject a decrease in the number of Chinese tourists, students and workers.

Economic Loss

Our third argument proposes that Taiwanese economic considerations will determine their resistant attitude toward China. Taiwan's economic interaction with China has been growing since 1980. From 1989 to 2010, the total trade flows between Taiwan and China had increased up to US\$142.9 billion (Muyard, 2012, p. 169). In 2010, Taiwan and China signed the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA), which opens cross-Strait free trade and capital markets. The ECFA deepened the cross-Strait economic integration in a way that provides greater interaction between businesses, capital sources, and human resources than before (Tung & Yeh, 2014). Despite increasing economic interaction, many Taiwanese do not enjoy the benefits (Lin, 2012; Muyard, 2012). Only a small group of capital-intensive classes reaps the profit of opening trade and investment opportunities from economic engagement with China. For most Taiwanese, they observe considerable financial capital flowing between Taiwan and China, labor-intensive industries being moved to China's coastal cities, technologies being transferred to Chinese companies, and Taiwanese-trained talents and intellects migrating to the mainland. For the labor class, cross-Strait economic integration directly resulted in decreasing salaries and job opportunities. In fact, income inequality has worsened since cross-Strait economic interaction became more intense in 2008 (Muyard, 2012, p. 174).

Economic protectionism is often cited as a reason to resist foreigners. Political economic analyses on globalization have demonstrated that economic interests can influence domestic politics. Trade, for example, according to economists, generates returns for owners who possess the abundantly endowed factor of production while the returns for owners of the scarce factor will decline (Stolper & Samuelson, 1941). The class interests thus diverge after the development of bilateral trade because there will be losers and winners. Since capitalists in a capital-abundant country receive considerable returns from trade, they will pursue efforts, such as lobbying or bribing, in support of open trade policies (Alt & Gilligan, 2009; Rogowski, 2009).¹¹ Workers, on the contrary, as losers in trade, will resist any potential bilateral trade of their country in order to keep them from the risk of opening markets (Dollar & Kraay, 2004; Freeman, 1995; Hiscox, 2001).

Victims of trade usually hold negative perspectives on economic liberalization and are resistant to foreigners, who are considered as competitors. Scheve and Slaughter (2001) find that the employment type and assets value determine individuals' support for new trade limits. Their analysis reveals that low-skilled workers and residents who live in areas where industries that would suffer from comparative disadvantage are concentrated are two major groups who support trade barriers. Beaulieu (2002) and Balistreri (1997) also find that low-skilled employed Canadians do not support the Canadian–U.S. Free-Trade Agreement (CAFTA). Similar phenomena are found in the process of European integration as well. Citizens who are better educated and are equipped with higher labor skills manifest higher level of support of European Union (EU) integration, compared to low-skilled workers (Anderson & Reichert, 1995; Gabel & Palmer, 1995).

Like victims under globalization, many Taiwanese, particularly working-class individuals, are likely to lose out in any economic interactions with China. They are forced to face competition with cheap and abundant Chinese labor, and many of them have lost their jobs after labor-intensive factories shut down their plants and relocated to mainland China. The past and potential economic losers in Taiwan thus resist increased business ties with China, and attempt to reverse the trend of increasing cross-Strait economic interaction. They consistently protested in several legislative elections after 2000 by voting for the pan-Green camp, who are supportive of a

¹¹A further discussion will involve the mobility of factor and the sectoral comparative advantage in bilateral trade. Since our discussion focuses on the causal mechanism that induces people's perspective on foreign countries, we only borrow the insights from trade politics, but are not involved in a deep discussion of the debate. For more detail, see Frieden, Lake, and Broz (2009, Part V).

slow-down policy regarding engaging China (Chen et al., 2012; Wong, 2010). They are also very negative and fearful about trade and economic integration. Survey research shows that the working class, which suffers the largest losses under cross-strait trade, is extremely resistant to a further economic integration with China (Lin, 2012). In the Sunflower Movement in 2014, participants claimed that the trade agreement with China will sacrifice the benefits of working class and serve the interests of the KMT and its “affiliated” big businesses. This has aroused the public’s emotion for being economic victims from cross-strait trade, and successfully mobilized many sympathetic citizens to join the movement.

If economic interest is an inherent cause driving the fear of China and Chinese citizens, Taiwanese viewing China and Chinese as economic competitors should decrease any chance that Chinese can come to Taiwan to compete with them in job and business opportunities and economic benefits. It is thus reasonable to expect that Taiwanese resistance to China would have to do with people’s calculation of economic interests from cross-strait economic interaction — those who believe they will suffer losses from further economic interaction with China may be more likely to resist closer ties with China and Chinese citizens. Economic loss, more specifically, will motivate Taiwanese to reject further contact with China and an increase of Chinese citizens in Taiwan. Indeed, even though China has been a growing economic giant in the world, many Taiwanese still believe that a large number of Chinese stay in Taiwan, legally or illegally, for better salaries than comparable work in China. Those who worry about their job security will be convinced that Chinese tourists will choose not to go back to China, but to find a job in Taiwan. They will also be convinced that Chinese students will become job competitors if the government opens the higher education market to young Chinese citizens. We thus expect that Taiwanese who believe engagement with China will cause their economic situation to deteriorate will choose to inhibit an increase of Chinese tourists and students.

The public’s concern about China’s impact on their economic benefits would be most serious to their attitudes toward policies regarding opening the job market to Chinese workers, as this issue directly links to job security. For Taiwanese, especially those low-skilled workers, China’s manufacturing industry poses a serious threat to their living. As discussed previously, in the past few decades, many Taiwanese businesses moved their factories to China to seek cheap labor, leaving behind the Taiwanese laborers, who mostly can only find jobs in the service sector with lower wages and less job security. The introduction of Chinese workers will definitely provoke Taiwanese anxiety about the competition with foreign cheap labor, especially those who have suffered from economic loss in the past decades. Hence, economic loss

should be a powerful predictor for Taiwanese attitudes toward the introduction of Chinese workers. Those who believe engagement with China has harmed their economic interest should strongly oppose an increase of Chinese workers, while those who disagree with such a claim may be more amenable to an increase of Chinese workers. Thus, the economic interest hypothesis is as follows.

Economic interest hypothesis: All else being equal, Taiwanese who believe engagement with China has harmed their economic interest will be more likely to resist closer ties with China and Chinese citizens; on the other hand, those who do not believe so will be less likely to resist closer ties with China and Chinese citizens. Specifically, Taiwanese who believe engagement with China has harmed their economic interest will be more likely to reject an increase of Chinese tourists, students, and workers, and approve of a decrease in the number of these Chinese citizens while those who believe engagement with China has a positive impact on their economy will be more likely to prefer such an increase and oppose a decrease in the number of Chinese tourists, students and workers.

In addition to investigating the applicability of the three theoretical arguments in Taiwanese resistance to China, we are also interested in the comparison of the explanatory power of the three factors. Indeed, while we believe cultural differences, democratic anxiety and economic interest all drive Taiwanese resistance to China and Chinese citizens, the degrees to which these factors influence Taiwanese attitudes toward a specific group of Chinese citizens may vary. After all, these groups may signal threat on different issues to different sectors of Taiwanese society. Among the linkages of these issues and the explanatory factors, the most relevant one, as we have also discussed earlier, is the association between the introduction of Chinese workers and the public's fear of economic loss. Although it is not difficult for Taiwanese to picture China as a threat based on the fear of cultural and political differences, the economic incentive, intuitively, should be the first and most direct consideration when evaluating the impact of introducing Chinese workers to Taiwan. On the other hand, when it comes to the issues of Chinese students and tourists, economic consideration should be less important than the cultural differences and democratic anxiety in explaining Taiwanese resistance to these two groups of Chinese citizens. Also, considering that tourists and students would be the potential groups that could bring the most direct economic benefit to the local economy in Taiwan, the worry of economic loss for those who are doing business with tourists and students would be neutralized. Our expectation thus is that economic loss will be the strongest factor in explaining Taiwanese resistance to Chinese workers, while it will not be as powerful as cultural differences and democratic anxiety in accounting for attitudes regarding the increase or decrease of Chinese tourists and students. We test this proposition in the following empirical analysis.

Data and Variables

In this section, we specify our data source and variables that are used in the statistical analysis. To investigate Taiwanese resistance to China, we use ordinal variables to measure Taiwanese preferences over the introduction of Chinese tourists, students, and workers in Taiwan. We also specify our independent and control variables. The method and empirical results will be discussed in the next section.

Data

We use the China Impact Survey 2012 (CIS 2012) (Chang, 2014) to test the above-specified hypotheses.¹² The CIS data were collected by Taiwan's official research agency, the Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica, whose goal is to investigate public attitude toward cross-Strait interactions and exchanges after the Taiwanese government signed the ECFA with mainland China in 2010. The survey was conducted through telephone interviews.

In the CIS 2012 study, the questionnaires are divided into five themes, including working conditions, demographic questions, perceptions of China, China's influence on Taiwan, and current political affairs. The target population was defined as Republic of China citizens who are 20 years or older, and that population was sampled by the Computer-Assisted Telephone Interview (CATI) system from a listing of all residential telephone numbers in Taiwan. A total of 24,939 phone numbers were contacted between February 20 to February 27, 2012. It yielded 1,202 valid cases with a cooperation rate of 57.64%. After weighting, the demographic characteristics of the sample are consistent with the population. Therefore, this data set provides an empirical basis for evaluating people's perception of China and attitude toward cross-Strait interactions.

Dependent Variables: Individual Preferences over Chinese Tourists, Students and Workers

The dependent variable in our hypothesis concerns Taiwanese resistance to China and Chinese citizens. Traditionally, scholars use the degree to which individuals

¹²The data were from China Impact Survey 2012 (CIS 2012), whose coordinator is Research Fellow Mau-Kuei Chang (Institute of Sociology, Academia Sinica). CIS 2012 was available from the Survey Research Data Archive, Center for Survey Research, Research Center for Humanities and Social Science, Academia Sinica. The authors appreciate the assistance in providing data by the institute and individual(s) aforementioned. The authors alone are responsible for the views expressed herein.

like or dislike China as measure for the public opinion on China (Chu et al., 2014; Linley et al., 2012).¹³ This measure, however, is too general to draw policy-relevant implications because favorable or unfavorable attitude choices may not directly translate to individual policy preferences. Instead of using the favorable/unfavorable attitudinal scale, we look at people's policy evaluation on whether they resist an increase in Chinese individuals coming to Taiwan. To do so, we measure Taiwanese individuals' attitudes toward three recent most salient and contending policy issues involving Chinese tourists, Chinese students, and Chinese laborers. Specifically, we examine the public's responses to the following questions: (1) whether the government should increase or decrease the number of Chinese tourists to visit Taiwan; (2) whether the government should increase or decrease the number of Chinese students to study in Taiwan; (3) whether the government should increase or decrease the number of Chinese workers to be employed in Taiwan. The respondents are given three options to these questions: increase, remain the same, and decrease. We consider it as an ordinal preference representing the degree to which individuals resist to China.

Table 1 shows the distribution of our dependent variables. It suggests that Taiwanese people are not particularly resistant to Chinese tourists and students. Only 12.3% of people report that the number of Chinese tourists nowadays in Taiwan should be decreased. People who think the government should cut the number of Chinese students account for one-fourth of the population. On the other hand, the majority of respondents express skepticism over issues to reduce the restrictions on Chinese employees and investments. In our data, about 45% of respondents think that the number of Chinese workers should be decreased. From the statistics, it seems that Taiwanese are more resistant to China when it comes to policies related to economic matters rather than social issues. This trend is heuristic because it is consistent with the observable Taiwanese public reaction to Chinese policies in recent years. Compared to education policies, economic or trade issues have led to more controversial debates in Taiwan. For example, the ECFA has received considerable attention and triggered widespread protests against the government, while the opposition to Chinese students and tourists does not have the same mobilizing impact on the public.

¹³Many survey companies also continue to investigate whether the public opinion favors a growing China. The Pew Research Center is one such example, see <<http://www.pewglobal.org/2014/07/14/chapter-2-chinas-image/>> (accessed on September 15, 2016).

Table 1.

Attitude toward Chinese Tourists, Students, Workers, and Investment

1. Do you think the number of Chinese tourists in Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is?

Increase	Remain the same	Decrease	Total
46.98%	40.68%	12.34%	100.00%
(537)	(465)	(141)	(1,143)

2. Do you think the number of Chinese students in Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is?

Increase	Remain the same	Decrease	Total
30.38%	43.28%	26.35%	100.00%
(332)	(473)	(288)	(1,093)

3. Do you think the number of Chinese workers in Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is?

Increase	Remain the same	Decrease	Total
9.00%	45.19%	45.18%	100.00%
(101)	(507)	(514)	(1,122)

Independent Variables: Cultural Detachment, Defending Democracy, and Economy Loss

Our hypotheses suggest that all else being equal, (1) individuals who are more alien to Chinese culture will be more resistant to China and Chinese citizens coming to Taiwan; (2) individuals who are more defensive or anxious in their attitude of protecting Taiwanese democratic institutions will be more resistant to closer ties with China and Chinese citizens coming to Taiwan, and (3) individuals who are more pessimistic in evaluating the economic influence of the cross-strait economic integration will be more resistant to closer ties with China and Chinese citizens coming to Taiwan. The three variables — cultural differences, democratic anxiety, and economic interest — will be drawn from the data set directly. For the first variable, we use the question that asked respondents' agreement on the statement of "sharing the same ethnicity and language between Taiwan and China." The answers are recoded using a five-point scale: 1 = strongly disagree; 2 = disagree; 3 = hard to say; 4 = disagree; 5 = strongly disagree, in which higher values represent higher degrees to which an individual is alien from Chinese culture.

For the democratic anxiety hypothesis, we use the question asking respondents to evaluate “the impact of cross-Strait relations on Taiwan’s democracy.” The answers are recoded as 1 = very positive; 2 = positive; 3 = no impact; 4 = negative; 5 = very negative. Higher values indicate stronger defensive attitudes a person think about China’s influence on Taiwan. As for the economic loss hypothesis, we operationalize this variable by using a question related to respondents’ assessment about “the impact of cross-Strait economic integration on their family’s economic wellbeing.” The answer is coded as 1 = very positive; 2 = positive; 3 = no impact; 4 = negative; 5 = very negative. Since higher values represent individuals’ self-evaluation as victims in economic engagement with China, we expect this variable to be positively correlated with our dependent variable.

Control Variables

Based upon the previous research on political behavior in Taiwan, voters’ party identification and national identity are decisive factors in Taiwan’s electoral politics. These two variables are included as controls. For partisanship, we control whether the respondent identified themselves as the party in the pan-Blue camp or the pan-Green camp,¹⁴ or has no party identification. We expect that compared to pan-Blue party identifiers, pan-Green (or non-party) identifiers are more likely to support resistance to China. For national identity, we operationalize it by measuring individuals’ preference on the issue of Taiwanese independence or unification with China. Respondents who answered that they favor unification will be coded as 1. Those who answered remain status quo are coded as 2 and support Taiwan independence are coded as 3.

Several socio-demographic variables may affect Taiwanese attitudes toward China and are often used in accounting for the formation of public opinion. We also include these variables as controls. Specifically, variables related to respondents’ socio-economic status such as gender, age, educational level, social class, and their ethnic identity are used as controls. For respondents’ gender, we recode female as 1, otherwise as 0. Respondents’ age is grouped into a 10-year interval from 20–29 to above 60. Respondents’ level of education is classified into five categories, which were “elementary or below,” “middle school,” “high school,” “some college,” and “university or above.” Social class is defined as a categorical variable of occupational

¹⁴The pan-Blue camp usually refers to the parties that are pro-China and support unification. The KMT, People First Party and New Party are considered pan-Blue. The pan-Green camp refers to the parties that are anti-China and prefer Taiwan’s independence. The DPP, Taiwan Solidarity Union and New Power Party are considered pan-Green.

classification including “not in the labor force,” “farmers and manual workers,” “non-professional employees,” “professional or semi-professional,” with the “managers” serving as the reference category. For ethnic identity, we control four major language groups in Taiwan, which are Minnan, Hakka, Mainlander, and indigenous Taiwanese, respectively.

Empirical Results

Since our dependent variables are ordinal, it is preferable to use ordered logit rather than OLS estimates to test our hypotheses.¹⁵ However, our dependent variables violated the parallel regression assumption when using ordered logit models, indicating that one or more coefficients differ across pairs of outcome groups, which would bias the empirical results.¹⁶ To solve this problem, we employ the generalized ordered logit model as an alternative method for hypotheses testing. The generalized ordered logit model can overcome the problem of the parallel regression assumption being violated by estimating a series of binary logistic regressions where different categories of the dependent variable are combined (Williams, 2006). For instance, our dependent variable of preferred number of Chinese tourists has three categories in order: increase, remain the same, and decrease. The first panel contrasts category 1 (increase) with categories 2 (remain the same) and 3 (decrease); the second panel contrasts categories 1 and 2 with category 3. The model therefore can provide result after correcting the explanatory variables that violate the parallel regression assumption. Technically, we use a STATA package named *gologit2* (Williams, 2006) to fit the generalized ordered logit model. By adding *autofit* option, the model relaxes the parallel regression assumption only for variables where the assumption is violated so that the model is more parsimonious than *gologit* proposed by Fu (1999). Another advantage of using *gologit2* is postestimation commands like *predict* or *margins* are allowed, which makes the results easier to interpret. We use estimates from general ordered logit to calculate the predicted probabilities for further investigating the substantial influence of the explanatory variables on Taiwanese resistance to China.

¹⁵We compare these estimates with OLS estimates, and Hausman tests (not shown in the table) suggest that ordered logit estimates are more appropriate than OLS estimates ($p < 0.05$).

¹⁶A user-written package — *brant* (Long & Freese, 2014) — is used to test the parallel regression assumption. The brant test statistics show that the assumption is violated in two of our models (student and worker). We very much appreciate our reviewers’ helpful comment on this test.

Table 2 shows our generalized ordered logit models for Taiwanese citizens' preference over whether to alter the number of Chinese tourists, students, and workers allowed in Taiwan.¹⁷ Our hypotheses specify three factors that determine the formation of Taiwanese resistance to China or Chinese—cultural alienation, democracy defense and economic loss. The results in Table 2 generally confirm our hypotheses but the effects of the three factors on people's policy preferences differ to a varying degree. Model 1 (tourists) shows that perceptions of cultural differences, negative evaluations of China's impact on Taiwan's democracy and pessimism about the effect of the economy on their family significantly increase the likelihood that people prefer to decrease the number of Chinese tourists. Model 2, where the parallel regression assumption is violated, indicates that democratic anxiety and economic loss exert strong and equivalent effects on people's preference to reduce the number of Chinese students, while the effect of cultural alienation differs across two regressions. The differed estimates of cultural alienation suggest that in comparison to increase the number of Chinese students, people are more likely to prefer status quo or decrease when the perception that culture difference between Taiwan and China is getting larger. But this effect is not significant if the reference categories become 3 (decrease) vs. 2 and 1 (remain the same and increase). In Model 3, we find that the perceived cultural differences are not significantly associated with respondents' preference over the introduction of Chinese workers, while the effect of democratic anxiety is to push people more supportive to the most extreme attitude (decrease the number of Chinese workers). Unlike cultural and democratic anxiety factors, economic loss is a consistent and powerful predictor in this model.

Figure 1 shows the predicted probabilities calculated from the coefficients for the cultural differences variable.¹⁸ The graph on the left side represents the effect of cultural differences on the likelihood that individuals will choose to increase the

¹⁷We also conducted a factor analysis for the preference over the increase or decrease of the number of Chinese tourists, students, and workers. The result (not shown in this paper) demonstrates that the three dependent variables can tap into a single dimension with internal consistency, which allows us to construct an index combining all three dependent variables. We regress the index on our independent variables and control variables, and find that cultural differences, democratic anxiety, and economic loss are all significantly correlated with the factor score and follow our theoretical expectations. However, we are more interested in looking at individual policy preferences separately, so we do not employ a factor score to evaluate Taiwanese resistance to China.

¹⁸To make the predicted probabilities interpretable, we compute them in each model by setting the democratic anxiety and economic loss variables at their means while other categorical variables are specified either as a 1 or a 0. According to our settings, the predicted probability in Figure 1 means the likelihood to resist closer ties to China for a respondent who is a male, 40–49 years old, university-educated, ethnic Minnan, professional-careered, not affiliating to parties, supporting status quo on unification/independence issues and showing a moderate attitude on democratic anxiety and economic loss questions.

Table 2.
Generalized Ordered Logit Estimates for Taiwanese Resistance to China

	(1) Tourist		(2) Student		(3) Worker	
	> increase	> remain	> increase	> remain	> increase	> remain
Cultural differences	0.149(0.054)**		0.280(0.068)***	0.128(0.065)	0.095(0.055)	
Democratic anxiety	0.530(0.072)***		0.0404(0.070)***		-0.060(0.109)	0.354(0.109)***
Economic loss	0.358(0.085)***		0.371(0.083)***		0.319(0.085)***	
Female	0.532(0.147)***		0.667(0.167)***	0.179(0.180)	0.123(0.148)	
Age (20–29 as reference group)						
30–39	-0.365(0.245)		-0.018(0.243)		-0.427(0.256)	
40–49	-0.528(0.244)*		0.273(0.241)		-0.261(0.253)	
50–59	-0.522(0.266)*		0.021(0.260)		-0.543(0.273)*	
above 60	-0.691(0.289)*		-0.028(0.282)		-0.741(0.293)*	
Education level (university and above as reference group)						
Elementary	-0.301(0.349)		0.077(0.349)		0.372(0.353)	
Middle	-0.557(0.295)		0.133(0.291)		-0.115(0.448)	0.832(0.314)**
High	-0.381(0.184)*		0.323(0.180)		0.548(0.187)**	
College	-0.302(0.199)		0.012(0.191)		0.470(0.200)*	
Ethnicity (mainlander as reference group)						
Minnan	-0.025(0.212)		0.218(0.197)		0.032(0.206)	
Hakka	-0.145(0.297)		-0.149(0.284)		0.101(0.289)	
Indigenous Taiwanese	0.551(0.644)		-0.180(0.726)		-1.060(0.637)	

Table 2. (Continued)

	(1) Tourist		(2) Student		(3) Worker	
	> increase	> remain	> increase	> remain	> increase	> remain
Career (manager as reference group)						
Non-labor force	0.525(0.256)*		0.224(0.248)		0.114(0.261)	
Farmer & manual	0.480(0.261)		0.355(0.250)		0.519(0.268)	
Non-professional	0.100(0.247)		0.107(0.233)		0.189(0.244)	
Prof. Semi-prof.	0.069(0.229)		0.113(0.215)		0.254(0.224)	
Party identity (pan-Blue as reference group)						
Non-affiliated	0.270(0.162)		0.194(0.155)		0.180(0.160)	
Pan-Green	0.468(0.217)*		0.309(0.216)		0.428(0.226)	
Stance on unification/independence of Taiwan (unification as reference group)						
Status quo	0.319(0.224)		0.222(0.205)		0.997(0.267)***	0.217(0.223)
Independence	0.583(0.255)*		0.229(0.274)	0.731(0.264)**	0.433(0.249)	
Constant	-2.980(0.424)***	-5.796(0.462)***	-3.078(0.411)***	-4.851(0.441)***	0.345(0.459)	-3.061(0.434)***
Model info.		N = 978		N = 930		N = 943
	Log likelihood = -784.19		Log likelihood = -852.87		Log likelihood = -781.68	
	LR chi2(23) = 332.19***		LR chi2(27) = 301.56***		LR chi2(26) = 206.35***	
	Pseudo R ² = 0.175		Pseudo R ² = 0.150		Pseudo R ² = 0.117	

Note: Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.




Figure 1. Cultural difference and Taiwanese resistance to China.

number of Chinese tourists, students, and workers while on the right side of the figure shows the probability changes in people’s attitude toward a decrease of Chinese tourists, students, and workers. For preferences on the increase of Chinese tourists, the likelihood that people who strongly agree Taiwan and China have the same culture will favor increasing Chinese tourists is 57%. The probability will go down to 42% for people who strongly disagree that Taiwan and China share the same culture. As for the Chinese student model, the probability that people who strongly agree Taiwan and China share the same culture will favor introducing more Chinese students is 41% while the probability is 18% for those who strongly disagree the cultural sameness between Taiwan and China. The resistance is a little weaker when it comes to the preference over decreasing Chinese tourists and workers. Those who strongly believe Taiwan and China share the same culture will be less likely to favor a further decrease of Chinese tourists and students (the probabilities are 4% and 17%, respectively) than those who strongly disagree the cultural sameness (the probabilities are 8% and 26%, respectively). In Figure 1, we can also see that for the preference over introducing Chinese workers, this variable does not significantly change along with people’s attitude toward cultural difference between Taiwan and China.

The democratic anxiety hypothesis receives strong empirical support across all models. This democracy factor provides evidence that defense of political institutions may be one of the major factors forming Taiwanese resistance to China for most issues with the exception of changing the number of Chinese workers. People who consider China to have a very negative effect on Taiwan’s democracy are likely to decline the increase and to support the decrease of Chinese tourists, students, and workers in Taiwan. On the other hand, those who believe that China has a positive impact on Taiwan’s democracy have the opposite policy preferences. It should be noted that, however, as shown in Table 2, the worker model suggests that only when comparing the moderate response (remain the same) with increasing or decreasing Chinese workers, the political institution factor will be significantly associated with their resistance to Chinese workers. Nevertheless, we can still see the strong effect of democratic anxiety on Taiwanese resistance to China. Figure 2 further evinces this pattern. Holding all other variables constant, the probability that people who consider the impact of China on Taiwan’s democracy to be very positive will increase support for increasing Chinese tourists to 70% while it will drop to 22% when people hold




Figure 2. Democratic anxiety and Taiwanese resistance to China.

that engagement with China will have very negative impact on Taiwan's democracy. The difference is about 48%.

As for the preference for the decrease of Chinese tourists (the solid line in the right-sided graph of Figure 2), people believing that China has had a very positive impact on Taiwan's democracy (2%) are about 16% less likely to wish for a decrease of Chinese tourists than people who believe the impact is very negative (18%). As for the preference for increasing the number of Chinese students, the difference of probabilities between those who evaluate China's impact on Taiwan's democracy very negatively (12%) and those who consider the impact to be very positive (41%) is about 29%. This difference is 31% in their policy preference over a decrease of the number of Chinese students. The pattern is somewhat different in people's preference on Chinese workers. As shown in Table 2 as well as in Figure 2, Taiwanese citizens' evaluation of China's impact on Taiwan's democracy seems to have nothing to do with their attitude toward increasing the number of Chinese workers. When it comes to their preference over the decrease of Chinese workers, however, there is a 26% chance that those with positive evaluations are willing to decrease the number of Chinese workers, which increases to 59% when people considered the impact to be very negative. One reasonable interpretation could be that individuals' evaluation of China's impact on Taiwan's democracy is more a risk-averse rather than risk-seeking question for respondents. As such, people manifest strong resistance to and choose to decrease Chinese workers when they view China as harmful to Taiwan's democracy, but they will not be motivated to support the increase of Chinese workers when they believe China exerts a positive effect to Taiwan's democracy.

Individuals' evaluations for the impact of cross-Strait interactions on the economic well-being of their family are also significantly correlated with Taiwanese resistance to China. The marginal effect of economic loss, in plain view, is slightly weaker than that of democratic anxiety in Taiwanese opinion on the increase or decrease of Chinese tourists and students, and on the decrease of Chinese workers, but the economic loss effect is largest among the three major explanatory variables in accounting for people's choice on whether to increase Chinese workers. This is not surprising, because in comparison to tourists and students, allowing more Chinese workers directly influences the labor markets and the economic life and wellbeing of Taiwanese laborers.

Figure 3 shows the expected probability of Taiwanese evaluation of economic loss and their resistance to Chinese tourists, students, and workers. In the left-side graph, we can see that the probabilities of choosing to increase Chinese tourists, students, and workers are consistently and sharply decreasing when the evaluation of




Figure 3. Economic loss and Taiwanese resistance to China.

the impact of cross-Strait relationships on the family’s economy moves from very positive to very negative. For the preference of whether to increase the number of Chinese tourists, the difference is around 34% (very positive: 68% and very negative: 34%). For the issue of Chinese students, the difference is 30% (very positive: 48% and very negative: 18%). For the increase of Chinese workers, the difference is 8% (very positive: 12% and very negative: 4%). People’s negative evaluation of the economic impact of cross-Strait relationships on their family increases the likelihood that they will prefer to decrease the number of Chinese tourists, students, and workers. For the preference over decreasing Chinese tourists, the likelihood goes up from 3% (very positive) to 10% (very negative). For the preference over decreasing Chinese students, from 11% (very positive) to 35% (very negative) and for the preference over decreasing Chinese workers, from 24% to 53%. These highly significant differences among individual policy preferences suggest that economic loss is a strong predictor for Taiwanese resistance to China.

To further compare the three factors explaining Taiwanese resistance to China, we conduct a Wald test to examine whether there exists a statistically significant difference among cultural, democratic, and economic estimates in each model. The test

results are shown in Table 3. The upper panel in Table 3 displays the results for the coefficients where the reference group of outcome variables is restricted to the “increase” category. The lower panel, on the other hand, reports the testing results as the compared group of the dependent variable is “decrease” vs. “increase and remain the same.” In the tourist model, although the three factors are all significant, our test shows that the effect of cultural differences is much weaker than that of democratic anxiety or of economic loss. In the student model, again, we find evidence showing that democratic anxiety and economic loss exert stronger influence than the cultural counterpart on the attitude of decreasing the number of Chinese students. Finally, our comparison of the effects of democratic anxiety and economic loss suggests that Taiwanese unwillingness to introduce Chinese workers is mainly driven by the perceived risk of economic loss. As shown in the increase panel in Table 3, the effect of economic loss is statistically and significantly different from that of democratic anxiety. While democratic anxiety plays some partial role for the explanation of introducing Chinese workers, the test results provide a support that economic loss consistently influences people’s attitude toward issues involving and introducing Chinese workers. The results also suggest that perceived cultural differences are not the reason for Taiwanese to resist everything involving China, at least not on their attitude toward the policy regarding introducing Chinese workers. One implication is that cultural differences

Table 3.

Tests for the Coefficients of Cultural Differences, Democratic Anxiety, and Economic Loss

Testing Hypotheses	Model 1: Tourist	Model 2: Student	Model 3: Worker
> increase panel:			
Culture = Democracy	Rejected Chi2(1) = 15.6***	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 1.5	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 1.5
Culture = Economy	Rejected Chi2(1) = 4.3*	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 0.7	Rejected Chi2(1) = 4.9*
Democracy = Economy	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 1.8	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 0.1	Rejected Chi2(1) = 6.1*
> remain the same panel:			
Culture = Democracy		Rejected Chi2(1) = 7.3***	Rejected Chi2(1) = 6.9**
Culture = Economy		Rejected Chi2(1) = 5.4*	Rejected Chi2(1) = 4.9*
Democracy = Economy		Do not reject Chi2(1) = 0.1	Do not reject Chi2(1) = 0.9

Note: Culture: cultural differences; Democracy: democratic anxiety; Economy: economic loss.

would be the weakest among the three explanatory factors in accounting for Taiwanese resistance to increased ties with China and Chinese citizens.

Overall, our expectation that economic interest is the strongest driving force to Taiwanese attitudes toward Chinese workers is confirmed. Yet, economic interest remains a strong factor in explaining people's preference over the increase or decrease of Chinese tourists and students. The potential economic gains from the two groups seem not to water down Taiwanese anxiety about China's negative influence on their family economy.

The control variables display an interesting picture of Taiwanese preference over Chinese tourists, students, and workers. Age is not as influential as we had originally anticipated. Many social movements against China in recent years were initiated by many young Taiwanese, yet, we can only see that the youngest generation (20–29) is less favorable to increasing number of Chinese tourists than the older generation, particularly, people who are above 40 years old. There is no significant correlation between people's age and their preference over introduction of Chinese students. As for the issue concerning Chinese workers, people who are 60 years or older are less resistant to Chinese workers than people who are in their twenties, which makes sense as this group, mostly retired, may not be sensitive to job loss or fluctuations in the job market. This group may also represent many individuals who themselves migrated from the mainland following the civil war, who would be sympathetic to others seeking to do the same. Education is not a powerful predictor either, while it is significantly correlated with individual preferences over the introduction of Chinese workers. Less educated people are more resistant to increasing the number of Chinese workers and also more willing to decrease it than the highly educated. From the discussion of economic benefits, this also makes sense, because the less well-educated and low-skilled workers are more vulnerable than the highly educated to job competition, especially, when it comes to competition for low-wage jobs with cheap Chinese labor. Finally, the variable measuring career does not exert much influence on Taiwanese resistance to China.

Interestingly, ethnicity and party identification are not particularly important factors in explaining Taiwanese resistance to China. Ethnicity is not significantly correlated to the three dependent variables. Party identification only accounts for individual preferences on the increase or decrease of Chinese tourists. Those who self-identify as members of the pan-Green camp are more likely to resist Chinese tourists than those who belong to the pan-Blue camp. One significant factor that helps explain Taiwanese resistance to China is their political stance on unification or independence. Not surprisingly, those who support Taiwan's independence from China are more

likely to choose to decrease but less likely to choose to increase the number of Chinese tourists, students, and workers. One implication from these results is that the traditional cleavages, such as party identification or ethnicity, as we have doubted, may not necessarily form Taiwanese preference over the policy involving China.

The findings broadly suggest that Taiwanese citizens fear China's influence for all three hypothesized reasons, but there appear to be some key differences in how the sources of anxiety about Chinese influence alter resistance to the various categories of Chinese visitors. This is most notable in the differences between attitudes toward Chinese workers and Chinese tourists, where there exists a considerable gap between which segments of Taiwanese society are most concerned with expanding or contracting their presence, based on such things as education and the source of their resistance to China. The findings suggest that Taiwanese citizens have two major competing concerns with regard to China—a long-term concern about the potential loss of democracy, and a short-term concern about the loss of jobs and other economic problems associated with greater economic integration. Given the reticence of the Taiwanese government to pursue closer political ties, and the ease and greater material benefits that come with the already ongoing economic integration, it is likely that Taiwanese fear political integration in the abstract, but are already feeling the effects of economic integration.

With regard to fears of political integration, the “democratic anxiety” hypothesis directly measures this, and shows interesting results that suggest significant differences in those who are fearful of Chinese rule over Taiwan. This may help explain the results for opposition to the arrival of tourists to Taiwan, with great differences in the reasoning behind opposition to their arrival. One of the only demographic variables that even approaches significance for decreasing the number of tourists in Taiwan is that of “pan-Green” affiliation, which may be in part driven by the example of Hong Kong. Those who fear Taiwan transforming into another province of China will certainly look to Hong Kong as an example, where, along with the erosion of political rights, significant local resistance has targeted mainland Chinese tourists as a source of economic woes. This is in large part because these tourists have altered the economy of Hong Kong toward production of luxuries and the construction of hotels and other accommodations for tourists, often at the expense of housing or businesses enjoyed by the local population. With a strong substantive impact coming from the variable for democratic anxiety, it is likely that the example of Hong Kong is a major driver in opposing Chinese rule in a more abstract political sense. Though the data in this study do not directly capture this, it is likely that those who fear the erosion of democratic values are younger and slightly better educated—thus insulated from the direct

economic problems that might come with outsourcing or labor competition, but politically aware and with plenty to lose to an influx of tourists if Taiwan were to mimic the experience of Hong Kong. Still, not all Taiwanese will follow this pattern, and certainly many of the more highly educated will continue to view tourists as a potential source of income and prosperity, as suggested by the significance of the highly educated in supporting an increase in tourist visits.

By contrast, the attitudes toward workers tell a clear economic story, with those fearing economic integration and those standing to lose most opposed to the arrival of Chinese workers. Their opposition to China is more immediate and broader than those fearing the loss of democracy—for their concerns are already ongoing, and economic integration is a much easier sell to the people of Taiwan than political integration. Somewhat surprisingly, it is those with a high school education who most fear the loss of their jobs to the mainland Chinese—but this impact lessens as education increases, suggesting those with a moderate to high amount of education most fear job loss and competition from Chinese workers. This may be due to the fact that they stand to lose jobs to those they feel are “less qualified” than them, whereas the most poorly educated workers in Taiwan are already working under similar conditions and without significant material or job security advantages relative to their mainland Chinese competition. Indeed, outsourcing and immigration in other countries have often seen the greatest opposition not from manual laborers and farm workers (who would represent the poorest and least educated in Taiwan), but rather from high school-educated factory workers and others with *some* education, who stand to lose their relatively prestigious jobs to those who will work under much worse conditions and with far fewer skill-based or educational qualifications. The strength of their opposition, as represented by some of the few variables to demonstrate strong statistical significance, suggests that they have already begun to feel the impact of Chinese workers and oppose their mere presence in Taiwan out of a fear of continued labor competition.

Conclusion

In this paper, we investigate Taiwanese resistance to China, with a specific focus on Taiwanese preference over the introduction of Chinese tourists, students, and workers. We test three theoretical arguments—cultural alienation, democratic anxiety and economic loss. Our findings suggest that democratic anxiety and perceived economic loss may be two major factors that motivate Taiwanese to develop resistant attitude to Chinese tourists, students, and workers, while cultural alienation does not

explain Taiwanese resistance to Chinese workers. Comparing the marginal effects, we further identify that economic loss outperforms democratic anxiety as a predictor when the issue is related to Chinese workers. For the other two policy preferences regarding Chinese tourists and students, both democratic anxiety and economic loss present a consistent and powerful explanation for Taiwanese citizens' unwelcoming attitude to closer ties with China, and Chinese citizens.

The policy implications seem to be straightforward. The Taiwanese government, when engaging with China, should pay specific attentions to the public's cultural orientation, democratic values as well as economic interests. As for specific policy treatment, when it comes to the policy to import Chinese workers, an efficient way for the government to alleviate the public's worries is not to increase Taiwanese familiarity with Chinese culture, but to allocate resources on the improvement of domestic employment as well as on the regulations of Chinese workers to prevent them from harming Taiwan's national security and democracy. For the policies that open the tourism and education market to China, while democratic anxiety, cultural similarity and the economic interests are all important to the popular supports of the policies, a great deal of effort in which the government should put is to convince the Taiwanese public that democratic values and institutions will not be sabotaged, and at the same time, to show the public the economic gain in opening the market to China. The experience of Hong Kong likely lies heavily in the minds of most Taiwanese, and is speculated to be a source of support for the pan-Green coalition, as Taiwanese can directly point to China's lack of respect for democratic institutions in favor of more centralized rule from Beijing. Undoubtedly, Taipei should also balance the benefits earned from bilateral trade and investment by spending more on taking care of the losers in the trade with China, not only for farmers and low-skilled workers, but also those workers with moderate amounts of education working in Taiwanese factories and other somewhat skilled labor that might see their jobs be given to Chinese workers with fewer qualifications. Only after solving these issues, the Taiwanese government's China policy can receive less public's objection and be smoothly implemented.

The findings also provide some implications about the cross-Strait relationships. The statistical analysis evinces a strong negative relationship between the Taiwanese anxiety about China's influence on the democratic institutions and their unwelcoming attitude toward China. The political institutional difference between China and Taiwan is probably the most hard-to-address issue for the two governments. In order to increase the Taiwanese fondness of China, Chinese government has constantly spent considerable resources on attracting Taiwanese socially and economically. Every year, China funds numerous visits of Taiwanese social groups, students, and local officials

to enhance Taiwanese familiarity with China. Beijing is also willing to economically share disproportional benefits to Taiwanese, by signing the trade agreement that is highly advantageous to Taiwanese manufacturers and farmers for selling their products to China. Although the social contact and economic inducement are found to be effective to increase the level of likeness on China (Niou, 2008; Wu et al., 2014), the Taiwanese anxiety about China's political influence is just temporarily narcotized. Taiwanese public resistance to China may not be completely ameliorated without removing their worry of China's impact on Taiwan's democracy.¹⁹ This suggests that without a convergence of political institutions, Taiwanese will still resist China even though they can receive material benefits from and be culturally familiar with China. The cross-Strait political institutional difference will continue to pose a challenge of cross-Strait relationships.

¹⁹Future research can further observe potential interaction effects of important socioeconomic variables such as class, education, age, or other theoretical relevant variables, and the cultural, political or economic factors on Taiwanese resistant attitudes toward China and Chinese citizens. Doing so could help us design certain policy remedies to "Sinophobia syndrome."

Appendix

Table A.
Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used in the Analysis

Variables	N	Mean	s.d.	Min.	Max.
[Chinese tourists] Do you think the number of Chinese tourists to Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is? Increase = 1; same = 2; decrease = 3	1,143	1.654	0.688	1	3
[Chinese students] Do you think the number of Chinese students to Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is? Increase = 1; same = 2; decrease = 3	1,093	1.960	0.752	1	3
[Chinese workers] Do you think the number of Chinese workers to Taiwan nowadays should be increased, decreased, or remain the same as it is? Increase = 1; same = 2; decrease = 3	1,122	2.368	0.643	1	3
[same race & language] Do you agree that the people of Taiwan and Mainland China share the same language and race? 1 (agree)–5 (disagree)	1,182	2.662	1.395	1	5
[Taiwan economy] How do you think the impact of current cross-strait relations on Taiwan's overall economic development? Good influence or bad influence? 1 (very good)–5 (very bad)	1,121	2.599	1.284	1	5
[Taiwan democracy] How do you think the impact of current cross-strait relations on Taiwan's democracy? Good influence or bad influence? 1 (very good)–5 (very bad)	1,081	2.580	1.260	1	5
[No affiliated] Between DPP, KMT, and other parties, which party do you support? do not support any party = 1; others = 0	1,187	0.456	0.498	0	1
[pan-green] Between DPP, KMT, and other parties, which party do you support? DPP, TSU = 1; Others = 0	1,187	0.184	0.387	0	1
[status quo] Some people say that Taiwan should declare independence immediately. Other people say that Taiwan and China should unify immediately. Other people want to maintain status quo. Which one do you agree with? status quo = 1; others = 0	1,172	0.600	0.490	0	1

Table A. (Continued)

Variables	N	Mean	s.d.	Min.	Max.
[independence] Some people say that Taiwan should declare independence immediately. Other people say that Taiwan and China should unify immediately. Other people want to maintain status quo. Which one do you agree with? Independence = 1; others = 0	1,172	0.279	0.449	0	1
[female] Respondent's gender. Female = 1; Male = 0	1,202	0.527	0.499	0	1
[20-29] the birth year of the respondent. 1 = 20-29; others = 0	1,202	0.107	0.309	0	1
[30-39] the birth year of the respondent. 1 = 30-39; others = 0	1,202	0.200	0.400	0	1
[40-49] the birth year of the respondent. 1 = 40-49; others = 0	1,202	0.294	0.456	0	1
[50-59] the birth year of the respondent. 1 = 50-59; others = 0	1,202	0.219	0.414	0	1
[elementary] What is your highest education? elementary or below = 1; others = 0	1,199	0.082	0.274	0	1
[middle] What is your highest education? middle school = 1; others = 0	1,199	0.090	0.286	0	1
[high] What is your highest education? high school = 1; others = 0	1,199	0.281	0.450	0	1
[college] What is your highest education? some college = 1; others = 0	1,199	0.173	0.378	0	1
[minal] What is your father's ethnic background? Mina = 1; others = 0	1,172	0.779	0.415	0	1
[hokka] What is your father's ethnic background? Hokka = 1; others = 0	1,172	0.089	0.284	0	1
[no labor force] What is your main occupation? Not in the labor force = 1; others = 0	1,181	0.219	0.414	0	1
[farmer & manual] What is your main occupation? Farmers and manual workers = 1; others = 0	1,181	0.168	0.0374	0	1
[non-professional] What is your main occupation? Non-professional = 1; others = 0	1,181	0.196	0.397	0	1
[professional] What is your main occupation? Professional = 1; others = 0	1,181	0.284	0.351	0	1

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The Political Role of the People's Court and Authoritarian Regime Resilience: The Revision of the Environmental Protection Law in China

HIROKO NAITO

This paper demonstrates how the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) designed the political role of the People's Court for authoritarian regime resilience. In particular, the case of the revision of the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) is selected because it was the first law in China to give detailed rules for public-interest trials. To illustrate the process by which the law was made, the paper is divided into three parts: (1) the practice of local governments before the revision of the law, (2) central government inspections in the provinces during the period that the law was being made, and (3) the revision process of the EPL in the National People's Congress. From this analysis, the paper concludes that the CCP streamlined the litigation process because it wanted to use the People's Court system as a tool to collect and understand citizen complaints, which it could then use to manage the issues of social stability.

KEYWORDS: Authoritarian regime resilience; People's Courts; Environmental Protection Law; environmental public-interest trials.

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The Constitution of the People's Republic of China defines the leadership of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). The People's Court operates under its leadership and this implies that the judicial branch in China does not have independence. The existing literature on contemporary Chinese politics often devalues

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the political role that the People's Court has, regarding it as highly politicized but also muted (Dressel, 2012; Mori, 2013; Sakaguchi, 2009).

Although the CCP's sovereignty over the People's Court has not changed, the functions of the People's Court are gradually shifting to judicialize the aspects of Chinese political life. A norm of judicial independence has been declared, and judges are adhering to it more often in economic and criminal cases that are not sensitive enough to draw interference from party authorities (Nathan, 2003; Wang, 2014). This paper examines the revision of the Environmental Protection Law (EPL) from 2011 to 2014 to demonstrate how the CCP designed the political role of the People's Court for strengthening regime resilience. When the court works, it requires someone to start litigation. This paper especially focuses on the discussion of the CCP's definition of the plaintiff for the EPL.

As the CCP engineered the law's design, the selection of possible plaintiffs allowed to bring trial drew attention. The CCP disapproved of allowing third parties and groups to file suits because increasing the number of these trials could overburden the courts (Wang & Sakurai, 2007, pp. 667–668). In contrast to the previous version of the law, the newly revised EPL included a section titled "Openness of Information and People's Participation," which specified who could file environmental public-interest suits. According to the revised law, persons and organizations that are not directly affected by environmental problems can nevertheless file suits regarding the environmental protection.

The question then arises, why did the CCP accept this revision of the EPL despite its negative attitude toward group and third-party trials? To address this, not only the lawmaking process at the central level is explained, but also the inspections of local cases are explained by the central government. In China, law is always written after gathering the experience of multiple local cases. The process of drafting the EPL went the same way. Many trials taking place on the local level were observed, and representatives of the central government went to local venues to study cases for ideas to revise the law.

This paper shows that the CCP needed to extend the definition of a possible plaintiff and facilitate the ability to file suits because it sought to use the People's Court as an institutionalized way to gather information on popular demands. This paper defines institutionalization as "the creation and perpetuation of formal and informal guidelines" (Zeng, 2014, p. 295). As the revision of the EPL was being considered, the number of demonstrations with environmental demands was rapidly increasing, and CCP's controlling social stability costs a great deal. To understand the circumstances of the CCP, if conflicts could be resolved and demands could be accepted using an

institutionalized tool such as the People's Court, deterrence of illegal actions would be less necessary. Therefore, the CCP emphasized the people's participation in resolving environmental problems, also accelerating the political role that the judicial branch has.

This phenomenon does not imply the improvement of the autonomy of the People's Court or the possibility of democratization. On the contrary, the CCP worked to strengthen its hold over the People's Court while facilitating its role in stabilizing the regime.

Academic Debates on the Political Role of the Judicial Branch in Authoritarian Regime Resilience

The political role of the judicial branch under authoritarian regimes is related to the following topics: the legal system in China and the judicialization of politics. It also refers to the studies about democratic institutions under the authoritarianism to build a framework for rethinking the political role of the judicial branch in authoritarian regime.

Legal System in China

This paper focuses on the case of China to analyze the political role of the judicial branch in authoritarian regime, which, however, has been examined rarely. This is because the People's Court does not have the power to review the constitutionality of law; for this reason, it is believed among scholars that the People's Court does not have a strong influence on the policy-making process. Data from the Rule of Law index 2016 show that Singapore has the highest level of "rule of law" among 113 countries with 9 (lower numbers show greater rule of law), and China on this same scale scores 80. It is clear that the level of the rule of law is low in China, even compared with other authoritarian countries.

Although the People's Court is not independent from the authority of the CCP, it is hard to deny that the legal system in China became more modernized after the 1980s. The basic laws, such as the Organic Law of the People's Court (1980), the Civil Procedure Law (CPL) (trial, 1982), and the Administrative Procedural Law (1990), were enacted, and laws regulating economic activities were issued. Due to the development of the legal system in China, interpretations of Chinese law are debated, and studies of the Chinese legal system are foregrounded.


Unfortunately, scholars have not analyzed in depth the relationship between the CCP and the People's Court, perhaps because the political dimension is overlooked in the current literature on Chinese legal system. However, their perspectives on this relationship can be classified into two groups. One recognizes the People's Court as a tool for the CCP to constrain society (Oguchi & Tanaka, 2012; Sakaguchi, 2009; Sakurai, 2014; Xin, 2014), the other regards the People's Court as a system to use to redress human rights abuses (Kima, 1995; Takamizawa & Suzuki, 2010). Studies have also sought to understand the level of rule of law in China using comparative studies (Jiang, 2015; Li, 2011; Tajimi, 2015), concluding that in China, rule of law cannot grow until the CCP is no longer in authority. Chinese legal studies do not discuss why the CCP needs the People's Court, how it maintains its power, and what the rule of law is in the Chinese context.

Judicialization of Politics

The aforementioned questions are treated by political scientists under the rubric of the judicialization of politics. In this paper, the judicialization of politics refers to "the increased presence of judicial processes and court rulings in political and social life" (Dressel, 2012, p. 4). Scholars note that it occasionally happens in authoritarian regimes because dictators have a variety of choices on what degree of rule of law they administer (Tamada, 2017). Figure 1 shows that the white dots, democratic regimes, have a correlative relationship with a high level of rule of law. Gray dots, authoritarian regimes, are on the other hand distributed widely.¹

Wang (2014) investigated why one dictator chooses greater rule of law while another does not. Wang defines the rule of law that exists in authoritarian regime as a "partial form of the rule of law" in which judicial fairness is usually respected in the commercial realm but not in the political realm. That paper addresses CCP delegates and the People's Court's ability to make judgments when the CCP needs the cooperation of organized and un-politicized interest groups, such as foreign investment and private companies (Wang, 2014). Referring to Wang's arguments, it can be understood that what games happen inside the court and how the games change from the "rule by law" to a "partial form of rule of law." However, the CCP's intentions toward its change are not revealed. Therefore, the paper focuses on the institutionalization

¹In this paper, "Not free" or "Partly free" in the Table of Country Scores of Freedom in the World 2017 are recognized as authoritarian regime, and "Free" as a democratic regime.



Source: World Justice Project, *Rule of Law Index 2016*, <http://data.worldjusticeproject.org/#table>; Freedom House, *Freedom in the World 2017 Table of Country Scores*, <https://freedomhouse.org/report/fiw-2017-table-country-scores>. It refers to the figure that Wang (2014, p. 4) shows.

Figure 1. Relationship between rule of law and freedom.

process of the People's Court system, such as lawmaking process, and analyzes how and why the CCP moved to a "partial form of rule of law."

Ginsburg and Moustafa (2008) and Xin (2009) reveal the CCP's intention to a "partial form of rule of law" by focusing on the making process of the Administrative Procedure Law. Issuing the Administrative Procedure Laws in China was a large step toward installing the rule of law. Its purpose was the functions of the People's Court to normalize the relationship between party and state (Ginsburg & Moustafa, 2008; Xin, 2009). Comparing with their findings, a key finding of this paper is that the People's Court functions not only as legal supervision, as held in the existing literature, but also as a platform for collecting the demands of the people. The CCP has designed with it a mechanism for repressing illegal activities and legitimizing its regime.

The Framework for Rethinking the Political Role of the People's Court

Authoritarianism, also called as a dictatorship, has the fixed idea, which is a dictatorship that is politically constrained and its operation that is excessively rigid. When the CCP's one-party system is chosen as a case of a dictatorship, the fixed idea is needed to rethink because the CCP has high adaptability (Shambaugh, 2009).

For rethinking an idea of a dictatorship, Svoblik (2012) explains the problem that a dictator usually faces for sustaining its regime. As in a dictatorship, the most common form of regime transition is the *coup d'état*, the conflict a dictator must resolve in sustaining his or her regime is power-sharing with the power elite and opposition (Svoblik, 2012). Moreover, scholars find that dictators use democratic institutions, such as legislatures and political parties, to organize concessions to potential opposition, while also collecting their demands (Gandhi, 2010; Imai, 2013; Kamo, 2013; O'Brien, 2008).

Before their studies were published, it was believed that democratic institutions in an authoritarian regime create a meaningless system that does not function as it would in a democratic regime. However, if such institutions are truly empty, why do dictators set them up? Scholars have discussed how and why such institutions are useful to authorities in maintaining power.

This paper uses the framework, which the studies on democratic institutions in authoritarianism show and explore. Similar to the studies about the democratic institutions in authoritarianism, the People's Court can also be regarded as a meaningless system; however, it still exists. Therefore, the political role of the judicial branch for a dictator can also be examined by using the framework.

This paper focuses on the CCP's intention for functioning the People's Court in sustaining the CCP's leadership. And, it reveals that the CCP institutionalizes the system of the People's Court as a platform for collecting people's demand. This phenomenon cannot be examined as an improvement of the level of rule of law in China although it is the strategy for the CCP to maintain its regime; further, it is the political role of the judicial branch in authoritarian regime.

Local Government Practices for Environmental Public-Interest Trials before the Revision of the EPL

Data Set for Environmental Public-Interest Trials in Local Cities


When the CPL was revised in August 2012, an article relating to public-interest trials was added. This article allowed public-interest trials for environmental problems and consumer affairs. It only defined the basic policy and therefore the detailed contents were determined during the revision of the EPL and the Consumer's Interest Protection Law. The EPL was a case of an initiative for public-interest trials, as well as for the new political role of the People's Court.

The EPL was accepted in April 2014, and enacted on January 1, 2015. In China, laws are always written after the experiences of multiple local cases are gathered. The

EPL was not an exception. This article examines 31 local cases that occurred before the EPL was revised.²

Figure 2 shows the location of the 31 trials. Almost half of the trials were conducted in Jiangsu province, with Guizhou and Yunnan provinces ranking second and third, respectively. Of the 31 cases, over 70% were located in these three provinces. The reason that the number of environmental public-interest trials was so high in these three provinces was the tolerant attitude of the provincial government. Guizhou and Jiangsu established specific courts for environmental problems in 2007; Yunnan did so in 2008.³ Courts in these provinces were more likely to hear environmental public-interest trials than in other provinces.

Figure 3 shows the five kinds of plaintiffs that initiated the trials. The All-China Environmental Federation (ACEF) is a government-organized non-governmental organization (NGO) that specializes in environmental protection and is managed by the




Note: The author's own tabular representation and data.

Figure 2. Number of environmental public-interest trials from 2007 to 2014.

²The “Judicial Opinion of China” is the biggest archive for court data. However, it includes only nine cases of environmental public-interest trials, while the “Environmental Green Book” states that there were 76 environmental public-interest trials from 2007 to 2013. The data in Liu’s (2013) book are compiled from public information and the information from the People’s Court in Guiyang city. This paper uses not only “Judicial Opinion of China,” but also the party’s papers, such as *People’s Daily*, *Legal Daily* and *Court Daily*. Additionally, Internet is used to see local government website for collecting more cases.

³Qinzeng city in Guizhou province is the first place where the specific court for environmental problems in 2007 was set up. Wuxi city in Jiangsu province had it in April 2008, and Kunming city in Yunnan also built it up in December 2008. This information comes from Li (2008), Zhao (2008), Dai and Wang (2008).



Note: The author's own tabular representation and data.


Figure 3. Classification of plaintiffs of environmental public-interest trials from 2007 to 2014.⁴

Ministry of Environmental Protection. Referring to Figure 3, it can be seen that more than 70% of plaintiffs were state organs and quasi-state organs.

Figure 4 shows the breakdown of the kinds of plaintiffs for each year from 2007 to 2014. There are two notable findings here. The first is that in nearly all cases, only state organs acted as plaintiffs from 2007 to 2011. A private citizen initiated a trial in 2009, and a social organization did so in 2010. However, both cases were supported by the administrative organs or ACEF. There were no cases without the involvement of a state organ before 2011.

The second observation is that 2012 was a crucial turning point, and when a great diversification of the kind of plaintiffs initiating the trials occurred. The People's Courts heard cases initiated by social organizations and private citizens after 2012, and the share of such cases increased later. Many cases thus were allowed due to the revision of the CPL. The revised law added an item that addressed trials for public interest. It defined that an authority or relevant organization as prescribed by law may institute an action in a People's Court for conduct that pollutes the environment, infringes upon the lawful rights and interests of large numbers of consumers, or otherwise damages the public interest (The National People's Congress (NPC) of the People's Republic of China, 2012b). According to Article 55 of the CPL, cases filed by

⁴There are four cases that have several plaintiffs, such as (1) people's prosecutor and administrative organ, (2) All-China Environmental Federation and social organization, (3) All-China Environmental Federation and individual, and (4) social organization and administrative organ. Every patterns, either or both, are state organs.



Note: The author's own tabular representation and data.

Figure 4. Breakdown of the cases by the type of plaintiff from 2007 to 2014.

social organizations and private citizens could be accepted in local People's Courts starting in 2013.

However, the CPL does not define the detailed content of the public-interest litigation, such as the kind of plaintiff, the way to file cases, or the definition of environmental public-interest litigations. The CPL left these decisions to law to be enacted later and to cases. A discussion is needed for local cases occurring before the revision of the EPL to understand how the CCP adapted to the new style of trials, namely, public-interest litigation.

While the state organs still had a superior status over other plaintiffs, local People's Courts were gradually beginning to accept a more diverse array of cases before the revision of the EPL. The following section examines the content of trials and the impact those trials had on the society and politics in China.

Analysis of Trials


As Figure 2 shows, many trials took place in Jiangsu province. The trials in Jiangsu, totaling 13 in all, were mostly concerned with issues of water pollution due to the province's rich water resources such as Taihu (太湖) and owing to the Jiangsu government's proactive role in environmental public-interest trials. Another characteristic of such trials is that they tended to be conducted under the CPL. This is

because water, air, and noise pollutions come from factories, which means managers of factories or companies are usually the targets of the lawsuits. More than 90% of the defendants are companies and/or their managers.

If one considers that most of the plaintiffs in these trials are state organs while most of the defendants are companies and individuals, one might conclude that environmental public-interest trials are simply a tool for the state to control society. If one looks at the claims that motivate these trials, however, it is clear that they are not simply tools of state control.

Although the biggest number of plaintiffs for environmental public-interest trials is state organs, the source of information on environmental pollution issues brought to court was local people's voice: in 12 cases of 31, the action began because of complaints from local citizens. This can be interpreted to mean that the state organs worked to gather people's demands and answer them using the People's Court system. Figure 5 presents a breakdown of plaintiff identity among suits filed on the basis of citizen complaints. The most frequent plaintiff is ACEF and the second most frequent is a government prosecutor.

State organs worked to gather citizen complaints to understand what environmental problems had occurred in different localities, and the central government created a government-supported NGO in the form of ACEF to make this mechanism more flexible.



Note: The author's own tabular representation and data: 12 cases over total 31 cases were filed on the basis of citizen complaints; two cases had two kinds of plaintiff, so 14 are shown in total in Figure 6.

Figure 5. Plaintiff identity for suits filed on the basis of citizen complaints from 2007 to 2014.

However, it is not obvious from Figure 5 what motivation local governments had for collecting their demands and representing them. In December 2013, a notice of the Central Organization Department to improve the performance evaluation of local leading cadres was issued. In this notice, the CCP stated that henceforth, local leading cadres would not be evaluated only by how much economic growth they created; they also needed to build up a harmonious society (Zhu, 2013). A major part of constructing such a society is environmental protection. Local governments must perform well with regard to environmental problems to obtain and keep their benefits, especially, after 2013.

Following are a few examples of how local government took on cases on the basis of citizen complaints. In the municipality of Changzhou in Jiangsu, people complained to the local government about a strong smell coming from a nearby pond. The government warned the company suspected of pollution but to no avail, so civil society groups filed a suit against it (Judicial Opinion of China, 2014). Other cases also show that citizen complaints are the most important causes behind the environmental public-interest trials. A villager in Pinghu city (平湖市) in Zhejiang complained to the Pinghu Environmental Protection Bureau, and it began an investigation. It found that large amounts of polluted soil were being dumped illegally into the water quality protection district. The Pinghu Environmental Protection Bureau issued an administrative disposition that required companies to pay a fine of RMB 50,000 and clean up the polluted area. However, after the cleaning, the amount of pollutants still exceeded the regulated levels. The people's prosecutor in Pinghu city filed lawsuit as a plaintiff (Fan, 2011).

Central Government Inspections in the Provinces

This section examines how the central government studied such cases from the provinces in the process of drafting the EPL. It especially focuses on inspections and analyzes what the central and local governments negotiated over and how these negotiations affected the lawmaking process.

The Environmental Protection and Resource Conservation Committee of the NPC can submit proposals on environmental law.⁵ The committee conducted inspections in several provinces, such as Shanxi (five times), Anhui (three times),

⁵See the Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee of the 12th NPC, *The Responsibility of the Committee* <http://www.npc.gov.cn/npc/bmzz/huanjing/node_1710.htm> (accessed December 9, 2015).

Jiangsu (two times), and Fujian (two times). It is not obvious, however, why the Committee chose these provinces for inspection. Inspections took place in 2006 and between April 2011 and March 2013. The objective of the 2006 inspections was to create legal proposals that would support the need of a revision to the law; these proposals were then submitted to the NPC in 2007.

When Hebei, Shanghai, and Anhui were inspected by the committee in 2006, local governments in these areas stated, “a revision of the EPL is needed and should be the fundamental law in the area of environmental protection.”⁶ The Shanghai Environmental Protection Bureau proposed the study group to “(1) set rules of government action for the environment, (2) define companies’ responsibility for the environment, and (3) strengthen punishment for illegal activities.” The major reason for the increase in illegal polluting activities is the cost of protecting the environment, which is simply more expensive than polluting. The proposal was intended to change this situation, and reaffirmed that the government was the main actor in approaching and managing environmental problems.

Unlike the visits to the provinces of 2006, the inspections after 2011 put the emphasis on the participation of the people. During inspections in Hunan in April 2011, Wu Jiangping, a local government cadre in Hunan and a lawmaker in the NPC, explained, “this revision process needs to raise the status of the EPL. We should establish it as a national fundamental law; environmental protection activities are needed, and we need to make punishments for environmental pollution more severe, trying not to make the scale of environmental pollution more severe.” In contrast with the inspections in 2006 in Shanghai, it is clear that here, the new idea of popular participation was present.

This tendency can be observed also not only in the inspections in Hunan, but also elsewhere. Pan Yue, who is the Assistant Director of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, insisted at a meeting on the revision of the EPL in Hubei, “we need to strengthen the government’s responsibility for environmental protection, organize a management system, and secure human rights” (The NPC of the People’s Republic of China, 2011).

During inspections in Shanxi province in 2011, lawmaking meetings were also held and Zhang Wentai, the Assistant Director of the Ministry of Environmental Protection, noted that there were three significant points in the lawmaking process as

⁶See Shanghai China, *The Environment Protection and Resources Conservation Committee in Shanghai Promotes Studies and Discussions about Revision of Environmental Protection Law* <<http://www.shanghai.gov.cn/shanghai/node2314/node2315/node4411/userobject21ai173779.html>> (accessed March 25, 2015); The NPC of the People’s Republic of China (2006) and Cao (2006).

follows: gathering the opinions of the masses and their knowledge while reflecting them in policies, accepting opinions from experts in different fields, and not only going forward with new challenges, but also taking over outcomes from previous actions as well as learning from experiences in foreign countries. The deputy mayor of Xian proposed encouraging popular participation and adding related articles to the law, as well as defining social organizations as possible plaintiffs or defining what administrative organ would manage the environmental protection project. He noted, "What I would like to say is that environmental public-interest trials are needed" (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2011).

The two sets of visits in 2006 and 2011 show a great contrast: the latter emphasized the importance of popular participation. Both central-level and local-level cadres pointed this out. According to their statements and the results of the meetings in the provinces, it is clear that they believed that popular participation was crucial in promoting environmental protection and gathering information on the demands of the people, especially, where environmental problems were worsening.⁷ Bearing in mind the experimental trials that local People's Courts had accepted since 2007, local governments proposed to the center that popular participation would be a useful tool to gauge the severity of environmental problems. The government risks social instability if it fails to resolve these problems. Therefore, in our examination of meetings and inspections regarding the EPL, we cannot overlook this emphasis on popular participation and the significance of public-interest trials in satisfying popular demand.

Revision of the EPL

This section focuses on the revision of the EPL from August 2012 to April 2014, and addresses the following two research questions. Why did the EPL need to be

⁷Not every inspection mentioned the point of how the law defines the definition of a plaintiff. The discussion on the definition of a plaintiff gradually faded away especially after the inspection in Henan province in 2011. The reason of this phenomenon related to the purpose of the inspections. The purpose of the inspections before July 2011 was deciding the principle of EPL and the meetings that were organized during the inspections mentioned that "Environmental Protection and Resources Conservation Committee Protection Committee of the NPC held meetings in several places for the revision of public protection law." Compared to the situation before July 2011, the meetings that were held after July 2011 in local provinces pointed out that the purpose of the inspections were "hearing about the situation of environmental protection businesses in each local provinces." Comparing the meetings before and after July 2011, it can be concluded that the purpose of the inspections was gradually transformed from making the principle of the law to hearing the situation in local provinces and the inspections themselves were also fragmented.

revised? And how was it revised? This section looks closely at the articles related to environmental public-interest trials.

The Background of the Revision

Institutionalization of environmental regulation began in 1978, when the Constitution of the People's Republic of China was revised. The EPL was drafted and tested in 1979, and a revision of the law came into effect in 1989. Interestingly, the institutionalization of environmental regulation was settled before the onset of China's rapid economic growth (Li, 1999).

There is a strong correlation between environmental problems and the growth of secondary industries that are linked closely to economic growth. There is no doubt that environmental problems in China worsened as its rapid economic growth increased; however, the EPL had not been revised since it was implemented in 1989. Thus, the revision and discussion from 2012 to 2014 was crucially important in rethinking the balance of environmental and economic issues in China. The importance of the 2012–2014 revision is evident from its unusually long duration of the council discussion (see Table 1).

A group of 2,474 lawmakers and representatives submitted 78 proposals for revising the EPL between 1995 and 2012 (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2012d). According to Lu Zhongmei, an environmental protection expert and lawmaker, the Environmental Protection and Resource Conservation Committee of the NPC began its discussion of the EPL and related laws and reported to the Standing Committee of the NPC that the law needed some revision (Li, 2013; Lu, 2013). The NPC proceeded to revise the law in 2011 after receiving the report. The revision process itself took less than two years, though the law underwent a lengthy discussion.

While the law's design was under discussion, beginning in 2012, the articles concerning environmental public-interest trials attracted people's attention. Because

Table 1.
Duration of Council Discussions on EPL in 1979, 1989, and 2014

Name of Bill	Date Passed	Number of Councils	Length of Council
EPL (trial)	September 1979	1	3 days
EPL (revised)	December 1989	2	63 days
EPL (revised)	April 2014	4	573 days

Note: Kamo (2006); see also the NPC of the People's Republic of China, *The Draft Amendment of EPL* <http://www.npc.gov.cn/huiyi/lfzt/hjbhfxzaca/node_19114.htm> (accessed February 28, 2015).

the CPL was revised around the time that the discussion of the EPL was beginning, the compatibility between the two laws provoked much interest (Liu, 2013). An article was added to the CPL defining public-interest trials, stating, “where the environment is polluted, the lawful rights and interests of the mass of consumers are infringed upon, or other acts harming the public interest are committed, the organs stipulated by law and relevant organizations may bring actions to the People’s Court.” Previously, the CCP would not have approved any law including articles allowing groups and third parties to bring trials for public interest. Now, in contrast with the CCP’s previously negative attitude, the revision of the CPL included a definition of public-interest trials. As the CPL was being revised in 2013, the revision of the EPL had just begun. Therefore, there was a question of how the EPL would refer to the revision of the CPL, especially in regard to public-interest litigation, attracted much attention.

In addition, the increase in interest in environmental problems among the people was connected to the rise in importance of public-interest trials during the revision process. The number of demonstrations related to environmental problems increased by 29% every year since 1996 (Yang, 2014). To deal with this situation, the establishment of the rules of environmental public-interest trials was one way to create a platform for people to air their demands (Dai, 2014).

Environmental public-interest trials are not discussed only as a solution for environmental problems, but also to accelerate the use of the People’s Court to reconstruct state–society relations in China. Furthermore, this discussion expanded to touch on how the CCP could manage state–society relations — the discussion of the so-called party–state relationship. Therefore, focusing on how the discussion about the definition of environmental public-interest trials developed is significant in understanding why the CCP pushed toward the institutionalization of the judicial system and the construction of the relationship with the People’s Courts.

Changing Definitions Related to Environmental Public-Interest Trials

During four meetings of the Standing Committee of the NPC held from August 2012 to April 2014, three drafts of the EPL and the final version of the law were issued. Table 2 shows how the definition of a plaintiff for environmental public-interest trials changed through the drafts to the law. The law added a fifth section titled “Openness of Information and Popular Participation,” which includes an article (Article 58) defining environmental public-interest trials. The first draft contained neither that section nor that article (The NPC of the People’s Republic of China, 2012a).

Table 2.

Changes in the Definition of a Possible Plaintiff across the Three Drafts of the Revision to the EPL

Provisions Regarding a Possible Plaintiff in the Environmental Public-Interest Trial	
August 31, 2012 The first draft	NA
July 7, 2013 The second draft	ACEF and environmental federations located in provinces, autonomous regions and directly controlled municipalities may file litigation in the People's Court.
October 21, 2013 The third draft	National-level social organizations that are registered with the civil affairs departments of the people's governments have specialized in environmental protection public-interest activities for at least five consecutive years, and have high reliability, may file litigation in the People's Court.
April 2, 2014 The final version of the law	<p>Social organizations that meet the following conditions may file litigation to the People's Court:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Are registered with the civil affairs departments of the people's governments or above the municipal level with sub-districts in accordance with the law. (2) Have specialized in environmental protection public-interest activities for at least five consecutive years, and have no legal violation records. <p>Courts shall accept the litigations filed by social organizations that meet the above criteria. The social organizations that file the litigation shall not seek economic benefits from the litigation.</p>

Note: The NPC of the People's Republic of China (2012a, 2013a, 2013b, 2014).

From the drafts to the final version of the law, the definition of plaintiffs who can file suits expanded. The second draft stated that the ACEF at the provincial level can file suits as plaintiffs (All-China Environment Federation, 2013). The ACEF is a nonprofit organization, managed by the Ministry of Environmental Protection, registered with the Ministry of Civil Affairs, and approved by the State Council.⁸ The Environmental Protection Federation is also a nonprofit organization and works under

⁸For instance, Environmental Protection Federation in Jiangsu province was established under the leading management of Ministry of Environmental Protection in Jiangsu province. See the introduction of the Environmental Federation in Jiangsu province <http://222.190.123.53:8080/pub/jshblhh/gywm/lhhjj/201404/t20140424_263287.html> (accessed March 1, 2015).

the leadership of local government (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2013b). In contrast with the second draft, the third draft deleted the definition laid out in the second draft. It allowed social organizations to serve as long as they (1) are registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs of the People's Republic of China, (2) have specialized in environmental protection public-interest activities for at least five consecutive years, and (3) are highly reliable (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2014).

We also see an expansion of the definition of a possible plaintiff between the third drafts and the Law. The third draft stated that organizations must be "registered by the Ministry of Civil Affairs" and be "national-level social organizations"; however, the final version of the law authorized organizations "registered with the civil affairs departments of the people's governments or above the municipal level with sub-districts in accordance with the law" and removed the criterion of "nationwide social organization" (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2014). The third draft stipulated that the organization should be nationwide and be registered with the central government, while the final version of the law accepted organizations that were registered by local governments. Clearly, the definition of a possible plaintiff expanded from these initial drafts to the final version of the law.

The validity of the article of the environmental public-interest trials in the EPL also gradually changed and strengthened. The third draft stated, "if any other law has another regulation, follow it," but the final version of the law dropped this provision. It is obvious that the third draft gives other laws' priority. Nonetheless, the final version of the law does not approve it and makes the EPL superior to others. The final version of the law indicates that the definition of a plaintiff should refer back to the EPL.

Analysis of Points Discussed during the Revision Process

Lawmakers discussed the environmental public-interest trials, even though they were not mentioned in the first draft. When the 28th subcommittee meeting of the 11th Standing Committee of the NPC was held on August 29, 2012, Zou Ping, a member of the Standing Committee, spoke of "the need to clearly define the concept of environmental rights, establish the institution of environmental public-interest trials, and strengthen popular participation in environmental protection" (The NPC of the People's Republic of China, 2012e). At the same meeting, Wang Yuancheng observed that "social organizations have an important role for improving environmental protection projects. I hope that the law will clearly note the active participation of social organizations, civil organizations, and citizens in environmental protection," and proposed

to “add that ‘the central government supports social organizations, civil organizations and citizens to participate in environmental protection projects into law” (The NPC of the People’s Republic of China, 2012c). Although many proposals were raised, those were not added into the first draft. Wang Guanghao, a chief member of the Environmental Protection and Resource Conservation Committee of the NPC, explained, “we still haven’t made sense of what regulation would be the best for environmental public-interest litigation” (A Head of the Environment Protection, 2012).

After the end of the first round of the meetings of the Standing Committee of the NPC, members of academies held meetings and proposed adding an article on environmental public-interest trials (Qie, 2012). Bie Tao, the Deputy Director of the Department of Policies, Laws, and Regulations at the Ministry of Environmental Protection explained that “consumer protection law defined the plaintiff by referring to the revised CPL. The People’s Congress should recognize that the EPL also needs to define that.” On the other hand, he also observed, “there are so many kinds of environmental protection organizations that we need to create a regulation.” Bie Tao understood how important it was to ensure the presence in the final draft of an article dealing with the severe environmental problems, but also exhorted caution about bringing third parties into the political sphere.

Incorporating these proposals, the second draft added an article on environmental public-interest trials. The definition restricted it to two specific organizations, namely, the ACEF and the Environmental Federation, at the province level. After the second draft was issued, some lawmakers said that it was improper to define specific organizations in the law, while others said the definition of a possible plaintiff would greatly escalate once the CCP allowed a specific public-interest organization to be a possible plaintiff (The NPC of the People’s Republic of China, 2013c). After the second draft, the discussion focused on how the law restricted the definition of a plaintiff for environmental public-interest cases.

The third draft represented a compromise between two opinions that lawmakers put forward during the discussion that ensued after the promulgation of the second draft. During the 5th Council of the 12th NPC, some lawmakers advocated expanding the definition of the possible plaintiff, while others claimed that there was “no need to expand the definition, as we already have many means to figure out illegal behavior.” The third draft must have been a compromise plan because the number of organizations that can file litigation is obviously larger in the third draft. There are 11 organizations in China that meet the requirements stipulated in the third draft, while the second draft only accepted two.

The paper further expanded the definition of a possible plaintiff. The defense of the final version of the law at the 8th Council of the 12th NPC was that “the people gradually have become more aware of environmental protection, and popular participation in these activities is significant” (Zhao, 2014) and “especially with regard to the definition of the possible plaintiff, we need to believe in social power and refer to the experiences of foreign countries” (Zhang, 2014). The CCP accepted the final version of the law because it offered courts as a platform for the people to air demands about environmental problems.

Conclusion

This paper presented a three-party analysis and examined why the CCP accepted and revised the EPL that included articles approving public-interest trials. The first analysis looked at data on environmental public-interest trials accepted in local People's Courts before the revision of the EPL in 2014. After the revision of the CPL in 2012, not only state organs but also civil society groups and private citizens became able to file environmental public-interest suits, although the majority of plaintiffs are still state and quasi-state organs. On the other hand, the reason why state organs begin trials is to accept local citizens' claims. Local People's Courts aimed to deal with the environmental public-interest trials in an orderly fashion and experimented with ways to increase social stability.

The second part of the analysis considered the central government's inspection in the provinces. The Standing Committee of the NPC insisted that discussion of law-making began in 2012 (and survey work in 2011), but it proposed revising the EPL as early as 2006. It is obvious that for a long time, there had been plans to revise the law. In the differences between the inspections in 2006 and after 2011, it can be observed that local governments and the central government all recognized the significance of popular participation in environmental protection after 2011. During inspections, local cadres continued to propose to the central government this idea, which stemmed from their experiences in trials that had been accepted in local People's Courts prior to the inspections.

The last part was a comparative analysis of three drafts and the final version of the EPL. It also examined the lawmaking process. At the beginning of the lawmaking process, opinions were divided on the definition of a possible plaintiff but the size of the group of entities that had the ability to fill this role gradually expanded with succeeding drafts and the final version of the law. The CCP recognized that popular

participation, such as activities by civil society groups and private citizens, is crucial to the resolution of environmental problems. Also, in the attempt to avoid a larger conflict between the people's behavior and the CCP's leadership, the CCP sought to comprehend the environmental situation in local areas and the claims that local citizens had. Therefore, the CCP's move to expand the definition of a plaintiff transformed People's Courts into a platform for citizens to put forward their demands. However, if the CCP encouraged citizens to use the People's Court to solve environmental problems as far as they wished, citizens would assume an overbearing attitude during trials and there would be too much pressure on the People's Court. Accordingly, the courts have tended to accept cases supported by the state and quasi-state organs, such as administrative organs, government-organized NGOs, and the people's prosecutors. The CCP has understood that its new tendency has made the mechanism of popular participation orderly and the People's Court functioned as an effective platform for collecting people's demands.

The political role of the judicial branch in an authoritarian regime is usually regarded as a meaningless system because it does not work as it would in a democratic regime. In the case of China, this idea is also predominant. However, according to a three-party analysis, this paper shows that the People's Court functions as not only a legal supervisor, as held in the existing literature, but also a platform for storing and revealing the demands made by people to the government. The CCP has designed with it a mechanism for repressing illegal activities and legitimizing its regime.

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