

持續進行中的全球貿易自由化： 中國在 G8 的機會

柯爾頓

加拿大多倫多大學政治系教授兼 G8 研究團隊主任

關鍵字：貿易自由化、八國高峰會議、加拿大、中國

中文摘要

2007 年的八國高峰會議（Group of Eight, G8）在德國的海利根達姆（Heiligendamm）舉行。該次高峰會的重大成就之一就是 G8 與新興經濟體啟動了所謂「海利根達姆進程」（Heiligendamm Process）的對話機制。同時，八大工業國領袖也贏得新興經濟體及開發中國家的支持，達成共同奮鬥以適應氣候變遷的協議。參與對話機制的國家除 G8 成員外，尚包含巴西、中國、印度、墨西哥與南非等新興經濟體。對話機制強調創新、投資自由化、智慧財產（intellectual property）、發展以及能源效率議題。未來海利根達姆進程是否會導致英國首相布萊爾（Tony Blair）所預測的完全質變（complete metamorphosis）則是八國高峰會與新興經濟體政治領袖們的重大挑戰。但是朝此方向發展將有助於將貿易直接加入議程，終能實現布萊爾的預測。

有不少人指出目前八國高峰會之所以在全球貿易治理上失敗的原因。絕大多數將之歸咎於不斷變遷的專業能力，因為全球貿易的權力正越來越從 G8 的成員過渡到 G8 外的新

興經濟國家。為此，G8 已試圖引進新興的貿易強國。首先是在 1999 年透過 20 國集團 (the Group of Twenty, G20) 的財長對話來達成此目標，接著又自 2004 年起經由七國財長俱樂部來邀請中國財長與會，終而從 2003 年開始藉舉行 G8 加五的高峰會對話來改善與發展中國家的溝通管道。但是儘管 G8 允許其四邊對話對由新興經濟強國所組成的新 G20 貿易部長會議做出讓步，不過後者卻未能加速杜哈回合的議程 (Doha Development Agenda, DDA)，也未能使之有圓滿的結局。

迄今，現存的一些有關「海利根達姆進程」的文獻對此進程的前景抱持謹慎的樂觀態度，而另一方面則點出該進程所面臨的許多障礙。但是卻無一文章論及「海利根達姆進程」對全球貿易治理的潛在貢獻，也沒有一篇文章從詳細的之前身、緣起、協商、架構與早期的運作情形為基礎來檢視該進程未來可能的成果。本文主旨即在從全球貿易治理貢獻的角度來深入分析「海利根達姆進程」過去的發展過程、現況與未來的發展潛力。

Sustaining Global Trade Liberalization: China's G8 Opportunity

**Professor John Kirton
Director, G8 Research Group
University of Toronto¹**

Key words : G8, trade liberalization, Canada, China

Introduction

In his speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos on January 27, 2007, British Prime Minister Tony Blair made two bold predictions (Blair 2007). First, he forecast: "On the WTO...I think it is now more likely than not...that we will reach a deal within the next few months." Second, he declared: "The G8 is already on its way to metamorphosis into G8+5. At G8+5, it can be a forum for agreement between the most powerful nations with a true modern global reach. But sooner or later, the metamorphosis should be complete."

His first forecast proved to be a failure, for as 2007 ended, the badly overdue Doha Development Agenda (DDA) at the

¹ This article is based on a paper prepared for a conference on "Facing Global Trade Imbalance: Cooperation and Development," sponsored by the Global Trade Development Forum and the Sixth Annual Academic Meeting on China and the World Trade Organization, Beijing, China, November 9-12, 2007. The author gratefully acknowledges the contribution of Jenilee Guebert, Senior Researcher, G8 Research Group.

World Trade Organization (WTO) remained undone. But his second proved prescient, as the Group of Eight's (G8) June 6-8th, 2007 Summit launched a new Heiligendamm Process (HP) of structured dialogue between the G8 and "outreach five" (O5) countries led by China on investment, intellectual property, development and energy. Whether the HP will lead to the complete metamorphosis called for by Blair is a key challenge for political leadership in both the G8 and O5 in the coming years. But as it moves in that direction, it could usefully add trade directly to its agenda and thus help make Blair's first prediction come true in the end.

This potential arises first from the G8's proven performance as a centre of global governance over its first thirty two years. Since its inception as the Group of Seven (G7) in 1975, this club of major market powers has made several decisive contributions to global governance in a growing array of fields. It has helped its members more effectively manage their domestic politics, deliberate about domestic and international problems, set new normative directions to address them, take collective decisions to solve them, implement those decisions and institutionalize them in G8-centred bodies of its own. At the same time, the G8 has faced a barrage of criticisms, ranging from its failure to involve its citizens, deal with the right issues, define proper directions, make appropriate decisions, comply with them completely, and involve the relevant powers, international organizations, civil society and other actors in the galaxy of global governance that the G8 has now become (Bayne 2001, 2004, 2005; Fratianni et al. 2007, Hajnal 2007a, 2007b; Putnam and Bayne 1987).

This record of achievement and disappointment has been evident in international trade. Since the start, the G8 has played a critical catalytic role in successfully launching and concluding successive rounds of multilateral trade liberalization. Yet it has been taking longer for an internally divided and seeming less influential G8 to launch and conclude successive rounds. And its latest launch — the innovative DDA initially destined to be done by 2004 — is now badly overdue, with no end in sight.

There are many alleged causes of the G8's current failure in global trade governance. The most obvious flow from changing specialized capability, as global trade power increasingly shifts from those within the G8 to the major emerging powers outside. To be sure, the G8 has moved to incorporate the new trade powers, first through the Group of Twenty (G20) finance ministers forum it launched in 1999, then through the G7 finance ministers club reaching out to China since 2004, and finally through the G8 Plus Five Summit dialogue beginning in 2003 and unfolding continuously since 2005. But the G8's newest full member, Russia, remains outside the WTO, while the WTO's newest major member, China, remains outside the G8. And while the G8 has allowed its own Quadrilateral to give way to a new G20 trade ministers' caucus created by the emerging powers, the latter has not brought Doha Development Agenda (DDA) to a speedy and successful end.

There is thus much riding on the outcome of the HP - the latest experiment in combined established-emerging power governance. Trade itself is not one of the designated four subjects for the HP's two year structured dialogue. But the important trade-related issues of investment, intellectual

property, development and energy efficiency are. The first two are central to the WTO and its “Singapore issues.” The third is the very focus of the DDA And the latter has clear implications for trade, especially with Japan and the United States reportedly working on an initiative to accelerate trade liberalization in energy-efficient products at the Japanese-hosted G8 summit to be held in Hokkaido on July 7–9, 2008.

Thus far, the few existing accounts of the HP have expressed cautious optimism about its prospects, while highlighting the many obstacles it confronts (Kirton 2007; Gnath 2007; Cooper and Jackson 2007). But none has dealt with its potential contribution to global trade governance. And none has examined in detail its precursors, origins, negotiation, architecture and early operation as a basis for judging how successful it could be, both in the trade domain and overall.

This study presents the first detailed analysis of the past, present and potential of the new Heiligendamm Process as a contributor to global governance in trade, in the many other issues where the fates of the G8 and emerging powers are increasingly intertwined, and as a more effective and legitimate centre of global governance at large. It first examines the G8’s record in general and in trade in particular, the G8’s treatment of China as the leading emerging power, the performance of the G20 and G7 finance ministers’ forums in bringing the established and emerging powers together, and the G8 Plus Five process that began at the G8 summit in 2003. It then analyses the conception, negotiation, emergence and early operation of the HP created at the G8 summit in 2007. It concludes by identifying the HP’s strengths and weaknesses, its potential to become a

leaders-level club, and to contribute decisively to global governance in the field of trade.

This study argues that the prospects for the HP's emergence as an effective centre of trade and global governance are more promising than the existing analyses and current mood suggest. Both the G8 summit and trade G20 acting separately have failed to bring the DDA to a successful end. At the same time, there has been a transformation in the G8's treatment of China, and the two have now joined as equals to produce the balanced, broadening dialogue and results of the finance G20. The successes and shortcomings of the G8 Plus Five process have generated moves toward more institutionalized engagement between the G8 and emerging powers. Despite reservations among the G8's most powerful members, the U.S. and Japan, and the concerns of many O5 about their unequal treatment, the maximum version of the HP has emerged, complete with a secretariat housed in the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) to foster its extensive work program over the next two years. Its future is promising, as a once resistant Japan has now accepted it, and a more enthusiastic Italy and Canada take over as G8 hosts in 2009 and 2010. The many growing vulnerabilities afflicting China, its O5 partners and the G8 members will make all more eager for common solutions, arrived at in common, to be found in the years ahead. Trade is the obvious place for this expanded contribution to global governance to start.

The Past: The Process of G8 Expansion The G8's Trade Governance

Since its 1975 creation, the G7/8 club of major market powers has made several decisive contributions to global governance across a growing range of fields. As Appendix A indicates, its effectiveness as a comprehensive centre of global governance has increased across all the major dimensions by which an international institution's performance can be assessed. As Appendix B shows, this increasing effectiveness has been evident in the field of trade, which, along with macroeconomic policy and North-South development, has been one of the three issue areas dealt with by every G7/8 summit since the start. In trade, the summit has secured some of its most striking successes (Cohn 2002). These include resisting protectionism, concluding the stalled Tokyo Round in 1979, launching the Uruguay Round in 1986 and concluding it 1994, endorsing regional trade agreements such as the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement in 1988, and creating new trade institutions, above all its own trade ministers Quadrilateral in 1981 and the WTO itself in 1995. Its most recent achievement has been helping launch the DDA at the G8's Genoa Summit in 2001.

Yet in trade the G8 has also seen some of its most spectacular failures — its neglect of the subject in the early 1980s, its failure to launch a new round at the bitter Bonn Summit in 1985, its unfulfilled promises in 1990, 1991 and 1992 to complete the Uruguay Round within a year, and the rejection of U.S. president Bill Clinton's call for a new round at Naples in 1994. During the 1990's the deepening integration brought by globalization drove the trade agenda and summit into difficult,

once domestic issues. The 1997–98 global financial crisis eroded the neo-liberal consensus on the benefits of freer trade. Outside countries and civil society actors demanded more inclusive, transparent, democratic decision making in trade governance. Thus the G7/8's historic role as the ultimate guardian against protectionism, as the catalyst for further liberalization, and as the global trade governor of last resort, met mounting challenges. While it did launch Doha, its greatest apparent failure has come not bringing the DDA to a successful end thus far.

The questions of how well the summit governs global trade, and why it succeeds and fails, have long been debated by scholars. Some see the G7/8 as an ineffective centre of global trade governance, although they disagree over why it is so. Here the first, “legalization” school suggests that the G7/8 is bound to be irrelevant, or at best a deliberative “ginger group,” as it lacks the obligation, precision and delegation that charter-bound, organized international institutions require for effectiveness and legitimacy (Abbott et al. 2000; Baker 2000; Goldstein et al. 2000, Grieco and Ikenberry 2002). By this legalization logic, any G7 effectiveness should have disappeared in 1995 after the new, highly legalized WTO was born to replace the more lightly organized General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT).

A second, “false new consensus” school ascribes G7 ineffectiveness in the 1990s not to such external, institutional factors, but to internal cognitive and capability ones. It highlights G7 governors' inaccurate belief that they could not control globalization in an era of U.S. decline and in the face of the resulting rise of traditional differences among members (Bergsten and Henning 1996).

In contrast, many see the G7 as an effective centre of global trade governance, for good or bad. Thus a third, “neo-liberal leadership” school argues that the G7, as the club of capitalist powers and state agents from capitalist classes, enforces a destructive, disciplinary neo-liberalism (Helleiner 2001; Gill 2000, 1999), makes only superficial adjustments to sustain the ideological framework in the face of crisis and contestation (Dallaire 2001) or properly defends its core values of openness (Sally 2001; Freytag 2001; Donges and Tillman 2001; Theuringer 2001; Dluhosch 2001).

A fourth, “social change” school, suggests that the G7/8 defends and expands the embedded liberalism of the 1945 order by ensuring that trade liberalization promotes employment, social welfare and, now, ecological values, especially in the face of the crises that globalization brings (Kirton 2002; Kirton, Daniels and Freytag 2001). It does this due to its institutional ability to embrace and integrate a full range of subjects and values, in a forum dedicated to open democracy, individual liberty and social advancement, and one directly controlled by popularly elected democratic leaders. The G7/8’s failures in setting new, socially sensitive normative directions arise primarily when it defers to the heavily legalized organizations of the 1940’s global governance architecture and, above all, to the new WTO.

This debate deepens when the G7/8 summit’s performance in collective decision making and compliance on trade is put in the primary place. Here, a fifth, “democratic institutionalist” school argues that the summit has had a highly variable trade performance, doing “well” from 1975 to 1978, performing “not

very highly” from 1979 to 1986, “mixed” from 1987 to 1993, and “low” from 1994 to 2000 (Bayne 2001a; Ullrich 2001, 2005). It does best when the leaders commit themselves to defending the open multilateral trade system, remain personally engaged, involve outside countries and civil society, and set consistent policies in related areas such as development and debt relief. In keeping with the legalization logic, it is more likely to succeed when it has a trade ministers’ forum or presence with the GATT/WTO (Winham 1986; Wolfe 1998), and when it works in support of or connection with the summit established, G7/8 guided multilateral organizations, assisted by powerful trade bureaucracies within members’ national governments (Kokotsis 1999; Ikenberry 1993).

A sixth, “flexible concert” school also points to a generally successful G8 trade performance. But it is based on the G8’s character as a flexible concert of equals and the limitations of its “hard law” competitor, the legalized GATT/WTO (Cohn 2001, 2002, esp. ch. 7–9; Kirton 2002, 1999a, 1999b, Daniels 1993). It argues that “the G7/G8, the Quad and the OECD have occupied important positions at the upper levels of the trade decision-making pyramid,” as a result of “the dominance of developed countries in the North over developing countries in the South, the decline of U.S. economic hegemony, the growing interaction of trade with other issues as a result of globalisation, and the unique characteristics of the GATT/WTO as an international organisation” (Cohn 2002, 278–289). These characteristics are the GATT/WTO’s lack of decision-making procedures for G7/8 or anyone’s executive leadership, and its narrow, legally entrenched trade mandate that prevents it from forming the broader, more balanced linkages a globalizing world

demands. Thus the WTO, imprisoned in its own legal straitjacket, helps make the G7/8 the effective centre of global governance on trade.

A systematic test of these competing schools sustains Bayne's assessment of a six-stage cadence of G7/8 trade governance (Kirton and Kokotsis 2003). Thus the G8 had high trade achievements in 1977–78 (with the closing of the Tokyo Round); much lower in 1981–82; non-existent in 1983–1989; mixed in 1990–1993 (with the ultimately successful effort to close the Uruguay Round); non-existent again in 1994–2000; and high again in 2001 (with the launch of the DDA). Yet the pattern becomes less clear, particularly in recent years, as the analysis moves in turn through the deliberative, directional, decision-making, delivery and institutional development dimensions of summit performance. These patterns show that summit performance is a five-layered funnel, in which large deliberative contributions at the top are winnowed down to little institutional development at the bottom. Furthermore, they show that summit performance is best considered a multidimensional outcome, with considerable independent variance for each component, suggesting a separate array of causal factors at work in each case.

A correlation of aggregate and component trade performance with the major causal variables specified by the “flexible concert” school, supplemented by the larger “legalization” school confirms the multidimensional nature of summit performance and the need for a specific cluster of factors to explain each component. However, a core group of generative, comprehensively relevant causes also emerge. They portray the

G7/8 as a continuing collective hegemon, operating as a comprehensive, flexible summit-level institution with an interlinked agenda. It benignly offers effective global trade governance when its members' overall capabilities become more equal, creates commitments when left alone, complies when outsiders come to watch, and does best when the members' closed economies become more equally dependant on each other and when their leaders bring a shared political purpose and more experience to their annual encounter. Even as the GATT/WTO becomes more legalized, multilaterally inclusive and democratic, there remains an important role for the G8 summit's global trade governance work.

These core causal factors account well for the failure of the G8 to deliver the repeatedly promised DDA. The G8's historic collective predominance in the global system and the equalization of trade capabilities within the G8 club have declined, as China and other emerging powers have arisen as trade powers since 2003 (see Appendix C; Humphrey and Messner 2005). Moreover China has become an increasingly consequential and now ranking "top five" trade partner of all members of the G8 (save for Britain and Italy, see Appendix D). The old pattern of the G8 producing trade commitments on its own, with outsiders only ensuring compliance with them, has become obsolescent as China has become one of the most important global trading powers and partners (Ostry 2005). After the great continuity of leaders at G8 summits from 2000 to 2005, the experience of the G8 leaders has declined, even as that of their increasing regular O5 partners, lead by China, has been on the rise. And even as the GATT/WTO has become more legalized, multilaterally inclusive and increasingly democratic in

membership, and as China has become a member of it and the new trade caucus groups beyond the G8, the Doha deal remains undone. In order to generate more effective global trade governance, there are thus good grounds for reforming the G8's partnerships and processes, with a stronger relationship with China taking pride of place.

The G8/7's Relationship with China

Over the past decade, the G8 and China have made major moves in this direction, even though the effects of this closer association have remained a matter of debate (Kirton 2001a; Martinez-Diaz 2007). Among G8-centred scholars, one school of thought treats China as an outside object, warranting no institutionalized association with the G7 (Bayne 1995; Sachs 1998; Kirton 1999b). A second school views China as a worthy associate, although one lacking at present, and perhaps for some time, a legitimate claim for full membership (Whyman 1995; Hodges 1999; Baum and Shevchenko 2001). A third school regards China as a legitimate member of some or all of the G7/8 system (Jayarwedna 1989; Smyser 1993; ul Haq 1994; Commission on Global Governance 1995; Brezinski 1996; Bergsten 1998; "Welcome to China, Mr. Clinton" 1998, Desai 2006). This debate among these schools long saw limited analytical advance. It largely ignored key issues, notably the particular form any association should take, the rationale and ultimate objective underlying association and, above all, the process from moving toward a system in which China, without or with others, had a mutually comfortable and meaningful place in the G8.

A detailed analysis of the G8's actual treatment of China from 1975 to 2000 showed the G8 increasingly embracing China (Kirton 1999c, 2001a). In particular China's responsible position in the 1997–99 financial crisis, its approach to international financial system reform in ways that coincided with the position of some G7 members on some core issues and its contribution to the Group of Twenty-Two (G22) finance ministers, which met in 1998, in the G20 and in the Financial Stability Forum (FSF) was judged to warrant a move toward association with the G7/8 at the leaders level itself. The proper move for the G8 in 2000 seemed to be to invite China's leader to join G8 leaders for a pre-summit dinner dialogue, a strategy that Japanese prime minister Keizo Obuchi embraced in part as he prepared to host his summit at Okinawa that year (Kirton 2001a). And greater participation or even full membership in the G7 finance ministers forum seemed appropriate as well (Kirton 2001a, Desai 2006). Since that time, the closer association between the G8 and China has emerged through the G20 finance ministers since 1999, G7 finance ministers since 2004, and the G8 summit itself starting in 2003 and continuously since 2005.

The G20

While a G8-China leaders-level association also arose in 2003, the Asian-turned-global finance crisis had earlier bred the new G20 finance ministers' forum, where China was an equal, key member from the very start. There is a rich debate about the performance of this group, especially its role in empowering as equals the emerging systemically important members, with China in the lead. But a careful analysis of its performance shows that the G20 has increasingly done well as a valuable and

valued balanced centre of global governance across an increasingly wide range of concerns (Kirton and von Furstenberg 2001; Kirton 2001b, 2005b; Martinez-Diaz 2007).

The G20 was created as a consequence of American and G8 leadership as a consensus-oriented forum of systemically significant global countries with a mission to prevent financial, economic and related crises, and to institute the social protections that would make globalization work for the benefit of all. Based on a strong start in its first two years, it evolved during its first half-decade from a largely deliberative forum to one that set new normative directions, took collective decisions and developed global governance by broadening its own agenda, thickening its own structure and working in conscious interdependence with other multilateral organizations and the G8 (see Appendix E). It had an increasingly autonomous impact as an international institution in bridging differences between and within the developed and emerging countries, and in hastening agreement on “constitutional” issues in outside governance forums. Yet essential to its success was its pattern of working closely in tandem with the similarly constructed, much more experienced and much more cohesive G8, in support of the principles of transparency, openness, democracy, social advancement and equity that the G8 has at its institutional core. Its success sustained the case that a L20, composed of the same members, should be created, through a strengthening of the G8 Plus Five process that emerged after 2003 (Kirton 2004a, 2004b; Cooper 2007).

The strength of the G20 platform can be seen in several ways. The first is the growing breadth of the agenda that the G20

has discussed, as it has grown well beyond financial stability to embrace trade-related and trade matters. The second is the general rise in the number of commitments, amidst great annual variation, that each autumn meeting has produced. The third is the move toward rotating the chair, alternating between a G8 member and a non-G8 one. In the lead among this latter constituency have been the O5 powers of India in 2001 (although the location of the meeting was replaced due to the September 11 terrorist attacks), Mexico in 2003, China in 2005, South Africa in 2007 and Brazil in 2008 (Cooper 2007).

Since the Canadian-hosted meeting in 2000 the G20 has been a body for global trade governance in the collective decisional domain (Appendix E). Its performance here peaked at five trade commitments in 2005, when China held the chair. Here it went beyond traditional MTN liberalization measures to embrace south-south trade, trade and investment and trade for development (see Appendix F). While not enough is known about the origin and negotiation of these G20 trade commitments, or G20 members' compliance with them, preliminary analysis suggests that the G20 trade commitments in 2003 induced compliance from their developed and developing country members alike (Appendix G). A separate analysis using a different method based on public materials concludes that trade is a G20 issue area where the G20, in balanced fashion as a forum of equals, sides with neither the G7 nor the G24 (Martinez-Diaz, 2007: 11).

G7 Finance Ministers

At the same time, China's association with the G8 has been strengthening at the finance ministers level, where even Russia is not yet a full member of the G7 club. This club was born in 1973 with four, then five members, and became a G7 club during the Japanese-hosted summit in 1986. Russia became associated with it first in 1992 and more regularly as the 21st century began. China first attended as an invited guest in October 2004 and came again in February, September and December 2005 and June 2006 (see Appendix H). It came alone in its first two appearances, but was joined by the full slate of Plus Five countries — Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa and Mexico (BRICSAM) — in September 2005. In December 2005, Mexico and South Africa were missing. In June 2006 Brazil did not attend although G20 members South Korea and Australia did. For those times when China has been absent, no countries other than the G8 members have come.

The Plus Five Process

The success of the G20 process, and China's role within it, is further seen by the invitation to China to participate in the G8 summit itself. China came to its first G8 summit in 2003, returned again in 2005 and has been at every G8 summit since. In 2003 it came at France's invitation as part of a much larger collection of countries (Kirton and Panova 2003, G8IC 2004). Its inclusion, and that of India and South Africa appears to have helped them comply with the G8 commitments made at the summit, even if these commitments were made only by the G8 (See Appendix I). After the interruption of the American-hosted 2004 G8, when no emerging economies were invited, China returned at British invitation to the 2005 Gleneagles Summit, as

part of the Plus Five emerging powers group. It returned in the same configuration for Russia's G8 in 2006 and Germany's in 2007 (Aslund 2006, Vickers 2006). Again, compliance with the 2006 G8 climate change commitments came from both the G8 and the O5. At the ministerial level, China was also a full founding member of the G8's Gleneagles Dialogue on clean energy and climate change, created at British inspiration at the G8 Plus Five leaders meeting in 2005.

The Present: The Heiligendamm Process

This now emerging "G13" leadership is thus demonstrating its value in addressing the financial, social and environmental stability and security issues required for sustainable trade liberalization. The G8 and O5 leaders recognized this benefit in the summer of 2007. For one of the major deliverables of their G8's Heiligendamm Summit was the coming together of the G8 and the O5 in the HP that gave the O5 powers a more reliable, institutionalized involvement in the G8 than ever before. This innovation was seen by most observers as one of the key achievements of the summit (Kirton 2007; Gnath 2007; Cooper and Jackson 2007). A detailed examination of its emergence from its initial appearance as an idea of one G8 leader, to an established institution accepted by all the G8 and O5 members, strongly suggests the potential of this emerging "G13" as a centre of global governance in general, and especially in trade.

Preparing the HP

The process of producing the HP began at the last session of the 2006 St. Petersburg Summit, when British prime minister Tony Blair proposed that the O5 be added to the G8 as full members. But while the ultimate goal of a full G13 had found recognition and a champion, Blair's partners were convinced that the G8 should remain capable of taking action. They thus decided to keep their club the way it was. They calculated that the bigger the group, the smaller the commonality among its members and thus the lesser capacity for action that would come.

From the start of their planning for the summit in 2007, the German hosts built on Blair's idea. The O5 — sometimes referred to as the threshold countries — would be invited to their third G8 summit in a row. But there was no hint at the outset that these five countries would play any greater part in the G8 than they had before. There were no signs that the Germans had anything unusual planned as far as outreach or a HP was concerned. There was no mention of the term “Heiligendamm Process” in the initial papers prepared by the Germans and circulated to their G8 partners. Yet to close observers it was clear that Germany, as host, was now structuring the agenda to focus on those issues where the presence of the Plus Five would be necessary on functional grounds.

It was only in February that the ‘sherpas’ preparing the summit for their leaders asked how the G8 could best engage the O5. Blair had now publicly stated that he wanted the G8 to expand in his speech to the World Economic Forum at Davos on January 27, 2007 (Blair 2007). The sherpas felt that the G8 would see the adaptation of its structure. Heiligendamm would be the third consecutive time their leaders would meet with the

O5 members at the summit. Many considered it hard not to invite the O5 if the G8 was to have any outreach at all.

Moreover, the G8 had to adapt to the evolving shifts in geopolitical and geo-economic power. The sherpas agreed that the core of the G8 no longer focused just on economics and markets but also on shared values and on sharing and broadening the benefits of globalization. The combined G8 no longer represented global strength as it once did. Consequently, several issues no longer had a G8-only solution. Issues with a global impetus could no longer be discussed fully without involving the O5. This led to a consideration of issues that might be appropriate for a discussion. These included climate change. Among the O5, China was about to surpass the U.S. as the world's number-one producer of greenhouse gas emissions. Brazil was already number four, with three quarters of its emissions coming from deforestation, mostly in the Amazon.

Yet there was still some reluctance to give up the shared history of the G8. There was also a clear desire to carefully think through any possible expansion. It was crucial that the Americans play in the mechanism. As a new broader representation developed, it must not create a forum for ganging up on the Americans (May 2005). Nor could it diminish the G8 or come at the expense of the candour, intimacy and shared values of this forum, which gave impetus to other institutions. There needed to be plans for continuity, particularly to preserve the sense of a G8 meeting with a G8 agenda and G8 documents, rather than one shared with the O5.

Another issue was whether to expand beyond the O5. Some felt an enlarged group probably needed to extend beyond five in order to ensure, for example, Muslim representation. This could be Nigeria — the largest African country — or Saudi Arabia. It would be difficult to obtain broad representation with only five participants.

The agenda was also a consideration. Inclusion required a real issue to discuss and advance. Here, the sherpas recalled the origin of the G7 in the aftermath of the oil crises of the early 1970s—the burning issue of the day. They also concluded that they needed to be careful to find an issue that did not detract from other institutions that already had it in their mandate. And it must be an issue that would allow for deliverables beyond simply the discussion stage. The G8's Heiligendamm agenda already included several items appropriate for a G8 Plus Five discussion, under the label of ensuring, sharing and broadening the benefits of globalization. These topics were climate change, economic imbalances and intellectual property protection. These were related: new technologies were needed for coping with climate change, involved intellectual property protection and needed to be financed. The question was how to pull these threads together into a robust agenda. Care needed to be taken to avoid overlap, in developing an agenda collectively between the G8 with the O5.

There were differing perspectives on what to do and how to proceed. But some saw a pragmatic opportunity that could bring out the creative element of G8 leadership and take the evolution of its architecture to the next stage. While transformation would not be possible in time for the

Heiligendamm Summit, the G8 was ready to take the next step through a more elaborate engagement at Heiligendamm.

By April, the Germans had labeled their intended institutional innovation the HP. They decided to hold two G8 and O5 encounters a year, with a meeting with the O5 officials added on to the G8 sherpa meetings. Here 13 or 14 participants would engage in an equal exchange with one another. On this basis the Germans asked the environmental and climate experts of each country to come to a special meeting in Berlin on May 4.

After the meeting, the Germans concluded that the way participants in the G8 knew one another and were aware of one another's positions was quite different than the dynamic between them and the O5. With new guests at the table, it was not always possible to see the articulation and evolution of positions. Discussions were more difficult. Participants were more cautious. Progress was slower. Thus, the joint meeting showed the importance of intensifying this type of dialogue. This implied that the industrialized countries must not expect too much from the threshold countries in the field of climate change. At the end of the meeting, the Germans announced that a follow-up meeting of the G8 and O5 sherpas would take place on October 16, after the summit had been held.

The Germans also developed a proposal for the HP - a structured topic-related dialogue whose results would be submitted in two years time, under the Italian presidency in 2009. Possible issues would focus on topics of mutual interest, related to the world economy, for both the threshold countries and the G8.

One central topic was innovation and its protection. Knowledge-based societies needed innovation and to promote it for the sake of growth and jobs in G8 countries. But there was also a need to protect innovation, through copyright. The protection of intellectual property rights must be a priority and common solutions sought.

Another potential issue was investment. On the one hand, it was important that the G8 countries themselves made it clear that they favoured open investment markets. This preference could no longer be taken for granted. The United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had found that in the 1990s national investment legislation contained protectionist rules covering about 3% of foreign direct investment. This had risen to 20% at the beginning of the 21st century (OECD, 2007). Whatever one's position on globalization, the German chancellor and her sherpa were convinced of the danger of this protectionist path. They sought a declaration that supported freedom of investment. Investment conditions were important because the more open the markets, the more necessary it was to agree on similar investment conditions with the most important trade partners. Thus this was a good issue for the O5. It was also a directly trade-related one.

Two other possible items fit this category. One was energy efficiency. Here there was a debate about climate change. When asked practical questions about potential first steps, the Germans replied with the hope that the framework of the Heiligendamm Process would produce reasonable results. However, the separate joint meeting already scheduled for October 16 would focus on climate change, outside the HP itself.

The other topic was development. The Germans were convinced that for Africa to embark on the path to much better development, good governance was required. It was thus important for the international donor community to reach a consensus on governance. There were already different forums available. But the Germans wanted to discuss this issue with the O5 too.

The OECD offered to provide a platform for the HP. It would prepare the sherpa meetings on the chosen four issues of intellectual property, investment, development and energy efficiency. It would not serve as a body for implementation or control. Although not all the participants, especially from the O5, supported this development, the OECD expected its offer to be accepted, as it eventually was.

The Germans' goal was a structured dialogue between the G8 and the O5. They felt that for global governance, the leaders of these threshold countries must become aware that with their growing economic weight came more responsibility. They were only able to take on such responsibility against the background of preparing for the G8. On issues such as climate change, the O5 expected advance steps to be taken by the G8. Although this move was taken for granted by the Europeans, not all G8 partners shared the same view. The Germans had to respond first within the G8. In the framework of the G8's consensus process, they also would have to find a way to sum it all up in documentary form. At the end of May, the Germans were hopeful they could achieve this. With such dialogue and cooperation, a G13 could be possible in the end.

On the eve of the summit, all understood the HP would be a major deliverable. However, this deliverable would unfold along with the host's year in the chair. The Germans thus needed to negotiate with the Japanese and the Italians, who would host in 2008 and 2009 respectively. All wanted a higher degree of confidence in what the process entailed. The sherpas saw the HP as a logical way to address the obvious calls for the G8 to expand the dialogue. The agenda could be built collaboratively throughout the year. That said, options were kept open about the degree of formal institutionalization, right down to level of selecting who the five outreach participants would be. There was a desire to keep the wording flexible.

At the Summit

At the summit host German Chancellor Angela Merkel's skills as a good chair were needed to get the members to agree with the HP. The O5 leaders had been kept waiting in a separate room by themselves, without even the German foreign minister to tend to them. The only G8 leader who visited them was Russia's Vladimir Putin, who spent an hour with the O5. The Germans publicly issued a one-page document on the HP before the meeting with the O5 had taken place. At the outreach session, the Chinese, Indian and South African leaders were upset by what they felt was an inappropriate and premature announcement. Merkel managed their discontent smoothly, admitting that mistakes had been made. Emphasizing the importance of the process, she was able to bring all the O5 partners back on board.

The innovative HP that emerged from the summit was a high-level, structured dialogue between the G8 and O5 on the issues of intellectual property, investment, development and energy efficiency. It would start in the second half of 2007 and aim at producing tangible results in two years. An interim report was due at the 2008 summit and a final one at the 2009 one. The OECD was asked to serve as a platform and the IEA to do so in the field of energy efficiency. The German vision was fully realized, with the issue of energy efficiency included and the OECD given a secretariat role.

Through this institutionalized outreach, the G8 club expanded to embrace the rapidly rising, largely democratic global threshold powers of China, India, Brazil, Mexico and South Africa. The HP extended the ongoing 2005 Gleneagles Dialogue on Clean Energy, Climate Change and Sustainable Development. It had already proven itself when the May 2007 meeting of the G8 and O5 sherpas delivered the signal that developing countries would control their carbon if America and its allies did. The HP showed again that the G8, like the OECD and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), could expand to include rising powers, unlike the UN Security Council (UNSC), with its frozen membership of five permanent members, and unlike the Executive Boards of the Bretton Woods bodies still struggling with their divisive issues of “voice and vote.” But there was still an attempt to keep the outreach flexible. Its membership was not fixed. There was no certainty that the countries that had been invited for the previous five years would remain the same in the years ahead.

Follow-up

The follow-up to the Heiligendamm Summit was framed in response to French president Nicolas Sarkozy's call for a new G13 to emerge (BBC 2007; Sarkozy 2007; Williamson 2007). Among the G8 members, questions remained about whether it would be the same five participants in the future, the same agenda with the same overlap between the O5 and G8 agendas, and whether the O5 leaders would come to the next summit to discuss the same issues the HP had. It was also unclear whether a summit agenda would be developed jointly between the G8 and O5.

Many felt that the O5 leaders would have a larger place in the process by the end of the year. But most also felt that the best part of the G8 summit was the first part, when leaders as the seven or eight talked about what it was like to be leaders of major market democracies, facing economic challenges as democratically elected leaders, with the demanding media, legislatures and judiciaries they must face. At their summit they exchanged ideas about how to manage the aspects of their common situations. Indeed, they set aside their prepared texts to engage in frank discussions about managing economies in today's difficult world. The opportunity to do this was what brought them back every year. It was what they enjoyed most about the G8 summit. In contrast, in the larger meeting at Heiligendamm with the outreach participants present, some G8 members felt that at least one O5 leader had spoken as if he were relying on prepared papers, as if he were still speaking at the UN.

Following the summit the task of managing the HP itself and the O5 remained. The G8 had to be sure it had real, valuable discussions with the O5. The role of the OECD remained somewhat controversial. The Germans still had some work to do to make it acceptable to the O5. It had become so by the fall.

Within the G8, one outstanding issue was whether the G8 Plus Five formula would induce the O5 to take real action on climate change. The Americans asked about the rationale for the October 16th G8-O5 meeting on climate that was not part of the HP. They were concerned because they had scheduled their own meeting on climate in Washington and feared duplication or competition. They reluctantly accepted the argument that it was important to show that the unity displayed at the Heiligendamm Summit on climate remained intact. The G8-O5 meeting on climate thus took place with the Americans there. It ended with a chair's statement that codified further G8-O5 convergence, if of a low-level sort. Indonesia had also been invited to attend in its capacity as the chair of the UN's Bali meeting, but it did not attend.

By the end of October, the G8 agreed that the first scheduled HP meeting would be on investment and take place the following month at the OECD. There would be two to three meetings a year on each of the four topics, among relatively senior, technical experts. Development cooperation would be dealt with by development agencies. There would be meetings of an overall steering committee, back to back with sherpa meetings. Some outreach countries still resisted anchoring the HP too closely to the OECD, leading the G8 to look for a reasonable separation between the two. Both the G8 and O5

identified sherpas to constitute a group of 13 or 14 individuals who could talk equally to one another. Everyone was comfortable with the HP. All were taking the HP very seriously indeed.

By this time, too, the initially resistant Japanese had warmed up to the HP. At first they had accepted it as a German initiative that the Germans would implement on a separate track from preparations for the 2008 summit itself. Now they indicated they were willing to take over the HP's chair and steering committees after 2007 and after the German-hosted first meeting in the spring of 2008. They further signaled they would invite the O5 leaders to their summit in July (Daily Yomiuri 2007). But the Japanese reserved the right to invite others as well. Other G8 partners felt such flexibility was important for them too. It remained unclear how the Japanese would structure their summit's outreach day.

Conclusion

The G8 Plus Five or G13 formula has now emerged as the likely winner of the great competition among new combinations claiming to serve as the centre of global governance for the 21st-century world. It is winning out over other attendees with fewer, greater and different numbers, at the level of leaders, ministers and officials and across a wide range of policy domains (Bradford and Linn 2004; 2007, Carin and Smith 2005; Cooper et al. 2006; Cooper and English 2005; Fues 2007; Gurría 2005; Lesage 2007; Maddox et al. 2007, Martin 2006; Wilson and Purushothaman 2003). To be sure, to the G13 other countries and international organizations may be added and sometimes

Mexico and South Africa are left off the G7 finance ministers list. But the G13 core is almost always there. It may even transcend the G8's historic pattern of adding new members one at a time, with India seen by some as the next logical choice (Kirton 2005a, Thakur 2007).

With such stability, the major outstanding question concerns the subjects on which the emerging G13 will prove its worth. On the existing HP agenda, it is easy to identify what the G8 want of the O5, notably higher standards on intellectual property and investment protection, more money and standards for development and more action to control climate change. It is harder to identify what the O5 want from the G8 (Yongding 2005, China 2007, Chen 2007). Moreover, there are a large number of issues, such as macroeconomic management, infectious disease, and climate change directly where the G8 and O5 share predominant global capability and a common fate, but which are not on the shared HP agenda yet (See Appendix J).

Here the issue of trade stands out. China ranks fourth as a global exporter, and the O5 collectively provide 10% of world exports now (see Appendix J). The O5's global share of financial capability, as measured by IMF quota shares, is 9.34%. The G8 summit, its trade ministers Quadrilateral, the trade G20, the finance G20 and the WTO acting separately have failed to bring the long overdue DDA to a successful end. The G13 possesses the overwhelming and internally balanced trade power in the world. The early reservations about the HP from the G8's most powerful members, the U.S. and Japan, and the concerns of many O5 members of their unequal treatment are now fading fast. As investment, the most directly trade related issue, is

where the HP is moving ahead first, the time could well be right for a trade-dependent, multicultural, international institution-building Canada to put trade on the agenda of an enhanced G13 when it hosts the G8 in 2010.

More broadly, it is striking that at present, the G8 alone has global collective predominance, defined as a majority, in the specialized capabilities necessary to solve the four global problems chosen for the HP agenda during its first two years. This supports the case for a two tier G8-O5 annual summit for the moment for agenda items such as this. However, in the fields of trade, finance and climate, the G8 alone currently commands a minority of the relevant global capabilities (or vulnerabilities in the case of climate). The addition of the O5 would restore the new G13 to global predominance again. This suggests a strong need to add these issues to the HP as soon as possible, and to make the O5 full partners at the G8/G13 summit where the issues of trade, finance and climate are discussed. An analysis of the web of overlapping memberships in international institutions suggests that at the critical leaders level, it is only at a new G13 that this desired more equal association and effective action can take place (See Appendix K).

References

- Abbott, Kenneth W., Robert Keohane, Andrew Moravcsik, et al. (2000). "The Concept of Legalization." *International Organization* 54(3), 401–420.
- Aslund, Anders (2006). "Russia's Challenges as Chair of the G-8." *Policy Briefs in International Economics* PBO6-3 Washington, DC, Institute for International Economics 7 (March).
- Baker, Andrew (2000). "The G7 as a Global 'Ginger Group': Plurilateralism and Four Dimension Diplomacy." *Global Governance* 6 (April-June), 165–190.
- Baum, Richard and Alexei Shevchenko (2001). "Bringing China In: A Cautionary Note." In Richard Rosecrance, ed., *The New Great Power Coalition: Toward a World Concert of Nations*, 327–344. New York: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Bayne, Nicholas (1995). "The G7 Summit and the Reform of Global Institutions." *Government and Opposition* 30 (Autumn): 497.
- Bayne, Nicholas (2001). "Concentrating the Mind: Decision-Making in the G7/G8 System." Presentation to the *Promoting Conflict Prevention and Human Security: What Can the G9 Do?* Conference of the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, July 16, 2001. Available at: www.g8.utoronto.ca/conferences/2001/rome/bayne-conflict.pdf
- Bayne, Nicholas (2001a). "The G7 and Multilateral Trade Liberalization: Past Performance, Future Challenges." In J.J. Kirton and G. von Furstenberg, eds, *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalization in the Twenty-First Century*, 171–189. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Bayne, Nicholas (2004). "Prospects for the 2005 G8 Gleneagles Summit." Presentation to the G8 Research Group, University of Toronto, November 22.
- Bayne, Nicholas (2005). "Do We Need the G8 Summit? Lessons From the Past, Looking Ahead to the Future." In Michele Fratianni, John J. Kirton, Alan M. Rugman, Paolo Savona, eds., *New*

perspectives on Global Governance: Why American Needs the G8, 15-28 (Aldershot: Ashgate).

- BBC Monitoring Former Soviet Union (2007). "Russia Supports French President's Idea of G8 Enlargement." Text of report by Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs website on August 28 entitled "Answer by Russian Foreign Ministry official representative Mikhail Kamynin to question from the Russian media on [French President] N. [Nicholas] Sarkozy's idea regarding G8 enlargement." British Broadcasting Corporation.
- Bergsten, Fred (1998). "The New Agenda with China." *International Economic Policy Briefs* 98 (2), 1–2.
- Bergsten, Fred, and Randall Henning (1996). *Global Economic Leadership and the Group of Seven*. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Blair, Tony (2007). "Speech at Davos." January 27, World Economic Forum, Davos. <www.number-10.gov.uk/output/Page10858.asp> (October 2007).
- Bradford, Colin and Johannes Linn (2004). "Global Economic Governance at a Crossroads: Replacing the G7 with the G20," Brookings Institute Policy Brief 131. <www.brookings.edu/papers/2004/04/globaleconomics_colin-i-bradford-jr.aspx> (October 2007).
- Brezinski, Zbigniew (1996). "Let's Add to the G7." *New York Times*. June 25, A11.
- Carin, Barry, and Gordon Smith (2005). "Making Change Happen at the Global Level." In J. English, R. Thakur and A.F. Cooper, eds., *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*, 25–45. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Chen Feng (4 June 2007). "G8 Not Platform for Exerting Pressure," Government of the People's Republic of China (Beijing). <www.gov.cn/misc/2007-06/04/content_636224.htm> (October 2007).
- "China Positive on Sarkozy's G8 Proposal – Foreign Ministry" (2007). AFX International Focus, August 31.

- Commission on Global Governance (1995). *Our Global Neighbourhood: The Report of the Commission on Global Governance*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Cohn, Theodore (2001). "Securing Multilateral Trade Liberalization: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence." In J.J. Kirton and G. von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions In Global Economic Governance*, 189–218. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Cohn, Theodore H. (2002). *Governing Global Trade: International Institutions in Conflict and Convergence*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Cooper, Andrew F. (2007). "The Logic of the B(R)ICSAM Model for G8 Reform," *CIGI Policy Brief in International Governance* 1 (May).
- Cooper, Andrew F., Agata Antkiewicz and Timothy M. Shaw (2006). "Economic Size Trumps All Else? Lessons from BRISCAM." *CIGI Working Paper* 12.
- Cooper, Andrew F. and John English (2005). "Introduction." In J. English, R. Thakur and A.F. Cooper, eds., *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Cooper, Andrew F., and Kelly Jackson (2007). "The Incremental Transformation of the G8 through the Heiligendamm Process." Paper prepared for Diplomatic Study, Summer 2007.
- Daily Yomiuri (2007), "Govt's G-8 priorities to include nuclear nonproliferation," November 26.
- Dallaire, Sebastien (2001). Continuity and Change in the Global Money Order." In J.J. Kirton and G. von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century*, 95–111. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Daniels, Joseph P. (1993). *The Meaning and Reliability of Economic Summit Undertakings*. New York: Garland Publishing.
- Desai, Seema (2006). "Expanding the G8: Should China Join?" Foreign Policy Centre. <fpc.org.uk/publications/190> (October 2007).

- Dluhosch, Barbara (2001). "The G7 and the Debt of the Poorest." In J. Kirton and G. von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalisation in the Twenty-First Century*, 79–92. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Donges, Juergen B., and Peter Tillman (2001). "Challenges for the Global Financial System." In J.J. Kirton, J. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Governing Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 33–44. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Fратиани, Michele, John Kirton and Paolo Savona, eds. (2007), *Financing Development: The G8 and UN Contribution*, Ashgate: Aldershot.
- Freytag, Andreas (2001). "Internal Macroeconomic Policies and International Governance." In J.J. Kirton, J. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Governing Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 21–32. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Fues, Thomas (2007). "Global Governance Beyond the G8: Reform Prospects for the Summit Architecture," *Internationale Politik und Gesellschaft* 2: 11–24.
- G8 Information Centre (2004). "Press briefing by French President Jacques Chirac." Sea Island documents, University of Toronto (June 9).
- Gill, Stephen (1999). "Structural Changes in Multilateralism: The G7 Nexus and the Global Crisis." In M. Schechter, ed., *Innovation in Multilateralism* (New York: St. Martin's Press).
- Gill, Stephen (2000). "The Constitution of Global Capitalism." Paper presented at the annual convention of the International Studies Association, March 15, Los Angeles.
- Gnath, Katharina (2007). "Beyond Heiligendamm: The G8 and Its Dialogue with Emerging Countries." *Internationale Politik* 8 (Fall).
<en.internationalepolitik.de/archiv/2007/autumn2007/beyond-heiligendamm.html> (October 2007).

- Goldstein, Judith, Miles Kahler, Robert Keohane, et al. (2000). "Legalization and World Politics." *International Organization* (54)3.
- Grieco, Joseph, and John Ikenberry (2002). *State Power and World Markets: The International Political Economy*. New York: Norton.
- Gurria, Angel (2005). "A Leaders' 20 Summit?" In J. English, R. Thakur and A.F. Cooper, eds., *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*, 63–71. New York: United Nations University Press.
- Hajnal, Peter I. (2007a). *The G8 System and the G20: Evolution, Role and Documentation*. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Hajnal, Peter (2007b), "Summitry from G5 to L20: A Review of Reform Initiatives." *CIGI Working Paper* No. 20, March.
- Helleiner, Gerald (2001). "Markets, Politics and Globalization: Can the Global Economy Be Civilized?" *Global Governance* 7(3): 243–263.
- Hodges, Michael (1999). "The G8 and the New Political Economy." In M. Hodges, J.J. Kirton and J. Daniels, eds., *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*, 69–74. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Humphrey, John and Dirk Messner (2005). "The Impact of the Asian and other Drivers on Global Governance." Available at: <www.ids.ac.uk/ids/global/pdfs/AsianDriversGovernancepaper05.pdf>
- Ikenberry, John (1993). "Salvaging the G7." *Foreign Affairs* 72 (Spring), 132–139.
- Jayarwedna, L. (1989). "World Economic Summits: The Role of Representative Groups in the Governance of the World Economy." *Journal of the Society of International Development* 4, 17–20.
- Kirton, John J. (1999a). "Economic Co-operation: Summitry, Institutions and Structural Change." In J. Dunning and G. Boyd, eds., *Structural Change, and Co-operation in the Global Economy*. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

- Kirton, John J. (1999b). "Explaining G8 Effectiveness." In M. Hodges, J.J. Kirton and J. Daniels, eds., *The G8's Role in the New Millennium*, 45–68. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John (1999c). "The G7 and China in the Management of the International Financial System." Paper prepared for forum on "China in the 21st Century and the World," sponsored by the China Development Institute, the China International Center for Economic and Technical Exchange and the National Institute for Research Advancement, Japan, Shenzhen, China, November 11–12. <www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton199903> (October 2007).
- Kirton, John J. (2001a). "The G7/8 and China: Toward a Close Association." In J.J. Kirton, J. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 189–222. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J. (2001b). "The G20: Representativeness, Effectiveness and Leadership in Global Governance." In J.J. Kirton, J. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 143–172. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J. (2002). "Embedded Ecologism and Institutional Inequality: Linking Trade, Environment and Social Cohesion in the G8." In J.J. Kirton and V. Maclaren, eds., *Linking Trade, Environment and Social Cohesion: NAFTA Experiences, Global Challenges*, 45–72. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton John. J. (2004a). "Getting the L20 Going: Reaching out from the G8." Paper prepared for workshop on "G20 to Replace the G8: Why Not Now?," Brookings Institution, Institute for International Economics and the Centre for Global Governance, Washington DC, September 22.
- Kirton, John J. (2004b). "Toward Multilateral Reform: The G20's Role and Place." Paper prepared for a conference on "The Ideas-Institutional Nexus: The Case of the G20," sponsored by the Centre of International Governance Innovation, United Nations University FLASCO and the University of Waterloo, Buenos Aires, May 19–21.

<www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2004/kirton_g20_2004.pdf>
(October 2007).

- Kirton, John (2005a), "The Future of the G8." In M. Fraser, ed., *G8 Summit 2005: Mapping the Challenges*, 186–189. London: Newsdeck Publications.
- Kirton, John J. (2005b). "Toward Multilateral Reform: The G20's Contribution." In J. English, R. Thakur and A.F. Cooper, eds., *Reforming from the Top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*, 141–168. Tokyo: United Nations University Press.
- Kirton, John J. (2007). "G8: An Economic Forum of the Enlarged Western Alliance? The Record from Rambouillet 1975 through Heiligendamm 2007 to Canada 2010." Paper prepared for the North American European Summer Academy of Centre International de Formation Européenne, Nice, and the Zentrum für Wissenschaft und Weiterbildung Schloss Hofen, Lochau, Austria, July 24.
<www.g8.utoronto.ca/scholar/kirton2007/kirton-schlosshofen-070724.pdf> (October 2007).
- Kirton, John J., Joseph P. Daniels and Andreas Freytag (2001). "The G8's Contributions to Twenty-First Century Governance." In J.J. Kirton, J.P. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 283–304. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J. and Ella Kokotsis (2003). "Producing International Commitments and Compliance without Legalization: G7/8 Performance from 1975 to 2002." Paper prepared for the International Studies Association, Portland, Oregon, March 1.
- Kirton, John J., and Victoria V. Panova (2003). "[Coming Together: The Evian Legacy](#)." In M. Fratianni, P. Savona and J.J. Kirton, eds., *Corporate, Public and Global Governance: The G8 Contribution*, 201–230. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Kirton, John J., and George von Furstenburg, eds. (2001). *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalization in the Twenty-First Century*. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Kokotsis, Ella (1999). *Keeping International Commitments: Compliance, Credibility and the G7, 1988–1995*. New York: Garland.
- OECD Global Forum for International Investment (2007). Accessed 2007 at: www.oecd.org/daf/investment/gfii
- Ostry, Sylvia (2005), “Summitry and Trade: What Seal Island Could Do For Doha.” In Michele Fratianni, John J. Kirton, Alan M. Rugman and Paolo Savona, eds. *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8*, 205-212 (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Lesage, Dries (2007). “Globalisation, Multipolarity and the L20 as an Alternative to the G8.” *Global Society* 21 (3): 343–361.
- Maddox, Bronwen, David Charter and Roger Boyes (9 June 2007). “G8: What it all means and what comes next,” *The Times* (London).
- Martin, Paul (2006). “Speaking Notes for the Right Honourable Paul Martin P.C., M.P.” Annual Meeting of the Development and Peace Foundation, Dresden, Germany (June 8). Available at: www.paulmartin.ca/speech-20060608-1.html
- Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo (2007). “The G20 after Eight Years: How Effective a Vehicle for Developing-Country Influence?” *Brookings Global Economy and Development*, (October) Working Paper 12.
- May, Bernhard (2005). “The G8 in a Globalising World: Does the United States Need the G8?” In Michele Fratianni, John J. Kirton, Alan M. Rugman and Paola Savona, eds. *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8*, 67-82.
- Putnam, Robert D. and Nicholas Bayne (1987), *Hanging Together: Cooperation and Conflict in the Seven power Summits*, (Harvard University Press: Cambridge: Mass.).
- Sachs, Jeffrey (1998). “Global Capitalism: Making It Work.” *Economist* 348 (September 12), 23-25.
- Sally, Razeen (2001). “Looking Askance at Global Governance.” In J.J. Kirton, J. Daniels and A. Freytag, eds., *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, 55–78. Aldershot: Ashgate.

- Sarkozy, Nicolas (2007). "Fifteenth Ambassadors Conference: Speech," August 27. <www.premier-ministre.gouv.fr/en/information/press_871/fifteenth_ambassadors_conference_speech_57109.html> (October 2007).
- Smyser, W.R. (1993). "Goodbye, G7." *Washington Quarterly* 16 (Winter), 15–28.
- Thakur, Ramesh (2007). "India's Rising and Shining: Will It Prove a False Dawn?" CIGI Policy Brief in International Governance 2 (July).
- Theuringer, Martin (2001). "International Macroeconomic Policy Cooperation in the Era of the Euro." In *Guiding Global Order: G8 Governance in the Twenty-First Century*. Edited by John Kirton, Joseph Daniels and Andreas Fretag. Ashgate: Aldershot, 173-187.
- Ul Haq (1994). "The Bretton Woods Institutions and Global Governance." In P. Kenan, ed., *Managing the World Economy*, 409–418. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
- Ullrich, Heidi (2001). "Stimulating Trade Liberalization after Seattle: G7/8 Leadership in Global Governance." In J.J. Kirton and G. von Furstenberg, eds., *New Directions in Global Economic Governance: Managing Globalization in the Twenty-First Century*, 219–240. Aldershot: Ashgate.
- Ullrich, Heidi K. (2005). "Effective or Defective? The G8 and Multilateral Trade Negotiations." In Michele Fratianni, John J. Kirton, Alan M. Rugman and Paolo Savona, eds. *New Perspectives on Global Governance: Why America Needs the G8*, 213-330 (Aldershot: Ashgate).
- Vickers, Brendan (2006). "Heading toward the G-8 St. Petersburg Summit: What's in it for Africa?" *Global Insight*, Institute for Global Dialogue 63 (July 9), 1-4.
- "Welcome to China, Mr. Clinton" (1998). *Economist* 347 (June 27), 17.
- Williamson, Hugh (2007). "Emerging Powers Flex Muscles to Push for More Influence on G8," *Financial Times*, July 4, 6.

- Wilson, Dominic and Roopa Purushothaman (2003). "Dreaming With BRICs: The Path to 2050." *Global Economics Paper*. Goldman Sachs 99 (October), available at:
<www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/rankorder/2001rank.html>
- Winham, Gilbert (1986). *International Trade and the Tokyo Round Negotiations*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
- Whyman, William (1995). "We Can't Go On Meeting Like This: Revitalizing the G7 Process." *Washington Quarterly* 18(3), 139–165.
- Wolfe, Robert (1998). *Farm Wars: The Political Economy of Agriculture and the International Trade Regime*. Houndmills: Macmillan.
- Yongding, Yu (2005). "China's evolving global view." In John English, Ramesh Thakur, and Andrew F. Cooper, eds. *Reforming from the top: A Leaders' 20 Summit*, 187-200 (Tokyo: United National University Press).

Appendix A: G8 Summit Performance by Function, 1975–2006

Year	Bayne grade	Domestic political management		Deliberative			Directional	Decisional	Delivery	Development of global governance
		% mem	Ave # of refs	# of days	# of state-ments	# of words	# of ref to core values	# of commit-ments	Compliance score	# of bodies created Min/Off
1975	A-			3	1	1,129	5	14	57.1	0/1
1976	D			2	1	1,624	0	7	08.9	0/0
1977	B-			2	6	2,669	0	29	08.4	0/1
1978	A			2	2	2,999	0	35	36.3	0/0
1979	B+			2	2	2,102	0	34	82.3	0/2
1980	C+			2	5	3,996	3	55	07.6	0/1
1981	C			2	3	3,165	0	40	26.6	1/0
1982	C			3	2	1,796	0	23	84.0	0/3
1983	B			3	2	2,156	7	38	-10.9	0/0
1984	C-			3	5	3,261	0	31	48.8	1/0
1985	E			3	2	3,127	1	24	01.0	0/2
1986	B+			3	4	3,582	1	39	58.3	1/1
1987	D			3	7	5,064	0	53	93.3	0/2
1988	C-			3	3	4,872	0	27	-47.8	0/0
1989	B+			3	11	7,125	1	61	07.8	0/1
1990	D			3	3	7,601	10	78	-14.0	0/3
1991	B-			3	3	8,099	8	53	00.0	0/0
1992	D			3	4	7,528	5	41	64.0	1/1
1993	C+			3	2	3,398	2	29	75.0	0/2
1994	C			3	2	4,123	5	53	100.0	1/0
1995	B+			3	3	7,250	0	78	100.0	2/2
1996	B	40%	1	3	5	15,289	6	128	41.0	0/3
1997	C-	40%	1	3	4	12,994	6	145	12.8	1/3
1998	B+	25%	1	3	4	6,092	5	73	31.8	0/0
1999	B+	80%	1.7	3	4	10,019	4	46	38.2	1/5
2000	B	40%	6.5	3	5	13,596	6	105	81.4	0/4
2001	B	33%	1.5	3	7	6,214	3	58	55.0	1/2
2002	B+	17%	1	2	18	11,959	10	187	35.0	1/8
2003	C	40%	2.5	3	14	16,889	17	206	65.8	0/5
2004	C+	33%	1	3	16	38,517	11	245	54.0	0/15
2005	A-	40%	1	3	16	22,286	29	212	65.0	0/5
2006		39%	1.8	3	15	30,695	256	317	47.0	0/4
2007				3	8	25,857	651	329		0/4
Ave. all	B-	40%	1	2.9	5.9	9,283	32.9	90.4	44.7	0.3/2.4
Av. cycle 1	B-			2.1	2.9	2,526	1.1	29	32.5	0.14/0.71
Av. Cycle 2	C-			3	3.3	3,408	1.3	34	32.4	0.29/1.14
Av. Cycle 3	C+			3	4	6,446	4.4	56	47.5	0.58/1.29
Av. Cycle 4	B	29.3%	2	2.9	6.7	10,880	5.7	106	40.7	0.58/3.57
Av. Cycle 5	B-	37.7%	1.5	3	15.3	26,849	177	262	58.0	0.00/7.4

Notes:

- *Bayne Grade: the 2005 grade of A- is a confirmed grade.
- *Domestic Political Management: % Mem is the percentage of G8 countries that made a policy speech referring to the G8 that year. Ave # refs = the average number of references for those who did mention the G8 that year.
- *Directional: number of references in the communiqué's chapeau or chair's summary to the G8's core values of democracy, social advance and individual liberty.
- *Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2005 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments (see G8 Information Centre <www.g8.utoronto.ca/compliance>).

Appendix B: G8 Trade Performance by Function, 1975–2006

Year	Bayne Grade	Domestic political management		Deliberative	Directional	Decisional	Delivery
		% TR	TTL	OTL	# of references to core trade	# of trade references	Compliance Score
1975	A-	13%	2	15	2(1)/1	14	0
1976	D	24%	6	25	2/2	7	?/+23.9
1977	B-	21%	8	38	6/2	29	?/+50.2
1978	A	29%	9	31	4/3	35	?/+97.9
1979	B+	25%	3	12	3/3	34	?/33.3
1980	C+	10%	5	51	4/1	55	?/0
1981	C	21%	8	38	6	40	?
1982	C	21%	3	14	9(1)	65	-71%
1983	B	7%	1	14	4	38	?
1984	C-	8%	2	25	4(1)	31	-14.3%
1985	E	11%	2	19	1	24	?
1986	B+	18%	3	17	4(1)	39	-42.9%
1987	D	23%	8	35	9/1	54	?/+100%
1988	C-	20%	9	44	6(6)/0	27	+10%
1989	B+	13%	7	56	7(5)/1	61	+20%/+79.3%
1990	D	18%	15	84	10(10)	78	-50%
1991	B-	14%	9	64	10(9)	53	+13%
1992	D	10%	5	50	2(2)	40	+100%
1993	C+	25%	4	16	5(5)	29	+100%
1994	C	19%	7	36	5(4)	53	+50%
1995	B+	16%	8	51	12(12)	76	+33%
1996	B/A+	18%	10	55	12(P)	128	+29%
1997	C-/B+	4%	5	128	5(P)	111	-86%
1998	B+/B-	8%	2	26	5(P)	73	+33%
1999	B+/A	14%	7	49	4(P)	46	-57%
2000	B/B	10%	8	82	11(P)	163	+100%
2001	B/B+	17%	9	54	2(P)	58	+8%
2002	B+/B+	8%	4	51	12	188	0%
2003	C	17%	31	184	4	62	-38%
2004	C+	9%	35	401	5	88	+55%
2005	A-						+26%
2006	?						+11%
Ave. all	B-	16%	6.04	42.14	5.93	58.89	+7.20%
Av. cycle 1	B-	19%	4.00	20.00	2.00	10.5	0.00%
Av. Cycle 2	C-	19%	5.29	28.29	5.14	42.29	-71.00%
Av. Cycle 3	C+	16%	6.57	40.00	5.86	44.86	-15.44%
Av. Cycle 4	B	15%	6.86	57.14	7.29	70.00	+31.54%
Av. Cycle 5	B-	11%	6.00	52.40	6.80	105.60	+9.2%

Notes:

*Second grade from 1996 to 2002 represents trade only.

*Domestic Political Management: % TR is the percentage of total trade paragraphs devoted in whole or in large part to in overall total of paragraphs in leaders' documents.

*Directional: Principles of trade expressed in the opening, introductory section of the major G7/8 communiqué(s) released in the name of leaders at each annual G7/8 summit. Principles are statements of fact, causation or rectitude. First number of core trade references and compliance are by Kokotsis (1999), and the second by Daniels (1993). Numbers in parentheses indicate number of commitments on trade assessed if less than all.

*Compliance scores from 1990 to 1995 measure compliance with commitments selected by Ella Kokotsis. Compliance scores from 1996 to 2006 measure compliance with G8 Research Group's selected commitments (see G8 Information Centre at <www.g8.utoronto.ca/compliance>).

Appendix C: Global Trade Power

	GATT Contributions 1994 (By %, for all above 2%)	Merchandise Exports, 1997, (US\$ Billion, as % if world total)	Merchandise Exports, 2004 (US\$ billion, as % of world total)	Merchandise Exports, 2005 (US\$ billion, as % of world total)	Exports, 2005 (% of total world exports)	Exports, 2007 (% of total world exports)
Euro area	-	-	-	17.15	17.48	16.36
United States	14.60	12.60	9.00	8.65	12.72	11.89
Germany	12.40	9.40	10.00	9.28	9.55	8.83
Britain	6.30	5.10	3.80	3.67	6.42	6.33
China	-	3.30	6.50	7.28	4.85	5.95
Japan	8.50	7.70	6.20	5.68	6.02	5.56
France	7.20	5.30	4.90	4.43	5.32	4.69
Netherlands	4.10	3.50	3.90	3.88	3.54	3.57
Italy	5.50	4.40	3.80	3.56	4.04	3.56
Canada	3.90	3.90	3.50	3.43	3.67	3.18
Belgium	3.40	3.10	3.40	3.19	2.77	2.56
South Korea	2.30	2.50	2.80	2.72	2.30	2.34
Spain	2.40	1.90	2.00	1.84	2.53	2.22
Russia	-	1.60	2.00	2.33	1.58	1.94
Taiwan	-	2.20	-	-	1.74	1.64
Mexico	-	2.00	2.10	2.04	1.75	1.60
Singapore	-	2.30	2.00	2.19	1.19	1.35
India	-	-	-	0.95	0.80	1.10
Australia	-	-	-	1.01	0.98	1.05
Hong Kong	3.10	3.40	2.90	2.79	1.06	1.00
Brazil	-	-	-	1.13	0.84	0.93
Turkey	-	-	-	0.7	0.70	0.72
Indonesia	-	-	-	0.82	0.67	0.69
South Africa	-	-	-	0.49	0.46	0.48
Saudi Arabia	-	-	-	1.73	0.99	-
Argentina	-	-	-	0.39	-	-

Sources:

Kirton, John J. (2007) *Canadian Foreign Policy: in a Changing World* (Toronto: Thomson/Nelson).

The Economist (2006 and 2008). *Pocket World in Figures* (London: Profile Books Ltd.).

World Trade Organization website: <<http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E>>

Appendix D: The G8 and China's Top Five Trade Partners

	China	Canada	France	Germany	Italy	Japan	Russia	Britain	U.S.	EU
China	-	1.60	1.70	2.70	-	13.50	4.60	-	4.60	4.8
Canada	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	23.4	-
France	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Germany	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Italy	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
Japan	11.00	2.10	1.50	-	-	-	-	1.80	6.1	4.1
Russia	-	-	-	2.20	2.00	-	-	-	-	5.3
Britain	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
U.S.	21.40	83.90	7.20	8.80	8.00	22.90	-	14.70	-	23.5
EU	18.90	5.70	65.00	63.40	58.80	14.70	44.90	46.60	20.60	-
<i>Total</i>	<i>51.30</i>	<i>93.30</i>	<i>75.40</i>	<i>77.10</i>	<i>68.80</i>	<i>51.10</i>	<i>49.50</i>	<i>63.10</i>	<i>54.70</i>	<i>37.70</i>

Source: World Trade Organization, Trade Profiles: <http://stat.wto.org/CountryProfile/WSDBCountryPFReporter.aspx?Language=E>

Notes: Numbers indicated represent the breakdown in the country economy's total exports. Only the top five exporters are included in the 'main destination' analysis. Destinations that are not a part of the G8 Plus China are not included here. EU=European Union

Appendix E: G20 Performance by Function, 1999–2006

Year	# of total words in communiqués	# of statements	# of total commitments	# of core trade commitments	# of total trade commitments	# paragraphs mentioning trade	% of total paragraphs
1999	464	1	4	0	0	1	17%
2000	2517	2	8	1	1	5	13%
2001	1957	1	24	1	4	2	6%
2002	991	1	2	1	1	1	10%
2003	1185	1	6	1	1	1	13%
2004	3930	4	10	2	2	5	13%
2005	3381	4	8	0	5	7	21%
2006	3475	4	9	1	1	7	19%

Notes: All information comes from the G8 Information Centre at <www.g8.utoronto.ca>.

of total commitments only includes commitments as they relate to the G20 as a whole and does not refer to country specific commitments. # of paragraphs mentioning trade refers to paragraphs from communiqué and all other documents produced by the G20 at their official meetings.

Appendix F: G20 Trade Commitments

1999 Berlin, Germany (0 commitments)

December 15-16, 1999, Berlin

2000 Montreal, Canada (1 commitments)

October 15, 2000, Montreal

Communiqué (1 commitment)

2000-6. Contribute to international efforts to increase the provision of other global public goods to address serious issues such as infectious disease, agricultural research, and the environment, which cut across national borders and require concerted global co-operation.

Annex (0 commitments)

2001 Ottawa, Canada (4 commitments)

November 15-17, 2001, Ottawa

Communiqué (1 commitment)

2001-1. We reaffirm our commitment to free trade and open international markets as a key source of global prosperity. In this context, we welcome the Doha Development Agenda agreed to at the WTO Ministerial Conference launch of a new WTO trade round and commit to work together to achieve multilateral trade liberalization that accelerates progress against poverty and promotes growth.

Action Plan on Terrorist Financing (1 commitment)

2001-8: Above all, we will enhance our ability to share information domestically and internationally as a vital component in the fight against terrorism.

Freezing Terrorist Assets (0 commitment)

Implementation of International Standards (0 commitments)

International Cooperation: Exchange of Information and Outreach (3 commitments)

2001-16: We will enhance our cooperation on the international exchange of information,

including regarding actions taken under UN resolutions. G20 member countries will promptly implement such measures as are necessary to facilitate this exchange.

2001-17: Each G20 member will establish promptly, or maintain, a Financial Intelligence Unit and will take steps to enhance information sharing among them, including through promoting universal participation in the Egmont Group of such units.

2001-18: We will promote the fight against terrorist financing within our respective regions, and will ask other countries to join this Action Plan.

Technical Assistance (0 commitments)

Compliance and Reporting (0 commitments)

2002 Delhi, India (1 commitments)

November 23, 2002, Dehli

Communiqué (1 commitment)

2002-1: Recalling the partnership between developed and developing countries, reflected in the Monterrey and Johannesburg Conferences, we reaffirm our shared commitment to achieving the Millennium Development Goals, particularly in Africa through supporting NEPAD. We recognize that development assistance can enable poorer nations to build capabilities for exploiting the benefits of more integrated markets, reduced economic distance between nations and greater exchange of global information and knowledge.

2003 Morelia, Mexico (1 commitments)

October 26-27, 2003, Morelia

Communiqué (1 commitment)

2003-1: We, Finance Ministers and Central Bank Governors, are committed to giving impetus to the multilateral trade approach as one of the most effective ways to promote global growth, reduce poverty and ensure that the benefits of globalization are broadly shared by all, particularly the poorest countries. We therefore called on all World Trade Organization (WTO) members to quickly re-energize the negotiation process toward the fulfillment of the Doha development agenda, recognizing that flexibility and political will from all are urgently needed.

2004 Berlin, Germany (2 commitments)

November 20-21, 2004, Berlin

Communiqué (2 commitment)

2004-3. We are committed to a quick resolution and effective implementation of the Doha Round.

2004-7. We will work to implement the high standards of transparency and effective exchange of information through legal mechanisms such as bilateral information exchange treaties, and we also call on those financial centres and other jurisdictions within and outside the OECD which have not yet adopted these standards to follow our lead and take the necessary steps, in particular in allowing access to bank and entity ownership information.

Reform Agenda (0 commitments, individual country commitments are excluded)

Statement on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes (0 commitments)

2005 Xianghe, China (8 commitments)

October 15-16, 2005, Xianghe, Heibei, China

Communiqué (0 commitments)

Statement on Reforming the Bretton Woods Institutions (0 commitments)

Statement on Global Development Issues (5 commitments)

2005 – 4: We are committed to significantly increasing market access for goods and services, reducing trade-distorting domestic support, eliminating all forms of export subsidies in agriculture, and providing effective special and differential treatment for developing countries.

2005 – 5: We acknowledge the paramount role of South-South trade in this respect, and will further explore means to grant the least developed countries duty-free and quota-free market access.

2005 – 6: We are committed to working together in this area to substantially improve market access for products from developing countries, especially the least developed ones.

2005 – 7: We are also committed to helping developing countries build a sound trade and investment environment.

2005 – 8: We will also promote greater cooperation among members of the international community, including public-private partnerships, in order to meet the common development challenges of sustainable and inclusive growth and poverty alleviation.

Reform Agenda: Agreed actions to implement the G20 Accord for Sustained Growth (0 commitments, individual country commitments are excluded)

2006 Melbourne, Australia (1 commitments)

Communiqué (1 commitment)

2006-2: We agreed that the G20 will work toward articulating these principles [the development of clear principles to guide trade and investment for extractive industries].

Reform Agenda (0 commitments, individual country commitments are excluded)

Appendix G: Compliance with the G20's 2003 Morelia Commitments

Country	Trade	Crisis	Codes	Abuse	OFCs	Terrorism	Total
USA	0	n	0	+1	0	0	+20%
Japan	+1	0	n	+1	n	0	+50%
Canada	+1	n	0	+1	0	+1	+60%
Russia	+1	n	0	+1	n	+1	+75%
<i>G8 Total (4)</i>	+3	0	0	+4	0	+2	+51%
China	0	n	n	n	+1	+1	+66%
Korea	0	n	n	n	n	0	0%
India	+1	0	0	+1	n	0	+40%
Australia	+1	0	0	+1	-1	0	+16%
S. Africa	+1	0	0	+1	0	+1	+50%
Indonesia	0	n	0	+1	+1	0	+40%
<i>Non G8 Total (6)</i>	+4	0	0	+4	+1	+3	+35.3%

Appendix H: Attendees of G7 Finance Ministers Meetings

	IMF	Russia	EC	World Bank	WT O	Chi na	Indi a	Bra zil	South Africa	Isr ael	Palest ine	Aust ralia	Middle East Quartet	Nig eria	South Korea	Kuw ait	Nor way	Saudi Arabia	Singa pore	UAE		
92-Apr		1																				
92-Sep		1																				
95-Apr		1	1																			
95-Oct		1	1																			
97-Sep	1																					
98-Feb	1																					
98-Apr	1																					
98-May	1	1	1	1	1																	
98-Oct	1		1	1																		
99-Feb	1		1																			
99-Apr	1		1																			
99-Sep	1		1																			
00-Jan	1		1																			
00-Apr	1		1																			
00-Sep	1		1																			
01-Feb	1	1	1																			
01-Apr		1	1																			
04-Oct							1															
05-Feb							1															
05-Sep		1				1	1	1	1													
05-Dec						1	1	1		1	1		1									
06-Jan*		1																				
06-Feb*		1																				
06-Jun*		1				1	1		1			1			1	1						
07-Feb		1				1																
07-May*		1				1	1	1				1			1	1						
07-Oct		1				1										1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Total	27	14	12	2	1	8	4	3	2	1	1	2	1	2	3	1	1	1	1	1	1	1

Notes: Scores are tentative. IMF attended 15 meetings prior to April 1992. These are included in the total. In the April 2005 meeting, it was mentioned that representatives from the Middle East and North Africa would participate in a meeting. *Signifies G8 finance ministers meeting. EC = European Community; IMF = International Monetary Fund; WTO = World Trade Organization, UAE=United Arab Emirates a. Reference to a meeting with these regions later in the day.

Sources: G8 website <www.g8.utoronto.ca> Hajnal (2007).

Appendix I: 2003 Evian Final Compliance Scores for G20(5) Countries*

	China	S. Korea	Australia	S. Africa	India	Average:
World Economy	0	0	0	+1	0	+0.20
ICT	0	0	0	+1	0	+0.20
Trade	+1	+1	0	+1	0	+0.60
Development (ODA)	n/a	0	0	0	0	(0)
Debt (HIPC)	0	n/a	0	0	-1 (?)	(-0.20)
Marine Environment	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00
HIV/Infectious Diseases	+1	+1	0	+1	-1	+0.40
Crime (Terrorist Financing)	+1	0	+1	+1	0	+0.60
Terrorism (CTAG)	+1	+1	+1	0	0	+0.60
Transport Security	+1	+1	+1	0	+1	+0.80
Weapons of Mass Destruction	+1	0	0	+1	+1	+0.60
Energy	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1	+1.00
Country Average:	(+0.67)	(+0.50)	+0.42	+0.67	(+0.17)	(+0.48)

* The average score by issue area is the average of all countries' compliance scores for that issue. The average score by country is the average of all issue area compliance scores for a given country. The overall compliance average is an average of the overall issue average and overall country average. (For the purposes of this table, all averages have been rounded to two decimal places.)

Appendix J: G20 Specialized Capability

	GDP (current prices, % of world IMF estimates for 2008)	Foreign Direct Investment (Inflow, \$m)	Foreign Direct Investment (Outflow, \$m)	Innovation Property Protection (# patents granted, average 2002-04)	Development (Aid Donors, \$USM)	Energy Efficiency (Energy Consumption, M tonnes oil equivalent,	Trade (Exports 2007, % of total world exports)	Finance (IMF Quota Shares, % of total)	Climate Change (CO2 emission tonnes M 2003)	Health (Est. # of people with HIV/AIDS 2005)
USA	14,305.702	99,443.00	-	84,958	27,622	2,325.90	11.89	17.09	4,816.20	1,200,000
Japan	4,552.204	-	45,781.00	109,823	13,147	533.20	5.56	6.13	1,231.30	17,000
China	3,713.301	72,406.00	11,306.00	5,913	*	1,609.30	5.95	3.72	4,143.50	650,000
Germany	3,414.629	32,663.00	45,634.00	12,804	10,082	3480.00	8.83	5.99	805.00	49,000
Britain	2,933.245	164,530.00	101,099.00	3,430	10,767	233.70	6.33	4.94	569.10	68,000
France	2,656.527	63,576.00	115,668.00	9,023	10,026	275.20	4.69	4.94	373.90	130,000
Italy	2,174.816	19,971.00	39,671.00	2,298	5,091	184.50	3.56	3.25	445.50	150,000
Canada	1,527.764	33,822.00	34,083.00	1,057	3,756	269.00	3.18	2.93	565.50	60,000
Spain	1,524.903	22,987.00	38,772.00	1,432	3,018	142.20	2.22	1.40	211.80	140,000
Russia	1,480.180	14,600.00	13,126.00	18,264	-	641.50	1.94	2.74	1,493.00	940,000
Brazil	1,450.011	15,066.00	-	676	-	204.80	0.93	1.40	298.30	620,000
India	1,249.439	-	-	695	-	572.90	1.10	1.91	1,273.20	5,700,000
South Korea	1,006.129	-	-	31,915	752	213.00	2.34	1.35	455.90	-
Australia	942.331	-	-	-	1,680	115.80	1.05	1.49	354.10	16,000
Mexico	939.289	18,055.00	-	-	-	165.50	1.60	1.45	415.90	180,000
Netherlands	804.636	43,630.00	119,454.00	1,887	5,115	82.10	3.57	2.38	140.90	18,000
Turkey	513.298	-	-	-	601	81.90	0.72	0.55	146.20	2000
Belgium	467.721	23,691.00	22,925.00	-	1,963	57.70	2.56	2.12	102.80	14,000
Indonesia	444.641	-	-	-	-	174.00	0.69	0.96	295.00	170,000
Saudi Arabia	407.033	-	-	-	1,734	140.40	-	3.21	302.30	-
Taiwan	398.408	-	-	29,773	483	-	1.64	-	-	-
South Africa	299.600	-	-	-	-	131.10	0.48	0.86	285.40	5,500,000
Argentina	279.528	-	-	-	-	63.70	-	0.97	127.50	130,000
Hong Kong	216.267	35,897.00	32,560.00	-	-	-	1.00	-	-	-
Singapore	166.170	20,083.00	-	-	-	-	1.35	0.40	-	5500
G8 total	33,045.07	428,605.00	395,062.00	241,657	80,491	7,943.00	45.98	48.01	10,299.50	2,614,000
G8%world	57.70%	61.11%	53.56%	57.10%	72.75%	63.75%	45.98%	48.01%	45.63%	6.62%
05 total	7651.64	105,527.00	11,306.00	7,284	*	2,683.60	10.06	9.34	6,416.30	12,650,000
05%world	13.36%	12.47%	15.39%	2.28%	*	21.54%	10.06%	9.34%	28.42%	32.03%
G13%world	71.06%	73.58%	68.95%	59.38%	72.75%*	85.29%	56.04%	57.35%	74.05%	38.69%

Notes: *China does provide aid, but does not disclose the amount. Italics indicate countries that are not members of the G20. '% of world total' only include numbers represented in graph, therefore percentages do not necessarily represent the entire group (ie. G8, O5 or G13), but rather the members of the group that have data provided.

Sources: The Economist (2008). *Pocket World in Figures* (London: Profile Books Ltd.).

InternationalMonetaryFund(IMF)website:<http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/memdir/members.htm>

WorldHealthOrganization(WHO)website:

<http://www.who.int/globalatlas/includeFiles/generalIncludeFiles/listInstances.asp>

Appendix K: International Institutional Membership

	USA	Japan	Germany	Britain	France	Italy	Canada	Russia	China	India	Brazil	Mexico	South Africa
<i>Summit Level</i>													
G8-O5	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
OSCE	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y					
APEC	Y	Y					Y	Y	Y			Y	
Commonwealth				Y			Y			Y			Y
Francophonie					Y		Y						
European Council			Y	Y	Y	Y							
SPP	Y						Y					Y	
SCO								Y	Y				
<i>Non-Summit Level</i>													
UNSCP5	Y			Y	Y			Y	Y	Y*			
IMF Board	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		
IMFC	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
OECD	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y					Y	
G20	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y
FSF	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y	Y						
G24									Y*	Y	Y	Y	Y
G77									Y*	Y	Y		Y
ASEAN (+3)		Y											
SOA	Y						Y				Y	Y	
ASEM		Y	Y	Y	Y	Y		Y	Y	Y			
TOTAL	11	9	9	11	11	8	12	9	9	8	6	7	5

*Indicates observer state