

# 全球移民與多文化南韓社會的形成： 移民理論及其對南韓的適用性

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## 中文摘要

據報導 2006 年超過 50 萬的外國人居住在南韓，國際移民勞工佔大多數。雖然南韓對進口外勞的依賴不會減少，但是南韓一向以單一民族的社會（**ethnically homogenous society**）自傲，堅持不需移民政策。然而本文認為南韓社會正快速形成多文化社會，且此一過程將是不可避免與無法逆轉的。為支持此一論點，本文將檢視各種導致南韓形成多種族的社會因素，其中包括繼續湧入外勞、人口快速老化、低生育率（**low fertility rate**）與缺少新娘。本文也同時評估各種移民理論與趨勢對南韓案例的適用性。南韓案例證明全球化促進國際移民，因為此一理論可適用到所有社會，幾乎所有社會移民的人數都在持續增加。

# **Global Migration and the Making of a Multicultural Society in Korea: Migration Theories and their Applicability to the Korean Context**

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**Key Words:** Korea, multicultural society, international migration, migrants, intermarriage, and aging

## **ABSTRACT**

More than a half million foreigners reportedly resided in South Korea in 2006, with international migrant workers accounting for a majority. Although the country's reliance on imported foreign labor is likely to continue unabated, the country prides itself as an ethnically homogenous society and insists on almost zero-immigration policy. However, this paper argues that Korean society is rapidly becoming a multicultural society and that this process is inevitable and irreversible. In support of this argument, the paper examines various social factors that are contributing to the making of a multiethnic Korea, including the continuing influx of foreign workers, rapid aging of the population, low fertility rate, and shortage of brides. The paper also assesses the applicability of various theories and trends of migration to the Korean context. The Korean case affirms the globalization and acceleration of

international migration, as practically every society is affected by it and as the number of migrants continues to increase.

## **Introduction**

A report by the U.N. (2006) shows that the number of people who live and work outside their countries of birth has doubled over the last 35 years to 191 million in 2005 (see International Organization for Migration 2005). The total represents about three per cent of the world's population or one in every 35 persons. About 6 out of every 10 international migrants live in high-income economies, including 22 developing countries such as South Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Bahrain, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Qatar (United Nations 2006, p. 12). Other findings by the report include the following: around 75 per cent of international migrants lived in just 28 countries, with one in every five living in the United States; international migrants comprise at least 20 per cent of the population in 41 countries; female migrants consist of nearly half of all international migrants, although they outnumber male migrants in developed countries; and about a third of the 191 million international migrants has moved from one developing country to another, while another third has migrated from a developing country to a developed country, which shows that the number of "South-to-South" migrants is similar to that of "South-to-North" migrants (United Nations 2006, p. 12).

As in other parts of the world, international migration in Asia is an important social issue since most countries in the region are affected by temporary labor migration as

either labor-exporting or labor-importing countries. Only a handful of Asian countries import labor, namely Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Malaysia. Since the 1980s Japan has been importing foreign workers to meet the demand for cheap labor from small- to mid-sized firms. The country now has about two million registered foreigners (1.57 per cent of the population), including 700,000 Korean and 200,000 Chinese descendents of colonial immigrants, and the issues of citizenship, nationhood, and national identity have become important topics of discourse.

South Korea (henceforth Korea) too has been systematically importing foreign workers since the early 1990s. The number of the unskilled foreign laborers as of 2005 totaled more than 285,000, including undocumented workers. The demand for foreign labor has largely come about as the relatively better-educated and wealthier Koreans began to turn away from certain occupations and wage levels, especially the so-called 3-D (difficult, dirty, and dangerous) manual jobs, prompting the Korean government to utilize several labor-importing schemes since 1992 to systemically control the influx of foreign workers. The number of foreigners in Korea will increase even more as the anticipated bride shortage will bring in more foreigners.

The presence of such a large number of migrant workers, along with a sizable number of foreign brides and professional foreign workers, marks a significant departure from the proverbial image of Korea as an ethnically homogenous society. Although the proportion of

foreigners in Korea represents a little over one per cent of the total population of 48 million as of the end of 2005, chances are, as this paper argues, that the country will become a multiracial and multiethnic society in the near future. The question is: What are the factors that are likely to bring more foreigners into Korea in the future, thereby ushering in the making of a multiethnic Korea? How do theories of migration apply to the Korean case? In spite of the significance of these questions, there has been to date only scant scholarly attention paid to these issues.

This paper redresses this imbalance by first reviewing the theories of migration and tracing the history of and policies on labor importation in Korea. The paper then examines the factors that will necessitate the inflow of a large number of foreigners: rapid aging of the population and the resulting labor shortage; and son preferential practices and shortage of brides. Lastly, the paper assesses the applicability of the migration theories to the Korean context and analyzes international migration in the Korean context in view of the general trends of global migration. The Korean case shows that international migration has undoubtedly become universalized, as practically every country of the world is affected in one way or another as either a sending or receiving country. The Korean case further reveals that international migration will persist and will continue to increase, as differentials in wages, employment conditions and living standards between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries remain unchanged.

## Theories of Migration

A variety of theories have been advanced to explain why people migrate to foreign countries (Massey et al. 1993; Portes and Borocz 1989; Castles and Miller 2003, pp. 21-29). Neoclassical economics views international migration as a consequence of differentials in wages and employment conditions among migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. It sees migration as a rational choice made by an individual on the basis of calculating the relative costs and benefits of staying in the area of origin or migrating to different destinations (Castles and Miller 2003, p. 22). Accordingly, people are likely to migrate from densely to less populated areas and from areas with low living standards to areas with high living standards. Also known as “push-pull” theories, approaches couched in this line of argument view the causes of migration to be a combination of push factors and pull factors. Push factors are negative circumstances such as poverty, high rates of unemployment, lack of economic opportunities, low living standards and political repression that motivate or force people to leave the area of origin. Pull factors, on the other hand, are positive circumstances such as better job opportunities, higher wages, high living standards, demand for labor, and political freedom that attract people to alternative destinations.

The “new economics of migration” perceives immigration as a family or household decision aimed at maximizing income and minimizing risks to family income. Households in developing countries attempt to control

risks to their economic wellbeing by sending some family members to work in foreign labor markets (Massey et al. 1993, p. 436). In the event of failing local economic circumstances, families can rely on their remittances for support. The theories based on the “new economics” of migration also argue that international migration will occur even in the absence of wage differentials, for households have strong incentives to diversify the allocation of household resources, including family labor.

World systems theory regards international migration as a natural outgrowth of economic globalization and the expansion of capitalist economic relations across national boundaries. With the penetration of capitalism from its core into peripheral societies, land and raw materials as well as labor within the latter come under the influence of markets. In this way, an increasing number of the people all over the world are absorbed into the global market economy, inevitably generating migration flows, some of which have always migrated abroad (Massey 1989). A similar theory called the historical-structural approach sees migration primarily as a means of mobilizing cheap workforce for capital (Castles and Miller 2003, p. 25). As Saskia Sassen (1988, pp. 31-36) argues, migration is a “global labor supply system” that supplies cheap labor to both urban and rural labor markets in the economically advanced nations. This approach, which is rooted in both world systems theory and Marxist political economy, emphasizes the uneven allocation of economic and political power in the global economy that facilitates international migration. Mass recruitment of cheap labor by capital allows rich countries to get even richer by

exploiting the resources of poor countries, particularly labor, thereby perpetuating uneven development (see Sassen 1988; Potts 1990).

Another theory of international migration is called dual labor market theory, which contends that international migration occurs due to the chronic demand for immigrant labor that is intrinsic to the economic structure of industrialized societies (see Piore 1979). The persistent need for foreign laborers stems from the fact that the better-educated, wealthier, and status-conscious individuals in the economically advanced nations shun away from certain jobs that are relatively low-paying and less prestigious.

In addition to these theories of migration, a useful concept in explaining international migration of women as brides is “hypergamy.” Derived from the caste system of India, the concept refers to the practice that requires or expects women of sub-castes within a caste to marry higher-ranked men than their own. Accordingly, the concept of global or cross-border hypergamy is used to analyze patterns of intermarriage in Asia where women from developing countries migrate to marry men living in richer countries such as Japan, Taiwan, and Korea (see Constable 2005). The reverse case in which women marry men of inferior status than their own is called “hypogamy.”

All of these theories of international migration are at least partially pertinent in explaining the inflow of both migrant workers and foreign brides into Korea. For



example, the differentials in wages and employment conditions existing in Asia have certainly prompted a large number of migrants to seek higher-paying jobs in Korea. In congruence with the historical-structural approach to migration and dual labor market theory, moreover, Korea has been utilizing labor importation to mobilize cheap workforce and to fill jobs left unfilled by Koreans, respectively. As for bride migration, hypergamy is prevalent for the foreign brides who marry Korean men, because most of them are from developing countries in other parts of Asia. Before discussing the applicability of these theories to the Korean context in more details, the paper first examines the factors that are ushering in the making of a multicultural Korea.

### **Influx of Migrant Workers**

Korea had actually been a labor-sending country from the early 1960s to the late 1980s. Thousands of Korean workers migrated annually to other countries in the 1960s and 1970s, notably to Germany, when miners and nurses made up the bulk of the outgoing migrant workers. During the “construction boom” of the 1970s and early 1980s in the Middle East, tens of thousands of Koreans were sent there to work as construction workers for Korean companies. In the 1980s, more than 30,000 Koreans migrated annually as laborers to other countries, although the figure dwindled to 18,000 by 1993 (Ministry of Justice 1982-1993).

Since the late 1980s, Korea is said to have undergone a “migration transition” from a labor-sending

nation to a labor-importing nation (Park 1994). When foreign migrant workers first began arriving in Korea in 1987, a shortage of manual workers was estimated at 100,000 (Kwon 2004, p. 1). The reason for this turnaround was the serious labor shortage for small- and medium-sized manufacturing firms. Since the mid-1980s, Korea has experienced a deceleration in the growth of the labor force as the rural labor surplus became exhausted and the participation rate of youth (15-19 age group) in the labor force declined significantly due to longer schooling. The labor shortage was also caused by the booming housing construction industry, which drew Korean workers out of relatively low-paying factory jobs into higher-paying construction industry. Another cause was the accelerated labor market segmentation since the early 1990s which brought about uneven labor shortages: large firms subcontracted some of their labor-intensive production lines to small firms (5-29 employees) to cope with the escalating national and international competition, leading to the rise in the percentage of employees in small firms from 18.3 per cent in 1980 to 27.6 per cent in 1995. The labor shortages in Korea were and are thus "more serious in smaller firms than in larger firms, and in unskilled jobs than in highly skilled jobs" (Lee, H. 1997, p. 357). The labor shortage in manufacturing became very serious in 1991 when the unfilled production jobs totaled 222,000.

Perhaps more important than the migration transition and labor market segmentation in explaining labor importation in Korea is a demand for cheap, unskilled labor to fill jobs shunned by Koreans. In congruence with dual labor market theory, the demand for foreign labor in Korea

came about as the relatively better-educated, more status-conscious, and wealthier Koreans began to turn away from low-paying and less prestigious manual jobs, particularly those deemed 3-D jobs. To mitigate the labor shortage in unskilled, manual jobs, the Korean government began to systemically coordinate policies to bring in, and to control the inflow of, foreign migrant workers since the early 1992.

**Table 1 Number of Migrant Workers to Korea, 1994-2005**

Year	Technical Trainees	General Trainees	Other Non-professional Workers	Total Migrant Workers
1994	31,830	2,031	0	33,861
1995	40,435	2,438	0	42,873
1996	50,314	2,929	0	53,243
1997	47,550	3,546	0	51,096
1998	25,571	3,363	1	28,935
1999	46,814	3,438	0	50,252
2000	45,651	3,502	192	49,345
2001	28,092	3,964	1,191	33,247
2002	31,818	4,387	3,120	39,325
2003	52,878	5,914	33,765	92,557
2004	38,150	8,501	60,037	106,688
2005	41,365	10,257	47,610	99,232

(Source: Recalculated from National Statistical Office, 1994-2005)

Accordingly, the number of such workers entering Korea increased from 33,861 in 1994 to 49,345 in 2000, 106,688 in 2004, and 99,232 in 2005 (see Table 1). From the beginning, Korea attracted workers from a dozen or so Asian countries, including China (predominantly ethnic Koreans), Vietnam, Indonesia, Bangladesh, and the Philippines. More recently, however, foreign migrant workers have come from dozens of countries from practically all over the world, including Russia, Pakistan, India, Uzbekistan, Brazil, and Nigeria. These workers are typically employed in agriculture, fishery and service industry as well as in the 3D jobs, such as those in construction, metal planning, dyeing, auto-parts, tanning, textiles, furniture-manufacturing and other small- to medium-scale manufacturing industries (see Seol 2000).

Through a series of labor importation schemes, several hundreds of thousands of foreign workers, skilled and unskilled, have been brought into Korea, ushering in the dawn of a multiethnic Korea (see Table 2). What must be noted here is that labor importation until now has been prompted not by an actual labor shortage but by the Koreans' aversion to low-paying manual jobs, which is a phenomenon consistent with dual labor market theory. A more compelling factor that is expected to bring in a far larger number of foreign laborers in the near future is the rapid aging of the population and the resulting labor shortage. Indeed, Korea is now experiencing a rapidly aging population and, as a consequence, the ratio of the economically active population will decline, resulting in a severe labor shortage beginning in 2010 (Korea Labor Institute 2005). Assuming that Korea's economic growth

potential will average 4.5 per cent and that there will be an annual 1.51 per cent increase in demand for labor during the next 15 years, demand will surpass supply in the labor market from about 2010, resulting in a shortage of 586,000 workers in 2015 and 1.23 million in 2020. An estimate by the Bank of Korea is even higher—it forecasts that the country will face a shortage of up to 4.8 million workers in 2020 (Bank of Korea 2006).

**Table 2 Registered Foreigners by Nationality**

Country of Origin	1985	1990	1995	2000	2002	2003	2004	2005
Korean Chinese	-	-	7,367	32,443	48,293	108,283	128,287	146,338
China	2	147	11,825	26,541	36,297	77,202	80,036	70,654
Vietnam	-	1	5,663	15,624	16,901	23,315	26,053	35,514
Philippines	251	578	9,004	15,961	17,296	27,562	27,934	30,649
Indonesia	19	78	3,434	16,700	17,140	28,349	26,063	22,572
Taiwan	25,008	23,583	23,265	23,026	22,699	22,585	22,285	22,178
Thailand	48	52	478	3,240	4,790	19,996	21,890	21,398
Japan	2,472	5,323	9,365	14,013	15,350	15,967	16,399	17,209
Mongolia	-	2	36	769	1,352	9,218	10,987	13,695
Uzbekistan	-	-	810	3,737	4,096	10,697	11,525	10,752
Bangladesh	11	11	2,700	7,882	8,990	13,600	13,078	9,094
Pakistan	27	27	803	3,215	3,707	7,147	9,226	8,701
India	290	282	522	946	1,632	4,428	4,778	3,911
U.S.A	7,750	14,019	22,214	22,778	22,849	23,208	22,566	23,476
Canada	381	615	1,962	3,296	4,977	5,440	5,784	6,380
Brazil	38	122	513	219	258	279	260	292
Russia	-	-	857	2,581	4,019	6,140	4,556	3,697

U.K.	784	670	685	1,269	2,014	2,085	2,049	2,505
France	813	608	989	1,466	1,430	1,461	1,478	1,537
Germany	574	773		1,076	1,060	1,129	1,088	1,228
Australia	203	378	614	1,022	1,623	1,572	1,425	1,551
New Zealand	45	51	102	534	1,156	1,098	860	904
Nigeria	-	4	27	218	495	1,173	1,112	947
Others	2,204	2,183	6,589	11,693	14,033	26,001	29,158	30,002
Total	40,920	49,507	110,028	210,249	252,457	437,934	468,875	485,144

Source: Ministry of Justice 1985-2005

All of this leaves Korea with no choice but to import more foreign laborers. Labor importation, which to date has been largely prompted by the Korean's aversion to low-paying manual jobs, will be needed due to an actual labor shortage. Foreign laborers will also be needed just to sustain the momentum of economic growth. As Korea increasingly shifts to a service economy, the need for migrant workers is likely to actually increase, as evidenced by the patterns set by the West. It is not too far-fetched to argue that the continuing labor shortage will galvanize the Korean government to grant permanent resident statuses to migrant workers to secure a stable supply of (cheap) labor and to even bring in immigrants in the near future. And the availability of a large pool of migrants—due to the continuing wage differentials and differences in living standards among developed and developing countries as well as other push and pull factors—coupled with the Korean government's wish to mobilize and exploit cheap workforce from abroad will facilitate constant flows of migrants into Korea.

## Migrant Brides: Bride Shortage and Increasing Intermarriage

In addition to the continuing influx of foreign laborers, there is still another factor at work that will ensure the emergence of a multicultural Korea: the influx of migrant brides. As with migrant laborers, a vast majority of foreign brides have come from developing countries in other parts of Asia and their migration too seem to have been motivated by push and pull factors.

The proportion of intermarriages in total marriages in Korea has jumped more than ten-fold since 1990, accounting for nearly 14 per cent as of 2005. The increase in intermarriages has become particularly pronounced since the early 1990s when the growing number of migrant workers in Korea naturally led to an increase in international marriages (see Table 3). The soaring number of international marriages is also due to a significant growth in the number of “picture brides” from abroad.

**Table 3 International Marriages in Korea, 1993-2006**

Year	Total Number of Marriages	Number of International Marriages	Per centage of International Marriages
1990	399,312	4,710	1.2
1991	416,872	5,012	1.2
1992	419,774	5,534	1.3
1993	402,593	6,545	1.6

1994	393,121	6,616	1.7
1995	398,484	13,494	3.4
1996	434,911	15,946	3.7
1997	388,591	12,448	3.2
1998	375,616	12,188	3.2
1999	362,673	10,570	2.9
2000	334,030	12,319	3.7
2001	320,063	15,234	4.8
2002	306,573	15,913	5.2
2003	304,932	29,658	8.4
2004	310,994	35,447	11.4
2005	316,375	43,121	13.6
2006	337,528	39,071	11.6

(Source: National Statistical Office, 2006b)

Rapid urbanization has largely drained the countryside of young women, who migrated to cities for better educational and job opportunities as well as better living standards. Unable to find brides in Korea, men living in the countryside began to look outside the country. In fact, 35.9 per cent of men in the countryside who got married in 2005 did so with foreign brides from such countries as China (ethnic Koreans), Vietnam, the Philippines, and even Uzbekistan. As Table 4 shows, most of foreign brides comprise of other Asians, particularly those from less developed nations, attesting to increases in cross-border hypergamy.



**Table 4 Origins of Foreign Wives**

Year	Total	Japan	U.S.A.	China	Philippines	Vietnam	Thailand	Russia	Mongolia	Others
2001	10,006	976	265	7,001	510	134	185	157	118	660
2002	11,017	959	267	7,041	850	476	330	241	195	658
2003	19,214	1,242	323	13,373	944	1,403	346	297	318	968
2004	25,597	1,224	344	18,527	964	2,462	326	318	504	925
2005	31,180	1,255	285	20,635	997	5,822	270	236	561	1,119
2006	30,208	1,484	334	14,608	1,157	10,131	273	206	593	1,422

(Source: National Statistical Office, 2007b)

The number of foreign brides will significantly rise over the next decade or so, because Koreans' son preference has led to a serious imbalance in sex ratio at birth in favor of males since the late 1980s, which will result in an acute shortage of brides in the near future. The normal sex ratio at birth is around 105, but the ratio in Korea has hovered around 110 in the 1980s and 1990s, meaning that the number of extra males has been accruing over the years in Korea. As a consequence, Korea is expected to face a serious "marriage squeeze," i.e., shortage of brides. For example, sex ratio of men and women in their most "suitable" years for marriage—i.e., 26-30 year old males and 24-28 year old females—is expected to be 118.9 in 2010, 122.3 in 2011 and 2012, 120.0 in 2013, 112.0 in 2020 and 116 in 2030 (National Statistical Office 2001). What this means is that hundreds of thousands of males in their teens and early 20s as of 2000 will not be able to find Korean wives when they reach

their marrying ages, meaning that intermarriages will increase even more.

### **Multicultural Korea: Issues and Implications**

This paper sheds new light on several important issues in the study of international migration. As insinuated above, the paper reveals many implications for the broader theoretical debate in the field. First, most of the theories discussed above are relevant to either labor or bride importation in Korea. In congruence with neoclassical economics views, those who come to Korea as unskilled migrant workers are from developing countries and their migration is obviously prompted by differentials in wages and employment conditions existing in Asia. Push-pull factors also play a role in prompting international migration, including those by foreign brides. In agreement with world systems theory, international migration into Korea can be seen as an impact of economic globalization in which an ever-increasing number of people across the globe are incorporated into the world economy, ultimately engendering migration flows. The historical-structural approach is also applicable, since Korea, having achieved a remarkable economic development in the last four decades, has been utilizing labor importation/migration as a means of mobilizing cheap workforce. Another theory pertinent to the Korean case is dual labor market theory, for labor importation has been necessitated by the fact that the wealthier and better-educated Koreans began to shun away from low-paying and less prestigious manual jobs.

Second, out of these theories that explain the cause of international migration, theories grounded in push-pull factors seem to be most persuasive in implying that the pace of international migration will not slow down in the future. That is because global inequality will persist and the very conditions that characterize the disparity will remain: developing countries will continue to be troubled by poverty, low living standards, lack of economic opportunities, human rights abuses, political repression, and/or violent conflicts, while industrialized nations as well as the Newly Industrializing Economies (NIEs) will continue to maintain relatively higher living standards and offer the prospect of better economic opportunities, political freedom, and better social security.

Third, the Korean experience in labor importation, i.e., importing labor to address labor shortage and to sustain the momentum of growth, is not that different from those of European and North American counterparts. And if the patterns set by the West are an indication of what Korea can anticipate, the country's increasing shift to a service economy will mean that the need for migrant workers will not diminish and that low-wage service jobs will largely become the domain of migrant workers. Indeed, foreign workers will soon be found in such occupations as cashiers, maintenance workers, cooks, waiters/waitresses, and transportation workers.

Fourth, the feminization of migration in Asia will increasingly take the form of bride migration. In fact, the international migration of women as brides will actually increase in the region, as many Asian countries, including

Taiwan, Korea, China and India, are expected to suffer from an acute shortage of brides due to decades-long son-preferential practices, i.e., sex-selective abortions. Involuntary migration of women in the form of human trafficking can also increase.

Fifth, the Korean case points to a new trend that can be called the *regionalization of international migration*. The inflow of foreign workers and brides into Korea indicates that international migration within Asia is becoming more prominent. The region's persisting economic disparities and demographic differentials—i.e., the declining labor supply due to rapid aging in the more developed economies, and the large pool of the economically active population in less developed countries—means that international migration will continue unabated in the future. What will be different is that the destination will increasingly be within the Asian region. As Asia further transforms itself as a region of growth and prosperity, intra-regional immigration is likely to increase even more, particularly because of the geographical proximity and cultural similarities between the migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries. The increasing economic and cultural integration of the Asian region will also help further facilitate this trend.

Lastly, the Korean case reminds us that research on race and ethnicity needs to focus more on the latter as a social problem. In the West, race has always been a far more important issue than ethnicity, because there is a clear racial divide and racism is a major problem. In Korea, however, what exists is an ethnic divide and ethnic-based

stereotypes and hostility. Just like racism, which is a discrimination and prejudice based on the belief that people with different physical attributes (particularly the difference in facial characteristics and skin color) have different abilities and character, ethnic-based discrimination and stereotypes are based on the idea that cultural attributes (language, customs, religious practices, etc.) determine people's abilities and character. And ethnic hostility and intolerance based on such belief can be as harmful as racism, as has been the case in the former Yugoslavia, Russia, Northern Ireland, Spain, and numerous African countries.

## **Conclusions**

This paper has examined various factors that are making Korea a multiethnic society. Labor importation was initially triggered by Koreans' aversion to low-paying and less prestigious manual jobs, but the inflow of migrant workers will increase exponentially as the country needs to address labor shortage resulting from the rapid aging population and record-low fertility rate. The rapid rise in intermarriages, first a phenomenon limited to farmers and blue-collar workers, will proliferate into wider social classes as decades-long practice of son-preference, i.e., induced sex-selective abortions, has resulted in a shortage of females. As a consequence, interracial and interethnic births will naturally rise. Taiwan, which seems to be ahead of Korea by about ten years in experiencing labor importation and bride importation, provides a glimpse into changes that are in store for Korea in the near future: cross-border marriages accounted for 20.1 per cent of total

marriages in Taiwan in 2005 (the figure reached its peak in 2003 when it was 31.9 per cent), while births of bi-ethnic and bi-racial children accounted for 12.9 per cent of total births (Kojima 2006).

All of these changes, present and future, generally correspond to the five general trends in international migration identified by Castles and Miller (2003, pp. 7-9): 1) the *globalization of migration*—more and more countries are affected by migration and migrants come from much more diverse areas of origin; 2) the *acceleration of migration*—international migration of people is continuing to grow in size all across the globe; 3) the *differentiation of migration*—most countries have a whole range of types of immigration, including labor migration, refugees and permanent settlement; 4) the *feminization of migration*—women are playing a greater role in most types of migration, particularly in labor migration.; and 5) the *growing politicization of migration*—international migration is having a greater impact on domestic politics and national security policies of states as well as bilateral relationships among them [*italic in the original source*]. The fact that the proverbial ethnically homogeneous Korea is becoming multiethnic lends support to the trend of the globalization of migration in which practically every society is being affected by migration one way or another; the growth in the number of migrant workers and foreign brides in Korea indicates the acceleration of migration; the influx of foreigners into Korea began with migrant workers, but it expanded to include foreign brides, both of which manifest the differentiation of migration; in addition to the sizable number of female migrant workers, the growing

number of foreign brides migrating to Korea displays the feminization of migration; and the Korean government is closely working with labor-and bride-sending countries to ensure propriety on both sides, indicating the growing politicization of migration.

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