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Political Attitudes, Social Trust, and Support for Immigration: Evidence from Three East Asian Countries

政治態度、社會信任與移民政策偏好：

來自東亞三國之調查資料檢證

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Abstract

International migration more than tripled in size from 77 million in 1960 to almost 258 million in 2017, with Asia recently overtaking Europe as the region with the largest movements in both inward and outward migration. Migrant inflows can potentially influence countries' policy-making processes and escalate societal conflicts, as well as impact the labor market, education system and health sector. But whether it profoundly affects domestic politics, and how exactly it does, hinges importantly on the attitudes of native-born groups toward immigrants and immigration itself. Relevant research is ever-expanding, especially now more than ever that migration has become a pressing social, economic and political issue for governments all over the world. However, most studies are concentrated on 'immigrant nations', such as the US and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and more recently, European states.

In an attempt to bridge existing literature on the 'Western' realm of economically advanced countries with its Asian counterparts, this study focuses on an empirical analysis of political factors and immigration attitudes using individual-level survey data from the Asian Barometer Wave 4 in three democratic and newly-industrialized East Asian countries. Compared to traditional settler societies, immigration policies are said to be more constrained by public opinion in East Asia, whose governments have been slow to turn to immigration despite having consistently low fertility rates, a rapidly aging population, and a declining labor force. The main question being asked is: *do political and ideological attitudes influence support for immigration in nontraditional immigrant destinations such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan?* Results suggest that defensive nationalism and social traditionalism are significant predictors of immigration views across all three countries. Social trust is significant in Japan, but overall, seems to have a weak positive relationship with immigration views in East Asia.

The outcome of this study supports previous works in contending that in East Asia, the concept of cultural threat is more significant than economic threat. In addition to addressing the research gap between traditional and nontraditional immigrant societies, the topic of this study may also be vital in informing current immigration policies in East Asian countries.

Keywords: Political Attitudes, Defensive Nationalism, Social Traditionalism, Social Trust, Support for Immigration, East Asia

Abstract 摘要

國際移民以超過三倍的成長速度，從1960年的7700萬人增加到2017年的近2.58億，其中亞洲最近首次超過歐洲，成為向內和向外移民增幅最大的地區。移民的湧入可能會影響各國的政策制定且可能加深社會衝突，並連帶影響勞動力市場，教育體系和衛生相關問題。但移民是否會深切地影響國內政治，以及如何影響，很大程度取決於土生土長的龐大族群對移民和移民議題本身的態度。移民的相關研究正不斷擴大，特別是現在比以往任何時候更受重視，移民儼然成為全世界政府所需面臨的緊急社會、經濟和政治問題。然而，多數研究都聚焦在「移民國家」，譬如美國和加拿大，澳洲和紐西蘭，以及近日最受討論的歐洲國家。

為了將經濟發達國家的「西方」領域與亞洲國家現有的文獻連接起來，本研究側重於使用亞洲動態調查第4波，以對三個民主及新興工業化東亞國家進行研究，對其政治因素和移民態度進行實證分析。與傳統的定居社會相比，移民政策據說更受東亞公眾輿論的制約，儘管當地生育率一直很低，也面臨人口迅速老化以及勞動力下降等問題，政府也沒有馬上從移民身上尋求解決之道。此論文的主要提問是：政治意向和意識形態是否會影響非傳統移民地如日本、韓國和台灣當地人民對移民的支持？結果顯示，伴隨教育，居住地和收入，民族主義和傳統主義是預測三個國家對移民看法的重要因素。社會信任在日本很受重視，但總體來說，與移民看法的關聯相當薄弱。

就其本質而言，移民與公民身份和世界主義都是相關聯的，它定義了誰是這個國家的人，且法律也標示了界線，清楚劃分「我們」和「他們」的區別。此論文的研究結果證實了之前的看法，認為在東亞，文化威脅被視為比經濟威脅更嚴重。除了解決傳統和非傳統移民社會之間的研究差距，此論文的主題對於東亞國家目前的移民政策也是相當重要，期待能引出一條道路或給予啟發。

關鍵詞: 政治態度, 民族主義, 墨守傳統, 社會信任, 與移民政策偏好, 東亞

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Chapter 1. Introduction

International migration has risen dramatically over the past half century, more than tripling in size from 77 million in 1960 to almost 258 million in 2017 (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs [UN DESA], 2017). In turn, this global phenomenon of people crossing national borders has increasingly become a pressing social, economic and political issue for governments all over the world – as evidenced by Brexit and the ongoing migration crisis in Europe, large-scale displacement of refugees in Southeast Asia and Africa, and the hot-button immigration policy debates under the Trump administration in the United States.

With the ushering of a demographic transformation in many developed democracies, migrant inflows can potentially influence countries' policy-making processes, escalate societal conflicts, raise questions on welfare and redistribution, as well as impact the labor market, education system and health sector. Coupled with ideological discourses, immigration issues may be used by politicians as a powerful but asymmetrical tool for voter mobilization (Brooks, Manza, & Cohen, 2016; Harteveld, Kokkonen, & Dahlberg, 2017). But whether it profoundly affects domestic politics, and how exactly it does, hinges importantly on the attitudes of native-born groups toward immigrants and immigration itself (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014).

By its nature, immigration lies at the nexus of citizenship and cosmopolitanism, and is also a legal concept that defines who belongs within the boundaries of a state and where the law draws the line between 'us' and 'them'. In contrast to other salient national concerns that may go unnoticed by the masses because of the amount of technical knowledge needed to understand them, immigrants are very visible as people whom one can encounter in daily life. Thus, immigration is a concern wherein the public feels it has much at stake, especially once it intersects with other contentious issues such as race, multiculturalism, crime, terrorism, and negative impacts of globalization.

Over the past decades, studies have shown the two-way relationship between public opinion and policy, and how they can shape and reshape each other (Campbell, 2012; Page & Shapiro, 1983). In the case of the US, conventionally dubbed as a 'nation built on immigrants', public policy on immigration followed public opinion up to the mid-1960s. However, after the passage of the Immigration Act of 1965 – which abolished ethnocentric national origin quotas

and set up the family reunification principle – opposition to immigration suddenly spiked up. At least in the U.S., after 1965 and in recent years, public policy has rarely reflected public opinion on immigration (Lee, 1998; Thompson, 2018). On the contrary, the UK's Brexit, in which immigration played a central role, demonstrated how a government might implement the results of a national referendum against its preferred option. These examples, among others, illustrate the enduring relevance of public opinion on immigration to public policy, and consequently, to both domestic and international politics.

To understand public opinion better, it is necessary not just to study its implications, but to also flip the coin and look into how attitudes and preferences on immigration are formed. The extent of research previously done on this broad and ever-expanding question is reflected in recent reviews (eg. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Predictably, most studies are concentrated on settler societies or 'immigrant nations', such as the US and Canada, Australia and New Zealand, and more recently, Western European states. What may come as surprising is how this formidable body of literature consisting of largely economic and psychosocial explanations has tended to overlook the importance of political factors such as ideology (Brooks et al., 2016; Hlavac, 2011; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Medeiros, Figueiredo, Batista, Campos, Rosendo, & Coêlho, 2011).

In an attempt to address these gaps, the main questions being asked in this proposal are:

1. *Is there a relationship between political factors and public opinion toward immigrants and immigration in East Asia?*
2. *More specifically: do ideological and political attitudes such as defensive nationalism, social traditionalism, and social trust influence support for immigration in nontraditional immigrant destinations such as Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan?*

It seems fit to study these three because they are the newly-industrialized, democratic countries in East Asia. They are often put together by other scholars because of their interrelated immigration histories and similar policy trajectories. While they have already transitioned from being emigrant senders to immigrant receivers, other countries, especially in Southeast Asia (with the exception of Singapore and Malaysia), send more of their people abroad. In addition, they also have shared narratives of early civilizations and overlapping cultural norms.

As nationalism can be a complicated, multidimensional concept, this study adopts a narrower definition from literature, termed here 'defensive nationalism' – uncritical support for

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the nation that leads to a feeling of superiority and contempt for foreigners, as well as their way of life (Jeong, 2013; Latcheva, 2010). Social traditionalism refers to a set of values that uphold agreement to norms and the status quo, resisting liberal thoughts and lifestyles that may disrupt harmony in society (Altemeyer, 1981; Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010). Distinct from political trust, which involves vertical trust in elites or institutions, social trust is a horizontal or interpersonal trust in others – faith in people – that they can put others' interests at heart and not willingly harm another person. It is at the core of social capital, often theorized as the secret ingredient for a society's rise and fall in many aspects.

The purpose of this study is threefold: first, to contribute to the development of current discussions by focusing on the impact of political factors on the formation of immigration preferences and support; second, to bridge existing research on the 'Western' realm of economically advanced countries with its East Asian counterparts; and third, to see if patterns of similarities and differences between the three countries in focus exist, especially with their intersecting histories and economies.

Contrary to most of the previous research on political factors, this study will not use the widely-accepted conceptualization of ideology along a single 'left' to 'right' dimension. Instead, it will focus on certain ideological attitudes, namely: defensive nationalism and social traditionalism, as well as social trust. Logistic regression will be applied to data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey conducted between 2014 and 2016 to find the relationship between political attitudes and support for immigration in the three East Asian countries under analysis. The hypotheses are that: *individuals who agree more with defensive nationalism and social traditionalism will be less supportive of immigration, while those who are more inclined to trust most people, even strangers, will also be more supportive of immigration*.

The significance and relevance of this study is underscored by the fact that Asia has recently overtaken Europe as the region with the largest flows in both inward (80 million) and outward (110 million) migration (UN DESA, 2017). Additionally, East Asian countries in particular, are slowly turning to immigration-related solutions to the combined demographic problems of consistently low fertility rates, a rapidly aging population, and a declining labor force. Compared to traditional settler societies in the West, however, immigration policies are much more constrained by public opinion in East Asia (Staedicke, Batalova, & Zong, 2016).

This study is organized as follows. The next chapter provides a brief background on the immigration situation in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. In chapter three, the literature on public opinion towards immigration is surveyed, further discussing the influence of political factors on immigration preference, as well as the East Asian perspective. Chapter four focuses on the theoretical bases and assumptions underpinning this study; while chapter five details the research design to be implemented, including the source of data, variables, and the choice of regression technique. Chapter six discusses the results of empirical analyses, and finally, the last chapter concludes the study.

Chapter 2. Immigration in East Asia

While low fertility rates and longevity are among the indicators of economic development, it can also lead to a shrinking work force, which in turn, can inhibit economic growth. Among the fastest-aging regions in the world, East Asia's demographic transition is one of the most pressing issues the region is facing today (Chung, 2010; Gaynor, 2016; Kim & Torres-Gil, 2008; Staedicke et al., 2016; Takenaka, 2012, Takenoshita, 2016). Following what has been happening in other parts of the world, immigration seems to be the most immediate solution to this problem, but it is also one of the hardest to sell to the public, due to the ideology of cultural homogeneity or ethnic and national purity prevalent among East Asian countries (Bélanger, 2010; Bélanger, Lee, & Wang, 2010; Chung, 2010; Ku & Kironska, 2016; Nagy, 2015; Staedicke et al., 2016; Takenoshita, 2016). Even though East Asia's experience with immigration per se is limited compared to Western counterparts – with Japan and South Korea (henceforth, Korea) being characterized as "latecomers to immigration" (Chung, 2014) – both outward and inward migration flows have taken place in the region for the past few decades.

During the latter half of the 20th century, post-colonial Asian migration flows were mostly directed towards Western countries or the Middle East. In the 1990s, however, migration of the Asia-Pacific region as a whole started to grow, with the trend mainly defined by movement from less developed countries to fast-growing newly industrialized countries (NICs). Those who were sending people included China, as well as most South and Southeast Asian countries, while the ones receiving them were Brunei, Singapore and the rest of East Asia (Hong Kong, Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan). Although there are also cultural, environmental, and political push and pull factors, migration is still mostly motivated by economic reasons (Ku & Kironska, 2016). One explanation for this shift is the widening of the income gap with other less developed countries (Abella, 2019). Likewise, according to Seol and Skrentny (2009), "As countries develop economically, they typically transition from being countries of emigration to countries of immigration" (p. 578).

Japan and Korea have been sending their citizens abroad for centuries, and not until the late 1980s have they started to host a growing number of low-skilled migrant workers. But although scholars note a rapid increase in immigration in the past decade (eg. Takenoshita, 2016), Seol and Skrentny (2009) argue that they remain countries of "migrant worker sojourn

and not true immigration" (p. 579). Labor importation has a clear net positive for NICs; they contribute to the economy and impose no cost to the state if workers do not bring their dependents to settle down in their host country.

Taiwan shares this feature of hosting a large migrant worker population with Japan and Korea, although in contrast, it has long been a nation based on migration. Except for aborigines, most Taiwanese are descended from Mainland China, whom cannot be considered 'foreigners' even more so because of the enduring political struggle between the two nations. As per Ogawa (2017), "Taiwan's migration regime is shaped by its geo-political position in the international community, influenced by longstanding tension in the cross-strait relationship with the People's Republic of China…lack of presence and isolation from the international arena…" (p. 10). Although separated from China by history and ruling ideology, Taiwan is similarly a Confucian-heritage society, characterized by the values of collectivism, social harmony, fulfillment of responsibilities, and conservatism (Ku & Kironska, 2016). In consequence, Taiwanese people have continually grappled with a 'Chinese-oriented' identity heavily influenced by politics.

2.1. Brief History of Immigration Control

Although there are important distinctions from one country to another, immigration history in the three East Asian countries and the evolution of their policies over time also bear many similarities. Their brief histories of immigration control will be discussed in the following subsections.

2.1.1. Japan

For more than two centuries during its Edo period (1603-1868) under the Tokugawa Shogunate, Japan had isolationist foreign policies that closed the doors for immigration and kept the population stable. Inward and outward migration only picked up after the Meiji Revolution in 1868, when Japan sent thousands of researchers, military personnel, and students of different disciplines abroad for its modernization and Westernization program. This large emigration was further aggravated by the collapse of the Edo class system, which restricted the free movement of the Japanese people not just geographically, but also socioeconomically; as well as traditional agricultural workers migrating to the US after being rendered unemployed by accelerated industrialization. Meanwhile, colonial immigration ushered people in with the annexation of

Taiwan in 1895 and South Korea in 1915. Colonial subjects were put to work in Japanese factories and mines to support economic and military expansion (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

After the second world war and during the economic miracle of the 1950s to 70s, Japan was in dire need of a larger labor force to sustain its growth (Mędrzycki, 2017). Despite this requirement, it was a time of fewer immigrants in Japan, largely due to four interrelated reasons discussed by Kajita in Kondo (2002). First, there was an upshot in internal migration of farmers-turned-laborers from rural to urban areas; second, greater automation and improvement of manufacturing led to less demand for unskilled workers; third, labor unions were weak and citizens who were previously not included in the labor force (eg. students, housewives, elderly people) became involved in part-time work; and finally, Japan had one of the longest working hours among developed countries, which made it relatively unattractive as a labor destination compared to its Western counterparts.

In addition, the Immigration Control Law of 1952, patterned after the US model, was explicitly designed to 'control' resident aliens, not to boost immigration or increase foreigner naturalization. In fact, no one ever entered Japan under the category 'immigrant' until a new law was passed in the 1980s. Koreans and Taiwanese who immigrated during their colonial periods were officially labelled 'foreigners'. Subsequently, Japan put up an alien registration system so the government can observe and monitor outsiders. Among the public, there was little support for immigration, coinciding with an ideology of the ethnic nation-state (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017). Kuroda in Kondo (2012) cites a former Ministry of Justice official stating that Japan "…constitutes a 'monoethnic state', therefore, there is much anxiety about admitting foreigners' settlement, and generally, people consider it as contrary to the national interest" (p. 2).

It is important to note that the internal migration previously mentioned was pushed by Japanese officials, under the guise of nationalism and keeping the country unified. In connection, although the colonial laborers were also crucial to sustaining Japan's economic growth and military prowess, they were not given full privileges after Japan gained its independence from post-war US occupation. The Koreans who came over during the last years of the Japanese empire eventually became the biggest foreign community, but lacking citizenship, they did not have access to many social rights and were discriminated in both private and public sectors. At

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that time, those seeking naturalization were required to have Japanese surnames, a rule linked to the patrilineal *jus sanguinis* principle. (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

In the 1980s, some reformative measures were taken by the Japanese government regarding citizenship laws in response to the following: the ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1979, as well as the UN Refugee Convention in 1981; the rise of migration movements; and the growing number of illegals and overstaying visitors due to restrictive migration regulations. In the 1985 Citizenship Act, the requirement of having a Japanese surname was removed, while the citizenship requirements for the National Pension Act and the Child Allowance Act, among others, were also eliminated. However, national initiatives for alien rights protection were still weak, and it was only among local governments that policies of symbiosis and living together were endorsed (Kondo, 2002; Mędrzycki, 2017).

The 1990s saw a period of still relatively strict immigration, albeit coupled with the opening of several doors. Starting from 1991, Japanese descendants in different countries such as the US, Brazil, and Peru, were permitted a quasi-permanent resident status. Also called *Nikkeijin*, these ethnic Japanese were legally allowed to work without restrictions, subject to periodic renewals of their status. This was the 'front door', and the primary solution (although not explicitly stated by the national government) to labor shortage and the problem of illegal workers. The 'side door' was opened in 1993, with the establishment of the Technical Internship Trainee Program (TITP) that took in economic migrants. It was officially meant to facilitate technology and skills transfer to less developed countries, but it also became an avenue for exploitation of cheap, unskilled labor. Participants' passports were often kept by their bosses to restrict them from moving from one company to another. However, this often led to the 'back door', which referred to irregular workers and tourists who overstayed and started working illegally.

The 2000s marked a decade of noticeable developments on paper, but Akashi (2014) argues that the effect of various laws and agreements with regards to foreign labor and immigration were actually minimal, and suggest that in Japan, "…it is still a long way to an open-door policy" (p. 183). The Guidelines about the Permission for Permanent Residence released in 2006 basically just made official what is already happening on the ground, and did not improve the conditions for permanent residents, nor increased their number. In 2008, the

Economic Partnership Agreements (EPA) concerning the acceptance of care and nursing staff from Indonesia, the Philippines, and later on, Vietnam, were primarily based on foreign policy, but opposed by domestic institutions governing Japanese health and welfare. The Japanese Nursing Association and its political counterpart, the Japan Nursing Federation, were strictly against loosening restrictions for immigration, and upholds that all foreigners in the care industry must have the same skills and qualifications as required from Japanese citizens, even passing the national exam.

In 2010, Japan agreed to start a pilot program on accepting refugees, but the purpose might have been simply to dispel criticism about being a closed country (Akashi, 2014). Although the number of asylum seekers accepted had gradually increased since 2014, it does not even amount to one percent of the total applications received. In 2017, for example, only 20 out of almost 20,000 were approved; while in 2018, the applications plunged to 10,493, out of which only 42 were granted asylum (Japan Today, 2018, 2019).

After a decade of informal discussions, a point-system for high-skilled foreign professionals was introduced in 2012, wherein those accepted will be able to bring family members abroad, as well as attain permanent resident status after five years. However, the hurdles were high, and the program also suffered from a fair amount of institutional constraints. During this time, Japan simultaneously promoted academic exchange by trying to increase the number of international students in Japan, while also sending Japanese students abroad. This was one of the strategies in making the country more open and diverse, without moving away from the idea of Japanese people as more superior. Chinese students compose almost half of the international student population, but students from Vietnam and Nepal have also increased in recent years (Mędrzycki, 2017).

In reality, Japan did not and still does not use the term 'immigration policies' (*immin seisaku)* to refer to frameworks and regulations on accepting foreigners, although recent developments have implied a slow turn towards such a system (Akashi, 2014). Instead, the national government use 'immigration control', while officials use 'alien policy'. In the 1980s, what would have been 'integration policies' were called 'internationalization policies', especially since there were external calls for immigration reform (Kondo, 2002).

Although the TITP has functioned over the years as a de-facto guest worker program, it has also become notorious for violations and abuses. In 2017, the Japanese government increased

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protection for the trainees and interns, but all these might very well go against the most recent framework development in the context of foreign labor.

Just last December 2018, Japan has passed an amendment to the latest version of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, which finally allowed lower-skilled and semi-skilled workers in the country starting April 2019. This comes as a response to escalating demographic pressure, with a population that currently drops at about 400,000 people each year. The new legislation is projected to attract 345,000 foreign workers within the next five years, across industries with the most severe shortages such as construction, leisure, cleaning, and elderly care. Depending on the visa category, they can stay for more than five years and even attain permanent resident status. However, opposition parties, critics, and migration activists claim that the law has been hastily planned, is not comprehensive enough, and fails to address how Japan will deal with issues of social inclusion and labor rights (Denyer & Kashiwagi, 2018; Toshihiro, 2019).

2.1.2. South Korea

Until recent years, it has been widely-accepted that Koreans had only one common ancestor – Dangun, who founded the first state in the Korean peninsula in 2333 BC. For 5,000 years, Koreans believed they have maintained an ethnically homogenous, 'one-blood', 'one-race' nation state, losing its independence only once between 1910 and 1945 during the Japanese annexation, before being divided into north and south after World War II (Oh, Kang, Shin, Lee, Lee, & Chung, 2012; Park, 2017). In fact, the Chosun or Yi dynasty, which had ruled a unified Korea since 1392, has often been called 'Hermit Kingdom' (similar to how North Korea is now nicknamed the same), because contact with foreigners and travel outside the state were strictly prohibited (Strand, 2004).

Some scholars have doubted this mono-ethnic narrative, as historical evidence shows that Korea had been invaded countless times before by China (Manchurian Dynasty) and Japan, as well as made contact with various ethnicities through trade and commerce. The Manchurian invasion (1627-1636) in particular, led to a lasting cultural and political proximity with China. Many Koreans who migrated to China throughout the decades gave birth to the distinct social category of the *Joseonjok* (Lim, 2009). In modern times, South Korea had become religiously diverse, but as the governing principle of the Chosun Dynasty, Confucianism planted the seed for

paternalism and the traditional clannish family system still embedded in contemporary society (Kim, 2014; Strand, 2004).

Thus, it has been argued that the idea of a Korean national identity based on the myth of Dangun was a modern invention which had only been around since the late 19th and early 20th centuries. This ethnic nationalism has since been mobilized by authorities for various political purposes – from fighting Japanese colonialism and soothing the wounds of a divided Korea, to dealing with experiences of rapid economic growth and intense competition with North Korea, all the way to the democratization movement in the 1970s and 80s. Consequently, Korean ethnic identity has been fused with conceptions of modern nationalism (Oh, et al., 2012; Park, 2017) and citizenship (Choo, 2016; Kondo, 2002).

South Korea had long been known as an emigration country. As discussed in the previous subsection, at the beginning of the 20th century, Korea under Japanese rule had supplied workers to support Japan's economic and military expansion. Those who stayed in Japan pre-1945, along with their descendants, are called *Zainichi* Koreans. Although by itself, the Japanese term implies 'temporary residence' for a foreigner staying in Japan, it has come to refer to those who refused to give up their Korean 'nationality' in favor of being a naturalized Japanese citizen (Kondo, 2002). Other Koreans went to China and Russia during the colonial period (Kim, 2009).

During the Korean War between 1950 and 1953, sudden population upheaval was brought about by ten million people moving from the communist north to the south. For a decade, post-war South Korea was one of the poorest countries in the world. Unsurprisingly, when the US opened its door to non-Europeans in 1965, South Koreans started to migrate there to study or seek greener pastures. Through the help of foreign aid and largely protectionist economic policies, it entered the phase of rapid industrialization between the 1960s and 80s, and also began sending workers to different parts of the world (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017). Complementary to the Emigration Law enacted in 1962 was the Immigration Control Act established in 1963 (Oh, et al., 2012).

From the 1960s to 70s, thousands of Korean workers went to Germany to be miners and nurses. During the construction boom of the 1970s and 80s, millions went to the Middle East to be construction workers under Korean contractors, although most returned home after several years. They lived in a highly restrictive environment and were not exposed much to the culture of receiving countries. Travelling abroad was still strictly regulated until the 1980s, after which

outward migration picked up, with Koreans going to live in other countries such as Japan, China, and Canada. Consequently, those who stayed had limited exposure to foreign cultures until South Korea hosted the 1986 Asian Games and the 1988 Olympic Games (Kim, 2009; Oh, et al., 2012; Park, 2017).

As a result of better education and a growing economy in the 1990s, many Koreans started to refuse low-paying and less prestigious jobs, sparking shortage in unskilled, manual labor. Thus, the Industrial Training System (ITS) was introduced by the government in 1994, wherein foreign workers were given two-year work permits after the completion of a one-year training program. In its first year, more than 30,000 people arrived from less developed Asian countries to take part in the scheme within the main sectors of manufacturing, construction, agriculture, and fisheries. However, primarily due to operations in the hands of business associations, trainees were paid barely above the minimum wage and more often than not were victims of exploitation. Countless ran away from their trainee programs and companies, becoming undocumented workers as they sought for higher-paying jobs elsewhere in the country. Due to the discrepancy between labor requirements and migration laws, the number of illegals rose year by year. This situation persisted until the next decade, when a more effective legal framework for foreign labor was developed (Kim, 2009).

In 2002, the Employment Management System (EMS) was put in place, but it was limited to temporary foreign workers of Korean descent, notably the children of those who migrated to China, Russia and Japan during the colonial period. The 2003 Employment Permit System (EPS) was more comprehensive, essentially a guest worker scheme meant for all foreigners. Many unauthorized workers were given a chance to apply for a permit, while those who were ineligible were allowed to return to their home countries without paying fines. In contrast to the ITS, the EPS was strictly regulated by government agencies. In 2004, the EMS was merged with the EPS, such that the General EPS referred to workers from sending countries with whom Korea has signed agreements with, while the Special Case EPS governed workers with Korean ancestry. Although laborers from both categories can only stay for a maximum of three years, those governed by the Special EPS can work in more service sectors and have no re-entry restrictions. Under the Sincere Worker Re-Entry System in 2012, employers can request to extend any worker's stay for another one year and ten months. After being implemented side by side with the EPS for several years, the ITS was scrapped in 2007. (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

The EPS gained international recognition in 2011 when Korea received a United Nations Public Service Award for combating corruption in Asia. Among the meaningful contributions the framework has brought about include solving labor shortages, reducing the number of unauthorized workers, lowering the costs of coming to Korea, ensuring that labor laws are equally applied to migrant workers, and in general, introducing transparency and legality to the employment process. Despite these seeming breakthroughs, occupational accidents, unfair treatment, discrimination and exploitation of workers still abound, and there has been continuous clamor for the implementation of more human rights protection policies. Ultimately, the EPS has also successfully deterred the long-term settlement of foreign workers in Korea (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

In 2010, the government had unveiled a points-based system for highly-skilled migrants, a rare pathway to permanent residence different from the two traditional routes of ethnicity and marriage. In the same year, they also offered five-year residency visas for investors in designated real estate and public projects. Another business-related means is the dedicated start-up visa introduced in 2013 (Power, 2019).

Still the easiest ways to acquire Korean citizenship is either having at least one Korean parent (by ethnicity) or getting married to a Korean citizen. Imbalance in men to women ratio due to son preference, coupled with more women leaving the countryside to have better education and job opportunities had resulted to rural Korean men seeking out brides from other countries. Meanwhile, foreign women (predominantly Chinese and Vietnamese) also looking for a better life meet their future husbands through marriage brokers. Consequently, thousands of international marriages still happen in Korea each year (Kim, 2009; Park, 2017).

Despite expectations that Korea is already emerging as a multicultural society, and amidst official efforts to bring about policies on integration, negative sentiments toward foreigners and immigration is still widespread (Power, 2019).

2.1.3. Taiwan

Since 16th century Dutch occupation up to the 20th century Japanese colonization, Taiwan has historically been a migrant-receiving society. Although Chinese peoples have been coming over the island when the Dutch opened up its labor market, it was not until after the Japanese turned over Taiwan to China that cross-strait migration really picked up. After the Chinese civil

war between 1949 and the early 1950s, more than two million citizens and soldiers from then-Republic of China (ROC) came over to take refuge in the island (Cheng, 2008; Ku & Kironska, 2016; Wang, 2011).

According to Wang's (2011) study of immigration trends and policy changes in Taiwan, population movements were strictly controlled during the Cold War era to prevent communist infiltration. The legacy of Japanese colonial population control infrastructures such as household registration, personal identification systems, as well as community-based crime prevention systems, remained long after they had gone and well into present-day Taiwan. When Taiwan lost official United Nations representation in 1971, many Taiwanese citizens left the country for political security in the United States or elsewhere. Coupled with globalization trends in the late 1980s, travel restrictions were relaxed and the Taiwanese population became increasingly mobile. On the contrary, migration into Taiwan remained somewhat restricted.

Since 1949, Taiwan's immigration policies have been largely shaped and reshaped by its political relationship with China, as well as the political party currently in power. The policies have been criticized for not being comprehensive despite containing many rules and regulations. Liao (2008) contends that the main reason immigrants – especially foreign spouses – were very concerned about naturalization and citizenship, was because "under Taiwan's social and legal context, resident aliens, no matter how long they lived on the island, are subjected to immigration authorities' interrogation, raid, deportation or threat of deportation, detention and so forth" (p. 39). Additionally, they were "ineligible to most government/social benefit", such that "they can't be a full-fledged respectable person living in Taiwan without the [National ID Card]" (Liao, 2008, p. 39).

Before some amendments to the Immigration Act were passed in 2007, Liao (2008) detailed how "exclusionary" Taiwan's immigration laws were, which denied family union rights, implemented deportation and detention without due process, imposed labor restrictions on immigrant spouses, required unreasonable documents and financial certifications prior to naturalization (p. 39). And even *after* being naturalized, the legal system still treated 'foreigners' as 'second-class citizens'. He argued that policymakers cannot ban international marriages directly, in order to back up Taiwan's claim of being a 'liberal democracy' that supports 'human rights', 'freedom of marriage', and 'equal opportunity for everyone'; instead, they just "made every direct and indirect effort in 'discouraging' [immigrants'] arrival" (Liao, 2008, p. 45). It

was only in 2016, a decade after Liao's writing, that the parliament amended and revoked the rule on foreign spouses having to provide a certificate of worth or assets as evidence of their financial strength (Overseas Community Affairs Council, 2016).

The mentality described by Liao (2008) has to come from somewhere, and Lan (2008) argues:

> "The anxiety about miscegenation and interethnic marriage rests upon a false premise that Taiwanese make up a discrete biological and social entity with common cultural roots and a pure gene pool despite the fact that the Taiwanese are ethnically heterogeneous and the boundaries of the community have been fluid, permeable, and subject to historical change and political disputes" (p. 843).

In connection, Wang (2011) identifies three ideologies governing the Taiwanese perspective on immigration. The first is the '*jus sanguinis*' principle – considered patriarchal because only the descendants of ROC males can apply for naturalization prior to 1999 revisions of the Nationality Law. Then, foreign wives and daughters had to leave the country when their temporary resident permits expire.

The second is the concept of *renkou suzhi* or 'population quality', a class-based ideology of categorizing migrants as either 'high' or 'low quality' to prevent contamination of a predominantly Chinese society. Those not considered as high quality include the blue-collar worker, foreign spouses and their children, as well as lesser-educated migrants. This is reflected in the rhetoric of government officials and policy makers alike. In a national education conference in 2004, Vice Minister of Education Chou Tsan-Te "expressed his worry about the "low quality" of immigrants and said that "foreign brides should not have so many children" (Yiu in Lan, 2008, p. 842). A couple of years after, Liao (2008) narrates how Chen-Chi Wu, the Director General of the National Immigration Agency, told them that "he respects [their] effort in advancing immigrants' human rights", while reminding them that "the quality of Taiwanese population must be paramount" (p. 45).

The third principle is Taiwan's emphasis on 'national security', borne out of its antagonistic relations with Mainland China. Thus, stricter policies toward Chinese foreign spouses and workers were put in place to control threats to the Taiwanese nation. This rationale is illustrated in one of the comments made by a scholar drafting the 2007 Whitebook of Population Policy, wherein Chinese spouses "hold a national identity that does not prioritize the interest of Taiwan" (Lin in Lan, 2008, p. 838). Ironically, and in comparison with the 'othering'

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of Southeast Asians and other foreigners, the ethnic and cultural proximity of Chinese immigrants is viewed as threatening.

In the past two years, there have been some plans and gestures made towards reforming Taiwan's "outdated, slow, and inhibitive immigration policy" (Prowse, 2016, par. 1). Due to the concern over its population decline, relevant government agencies have been directed to evaluate policymaking, including the area of immigration. As the political tides shifted power to the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 2016, the administration had since unveiled the New Southbound Policy (NSP) and the NDC's Plan for Retention of Talent as two measures meant to address the disincentives foreigners have in living and working on the island. The NSP is a revival of former president Lee Teng-hui's "Going South" policy in the 1990s, which endeavored to reduce dependency on Mainland China and enhance economic ties with Southeast Asia, particularly Indonesia, the Philippines, Thailand, Vietnam, and Malaysia (Ogawa, 2017).

Last year, bills have been drafted to encourage the stay of high-skilled and mid-level labor, as well as international students (Mercene, 2018; Focus Taiwan, 2018). Additional amendments to the Immigration Act are also underway (Prowse, 2016; Taipei Times, 2018). However, some issues that are still yet to be addressed include providing work permission for spouses of permanent residents (different form the 'citizen' category) and the requirement of renouncing original nationality for non-high skilled workers (Prowse, 2016).

2.2. Trends in International Migration

Figure 1[1] below comparatively shows the international migration trends in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, relative to the aggregate migrant stock in the world. So far, Japan has the most number of international migrants among the three countries, with a total of 2.3 million in 2017. Korea currently has 1.5 million, while Taiwan, which has not yet breached the one million mark, has 717,736. Although in Japan and Korea, the numbers have increased throughout the years, it seems to be slowing down since the mid-2000s. For Taiwan, migration peaked in the early 2000s, dipped in 2010, and began to climb steadily since then. Within a decade, migrants in the world have multiplied from 160 million in 1995 to almost 258 million in 2017.

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[1] Data for Japan, South Korea, and the world were sourced from the UN DESA's (2017) migrant stock statistics, while data for Taiwan was sourced from the Ministry of the Interior's National Immigration Agency (2017), as the number of foreign residents.

Figure 1. International Migrants in East Asian Countries and the World (1995-2017)

Figures 2 to 4 show the increase of international migrants for each country from 2005 to 2017, along with their share of the total population[2]. Here, it can be seen more clearly that the number of international migrants has indeed increased throughout the last decade in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. However, if migrants as a share of the country's total population is accounted for (less than four percent for all three), it is a different story, and incomparable to Western countries with one fourth or more of the population coming from overseas.

Figure 2. International Migrants in Japan (1995-2017)

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
[2] Population data for Japan and Korea were sourced from the UN DESA (2017), while data for Taiwan was sourced from the Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (2017). Share of the total population was computed by the researcher.

Figure 3. International Migrants in South Korea (1995-2017)

Although Japan has the largest number of migrants, it is also the one with the lowest as a share of its population in 2017 (1.82%). Conversely, Taiwan has the lowest number of migrants, but has the most as a share of its population (3.04%). Among the three, Korea experienced the fastest increase in migration growth in line with its own population growth, jumping ten times from almost only 124,000 migrants in 1995 (1.03%), to over one million in 2017 (2.26%).

Figure 4. International Migrants in Taiwan (1995-2017)

In terms of the migrants' gender, Japan started out with around a similar proportion, but since 2000, females have increasingly outnumbered males. The opposite is true for Korea, with the number of males outstripping females since 1995. In Taiwan, the gender proportion is more

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unstable. There were more males in 1995, with the number of females growing since the mid-2000s, and males closing in again in 2017.

2.3. Trends in International Marriages

Aside from labor migration, marriage-based settlement also intensified flows into Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (Bélanger, 2010). The number of international marriages has been growing since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, mainly as a result of greater gender equality in education and employment, which led to: 1) more educated women becoming part of the labor force; 2) fewer women wanting to marry and take care of the elderly (especially their husbands' parents); 2) the domestic marriage crisis, and men being forced to seek more 'traditional' brides overseas, whom they view as desirable (Bélanger et al., 2010).

The subsequent popularity of international matchmaking is both a consequence and continuing cause of the increase in foreign spouses. Because they come from less developed countries, commercial agencies specifically market Chinese and Southeast Asian brides as more conventional, feminine, and submissive, according to the needs of potential grooms from East Asia (Bélanger et al., 2010; Lin, 2016). Thus, there are a lot more female foreign spouses than males. They are viewed negatively and even called 'gold diggers' who are only interested in the males' economic support, especially since they send back money to their home countries in support of their relatives. No different from migrant workers, they are perceived as an intrusion to their host nations' cultural homogeneity, and are often the object of discrimination and racism (eg. Chan, 1999; Hsia, 2007; Kim, 2009; Nho & Lee, 2016; Shipper, 2008; Tierney, 2008, 2011; Wang & Bélanger, 2008). The level of prejudice may also depend on their ethnicity and country of origin (Lee, Seol, & Cho, 2006).

Figures 5 to 7 show the trends in East Asian international marriages, as well as a comparison between the proportion of spouses by gender.[3] Since data collection began in 1965[4], there has been a steady increase in marriages between a Japanese groom and a foreign bride each year, peaking around 20,000 in the 1990s, and again in 2005, at about 33,000. With Japanese brides and foreign grooms, there was a slight dip in the 1980s, followed by a gradual increase

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[3] National Institute of Population and Social Security Research (2017), Statistics Korea (2017), Taiwan Ministry of the Interior (2017)

until around 8,300 in 2005. In 2006, however, international marriages started to decline after revisions to immigration laws were enacted, cracking down on women working with entertainment visas in hostess clubs and fake marriages aimed at obtaining Japanese citizenship (Nippon Communications Foundation, 2018).

Figure 5. Japanese International Marriages (1965-2015)

In Korea, although marriages between native males and foreign females far outnumber those between native females and foreign males, there was a significant increase in both categories from the early to the mid-2000s. After a record high of 30,719 (Korean males and foreign females) and 11,637 (Korean females and foreign males) marriages in 2005, the numbers

Figure 6. Korean International Marriages (2000-2017)

gradually leveled off.

The South Korean government initially encouraged the matchmaking industry as a solution for unmarried men and low fertility rates in rural areas (Bélanger et al., 2010), but reports of violence against foreign wives prompted legislation against both offenders and illegal brokers in the late 2000s (AFP, 2014). Annual number of marriages hit the lowest point in 2017 since statistics began in 1970, mainly due to the emerging trend of late marriage, high rent and unstable job conditions (Park, 2017).

In Taiwan, data for international marriages is divided into two broad categories: the first encompasses statistics concerning Mainland China, with separate numbers for Hong Kong and Macau; the second concerns 'foreign' nationalities, mostly Southeast Asian spouses – which make up a significant proportion – and those from other countries. While the number of marriages between Taiwanese females and both Chinese and foreign males has mostly remained constant since 2008 until 2018, there was a significant and very noticeable drop in marriages between Taiwanese males and Chinese females in the same decade. The decrease is such that annual marriages between Taiwanese males and foreign females had overtaken it by 2016.

Figure 7. Taiwanese International Marriages (2008-2018)

Unlike migrant workers, foreign spouses immigrate to East Asian countries with their husbands or wives. The women give birth to a new generation of biracial children who will impact cultural norms and national identifications later on. This makes the phenomenon of international marriages an important issue for ordinary citizens and policy makers alike. As it is,

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foreign spouses face a host of issues, ranging from strict citizenship laws, inaccessible systems of social benefits, domestic violence, and their threats to their general well-being (eg. Nho & Lee, 2016).

Scholars argue that the continuing rise in international migration and marriages inevitably contribute to ethnic diversity and the emergence of multicultural societies in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan (eg. Bélanger, et al., 2010). These demographic transformations, in the long run, can challenge their dominant ideologies of nationalism, cultural homogeneity, and native citizenship. But given the ample evidence of prejudice, ethnocentrism, and racial discrimination, strong public opposition to immigration can still be expected from their native-born population in the coming years.

Chapter 3. Literature Review

As international migration levels rose, research on public opinion regarding immigrants and immigration also expanded. The puzzle of which factors have a stronger hand in shaping attitudes and preferences has been approached by different disciplines in the social sciences, reflecting the wide-ranging potential causes and effects of public opinion. For the purposes of clarifying concepts and terminologies, this section begins with a brief discussion of definitions.

The term 'public opinion' has been used to mean different things at different points in time – from the ancient Greek citizens' individual display of rhetoric and oratory, to a 1940s argument that it was a purely collective phenomenon (Berinsky, 2012). In 1961, Key provided a useful and expansive working definition of public opinion: "Those opinions held by private persons which governments find it prudent to heed (p. 8)" (as cited in Berinsky, 2012, p. 2). This suggests that even though these opinions are owned by individuals, it derives its power in the public sphere. Although there are other measurement techniques, polls and surveys have emerged as the most prevalent in gauging the public will (Berinsky, 2012).

Traditionally, 'migration' is the movement of people within national boundaries, such as the population flows from rural to urban areas, while 'immigration' is the movement of people across national boundaries (Gottdiener & Budd, 2005). However, the term 'migrant' has been recently associated with refugees, workers shifting from job to job by the season, and those moving temporarily from one country to another for economic reasons. A 'refugee', more specifically, is a person without government protection who has been forced to leave his or her own home country to escape persecution, political and/or armed conflict, or both. On the other hand, an 'immigrant' is someone who has willingly moved to a foreign country with the intention of settling down and living there (Vore, 2015). In this regard, an immigrant is also an 'international migrant': "any person who changes his or her country of usual residence" (UN DESA, 1998, p. 9).

Under these umbrella concepts is a list of other terms and subcategories, like 'migrant worker', 'asylum seeker', or the adjectives 'illegal', 'undocumented', and 'unauthorized'. All of these terms may be enclosed within domestic and international laws, and meanings have changed and can change over time. Problems can arise when the media and the public interchange terms

without further clarification of what they are actually referring to, and as such, even the choice of words can politically frame a particular event.

Furthermore, in academic contexts, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) argue the need to differentiate between 'attitudes toward immigrants' and 'attitudes toward immigration', as the public can have positive views of immigrants and still be opposed to immigration. They also point out the issue of terminological ambiguity in this very broad research area, which renders reported findings not always directly comparable. Although it is beyond the scope of the present study to analyze how survey questionnaires are structured and worded, immigration attitudes have been proven to vary depending on the questions asked (Segovia & Defever, 2010). This is critical issue that needs to be acknowledged and addressed in the field of public opinion polling and research, as well as in communication and any kind of reportage.

Also included here are some notes on the term 'settler society', a theoretical concept in early modern and modern history used for comparative analysis of predominantly European civilizations *settling somewhere else* from their original habitat to new destinations. Prominent examples of modern settler societies would be the British colonies in North America, New Zealand, Australia, and South Africa; the Dutch colony in South Africa; the French colonies in North Africa and the Pacific; as well as the Spanish colonies in South America. This concept is intimately linked with 'settler colonization', patterns of settlement where the settlers have replaced aboriginals/indigenous peoples as rulers of a territory – a historical phenomenon that can be traced back to tribe expansion in the 13th and 12th centuries BC, as well as Chinese colonization from the Yellow River southwards in the 9th century BC (Lloyd & Metzer, 2013). Thus, traditional settler societies refer to non-European countries where Europeans have mainly settled down centuries ago. Given similar characteristics of being 'closed' to groups of other racial, linguistic, and ethnic origins, it is appropriate to call the East Asian countries studied here as non-traditional settler societies.

Moving on to the literature itself, the sheer volume of work previously done on this topic cannot be understated. To narrow down the discussion, this survey is further subdivided into three subsections: an overview of research traditions, a summary of studies focusing on political factors, and a closer look at East Asian views of immigration.

3.1. Public Opinion towards Immigrants and Immigration

As such, primarily referenced here are two comprehensive reviews within the past decade, as well as some of the studies completed in more recent years. Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) emphasize the importance of probing the relationship between individual and societal processes through a clear micro-macro categorization of theories and determinants identified in the literature. While they explicitly come from a sociological perspective, most of the research in their review inevitably cross social science disciplines.

Four years after, Hainmueller and Hopkins (2014) reviewed some 100 studies of immigration attitudes from more than two dozen countries in the past two decades. Although the field has been previously dominated by cross-sectional research and country analyses, it has gradually evolved to include innovative research designs and experimental studies. Focusing on the opinion of majority groups and covering quantitative research in Northern America and Western Europe, they draw out works central to political science debates and divide them into two traditions. The first, political economy, directly corresponds with Ceobanu and Escandell's (2010) individual-level theories of socioeconomic correlates and self-interests; while everything else falls into the second, or what they termed 'sociopsychological' approaches. Presented in the next paragraphs and the following tables is a combined summary of their reviews.[5]

3.1.1. Theoretical Perspectives on Attitudes towards Immigrants and Immigration

Individual Level. On the individual level, three theories have emerged as prominent: 1) socioeconomic correlates and self-interests (also called political economy), 2) identities and values, and 3) contact with out-group members.

Political Economy. The first strand is influenced by one's social position, rational calculations, material interests, and fear of competition; wherein results from various studies (see Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Olzak, 1992; Pettigrew, 2000; Sides and Citrin, 2007) point to a predictive consistency of negative attitudes. Similarly, Hainmueller and Hopkins' (2014) political economy perspective examines this conflict between natives and immigrants in two areas: the 1) labor market, and for 2) government spending and services.

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[5] Studies and sources mentioned in this subsection and review summary were originally cited by Ceobanu and Escandell (2010), as well as Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014).

Labor Market Competition. Studies in the subcategory of labor market competition are based on the factor proportion (FP) model, a formal economic model which assumes that natives and immigrants are perfectly substitutable. It predicts that increasing the supply of low-skilled labor through immigration will lower wages or take away employment from low-skilled natives, while raising wages for high-skilled natives; and vice versa. Thus, low-skilled natives would tend to oppose low-skilled immigrants, while high-skilled natives would tend to support them (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001). However, it may depend on the kind of work or sector (Malhotra, Margalit, & Mo, 2013); or simply on the natives' perception of how immigrants generally impact their industries, and not because of their self-interest (Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013). Other studies find no evidence that natives fear labor market competition at all, with results even suggesting that respondents with more education (previously used as a measure for skill) support both low-skilled and high-skilled immigration (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Ford, Morrell, & Heath, 2012); and that workers at all skill levels support high-skilled immigration more than low-skilled immigration (Hainmueller, Hiscox, & Margalit, 2011).

Fiscal Burden. Aside from labor market competition, there is also concern about low-skilled immigrants being a fiscal burden and having a negative effect on natives' post-tax income, while high skilled immigrants have the opposite effect. A public finance model coupled with the FP model predicts that natives with higher incomes would be more opposed to low-skilled immigrants and more supportive of high-skilled immigrants, than natives with lower incomes (Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007). However, other studies find no evidence of fiscal threat (Tingley, 2013), and argue that rich and poor natives are actually both opposed to low-skilled migration (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010).

Symbolic Interests. Contrary to material interests, there are symbolic interests like personal values and identification with a group (including nationalism), that may lead to exclusionary and unfavorable views toward others (see Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Hjerm, 1998; Luedtke, 2005; Mummenday, Klink & Brown, 2001).

Contact Theory. The third strand of research (see Brewer, 1996; Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009; McLaren, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998) draws on Gordon Allport's (1954) contact hypothesis, which proposes that exposure to an out-group will foster more favorable attitudes toward them, as long as four basic conditions are satisfied: equal status, cooperation, similar goals, and official endorsement.

Table 1. Summary of Literature: Theoretical Perspectives on Immigration Attitudes

Level	Theories	Literature
Individual (Micro)	Political economy or socioeconomic correlates and self-interests (eg. labor market competition and fiscal burden)	Burns & Gimpel, 2000; Dancygier & Donnelly, 2013; Ford, Morrell, & Heath, 2012; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2010; Hainmueller, Hiscox, & Margalit, 2011; Hanson, Scheve, & Slaughter, 2007; Malhotra, Margalit, & Mo, 2013; Mayda, 2006; Olzak, 1992; Pettigrew, 2000; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Sides and Citrin, 2007; Tingley, 2013
	Identities and values, such as social identity theory	de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Hjerm, 1998; Luedtke, 2005; Mummenday, Klink & Brown, 2001
	Contact with out-group members	Brewer, 1996; Escandell & Ceobanu, 2009; McLaren, 2003; Pettigrew, 1998
	Psychological processes, such as emotional responses	Brader, 2008; Gadarian & Albertson, 2013; Wright & Citrin, 2011
	Group threat or intergroup competition for both material nonmaterial issues	Bobo, 1988, 2000; Fetzer, 2000; Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002
	Generalized Prejudice, group-specific stereotyping and ethnocentrism	Sniderman, Peri, de Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000; Kinder & Kam, 2009; Tichenor, 2002
Contextual (Macro)	Mass media effects	Abrajano & Singh, 2009; Branton, Cassese, Jonas, & Westerland, 2011; Dunaway et al, 2010; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Hopkins, 2014b; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013
	Contact in subnational contexts	Fetzer, 2000; Hood & Morris, 1998; Hopkins, 2010; McLaren, 2003; Newman, 2013

Psychological Processes. Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014) identifies psychological processes as another area of individual-level theories ripe for further research. Some experimental studies have explored the role of emotions, such as stress and anxiety, in increasing negative attitudes of native-borns towards different immigrant groups (Brader, 2008; Gadarian & Albertson, 2013; Wright & Citrin, 2011).

Group Threat. On the contextual level, theories focus on certain structural conditions which try to explain why specific groups of people develop particular attitudes toward out-group members. The most widely used is the theory of group threat, a zero-sum perspective on intergroup competition. Whether the threat is real or perceived, negative reactions are triggered once natives feel that their collective economic, cultural, or religious interests are at risk (Bobo, 1988, 2000; Fetzer, 2000; Jackson, Brown, Brown, & Marks, 2001; LeVine & Campbell, 1972; Quillian, 1995; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Coenders, 2002). Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) observes that many studies based on cross-national data include individual and contextual-level competitive threat as a predictor, with results linking it strongly to unfavorable views towards immigrants. However, they also think it is counterproductive to simply focus on this, as it shows an incomplete picture of the causes for attitude formation. Beyond group threat are the literature on ethnocentrism, group-specific stereotyping, the role of the media in shaping attitudes toward immigrants and immigration, and contact in subnational contexts.

Prejudice and Ethnocentrism. Although negative sentiments can be relatively undifferentiated across various immigrant groups in the form of generalized prejudice (Sniderman, Peri, de Figueiredo, & Piazza, 2000; Kinder & Kam, 2009; Tichenor, 2002), ethnocentrism can also be expressed towards specific groups at specific historical periods or points in time, such that country of origin still matters (Ford, 2011; Ford, Morrell, & Heath, 2012).

Media. In relation, how the media portrays immigrants and which groups they portray are important, too. News reports are not always divisive, but groups that get more coverage or are depicted negatively can be the target of unfavorable opinions (Branton, Cassese, Jonas, & Westerland, 2011; Hainmueller & Hangartner, 2013; Hopkins, 2014b; Valentino, Brader, & Jardina, 2013). Depending on their interests, media outlets can also express explicit anti or pro-immigration stances that might influence their audiences (Abrajano & Singh, 2009; Dunaway et al, 2010).

Subnational Contexts. Emerging from the micro-level contact theory are studies on subnational demographic contexts, wherein residential proximity can provide opportunities for interaction with immigrants. However, studies do not seem to arrive at a fixed effects conclusion, as exposure to the different minority groups do not necessarily reduce stereotyping or racialization (Fetzer, 2000; Hood & Morris, 1998; Hopkins, 2010; McLaren, 2003; Newman, 2013).

3.1.2. Determinants of Attitudes towards Immigrants and Immigration

Perceptions. With regards to determinants, micro-level predictors can be categorized into either attitudinal or non-attitudinal. Unfavorable views toward immigrants can result from the perceived economic and cultural consequences of immigration (Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Citrin & Sides, 2008; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Raijman, Davidov, Schimdt, & Hochman, 2008; Sides and Citrin, 2007), as well as perceptions on the size of the immigrant population in neighboring areas or society at large, especially when natives overestimate it (Blinder, 2013; Green, 2009; Hjerm, 2007; Jackson et al., 2001; McLaren, 2003; Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006, 2008).

Ideology. Political ideological orientations measured through 'left-right' scale can also influence attitudes, with the consensus that people who are more conservative – or those who align themselves with right-wing parties – are more likely to oppose immigrant presence or support restrictionist immigration policies (Albertson & Gadarian, 2012; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Knoll, Redlawsk, & Sanborn, 2011; McLaren, 2001; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, & Hayes, 2013; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007).

Identity. Another set of attitudinal predictors are the complex and multidimensional identifications with a national community or a supranational entity such as the European Union (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Coenders & Scheepers, 2004; Kunovich, 2009; Luedtke, 2005; Schildkraut, 2005; Wright, 2012). These attachments can yield mixed results, as some conceptions of national community and boundaries can accommodate immigrants easier than others (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Wong, 2010). Research have also shown that 'civic' and 'ethnic' nationalisms are not fixed or absolute, and that "national sentiments premised upon democratic ideals and political voluntarism can coexist with exclusivist national feelings" (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010, p. 321).

Table 2. Summary of Literature: Determinants of Immigration Attitudes

Level	Predictors	Literature
Individual (Micro)	*Attitudinal*	
	Perceptions about the consequences of immigration	Citrin, Green, Muste, & Wong, 1997; Citrin & Sides, 2008; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Raijman, Davidov, Schmidt, & Hochman, 2008; Sides and Citrin, 2007
	Perceptions about the size of the immigrant population	Blinder, 2013; Green, 2009; Hjerm, 2007; Jackson et al., 2001; McLaren, 2003; Scheepers et al., 2002; Schneider, 2008; Semyonov, Raijman, & Gorodzeisky, 2006, 2008
	Attitudes measuring political ideology	Albertson & Gadarian, 2012; de Figueiredo & Elkins, 2003; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Knoll, Redlawsk, & Sanborn, 2011; McLaren, 2001; Merolla, Ramakrishnan, & Hayes, 2013; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Sides & Citrin, 2007
	Identification with national community or supranational entity	Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008; Coenders & Scheepers, 2004; Kunovich, 2009; Luedtke, 2005; Schildkraut, 2005; Wong, 2010; Wright, 2012
	Perceptions about norm violations	Newman, Hartman, & Taber, 2012, 2013; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Schildkraut, 2011; Theiss-Morse, 2009
	Non-Attitudinal	
	Educational level	Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hello, Scheepers, & Gijsberts, 2002; Mayda, 2006; Quillian, 1995; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001; Wagner & Zick, 1995
	Labor force status, occupational classification, personal/household income	Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Schneider, 2008
	Demographic variables (eg. age, sex, type of residence)	Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Quillian, 1995
	Religious variables (eg. denomination, church attendance)	Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002
Contextual (Macro)	Minority presence or size of immigrant population	Kunovich, 2002; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Schneider, 2008
	Economic condition (eg. high unemployment rate, financial crisis)	Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2008; Hopkins, 2010; Lahav, 2004; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw, & Yang, 1997; Mayda, 2006; Semyonov et al., 2008; Wilkes, Guppy, & Farris, 2008; Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008
	Liberal-democratic tradition	Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hello et al., 2002
	Immigration policy intentions	Hjerm, 2007
	Countries' religious affiliations	Hello et al., 2002
	Political-ideological climate	Semyonov et al., 2006, 2007, 2008; Wilkes et al., 2007
	Political-economic history	Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008

Norm Violation. On a related note, unfavorable attitudes towards immigrants are also attributed to perceptions of norm violation when it comes to the workplace and fluency of language, as well as other difficulties with assimilation (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Newman, Hartman, & Taber, 2012, 2013; Paxton & Mughan, 2006; Schildkraut, 2011; Theiss-Morse, 2009).

Education. Non-attitudinal predictors include participants' educational level and social standing indicators, along with demographic and religion-based variables. On aggregate, and even when controlling for other markers of social position, a higher educational level consistently deters anti-immigrant and anti-immigration sentiments (Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hello, Scheepers, & Gijsberts, 2002; Quillian, 1995; Wagner & Zick, 1995). However, this 'liberalizing effect' varies across national settings and different educational systems (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hainmueller & Hiscox, 2007; Hello et al., 2002); and is also said to be significantly larger for those who are part of the active workforce than those who are unemployed (Mayda, 2006; Scheve & Slaughter, 2001).

Social Standing. The most commonly used indicators of social standing are labor force status, occupational classification, and also personal or household income. The main assumption is related to labor market competition, where natives from lower socio-economic classes, or those in vulnerable employment situations, tend to have more unfavorable attitudes than those who have secure status (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Schneider, 2008).

Demographic Attributes. Although some studies have found that males, older respondents, and those who live in rural areas are more likely to hold negative opinions of immigrants and immigration, than females, young respondents, and urban residents (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Quillian, 1995), the predictive power of demographic variables is less stable than other predictors. Similarly, the effect of religious variables such as denomination and church attendance is also inconclusive (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002), which has unfortunately led to the dearth of research in this subcategory of nonattidunal determinants.

Immigrant Population. The relatively more recent inclusion of macro-structural conditions into analytical models has allowed researchers to control for individual-level predictors while exploring specific spatial (countries, states, regions, etc.) and temporal (historical periods, years) contexts. Minority presence, or the size of an immigrant population,

can be seen as a direct competition for resources. Thus, it has been associated with unfavorable views towards immigration, but opinions are moderated when measures of intergroup contact are added (Kunovich, 2002; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Schneider, 2008). Some studies also argue that the size itself is inconsequential, and that the rapid increase of the immigrant population might be more relevant (Hopkins, 2010; Zick, Pettigrew, & Wagner, 2008).

Economy. Economic condition is another important macro-level determinant, and massive unemployment or recession may actually weaken the effects of individual-level social standing (Kunovich, 2004). Although a struggling economy is a good predictor of negative attitudes towards immigrants and immigration (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2008; Lahav, 2004; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw, & Yang, 1997; Semyonov et al., 2008; Wilkes, Guppy, & Farris, 2008), such opposition can exist in prosperous countries as well (Mayda, 2006). Nonetheless, economic condition seems to have more predictive power than the size of an immigrant population.

Other macro-level predictors. Some have tried to go beyond the structural effects of competition and group threat by looking into the roles of liberal-democratic traditions (Coenders & Scheepers, 2003; Hello et al., 2002), immigration policy intentions (Hjerm, 2007), religious hetereogeneity (Hello et al., 2002), political-ideological climate (Semyonev et al., 2006, 2007, 2008; Wilkes et al., 2007) and political-economic history (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2008).

In their review, Ceobanu and Escandell (2010) conclude that despite theoretical, methodological, and interpretational limitations, studies testing the group threat, social identity, and contact theories have arrived at fairly consistent results regarding the predictors of opinions toward immigrants and immigration. However, they also believe that to move the research agenda forward, longitudinal data should be utilized more; and that variables on the micro, meso, and macro levels should be modeled interactively.

Although the political economy tradition and individual-level explanations concerning self-interest are more theoretically parsimonious, evidence increasingly suggests that the effect of cultural and symbolic factors, personal contact, and even the perceptions of native-born populations – may be more significant than that of material aspects (Card, Dustman, & Preston, 2012; Citrin & Sides, 2008; Fetzer, 2000; Hainmueller and Hopkins, 2014; McLaren, 2003; McLaren & Johnson, 2007; Sides & Citrin, 2007; Wilkes et al., 2008).

Ceobanu & Escandell (2010) had cited works on political-ideological orientations, but point out the need for studies that focus on the impact of contextual-level factors such as the political landscape of a country. On the other hand, Hainmueller & Hopkins (2014) emphasize how research on immigration attitudes, relatively compared to other predictors, has been "surprisingly divorced from research on political partisanship and ideology" (p. 244). Several studies have already included these as control variables, but they argue that these need to be central issues moving forward. They also note that even though the role of self-interest in shaping mass attitudes seems limited, organized interests can still be present in the policy-making process of immigration.

3.2. Political Factors and Immigration Attitudes

Due to the research gap mentioned in the previous section, we expound on political factors here, which are related to three attitudinal determinants mentioned in the previous section – ideology, identity, and norm violation. In the early decades of academic study, ideology was seen as one of the core building blocks for what scholars thought constituted the shaping of public opinion. After all, it provides a relatively abstract and broad structure for a variety of political attitudes and preferences. Post-1970s, however, the discipline expanded beyond the power of ideology to include the roles of factors such as race, religion, emotion, personality, identities, and interests, among others (Berinsky, 2012). In the past 30 years, the importance of ideology has been somewhat understated, which might also be one of the reasons why it has not been as salient in the subfield of immigration attitudes research. The renaissance of polarization between the constructed notions of left and right seems to have brought back ideology to the frontlines of both scholarship and daily conversations.

Social scientists have struggled to pin down a single, common definition for 'ideology', but Federico (2012) outlines three crucial claims about it, where: 1) ideologies are frameworks or schemas that consist of opinions, values, and beliefs about the nature of social reality; 2) they are held in common by a group of people living in a specific social and historical context; and 3) they both provide interpretations of society as it currently exists, and prescribe normative guidelines on its ideal organizational structure. In other words, ideologies are said to be "shared belief systems that reflect some group's understanding of the social world and its vision of what that world should ideally look like" (Federico, 2012, p. 80).

The most common and familiar assumption regarding ideology is that positions can be simplified into single belief dimensions, where the left (liberal) is anchored to preferences for equality, openness, and social change, while the right (conservative) is moored to preferences for hierarchy, tradition, and social order. While this left-right framework is the norm in the academic and political worlds alike – presumably because of its simplicity and the abounding evidence of its consistency with reality – others argue that ordinary citizens' ideological views are actually multidimensional (Federico, 2012); or even that very few thought of politics from an ideological perspective (Converse, 1964). Contrary to the seemingly extreme liberal-conservative divide and a rising affiliation with either group, individuals can hold opposing views and stances from both sides according to the conventional discourses they are exposed to (Strauss, 2012). The scholarly inclination to the left-right approach is understandable, as a multidimensional one renders decision-making more difficult – especially in intense political competitions – due to the dichotomous nature of most political choices (Federico, 2012). Thus, political elites and politically-engaged masses usually benefit more from a single dimension of ideology, especially in countries where partisanship and political polarization are more evident.

The Radical Right. Even though studies on the relationship between ideology and immigration attitudes are seen to be lacking in both North American and European contexts (Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Medeiros et al., 2018), there is an overwhelming consensus in existing research that conservatives, or right-aligned individuals, are more associated with unfavorable views toward immigrants (eg. Bierbrauer & Klinger, 2002; Chandler & Tsai, 2001; Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Harteveld et al., 2017; Hawley, 2011; Jewell, Melgar, Molina, & Rossi, 2009; Lahav & Courtemanche, 2012; Neiman, Johnson, & Bowler, 2006; Kiehne & Ayon, 2016).

In the case of Australia, radical right parties assert that immigration is a threat to security, cultural identity, and redistribution, influencing the passage of more restrictive policies (Zaslove, 2004). In Switzerland, they explicitly frame it as a "contentious and menacing development" in order to strengthen their campaigns and sustain voter mobilization (Skenderovic, 2007). Before being elected US president in 2017, Republican nominee Donald Trump rode his campaign on controversial remarks about illegal immigration – stereotyping immigrants as criminals and proposing to build a wall on the US-Mexico border. These negative attitudes from the right are part of "galvanizing effects" seen among those already inclined to oppose immigration (Sniderman, Hagendoorn, & Prior, 2004, p. 36).

Nationalism. Most radical right parties draw on exclusivist conceptions of nationhood, and thus, social science theorists and even the parties themselves underline the role of nationalist ideology in their cause. In a study by Lubbers and Coenders (2016), they find that the more pride people have in the nation, the more likely they will vote for the radical right, especially if they hold ancestry, culture, and speaking the national language very important aspects of national identification. Related to identity theories presented in the last section, previous research has also demonstrated that nationalism – sometimes defined as uncritical and/or blind attachment to the nation – is correlated with negative attitudes towards immigrants; while patriotism – pride in the nation or in democratic institutions – can contribute to more positive attitudes (Barnes, 2015; Green, Sarrasin, Fasel, & Staerklé, 2011; Jeong, 2013; Luedtke, 2005; Pedersen, Attwell, & Heveli, 2005; Pehrson, Vignoles & Brown, 2009; Pryce, 2018; Ueffing, Rowe & Mulder, 2015).

This relationship is further influenced by national governments' restrictive policies towards immigration, as conditioned by individuals' political awareness and interests (Sandovici, Jakobsen, & Strabac, 2012). Among adolescents, there seems to be evidence that nationalism correlates with anti-immigrant attitudes in older democracies, but not in newer ones (Barber, Fennelly, & Torney-Purta, 2013).

On the other hand, there is also an existing research tradition where immigration is treated as the explanatory variable with regards to nationalism. Sandelind (2012) observed how European politicians and political theorists alike have expressed their worries about the potential damaging impact of immigration on social cohesion, national identity, and ultimately, the very foundation of European states. She argues, however, that immigration should not be simply perceived as a threat to passive nation states, but also an issue that national identity itself produces. In studying different empirical models for the relationship between the two variables, Heinrich (2018) concludes that the presumption for anti-immigration attitudes predicting nationalist sentiments does not hold.

3.3. Social Trust and Immigration Attitudes

The relationship between social trust and immigration has been frequently studied from the perspective of the 'social trust argument'. Although variations of this argument exist, all of them contend that social trust fosters cohesion within a political community, and that trust cannot be achieved or maintained if immigration is not controlled (Mendoza, 2015). The position that

"admitting immigrants disrupts the shared identity of the citizenry, erodes support for the welfare state and, so, obstructs the realization of justice" is often used to justify restrictions on immigration (Pevnick, 2007, p. 2). Consequently, even empirical research in the past decades, especially in the US, has been focused on the negative impact of immigration and ethnic diversity on social trust and community cohesion (Alesina and La Ferrara, 2002; Costa and Kahn, Delhay and Newton, 2005; Knack and Keefer, 1997).

Some studies have challenged the prevalence of this claim, finding support that the said negative effects can be mediated by social ties (Stolle, Soroka, and Johnston, 2008), mitigated or even reversed within more economically equal and multicultural countries (Kesler and Bloemraad, 2010), and moderated by subnational integration policies (Gundelach and Manatschal, 2016). On the other hand, Kazemipur (2006) presents a positive relationship between social trust and immigration, a trend he believes is unique to the Canadian case – that trust rises with the increase in ethnic diversity and immigrant population size.

Herreros and Criado (2009) observed that social trust has not yet been used as an explanatory variable in explaining immigration attitudes. Trying to fill this gap, they conducted empirical analysis on 16 European countries, and results showed that social trust can both directly lead to more positive views of immigration, while also reducing the negative impact of 'perceived threat' in people's opinions of immigrants. In more recent studies of Europe, trust has been shown to be closely related to lesser feelings of threat (Sipinen and Bäck, 2016); and that individuals who are more trusting generally extend their positive worldview to immigrants and those with whom they do not share the same ethnic or cultural characteristics (van der Linden, Hooghe, Vroome, Van Laar, 2017).

On a related note, Kaltenthaler and Miller (2013) have successfully used social trust to predict individual support for trade liberalization. They argue that trade is one manner of foreign engagement, and that those who tend to distrust others will be less inclined to want to liberalize trade in an implicit effort to reduce exposure to foreigners. This is supported by another recent study, an experiment conducted in Vietnam, which finds evidence that higher levels of social trust generate greater support for free trade (Nguyen and Bernauer, 2018).

3.4. Immigration Attitudes in East Asia

As evident in the previous sections, mainstream research on immigration attitudes in general has tended to overlook the other half of the hemisphere. Compared to the traditional settler societies in North America and Australia, and even with European states that only became "countries of migrant settlement" in the last decade, East Asia has managed to "delay" immigration despite its economic advancement (Seol & Skrentny, 2009).

With the number of immigrants in the region steadily rising in the past decades, immigration has become a more contentious issue than before. This is reflected in comparative discussions of Japan and South Korea's policies on labor migration (Kartikasari, 2013), immigration (Bisheh, 2017; Kimura, 2016; Lee, 2010), and integration (Lee, 2017). Japan and Taiwan's labor migration has also been compared (Tsay & Tsai, 2003), and there is also an interesting critical content analysis of national surveys regarding foreign brides in South Korea and Taiwan (Bélanger, Lee & Wang, 2010). Add to that an expansive array of single-country studies on immigration.

However, with regards to quantitative research on immigration attitudes in the region, we have found only three studies in English. It is highly probable that there are other works written in any of the East Asian country's official languages. In the case of Japan, Green and Kadoya (2013) affirm that immigration remains a "somewhat elusive topic in the English language scholarship, and quantitative analysis on the subject is rare even in the Japanese literature" (p. 15).

Chang and Welsh (2016) draw from the Asian Barometer Survey to see if the region follows global trends on immigration attitudes. Aside from what has been traditionally called East Asia, they also include Southeast Asian countries in their broad analysis of economic, social, and attitudinal predictors. In terms of economic interest, they find that perceptions of economy and perceptions of security do matter, wherein those who had positive perceptions also view immigration favorably. Variables under social conditions seem to depend heavily on country context, but ethnic status and social trust emerge as significant region-wide. For demographic determinants, those with more education and who lived in urban areas favor immigration; while age has inconsistent effects across countries, and gender does not prove important to the region as a whole except for a few countries. With regards to views of globalization, East Asians who resist imported goods and believe in defending their way of life

also oppose immigration, while those with more engagement in global events have favorable views.

Fortunately, Chang and Welsh (2016) also include political attitudes in their research. However, this is the area where expected relationships were surprisingly debunked. For example, Japan is the only country where those who support democracy also support immigration. Japanese people who believe in diversity also have more favorable views of immigration. But in many countries, it is the opposite scenario. There is also considerable country to country variation when it comes to support for centralized leadership and immigration attitudes. Thus, the researchers recommend the need for more specific country analyses when it comes to political factors.

More recently, Shim and Lee (2018) move away from economic, social, and political determinants of immigration attitudes by focusing on the psychological dimension of risk preference. Utilizing the 2008 East Asian Social Survey – a collaborative project between China, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan – they hypothesize that those who are more open to taking risks will also be more supportive of immigration. They operationalize immigration in the East Asian context by focusing on attitudes toward foreign laborers. Except for China, the other three countries emerge as anti-immigrant, with more than half of South Korean and Taiwanese respondents wanting to decrease the migrant inflows. Japanese respondents prove to be the most risk-averse. Results suggest that those who believe in taking chances rather than leading a stable life, as well as those who prefer high-risk and high-return scenarios, are more likely to be pro-immigration. This is even more true for countries which have only recently started hosting migrants and immigrants, as they are relatively unfamiliar with out-group members.

Chang (2019) examines South Korea more closely using the 2010 Korean General Social Survey, revealing that socio-psychological concerns and macro-economic evaluations determine anti-immigrant attitudes in the country. Similar to results of studies in North American and European countries, these predictors include xenophobia, conceptual views of citizenship, and perception of immigration impact on the economy. The difference is drawn when policies have humanitarian dimensions, as Korean ethno-cultural views tend to moderate negative attitudes toward immigrants.

While there seems to be little interest so far in analyzing region-wide immigration attitudes, there are some single country studies in English on South Korea and Taiwan, with relatively more for Japan. Again, the assumption is that more research has been written in their

own languages, especially since some national surveys have included questions on migrant workers and immigration as early as the 2000s. In Taiwan, cultural proximity – and to a lesser extent – greater economic development, contribute to more positive views of migrants, with the Taiwanese being friendlier towards people from Japan, Europe, and North America, compared to those from South Korea, China, and Southeast Asian countries (Chen & Yi, 2013). In South Korea, evidence suggests that exclusivist definitions of nationality are more associated with those who believe that immigrants are a cultural threat, as opposed to an economic threat (Ha & Jang, 2014).

In general, anti-immigration attitudes are taken as given in Japanese society, but variation and conditionality has been found. Consistent with literature in other parts of the world, education leads to more favorable views toward immigrants for both cultural and economic reasons, and different types of natives also prefer different types of immigrants (Kage, Rosenbluth, & Tanaka, 2018). Contrary to labor market expectations, however, the Japanese tend to favor immigrant workers with higher status and willingness to assimilate, while country of origin only had significant effect among Korean workers over Chinese workers (Kobayashi, Collet, Iyengar, & Hahn, 2014).

Due to their increased international mobility, college students in Japan believe that foreign labor is important to economic development, leading them to be more accepting of migrant workers and their equal treatment with citizens (Wingate, 2012). In relation, Green and Kadoya (2013, 2015) assert that contact theory holds in Japan, where immigrant attitudes become more favorable as natives are more exposed to foreigners. This is largely dependent on English language conversation ability – also associated with more positive views toward out-group members. Regional variation occurs depending on the size of foreign population, while economic threat is insignificant compared to fear of cultural differences. Corroborating this and Shim and Lee's (2018) findings on risk preferences, Japanese citizens who are more risk-averse support immigration less. This is also true for those who are biased towards the status quo, have pessimistic views of the national economy, and have no personal contact with foreigners (Tomiura, Ito, Mukunoki, & Wakasugi, 2018).

In the first wide-scale experiment on information campaigns, two studies were conducted to test whether pro-immigrant information treatments can sway public opposition against immigration. First, they discover that positive information can indeed lead to an increase in immigration support and even encourage people to sign parliamentary petitions for friendlier

policies (Facchini, Margalit, & Nakata, 2016). Second, regarding the impact of certain demographic variables, results indicate higher baseline support for pro-immigration petitions among males, although treatment effects were significantly higher for females. And while there seems to be an age gap among males, with the older generation more supportive of immigration than the younger; for females, education has more impact and leads to higher support. These findings suggest that public opposition – especially among female voters – may be tempered if the government or certain organizations invest in information campaigns (Hiroyuki, 2017).

One study tests for whether or not greater immigrant presence influence Japanese voters to support the more conservative right-wing party, reporting mixed results (Iida, Matsubayashi, & Ueda, 2012). Although there is an existing body of research on immigration policies and political parties, only Chang and Welsh (2016) includes political attitudes as a predictor for immigration attitudes in East Asia. As immigration issues become more salient, and as policy discussions take center stage in East Asia, it is all the more imperative to study the relationship between political factors and immigration attitudes.

Chapter 4. Theoretical Framework

This study takes the position that political ideology on a left-right scale cannot be appropriated to the East Asian case. Citing Kinder (1998), Feldman (2003) asserts:

> "Although politicians, philosophers, and social scientists often discuss politics along a single left-right dimension, 50 years of research on public opinion show that a unidimensional model of ideology is a poor description of political attitudes for the overwhelming proportion of people virtually everywhere" (p. 76).

Unfortunately, ABS data does not have a measure for the left-right scale, and thus, this position cannot be properly tested before conducting this study's analysis. This is precisely because some proponents of the survey itself argue that there is no clear understanding of left and right among East Asians even if such self-proclaimed political parties do exist in some countries.

We also find support for not using a singular dimension of political ideology as a predictor for immigration attitudes in Hlavek's (2011) research, which uses the variables laissez-faire views, social traditionalism, and civic/national pride. He contends that for cross-national comparisons, the left-right index can be problematic because the understanding of what is left or right may vary from one country to another. In Wu (2017), one recommendation in dealing with the unidimensional model problem is to "directly measure the substance of left/right ideology rather than using it as it is" (p. 77).

Thus, in this study, instead of choosing political ideology per se as the explanatory variable, we use two political attitudes: defensive nationalism and social traditionalism. These are related to an existing theoretical perspective identified in literature – the significant influence of symbolic interests, such as values and personal identifications with a group, to the formation of opinions on immigrants and immigration (Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Additionally, we also include social trust – a belief that people in general are trustworthy – as a third explanatory variable, in light of its widely-accepted role as "the glue for more integrated and cooperative communities" (Herreros & Criado, 2009).

In political psychology, extensive research exists on the relationship between values and political attitudes (Feldman, 2003), and scholars have also proposed multidimensional models of political ideology by linking it with specific value systems (eg. Rokeach, 1973; Braithwaite, 1982). The most relevant would be the body of theories on the economic and social dimensions

of ideology (Feldman & Huddy, 2014). Schwarz (1994), one of the earlier proponents of this model, labels the two dimensions 'economic egalitarianism' and 'classical liberalism'. While economic egalitarianism "refers to whether the government should devote itself more to promoting equality by redistributing resources or to protecting citizens' ability to retain the wealth they generate in order to foster economic growth and efficiency" (p. 40); classical liberalism – the social dimension – "refers to whether government should devote itself more to guarding and cultivating individual freedoms and civil rights or to protecting the societal status quo by controlling deviance from within or enemies from without" (p. 39).

Some studies find evidence that in East Asia, the concept of cultural threat is more significant than economic threat when it comes to views of immigrants (eg. Green & Kadoya, 2013, 2015; Ha & Jang, 2014). The two-dimensional model previously described allows us to decompose the left-right spectrum and focus instead on classical liberalism, or the social dimension of political ideology. Two major theories can link nationalism – as part of this social dimension – with anti-immigrant attitudes.

4.1. Social Identity Theory

In 1979, Tajfel and Turner developed and introduced social identity theory (SIT), which later became one of the most prominent theoretical positions when it comes to the social psychology of intergroup behavior. Moving from earlier theories of identity shaped by mostly individual interactions, social identity is based on group membership, which can be an important source of pride and self-esteem. However, social groups are associated with either positive or negative value connotations, and thus, social identity is also evaluated as either positive or negative.

SIT identifies three cognitive processes that individuals go through in defining their in-group and out-group classifications. First, *social categorization* enables people to simplify reality by organizing individuals based on the group they belong to, and generally involves emphasizing similarities and differences between groups. Although someone can be part of several categories, one becomes more salient depending on the circumstances, drawing attention to the performative aspect of identity. During *social identification*, individuals adopt the identity of their group, such that they start being emotionally invested in being a part of collective, as well as acting like how a group member is expected to act. This is the stage when individuals' self-esteem becomes

bound to group membership. Because people want to maintain positive feelings about themselves, they will then resort to *social comparison* and measure their group against others. Eventually, negative feelings about the status of one's group can lead to social competition and prejudice.

Following Pedersen et al. (2005), we contend that national identity is a "specific form of social identity", where "the more strongly a person identifies with a particular group, the more that group and its relations with other groups will affect that person and direct his or her beliefs and behaviours" (p. 150). By itself, national identity does not necessarily lead to out-group rejection (Jeong, 2013), but some studies have linked heightened nationalism with prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Pedersen & Walker, 1997). There is also evidence that strongly identifying with one's in-group is correlated with negative evaluations of out-groups (Mummendy, Klink, & Brown, 2001). Thus, nationalism can conjure an image of who 'others' are, and serve as a natural divide between 'us' and 'them'.

For example, if language can be considered a boundary marker between nations, then people who believe that speaking their national language is a very important part of their identity, culture, and tradition and will hold those who do not speak it as 'others' (Barber et al., 2013; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014; Lubbers & Coenders, 2016).

4.2. Symbolic Politics Theory

Usually contrasted with self-interest, which is an instrumental approach to an individuals' goal attainments, symbolic politics theory (SPT) argues that "human beings are intensely concerned about remote and abstract political symbols, even though the emotional costs they pay and benefits they receive from such involvement are modest" (Sears, 1993, p. 113). Through the process of classical conditioning in early life, strong and stable reactions to symbols (could be images, people, words, etc.) – 'symbolic predispositions' – are formed, leading people to acquire racial prejudice and identify with certain political parties and ideologies.

Contending that previous literature has overlooked the importance of national symbols as an integral part of SPT, Jeong (2013) proposes to extend the theory to include 'national feelings', which may encompass similar but different concepts relating to nationalism, such as national identity and national pride. He reasons that often times, as "an object of strong allegiances…the nation itself serves as a political symbol which rivets citizens' attention and evoke strong

emotions" (Jeong, 2013, p. 1463). He adds that immigration is "expected to be strongly associated with what individuals feel about their nation", especially since immigrants are "outsiders in contexts where nationhood is the basis of self-categorisation and psychological attachment" (Jeong, 2013, p. 1463). He maintains that immigration attitudes are primarily conditioned by how an individual understands the meanings and symbols attached to his/her nation, such that he/she reacts negatively to those who seem to violate what a nation and/or people stand for. Thus, SPT can be theoretically linked to SIT, since the strength of the nation as a symbol is also anchored on the construction and adoption of an individual's identity in relation to the national group he/she belongs to.

Testing his argument with the 2004 General Social Survey, Jeong (2013) finds that different kinds of national feelings evoke different reactions to immigration. National pride, which is self-referential and not conditioned upon comparison with others, can lead to positive attitudes. However, nationalism, defined as "a feeling of superiority and contempt for foreigners", is inherently related to out-group derogation and does indeed contribute to anti-immigrant views. National identity, on the other hand, seems to be a neutral feeling.

4.3. Right-Wing Authoritarianism

Nationalism can be viewed as an ideology in itself – grounded in authoritarianism, strongly endorsed by conservatives (the right-aligned), and often involving the support of political leaders (Huddy & Khatib, 2007; Schatz, Staub, & Lavine, 1999). As established in this study's literature review, nationalism has long been associated with exclusivist worldviews and the conservative right (Fischer, 2009; Skenderovic, 2007).

Thus, nationalism can be related to the political-psychological concept of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), a type of personality that exhibits high degrees of three interrelated traits: conventionalism, or agreement with tradition and societal norms; submission to established authorities in society; and aggression in the name of authorities towards those who violate traditional norms (Altemeyer, 1981). Contemporary theoretical frameworks and expanding empirical evidence indicate that RWA can predict prejudice. In the context of immigration attitudes, natives with high RWA react unfavorably towards immigrants who deviate from cultural norms and whom they perceive to be threats to security and national

identity (Cohrs & Stelzl, 2010). However, some have criticized this unidimensional approach, arguing that although the three traits related, they are also distinct (Duckitt et al., 2010).

In line with these criticisms and my earlier contention that ideology in East Asia cannot be labeled as simply left or right, we only use the first component of RWA – conventionalism – as an explanatory variable. Duckitt et al. (2010) calls this 'traditionalism', which "expresses the value and motivational goal of maintaining traditional lifestyles, norms, and morality, and resisting "modern" liberal, secular, open lifestyles…likely to stem from threats of disruptive social changes…" (p. 691).

In this study, it is termed 'social traditionalism', and it is important in upholding social order and harmony in society. The logic is that prior to their assimilation and integration, immigrants will be seen as outsiders to a national community, and citizens who adhere more to society's conventions and traditions will tend to have less favorable views toward them as potential violators of the norm and bringers of different thoughts and beliefs.

4.4. Social Trust

Politicians and academics alike believe that national identity is a prerequisite for the kind of social trust and solidarity that building a democratic welfare state requires (Sandelind, 2012). It increases understanding among people who already have reasons to collectively define themselves as one group. However, social trust can either be *particularized* or *generalized*. According to Rothstein and Uslaner (2005), particularized trust is limited to people's in-group and is indicative of social strains, where each individual or group only serves its own interests and have little faith in the good intentions of others. Generalized trust, on the other hand, "links us to people who are different from ourselves" and "reflects a bond that people share across a society and across economic and ethnic groups, religions, and races" (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005, p. 45). Uslaner (2002) further argues that social trust has a moral foundation, wherein 'trusters' are compelled to treat strangers as if they are trustworthy, regardless if they share the same views on policy issues or ideology.

Herreros and Criado (2009) proposes that a 'social truster' is someone with 'social intelligence', "an individual who has learned to discern better which people are trustworthy" (p. 341). This can lead a person to trust strangers because he/she does not base his/her judgement anymore on racist or cultural stereotypes. Social trusters can then extend their trust to those who

are ethnically and/or culturally different from them, including immigrants. As generalized trust can reduce ethnocentrism, it can also serve as a foundation for multiculturalism (Kaltenthaler & Miller, 2013). If particularized trust and a strong national identity lead to social cohesion within a national community, generalized trust can be one of the key ingredients in promoting social cohesion within the same community even when a foreign population is present.

However, trust has also been associated with happiness and well-being, where 'winners' with higher socio-economic status – the wealthier and the more educated – can afford to risk trusting their interests to others (Inglehart, 1999; Putnam, 2000). In contrast, societal 'losers' who are poorer and more pessimistic about life can be less trusting and more suspicious of others. Consequently, social trust is higher in richer societies that have more equality (Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005).

4.5. *The Hypotheses*

Based on previous literature and the theoretical framework presented, three hypotheses are formulated:

H₁: Individuals who display higher degrees of defensive nationalism are less likely to support immigration.

H₂: Individuals who believe more in social traditionalism are less likely to support immigration.

H₃: Individuals who exhibit higher levels of generalized social trust are more likely to support immigration.

Chapter 5. Research Design

In this study, the relationship between the outcome of interest – support for immigration in three East Asian countries – and three key explanatory variables, including defensive nationalism, social traditionalism, and social trust, is explored. Using data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey (hereafter, ABS4), three kinds of logistic regressions are applied applied in the empirical analysis – binary, ordered, and multinomial.

5.1. The Data

The ABS4 is a cross-national, face-to-face representative survey under the supervision of the Center for East Asian Democratic Studies in National Taiwan University, with headquarters in Taipei, Taiwan. The fourth wave was conducted in 14 countries, including Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, between 2014 and 2016. A model ABS usually has a sample size of around 1,200 respondents, which will vary depending on a certain country's population. The total sample size for the three East Asian countries being studied is 3,938 respondents. Table 3 summarizes the sample and population sizes (at survey time), coverage areas, and survey administration dates for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan.

Table 3. Background Information on ABS Wave 4[6]

Country	Population Size	Sample Size	Coverage Areas	Survey Dates
Japan	126.9 million	1,081		January to March 2016
South Korea	50.42 million	1,200	all, except Jeju Island	October to December 2015
Taiwan	23.43 million	1,657	6 municipalities 3 cities 13 counties	June to November 2014

Since Wave 1 was conducted in 2001, this was the first time that a survey item on immigrants was added to the questionnaire under the section 'Globalization', suggesting that

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[6] Information is sourced from the Asian Barometer Survey website and the actual dataset. Data on coverage areas for Japan was unavailable at the time of writing.

immigration had just recently come to the forefront of relevant issues in East Asia. Unfortunately, it is also the only question on immigration. Although this dataset does not allow longitudinal analysis – which causes certain limitations and can reduce accuracy of estimation – we have only found one other study that has used the ABS4 to analyze public views of immigration. The difference between this paper and Chang and Welsh's (2016) is that we added social traditionalism as an explanatory variable, zoomed in on three countries only, and provided more context into each as we dug deeper into the histories of their immigration policies.

5.2. The Variables

Outcome Variable. In this study, the outcome variable is *Support for Immigration*, operationalized through survey item 169, which asks, *"Do you think the government should increase or decrease the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country?"* The possible valid answers for this question are the following: "increase the inflow", "maintain the current inflow", "reduce the inflow", or "should not allow any more immigrants".

Figure 8 illustrates *Support for Immigration* on an aggregate level, as well as in the three countries under analysis, according to respondents' answers to question 169. The legend 'NA' represents answers recoded as missing values, such as "do not understand the question", "can't choose", and "decline to answer". In total, most respondents would like to maintain the current inflow of immigrants (45.38%), but more than one-fourth (29.86%) would like to reduce it. Only 9.95% would like to increase the inflow, not that much higher than the 8.46% who do not want to allow any more immigrants entirely. In terms of missing values, 6.35% did not choose from any of the four valid answers, and Japan's 11.93% contributed most to this.

Surprisingly, Japan has the highest percentage (14.71%) of those who are pro-immigration, while Korea has the highest share of respondents who are anti-immigration (11.75%). Contrary to the other two countries, in Taiwan, the percentage of those who want to reduce immigrant inflow (42.67%) is higher than those who want to maintain it (36.03%).

Explanatory Variables. Among ideological attitudes, three are hypothesized to be able to predict support for immigration. The first one, *Defensive Nationalism* among respondents, is measured through survey item 167, which asks for the degree of agreement to the statement: *"Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries"*. This is in line with how nationalism has been defined in literature as uncritical

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support for the nation (Latcheva, 2009), as well as contempt for foreigners, and by extension, their way of life (Jeong, 2013). It also implies a more active approach to nationalism; but other statements, while similar, seem to be more related to national identity and/or national pride, which can then lead to positive or neutral immigration attitudes (Heinrich, 2018; Jeong, 2013).

Figure 8. Support for Immigration in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

Figure 9 shows the proportion of respondents' answers to item 167, on an ordered scale from "strongly agree", "agree", "disagree", to "strongly disagree". On the aggregate level, 9.78% strongly agreed and more than half expressed agreement (56.42%), while a quarter disagreed (25.42%), 2.92% strongly disagreed, and only 5.46% are missing values. It is noticeable that Taiwan has a higher percentage of strong agreement (12.31%) and agreement (71.82%) to the said statement compared to both Japan (8.97%, 47.64%) and Korea (7%, 43.08%), which might be connected to Taiwanese people's concern for the threat of Chinese invasion and how that might affect their democratic way of life.

Survey item 164, used to operationalize the second explanatory variable, *Social Traditionalism*, states: *"If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic"*. According to Altemeyer (1981) and Duckitt, et al. (2010), social traditionalism reflects

an individual's desire to uphold social order, harmony, and societal norms. Item 164 seems to be a better measurement of socially conventional ways of thinking, compared to other statements more related to support for militarism and authoritarianism. Figure 10 visualizes the distribution of answers by degree of agreement, and looks a bit similar to the graph for defensive nationalism. For all countries, 4.47% strongly agree, 44.18% agree, 34.66% disagree, 9.5% strongly disagree, and 4.19% are missing values. Japan has a higher share of people who strongly agree with a conventional mindset (9.62%) compared to Taiwan (7.30%) and Korea (5.75%), although Taiwan still has the highest proportion of those who agree (55.82%).

Figure 9. Defensive Nationalism in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

To measure *Social Trust*, the third explanatory variable, we rely on question 25: *"Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they get a chance, or would they try to be fair?"* Compared to other available questions that seek to measure trust, Uslaner (2002) argues that the dichotomous 'most-people' question is still more effective, as this extends trust to people in general, even if they are different from us. Figure 11 pegs the level of aggregate trust at 65.46%, more than the halfway mark, compared to 27.50% who are not trusting and 7.03% who either cannot decide, do not understand the question, or declined to answer. It also seems that

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Koreans are the least trusting among the three East Asian countries, with almost half of the respondents (44.83%) believing that other people will take advantage of them, as against the figures for the Japanese (19.43%) and the Taiwanese (20.22%).

Control Variables. Previous literature has cited demographics, education, macro-economic evaluation, and socio-economic backgrounds as significant to attitude formation, and thus, some are included here as control variables. Although results are not as stable across time as for other predictors, females, younger people, those who are more educated, and those who live in urban areas, are said to have more positive views on immigrants and immigration (Chang & Welsh, 2016; Ford et al., 2012; Kage at al., 2012; Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Hainmueller & Hiscoz, 2010; Quillian, 1995).

Figure 10. Social Traditionalism in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

Economic condition has been found to be a reliable predictor, especially a struggling economy that may lead to more negative views (Coenders, Lubbers, & Scheepers, 2008; Lahav, 2004; Lapinski, Peltola, Shaw, & Yang, 1997; Semyonov et al., 2008; Wilkes, Guppy, & Farris, 2008). In this study, however, *subjective* economic evaluations are utilized, as sometimes, people will believe more in what they already think regardless if it reflects reality. So if people *believe*

that their country's economic condition is good (even if it might not be), it is logical to assume that they will be more open to immigrants who pose the threat of labor competition and fiscal burden.

Figure 11. Social Trust in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan

In relation, household income will be used to proxy for social standing. It is an often-used indicator in literature (Cebuano & Escandell, 2010). Those in vulnerable conditions tend to have more unfavorable views of immigrants (Gorodzeisky & Semyonov, 2009; Kunovich, 2004; Quillian, 1995; Semyonov & Glikman, 2009; Semyonov et al., 2006, 2008; Schneider, 2008), so we can expect individuals with higher income to hold more positive attitudes.

Lastly, we control for another political attitude – the preference for democracy. Although there seems to be little research on the implications of democratic preference to immigration attitudes, the literature on democratic values – which can include political trust, political tolerance, and belief in legitimacy – suggests that the human rights of those who live in democracies are better protected (Norris, 1999; Peffley & Rohrschneider, 2003). Orcés (2009) theorize that "people who support a democratic culture understand the importance of protecting the rights of minorities", allowing "for a more accepting culture that, in turn, enhances the

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prospects for a stable democracy" (p. 146-147). His study also supports this claim. A summary of how variables have been operationalized is presented in Table A of the Appendix.

Multicollinearity. As there seems to be theoretical links between *Defensive Nationalism* and *Social Traditionalism*, it is important to check for multicollinearity, which occurs when explanatory variables are highly correlated, making it more difficult for regression models to estimate the relationship between them and the outcome variable. Table 4 presents a correlation matrix of study variables using Pearson's method, including p-values and variance inflation factors (VIFs). Correlations between *Support for Immigration* and other variables follow our hypotheses. For the two variables of concern, *Defensive Nationalism* and *Social Traditionalism,* correlation is low enough at 0.25. As multicollinearity causes variance inflation, another way of checking for it is to look at the VIF values of each variable. A value of 1 indicates no correlation to other variables, while values above 5 indicate more than moderate collinearity. Based on the table, we can say that the assumption of no multicollinearity among variables is upheld.

5.3. Graphical Analysis

Before any empirical analysis is done, it is useful to try to visualize the relationship between variables to see any patterns that may or may not back the hypotheses up. We use stacked bar plots to compare the percentage of the dependent variable across each level of every explanatory variable. Previously, the graph for *Support for Immigration* is presented with its four original categories (five, including missing values). In this section, however, these categories have already been collapsed into two, where the answers 'increase' and 'maintain' inflow of immigrants are taken to signify a 'pro-immigrant' stance, while 'reduce' and 'not allow' signal an 'anti-immigrant' position. Missing values have not been included in the following graphs.

Figure 12 shows the bivariate relationships on an aggregate level for all the countries under analysis. It seems that the three plots follow the three hypotheses, with defensive nationalism and social traditionalism having an inverse relationship with openness to or favorable views of immigration, while implying that social trust has a positive relationship with the latter. It can be noticed that for the *Defensive Nationalism* plot, the percentage of people who are pro-immigrant but strongly disagree with being nationalistic (67.86%) is slightly lower than for those who simply disagree (70.92%), when it is expected to be higher. It gives the impression

Table 4. Correlation Matrix of Study Variables

	SI	DN	STrad	STrust	G	A	E	R(U)	PD	EE	I	VIF
Support for Immigration	1											
Defensive Nationalism	-0.14***	1										1.07
Social Traditionalism	-0.14***	0.25***	1									1.08
Social Trust	0.04**	0.07***	-0.02	1								1.03
Gender	-0.06***	-0.04†	0.04**	0.01†	1							1.02
Age	-0.04***	0.04***	0.05	0.05***	0.02	1						1.34
Education	0.2*	-0.09***	-0.17***	0.05*	-0.10***	-0.45***	1					1.52
Residence (Urban)	0.11***	-0.14***	-0.1***	-0.06***	0.02	-0.03***	0.18***	1				1.06
Preference for Democracy	0.05**	-0.04*	-0.11***	0.02	0.01	0.10***	0.05**	0.04*	1			1.03
Economic Evaluation	0.06***	-0.01	0.01***	0.09***	-0.06***	0.05***	0.05*	-0.03*	-0.04	1		1.03
Income	0.16***	-0.1***	-0.08***	0.05	-0.03*	-0.21***	0.40***	0.14***	0.03*	0.11***	1	1.19

Note: † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

that people who disagree more with the statement on defensive nationalism are also more anti-immigrant, even if this is only due to the conversion of counts to percentage. If we look at the actual frequency of answers, the total number for respondents who answered 'strongly disagree' is so much lower (112) than those who disagree (963).

Figure 12. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Three Countries

In Figure 13, we can see that the three bivariate relationships in the Japanese context all follow expectations. People who expressed agreement with the statements on defensive nationalism and social traditionalism hold more anti-immigrant views, while those who are more trusting have more pro-immigrant views.

For Korea in Figure 14, relationships are not as clear. The first plot is similar to the one on the aggregate level, where conversion of counts to percentage has slightly distorted the otherwise straightforward inverse association between *Nationalism* and *Support for Immigration*. Instead of a gradual downslope, the plot for *Social Traditionalism* shows a modest but sudden drop from the two levels of agreement to the two levels of disagreement. For the first two explanatory variables, the assumptions are still supported, but with *Social Trust*, it seems that there is no difference between the immigration attitudes of people whether they believe that others will treat them fairly or not.

Figure 13. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Japan

Figure 14. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Korea

Compared to Japan, the Taiwan context in Figure 15 also does not show very clear relationships between variables, except for the moderately positive association between *Social Trust* and *Support for Immigration*. Again, due to the count to percentage conversion, it seems as if those who strongly disagree with being nationalistic are even more anti-immigrant than those who strongly agree. But in reality, only 10 respondents expressed strong disagreement, out of which six were anti-immigrant and four were not, explaining the large percentage. If not for the

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slightly distortion on the relative frequencies of *Social Traditionalism* and *Support for Immigration*, it can also be seen that they are inversely related.

Figure 15. Support for Immigration Across Explanatory Variables in Taiwan

5.4. Empirical Analysis

Whereas ordinary least squares (OLS) can be used for quantitative response variables, generalized linear models (GLM) are more suitable for categorical dependent variables. Specifically, this study applies a special case of GLM, the logistic regression model, to a dependent variable with binary outcomes. Naturally, a binomial distribution can be assumed. Thus, getting linear probabilities that may fall below 0 or above 1 is inappropriate for binary or categorical outcomes because probabilities should fall between 0 and 1. Instead of a line, more realistic response curves have an S-shape, and curvilinear relationships are described by the formula:

$$\log\left[\frac{P(y=1)}{1-P(y=1)}\right] = \alpha + \beta x,$$

wherein the ratio $P(y=1) / [1 - P(y=1)]$ equals the odds of getting either a 0 or 1. In fitting the model, software is used to transform original data onto the natural logarithmic scale, also called the logistic transformation or logit. An abbreviated model is written as $\text{logit}[P(y=1)] = \alpha + \beta x$ (Agresti, 2018).

Binary Logistic Regression. In this study, we regress a dummy for *Support for Immigration* – coded 1 for 'pro-immigrant' and 0 for 'anti-immigrant' – on three explanatory categorical variables – *Defensive Nationalism*, *Social Traditionalism*, and *Social Trust*, as well as seven control variables that include gender, age, years of education, location of residence, economic evaluation, preference for democracy, economic evaluation, and household income. After coding, the mean position for the dependent variable is around the halfway mark at 0.59 – meaning 59% of all respondents support immigration.

Among four regression models, the first and main model utilizes individual-level data from all three East Asian countries while controlling for country fixed effects using country dummy variables. The remaining three are country-specific models, with one each for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The multiple logistic regression equation for all models is expressed as:

$$\text{logit}[P(y = 1)] = \alpha + \beta_1 gender + \beta_2 age + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 residence +$$
$$\beta_5 economic\ evaluation + \beta_6 preference\ for\ democracy + \beta_7 income +$$
$$\beta_8 defensive\ nationalism + \beta_9 social\ traditionalism + \beta_{10} social\ trust,$$

with the addition of the country dummies for the pooled model.

For ease of interpretation, all the explanatory variables have been recoded. *Defensive Nationalism* and *Social Traditionalism* were both originally on a scale of 1 to 4, with 1 being 'strongly agree' and 4 as 'strongly disagree'. However, we had to reverse the scale prior to regression, such that 1 is now 'strongly disagree' and 4 is 'strongly agree'. *Nationalism* has a mean of 2.77, while *Social Traditionalism* is at 2.52, signifying that slightly more people lean towards agreement. With *Social Trust,* 'try to be fair' has been recoded to 1, while 'take advantage' is 0. The mean is now 0.70, that is: 70% of all respondents believe that most people will be fair to them.

For the demographic variable gender, 'female' is coded 1, while 'male' is coded 0, evenly distributed at a mean of 0.50. Consequently, the variable has been renamed *Gender (Female)* for clarity. *Age* ranges from the voting-eligible 19 to a ripe 96, with a mean of 50 years, following an almost normal distribution. In reality, though, there might be a lot more of the older people, as it has been previously established that East Asian countries have aging populations. *Education* is the total number of schooling years, with a minimum of 0, maximum of 27, and a mean of 12.65. The distribution implies that around half of the respondents had finished high school, while the other half had gone on to college or even completed graduate degrees. For the variable geographic location or residence, 1 equals those who live in urban areas (eg. the capital,

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megacities, regional centers and major cities), while 0 equals those who live in rural areas (eg. small cities, towns, villages and the countryside). This is renamed *Residence (Urban)*, where 67.8% of respondents do live in urban areas at survey time.

Economic Evaluation is a three-category variable, with people rating the overall economic conditions of their country, coded 1 if their answer is 'very good' and 'good', 0 if 'so-so (not good, nor bad)', and -1 for 'very bad'. The three countries are relatively prosperous compared to their neighbors, yet surprisingly, more than half (57.21%) rated their economy negatively, with only 13.72% having favorable views.

Likewise, the political attitude *Preference for Democracy* has three levels, 1 for those whose opinion comes closest to 'democracy is always preferable to any other kind of government', -1 for 'under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one', and 0 for 'it does not matter whether we have a democratic or nondemocratic regime'. Majority (60.08%) prefer democracy, around a quarter (23.02%) thinks that an authoritarian government can be preferable depending on the situation, while the remaining 16.9% believe that there could be no difference either way.

As a measure for social standing, *Income* is the gross total household earnings, which include wages, salaries, pensions, dividends, and other sources of money for all the people living with the respondent before taxes and other expenses have been deducted. we retain its original coding on a scale of five quintiles, with 1 representing the lowest 20% and 5 the top 20% of incomes depending on the country context. Among all the respondents, those who indicated their status as belonging to the first quintile is at 22.17%, peaking at 23.89% for the second quintile, and gradually dropping to 13.55% for the fifth and highest income group. Summary statistics for the binary logit regression model variables are presented in Table 5.

Ordered Logistic Regression. For robustness check, we also employ ordered logistic regression, an extension of binary logistic regression that can take on an ordinal response variable and multiple explanatory variables. Among four models built, the first one still utilizes pooled data while the remaining three corresponds to data for each of the three East Asian country. *Support for Immigration* was previously a binary response variable, where 'increase' and 'maintain' are lumped together in the 'pro-immigrant' category, while 'reduce' and 'not allow' are combined in the 'anti-immigrant' category. But one may wonder if 'maintain' can actually be considered a supportive stance towards immigration, or if it simply indicates partiality for the status quo, and maybe even neutrality towards the issue.

Table 5. Summary Statistics

Variable	Obs	Unit	Mean	St. Dev.	Min	Median	Max	NA
Support for Immigration	3,688	Binary	0.591	0.492	0	1	1	250
Gender (Female)	3,938	Binary	0.504	0.500	0	1	1	0
Age	3,938	Years	49.559	16.464	19	50	96	0
Education	3,867	Years	12.652	3.359	0	12	27	71
Residence (Urban)	3,938	Binary	0.678	0.467	0	1	1	0
Economic Evaluation	3,891	Categorical	-0.435	0.721	-1	-1	1	47
Preference for Democracy	3,745	Categorical	0.371	0.833	-1	1	1	193
Income	3,482	Categorical	2.772	1.341	1	3	5	456
Defensive Nationalism	3,723	Categorical	2.773	0.667	1	3	4	215
Social Traditionalism	3,773	Categorical	2.518	0.777	1	3	4	277
Social Trust	3,661	Binary	0.704	0.456	0	1	1	165

In line with this thought, a new three-level response variable is created, *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*, where 1 still refers to 'increase', 0 equals 'maintain', and 'reduce' and 'not allow' remain -1. For this variable y, the expression $P(y \leq j)$ denotes the probability that responses fall in category j or below. With three categories, the cumulative probabilities are:

$$P(y = 1), \qquad P(y \leq 2) = P(y = 1) + P(y = 2), \qquad and \; P(y \leq 3) = 1,$$

where 1 refers to the entire scale (as probabilities are always between 0 and 1), and the order of cumulative probabilities reflect how the response variable is ordered. This means that in the context of *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*, category 1 refers to 'reduce' and 'not allow' (coded -1), category 2 is 'maintain' (coded 0), and category 3 is 'increase' (coded 1).

As just another type of GLM that requires nonlinear regression, cumulative probabilities are necessarily transformed on a log scale. For this study, we use only one cumulative logit model that can simultaneously describe the effect of explanatory variables for each category of *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*. This can be expressed as

$$\text{logit}[P(y \leq j)] = \alpha_j + \beta_1 gender + \beta_2 age + \beta_3 education + \beta_4 residence \; +$$

$$\beta_5 economic \; evaluation + \beta_6 preference \; for \; democracy + \beta_7 income \; +$$

$$\beta_8 defensive \; nationalism + \beta_9 social \; traditionalism + \beta_{10} social \; trust, \qquad j = 1, 2, 3,$$

where β has the same value for all three categories that *j* represents. In other words, the model assumes that the effect of an explanatory variable is the same for each cumulative probability (Agresti, 2018).

To check whether this parallel regression or proportional odds assumption holds for our data, we use the 'brant' package in R, which calculates for the p-value in a brant test developed by Brant (1990). This works with the ordered logistic regression models in this study, as generated by the function polr() in the R package 'MASS'.

Multinomial Logistic Regression. Based on Figure 8 – the distribution for *Support for Immigration* – we can see that many respondents simply want to maintain the inflow of immigrants. As brought up previously, this might indicate either neutrality or status quo bias. Almost half of all respondents in Japan, Korea, and Taiwan would like to maintain the number of immigrants (48.45%). If we can assume that these respondents simply might not care about the issue that much, then we can also try to compare only the extreme categories for *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*: increase (10.63%) and reduce and not allow (40.92%). Thus, we can also use multinomial logistic regression for robustness checks.

This type of regression is also an extension of ordinary logit model for nominal or unordered response categories. Each category is paired with and compared to a baseline category, and coefficients estimate the odds of the outcome for one group instead of another (Agresti, 2018). With three categories, where the baseline group is the third and last one, the baseline-category logits are

$$\log\left[\frac{P(y=1)}{P(y=3)}\right] \quad \text{and} \quad \log\left[\frac{P(y=2)}{P(y=3)}\right].$$

For this study, where the baseline category is 0 or maintain the number of immigrants, the following expression can model the log odds that the response is *j* in *c* number of categories

$$\log\left[\frac{P(y=j)}{P(y=c)}\right] = \alpha_j + \beta_{jg}gender + \beta_{ja}age + \beta_{je}education + \beta_{jr}residence +$$

$$\beta_{jee}economic\ evaluation + \beta_{jpd}preference\ for\ democracy + \beta_{ji}income +$$

$$\beta_{jdn}defensive\ nationalism + \beta_{jstrad}social\ traditionalism + \beta_{jstrust}social\ trust,$$

with the addition of the country dummies for the pooled model.

Chapter 6. Results and Discussion

The estimated results of binary logistic regression for five models are reported in Table 6. The first one is a reduced model, showing only the coefficients and standard errors for the three explanatory variables without controls. Model 2 includes all variables and pooled data from all three countries, and we control for country fixed effects by including dummy variables for Japan, Korea, and Taiwan. The succeeding three models are country-specific.

6.1. Binary Logistic Regression

Defensive Nationalism. As one of the three key explanatory variables, *Defensive Nationalism* comes out significant for Models 1 (pooled data), 2 (Japan), and 4 (Taiwan), where we find a strong, negative relationship between it and the outcome variable. The estimated results are in line with the hypothesis that ceteris paribus, those who display higher degrees of nationalism are less likely to support immigration.

Interestingly, despite its negative sign, it is not significant at all in Model 3 (Korea). In the previous chapter, it has been observed that Korea has the lowest share of respondents who agree with defending their way of life instead of becoming like other countries. Based on literature and the history of immigration in Korea, given the citizens' resilient belief in a homogenous, mono-ethnic society despite signs of emerging multiculturalism, we would expect *Defensive Nationalism* to have a stronger negative relationship with *Support for Immigration*; compared to Taiwan, which has had longer exposure to foreign cultures than the former.

Social Traditionalism. In Models 1 to 3, *Social Traditionalism* is a significant predictor, and has a strong negative relationship with *Support for Immigration*. Holding other determinants constant, estimated results agree with the hypothesis that people who tend to be more conventional – that is, those who believe that having too many different ways of thinking will lead to a more chaotic society – are also less supportive of immigration. It is only in Model 4 (Taiwan) that *Social Traditionalism m* is not significant, and the sign is positive, not negative.

This does not mean that Taiwanese respondents are not traditional-minded per se – as the percentage of those who agree to the statement is actually higher than those who disagreed; but it does suggest that *Social Traditionalism* does not have a large impact on their decision to support immigration or not.

Social Trust. Thirdly, *Social Trust* is only highly significant in Japan (Model 2) among the three countries. In the Japanese context, the hypothesis that "people who exhibit higher levels of generalized trust are more likely to support immigration" is true. For the pooled data in Model 1, however, there exists only a weak positive relationship between *Social Trust* and the outcome variable, and it turns out that *Social* Trust is not a significant predictor at all for Korea and Taiwan. This slightly corresponds with the graphical analyses in the previous chapter, which shows that except for Japan, there is almost no difference between the proportions of respondents who support immigration according to their belief of how other people will treat them.

If social trust is indeed correlated with social standing and well-being (Inglehart, 1999; Putnam, 2000; Rothstein & Uslaner, 2005), then one possible explanation for this is that Japan exhibits more social trust because it has more people in the upper income range. A quarter of the Japanese respondents (25.2%) indicate that their household income in the top 20% of society, as against the share for Korea (9.37%) and Taiwan (10.09%).

Control Variables. With regards to controls in Model 1, *Education* and *Residence (Urban)* both have significantly positively relationships with *Support for Immigration*. Similar to literature in the West, those who have been educated longer and those who live in capital and major cities, regional centers, and other urban areas, hold more favorable views of immigrants. Surprisingly, *Age* does not seem to be an important factor in general, and is only significant in the Taiwanese context, where it follows the assumption that older respondents will be less open to immigration.

Contrary to expectations and to Western research, *Gender (Female)* has a marginally significant negative relationship with the outcome variable, which suggests that females have less positive views of immigrants compared to males. This is in line with Facchini et al.'s (2016) findings that males are more supportive of pro-immigration petitions, and might be partially explained by the fact that historically, there is more demand for foreign wives in East Asia compared to husbands. Interestingly, all four demographic variables are not significant in Japan. In Korea, only *Residence (Urban)* has weak significance, while in Taiwan (Model 4), the same demographic variable is the only one *not* significant.

Preference for Democracy is not significant in Model 1 and 4 (Taiwan), but it is significant in Model 2 (Japan) and 3 (Korea). In Japan, the assumption that people who prefer democratic governments to authoritarian ones will also be more open to immigration is followed (Orcés, 2009), while those who prefer democracy in Korea are actually more opposed to

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Table 6. Determinants of *Support for Immigration*

	Model 1 (Reduced)	Model 2 (Pooled)	Model 2 (Japan)	Model 3 (Korea)	Model 4 (Taiwan)
Gender (Female)		-0.145†	-0.103	0.019	-0.311**
		[0.08]	[0.202]	[0.135]	[0.119]
Age		-0.004	0.007	-0.001	-0.015**
		[0.003]	[0.007]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Education		0.071***	0.062	0.04†	0.078***
		[0.015]	[0.048]	[0.029]	[0.021]
Residence (Urban)		0.273**	0.171	0.687**	0.205†
		[0.093]	[0.21]	[0.215]	[0.123]
Preference for Democracy		-0.001	0.481***	-0.198*	0.031
		[0.048]	[0.127]	[0.079]	[0.069]
Economic Evaluation		0.106†	0.14	0.002	0.145*
		[0.056]	[0.142]	[0.113]	[0.075]
Income		0.092**	0.18*	0.150**	0.035†
		[0.034]	[0.077]	[0.058]	[0.052]
Defensive Nationalism	-0.396***	-0.284***	-0.489**	-0.157	-0.272*
	[0.057]	[0.066]	[0.153]	[0.097]	[0.118]
Social Traditionalism	-0.252***	-0.150**	-0.315*	-0.237**	0.039
	[0.048]	[0.055]	[0.124]	[0.09]	[0.091]
Social Trust	0.171*	0.163†	0.578**	0.017	0.124
	[0.078]	[0.089]	[0.222]	[0.133]	[0.145]
Japan		0.629***			
		[0.129]			
Korea		-0.402***			
		[0.103]			
Constant		0.511	0.813	-0.008	0.256
		[0.37]	[1.058]	[0.645]	[0.599]
N		2,955	655	1,046	1,254
Log Likelihood		-1,829.60	-318.239	-659.043	-821.899
AIC		3,685.21	658.478	1,340.09	1,665.80

Note: Standard errors in brackets.

† $p<0.1$, * $p<0.05$, ** $p<0.01$, *** $p<0.001$

immigrants. Except for Model 4, where Taiwanese respondents who evaluated their economy positively also did so for immigrants, it seems that *Economic Evaluation* does not play a very significant role in East Asian immigration attitudes. *Income* is positively significant across all models, although it has the least significance in Model 4 (Taiwan). This means that respondents with higher income are also more open to immigrants.

The Akaike Information Criterion (AIC) is an estimator of the quality or fit of the models, taking into consideration the sample sizes and degrees of freedom. The lower the number, the better the quality or fit is. Model 2's AIC of 658.478 suggests that it has the data and the model fits best the Japanese context compared to Models 3 and 4. It cannot be compared to the pooled data in Model 1 because of the large difference in sample size.

Predicted Probabilities. For logistic regression models, it is useful to illustrate results using predicted probabilities, as the log coefficients of variables are often difficult and confusing to interpret. On the basis of Model 1, we generate new data by holding the control variables constant, and use the predict() function in R to calculate probabilities for each category of the three key explanatory variables. *Age* and *Education* are held at their means, while all categorical variables are held at the median. It can be observed that the following plots confirm our hypotheses for the non-linear relationships between predictors and *Support for Immigration*.

Figure 16 shows the predicted probabilities with their 95% confidence intervals for *Support for Immigration* across the four categories of *Nationalism*. As agreement with defending their way of life increases – that is, as respondents become more nationalistic – the predicted probabilities that they will also support immigration decreases. From 0.72 for those who strongly disagree, it drops to 0.65 to those who disagree, 0.59 for those agree, and finally, at 0.52 for respondents who strongly agree. The difference of 0.2 between the first and last categories of agreement represents a moderately strong effect.

Similarly, Figure 17 shows a downward trend for the outcome variable across categories of *Social Traditionalism*. As respondents believe more and more that too many different ways of thinking lead to a chaotic society, *Support for Immigration* also decreases. From a high of 0.66 for people who strongly disagree, it falls to 0.62 for those who disagree, 0.59 for those who agree, and 0.55 for respondents who strongly agree.

Although regression results suggest that only a weak positive relationship exists between *Social Trust* and *Support for Immigration*, Figure 18 still shows that predicted probabilities for

the outcome variable go from 0.55 respondents who think people will take advantage of them to 0.59 for those who think they will be treated fairly by other people.

Figure 16. Defensive Nationalism and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration

6.2. Ordered Logistic Regression

We also run ordered logistic regression on a three-category outcome variable for the purpose of robustness checks. We use the Brant test first to see if the models violate the proportional odds or parallel lines assumption, and they all pass. This means that the coefficients for each explanatory variable are the same for every level of the outcome variable. Estimated results are reported in Table 7.

We find that while *Defensive Nationalism* and *Social Traditionalism* still have a very strong negative relationship with *Support for Immigration (Ordered)* in Model 1, as well as other models, *Social Trust* loses the slight significance it had in the binary logistic regression models. One possible explanation for this is the three-level response variable itself. For all countries, the percentage for respondents who answered that they want the number of immigrants to be increased is always the lowest among all categories. Interpreting those who answered they want the number to be maintained as neutral to immigration, and coding it as 0, leaves a very small

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Figure 17. Social Traditionalism and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration


Figure 18. Social Trust and Predicted Probabilities for Support for Immigration

Table 7. Determinants of *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*

	Model 1 (Reduced)	Model 2 (Pooled)	Model 3 (Japan)	Model 4 (Korea)	Model 5 (Taiwan)
Gender (Female)		-0.193**	-0.231	0.004	-0.358**
		[0.073]	[0.163]	[0.126]	[0.113]
Age		-0.002	0.010*	-0.0003	-0.014**
		[0.003]	[0.006]	[0.005]	[0.005]
Education		0.083***	0.087**	0.061*	0.076***
		[0.014]	[0.038]	[0.028]	[0.02]
Residence (Urban)		0.263**	0.14	0.573**	0.239*
		[0.087]	[0.172]	[0.213]	[0.117]
Preference for Democracy		-0.002	0.387***	-0.128†	-0.009
		[0.044]	[0.114]	[0.072]	[0.066]
Economic Evaluation		0.066	0.007	0.007	0.109
		[0.051]	[0.11]	[0.105]	[0.071]
Income		0.077**	0.150**	0.082	0.06
		[0.031]	[0.062]	[0.055]	[0.049]
Defensive Nationalism	-0.352***	-0.244***	-0.377***	-0.163†	-0.219*
	[0.053]	[0.06]	[0.123]	[0.091]	[0.112]
Social Traditionalism	-0.302***	-0.213***	-0.408***	-0.284***	0.029
	[0.046]	[0.05]	[0.098]	[0.085]	[0.086]
Social Trust	0.198**	0.13	0.244	0.067	0.116
	[0.073]	[0.082]	[0.195]	[0.125]	[0.139]
Japan		0.651***			
		[0.111]			
Korea		-0.226*			
		[0.097]			
Cut point 1 (-1|0)	-1.994***	-0.260	-0.689	-0.182	-0.049
	[0.18]	[0.340]	[0.847]	[0.615]	[0.572]
Cut point 2 (0|1)	0.589***	2.498***	2.39**	3.013***	2.237***
	[0.17]	[0.343]	[0.853]	[0.623]	[0.576]
N		2,955	655	1,046	1,254

Note: Standard errors in brackets.
† p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

number of respondents who are can actually be called 'pro-immigration'. Another plausible explanation is that trust in East Asia is limited to its citizens, and is not generalized to include all people.

As for controls, *Education* and *Residence (Urban)* retain their significance and a positive relationship with the outcome variable. *Gender (Female)* comes out with a stronger negative relationship to *Support for Immigration (Ordered)* compared to the previous models.

6.3. Multinomial Logistic Regression

Aside from ordered logistic regression, we also run multinomial logistic regression on *Support for Immigration (Ordered)*, used to model nominal outcome variables with more than two levels. In Table 8, we see that we still have five models – reduced, pooled, Japan, Korea, and Taiwan, with the estimated results presented in that order. The first column under each model, labelled 'anti', represents the coefficients for those who answered "reduce" and "not allow" any more immigrants; while the second column refers to those who answered "increase" the number of immigrants, and is labelled 'pro'. Here, we set the answer "maintain" as our baseline, which means that we compare the odds of being either pro-immigrant or anti-immigrant to the odds of being neutral to or supportive of the status quo.

We find the results consistent with the estimates of binary logistic regression, and also with the three hypotheses in Models 2 (pooled) and 3 (Japan). For example, in Model 2 with the pooled data, an increase in the log-odds of *Defensive Nationalism* is associated with an increase in the log-odds of respondents being anti-immigrant and a decrease in the log-odds of respondents being pro-immigrant, against that of being neutral. This is the same case for *Social Traditionalism* – where the more that a respondent agrees with being traditional, the more that they will also be anti-immigrant. On the other hand, an increase in the log-odds of *Social Trust* is associated with a decrease in the log-odds of respondents being anti, and an increase in them being pro, against that of being biased to the status quo. This is the same for Model 3 (Japan), and is significant in either one of the columns for pro and anti. In Model 4 (Korea), however, results are significant only for *Social Traditionalism*, just like in Table 6. Similarly, in Model 5 (Taiwan), results are significant only for *Defensive Nationalism*.

Table 8. Determinants of *Support for Immigration (Ordered)* [Multinomial Regression]

	Model 1		Model 2		Model 3		Model 4		Model 5	
	(Anti)	(Pro)	(Anti)	(Pro)	(Anti)	(Pro)	(Anti)	(Pro)	(Anti)	(Pro)
Gender (Female)			0.088	-0.348**	0.018	-0.420†	-0.028	-0.063	0.226†	-0.451**
			(0.083)	(0.130)	(0.207)	(0.232)	(0.138)	(0.253)	(0.125)	(0.212)
Age			0.005	0.004	-0.005	0.012	0.001	0.001	0.014**	-0.005
			(0.003)	(0.005)	(0.007)	(0.008)	(0.006)	(0.010)	(0.005)	(0.008)
Education			-0.061***	0.057*	-0.042	0.095†	-0.039	0.086	-0.075***	0.019
			(0.016)	(0.025)	(0.049)	(0.053)	(0.030)	(0.057)	(0.022)	(0.035)
Residence (Urban)			-0.260**	0.071	-0.167	0.029	-0.748***	-0.415	-0.155	0.263
			(0.097)	(0.152)	(0.215)	(0.245)	(0.225)	(0.420)	(0.130)	(0.219)
Preference for Democracy			0.006	0.035	-0.455***	0.150	0.225**	0.253	-0.068	-0.181
			(0.049)	(0.078)	(0.131)	(0.181)	(0.080)	(0.155)	(0.073)	(0.115)
Economic Evaluation			-0.124*	-0.111	-0.180	-0.199	0.008	0.084	-0.168*	-0.123
			(0.058)	(0.089)	(0.145)	(0.154)	(0.115)	(0.212)	(0.078)	(0.130)
Income			-0.091**	0.001	-0.171**	0.087	-0.187**	-0.322**	-0.004	0.157†
			(0.035)	(0.052)	(0.078)	(0.087)	(0.060)	(0.109)	(0.055)	(0.086)
Defensive Nationalism	0.400***	0.020	0.275***	-0.065	0.465**	-0.101	0.146	-0.082	0.287*	0.080
	(0.059)	(0.089)	(0.068)	(0.101)	(0.156)	(0.172)	(0.099)	(0.180)	(0.124)	(0.191)
Social Traditionalism	0.191***	-0.346***	0.094†	-0.320***	0.217†	-0.478***	0.184**	-0.459**	-0.037	0.011
	(0.050)	(0.078)	(0.057)	(0.085)	(0.127)	(0.137)	(0.092)	(0.175)	(0.096)	(0.149)
Social Trust	-0.129	0.258†	-0.160†	0.008	-0.665**	-0.437	0.018	0.332	-0.111	0.067
	(0.081)	(0.135)	(0.092)	(0.149)	(0.230)	(0.274)	(0.136)	(0.251)	(0.153)	(0.260)
Japan			-0.500***	0.826***						
			(0.132)	(0.186)						
Korea			0.525***	0.810***						
			(0.107)	(0.183)						
Taiwan (intercept)	-1.706***	-0.947***	-0.398	-2.077***	-0.641	-1.803	0.291	-0.939	-0.172	-2.206*
	(0.196)	(0.280)	(0.382)	(0.580)	(1.082)	(1.195)	(0.663)	(1.227)	(0.631)	(1.015)
AIC	6,243.841	6,243.841	5,310.352	5,310.352	1,186.112	1,186.112	1,812.886	1,812.886	2,290.512	2,290.512

Note: Standard errors in brackets, † p<0.1, * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001

Chapter 7. Conclusion

As immigration takes center stage among social and political issues faced by governments across the globe, it is imperative for scholars and policy makers alike to study how preferences towards immigrants and immigration are shaped. However, research on immigration attitudes has been focused on traditional settler societies in Northern America, Australia and New Zealand, as well as Western Europe. Although at present, Asia has the largest inward and outward migration flows among world regions, not much mainstream attention has been given to it. Specifically, East Asian countries suffer from the demographic problems of low fertility rates, an aging population, and a dwindling labor force, and they are slowly turning to immigration as a slow but future-looking solution – but not without resistance from their publics.

Previous studies have found that cultural threats are indeed more salient in East Asia than economic threats. Thus, in this thesis, we attempted to bridge the gap in literature by focusing on the ideological determinants of support for immigration in Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan. Using data from the fourth wave of the Asian Barometer Survey, we employ binary logistic regression and ordered logistic regression to find the relationship between the said outcome variable and key explanatory variables: defensive nationalism, social traditionalism, and social trust.

Through graphical and empirical analyses, we find that defensive nationalism and social traditionalism have a strong, negative relationship with support for immigration, while social trust has a weak, positive relationship with support for immigration. The results confirm the hypotheses in this study, that as people become more nationalistic and conventional, they will support immigration less; and as they trust other people more, they will also support immigration more. These findings might be important starting points for policymakers and immigration advocates in East Asia, as they continue to study which solutions might be more effective in reducing xenophobia, prejudice and racial discrimination in their societies.

Among the three countries included in this study, the explanatory variables seem to have the strongest relationship with support for immigration among Japanese respondents. This is a crucial point in light of the recent developments in the immigration context of Japan, where for the first time, a law inviting and allowing low-skilled foreign laborers to legally work in the country has been passed just last April 2019. Despite decades of calling for this kind of

legislation, many still criticized the move by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe's government due to its hasty nature and not being comprehensive enough to address issues of social inclusion.

In Korea, results suggest that social traditionalism has the strongest relationship with support for immigration between explanatory variables. It would be interesting to probe why defensive nationalism and social trust is not significant in Korea, and how it might be connected with the unceasing rift between the north and the south. Another question related to this, is why is social trust low in Korea in general?

Among countries, the hypotheses seem to fit Taiwan the least, although defensive nationalism has weak significance. It is highly possible that this has something to do with its unstable and possibly volatile relationship with China, whose citizens have been the subject of discrimination as neither 'Taiwanese' nor 'foreigners'. Thus, instead of adherence to tradition or lack of trust in others, it might be their concern for defending their way of life that drives their reactions to immigrants and immigration.

Research Limitations. Limitations of this study include the use of cross-sectional data, which in this case, is inevitable when dealing with the ABS4 because immigration as an issue was only recently introduced among survey items. Previous research had advocated for the use of panel data to account for possible trends over time (eg. Ceobanu & Escandell, 2010; Hainmueller & Hopkins, 2014). Another limitation related to the cause of the first is the aggregation of immigrants into one category, instead of dividing it into two based on skill (high and low) or racial/regional groupings, something that Ford (2011) labels as a "serious methodological shortcoming" (p. 1017).

Recommendations. Thus, it is highly recommended that future studies be able to circumvent these limitations by using additional international datasets and surveys (eg. World Values Survey), as well as national surveys from East Asian countries (eg. Japanese General Social Survey, Korean General Social Survey, Taiwan Social Change Survey, etc.) to see patterns over time. We also recommend testing the explanatory variables used in this thesis for all Asian countries to see how the results compare and contrast across different regions.

Compared to experimental studies or randomized controlled trials, causal inference is difficult to arrive at with most survey and observational data. Consequently, this study does not propose to claim causality, but merely point out relationships between political attitudes, social trust and support for immigration.

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Appendix

Table A. Operationalization of Variables

Variables	Coding
Support for Immigration	**Positive attitude to immigration.** "Do you think the government should increase or decrease the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country?" Coded 1 if respondents answered 'increase' or 'maintain' (pro-immigration), and 0 if they answered 'reduce' or 'not allow' (anti-immigration).
Support for Immigration (Ordered)	**Positive attitude to immigration.** "Do you think the government should increase or decrease the inflow of foreign immigrants into the country?" 1: 'increase'; 0: 'maintain'; -1: 'reduce' or 'not allow'.
Defensive Nationalism	**Will to defend way of life in one's country.** Degree of agreement with the statement, "Our country should defend our way of life instead of becoming more and more like other countries". 1: 'strongly disagree'; 2: 'disagree'; 3: 'agree'; 4: 'strongly agree'.
Social Traditionalism	**Belief in upholding societal norms.** Degree of agreement with the statement, "If people have too many different ways of thinking, society will be chaotic". 1: 'strongly disagree'; 2: 'disagree'; 3: 'agree'; 4: 'strongly agree'.
Social Trust	**General trust in people.** "Do you think most people would try to take advantage of you if they get a chance, or would they try to be fair?" Coded 1 if respondents answered 'try to be fair', and 0 if they answered 'take advantage'.
Gender (Female)	**Gender.** Coded 1 if respondents are male, and 0 if female.
Age	**Age in years.**
Education	**Total years of education.**
Residence (Urban)	**Type of residence.** Coded 1 if respondents live in a 'capital city or megacity'/ 'regional center or other major cities' (urban), and 0 if they live in a 'small city or town' / 'village or countryside' (rural).
Preference for Democracy	**Political attitude with regards to government preference.** The question asks which statement comes closest to the respondents' opinions. 1: 'democracy is always preferable to any other kind of

	government'; 0: 'it does not matter whether we have a democratic or nondemocratic regime'; -1: 'under some circumstances, an authoritarian government can be preferable to a democratic one'
Economic Evaluation	**Current evaluation of economic condition.** "How would you rate the overall economic condition of our country today?" 1: 'very good' or 'good'; 0, so-so (not good and not bad); -1: 'bad' or 'very bad'.
Income	**Income level in quintiles.** 1: lowest; 2: low; 3: middle; 4: high; 5: highest.
Japan	**Country dummy.** Coded 1 if respondents are from Japan, and 0 if not.
Korea	**Country dummy.** Coded 1 if respondents are from South Korea, and 0 if not.
Taiwan	**Country dummy.** Coded 1 if respondents are from Taiwan, and 0 if not.