Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

Vol. 55 • No. 1 • March 2019

Editor-in-Chief
Chien-wen Kou
National Chengchi University

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, TAIPEI, TAIWAN (ROC)

World Scientific

Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

Vol. 55 • No. 1 • March 2019

Editor-in-Chief
Chien-wen Kou
National Chengchi University

INSTITUTE OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
NATIONAL CHENGCHI UNIVERSITY, TAIPEI, TAIWAN (ROC)

World Scientific

Issues & Studies (IS)

Subscriptions, changes of address, single-copy orders should be addressed to Journal Department, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., 5 Toh Tuck Link, Singapore 596224, or World Scientific Publishing Co, Inc, 27 Warren Street, Suite 401-402, Hackensack, NJ 07601, USA or 57 Shelton Street, Covent Garden, London WC2H 9HE, UK.

Articles and books for review should be sent to *Issues & Studies*, Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, No. 64, Wanshou Road, Wenshan District 116, Taipei City, Taiwan (ROC).

ROC Government Information Office, Certificate of Publishing Business Registration, No. 0999. Taipei Post Office, Chunghwa Post, Certificate of Journal Registration, No. 1029.

Typeset by Stallion Press
Email: enquiries@stallionpress.com

Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

Vol. 55, No. 1 **March 2019**

CONTENTS

Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs
Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2019) 1950001 (26 pages)

DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500012

Democracy in Myth: The Politics of Precariatization in South Korea

JI-WHAN YUN

After undergoing a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the 2016–2017 candlelight protests that led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye, many commentators in South Korea are confident that their country has become a land for what Karl Marx called "free men." Korean citizens are portrayed as being ready to participate in voluntary political associations and collective actions and to pursue their interests in the public sphere. However, the data are showing the opposite to be true: citizen participation in public-sphere activities has substantially decreased since the mid-2000s, while the government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness during the same period. Explaining the unnoticed background to this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the myth of the benefactor state in Korean democracy, arguing that this has emerged because neoliberalism has not only placed an increasing number of people in precarious positions but also neutralized them politically. The Korean government has capitalized on this situation to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. By investigating the period of Park's presidency (2013–2017) and the current rule of President Moon Jae-in (2017–), this essay shows how the myth of the benefactor state has emerged and created a unique cycle of Korean democracy.

KEYWORDS: Precariatization; the benefactor state; democracy; myth; South Korea.

* * *

Korea has undergone a series of mass demonstrations during the past three decades, including the June democratic uprising and the great workers' struggle in 1987, the anti-American rallies in 2002, the protests against beef imports from the United States in 2008, and the candlelight protests against President Park Geun-hye in 2016–2017. Many commentators in South Korea (hereafter, Korea)

JI-WHAN YUN (尹智煥) is an Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science at Ewha Womans University. His research interests are political economy, labor politics, contentious politics and radical democracy theory. He can be reached at <jiwhanyun@gmail.com>.

have observed a historical continuity among these events. This continuity has been created by proactive citizens, or what Karl Marx called "free men," who have long accumulated people power through associational and participatory activities in public spheres. At the 30th Anniversary of the 1987 uprising on June 10, 2017, President Moon Jae-in declared that the 2016 candlelight protests had completed the goals that the 1987 uprising had left unrealized. He stated, "our heroic citizens did not stop at achieving direct presidential elections in 1987, but have continuously struggled for freedom of speech, the creation of voluntary civil associations, and the expansion of democratic space within our society" ("President Moon Vows," 2017). Scholarly opinions have not differed from Moon's. They have analyzed how politically astute citizens have consistently developed street protests into a democratic norm (S. C. Kim, 2012) and candlelight vigils as an effective repertoire with which they can fight political injustice (J. H. Cheon, 2017).

Has Korea indeed become a land for free men since its democratization in 1987? Have the past decades witnessed the steady growth of proactive citizens who seek "genuine bonds between men" without being captured by "egoism" and "selfish need" or submitting to "a world of atomistic individuals who are inimically opposed to one another" (Marx, 1843/1978)? If there are free men in Korea, are they ready to voice their opinions in the public sphere by participating in voluntary political associations such as trade unions and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) or by engaging in collective actions against the government?

Unfortunately, such political drama as the 2016 candlelight protests often masks deeper realities. According to Figure 1, which illustrates the Democracy Barometer's measurements of the participation of citizens in public-sphere activities, Koreans were once willing to construct a land for free men through struggle, but are not as willing now. Participation in unions has declined since its peak in 1990. NGO activities increased remarkably between 1995 and 2000, yet have rapidly weakened since. Korea has faced a dilemma of "civil movements without citizens" (H. S. Kim, 2006). Despite the gradual increase in the number of NGOs, NGOs have had difficulty recruiting members. Petitions and demonstrations also dropped in the 2000s.

In contrast, the Korean government has managed to improve or at least maintain its political responsiveness. The assessments of several international organizations are helpful for understanding this point. While warning of a trend of democratic recession across the globe, the Democracy-in-Decline school has defined Korea's situation as remaining "free" (Diamond & Plattner, 2016). This appraisal is shared by several other international institutions. Freedom House's seven-point scale of political rights measures the electoral process, political pluralism, participation, and the functioning of



Note: Activities through trade unions = degree of economic-interest associations (trade union density + membership in professional organizations); Activities through NGOs = degree of public-interest associations (membership in humanitarian organizations + membership in environmental/animal rights organizations).
Source: Democracy Barometer (http://www.democracybarometer.org).

Figure 1. Measuring the public-sphere activities of South Korean citizens: Trade unions, civil associations, rallies and petitions.

government with a score of 1 meaning "most free." Korea received a score of 1 from 2010 to 2013, but was rated at 2 from 2014 to 2017.[1] The World Bank's Governance Indicators range from −2.5 (weak) to 2.5 (strong), and while they show that there have been ups and downs in its democratic performance, Korea has yet to receive a negative score.[2]

Much of the research has viewed the recent imbalance between the state and civil society in public sphere activities as an incomplete consolidation of Korean democracy (e.g., Hayashi, 2010; Mobrand, 2018; Shin, 2012). Some have claimed that Korea has not completely departed from a legacy of state intervention in the economy that began with its catch-up industrialization in the postwar period. Others have explained that Confucian norms against individualism have prevented Korean democracy from working properly. Finally, this imbalance has been ascribed to legal and institutional arrangements in Korea that exclude the political participation of disadvantaged

[1]See the website of Freedom House <https://freedomhouse.org/>.

[2]See the website of Worldwide Governance Indicators <http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/#home>.

citizens. However, any simplification of this imbalance as the resilience of state dominance cannot account for why citizens were once enthusiastic about political participation and have now become apathetic. More theoretically, it is necessary to discuss how the state and society have interacted in the past decade.

Explaining an unnoticed but crucial background for this imbalance, this essay sheds light on the emerging myth of the *benefactor state* in Korean democracy. It argues that the government has managed to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable moral sincerity and an administrative capacity to take care of all its citizens. This argument draws upon Marx's observation of the relative autonomy of the state in *The Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte* and elsewhere. In his writings, the state is depicted as an instrument for bourgeois interests but, simultaneously, as being capable of constructing an independent character and image from the ruling class in certain class conditions. The Bonapartist state ardently pursued autonomy from the ruling class and parliament, assuming the role of an impartial arbiter that could address the different aspirations and fears of all classes during a time of economic crisis. Likewise, the benefactor state in Korea has aimed for the construction of moral hegemony based on leadership, goodwill, and compassion in favor of the whole society rather than simply extending welfare programs or protecting economic interests.

Korea's neoliberalism has contributed to the rise of its benefactor state in two ways. One is the growing number of people who are placed in precarious working conditions, or *precariatization* (Standing, 2016). In addition to the end of the country's hyper-growth, Korea's neoliberal reforms have changed previously guaranteed employment conditions into underpaid and insecure jobs, preventing people from acquiring or maintaining proletarian positions. Many precarious people have been either laid-off, forced to retire early, or stripped off their job security, making it difficult to construct a proletarian identity. The other effect of neoliberalism has been the political *neutralization* of precarious people. They have retreated from the public sphere and have instead prioritized the stability of their livelihoods. Precarious citizens have individualized their social problems and assumed that the state will protect or, at least, not infringe upon their subsistence-based lifestyles. The government has made use of these conditions by "appearing as the patriarchal benefactor" (Marx, 1852/1963). It has repeatedly managed to produce slogans that have reached the maximum number of citizens, including precarious ones.

Additionally, this essay shows that a cyclical trajectory of democratic politics is likely to emerge in Korea because politics has evolved around the question of whether the government is sincere about protecting the subsistence economies of its

citizens. Overall, Korean democracy has remained stable because citizens have held vague expectations of government benevolence while the government has in turn shown a commitment to the security of their livelihoods. However, political resistance becomes inevitable when the benefactor state "cannot give to one without taking from another" (Marx, 1852/1963), negating its sincerity by pushing forward neoliberal reforms. When the state turns to repackaging neoliberal policies as *minsaeng* programs and its image as a benefactor state comes under suspicion, people begin to engage in widespread frustration, public cynicism, and even mass protests. The remainder of this essay shall explain the emergence of the myth of the benefactor state under precariatization and the resulting dynamics of state–society relations in Korea from Park's presidency (2013–2017) to the current rule of President Moon (2017–).

Precariatization and the Benefactor State in South Korea

In the past, Korea was a country of "swifter, more abrupt and more intensive proletarianization" than others (Koo, 1990). Jobs were abundant, and the growing number of workers constructed a distinct proletarian identity with the help of labor unions. However, this landscape has dramatically changed in recent decades. The end of the country's hyper-growth has limited the pace of proletarianization. Not only has the overall demand for labor shrunken substantially, but so has employment in manufacturing sectors. Consequently, Korean workers began to suffer from such problems as slow wage growth, employment stagnation, and job insecurity throughout the 1990s, and such problems have become almost chronic since the 2000s (Table 1). More importantly, the neoliberal transformation of the economy has resulted in

Table 1.
Labor Market Performances in Korea (1980s–)

	1980s	1990s	2000s	2001–2005	Avg.
Income growth indicators					
GDP growth %	9.5	7.3	4.3	3.0	6.5
Wage growth %	8.2	10.5	4.8	1.3	6.9
Employment security indicators					
Employment growth %	3.2	1.6	1.2	1.6	1.9
Share of employment in industry	30.7	32.1	26.3	24.7	29.0
Share of non-regular employment	31.4	35.1	40.7	38.2	36.1

Note: Sources are from OECD Statistics (http://stats.oecd.org); World Bank Open Data (https://data.worldbank.org); Gyeongjehwaldong-ingujosa [Survey on the economically active population] (http://kostat.go.kr/portal/korea/kor_nw/2/3/2/index.board).

precariatization. While proletarianization is the ongoing absorption of the working population into modern business organizations and their acquisition of a distinct identity and organizational power, precariatization can be defined as the opposite (Standing, 2016): increasing numbers of (1) workers were deprived of the opportunity to maintain job positions, (2) people were blocked from entering labor markets or developing careers in companies, and (3) workers were hired but marginalized and discriminated in terms of working conditions and employment security.

Most small shopkeepers in urban areas fit into the first type of precarious people mentioned previously. They were once within the working class but have now been crowded out from workplaces as the result of employment reductions (Yun, 2011). Particularly, there has been a sharp increase in the proportion of small shopkeepers aged 40–50 years. For them, opening a business was an impromptu decision after being laid off or retiring early. The establishment of their new businesses was not supported by sufficient market information or managerial know-how, resulting in the very low marginal profits of small shopkeepers and a serious gap between small and large firms in productivity (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development [OECD], 2009). These businesses are also very short-lived, surviving for an average of three to five years (Special Committee for Small- and Medium-sized Business, 2005).

The second segment of precarious workers refers to *discouraged workers* who abandon efforts to find new employment in the face of limited opportunities and poor working conditions (Yun, 2012). This type of precarious people includes young women and college students. Many young women have had to settle for jobs at relatively smaller firms and found salaries and advancement opportunities to be unsatisfactory, deciding to leave labor markets and become homemakers. Likewise, college students no longer enjoy an abundance of job opportunities. Some of them have remained unemployed after graduation. Others have intentionally delayed the completion of their undergraduate studies to avoid pending difficulties in labor markets and continue to rely on financial support from their families.

The final type of precarious workers consists of non-regular workers who have been deprived of their proletarian identity and power. Korea is one of several major industrialized economies that have highly expanded their non-regular workforce during the past decades. For example, Korea's share of temporary workers has become the second largest (28.8% in 2006), after Spain in 2005 and has had the swiftest increase among the OECD countries (Grubb, Lee, & Tergeist, 2007). This is not only due to radical measures taken by industries to reduce production costs, but also due to the government's neoliberal reforms. The government has revised the Labor Standard Act, the Workers Dispatch Law, and the Part-Time Workers Law to provide employers

more leeway in expanding indirect employment. Although the share of non-regular workers has dramatically increased, these workers have remained disorganized. During the period between 2007 and 2015, less than 5% of non-regular workers held union membership (Cheong, 2006).

While some may interpret the rapid development of precariatization as merely the emergence of class contentions, there has been an observable political neutralization of precarious people. A closer observation of their lifestyles suggests that the majority have more concerned with refashioning their lifestyles to a neoliberal model of labor markets and stabilizing their subsistence than banding together to call for the institutional reform of labor markets (C. W. Park, 2004).

For example, the more shopkeepers are plagued by excessive competition and the abusive power of large firms, the more dependent they become on financial resources in individual households, an unpaid family workforce, and tax avoidance techniques (K. A. Kim & Hahn, 2011). During their school years, students make use of universities to acquire good "spec(s)," a Korean–English abbreviation of the word "specifications." Specs include good grades, a high TOEFL (Test of English as a Foreign Language) or TOEIC (Test of English for International Communication) score, internships and student exchange experiences in foreign countries, any of which can be required for certain jobs. Finally, the relatively older and less-educated have continued to accept non-regular positions. Approximately 50% of non-regular workers have accepted their status voluntarily, while more than 75% of involuntary non-regular workers have signed contracts due to an immediate need for an income (OECD, 2012).

The individualization of subsistence-related problems has been the key reason for the political neutralization of precarious people. It must be equally emphasized that trade unions and NGOs have also failed to draw these people into public spheres and to politicize their concerns through institutional channels. Though these organizations have raised issues of precariatization in rallies and petitions, this does not indicate that they have actual connections to the precariat. Unions have not made significant efforts to incorporate non-regular workers into their organizations. Less than 5% of non-regular workers possessed a union membership from 2007 to 2015 (J. W. Jeong, 2016). Additionally, NGOs have lost their political influence in Korean society. According to a survey by the East Asia Institute (2013), the credibility and influence of NGOs has dramatically dropped since the mid-2000s, when many leaders of these organizations began to be co-opted by the Roh Moo-hyun government. Thus, the majority of precarious people have hardly seen NGOs as reliable guardians.

While almost exclusively focusing on subsistence-related issues, these neutralized people share the humble political goal that the government must protect or at least

not infringe upon their subsistence-priority lifestyles. They hold the vague expectation that they are first in line to receive the government's compassion and support. This goal is reinforced by Confucian notions that the primary goal of politics is to aid "poor commoners" (*seomin*) and stabilize their livelihoods. Precarious citizens also expect the government not to infringe upon their existing lifestyles, which they view as a last-resort means of stabilizing their subsistence under harsh market conditions. Thus, that government policies should require a radical change in their lifestyles is to them inconsiderable.

Though the emergence of precarious workers has the potential to threaten the legitimacy of the Korean state, the state can strengthen its legitimacy by seeing such people neutralized politically. It has capitalized on this situation by casting itself as a benefactor state possessing incomparable administrative largess to care for all social classes, including precarious people. Though a benefactor state offers many policies, its main purpose is often to show off its compassionate leadership rather than to systematically correct social problems. The benefactor state defines itself as a catch-all social planner that is able to produce the maximum number of good policies and coordinate social interests. In most cases, benefactor states commit to the promotion of "national-popular" goals that include not only economic growth, but political stability and consensus within civil society (Jessop, 1983). They behave as if they are free from particular economic interests in society and oriented to broader issues, even at the expense of capital accumulation or economic development. Finally, without taking responsibility for what they have hitherto done and the failure of previous policies, leaders of the benefactor state act as if they have only recently been invited to solve social problems. Acclamations for their administrative capacity and contributions to social stability help to keep people from recognizing or punishing them for previous failures to address social problems.

The benefactor state differs from several other concepts of the state that have been applied to Korean politics. On one hand, the benefactor state is a new version of dirigisme or statism in that it builds upon the "fracturing" (Henderson, 1975) of society in which the state is not only separated but insulated from atomized class interests. However, the benefactor state differs from old dirigisme as it does not endeavor to coercively intervene in society. The real purpose of the benefactor state is rather to establish moral hegemony over society by posing as a caregiver for disadvantaged citizens and by publicly demonstrating compassionate and competent leadership.

On the other hand, the distinctions between the benefactor state and the welfare state must be made clear. Both are the same in which democratic politics provides an incentive for the state's leaders to expand welfare programs and create new

constituencies. As developmental welfare state theorists have emphasized (e.g., Kwon, 2005; MacGregor, 1999), a welfarist turn of the Korean developmental state was made possible after democratization and the resulting competition between major parties. Park's self-portrait as a national benefactor also emerged from her competition with the Democratic United Party candidate, Moon, during the 2012 presidential election. However, the benefactor state differs from the welfare state in at least three important aspects. First, the benefactor state is not a response to the collective actions of social or political organizations. The welfarist turn in Korea first occurred after the financial crisis of 1997–1998, when labor organizations and grassroots activists united to claim social compensation (Wong, 2006). In contrast, the benefactor state capitalizes on numerous social problems when these problems remain un-politicized and social organizations fail to mobilize precarious citizens.

The second distinction between the benefactor state and the welfare state lies in the way the state is legitimated. The welfare state construction is an *ex post* path to the strengthening of legitimacy through tackling major social problems. In contrast, the benefactor state is an *ex ante* political maneuver to utilize widespread social problems as the very reason for the state to have authority. The primary goal is not to resolve social problems systematically but to emphasize the state as the exclusive savior of the whole society. As a result, social problems are not simply policy targets that the state must address but political resources available for the state to strengthen its legitimacy. The more concerned people are about social problems, the more capable the state is of portraying itself as a comprehensive planner that can achieve the best result for society as a whole.

Finally, the benefactor state develops a unique conflict structure in which poor policy performance can be forgiven, but deception cannot. Leaders of the welfare state can be punished when they do poorly in office or their promises are not fulfilled. In contrast, the stability and authority of the benefactor state greatly depends upon the perceived sincerity of the state's leaders in their commitments. The self-proclamation of the state as an exclusive champion of all classes has distracted public discourse from political struggles for new social rights, but has also made people vaguely dependent on the sincerity of the government for their futures. In such a state–society relationship, disapproval over poor performance, ideological confrontations, and organized demands for political change are not major sources of political conflict. Instead, the state's leaders can encounter frustrations over dishonesty or cynicism against authority when their commitments no longer appear sincere.

Overall, the relationship between the benefactor state and precarious people in Korea has been stable. Insofar as the government has stressed its moral obligations in

favor of the whole society, precarious people have been likely to remain politically inactive and expect benevolent treatment from the government. Nonetheless, this stability was broken when the sincerity of the state's leaders was in serious doubt. This was particularly true when the state abruptly carried out neoliberal policies upon the request of the capitalist class or the chaebol, but repackaged these policies as benevolent actions in favor of precarious people. However, this conflict has never easily put an end to the myth of the benefactor state. Because society remains economically precarious and politically neutralized, the government is always motivated to dominate the public sphere by maintaining the myth of the benefactor state.

Constructing the Myth

During the presidential election campaign in 2012, Park Geun-hye of the conservative New Frontier Party (NFP) startled both voters and the opposition by placing the improvement of *minsaeng* (the people's livelihood) or *minsaeng kyeongje* (the people's livelihood economy) as her top pledge. Originally presented by Chinese nationalist revolutionary Sun Yat-sen in 1906, *minsheng* (the Chinese pronunciation of *minsaeng*) is a left-leaning doctrine advocating the security of the livelihoods of ordinary citizens from the excesses of capitalism (Scalapino & Schiffrin, 1959). To this end, Park offered new promises in favor of disadvantaged people that included basic pensions, college tuition subsidies, and care for non-regular workers and small business owners.

Park's commitment to minsaeng signified a radical break from the anti-welfare and pro-business image of the conservative NFP, distancing her from unpopular President Lee Myung-bak, a neoliberal enthusiast and outspoken champion of the chaebol. Her balanced concerns for welfare development in addition to economic growth were expected to prevent voters from punishing the NFP for Lee's neoliberalism. Furthermore, Park was able to take hold of the welfare agenda throughout the campaign process a step ahead of her competitor, Moon of the Democratic United Party.

It must be equally emphasized that the *minsaeng* drive was part of an elaborate strategy by Park to construct the myth of the benefactor state. By committing to *minsaeng* improvements, she could lure people away from the fact that conservative politicians had so far accelerated precariatization and turn people's attention to the benign treatments offered by the new government. With the *minsaeng* slogan, Park was never meant to "explain the general principle governing social ills" or "identify

the principle of the state as the source of social ills" (Marx, 1844). Instead, she "held social ills to be the source of political problems" (Marx, 1844) — or "national integration," in Park's terms, claiming that only she and her administration could alleviate these ills, that is, the state was no longer the main culprit behind precariatization, but instead mythicized itself as a benevolent agent that could address the subsistence-related concerns that precariatization had caused. During the presidential elections, voters were also more concerned with who of Park or Moon could offer better care and subsidies than who would be more capable of identifying and tackling the structural causes of their economic distress (Yun, 2013).

As long as precariatization continued, Park's self-portrait as a leader of the benefactor state was more effective for consolidating moral hegemony than former President Lee's position as a business-friendly leader. Comparatively, Lee had been a ruler for "a limited section of the bourgeoisie" (Marx, 1852/1963). He supported business conglomerates through deregulatory measures and tax cuts while arguing that the economic success of these firms in the world market would trickle down through society in the form of increased employment opportunities. During Lee's rule, the destiny of precarious citizens became subject to the capacity of the market and the chaebol and not to the government. Conversely, Park posed as if she could welcome precarious people into the largesse of the state's administration while continuing to promote the political legitimacy of her father, former dictator Park Chung-hee (1963–1979), who had transformed the country into a paradise for the chaebol to bring about rapid industrialization. Overcoming the negative image inherited from her father, Park Geun-hye defined herself as an impartial arbiter who would "take care of all people as equal family members" and aim to construct "a one-hundred-percent Korea" (The Institute for Democracy and Policies, 2014).

To be a benefactor of all classes, the Park government designed her *minsaeng* plan as an all-encompassing policy package (Yun, 2017). First, the plan contained new welfare policies, such as a basic pension for the elderly, free medical treatment for four major diseases, college tuition subsidies, and payments for all-day childcare. Particularly, the basic pension with tax-based payments of KRW200,000 per month to all citizens aged 65 or older was highly welcomed by older adults who were unemployed or who ran unprofitable small businesses. Second, the *minsaeng* plan included such old-fashioned subsidies as support for traditional market areas, tax cuts for small shopkeepers, and financial subsidies for taxi drivers. Third, Park made it clear that her *minsaeng* plan would never increase the tax burden on citizens. She planned to finance welfare costs by reducing unnecessary public spending and making the underground economy more taxable. Finally, old development policies were added to the *minsaeng*

plan. In 2014, Park announced a three-year plan of economic innovation targeting several promising sectors and offering them financial and administrative incentives.

Park's efforts for the construction of the benefactor state were not confined to making new pledges. She aggressively waged political struggles within and without the NFP to monopolize the interpretation of *minsaeng*. She attacked "rational conservatives" in her own party who saw her *minsaeng* plan as unrealistic. A schism erupted between Park and these young conservatives in early 2015 when the NFP's floor leader, Yoo Seung-min, claimed in his National Assembly speech that Park's idea of welfare expansion without tax increases was a "fiction" and proposed seriously discussing tax hikes. Park publicly criticized Yoo and forced him to step down from his position. In addition to this intra-party struggle, Park also bashed local government leaders who offered more universalistic welfare programs. They included Seoul's Mayor Park Won-soon, who offered free meals for elementary students and cut tuition by half for the students of the University of Seoul, and Seongnam's Mayor Lee Jae-myung, who implemented post-pregnancy subsidies and financial support for city residents aged 24 years. These local government leaders were accused of being populists who bought votes with expensive welfare programs. Park aborted some of their welfare programs by cutting central government grants. By doing so, she intended to lessen the possibility that these leaders could take away the image of a genuine benefactor from her.

The Benefactor State That Was Not

After her inauguration in 2013, Park implemented several *minsaeng* policies as promised. These policies included some welfare programs, including the National Basic Livelihood Security Law and the Industrial Accident Compensation Law, a growth project called "creative economy," and financial support for start-ups and small businesses. However, there were cases in which she gave up the all-inclusive elements of her welfare promises and drastically redesigned the programs. Payments were reduced for all-day childcare and the creation of additional daycare centers. The most famous case was the scaling back of the basic pension scheme. During the campaign, Park offered a universal program to provide 200,000 won per month to all citizens aged 65 or older. However, she changed the plan after the inauguration and decided to pay from KRW100,000 to KRW200,000 to older adults with an income below the 70th percentile. The exact amount of basic pension benefits would be inversely proportional to national pension benefits already being received (Tak, 2016).

Such cases of poor performance or the failure to honor pledges were often forgiven since they did not seriously call into question the sincerity of Park's *minsaeng* improvements. However, Park faced political challenges when she abruptly proposed new neoliberal reforms and added them to the *minsaeng* package. First, the Park government attempted to draft numerous market expansion bills that would lift entry barriers for large companies in medical services, tourism, education, and real estate fields. The second was deregulation drives, including a "regulation-free-zone bill" allowing local governments to issue waivers to exempt selective firms from social and environmental regulations and a university restructuring program having colleges offer specializations in accordance with industrial demand. The final was a labor market reform to introduce more flexibility in the workplace. None of these reforms were either mentioned or highlighted as *minsaeng* programs during the elections. People perceived Park's *minsaeng* commitments to be deceptive by demonstrating frustration, cynicism, and even protests.

Park justified these new neoliberal reforms as an inevitable choice for *minsaeng* improvements. She and her allies claimed that the new *minsaeng* bills were the only way to address the concerns of unorganized workers and unemployed youth. NFP politicians repeatedly defined labor federations as organizations for "labor aristocrats," which focused solely on their privileges and blocked the creation of jobs for both youth and older adults (NFP, 2016). Large business associations such as the Korea Employer's Federation and the Federation of Korean Industries organized a signature campaign on the streets calling for the National Assembly to pass the *minsaeng* bills (S. Y. Park, 2016). In opposition, many social organizations questioned the sincerity of Park's *minsaeng* doctrine. Besides, progressive civil organizations including the People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD) and Lawyers for a Democratic Society, labor unions such as the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions and the Federation of Korean Trade Unions claimed that Park's doctrine contained "fake" measures that had nothing to do with the livelihoods of ordinary people (PSPD, 2015). The unions held mass rallies with other opposition parties to defy the government's *minsaeng* bills and called for more substantial actions to be taken for *minsaeng* stability.

Nevertheless, it was scattered precarious people and not established social organizations who heralded a complete end to Park's benefactor state. Once the most important reason for Park's strategic turn to the *minsaeng* doctrine, they now declared this discourse to be a mere deception. As the following episodes clearly demonstrate, Korean politics witnessed the development of deep suspicions of the sincerity of Park's *minsaeng* commitments among non-regular workers, students, and small

shopkeepers as well as the emergence of a plethora of small and unorganized political troubles among these precarious people.

The first episode concerns new patterns of protests among non-regular and dismissed workers. When many employers implemented radical employment adjustment programs in accordance with Park's neoliberal drive, workers at these companies appealed to the public by engaging in self-harm. Some workers employed self-immolation, self-hanging, and leaping off roofs, claiming that there was no way other than suicide to avoid hardship in the workplace. Other workers subjected themselves to sky protests, long-term tent sit-ins, and three-step-one-bow marches. Increasing numbers of workers had especially struggled in high-altitude places with minimal food and water for several months to a year (Y. Lee, 2015). These forms of struggle were not necessarily bring about a change in working conditions, but they did succeed in marring Park's image as a benevolent and compassionate leader. Resisting workers also managed to portray themselves as innocent sufferers of Park's inhumane neoliberal policies.

There are no official data for the forms of resistance described earlier, as the government regards them as irrational outbursts of feeling by a handful of anti-social or anomalous individuals. This essay therefore cites the number of annual reports on self-immolation, sky protests, tent sit-ins, and healing groups reported in *Kyunghyang Shinmun*, a major liberal newspaper in Korea. An important limitation of this approach is that single events can be counted multiple times. It is however not misleading, as the reports can show the frequency of new patterns of protests indirectly, as well as the extent to which precarious workers succeeded in drawing attention to their mistreatment.

Figure 2 implies a rise of individualized or small-scale forms of protest by non-regular and dismissed workers in the past decade (Y2). Sky protests were infrequently reported before 2008, but the number of reports on this type of protest has rapidly increased since. *Kyunghyang Shinmun* wrote only sporadically about self-immolation before 2007, with the exception of 2003. Reports of self-immolation have gradually risen since. Finally, the newspaper increased its reports on self-healing activities in 2009. In contrast, organized struggles of unionized workers have steadily declined. Strikes, lockouts and resulting lost days of work have gradually decreased since their peak between 2002 and 2005 (Y1). This trend has continued, although the wage growth rate has remained low and conservative governments have strongly pushed for neoliberal reforms. In other words, small-scale protests of unorganized workers have become increasingly notable, while organized struggles against management have given way to negotiation and cooperation in many workplaces (Kong, 2011).



Source: Statistics Korea (http://m.kostat.go.kr); Big Kinds: News Big Data & Analysis (http://www.bigkinds.or.kr).

Figure 2. Changing repertories of labor protest in Korea.

Park was also confronted with resistance from college students. Since the early 2000s, the Korean authorities have long considered reforming the university system both to upgrade its academic competitiveness and to cope with an impending low birth rate and declining student population (I. H. Kim, 2016). However, Park added neoliberal elements to these considerations (Roh, 2016). Her government forced universities to specialize in areas that industries were currently demanding. It implemented the Program for Industrial Needs-Matched Education project to increase the number of graduates majoring in engineering. Universities quickly responded to Park's policies by reducing the number of students in non-engineering departments and undertaking department mergers and shutdowns. These rampant restructuring actions depreciated the lifestyle that college students had hitherto maintained. Students worried that as universities shut down or downsized their departments, labor markets would discount their specs as "unnecessary" knowledge and skills. Protests at Ewha Womans University in summer 2016 were a reaction to such restructuring. As the university had decided to establish a new LIFE College granting bachelor's degrees after a two-year program and offer degrees at cheaper prices, students felt a relative reduction of their specs (K. H. Kim, 2016). Likewise, students of Kookmin University, Chung-Ang University, Soongsil University, and Sungshin Women's University protested university restructuring plans, hoping to cancel them. They occupied university buildings, staged press conferences, and marched on the campuses.

Finally, the frustrations of small shopkeepers ran particularly deep since the majority of them had voted for Park in the 2012 presidential elections. These grievances emerged in late 2013 when Park endeavored to make the underground economy more taxable (Won, 2014). To finance new welfare programs without tax hikes, the government strengthened the National Tax Service to monitor the tax-evading activities of small businesses and to strengthen penalties for tax avoidance. Tax-saving techniques had helped to make ends meet for small shopkeepers, but the tax authorities no longer tolerated these techniques and declared them illegal. At this time, many small shopkeepers withdrew their loyalty from Park (J. Y. Kim & Kim, 2014) and by mid-2015, most small shopkeepers had turned against her. The government's insistence on a policy of super-low interest rates to keep the real estate market afloat seriously undermined the stability of the household economy. The wealthy expanded bank loans for the purchase of houses and land, while small shopkeepers borrowed money to make up for their insufficient business resources. The result was a snowballing of household debt. Growing liabilities and stagnant incomes resulted in a serious financial burden on small businesses and the household economy.

In the end, precarious people chose not to accept their subsistence-priority lifestyles and participated in political action when such opportunities were made available by other classes. The 2016 candlelight protests were initiated by radical social organizations, and were unusually large due to the participation of middle-class citizens. However, the contributions of an unprecedented number of precarious citizens must not be downplayed. The proportion of small shopkeepers, non-regular workers, dismissed workers, retirees, and students among demonstrators in 2016 has remarkably increased in comparison with the candlelight protests in 2008 against beef imports from the United States (see Table 2). First, the share of self-employed or small shopkeepers increased from 7.3% in 2008 to 8.6% in 2016. This increase is not dramatic, but must not be underestimated. Small shopkeepers usually work on Saturdays and have to abandon a day's wages in order to attend rallies. The case is the same with workers in the sales and service sectors, whose share increased from 1.9% to 4.5%. Most of these are non-regular workers who cannot leave the workplace without the permission of a supervisor. According to Table 2, students were the second largest group in the 2008 protests (30.4%). The share of students increased remarkably in 2016 (33%) and resembled the top group (i.e., workers in management and professional jobs).

Precarious protesters did not merely contribute to the size of the candlelight demonstrations. They also had the effect of turning the rallies into positive and sustainable events. This is perhaps most evident in the activities of small shopkeepers.

Table 2.
Occupational Composition of Candlelight Protest Participants: 2008 versus 2016 (%)

Occupations	2008	2016
Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing	0.7	0.9
Self-employment	7.3	8.6
Sales/Services	1.9	4.5
Manufacturing	3.3	2.9
Management/Professional	42.7	35.1
Housewives	6.9	7.1
Students	30.4	33.0
Unemployed/Retired	6.5	6.8
No response	2.3	1.0

Note: Source is from J. H. Lee, Lee, and Seo (2017, p. 226).

Some of them installed street vendors and sidewalk cafés to sell candles, cushions, snacks, coffee, and alcohol. They also provided humor and wit. When NFP lawmaker Kim Jin-tae disparaged candlelight vigils by mentioning that "candles are blown out when it is windy," shopkeepers responded by selling light-emitting diode (LED) candles that could not be blown out. Shopkeepers also named their goods in ways that satirized Park. Items for sale included "impeachment cushions," "impeachment coffee," "geun-hye squid fries," and "resignation bee" (Y. J. Lee, 2016). Shopkeepers and students reacted fiercely to Park's televised statement on November 4, 2016, that "I cannot help 'disparaging myself' (*jagoegam*) because I, as president, allowed the scandals to occur" (Choi, 2016). The shopkeepers found it shameless that she would disparage not only her life, but also the lives of disadvantaged citizens during her presidency. They felt it ironic that Park would cast herself in the role of a victim. Many small shopkeepers parodied her words; Members of the National Federation of Retailers marched with placards saying, "I cannot help disparaging myself because I opened a shop foolishly," and "I cannot help blaming myself for being stupid enough to pay taxes" (Yoo, 2016).

Back to the Myth?

After bringing about the impeachment of Park Geun-hye through candlelight protests in 2017, many Koreans have mentioned that their country has entered "The Road Not Taken" — a phrase borrowed from the Robert Frost poem. Initially, the quote reflected concerns about the political uncertainties of no president. Later,

Koreans referred to the poem to express their aspirations for a new and better democracy. Many are convinced that a series of institutional and political steps after impeachment, including new presidential elections, the rise of Moon as the new president, and his high approval rate, clearly show that Korea has walked the new road safely and successfully.

Nonetheless, this optimism must be tempered for at least three reasons. The first concerns the balance between state and society. Several cases indicate that the normative power of the benefactor state is still at work in Moon's new democracy. When it comes to the question of whether citizens have answered "which democracy works better than others" and "how a better democracy can be constructed" (K. Y. Cheon, 2016) in their own words, it is difficult to claim that citizens have regained the status of "free men" who actively make use of the public sphere. Signs of the state's supremacy were witnessed even during the candlelight protests, when a thousand citizens proposed constructing a Citizens' Assembly to replace the National Assembly and promote the direct participation of citizens in the policy-making process. Most protesters showed no sympathy for this proposal and claimed that the Citizens' Assembly would introduce "red guards" (*hongwibyeong*; the Korean pronunciation of *hongweibing*) and cause political chaos (Hong, 2016).

Though President Moon has encouraged citizens to participate in direct democratic activities, there has been no remarkable increase in civil activism. Citizens have remained lukewarm about joining trade unions and voluntary civil associations. One could interpret Moon's recruitment of NGO leaders into government positions as an indicator of civil activism (Y. I. Jeong, 2017). Yet, this is an old pattern of co-optation that has not given labor movements or NGOs as much political power in public spheres as they used to have in the 1990s and early 2000s. A few radical groups have criticized Moon for his ambiguous positions on the deployment of the Terminal High Altitude Area Defense weapon system and tax-welfare reforms and for the unsatisfactory effects of his job-creation policy. However, many people do not welcome these criticisms. They claimed that the criticisms would only disarray the reform schedule and policy-making in the new government (J. U. Lee, 2017).

Second and more importantly, the Moon government has a strong incentive to maintain the benefactor state. Moon's compensatory policies — including increasing basic pension benefits, increasing subsidies for college students, having zero non-regular employment in public sector, vowing no tax hikes, increasing subsidies for medical costs, and ensuring protection for small business tenants — are either identical or upgraded versions of Park's *minsaeng* policies. "Human-centric economic growth," Moon's overarching vision of the economy, is similar to Park's *minsaeng*

discourse in which it simply adds a new element of income-led growth to Park's economic policies. Meanwhile, Moon has nullified the neoliberal labor reforms that Park once proposed. Yet other neoliberal measures, such as restructuring universities and implementing the low interest rate policy, have either remained intact or have only been slightly modified. Finally, like Park's *minsaeng* doctrine, several of Moon's policies are mere slogans without concrete plans for implementation. The policy of zero non-regular employment is a simple proclamation that has served to demonstrate the goodwill and sincerity of the Moon government. However, the government has not taken concrete actions to institutionalize this policy, but has instead shifted responsibility to cooperation between firms and employees (M. W. Lee, 2018).

Finally, Moon has introduced several institutions that may bring about democratic deepening, though political controversy has resulted when these democratic goals are overshadowed by the logic of the benefactor state. One example was an experiment with deliberative democracy. In 2017, the Moon government set up a public deliberation panel to decide whether to act on his promise to cancel a project to build two nuclear reactors. His government emphasized that this public deliberative process marked a step toward "a more mature, enhanced democracy" and away from "an exclusive, often clandestine, realm dominated by a cadre of astute officials and experts" ("Korea Experiments with," 2017). However, it must be recognized that this deliberative body provided Moon with an opportunity to externalize his policy-making. By doing so, the government managed to insulate itself from blame for policy choices and remove the political and contentious elements from social problems. Later, the government made use of the panel's recommendations when it decided to resume construction of the nuclear power plants, cancelling Moon's electoral promises.

The other example is an online petition platform opened by the Blue House in mid-2017 as a direct communication channel between citizens and the president. If a single petition collects more than 200,000 signatures, Blue House secretaries or ministers must offer their comments on the issue. Moon appreciated this system as "a place for the people to express their voices" and an opportunity to discuss issues not yet highlighted, such as the legalization of same-sex marriage and the protection of minority shareholders. However, some commentators are concerned that people "amplified their concerns," while "swarming the page with all kinds of messages, many of which had nothing to do with the government" (Yoon, 2017). These criticisms indicate that the online petition platform has reinforced the structure of the benefactor state. The petition channel has hardly worked as an institutional means to pressure the government, but has instead reinforced vague expectations for the benign role of the government in addressing the personal problems of individual citizens.

The conflict structure under Moon's benefactor state is similar to that under Park's. Moon gained political credibility by emphasizing his ideas for the protection of the whole society. However, there have been cases in which the translation of these ideas into concrete policies has caused a trade-off relationship between different segments of precarious people. In such cases, disadvantaged citizens are inevitably cynical about Moon's sincerity. For example, Moon's decision to increase the minimum wage and reduce working hours in favor of part-time workers frustrated small shopkeepers who must hire these workers at lower wages. They claimed that Moon had forgotten his commitment to the improvement of the lives of small shopkeepers and "made us into criminals" who would not pay the minimum wage (Y. J. Kim, 2018). Nonetheless, Moon's benefactor state appears to be generally more consolidated than Park's. The former is unlikely to be dismantled easily in the near future, not only because Moon has no political rivals as the 2018 local elections have shown, but also because the capitalist class is too weak to place political pressure on him. Having been involved in Park's corruption scandals, many chaebol leaders were arrested and/or indicted for bribery and other charges.

Conclusion

In stark contrast to the notion of ungrounded optimism that Korea has become the land for free men, this essay has stressed the myth of the benefactor state as an essential feature of contemporary Korean democracy. The main arguments of this essay were three-fold. First, Park's minsaeng project has shown that the Korean government has made use of the precariatization of labor to mythicize itself as a benefactor state that possesses an incomparable administrative capacity to take care of precarious people. The Park government has not aimed for a systematic solution of social problems, but rather utilized widespread social problems as the very reason for the state's supremacy over society. Second, the benefactor state has developed a unique conflict structure in which people are more likely to challenge the general credibility of political leaders than their specific policies. When Park suddenly carried out neoliberal reforms and attempted to justify them as *minsaeng* reforms, many precarious people questioned her sincerity as a national benefactor and expressed strong frustration and cynicism. Yet even after Park was impeached and power shifted to the opposition, the benefactor state still stood. Several episodes under Moon's presidency have proven that the Moon government has been tempted into reconstructing the image of the benefactor state to dominate the public sphere and better handle an economically precarious and politically neutralized society.

Enthusiastic supporters believe that Moon will play a different benefactor role than Park and elevate Korean democracy. By no means, however, does treating the state "as an independent entity that possesses its own intellectual, ethical, and libertarian bases" (Marx, 1875/1970) constitute a sufficient condition for the transition to a more inclusive and active democracy. This belief only serves to "set the state free" (Marx, 1852/1963) by making precarious citizens increasingly dependent on the so-called benevolent hands of the state, publicly blocking these people from politicizing their subsistence-related concerns. This paper has viewed the benefactor state as the structural outcome of the precariatization of labor rather than simply as a technical strategy of the state's leaders. As the unaddressed problems of precariatization have continuously dragged Korean society deeper into the myth of the benefactor state, the quality of the country's democracy continues to rest more on "the freedom of the state" (Marx, 1875/1970) than on the freedom of men.

This analysis of the benefactor state in Korea can apply to contemporary Japanese politics as well. The recent way in which Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe (2012–) has coped with labor market problems appears similar to Park's *minsaeng* strategy. Particularly, the work-style reforms (*hatarakikata kaikaku*) represent a new strategy of Japanese conservatives to construct a benefactor state. Abe abruptly broke with the old conservative position and showed enthusiasm toward labor-friendly issues, including equal pay for equal work, wage increases, and the reduction of overtime work hours. He intended to re-establish the moral hegemony of the conservative Liberal Democracy Party by decorating his reforms with such attention-grabbing slogans as "a world in which all people shine," and "the elimination of non-regular workers from dictionaries" (Cabinet Public Relations Office, 2014). Additionally, Abe has acted as if he were a catch-all social planner. According to him, the work-style reforms are to both make labor markets more secure and equitable and to construct a new "one-hundred-million-total-active society." Finally, Abe's sincerity and not the content of his reforms has been the main source of conflict. Some commentators have called him "deceptive" for using incorrect statistical data ("Government's Deception Puts," 2018), and others have charged that only "conservative business and political leaders bent on deregulation" are invited to *kondankai* (informal social gatherings) with the prime minister and asked to create the specific content of labor-friendly reforms (Kojima, North, & Weathers, 2017).

The analysis in this essay helps to uncover the unique relationship between precariatization and democracy in East Asia. Many scholars specializing in other areas have highlighted the possibility that the precariatization of labor in the neoliberal era may lead to bottom-up initiatives from society to develop counter-hegemonic visions

(e.g., Beveridge & Koch, 2017; Darling, 2014; Lancaster, 2017). In Spain, Uruguay, and Bolivia, high unemployment, welfare cuts, and employment insecurity have caused mass protests. However, events in East Asia indicate that the situation can be quite different if precarious people remain neutralized politically. The East Asian states have stepped in before precarious people are able to act, filling a politically neutralized space with their benign words and actions, that is, the states have capitalized on precariatization to better dominate society and prevented people from forming an opposition. Under these conditions, the sincerity of state leaders has emerged as the utmost virtue of democracy, while people are distracted from political struggle and collective action. Democracy may still work as a governing system, but it has been doing so without *demos*.

Acknowledgments

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea (NRF) grant funded by the Korea government (Ministry of Education) (No. NRF-2016-S1A3A2925063).

References

Beveridge, R., & Koch, P. (2017). The post-political trap? Reflections on politics, agency and the city. *Urban Studies*, *54*(1), 31–43.

Cabinet Public Relations Office. (2014, September 12). *Opening Speech by Prime Minister Shinzo Abe at the Open Forum, World Assembly for Women in Tokyo*. Retrieved from the official website of the Prime Minister of Japan and his Cabinet: https://japan.kantei.go.jp/96_abe/statement/201409/waw140912.html

Cheon, J. H. (2017). Nuga chosbul-eul deulgo eotteohge ssawossna [Who fought with candlelight, and how?]. *Critical Review of History*, *118*, 436–465.

Cheon, K. Y. (2016). Gwangjang-ui chosbul-eun 6wolhangjaeng wangyeolpan [The candlelight protests are a completion of the June struggle]. *Sisa-In*. Retrieved from https://www.sisain.co.kr/?mod=news&act=articleView&idxno=27823

Cheong, J. W. (2006). Bijeong-gyujig nojo gaib-uihyang-gwa hyeonhwang [Analyzing the willingness of non-regular workers toward union participation]. *Nodong Review* [Labor Review], *131*, 67–82.

Choi, H. J. (2016, November, 4). Ileolyeogo daetonglyeong haessna jagoegam: Bagdaetonglyeong, gamjeong hoso chiuchin damhwa [I cannot help "disparaging myself"

(*jagoegam*) as president: Park's emotional statement]. *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/bluehouse/768832.html

Darling, J. (2014). Asylum and the postpolitical: Domopolitics, depoliticisation and acts of citizenship. *Antipode*, *46*(1), 72–91.

Diamond, L., & Plattner, M. F. (Eds.). (2016). *Democracy in decline?* Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

East Asia Institute. (2013). *2013 pawojojig sinloeyeonghyanglyeog josaui juyogyeolgwa* [Main outcomes of survey on influence and credibility of powerful organizations in 2013] (EAI Public Opinion Briefing No. 136). Seoul, South Korea: Author.

Government's deception puts its work style reform in doubt [Editorial]. (2018, April 5). *The Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved from http://www.asahi.com/ajw/articles/AJ201804050021.html

Grubb, D., Lee, J. K., & Tergeist, P. (2007). Addressing labor market duality in Korea. In *OECD social, employment and migration* (Working Paper No. 61). Paris, France: OECD. doi: http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/058184274204.

Hayashi, S. (2010). The developmental state in the era of globalization: Beyond the Northeast Asian model of political economy. *The Pacific Review*, *23*(1), 45–69.

Henderson, G. (1975). *Korea: The politics of vortex*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Hong, S. I. (2016, December 12). Wanjangjillo chosbul waegog: Kim Je-dong cham-yeohan simin-uihoe geubjedong [Distorting candlelights with armbands: Kim Je-dong's Citizens Assembly movement stops]. *NoCutNews*. Retrieved from http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/4699995

The Institute for Democracy and Policies. (2014). Baggeunhye jeongchileul neom-eoseo [Beyond the Park Geun-hye politics]. Internal document.

Jeong, J. W. (2016, February). Bijeong-gyujig nojo gaib-uihyang-gwa hyeonhwang [The willingness of non-regular workers to participate in labor unions and the current level of development]. *Monthly Labor Review*, *131*, 67–82.

Jeong, Y. I. (2017, June 10). Munjaein jeongbu siminsahoe hyeobchi, cham-yeojeongbu neom-eoseona [Will the Moon government more commit to state–society cooperation than the Roh government?]. *Kyunghyang Shinmun*. Retrieved from http://news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?art_id=201706101420001

Jessop, B. (1983). Accumulation strategies, state forms, and hegemonic projects. *Kapitalistate*, *10*, 89–111.

Kim, H. S. (2006). Simin undong bipan-ui ide-ollogi jeog yoso gochal: "Simin-eobneun simin undong" ilan bipan-eul jungsim-eulo [Understranding the ideological aspects of the critiques of civil movements: Focusing on "civil movements without citizens"]. *NGO Studies*, *4*(1), 191–220.

Kim, I. H. (2016). Hangug daehaggujojojeong-ui hyeongtae byeonhwa-e daehan yeongu: 2003–2012 [A study on changing types of university restructuring in Korea: 2003–2012]. *Gyeongje-wa Sahoe* [Economy and Society], *110*, 201–208.

Kim, J. Y., & Kim, J. (2014, May). *Hanguk yugwonja-wa isyu II: Segeumgwa jeongbujichool-e daehan hangugin-ui insik* [Voters and issues in Korea II: Koreans' attitudes toward taxation and government expenditure] (The Asian Institute for Policy Studies Issue Brief).

Kim, K. A., & Hahn, J. R. (2011). *Jayongja-ui kookminyeongeum gaip jegobangan* [Policies for expanding the national pension coverage to the self-employed]. Seoul, South Korea: National Pension Service.

Kim, K. H. (2016, July 31). Sidaejeog heuleum vs. hag-wi jangsa: Idae milaelaipeudae jaengjeom-eun? [A historical trend vs. diploma sales: Issues concerning LIFE College of Ewha University]. *Joongang Daily*. Retrieved from http://news.joins.com/article/20381071

Kim, S. C. (2012, February 12). South Korea's candlelight protests a peaceful force. *Asia Times*. Retrieved from http://www.atimes.com/article/south-koreas-candlelight-protests-peaceful-force/

Kim, Y. J. (2018, July 13). Choejeoimgeum-e bunno: 700man jaeyong-eobja gugminjeohang-gwon baldong [Anger over minimum wage: 7-million small shopkeepers will resist]. *Joongang Daily*. Retrieved from http://news.joins.com/article/22797744

Kojima, S., North, S., & Weathers, C. (2017). Abe Shinzō's campaign to reform the Japanese way of work. *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, *15*(23), 1–17.

Kong, T. Y. (2011). Pathways to cooperation: The transformation of labour relations among leading South Korean firms. *Economy and Society*, *40*(1), 56–83.

Koo, H. (1990). From farm to factory: Proletarianization in Korea. *American Sociological Review*, *55*(5), 669–681.

Korea experiments with deliberative democracy. (2017, October 24). *The Korea Herald*. Retrieved from http://www.koreaherald.com/view.php?ud=20171024000986

Kwon, H. J. (2005). *Transforming the developmental welfare state in East Asia*. New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lancaster, T. D. (2017). The Spanish general elections of 2015 and 2016: A new stage in democratic politics? *West European Politics*, *40*(4), 919–937.

Lee, J. H., Lee, H. W., & Seo, B. K. (2017). *Tanhaeggwangjang-ui angwa bakk: Chosbul-minsim gyeongheombunseog* [Inside and outside of the impeachment square: An empirical analysis of the candlelight protest]. Seoul, South Korea: Chaegdam.

Lee, J. U. (2017, July 24). Munjaein jeongbuseojocha nodong-i "geudeul" munje dwaeseoya [Workers must not be put aside even under the Moon government]. *NoCutNews*. Retrieved from http://www.nocutnews.co.kr/news/4820099

Lee, M. W. (2018). Bijeong-gyujig jelo sidae seon-eon-ui yeogseol [A paradox of the declaration of the zero non-regular employment]. *Sisa Journal*, *1472*, 44–46.

Lee, Y. (2015). Sky protest: New forms of labour resistance in neo-liberal Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *45*(3), 443–464.

Lee, Y. J. (2016, December, 9). Meli tanhaeg aen haepi nyu daetonglyeong! [Merry impeachment and happy new president!]. *Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from http://www.hani.co.kr/arti/politics/politics_general/774013.html

MacGregor, S. (1999). Welfare, neo-liberalism and new paternalism: Three ways for social policy in late capitalist societies. *Capital & Class*, *23*(1), 91–118.

Marx, K. (1844). Critical notes on the article: "The king of Prussia and social reform. By a Prussian." Marxists Internet Archive. Retrieved from https://www.marxists.org/

Marx, K. (1963). *The eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte*. New York, NY: International. (Original work published in 1852).

Marx, K. (1970). Critique of the Gotha Program. In *Marx/Engels selected works* (Vol. 3, pp. 13–30). Moscow, Russia: Progress. (Original work published in 1875).

Marx, K. (1978). On the Jewish question. In C. Tucker (Ed.), *The Marx–Engels reader* (pp. 26–52). New York, NY: W. W. Norton. (Original work published in 1843).

Mobrand, E. (2018). Limited pluralism in a liberal democracy: Party law and political incorporation in South Korea. *Journal of Contemporary Asia*, *48*(4), 605–621. doi: 10.1080/00472336.2018.1441428.

New Frontier Party (NFP). (2016, February 15). Daebyeon-in nonpyeong mich seongmyeong [Commentary and statement of Spokesman].

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2009). *The impact of the global crisis on SME and entrepreneurship financing and policy responses*. Paris, France: Author.

Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). (2012). *OECD economic surveys: Korea*. Paris, France: Author.

Park, C. W. (2004). Hangug-in jeongchicham-yeoui teugjing-gwa gyeoljeong-yoin: 2004nyeon josagyeolgwa bunseog [Characteristics and determinants of Koreans' political participation: The analysis of the 2004 survey outcome]. *Korean Politics Research*, *14*(1), 147–193.

Park, S. Y. (2016, January 18). Baggeunhye jaegyejudo cheonmanseomyeong-undong dongcham nonlan [The controversy over Park's participation in business-led "ten-million signature campaign"]. *Pressian*. Retrieved from http://www.pressian.com/news/article.html?no=132619

People's Solidarity for Participatory Democracy (PSPD). (2015, December 8). *Bodo jaryo* [Press release]. Seoul, South Korea: Author.

President Moon vows not to let democracy falter again. (2017, June 10). *Yonhap news*. Retrieved from http://english.yonhapnews.co.kr/news/2017/06/10/0200000000AEN20170610001400315.html

Roh, J. K. (2016). Baggcunhycjcongbu dachaggujojojcong-ui jcongchisahochag [Political sociology of university restructuring during the Park administration]. *Gyeongje-wa Sahoe* [Economy and Society], *111*, 80–107.

Scalapino, R. A., & Schiffrin, H. (1959). Early socialist currents in the Chinese revolutionary movement: Sun Yat-sen versus Liang Ch'i-ch'ao. *The Journal of Asian Studies*, *18*(3), 321–342.

Shin, D. C. (2012). *Confucianism and democratization in East Asia*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Special Committee for Small- and Medium-sized Business. (2005). *Yeongse jayongeopja jonghap daechek* [A comprehensive policy for the small self-employed]. Seoul, South Korea: Author.

Standing, G. (2016). *The precariat: The new dangerous class*. London, UK: Bloomsbury Academic.

Tak, H. W. (2016). *Gichoyeongeumjedo pyeongga* [The evaluation of the basic pension scheme] (NABO Business Evaluation No. 352). Retrieved from https://www.nabo.go.kr/Sub/01Report/01_01_Board.jsp?bid=19&arg_id=5803&funcSUB=view

Won, J. K. (2014). Gichoyeongeum doib-e daehan gugmin insigjosa [Survey of citizen opinions on the introduction of a basic pension]. *Bogeonbogji Isyuwa Pokeoseu* [Health Welfare Issucs and Focus], *225*, 1–8.

Wong, J. (2006). *Healthy democracies: Welfare politics in Taiwan and South Korea*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Yoo, J. H. (2016, November 13). Gongjja hasdogeu nanwojun jayeong-eobja [The self-employed who gave free hotdog]. *Maeil Business News*. Retrieved from http://news.mk.co.kr/newsRead.php?year=2016&no=789895

Yoon, S. Y. (2017, November 23). Citizens amplify their concerns to the Blue House: Some worry that the petition platform could be too crowded. *Korea Joongang Daily*. Retrieved from http://korcajoongangdaily.joins.com/ncws/articlc/articlc.aspx?aid=3041128

Yun, J. W. (2011). Unbalanced development: The origin of Korea's self-employment problem from a comparative perspective. *The Journal of Development Studies*, *47*(5), 786–803.

Yun, J. W. (2012). The Korean way of financial rationalization and discouraged workers. *Korea Journal*, *52*(3), 148–176.

Yun, J. W. (2013). Why did the self-employed distrust the Democratic Party in South Korea's 2012 presidential election? Beyond modernization theory. *Asian Survey*, *53*(6), 1087–1111.

Yun, J. W. (2017). The paradox of inequality in South Korea: Minsaeng kyongje and reinvigorated developmentalism. *Pacific Affairs*, *90*(3), 481–504.

Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs
Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2019) 1950002 (22 pages)

DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500024

The Role of Social Media and Emotion in South Korea's Presidential Impeachment Protests

HEE MIN AND SEONGYI YUN

Previous studies have shown that social media is effective in large-scale mobilization, facilitating leaderless and more flexible forms of resistance. However, some scholars argue that this type of mobilization suffers from a lack of organizational form and collective identity. This paper shows that social media-centered networks can in fact promote collective actions powerful enough to challenge a corrupt president. We also prove the role of emotions in collective actions. Using an empirical analysis of the 2016 Presidential Impeachment Protests surrounding "Choi Soon-sil Gate," we first demonstrate the effects of social media activities on participation in collective actions. Next, we explore the effects of anger on social media activities and participation. In short, this study reveals a new angle on social media's influence in mobilizing collective actions by analyzing the effect of emotions on participation. In this process, social media activities are escalated by emotional outbreaks, and participation then increases throughout a given collective action.

KEYWORDS: Social media; collective action; emotion; anger; candlelight protests.

* * *

During the Park Geun-hye administration in 2016, South Korea was thrown into political turmoil by "Choi Soon-sil Gate," a political scandal involving the influence and alleged bribery of the South Korean President by Choi

HEE MIN is a Research Fellow in the Department of Political Science at Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea. She has research interests in political communication and Korean politics. She can be reached at <mhmhkr@khu.ac.kr>.

SEONGYI YUN, a corresponding author, is a Professor in the Department of Political Science at Kyung Hee University, Seoul, Korea. He has research and teaching interests in mass political behavior and Korean politics, with particular emphasis on political participation, civil society, and democracy model. He can be reached at <yun31@khu.ac.kr>.

Soon-sil and other individuals. Citizens were outraged, and the public indignation soon found expression in candlelight protests. Beginning with the first candlelight protest held on October 29, 2016, citizens filled Gwanghwamun Square ("the Square") every Saturday evening. The most surprising thing about the protests was their size. In the third candlelight protest on November 12, an organizer estimated that 1 million people gathered in the Square — the largest crowd since the June 1987 demonstrations. After President Park Geun-hye's third public apology on November 29, a sixth candlelight protest attracted 2.32 million protesters (an organizer's estimate) throughout the country. The wave of protests came to a stunning end with the impeachment of the President. The scale and reverberations were such that it attracted attention around the globe.

Even more noteworthy in these candlelight protests was the emergence of new patterns of participation. Many participated alone or in groups of two or three, without belonging to a particular political group. There was no apparent originator or representative organizing the protests, and no common behavioral pattern or message transfer system. Scholars taking an interest in these phenomena highlight the Internet and social media as key variables.[1] The Internet and social media are especially instrumental in maintaining broader and more diverse networks (Ellison, Vitak, Gray, & Lampe, 2014), enabling a more frequent exchange of messages with a wider set of contacts (Tong & Walther, 2011). Ultimately, groups of one, two or three individuals could gather to create massive protest groups in social movements, outside of institutional participation (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Carty & Onyett, 2006; Williams & Gulati, 2013).

Nevertheless, it cannot be concluded with certainty that the Internet and social media are vehicles for the rapid diffusion of collective action. Access to these communication technologies does not necessarily promote active participation (Bandura, 2001). Additionally, scholars who explain collective action from a conventional perspective have criticized Internet and social media-based networks as lacking in the ability to mobilize (J. Choi, 2015) as these participation structures cannot replace an organization's role to mobilize and provide what is called a "collective identity" for its participants in a collective action (Carty & Onyett, 2006). These scholars therefore argue that lacking formative organizations and a collective identity, social media-based movements cannot sustain collective actions long enough, even if they are able to initiate such actions.

[1]Baek (2012); Bennett (2003, 2006); Bimber, Flanagin, & Stohl (2005); Castells (2015); Cho & Kang (2008); J. Choi (2015); Jang (2010); Y. Kim (2008); H. Lee (2013); McDonald (2002); Yun (2009).

What then instigated the 2016 Presidential Impeachment Protests ("PIPs" or "2016 PIPs") and sustained them for more than five months? In other words, what drove people to come to the Square week after week and join forces in the PIPs? What sort of momentum managed to sustain their participation throughout the protests?

To answer these questions, this study focuses on the impact of anger in the mobilization of participants in the PIPs. Cognitive appraisal theories of emotion suggest that emotions steer people to adapt coping strategies (Ryan, 2011). Anger, in particular, increases the desire to act and confront an opponent (Ryan, 2011). Moreover, emotions prompted by a given situation influence collective behavior just as much as the loyalty of the members in an organization (Jasper, 1998). In the PIPs, people were outraged over the scandal, exchanged information and shared their feelings via social media, and then transformed these feelings into collective action. Consequently, the individuals connected at the Square formed an emotional community that resulted in an immediate and explosive form of mobilization.

Our purpose is to demonstrate that when such social media activities become emotional, participation in a protest increases. Thus, we reveal that emotions offer rich conditions for sustaining social media-centered networks. To this end, the remainder of this paper is structured as follows. The second section gives an overview of existing arguments about the impact of social media on collective action. The third section explores existing views on the role of emotions in mobilizing participation. The fourth section examines the affinity between emotions and social media. The fifth section is devoted to an empirical analysis of the mobilization process during the PIPs. After examining the effects of information sharing via social media on participation in the candlelight protests, we analyze the effect of emotions on social media activities and participation in the protests. The sixth section presents the results and conclusions of this study.

Social Media-Centered Communication in Collective Action

The PIPs have collectively become a symbol of Korea's political culture. Technological shifts in communication modes have changed the patterns of resistance manifested in political protests (Bimber et al., 2005). In particular, social media has played a crucial role in mobilizing large-scale political participation. This new phenomenon involves two interrelated characteristics of social media-centered communication. First, digital networks in social media aid the rapid sharing of information among individuals. Opinions about Choi Soon-sil Gate spread through social media in a variety of ways. Representative examples include hashtags such as "#But_Choi

Soon-sil" and "#Come Out_Choi Soon-sil" (A hashtag [#] is a label used in social media to facilitate classifications and searches; J. H. Kim, 2016). In social media, relevant content can be easily spotted with the use of a hashtag. Hashtag use also tends to strengthen networks among individual social media users. Many people used the aforementioned hashtags in their social media messages regardless of the content. These actions played an important role in uniting individuals infuriated over Choi Soon-sil Gate, greatly contributing to interactive communication through reciprocal linkages while also working as catalysts for attracting offline participants (Chang, 2010; Eveland & Cortese, 2004; Shah, Cho, Eveland, & Kwak, 2005). The forms of resistance in offline environments diversified with "#Come Out_Choi Soon-sil" street rallies, marches, and exhibitions of secondary banners (N. Choi, 2016).

Second, social media structurally alters the communication process, changing it from a collective to an individual one. Individuals in social media spaces are able to create issues and circulate them, dramatically increasing their participation. In the PIPs, Twitter user @abaris leaked the fact that Choi Soon-sil and her former husband, Chung Yoon-hoi, had established a company named Jubel in Germany to conceal assets (J. Y. Kim, 2016). It was thanks to Twitter that @abaris, an ordinary Korean in his 40s living in Germany, managed to draw such attention. The information he provided on Choi Soon-sil Gate was followed by a wave of related tips and reports posted by other netizens.

As the communication process becomes more individualized, the influence of central hubs and groups weakens (Yun, 2009). Communication via social media is characterized by a decentralized and self-motivated mobilization frame across social networks. This was clearly demonstrated by the emergence of various flag groups that attracted attention during the PIPs. The flag of the Rhinoceros Beetle Research Group that made its initial appearance at the third candlelight protest is a representative example.[2] This flag was not intended for an existing organization for rhinoceros beetle research; rather, it was associated with a group of ordinary people — a self-organized collective in the truest sense of the word — who spontaneously gathered and made a flag intended to express their outrage over Choi Soon-sil Gate with wit and humor. Such flags, disseminated through social media, encouraged others to participate

[2]The flag of the Rhinoceros Beetle Research Group prompted the emergence of an array of splashy troop flags aimed at satirizing the current political situation in the 2016 candlelight rallies, such as the Altitude Sickness Research Association, Resigra (a parody satirizing the purchase of Viagra with the Blue House budget), the National Lazy People's Alliance, the National Metalister League, the Democratic Cat Confederation, the Jumping Tiger Regiment, Loners Have Come, the National Cat Trade Union, and the Korean Society of Oxtail Soup. Groups launched increasingly colorful parodies whenever a new issue arose in relation to Choi Soon-sil Gate.

in the protests. Groups offered stickers, candles, and flexible gathering schedules to participants.

In this aspect, social media-based collective action has stimulated debate and prompted questions about whether it fits the theoretical requirements for effective or successful collective action (Bimber et al., 2005). Social media-centered communication is not structurally conducive to forming a group because the participants are decentralized, non-hierarchical, and segmented. It has at the same time become pervasive with the advent of mobile phones. Mobile phones accelerate temporality and mediate a culture of simultaneity (McDonald, 2002), helping to form a social media-centered entity and create a temporary public (Baek, 2012). As these connections are highly fluid in structure, it is not easy for online activities to inspire the offline mobilization of ordinary citizens and inspire their participation in the absence of face-to-face networks.

At the same time, participants in the PIPs did not welcome the presence of representative organizations. Participation in the protests was instead dominated by affinity groups.[3] Lacking organization-related features such as hierarchy and local communities, these are groups naturally formed based on certain affinities (e.g., families and friends) and characterized by loose boundaries, fluid structure, and spontaneous communication (McDonald, 2002). Organizations such as trade unions and political parties, on the other hand, fail to inspire such a sense of solidarity and loyalty. The fluid identity formed in an affinity group is neither determinative nor persistent, allowing for a kind of flexible, horizontal and dispersive movement that facilitates an efficient form of resistance unmatched by conventional paradigms of strong leadership and organization (Chang, 2010; Shirky, 2008).

Emotions in Collective Action

It is highly possible that communication through social media offers a greater potential for mass mobilization. Interaction among participants is a prerequisite for strengthening collective action. Through the process of collective action, participants display how they identify with and share feelings about a given issue (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012). In this process, social media spurs members to not only form an

[3]In this study, a survey questionnaire was disseminated to participants at the fifth candlelight rally held on November 26, 2016 (to be described in detail in the fourth section). The resulting analysis revealed that a majority of participants came with friends (40.7%), followed by family members (30%).

extensive network and mass-produce messages (Keum & Cho, 2010), but also to share their emotions.

It was not until recently that emotions began to attract attention in discussions on collective action. While classical collective action theorists dealt with emotions, they were treated as extreme and unreliable expressions of the psychopathological aspects of the individual (Barbalet, 2001/2007). With the rationalistic approach emerging as a dominant model for explaining collective action, emotions fell by the wayside. Rational-Choice Theory, for instance, assumes that individuals participating in collective action rationally calculate the costs and benefits of their participation. The Resource Mobilization Theory, which also emerged in the 1970s, regarded collective action as interest-seeking behavior. Discussions of these theories focused on effective means of aggregating the requisite resources for collective action, with "formal organization" emerging as the central element of collective action (Fireman & Gamson, 1979; McCarthy & Zald, 1977; Olson, 1989; Tilly, 1978). Eventually, emotions were seen to be distinct from rational interests and ceased to play any role in collective action theory.

More recently, however, there have been efforts to explain the collective action process with a combination of cognitive and emotive elements (K. Kim, 2006a). The expression of emotion is the result of a cognitive evaluation of an object or event (Lazarus, 1991). A dichotomous scheme of addressing reason and emotion runs the risk of disregarding "underlying emotions" as precursors of action (Barbalet, 2001/2007, p. 83). Furthermore, maximizing participation in collective action depends on how the participants frame their agenda (Carty & Onyett, 2006), in which the emotional dynamics of participants are also important. Imagine a case in which people become voluntarily involved in collective action without any direct conflict in their relationships. This scenario is only possible because participants share a consensus they cannot help agreeing to, which is explained to be an external effect of emotional dynamics (Goodwin, Jasper, & Polletta, 2012). People might have experienced emotionally directed interactions in their lives that resemble those of collective actions (Goodwin et al., 2012, p. 54). From this perspective, emotions are a part of the everyday operations of social processes and one of the elements necessary for social change (Barbalet, 2001/2007).

In this context, emotions become an important variable in the process of mobilizing for collective action. Their role can be further represented by the concept of the "injustice frame." Injustice frames depend on "the righteous anger that puts fire in the belly and iron in the soul" (Gamson, 1992, p. 32; as cited in Goodwin et al., 2012, p. 54). An injustice frame observes the situation through the display of anger

elicited over a perceived injustice and attributes responsibility for it (Gamson, 1992). It is therefore closely associated with negative emotions such as anger and shame (Scheff, 1990) and ends up forming a meaning frame for a collective action (Jasper & Poulsen, 1995). The injustice frame formed during the 2016 PIPs took form in the slogan "Is This a Country [?]", crystallizing people's angry feelings over various aspects of Choi Soon-sil Gate. Students preparing for college admission exams, their parents, and college students were infuriated over the college admission fraud of Chung Yoo-ra, Choi Soon-sil's daughter, and ordinary citizens became incensed over the corruption.

From this perspective, this paper endeavors to establish the role of emotions in explaining the strength of social media-centered communication. Collective action is prompted by emotions expressed over certain events (Castells, 2015). Sentiments and emotions that are connected to an event fuel politically motivated dynamics and, in turn, collective actions. Terrorism and conflicts concerning race or gender are representative of such cases (K. Lee & Lee, 2012). In addition, public indignation over a public issue is an important stimulus for self-motivated participation (Marcus & MacKuen, 1993; Valentino, Gregorowicz, & Groenendyk, 2009). Emotions are also important for prompting political actions that go beyond the means of expression (Mouffe, 2006).

During the 2016 PIPs, we observed that those who felt strong anger over Choi Soon-sil Gate were very active. News reports from general cable TV network JTBC regarding Choi Soon-sil's tablet computer are regarded as the origin of the wave of PIPs. On October 24, 2016, JTBC accessed the tablet computer of Choi Soon-sil, President Park Geun-hye's secret advisor accused of wielding undue influence, and reported on its content in a media exclusive.[4] The snowball effect of this news report[5] was such that Park Geun-hye, who had kept silent about the debate over her secret advisor, released her first public statement of apology the day following the JTBC report. Despite the apology, a series of events heated public sentiment to the boiling point, and the first candlelight protests took place on October 29.

[4]The JTBC news report reads "Choi Soon-sil's PC files were retrieved ... [revealing that she] received presidential speeches before the dates of their actual delivery." According to the report, the confiscated tablet PC contained 44 presidential speeches and over 200 classified documents, and Choi Soon-sil edited the speeches before delivery. The corresponding video can be viewed at <http://news.jtbc.joins.com/article/article.aspx?news_id=NB11340632>.

[5]As an example of the impact of the JTBC report, a man enraged by the news about Choi Soon-sil's tablet PC drove his truck into the JTBC building. When submitting a statement to the special prosecutor, Choi Soon-sil's lawyer demanded to investigate JTBC because its report on Choi Soon-sil's tablet computer was most likely a manipulation. More details can be read at <http://pub.chosun.com/client/news/viw.asp?cate=C01&mcate=M1003&nNewsNumb=20170122606&nidx=22607.>.

Encounters between Social Media and Emotions in the PIPs

Emotions have an inevitable effect on the actions of people as they respond to specific political developments. The role of emotions has gained even more attention with the increase in Internet and social media-mediated collective activities. Along these lines, the interaction between anger and the Internet and social media has become an object of extensive research.[6] One prominent example is the offline collective action driven by Internet-mediated public indignation during the 2008 mass panic over mad cow disease (K. Kim, 2006a, 2006b). In the candlelight protests, surges of affective responses worked toward mobilizing participation by fueling online activities (Jeong & Kim, 2009). In other words, collective emotions shared in cyberspace served as the basis for building an emotional consensus among the participants in the protests (H. Park & Lee, 2008).

Cyberspace enables the easy dissemination of the narrative structure of action (McDonald, 2002), and picture or video technologies are great facilitators. For example, participants in the 2016 PIPs used real-time Facebook Live as a new form of communication because it allowed them to easily communicate their experiences. They broadcasted events in the protests in real time while recipients gave spontaneous feedback in the form of comments or "likes." Sharing such information and experiences with others led to emotion sharing (Boltanski, 1999). In other words, "I" and "you" were bridged through linkages in a fashion very different from prior instances in which a collective identity was established through a robust organizational structure.

Hence, collective action no longer depends on the existence of a strong organization to sustain its collective identity. In a loose network in which the sharing of emotions is enabled, collective identity and action come into being through narration without any organizational representation (McDonald, 2002). Recent discussions of concepts such as the alternative or wild public (K. Lee & Lee, 2012), critical discursive public, and latent multi-public (K. Lee & Lee, 2012; Rhee, 2005) have been able to offer an explanation for network-mediated emotion sharing and collective action. In sum, social media-centered communication in which individuals share their experiences about an agenda has the power to mobilize through narration and emotion sharing. This was evident when people came out to the Square (McDonald, 2002). Participants shared a collective identity without having any organization to represent

[6]Castells (2015); Chadwick (2006); Goodwin et al. (2012); Gregg & Seigworth (2010); Jeong & Kim (2009); K. Kim (2006a, 2006b); K. Lee & Lee (2012); H. Park & Lee (2008).

their movement (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012, p. 3), passionately filling the Square in a collective action.

Methods

Sample

This section explores the role of emotions in social media activities and participation in the PIPs by describing the empirical analysis conducted in this study. Specifically, we analyze the effect of social media activities on participation. We also identify the effects of anger on social media activities and participation during Choi Soon-sil Gate and the protests. For this purpose, we employ a pathway analysis to examine the mobilization process during the PIPs.

Data were collected from 1,230 participants in the fifth candlelight protest held on Saturday, November 26, 2016, by means of interviews and questionnaires. The survey questionnaire was conducted on-site at candlelight protests held in Seoul ($N = 550$), Gwangju ($N = 340$), and Daegu ($N = 340$) by college students from the corresponding regions. Seoul, Daegu, and Gwangju are the major cities in South Korea. It is impossible to assess the representativeness of the sample due to the difficulty of locating respondents based upon demographics at each square. Despite this limitation, the survey data provide a unique opportunity to analyze the process and dynamics of the 2016 PIPs.

Questionnaires and Measures

The questionnaires conducted for this paper sought information regarding key variables such as social media activities, anger, and participation in the PIPs. For social media activities, the variable was defined as the *level of social media/mobile messenger messaging and information transfer* (hereafter "social media activities"). This indicates the extent to which respondents wrote or transferred messages about Choi Soon-sil Gate and the candlelight protests via social media or mobile messenger. Respondents were instructed to answer the following question: "How many times have you transferred information on Choi Soon-sil Gate and the candlelight protests by writing or sharing messages via social media or mobile messenger?" Respondents chose from the following five frequency ranges: "(1) 25 times or less, (2) 26–50 times, (3) 51–75 times, (4) 76–100 times, (5) 101 times or more." The *level of anger* was measured by asking respondents: "Using a scale from 1–5, where 1 means not at all and 5 means very much, how strong were your feelings of anger when you learned about Choi Soon-sil Gate?" For measuring the *level of participation in the PIPs*,

respondents were instructed to answer the question: "How many times have you participated in the candlelight rallies up to now (October 29 to November 26)?" Choices included the following: "(1) Once, (2) Twice, (3) Three times, (4) Four times, (5) Five times."

The *number of hours watching JTBC news* was an additional variable in the questionnaire. Unlike previous protests, the 2016 PIPs were initially sparked by stories presented through offline media rather than cyberspace. The JTBC network was the first to broadcast the information that led to Choi Soon-sil Gate, and watching relevant JTBC news reports was assumed to be associated with participation in the candlelight protests. Respondents were instructed to answer the following: "How many hours a day do you watch JTBC news to get information on Choi Soon-sil Gate and candlelight rallies?" Respondents were instructed to select one of the following five ranges: "(1) Less than 1 hour, (2) 1–2 hours, (3) 2–3 hours, (4) 3–4 hours, (5) 4 hours or more." The *average number of friends via social media and mobile messenger* was also included in the questionnaire. Respondents were instructed to answer the question: "How many friends or followers do you have on social media or mobile messenger?" Respondents were asked to select one of the following five ranges: "(1) 200 or less, (2) 201–400, (3) 401–600, (4) 601–800, (5) 801 or more."

The questionnaire also attempted to gauge the *political ideology* and *interest in politics* of respondents. Prior studies have argued that these are key variables influencing political participation. *Political ideology* was measured by asking respondents, "Using a scale from 1–5, where 1 means very conservative and 5 means very liberal, which of the following is your ideological orientation?" In *interest in politics*, respondents were asked the question: "How much do you enjoy discussing politics with others?" and instructed to answer on a scale from 1 (= Not at all) to 5 (= A lot). Finally, demographic variables such as *age* and *gender* were included, while education and income level were excluded as statistically insignificant to the pathway analysis.

Findings

Descriptive Statistics

Table 1 outlines the descriptive statistics of the data used in this study. As shown in Table 1, 66% of the respondents had pursued higher education. This was further separated into college students and graduates (36.5%) and graduate school students or higher (29.2%). Regarding age distribution, respondents in their 20s accounted for a slightly higher proportion (32%), followed by those in their 40s (20.3%), 50s (15.4%), and 30s (14.7%), demonstrating a balanced age distribution with little difference

Table 1.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in This Study I

Variable		Distribution (%)
Gender	Male	54.4
	Female	45.6
Education level	Middle school or lower	19.5
	High school	13.4
	College student or graduate	36.5
	Graduate school student or higher	29.2
Age (years)	≤ 18	8.5
	19–29	31.5
	30–39	14.7
	40–49	20.3
	50–59	15.4
	≥ 60	9.5
Income level (Unit: 10,000 won)	≤ 200	11.1
	201–400	32.5
	401–600	32.6
	601–800	12.7
	≥ 801	11.2
Number of hours watching JTBC news	< 1	32.0
	1–2	32.5
	< 2–3	18.1
	< 3–4	6.9
	≥ 4	10.4
Number of friends/followers on social media or mobile messenger	< 200	61.2
	201–400	23.6
	401–600	8.4
	601–800	3.7
	≥ 801	3.2
Social media activities	≤ 25	67.0
	26–50	17.2
	51–75	7.0
	76–100	4.0
	≥ 101	4.9
Total participation in the PIPs	1	44.9
	2	24.7
	3	16.3
	4	7.6
	5	6.5

Table 2.
Descriptive Statistics for Variables in This Study II

	Mean	Std. Dev.	Minimum	Maximum
Political ideology (positive = liberal)	3.49	0.87	1	5
Interest in politics (positive = a lot)	3.33	0.97	1	5
Anger (positive = strong)	4.77	0.015	1	5

between younger and older generations. A large proportion of the participants (45%) in the fifth candlelight protest were first-time participants. Moreover, 33% of the respondents answered that they had written messages or transferred information about Choi Soon-sil Gate or candlelight protests using social media/mobile messenger at least 25 times. Furthermore, 65% of the respondents were found to have spent less than two hours learning about Choi Soon-sil Gate through JTBC news reports.

The fifth candlelight protest was the largest of all rallies in terms of attendance, presumably reflecting people's unabated indignation and amplified suspicions regarding Choi Soon-sil Gate despite former President Park Geun-hye's public statement of apology. Likewise, respondents reflected a particularly high level of anger over Choi Soon-sil Gate in the questionnaire. The mean anger index of respondents was 4.77. In addition, the mean political ideology of respondents was 3.49, and their interest in politics was *considerable* ($M = 3.33$). Descriptive statistics for these variables are displayed in Table 2.

Participation in the PIPs by Anger Level and Social Media Activities

The purpose of this paper is to provide an explanation for the role of social media-centered networks in collective action. To find a viable answer, we endeavored to identify both the forces connecting the loose ties behind the candlelight protests and their effect on participation. These forces were examined with respect to public indignation over Choi Soon-sil Gate. Findings indicate that angry feelings over Choi Soon-sil Gate served to increase social media activities and subsequent participation throughout the protests.

Based on this understanding, a pathway analysis was performed to determine the effects of anger on mobilizing participation in the PIPs. Figure 1 illustrates the pathway analysis model showing the process of mobilization.[7] In this study, the

[7]As shown in Figure 1, we selected this pathway analysis model as the most suitable model. We ultimately excluded statistically insignificant variables from the final pathway analysis model.



Notes: ***$p < 0.001$, **$p < 0.01$, *$p < 0.05$, †$p < 0.1$.

Figure 1. Mobilization model of the 2016 PIPs. The effect of each variable is expressed with the standardized coefficient.

number of hours watching JTBC news was placed on the left side because, as mentioned earlier, JTBC reports on Choi Soon-sil Gate are regarded as the catalyst for the PIPs. In addition, according to our survey of the protesters, a majority of respondents learned about Choi Soon-sil Gate and the candlelight protests by watching JTBC news. Respondents were found to have learned about the protests first from JTBC with 2.3 points and followed by the Internet (2 points), social media and mobile messenger (1.9 points), terrestrial TV news (1.5 points) and newspapers (1.3 points).

Number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers, *political ideology*, *political interest*, *gender*, and *age* were also placed on the left side as variables influencing the level of participation in the PIPs. In addition, correlations were established between *age* and the *number of hours watching JTBC news*, between *age* and the *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers*, between the *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers* and *interest in politics*, between *age* and *political interest*, between the *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers* and *political ideology*, between *age* and *political ideology*, between *political interest* and *political ideology*, and between *political interest* and the *number of hours watching JTBC news*.

As for the *anger* variable, it is clear that respondents who felt the most anger over Choi Soon-sil Gate had an increased desire to share their emotions via social media

spheres. This indicates that anger leads people to take action in order to achieve their goals (Valentino et al., 2009). Such online interactions acted as catalysts for forming a collective identity necessary for participation in the protests. In this context, the *anger* variable shows the extent of the anger experienced by respondents as they watched reports on Choi Soon-sil Gate. People enraged by the JTBC reports expressed their opinions and feelings in cyberspace, as reflected in the variable *social media activities*. In other words, those who felt intense anger over Choi Soon-sil Gate were active in social media/mobile messenger and/or transferring related information. Finally, the *level of participation in the PIPs* was set as the dependent variable. The fit of the model presented previously was tested using AMOS 21. With the resulting GFI, AGFI, and RMSEA values of 0.977, 0.931, and 0.082, the model for candlelight rally mobilization established in this study was verified to be a good fit.[8]

The effect of social media activities on participation

An analysis of the effect of *social media activities* on the PIPs was conducted in this study. As shown in Figure 1, the level of *social media activities* had a statistically significant influence on the *level of participation in the PIPs* (standardized coefficient = 0.165, $p < 0.001$). From these findings, it can be inferred that the more frequently a respondent wrote messages or transferred information regarding Choi Soon-sil Gate via social media/mobile messenger, the more frequently he/she participated in the PIPs. These results agree with network social movement theories in which Internet/social media-centered communication of loose, horizontal ties is able to promote collective actions (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012; Cho, 2011; Keum & Cho, 2010; S. Park, 2012; Williams & Gulati, 2013).

Meanwhile, the *number of hours watching JTBC news* and *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers* were found to have a statistically significant influence on the *level of participation in the PIPs*: the more respondents learned of Choi Soon-sil Gate or the candlelight protests through JTBC, the more they participated in the candlelight protests (standardized coefficient = 0.065, $p < 0.05$). The *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers* influenced the *level of participation in the PIPs* in such a manner that participation in the protests increased with the number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers (standardized

[8]In general, a comparative fit index (CFI) or goodness of fit index (GFI) has a value ranging between 0 and 1, and a model is rated a good fit at 0.9 or higher. The value of the root mean square error of approximation (RMSEA) also ranges between 0 (perfect fit) and 1 (very poor fit), whereby a model is considered a good fit at < 0.05, a moderate fit at 0.05–0.08, and a poor fit at ≥ 0.1 (Browne & Cudeck, 1993).

coefficient = 0.090, $p < 0.001$). *Interest in politics*, *political ideology*, *gender*, *age* and *level of participation in the PIPs* were also positively related.

The effect of anger on social media activities and participation

Another goal of this study was to evaluate how angry feelings were transformed into political participation. The following discusses how anger influenced social media activities and participation in the PIPs. As shown in Figure 1, we explored the influence of *anger* on the *social media activities* of the respondents. This was statistically significant (standardized coefficient = 0.052, $p < 0.05$). Thus, the stronger the anger one felt over Choi Soon-sil Gate, the more frequently he/she engaged in writing messages or transferring related information via social media/mobile messenger. These results are consistent with the arguments of previous studies showing that emotional outbreaks manage to increase participation. Min and Yun (2016) found that the stronger the anger one felt over Korean politics, the more frequently he/she engaged in online activities. However, *anger* in fact exerted a statistically insignificant influence on the *level of participation in the PIPs.* This is why the mean anger index of respondents (4.77) was very high. For this reason, we did not set the pathway between *anger* and the *level of participation in the PIPs*. The *number of hours watching JTBC news* exerted a statistically significant influence on *anger* (standardized coefficient = 0.078, $p < 0.01$). The more Choi Soon-sil Gate information respondents received from JTBC, the stronger the anger they felt.

In this regard, a person's anger increased the more he/she obtained information on Choi Soon-sil Gate through JTBC, and so did the intensity with which people began writing messages or transferring information on the scandal through social media/mobile messenger. The more frequently someone engaged in such actions, the more likely it became that he/she would participate in the candlelight protests.

Figure 1 shows whether the correlations between the preceding and subsequent variables in the candlelight protest mobilization pathway are statistically significant, but it fails to explain the indirect effect of anger along pathways in the process of mobilization for the protests. If the power sustaining the loosely organized and leaderless networks in the protests is found in the activities involving anger sharing as hypothesized in this study, the indirect effect of anger on the pathways should be examined. In other words, after selecting a pathway that may shed light on the indirect effect of anger among the pathways illustrated in Figure 1, related statistical significance should be investigated.

Two pathways were selected for the purposes of this study. The first is the indirect effect of anger in the relationship between watching JTBC news and social

Table 3.
Analysis of the Indirect Effect of Anger in the Relationship between Watching JTBC News and Social Media Activities

	Indirect Effect	Lower Confidence Limit	Upper Confidence Limit	*P*-Value
Watching JTBC news → anger → social media activities	0.003	0.001	0.007	0.022*

Note: $*p < 0.05$.

media activities. The second is the indirect effect of anger in the relationship between watching JTBC news and the level of participation in the PIPs. If these two pathways prove to be statistically significant, it can be ascertained that the anger felt by individual citizens increased participation in the candlelight protests as it was shared through social media.

Table 3 outlines the analysis results for the first pathway: watching JTBC news → anger → social media activities. The results display that watching JTCB indirectly affects increased social media activities in a way that is statistically significant. This is to say that the more information people obtained on Choi Soon-sil Gate from watching JTBC news, the greater the anger they felt, which then resulted in more frequent social media activities.

Table 4 outlines the analysis results from the second pathway: watching JTBC news → anger → social media activities → participating in the candlelight protests. The indirect effect of anger in the relationship between watching JTBC news and the level of participation in the PIPs was statistically significant. This means that the more the information on Choi Soon-sil Gate people obtained from watching the news

Table 4.
Analysis of the Indirect Effect of Anger in the Association between Watching JTBC News and Level of Participation in the PIPs

	Indirect Effect	Lower Confidence Limit	Upper Confidence Limit	*P*-Value
Watching JTBC news → anger → social media activities → level of participation in the PIPs	0.001	0.000	0.001	0.022*

Note: $*p < 0.05$.

reports, the greater the anger they felt, indirectly leading to more frequent social media activities and, as a result, greater participation in the candlelight protests.

Meanwhile, the *number of social media/mobile messenger friends/followers* was found to influence involvement in *social media activities* (standardized coefficient = 0.324, $p < 0.001$). In other words, the more social media friends or mobile messenger followers one has, the more actively he/she is engaged in writing messages or transferring information via social media/mobile messenger.

Conclusion

Candlelight protests are no longer an unusual sight in society. They have gained a foothold in the participatory culture of ordinary citizens. The universality of social media and mobile technology has facilitated large-scale participation in such protests and diversified forms of expression. South Korea witnessed the emergence of this new form of political participation in the 2016 PIPs. These protests, with social media such as Facebook and mobile apps such as KakaoTalk serving as major communication networks, became more segmented and personalized. Throughout the duration of the PIPs, which lasted for as long as five consecutive months every Saturday evening, there was no single organization playing a central role. Organizations that had once orchestrated such gatherings were replaced by social media-based, networked individuals. Although participation networks based on social media-centered communication appear loose and unstable, they can function as a mechanism for mobilization through a process of emotion sharing.

To explore this phenomenon, this study analyzed the major factors contributing to mobilization in the protests. A pathway analysis was performed to determine the effect of anger on participation in the PIPs, where it was observed that anger over Choi Soon-sil Gate both increased the information shared via social media/mobile messenger and fueled the sharing of emotions. Furthermore, both expressing feelings of anger and the sharing of information via social media and mobile messenger were found to be conducive for increasing participation in the protests and playing a role in expressive communication. Expressive communication creates an agora for converging anger where interactions based on emotion sharing occur and weak ties become strong with a collective identity. Citizens enraged over the Choi Soon-sil Gate scandal shared the anger of "I" in various ways through social media/mobile messenger, forming a consensus space and a "we" identity. This process worked as the driving force for filling the Square week after week.

Ultimately, the social media-centered network seems to be looser and weaker than other forms in existence. Nevertheless, it works as a powerful mobilization mechanism through the sharing of emotions. The protests in 2016 were some of the largest in scale in South Korea. Citizens were disappointed with the President's integrity and ability to govern, and became angry about the attitudes of the politicians involved whenever new suspicions were revealed. Additionally, their anger was amplified by a continued distrust of the government. Citizens had already been dissatisfied with the government's lukewarm attitude toward the Sewol ferry sinking.[9] The timing of Choi Soon-sil Gate was such that the scandal was like oil on the flames of public anger toward the President and politicians. As a result, candlelight protests showed the potential power of weak ties, recording the largest number of participants to date.

Conversely, the mobilizing power of existing offline organizations in the 2016 PIPs cannot be ignored. On November 9, 2016, "The National Action against the Park Geun-hye Administration" (www.Bisang2016.net), formed from more than 1,500 non-governmental organizations, offered many statements and comments throughout the candlelight protests. However, rather than assuming a leading role, the National Action Against the Park Geun-hye Administration remained faithful to a role on the periphery (Bennett & Segerberg, 2012) while accepting the weak ties that flickered throughout social media. During the protests, this organization abstained from forming a strong agenda, political ideology, or collective identity. It instead focused on promoting the protests and providing space for political speeches on matters such as free speech, cultural events, and fundraising.

This study focuses on the emotional variable in collective behavior to shed light on the role of emotions in political arenas. The surfacing of emotions in cyberspace was formerly perceived as something negative. Emotions manifested via Twitter, Facebook, or KakaoTalk have been criticized for allegedly intensifying the formation of cliques, for instance. However, emotions can be good indicators of an increased awareness of a given issue and related behavioral trends. Such emotional manifestations can also be a starting point for progressive social change, and such was the experience in the 2016 PIPs. The citizens who gathered in the Square opposed the injustice of Choi Soon-sil Gate, expressing themselves in outpourings of anger that caused corrupt politicians to listen to popular concerns. Finally, at the same time, angry citizens gathered in the Square also expressed their optimism in a variety of

[9]The sinking of the Sewol ferry's sinking occurred on the morning of April 16, 2014, while it was en route from Incheon to Jeju. The ferry capsized while carrying 476 people, mostly were secondary school students from Danwon High School.

ways, even covering the police buses parked around the Square with flower stickers. Much to the delight of all concerned, it appears that the anger behind the 2016 protests has in fact transformed into greater hope for the future of Korea.

Acknowledgment

This work was supported by the National Research Foundation of Korea Grant funded by the Korean government (NRF-2016-S1A3A2 925063).

References

Baek, W. (2012). Changes in mobile social network services and social movements. *Journal of Korean Social Trend and Perspective*, *84*, 130–159.

Bandura, A. (2001). Social cognitive theory: An agentic perspective. *Annual Review of Psychology*, *52*(1), 1–26.

Barbalet, J. M. (2001). *Emotion, social theory, and social structure: A macrosociological approach* (H. Park, Trans, 2007). Seoul, South Korea: Ilshin.

Bennett, W. L. (2003). New media power: The Internet and global activism. In N. Couldry & J. Curran (Eds.), *Contesting media power: Alternative media in a networked world* (pp. 17–37). Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Bennett, W. L. (2006). Branded political communication: Lifestyle politics, logo campaigns, and the rise of global citizenship. In M. Micheletti, A. Follesdal, & D. Stolle (Eds.), *Politics, products and markets: Exploring political consumerism past and present* (pp. 101–126). New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction.

Bennett, W. L., & Segerberg, A. (2012). The logic of connective action: Digital media and the personalization of contentious politics. *Information, Communication and Society*, *15*(5), 739–768.

Bimber, B., Flanagin, A. J., & Stohl, C. (2005). Reconceptualizing collective action in the contemporary media environment. *Communication Theory*, *15*(4), 365–388.

Boltanski, L. (1999). *Distant suffering: Morality, media and politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Browne, M. W., & Cudeck, R. (1993). Alternative ways of assessing model fit. *Sage Focus Editions*, *154*, 136–136.

Carty, V., & Onyett, J. (2006). Protest, cyberactivism and new social movements: The reemergence of the peace movement post 9/11. *Social Movement Studies*, *5*(3), 229–249.

Castells, M. (2015). *Networks of outrage and hope: Social movements in the Internet age* (Y. Kim, Trans.). Seoul, South Korea: Hanul Academy.

Chadwick, A. (2006). *Internet politics: States, citizens, and new communication technologies*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Chang, W. (2010). Networked individualism and civil protest: The case of candlelight protest 2008. *Korean Political Science Review*, *19*(3), 25–55.

Cho, H. (2011). 2011 Middle East citizen revolution and the mediating role of SNS. *Studies in Korean Politics*, *20*(2), 309–338.

Cho, H., & Kang, J. (2008). Network politics and online social movements. *Korean Political Science Review*, *42*(3), 311–332.

Choi, J. (2015). Online-mediated mobilization: Revisiting the candlelight demonstration and its theoretical significance. *Journal of Social Studies*, *28*, 69–114.

Choi, N. (2016, October 22). Ije #nawara choesunsirida [Now, #come out, Choi Soon-sil]. *OhmyNews*. Retrieved from http://m.ohmynews.com/NWS_Web/Mobile/at_pg.aspx?CNTN_CD=A0002253548#cb

Ellison, N. B., Vitak, J., Gray, R., & Lampe, C. (2014). Cultivating social resources on social network sites: Facebook relationship maintenance behaviors and their role in social capital processes. *Journal of Computer-Mediated Communication*, *19*(4), 855–870.

Eveland, W. P., & Cortese, J. (2004). How website organization influences free recall, factual knowledge, and knowledge structure density. *Human Communication Research*, *30*(2), 208–233.

Fireman, B., & Gamson, W. A. (1979). Utilitarian logic in the resource mobilization perspective. In M. N. Zald & J. D. McCarthy (Eds.), *The dynamics of social movements: Resource mobilization, tactics and social control* (pp. 8–44). Cambridge, MA: Winthrop.

Gamson, W. A. (1992). *Talking politics*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Goodwin, J., Jasper, J. M., & Polletta, F. (Eds.). (2012). *Passionate politics emotions and social movements* (H.-S. Park & J.-H. Lee, Trans.). Paju, South Korea: Hanul Academy.

Gregg, M., & Seigworth, G. J. (2010). *The affect theory reader*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Jang, W. (2010). Network individualism and civil resistance: In the example case of the 2008 candlelight rallies. *Journal of Korean Politics*, *9*(3), 25–55.

Jasper, J. M. (1998). The emotions of protest: Affective and reactive emotions in and around social movements. *Sociological Forum*, *13*(3), 397–424.

Jasper, J. M., & Poulsen, J. D. (1995). Recruiting strangers and friends: Moral shocks and social networks in animal rights and anti-nuclear protests. *Social Problems*, *42*(4), 493–512.

Jeong, I., & Kim, S. (2009). Impact of Internet sensitivity on online and offline protest participation: Analysis of 2008 candlelight rallies. *Korean and World Politics*, *25*(4), 217–255.

Keum, H., & Cho, J. (2010). Smartphone, communication gap, and political participation. *Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies*, *54*(5), 348–371.

Kim, J. H. (2016, October 21). Seoul 100goseseo nabukkin #nawara choesunsil [Fluttering at 100 places in Seoul #Come out, Choi Soon-sil]. *The Hankyoreh*. Retrieved from www.hani.co.kr/arti/society/society_general/766753.html

Kim, J. Y. (2016, December 23). Choesunsil, gimgichun, bakgeunhye beolbeol tteolge han "jeongchideoku" beseuteu 3 in [Top 3 of politics mania making Choi Soon-sil, Kim Gichun, and Park Geun-hye tremble]. *Kyunghyan Shinmun*. Retrieved from news.khan.co.kr/kh_news/khan_art_view.html?artid=201612232239002

Kim, K. (2006a). Consensus mobilization on collective action in online: A study on 2002 candlelight demonstration. *Economy and Society*, *71*, 154–178.

Kim, K. (2006b). The effects of the Internet on the participation in collective action: Focusing on 2002 candlelight demonstration. *Korean Journal of Sociology*, *40*(1), 183–211.

Kim, Y. (2008). Background of candlelight demonstration: Interactions between offline and online. In *Proceedings of the International Conference of Korean Political Science Association*. Seoul, South Korea: Korean Political Science Association.

Lazarus, R. S. (1991). *Emotion and adaptation*. New York, NY: Oxford University Press.

Lee, H. (2013). *Click sociology: Deep reading of digital democracy from Facebook to Wikipedia*. Seoul, South Korea: IMAZINE.

Lee, K., & Lee, Y. (2012). Emotional participation and sharing via the Internet and SNS. In *Proceedings of the symposium and seminar of the Korean Society for Journalism and Communication*. Seoul, South Korea: Korean Society for Journalism and Communication.

Marcus, G. E., & MacKuen, M. B. (1993). Anxiety, enthusiasm, and the vote: The emotional underpinnings of learning and involvement during presidential campaigns. *American Political Science Review*, *87*(3), 672–685.

McCarthy, J. D., & Zald, M. N. (1977). Resource mobilization and social movements: A partial theory. *American Journal of Sociology*, *82*(6), 1212–1241.

McDonald, K. (2002). From solidarity to fluidarity: Social movements beyond collective identity — The case of globalization conflicts. *Social Movement Studies*, *1*(2), 109–128.

Min, H., & Yun, S. (2016). Emotions and political participation. *Korean Political Science Review*, *50*(1), 271–294.

Mouffe, C. (2006). *The democratic paradox* (H. Lee, Trans.). Seoul, South Korea: In-gan Sarang.

Olson, M. (1989). Collective action. In J. Eatwell, M. Milgate, & P. Newman (Eds.), *The invisible hand* (pp. 61–69). London, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.

Park, H., & Lee, J. (2008). Food, emotion, family mobilization: Candlelight rallies against the import of U.S. beef imports. *Society and Theory, 13*, 147–183.

Park, S. (2012). Study on SNS public opinion formation process and participation behavior. *Korean Journal of Journalism and Communication Studies, 58*, 55–73.

Rhee, J. W. (2005). Mediated inter-visibility of the Internet public sphere and the emergence of discursive publics. *Journal of Communication Research, 46*(2), 5–32.

Ryan, T. J. (2011). What makes us click? Demonstrating incentives for angry discourse with digital-age field experiments. *Journal of Politics, 74*(4), 1138–1152.

Scheff, T. J. (1990). Socialization of emotions: Pride and shame as causal agents. In T. D. Kemper (Ed.), *Research agendas in the sociology of emotions* (pp. 281–304). Albany, NY: SUNY Press.

Shah, D. V., Cho, J., Eveland, W. P., Jr., & Kwak, N. (2005). Information and expression in a digital age: Modeling Internet effects on civic participation. *Communication Research, 32*(5), 531–565.

Shirky, C. (2008). *Here comes everybody: The power of organizing without organizations*. New York, NY: Penguin.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tong, S., & Walther, J. B. (2011). Relational maintenance and CMC. In K. B. Wright & L. M. Webb (Eds.), *Computer-mediated communication in personal relationships* (pp. 98–118). New York, NY: Peter Lang.

Valentino, N. A., Gregorowicz, K., & Groenendyk, E. W. (2009). Efficacy, emotions and the habit of participation. *Political Behavior, 31*(3), 307–330.

Williams, C. B., & Gulati, G. J. J. (2013). Social networks in political campaigns: Facebook and the congressional elections of 2006 and 2008. *New Media and Society, 15*(1), 52–71.

Yun, S. (2009). The 2008 candlelight protest and changes of political participation pattern: Agents, structure and institutions. *Korean Journal of Area Studies, 27*(1), 315–334.

Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs
Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2019) 1950003 (25 pages)

DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500036

The Origins of the Park Jung-hee Syndrome in South Korea

EUNJUNG CHOI AND JONGSEOK WOO

In the past few decades, post-democratization politics in South Korea have witnessed an upsurge in authoritarian nostalgia, called the "Park Jung-hee syndrome." This paper examines the origins of public nostalgia for the authoritarian dictator by putting two theoretical arguments, i.e., the socialization thesis and the system output thesis, to an empirical test. This paper utilizes the 2010 Korea Democracy Barometer from the Korea Barometer and the 2010 and the 2015 Korean National Identity Survey from the East Asia Institute. The empirical analysis of the South Korean case strongly supports the political socialization argument, suggesting that citizens' yearning for Park Jung-hee is not merely an outcome of the negative evaluations of the democratic governments' performances. Rather, their authoritarian nostalgia is in large part an outcome of their political socialization during the Park dictatorship. The analysis implies that, although a resurgence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization South Korea is not expected to derail the country's route to democratic deepening, it may continue to be a main source of political division in partisan and electoral politics in the future.

KEYWORDS: Authoritarian nostalgia; South Korea; Park Jung-hee syndrome; socialization theory; system output theory.

* * *

The candlelight protests in South Korea in the winter of 2016–2017 led to the impeachment of President Park Geun-hye (2013–2017) and an abrupt end to a decade of conservative rule. After a decade of progressive governments by

EUNJUNG CHOI is Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at Chonnam National University. Her research interests include political corruption, elections and campaigns, and East Asian politics. She can be reached at <cjchoi76@jnu.ac.kr>.

JONGSEOK WOO is Assistant Professor in the School of Interdisciplinary Global Studies at University of South Florida. His research interests include military politics, Korean politics, and political corruption. He can be reached at <wooj@usf.edu>.

Kim Dae-jung (1998–2003) and Roh Moo-hyun (2003–2008), the political pendulum swung back to the conservative side with the electoral victories of Lee Myung-bak (2008–2013) and Park Geun-hye. At the heart of the conservative electoral victories in the past decade lies an upsurge of authoritarian nostalgia, or the so-called Park Jung-hee syndrome. Authoritarian nostalgia is not peculiar to South Korea, as many scholarly works illustrate a rise of authoritarian or communist nostalgia among the citizens of post-authoritarian or post-communist states (Chang, Chu & Park, 2007; Ekman & Linde, 2005; Pinto, 2006, 2010; Pridam, 2000). There is also nothing peculiar about nostalgia for authoritarianism among citizens in many new democracies. However, a unique aspect of the South Korean case has been the extent of support for Park Jung-hee, as the nostalgia has gone beyond typical partisan-ideological divisions. In the previous presidential elections that brought about the conservatives' electoral victories, the conservative candidates won by successfully overlapping their political identity with Park Jung-hee. Lee Myung-bak won the 2007 presidential election by mobilizing the memory of South Korea's economic miracle under Park Jung-hee's leadership and pledging to revive the national economy. Subsequently, the electoral victory of Park Geun-hye, Park Jung-hee's eldest daughter, was largely due to a widespread belief that she would repeat her father's miraculous performances.

Although Park Jung-hee's legacy remains a divisive issue among the citizens of South Korea, he is often remembered in an increasingly positive light, especially for his achievement of political stability and economic development (Denny, 2015). Why do people, and what types of people, miss the authoritarian rule they once fought hard to remove? When citizens express authoritarian nostalgia, what do they miss — the strongman, the authoritarian political system, or something that the authoritarian regime did successfully? Has Park Geun-hye's impeachment brought an end to citizens' nostalgia for her father, or will the Park Jung-hee syndrome continue to play an influential role in the future? These are the questions this paper sets out to answer through an empirical analysis of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization politics in South Korea. One distinct aspect of authoritarian nostalgia in South Korea is that Korean citizens do not miss authoritarianism per se but a particular authoritarian leader, Park Jung-hee. Therefore, authoritarian nostalgia in this paper refers to citizens' yearning for Park and his performances.

The theoretical arguments and empirical findings of this paper bring significance to the study of authoritarian nostalgia in general and the Park Jung-hee syndrome in particular. First, the research tests two competing theories of authoritarian nostalgia, i.e., socialization and system output, against the South Korean case. While literature on authoritarian nostalgia in post-communist societies is voluminous, theoretically

engaged research against a post-authoritarian case remains under-researched, with a few exceptions (Chang et al., 2007; W.-T. Kang, 2010; W. Kang, 2013, 2016). Second, this paper challenges the common finding from the previous literature on authoritarian nostalgia that citizens miss a previous dictator or his/her government mainly because they are not satisfied with the ways that the current democratic system performs. The South Korean case is unique because authoritarian nostalgia has ascended after the country achieved successful economic development and democratic consolidation. Finally, the empirical evidence in this paper refutes the common finding in the previous literature that authoritarian nostalgia is a mere expression of displeasure with the current democratic government's performance failure (Chang et al., 2007; Dahlberg, Linde, & Holmberg, 2015; Ekman & Linde, 2005; W.-T. Kang, 2010; W. Kang 2016; Pinto, 2010). Instead, it shows that, although the current democratic government's performance failure is relevant to authoritarian nostalgia, this nostalgia runs deeper, affecting citizens' political beliefs and value systems and ultimately keeping democratic deepening from taking place.

The Park Jung-hee Syndrome in South Korea

Citizens in South Korea have mixed memories of the military regimes of the pre-democratization era, particularly the rule of general-turned-president Park Jung-hee (1961–1979). At present, some remember Park as a national hero who transformed South Korea from a war-ravaged, chaotic, corrupt, and economically backward country to one that achieved miraculous economic success, effectively managed national security and order, and created an efficient government-bureaucracy machine. Others remember Park as a brutal dictator who brazenly suppressed citizens' demands for democracy and human rights, provided favoritism to a small number of big businesses (*chaebols*), and pursued a lifetime presidency until he was assassinated in 1979. This section discusses Park Jung-hee's legacies, how these legacies are reinvented and reinterpreted, and what makes the Park Jung-hee syndrome a substantial contributing factor in post-democratization politics in South Korea.

In the contemporary South Korean political setting, Park Jung-hee is widely accepted as a national leader who modernized the country. Significant accomplishments of the Park regime include unprecedented economic development and the effective management of national security. On average, the two decades of Park's rule (1961–1979) recorded double-digit annual economic growth. At the time of the 1961 coup d'état, per capita income in South Korea was a meager USD82; it reached

the USD1,640 mark in the final year of Park's rule. Although highly authoritarian, Park's ruling style is evaluated as completely refashioning the country's political and bureaucratic machines from corruption and inefficiency into a system of competence and adeptness.

The two decades of sustained economic development overhauled the political culture and political orientation of South Koreans with the accompanying urbanization, higher education, and mass political mobilization. At the turn of the 1960s, more than 70% of the country's entire population lived in rural areas; in the 1980s, more than 70% lived in urban or metropolitan areas. Furthermore, the economic development spurred higher education: College students numbered less than 20,000 in the 1960s but more than 1 million at the turn of the 1980s (M. Lee, 1990, p. 2). Ultimately, these changes produced a large white-collar middle class that became the force for political stability in post-democratization South Korea. The transformation of every aspect of socio-economic conditions is overlapped with Park Jung-hee's leadership.

On the other hand, citizens' feelings of resentment and outright rejection of Park Jung-hee's authority emanate from the memory of his heavy-handed authoritarian rule and his political desire to become a lifetime president. Park established the legacy of a strong state apparatus that overwhelmed civil society by perpetuating bureaucratic systems and oppressive police tactics originating in the Japanese colonial era. As a military dictator, he institutionalized a strong authoritarian state and brought in the military top brass into politics to consolidate his dictatorship. Park's authoritarian rule rested on security and military agencies as well as emergency decrees. Immediately after the 1961 coup, Park instituted the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) with founding director Kim Jong-pil, one of the leading figures of the coup and Park's brother-in-law. The KCIA was not a mere intelligence agency but rather an omnipotent organ to buttress Park's coercive rule. The KCIA's mission of political purges and physical intimidation was not limited to political opposition leaders, labor forces, and college students who carried out organized opposition; the agency also surveilled the ruling inner circle. Furthermore, the *Yushin* constitution of 1972 provided Park with legal backing for his dictatorship. The emergency powers of Article 54 stated that "... he shall have the power to take emergency measures which temporarily suspend the freedom and rights of the people ... and to enforce emergency measures with regard to the right and powers of the Executive and the Judiciary" (C. I. E. Kim, 1978, p. 367).

The Park regime's greatest positive contribution may be sustained economic growth. Even so, Park Jung-hee's economic policies have been criticized as a source of political corruption and excessive economic inequality. Economic modernization was

conducted principally by sacrificing blue-collar workers and farmers by holding their wages at minimum and denying their labor rights. Meanwhile, Park's policies of government-led fast industrialization provided a small number of *chaebols* with enormous preferential benefits while sacrificing other participants in the market, thereby creating massive systemic corruption between the state and the market (D. C. Kang, 2002). The Park regime provided *chaebols* with generous policy loans, tax breaks, and other favors at the expense of small- and medium-sized businesses, urban laborers, and farmers (W.-T. Kim, 2001, p. 17). In the end, urban workers, farmers, and college students constituted the frontrunners of anti-military and pro-democracy demonstrations in the early stages of democratization in South Korea.

Although the evaluations of Park Jung-hee and his legacy diverge, one interesting phenomenon is that Park is remembered and evaluated in an increasingly positive light in post-democratization politics in South Korea. Park's political resurgence has several wellsprings, including the 1997 financial crisis and the emergence of Park Geun-hye as the icon of political conservatives in recent decades. The Park Jung-hee syndrome is associated with the general public's deep frustration with the Kim Young-sam government (1993–1998), which mismanaged the national economy to the point of complete disarray. As a result of the 1997 financial crisis, people lost confidence in the democratic government's ability to manage the national economy (W.-T. Kang, 2010, p. 5). In this respect, the Park Jung-hee syndrome can be defined as a phenomenon in which ordinary citizens in South Korea express nostalgia for Park Jung-hee's role in economic development (W. Kang, 2013).

Numerous public opinion polls in South Korea reveal consistently high levels of support for Park Jung-hee as a respected national leader (W.-T. Kang, 2010, p. 2). At the time of the 1997 financial crisis, a public opinion poll by Gallup Korea showed that almost 80% of respondents expressed a positive evaluation of Park (N. Lee, 2009; W.-T. Kang, 2010). In a more recent Gallup poll conducted in August 2015, 74.3% positively assessed Park's political performance and a staggering 93.3% cited his contribution to the economic development of the country (Gallup Korea, 2015). Furthermore, in the same opinion poll that asked "which president did the best job leading the country after liberation," 44% answered Park Jung-hee, followed by Roh Moo-hyun (24%) and Kim Dae-jung (14%). Among those who positively evaluated Park, 52% listed economic development, 15% pointed to the "New Village Movement," and 12% cited "improving the lives of the people" as his prominent legacy.

Do Park Jung-hee's supporters merely wish to repeat the economic miracle in the post-democratization setting, or do they desire the more fundamental norms and values that Park brought to Korean society? The following section details two major

theoretical arguments regarding the origins of authoritarian nostalgia, based on which competing hypotheses are formulated for empirical tests.

Origins of Authoritarian Nostalgia

This paper tests two theoretical arguments that account for the origins of authoritarian nostalgia, or the Park Jung-hee syndrome in the case of South Korea: political socialization theory and system output theory (Ekman & Linde, 2005). The socialization thesis suggests that those who have been socialized into certain socio-political values under authoritarian leadership become more nostalgic than younger generations who have not experienced authoritarian rule. Meanwhile, system output theory contends that authoritarian nostalgia originates from individuals' dissatisfaction with the present government's performance. The former finds the origins of authoritarian nostalgia in the memories that were formed in a person's early stage of life, while the latter suggests that nostalgia arises when the current government fails to perform well. Socialization theory expects demographic factors — generational differences in particular — to influence the ways in which individuals evaluate their previous authoritarian regime. In the South Korean context, people with "authentic memories" about or actual experiences with the regime are expected to have different attitudes toward Park Jung-hee than those who merely heard about the regime. On the other hand, system output theory suggests that the current democratic government's performance determines the ways in which people evaluate the previous authoritarian regime. If the current democratic regime is performing well in key policy areas, especially in management of the national economy and democracy, citizens will not express nostalgia for the authoritarian experience and vice versa.

Political Socialization Theory

The socialization argument stems from the study of political culture, defined as a "system of symbols" or a product of interaction among individuals within a society with widely accepted values, norms, and attitudes (Geertz, 1973, p. 12). Also, culture is persistent and transmittable from one generation to another through socialization. However, the older generation is expected to be more nostalgic than the younger generation; while the former was socialized for a relatively extended period of time with specific values such as paternalism and authoritarianism, the latter only remembers the downfall of authoritarian rule. In the end, the older generation may

express strong nostalgia for authoritarian rule, while the younger generation is likely to reject such authoritarian values (Ekman & Linde, 2005, p. 364).

Those who spent their childhood and/or early adulthood under an authoritarian regime may have acquired specific political-ideological orientations that the regime actively mobilized for regime maintenance. Most authoritarian regimes emphasize strong conservative and statist or nationalistic ideologies; in the South Korean context, citizens were socialized into specific ideologies, such as strong anti-communism, nationalism, patriotism, and the prioritization of economic modernization over democracy and individual freedom and rights. Due to the dictatorship's creation of a constant sense of national security crisis, individuals typically become more patriotic and prioritize national security over other political values. The effects of socialization are stronger and deeper for residents in rural areas than for those in urban or metropolitan ones. In South Korea, the so-called New Village (or *Saemaeul*) Movement began in 1970 to reduce the increasing income gap between urban and rural areas by building and modernizing the infrastructure in the countryside. However, the campaign was not limited to economic modernization; it also focused on mobilizing the rural population for political campaigns and instilling that population with certain sociopolitical value systems, such as a spirit of self-reliance, diligence, the primacy of group/community, patriotism, and a sense of national destiny. Thus, the effects of socialization under Park Jung-hee have been more influential among the rural rather than urban residents.

The socialization thesis produces at least three hypotheses related to authoritarian nostalgia. First, *the older generation that has a direct experience or memory of authoritarian rule may express stronger nostalgia than the younger generation*. Second, *the more ideologically conservative and nationalistic a person is, the more likely (s)he is to be nostalgic for authoritarian legacies*. Third, *individuals from rural areas are more sympathetic to authoritarian legacies than urban residents* (W.-T. Kang, 2010; W. Kang, 2013, 2016).

System Output Theory

While the socialization hypothesis assumes that authoritarian nostalgia is exogenous from the current government and political institutions, the system output thesis argues that the presence or absence of such nostalgia is endogenous to the current political system. In other words, authoritarian nostalgia is directly related to the current government's success or failure. Citizens' evaluations of government performance and trust in government are a consequence of effective government

(Hetherington, 1998; Huntington, 1968; J.-Y. Kim, 2005; Newton & Norris, 2000). Furthermore, while the socialization argument assumes that nostalgia originates from specific social-cultural contexts and tends to be consistent for relatively long periods of time, the system output argument expects citizens' attitudes toward the current democratic regime and the past authoritarian regime to fluctuate in a relatively short period of time, depending on short-term government performance and citizens' evaluations of that performance (Choi & Woo, 2016).

According to the system output argument, authoritarian nostalgia arises when citizens are dissatisfied or frustrated with the current government's inability to govern. A strong sense of authoritarian nostalgia has arisen in the East Asian region (especially South Korea and Taiwan) that share a sense of democratic inefficiency (or political performance) in the current democratic system and the legacies of a successful and innovative authoritarian past (Chang et al., 2007). The concept of political performance has a broad connotation that includes both the judgments on the current government's performance (including economic growth, the management of national security and order, and the provision of various other public goods) and the quality of governance that is effective, impartial, and non-corrupt (Dahlberg et al., 2015, p. 20). This study focuses on national economic conditions as representative of economic performance and on representativeness and satisfaction with democracy as political performance. System output theory hypothesizes that *authoritarian nostalgia arises when citizens perceive that the current democratic government cannot perform effectively.*

Data and Variables

For an empirical analysis, this paper utilizes the 2010 Korea Democracy Barometer (KDB) from the Korea Barometer and the 2010 and the 2015 Korean National Identity Survey (KNIS) from the East Asia Institute (EAI). Unlike other election surveys, these surveys include questionnaires that evaluate past governments from the first republic, allowing this study to identify the determinants of individual evaluations of particular authoritarian regimes and individual attitudes toward democratic values. The KDB asks for a comparative evaluation of past and current administrations ("Which administration is the best?"), and the respondents choose one from a list of presidents' names. Meanwhile, the KNIS asks respondents to evaluate political and economic contributions of each administration on a four-point scale ranging from very positive to very negative. In other words, the surveys provide different measures of an authoritarian regime's legacy thus making it possible to study

its various aspects. Furthermore, the datasets offer variables related to individual attitudes toward democracy.

To test the system output and socialization hypotheses concerning the individual evaluation of an authoritarian regime (and, in particular, Park Jung-hee), the empirical analysis includes current political and economic performance variables, age group, political orientation, and other demographic factors. Political performance of the current government is measured by two indicators: satisfaction with democracy and representativeness. The question of satisfaction with democracy asks how satisfied individuals are with the current status of democracy. Representativeness refers to whether individuals believe that the current government works for the general public rather than for the few. Those who are more satisfied with democracy and representativeness should give a lower evaluation of Park's government. Individual evaluations of national economic status provide an indication of the current government's economic performance. Those who give higher ratings to the current government's economic performance are expected to give poorer evaluations of Park's government and legacy. Other relevant economic factors include the priority of economic problems as national goals and the pride individuals feel regarding South Korea's economic status on the world stage. In general, the economic achievements of the Park administration are widely admired among Koreans and are the origins of the recent Park Jung-hee syndrome. Therefore, individuals are likely to evaluate Park's government more highly when they prioritize the economy over other issues and are proud of Korea's economic development. The importance of economic issues is a dummy variable, with 1 for people who consider the economy to be the most important national goal and 0 for others. Pride in Korea's economic achievements is measured on a four-point scale ranging from 0 for never proud to 3 for very proud.

As measures of political socialization, the analysis includes age group, statism, and political ideology. In addition, regionalism and town size specific to the Korean case are considered. Different age groups share different experiences, which shape individual attitudes. Those younger than 40 and older than 60 are compared with those between 41 and 59, who experienced and actively participated in democratic movements in their teens and 20s and are expected to have the lowest rating for Park's authoritarian legacies. A person's ideology is the culmination of socialization or personal experiences. As discussed, a more conservative person tends to be aligned with authoritarian values and offer a higher evaluation of Park. Ideology is measured on a 10-point scale ranging from very liberal to very conservative. Nationalistic or statist tendency is another socialization indicator. Authoritarian regimes, such as Park Jung-hee's, prioritize the state and society over individuals by taking individual

sacrifice for the nation for granted. Therefore, the stronger one's nationalistic sentiments, the higher he/she is expected to rate Park's regime. Nationalistic sentiments are measured by how much respondents agree with the following question on a four-point scale ranging from "strongly disagree" to "strongly agree" with the statement: "Individuals must sacrifice themselves for the country." Regionalism has also been a dominant feature of Korean politics for more than a half century. Korean regionalism is the result of regional disparity in economic and political power between the southeast region of Gyeongsang and the southwest region of Jeolla. Historically, most major conservative parties, including the Democratic Republican Party led by Park (1963–1979), were based in Gyeongsang, while progressive parties have been based in Jeolla. As the Gyeongsang parties have been predominant, Gyeongsang citizens have benefitted from authoritarian regimes and successive conservative parties. In contrast, the Jeolla region has been the center of massive democratic protests against authoritarian regimes. Based on dummy variables for people from Gyeongsang and Jeolla, attitudes toward Park are compared with those of people from other regions. One of Park's recognized legacies is modernization of rural areas through the *Saemaeul* Movement. The rural areas as the base category are compared with medium-sized towns and large cities. The smaller the town people in which people live, the higher their rating of Park's legacy.

Empirical Analysis: Missing for What, and Why?

It is important to identify the object of authoritarian nostalgia because it brings different consequences depending on what individuals actually miss. While nostalgia for individual authoritarian figures has a limited effect on new democratic systems, nostalgia for authoritarian rule can be extended to a legitimacy crisis in new democracies. In the case of South Korea, it is clear that citizens miss a particular authoritarian leader, Park Jung-hee, and not authoritarian rule itself. KDB and KNIS surveys show that many South Koreans have better memories of the Park era than those of any other president, including other general-turned- and civilian presidents (see Table 1). In particular, according to the KDB survey, more than 40% of respondents consider Park's regime to be the best government, while less than 7% rate the Chun regime, another military regime, as the best. The KNIS also confirms that Park's political and economic legacies are evaluated much more highly than Chun's. In fact, economic growth was much higher during Chun's regime, but Koreans still evaluate Park's in a much more positive light. Furthermore, Roh Tae-woo,

Table 1.
Evaluations on Various Regimes in South Korea

	Best Government[a] (%)	Political Legacy[b] (0 to 3)		Economic Legacy[b] (0 to 3)	
Regime	2010	2010	2015	2010	2015
Park, Jung-hee	40.31	1.93	1.98	2.51	2.48
		(0.88)	(0.83)	(0.62)	(0.68)
Chun, Doo-hwan	6.35	1.10	1.22	1.40	1.60
		(0.81)	(0.81)	(0.82)	(0.79)
Roh, Tae-woo	1.75	0.96	1.11	1.05	1.22
		(0.70)	(0.68)	(0.71)	(0.70)
Kim, Young-sam	1.31	1.22	1.31	1.06	1.17
		(0.72)	(0.71)	(0.68)	(0.70)
Kim, Dae-jung	16.87	1.76	1.76	1.58	1.64
		(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.76)	(0.76)
Roh, Moo-hyun	26.07	1.79	1.84	1.60	1.64
		(0.76)	(0.77)	(0.70)	(0.70)
Lee, Myung-bak	7.34	1.36	1.14	1.41	1.17
		(0.74)	(0.72)	(0.75)	(0.77)
Park, Geun-hye			1.33		1.29
			(0.80)		(0.76)
Total	913	1,006	1,006	1,006	1,006

Sources: [a]KDB Survey, 2010 by the Korea Barometer; [b]KNIS, 2010 & 2015 by the EAI.

another general-turned-president and the first democratically elected president after the 1987 democratization, received some of the lowest ratings on political and economic legacy.

In addition, a series of surveys from KDB reveals that offering Park Jung-hee's regime as an example of alternative government systems leads to favorable responses to non-democratic options. In Table 2, for example, the 1997 KDB survey asked, "How much do you agree with the statement that the dictatorial rule like that of a strong leader like Park Jung-hee would be much better than a democracy to handle the serious problems facing the country these days?"; 65.6% of the respondents answered either "agree strongly" or "agree somewhat." On the other hand, for the question, "How much do you agree or disagree with the following: It would be better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything?", only 19.1% chose either "agree strongly" or "agree somewhat." The pattern is consistent across time: A non-democratic type of governance is more acceptable to Koreans when it is linked to the name of Park Jung-hee. These responses suggest that Koreans do not long for a return to an authoritarian regime but rather miss a particular leader,

Table 2.
Support for Non-Democratic Forms of Governing

	1994	1997	1998	1999	2001	2004	2010
A strong leader like President Park Jung-hee	60.5%[a]	65.6%[b]	44%[c]	41.7%[c]	57.1%[d]		
A strong leader[e]		19.1%	24.9%	16.5%	20.2%	18.2%	10.4%
Army[f]		15%	13.6%	8.9%	17.1%	15.5%	8.6%

Notes: [a]The sum of the percentages of three categories — completely agree, very much agree, and somewhat agree — in the following statement: "It would be better to have a strong leader like President Park Jung-hee govern than to continue a democracy in order to tackle the difficult problems facing our country."
[b]The sum of the percentages of two categories — agree strongly and agree somewhat — in the following question: "How much do you agree with the statement that the dictatorial rule like that of a strong leader like Park Jung-hee would be much better than a democracy to handle the serious problems facing the country these days?"
[c]The percentage of the respondents who chose "Rule by dictator" in the following question: "Some people say that rule by a dictator like Park Jung-hee is the best way to sort out the economic problems facing the country; others say that a democratically elected president is better. What do you think?"
[d]The sum of the percentages of two categories — Dictatorship and Democracy are much the same — in the following statement: "Which one is better for dealing with economic problems, democracy or dictatorship like the Park Jung-hee regime?"
[e]The sum of the percentages of two categories — agree strongly and agree somewhat — in the following question: "Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say we would be better off if the country were governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree with the following: It would be better to get rid of Parliament and elections and have a strong leader decide everything."
[f]The sum of the percentages of two categories — agree strongly and agree somewhat — in the following question: "Our present system of government is not the only one that this country has had, and some people say we would be better off if the country were governed differently. How much do you agree or disagree with the following: The army should govern the country."
Source: KDB from 1994 to 2010.

Park Jung-hee, who is considered the founder of the Korean model of economic development and modernization.

Considering that the economy is always the most important issue and influences individual attitudes toward other areas of governance in South Korea, it is not surprising that people evaluate Park Jung-hee highly in the political sphere as well. The 2010 and 2015 KNIS have found that economic issues such as economic growth, stability, and low inflation are considered the most important long-term goals of the country. The findings of the 2010 KDB survey are the same with regard to prioritizing economic development over democratization: 48.31% of respondents selected economic development and 33.96% answered that the two are equally important, while only 16.33% picked democratization. In short, as salient as economic issues are, Park's economic legacy remains prominent, influencing how people evaluate other areas of his governance.

Who Misses the Park Regime?

This empirical section tests the political socialization and system output hypotheses regarding the Park Jung-hee syndrome. Ordinal probit or logistic regression is appropriate for ordinal-dependent variables like Park's political and economic legacies. However, as ordinal logistic and ordinary least squares (OLS) estimations provide similar outcomes and it is easier to interpret OLS estimates, Table 3 presents the OLS results only, and the results of the ordinal logistic regression are offered in the appendix (see Table A.1). For another dependent variable, choosing the best government,

Table 3.
Evaluation on the Park Jung-hee's Regime

Variables	Political Legacy OLS Estimates (Standard Error)	Economic Legacy OLS Estimates (Standard Error)	Best Government Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)
Proud of Economic Achievements	−0.018	0.098***	
	(0.036)	(0.031)	
National Economic Evaluation	0.081***	−0.029	−0.278***
	(0.32)	(0.027)	(0.101)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.177***	0.032	0.116**
	(0.038)	(0.031)	(0.048)
Representation	0.74	0.022	0.086
	(0.035)	(0.029)	(0.097)
Prioritization of the Economy	0.262***	0.111**	0.404***
	(0.067)	(0.056)	(0.149)
Ideology	0.047***	0.022*	0.118***
	(0.015)	(0.012)	(0.040)
Statism	0.160***	0.149***	
	(0.034)	(0.29)	
Jeolla	−0.207***	−0.059	−0.546**
	(0.066)	(0.055)	(0.218)
Gyeongsang	0.196***	0.225***	0.522***
	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.163)
Younger Voters (less than 40)	−0.249***	−0.305***	−0.812***
	(0.055)	(0.046)	(0.203)
Older Voters (60 and older)	0.109*	0.009	0.939***
	(0.064)	(0.054)	(0.191)
Medium Town Size	−0.181**	−0.158***	
	(0.071)	(0.059)	
Large Town Size	−0.183***	−0.001	
	(0.053)	(0.044)	

Table 3. (*Continued*)

Variables	Political Legacy OLS Estimates (Standard Error)	Economic Legacy OLS Estimates (Standard Error)	Best Government Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)
Constant	0.993***	1.911***	−1.852***
	(0.129)	(0.108)	(0.362)
Adjusted R^2	0.198	0.148	Pseudo $R^2 = 0.107$
Log Likelihood			−549.057
LR χ^2			131.274***
Correctly Predicted			69.45%
N	1,005	1,005	933

Notes: [a]The dependent variables of Park's political and economic legacies are based on the questions, "How do you evaluate the following government in terms of political development?": Park Jung-hee government and "How do you evaluate the following government in terms of economic development?": The Park Jung-hee government on a 4-point scale from very negative influence to very positive influence.
[b]The dependent variable of the best government is based on the question, "Which government is the best government?" Respondents who chose the Park Jung-hee regime are coded as 1 and otherwise as 0.
[c]The variable of pride in economic achievement from the KNIS is measured based on the following question: "How proud are you of Korea's economic achievement?" Responses range from 0 (never proud) to 3 (very proud). This variable is not available in the KOBAR data.
[d]National economic evaluation is based on how individuals evaluate recent national economic conditions, ranging from 0 ("got worse") to 4 ("got better").
[e]Satisfaction with democracy in the KNIS asks, "How proud are you of democracy in South Korea?" ranging from 0 (never proud) to 3 (very proud), while the KOBAR asks "How are you satisfied with current status of democracy?" ranging from 1 ("very unsatisfied") to 10 ("very satisfied").
[f]The variable of representation concerns individual opinions on the government's representativeness of the whole public, ranging from 0 ("strongly disagree") to 3 (strongly agree).
[g]The prioritization of the economy asks respondents to choose the most important national goal from among many different issues in the KNIS, while the KOBAR asks to choose only among economic development, democratization, or both. Respondents who answered economic development are coded as 1, otherwise as 0.
[h]Ideology ranges from 1 ("very liberal") to 10 ("very conservative").

*Significant at $p \leq 0.10$; **Significant at $p \leq 0.05$; ***Significant at $p \leq 0.01$.
Sources: KNIS, 2015 from the EAI for the analysis of Park's political and economic legacies and KDB, 2010 for the analysis of individual choice for the best government.

Park's versus others', binary logistic regression is utilized. Table 3 shows that the analyses of the KNIS and KDB yield compatible outcomes. Unlike the empirical prevalence of the system output hypotheses in the literature on authoritarian/communist nostalgia, the results of this study place more weight on the political socialization hypotheses.

Park Jung-hee's contribution to political development

In evaluating Park Jung-hee's political legacy, both performance and socialization factors are statistically significant but not all have the expected directions.

Regarding economic performance, individual assessment of recent economic conditions has a positive effect on evaluating Park's political legacy, while pride in the economic achievements of South Korea does not. The more a person perceives that national economic conditions have been better than they were five years ago, the more highly he/she is likely to evaluate Park's political contributions. However, how proud a person is of Korea's economic status on the world stage does not make much difference in her/his rating of Park's political contribution. As for political performance, those who take pride in the state of democracy and believe that the government works for the common people rather than for the interests of the few rate Park's political legacy more highly. In short, those who are satisfied with current economic conditions and the state of democracy hold Park's political legacy in high regard. This seems incompatible with the system output hypothesis that suggests people who are more satisfied with the performance of the current government are less nostalgic for an authoritarian regime. It is also ironic that current economic conditions have a substantial effect on the rating of Park's political leadership, while esteem for South Korea's economic status in the world does not. The prioritization of economic issues is another important factor that determines appraisals of Park's political legacy. Those who prioritize economic development over other issues have a higher evaluation of Park's political legacy, which also suggests the primacy of economic concerns in the evaluation of the political sphere.

The results better conform to socialization hypotheses than system output hypotheses. The statistical significance of ideology, statism, and regionalism clearly supports political socialization hypotheses. Conservatives tend to be more nationalistic in general, but their correlation is relatively low at 0.168, which indicates that ideology and statism capture distinct political values of the individuals. The more conservative and nationalistic a person is, the greater respect he/she has for Park Jung-hee's political legacy. Statism has a clearer linear effect than political ideology (see Figures 1 and 2). Individuals in the ideological middle have a lower evaluation of Park's political legacy than those who are very conservative. However, evaluations among the most liberal do not differ greatly from other respondents. Meanwhile, the least nationalistic respondents have a much lower rating for Park than the most nationalistic ones. Residents of the Gyeongsang region rate Park's political contribution more highly than those in other regions, while respondents from Jeolla offer a lower score. Political ideology, nationalism, and regionalism in South Korea were mostly framed during the Park regime. Political ideologies in South Korea are split on the basis of anti- versus pro-authoritarian values and the engagement with versus containment of North Korea. Political parties in South Korea are traditionally aligned with these divisions. All authoritarian regimes, including Park's, have forced the sacrifice of the individual for



Figure 1. Predictive margins of ideology in evaluations of Park's political legacy (with a 95% confidence interval).



Figure 2. Predictive margins of statism in evaluations of Park's political legacy (with a 95% confidence interval).

the benefit of the nation or community, strategically employing the threat of North Korea (the "North wind") for the survival of their regimes. At the same time, Park politically and economically discriminated against Jeolla, the home of his political rival Kim Dae-jung and the so-called holy land of democracy. The regional frame established by Park has been and is still dominant in South Korean politics, through both political socialization and the party system.

The effects of age group and town size comprise the final group of significant socialization variables: (1) Evaluations of Park Jung-hee's political legacy by the middle-aged (between 40 and 59) are higher than the younger and lower than the older, and (2) residents in rural areas rate Park's political contributions higher than those in larger cities. Unlike the expectation that individuals between 40 and 59 years old, constituting the generation of democratization, have the lowest rating of Park's political legacies, their rating is substantially lower than the younger and less significantly different from the older age group (at the 0.1 significance level). This might reflect life-cycle effects in which people become more conservative as they age. Alternatively, the issue of jobs and job security during the 1997 financial crisis in which these people were in their late 20s through 40s might have changed their views of Park. The urban–rural gap in the evaluation of Park's political achievements is consistent with the socialization hypothesis; the *Saemaeul* Movement targeted mostly rural-agricultural areas so that rural residents experienced a stronger socialization process with the sociopolitical values that Park introduced into society.

Park Jung-hee's contribution to economic development

The determinants of evaluations of Park Jung-hee's economic legacy are quite different from evaluations of his political legacy, although political socialization hypotheses are more strongly supported here than system output hypotheses. Contrary to results in the political legacy model, pride in Korea's economic development has a positive effect on appraisals of Park's economic legacy, while recent economic evaluations have had a negative but insignificant effect. In other words, many Koreans attribute the country's modernization, industrialization, and rapid economic development to Park's leadership, but individual perceptions of the country's recent economic performance offer little explanatory power for the evaluations of Park's economic legacy. The statistical significance of the prioritization of the economy also suggests that individuals giving priority to the economy evaluate Park's economic legacy highly. However, political performance measured by satisfaction with democracy and representativeness is not an important factor in evaluating Park's economic contributions. In short, these outcomes show little conforming evidence for the system output hypotheses.

Much like the results of the political legacy model, most socialization factors significantly influence evaluations of Park Jung-hee's economic legacy. Ideology and statism have the anticipated effects: The more conservative and nationalistic a person is, the higher the evaluation he/she has for Park's economic accomplishments. However, compared with appraisals of his political legacy, individuals tend to give a higher score for Park's economic contributions across different levels of political ideology and statism (see Figures 3 and 4). In particular, political moderates have a greater appreciation for Park's economic achievements than his political ones. One distinct outcome from the political legacy model is that individuals born in Jeolla do not display a clear difference from people from other regions in how they rate Park's economic performance, while the Gyeongsang-born give a significantly higher score. In all regions, evaluations of Park's economic contributions are much higher than judgments about his political legacy (see Table A.2). Individuals from Jeolla display the largest discrepancy between their appraisals of Park's political and economic legacies. A relatively higher consensus on Park's economic achievements is evidenced across different age groups and town sizes. Regarding generational differences in the evaluation of Park's economic contributions, the younger give a significantly lower rating, but the older show little disparity from the middle-aged (between 40 and 59



Figure 3. Predictive margins of political ideology in evaluations of Park's economic legacy (with a 95% confidence interval).



Figure 4. Predictive margins of statism in evaluations of Park's economic legacy (with a 95% confidence interval).

years old). Having indirect memories of Park's economic performance, the younger generations have the least experience with it, while other age groups have more direct memories and are more familiar. As mentioned earlier, nostalgia for the Park regime first began after an unprecedented economic downturn and massive layoffs during the 1997 Asian financial crisis. As older generations (including the middle-aged group) were hit hard by the crisis, their priorities and values may have changed, and this supports generational effects. Furthermore, residents of medium-sized cities evaluate Park's economic legacy poorly compared with residents of smaller cities, while large-city residents differ little from rural residents. In short, socialization theory has much greater explanatory power in explaining individuals' evaluation of Park's political and economic contributions.

Park Jung-hee's as the best government

The KDB asks which government is the best by listing the names of past and current presidents. The best government model compares characteristics of Park Jung-hee's admirers with those who admire other presidents. Note that the KDB does not provide questions about statism, pride in South Korea's economic development, or town size. Furthermore, the questions do not separate Park's political and economic contributions. Therefore, any comparison of the KDB results with those of the KNIS

must proceed with caution. However, political socialization hypotheses are clearly confirmed, and slight evidence of the system output hypotheses exists.

As is consistent with the system output hypotheses, the more satisfied people are with the current national economic status, the less likely they are to choose Park Jung-hee's government as the best. One common explanation for the Park Jung-hee syndrome is poor economic performance under democratically elected presidents; thus, individual perceptions of good economic conditions offer little reason to feel nostalgic for Park. This is also illustrated by the significance of the prioritization of the economy variable. Those who prioritize economic development over democratization support Park's government. However, the effect of satisfaction with democracy is the opposite of what is suggested by the hypotheses. Those more satisfied with democracy are inclined to prefer Park's government over those of other presidents, which is consistent with the outcome of the political legacy model. Thus, one can say that people who are dissatisfied with the current status of democracy desire a political leader who can improve democracy rather than feel nostalgia for an authoritarian leader.

Regarding the socialization factors, the KDB results demonstrate similar patterns to the outcome of the political legacy model. The effect of ideology is such that conservatives are more likely to regard the Park regime as the best, confirming expectations. In particular, the most conservative individuals have more than two times greater chance to say Park's administration is the best than the most liberal (see Table A.1). The preferences of citizens from different regions also vary significantly over existing governments. Jeolla citizens are clearly less likely and Gyeongsang citizens more likely to select Park Jung-hee's government as the best than citizens from other regions: Residents of Jeolla are 42% less likely, while residents of Gyeongsang are 69% more likely. Individuals younger than 40 are less likely and those 60 and older are more likely to consider Park Jung-hee's government to be the best than respondents between 41 and 59 years of age. The generation gap in evaluating Park's regime is much larger between the middle-aged and older groups than between the middle-aged and younger groups. In short, the results of system output hypotheses tests are mixed, while the outcomes of political socialization hypotheses are more consistent across different models of the Park Jung-hee legacy.

Conclusion

The emergence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in recent decades has provoked puzzling questions about a surge of authoritarian nostalgia after successful democratization and democratic consolidation in South Korea. The aftermath of Park

Geun-hye's impeachment seems to have decreased citizens' nostalgia for the authoritarian dictator. However, what remains to be seen is whether the authoritarian nostalgia will become a thing of the past or if citizens will continue to miss Park Jung-hee even after his daughter's political debacle.

The empirical analysis in this paper tests two theoretical arguments in regard to the origins of authoritarian nostalgia, i.e., political socialization and system output, in the case of South Korea. Unlike the previous findings from the study of post-communist political settings in Eastern Europe that support the system output hypothesis, the South Korean case confirms both political socialization and system output hypotheses. Both government performance and political socialization strongly affect the ways in which individuals evaluate Park Jung-hee. Consistent with system output theory, citizens in South Korea do not express nostalgia for authoritarian rule in general, but rather miss this particular authoritarian leader. What they wish for is the rejuvenation of an economy that has significantly decelerated and even gone into serious crisis during the Kim Young-sam government (1993–1998). At the same time, political socialization variables strongly influence authoritarian nostalgia in South Korea. In particular, political orientation — ideology and statism — and regionalism strongly affect citizens' evaluations of Park. Supporters of the dictator are conservative and nationalistic and mostly from the Gyeongsang region. The significance of socialization factors is not consistent with the predominant body of literature on authoritarian nostalgia that supports the system output argument.

What empirical implications does this paper impart to post-Park Geun-hye era politics in South Korea? The findings in this paper convincingly reveal that authoritarian nostalgia does pose challenges to democratic deepening in South Korea. The Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization politics has created a belief among a segment of people that authoritarian regimes are better at managing the national economy and that democracy is inefficient by contrast. As a result, although this paper does not present empirical evidence, those who positively evaluate Park Jung-hee's government, particularly his political legacy, may be willing to accept non-democratic political values, such as rule by the few, the military, a strongman, or a single party. Furthermore, one significant political effect of the Park Jung-hee syndrome has been that it has brought notable electoral advantages to the conservative political party and its candidates in the past decade. In both the presidential and the legislative elections prior to Park Geun-hye's impeachment, conservatives had successfully utilized nostalgia for Park and taken ownership over national economic and security issues.

One puzzling question is whether the Park Jung-hee syndrome will continue to be a relevant factor in the current Moon Jae-in government and upcoming elections. If system output theory is true, Park's impeachment and the Moon government's high popularity will significantly weaken authoritarian nostalgia, and South Koreans are no longer likely to miss the dictator. If the political socialization thesis is true on the other hand, Park's impeachment is not likely to erase authoritarian nostalgia from Korean politics. In other words, although a resurgence of the Park Jung-hee syndrome in post-democratization South Korea is not expected to derail the country's route to democratic deepening, it may continue to be a major source of political division in partisan and electoral politics in the future.

Appendix

Table A.1.
Evaluation on the Park Jung-hee's Regime

Variables	Political Legacy Ordinal Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)	Economic Legacy Ordinal Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)	Best Government Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Proud of Economic Achievement	−0.027	0.334***	
	(0.094)	(0.103)	
National Economic Evaluation	0.197**	−0.114	0.757***
	(0.081)	(0.088)	(0.076)
Satisfaction with Democracy	0.516***	0.114	1.123**
	(0.099)	(0.105)	(0.054)
Representation	0.179**	0.064	1.090
	(0.091)	(0.096)	(0.106)
Priority of Economy	0.665***	0.242	1.498***
	(0.172)	(0.184)	(0.223)
Ideology	0.111***	0.065	1.126***
	(0.038)	(0.042)	(0.045)
Nationalistic	0.400***	0.444***	
	(0.090)	(0.097)	
Jeolla	−0.520***	−0.148	0.578
	(0.169)	(0.178)	(0.126)
Gyeongsang	0.548***	0.833***	1.686***
	(0.144)	(0.162)	(0.275)

Table A.1. (*Continued*)

Variables	Political Legacy Ordinal Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)	Economic Legacy Ordinal Logistic Estimates (Standard Error)	Best Government Odds Ratio (Standard Error)
Younger Voters (less than 40)	−0.624***	−0.918***	0.444***
	(0.140)	(0.151)	(0.090)
Older Voters (60 and older)	0.319*	0.105	2.558***
	(0.167)	(0.187)	(0.489)
Medium Town Size	−0.498**	−0.470***	
	(0.179)	(0.194)	
Large Town Size	−0.506	−0.018	
	(0.136)	(0.147)	
Cut1 (Constant)	−0.772	−2.554	0.160***
	(0.352)	(0.419)	(0.057)
Cut2	1.331	−1.167	
	(0.343)	(0.375)	
Cut3	3.674	1.451	
	(0.360)	(0.370)	
Pseudo R^2	0.097	0.086	0.107
Log Likelihood	−1,082.635	−837.756	−549.057
LR χ^2	232.87***	158.13***	131.274***
N	1,005	1,005	933

Notes: *Significant at $p \leq = 0.10$; **Significant at $p \leq = 0.05$; ***Significant at $p \leq = 0.01$.

Table A.2.
Evaluation on Park Jung-hee's Political and Economic Legacies by Region

	Political Legacy (Standard Deviation)	Economic Legacy (Standard Deviation)	N
Jeolla	1.756	2.400	180
	(0.863)	(0.737)	
Gyeongsang	2.178	2.674	298
	(0.820)	(0.567)	
Other Regions	1.939	2.398	528
	(0.808)	(0.695)	
Total	1.977	2.480	1,006
	(0.834)	(0.679)	
F-test	16.00***	17.95***	

Source: KNIS, 2015 from the EAI.

References

Chang, Y.-T., Chu, Y.-H., & Park, C.-M. (2007). Authoritarian nostalgia in Asia. *Journal of Democracy, 18*(3), 66–80.

Choi, E., & Woo, J. (2016). The origins of political trust in East Asian democracies: Psychological, cultural, and institutional arguments. *Japanese Journal of Political Science, 17*(3), 410–426.

Dahlberg, S., Linde, J., & Holmberg, S. (2015). Democratic discontent in old and new democracies: Assessing the importance of democratic input and governmental output. *Political Studies, 63*(1), 18–37.

Denny, S. (2015, September 17). The mixed legacy of a South Korean dictator. *The Diplomat*. Retrieved March 2, 2016 from http://thediplomat.com/2015/09/the-mixed-legacy-of-a-south-korean-dictator/

Ekman, J., & Linde, J. (2005). Communist nostalgia and the consolidation of democracy in Central and Eastern Europe. *Journal of Communist and Transition Politics, 21*(3), 354–374.

Gallup Korea. (2015, August 7). *Gallup Korea daily opinion*. Retrieved March 5, 2016 from http://gallupkorea.blogspot.ca/2015/08/1742015-8-1.html

Geertz, C. (1973). *The interpretation of cultures*. New York, NY: Basic Books.

Hetherington, M. J. (1998). The political relevance of political trust. *American Political Science Review, 92*(4), 791–808.

Huntington, S. P. (1968). *Political order in changing societies*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Kang, D. C. (2002). *Crony capitalism: Corruption and development in South Korea and the Philippines*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Kang, W.-T. (2010). Missing the dictator in a new democracy: Analyzing the "Park Chung Hee syndrome" in South Korea. *Political and Military Sociology: An Annual Review, 38*(1), 1–25.

Kang, W. (2013). Park Jung-hee syndrome and democracy in South Korea: Four points of debate. *Korea and International Politics, 29*(2), 73–105.

Kang, W. (2016). Democratic performance and Park Chung-hee nostalgia in Korean democracy. *Asian Perspective, 40*(1), 51–78.

Kim, C. I. E. (1978). Emergency, development, and human rights: South Korea. *Asian Survey, 18*(4), 363–378.

Kim, J.-Y. (2005). "Bowling together" isn't a cure-all: The relationship between social capital and political trust in South Korea. *International Political Science Review, 26*(2), 193–213.

Kim, W.-T. (2001). Korean politics: Setting and political culture. In S. H. Kil & C.-I. Moon (Eds.), *Understanding Korean politics: An introduction* (pp. 9–32). Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.

Lee, M. (1990). *The odyssey of Korean democracy: Korean politics, 1987–1990*. New York, NY: Praeger.

Lee, N. (2009). The theory of mass dictatorship: A re-examination of the Park Chung Hee period. *The Review of Korean Studies*, *12*(3), 41–69.

Newton, K., & Norris, P. (2000). Confidence in public institutions: Faith, culture, or performance? In S. Pharr & R. Putnam (Eds.), *Disaffected democracies: What's troubling with the trilateral countries?* (pp. 52–73). Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Pinto, A. C. (2006). Authoritarian legacies, transitional justice and state crisis in Portugal's democratization. *Democratization*, *13*(2), 173–204.

Pinto, A. C. (2010). The authoritarian past and South European democracies: An introduction. *South European Society and Politics*, *15*(3), 339–358.

Pridam, G. (2000). Confining conditions and breaking with the past: Historical legacies and political learning in transitions to democracy. *Democratization*, *7*(2), 36–64.

Issues & Studies: A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs
Vol. 55, No. 1 (March 2019) 1950004 (28 pages)

DOI: 10.1142/S1013251119500048

The Nature of Popular Protest and the Employment of Repressive State Capacity in China

SHINN-SHYR WANG, HSIN-HSIEN WANG AND WEI-FENG TZENG

While China's economic reforms have produced undeniably positive outcomes, a rapid increase in popular protests has become most striking in recent years. As protests grow steadily in both scale and frequency, the government continues to tout social stability as the chief concern of China today. These mounting tensions reflect a direct clash of horns between the maintenance of stability and the public's desire to exercise their rights, frequently culminating in acts of repression by the Chinese state in order to quell the unrest. This raises an important question: how can the relationship between repression and popular protest in China be characterized? More specifically, which precise circumstances of popular protest elicit the employment of China's repressive state capacity? Taking into account both theoretical perspectives and empirical analysis, this paper attempts to elucidate the issue by first collating a large body of data to clarify the precise characteristics of popular protest, then undertaking quantitative analysis to identify which factors trigger the mobilization of China's machinery of repression. Furthermore, this study identifies that in recent years, the use of state

SHINN-SHYR WANG (王信實) is an Associate Professor in the Department of Economics and Director of International Master's Program of Applied Economics and Social Development at National Chengchi University. His research interests include industrial economics, entrepreneurial economics, and Chinese economic development. With unique datasets collected and maintained by him and his colleagues at National Chengchi University, his current studies on China investigate empirically popular protests and elite promotion mechanisms in the authoritarian regimes. He can be reached at <sswang@nccu.edu.tw>.

HSIN-HSIEN WANG (王信賢) is a Distinguished Professor and Director of the Graduate Institute of East Asian Studies at National Chengchi University. His primary research interests include comparative politics, political sociology, and state-society relations in contemporary China. He can be reached at <esteban@nccu.edu.tw>.

WEI-FENG TZENG (曾偉峰) is an Assistant Research Fellow at the Institute for National Defense and Security Research. His primary research interests include comparative politics, democratization, conflict management, China politics and cross-Strait relations. He can be reached at <wftzeng@gmail.com>.

repression has risen in parallel with an increasing emphasis on the principle of "maintaining social stability" in China.

KEYWORDS: **Popular protest; contentious politics; maintenance of stability; repression; violence.**

* * *

China's reform and opening up can be seen as a large-scale, comprehensive form of "social change" comprising a series of significant transformations to its economy, politics, and society. Despite the sweeping economic development brought about by the reforms, the drastic shake-up of the prevailing system has additionally triggered a seemingly endless catalogue of social problems. In the triangular tug-of-war of Party-state control, economic transformation and social change, squeezed tightly between the state and the market, social issues have clearly been marginalized. Against this background, popular protest is incontrovertibly on the rise within Chinese civil society.

According to official statistics, the number of popular protests surged dramatically between 1993 and 2003, from the roughly 10,000 recorded in 1994 to 60,000 in 2003; in other words, a six-fold rise or an average annual increase of 17%. In addition, the number of protesters involved rose from around 73,000 to 307,000 in the same time period; an annual increase of 12%. Statistics published by the Ministry of Public Security in January 2006 report that in 2005, the number of unapproved mass demonstrations, street protests, and rallies numbered 96,000, involving over 820,000 participants (Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2007). An average of 263 mass incidents occurred on any given day of the year. Interestingly, Chinese Communist Party (CCP) authorities have not released any related figures for more recent years.[1] Participants in Chinese popular protests have ranged from workers, farmers, migrant workers, and urban business owners, to consumers, environmental activists, students, decommissioned veterans, ethnic minorities, and even taxi drivers. In terms of scale, more and more protests have involved up to several thousand or even more than 10,000 participants.[2]

---

[1]However, according to estimates by Professor Li Ping Sun (孫立平) of the Department of Sociology at Qinghua University, there were 180,000 incidents of popular protest in 2010. See "Zhongguo Xuezhe" (2011).

[2]Examples of such large-scale protests in recent years include the Hanyuan Incident (漢源事件) in Ya'an City (雅安市), Sichuan, the Shanwei Incident (汕尾事件) in Guangdong, the PX Incident (PX 事件) in Xiamen, the Bobai Incident (博白事件) in Guangxi, the Weng'an Incident (瓮安事件) in Guizhou, the Shifang Incident (什邡事件) in Sichuan, the Qidong Incident (啟東事件) in Jiangsu, and the noted Wukan Incident (烏坎事件) in Guangdong. A great deal of international attention has been focused on popular protests such as the 2008 rioting in Lhasa (西藏三一四事件, *Xizang San Yi Si Shijian*) and the 2009 rioting in Urumqi (新疆七五事件, *Xinjiang Qi Wu Shijian*).

Faced with ubiquitous and snowballing dissension, the state has often responded with force. The CCP has historically relied on the watchword "armed struggle" (武裝鬥爭, *wuzhuang douzheng*) to assert its authority, both during the civil war against the Kuomintang (KMT, Chinese Nationalist Party) and from the founding of the People's Republic of China (PRC) in 1949 to the present day. Thus, armed police and public security forces are often seen to represent the most efficient means for controlling civil unrest in many popular protests today (O'Brien & Deng, 2015; Wang, 2006). Common methods of repression recently observed include forced dispersion, detention and even covert intervention and violence by hired gangsters and thugs.

In order to prevent the outbreak of instability and unrest, the CCP administration has relentlessly promoted the principles of a "harmonious society" (和諧社會, *hexie shehui*), "putting the people first" (以人為本, *yi ren wei ben*), and "innovative social management" (社會管理創新, *shehui guanli chuangxin*). However, it is questionable whether these concepts have made any concrete difference to the state's reliance on repressive action in cases where protests erupt. The overriding policy of the CCP in this regard is rather the "maintenance of social stability" (維護社會穩定, *weihu shehui wending*), seen as imperative for the effective governance and continued development of China, and to be upheld at all costs. This perceived need for social stability may go a significant way to explaining such frequent use of China's repressive state capacity.

With social stability increasingly framed as one of the cornerstones of state development and popular protests in China showing no signs of abating, the analysis of popular protests in China has been steadily growing. In fact, China may be the world's most appropriate "laboratory" for studies of contentious politics (Perry, 2002; Perry & Selden, 2000). Interesting research results and a fresh awareness of related issues have been produced by initial in-depth studies into rural protests (Li & O'Brien, 2008; O'Brien & Li, 2005, 2006; Yu, 2006, 2010), the protests of migrant workers (Becker, 2012), the 1989 Beijing student movement (Zhao, 2001), and a growing body of research by a new generation of scholars.

However, this body of literature suffers from two key drawbacks which this study aims to address: first, the literature presents either theoretical discussions or case studies without producing a systematic and comprehensive discussion of the trends and features of Chinese popular protest. The main reason behind this weakness is a shortage of data for analysis. This paper intends to bridge this gap by processing a large body of data in order to systematically depict both popular protest and the state response in China.

Second, much of current research has investigated the source of protests and the process of mobilization, but very little has focused on the state's reaction and response.

Although some findings on the use of state machinery in repression have emerged (Cai, 2008, 2010; Chen, 2012; Deng & O'Brien, 2013; O'Brien & Deng, 2015; Wright, 1999), the exact circumstances or factors which lead the state into choosing to repress a protest have not been identified and examined systematically. Dahl has pointed out that the state will initiate repressive action when it deems the "cost of repression" to be lower than the "cost of toleration" (Dahl, 1971). Yet which factors influence the state's calculation of the costs of repression or toleration? This paper intends to address this issue in the case of popular protest in China.

Theories of Protest and Repression

Social movements and popular protests can be defined as forms of organized political activity, launched by the weak or vulnerable in society or those lacking in power and influence. Such protests tend to be bottom-up, organized movements of resistance or negotiation (McAdam, Tarrow, & Tilly, 2001, pp. 4–9) which often arise due to the lack of an appropriate political channel for the needs or demands of the agitators (Marx & McAdam, 1994, p. 93). On the other hand is the concept of a "political opportunity structure" highlighting the connection between social movements and the political system, proposing that the occurrence of protests is not related merely to the strength of social movements themselves, but is also subject to a range of political conditions (McAdam et al., 2001; Meyer, 2004).

With respect to social movements, the more recent concept of "contentious politics" has emphasized the importance of the state's political regime and stressed that popular protest is political in nature — in fact, the state itself is frequently an important contributing actor (Tilly & Tarrow, 2007). Mann (1993, 2008) proposed that state power can be divided into despotic power and infrastructural power. Despotic power is a way of orchestrating state forces to allow authorities to act upon their own initiative according to their respective will and jurisdiction, without engaging in routine or institutionalized negotiation with civil society and social groups. Despotic power is closely linked to the freedom to engage in repressive acts when deemed necessary. Repression "refers to the state's ability within its territory to coerce or intimidate populations or organizations that challenge the existing government and socio-political order" (Davenport, 2007a, pp. 1–23) and is associated with state's willingness and capacity to crack down on society. Davenport (2007a) points out that ever since the emergence of the nation-state, various forms of state violence have invariably existed, and despite new developments over time, the power of the state to repress has remained important throughout. The interests of ruling authorities lie

decidedly in maintaining the status quo. As such, repression is often the preferred approach to restore order in the case of dissent. Furthermore, the current literature on the "dissent–repression nexus" falls into two general categories (Davenport, 2007a; Lichbach, 1987). The first discusses how the type of political regime influences state tactics of repression, while the second emphasizes the strategic interaction between the state and the protesters.

Political Regime Type

Scholars generally agree that there is a non-linear relationship between the use of state repression and regime type, represented on a sliding scale from democratic to authoritarian to totalitarian. For example, Regan and Henderson (2002) discovered that the relation between regime type and use of repression can be represented by a bell-shaped curve. The most widespread use of repression has occurred in countries with mid-range, semi-democratic political systems. Carey's (2010) study of the link between state terror and protests also corroborated the existence of a non-linear correlation between regime type and use of repression. As institutionalized democratic regimes offer the public unobstructed channels for expression, the public is less likely to trigger the use of repression. On the contrary, the level of societal control in totalitarian dictatorships is so high that it is unlikely for social movements to even have the chance to emerge. The most widespread employment of repressive action occurs in countries with transitional and hybrid (semi-democratic) regime types (Carey, 2010). This supports the aforementioned theory of political opportunity structure which states that social movements tend to attract the most popular support in the mid-range, where political opportunity is neither entirely inaccessible nor completely open to competition.

While the political regime in China after its reform and opening up can no longer be defined as totalitarian, it still retains the characteristics of an authoritarian or post-Communist, post-totalitarian regime (Linz, 2000; Linz & Stepan, 1996). In fact, some innate characteristics of the Chinese system such as clientelism (Oi, 1989, pp. 1–12; Walder, 1986), clans (Lin & Chen 1999, pp. 145–170), and complex regional interest structures (Oi, 1999; Walder, 1995; Wank, 1999, pp. 23–40), actually go some way to block the interference of the state. But succinctly, China's current political regime type falls squarely into the peak of the repression bell curve. On the one hand, relative social autonomy has led to the emergence of limited mobilization networks, and on the other, the Party-state's total monopoly on power has led to the radicalization of popular protest. Authorities and protesters are often drawn into a zero-sum game of conflict.

Although the relationship between a political regime and the use of state repressive capacity is certainly illustrative, none the least in the case of China, this theory is also too static for our purposes. As it is broadly structural in nature, in discussions over the use of repression, the existence of this capacity is a pre-condition and therefore of little analytical use when considering the dynamics between the state machinery of repression and popular protesters. It is thus instructive to switch the research stance from considering repression merely an outcome of static structures to viewing it as a case of strategic interaction — the mobilization of state resources in a countermovement against the actions of protesting dissenters.[3]

Strategic Interaction

From the perspective of strategic interaction, state use of violent repression is not only related to regime type, but is also a direct response to the actions of protesters. For example, after examining the individual cases of Peru and Sri Lanka between 1955 and 1991, Moore (2000) concludes that by looking in particular at the sequential responses of the state and dissenters, it is possible to identify that the action or behavior of one party tends to be triggered by the other. Hoover and Kowalewski (1992) analyzed data on dissent-regime conflict between 1965 and 1991, discovering a positive linear correlation between the state's level of sensitivity to popular protest and the sensitivity of the reactions of protest groups to repressive action.

Regan and Henderson (2002) argue that a state's decision to employ repressive action is determined by the threat it faces. The state carries out a cost-benefit analysis in order to inform its decisions on the use of repressive action. According to Davenport's (2007b) study on dissent in the US, threats to the state can be divided into specifically political threats or threats that merely result from protest behavior. Political threats are seen by the state to be particularly dangerous; the instant any kind of significant political threat emerges, there is a dramatic increase in the likelihood of the state resorting to acts of repression (Davenport, 2007b). It is generally considered that the majority of democratic regimes would react in the same way as the US government in the cases in Davenport's study, and certainly a more authoritarian regime such as China's.

[3]In addition to the strategic interaction between state and society, another way to break down the current research agenda of China's state repression and social protests is to observe the variations in local state capacity. While this is an interesting research question, it is beyond the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, an analysis of how variations in local state capacity determine repressive state behavior is a promising project for future research. We thank one reviewer for pointing this out.

It is generally the state that prevails in interactions with protesters in non-democratic regimes, as it monopolizes power and possesses the vast majority of resources. For instance, research by Ferrara (2003) into the strategic interactions of the late 1980s Burmese military junta with dissidents reveals that protesters were dragged into a "Hobbesian Dilemma" as a result of repressive state tactics. Furthermore, when elites employ the machinery of the state in an act of repression, consistency is crucial to the evolution of a protest event. Inconsistency increases the likelihood of either more violent repression or the consolidation and reinforcement of the protests (Cunningham & Beaulieu, 2010; Lichbach, 1987). The inconsistency in the standpoints of the CCP central political elite during the Tiananmen Square Incident in 1989 is a pertinent example.

Taking this perspective into account, the use of repression may be best explained by considering the nature of the protest as opposed to static factors such as regime type or resource mobilization alone. Yet, several questions remain: Which precise factors contribute to a political regime's decision to employ tactics of repression? How exactly does a state make this cost-benefit analysis? Does the calculation depend on the target of the protest? The social background of the protesters? The protest methods employed? The forms of mobilization? The scale of the protest? Or are there other factors? How exactly does the state deliberate and ultimately decide whether or not to take action? This study will use an empirical approach to not only establish the characteristics and recent trends of popular protest in China, but also to attempt to identify which precise factors influence the state's decision to employ repressive action when faced with popular protest. In this paper, we argue that the strategic interaction between the state and protesters will vary across different phases of protest events under different structural conditions, which are determined by the aforementioned factors. We introduce these factors as follows.

Characteristics of Popular Protest in China

In terms of empirical analysis, this study makes use of descriptive statistics, correlation analysis, and regression analysis in order to draw a full picture of the relationship between protest characteristics and the use of state repression. As it is not possible to access official "authoritative" data, the data in this research were sourced from open reports on large internet news portals.[4] Although data collected via the

[4]Some news sites, such as Epoch Times (大紀元) or New Tang Dynasty Television (新唐人), have a particular stance, so the information published has been cross-referenced with other sources to ensure reliability.

media in this manner could potentially be biased, this study performed cross-comparisons in order to further draw out the most appropriate body of data. The data comprise 2,931 reports between 2006 and 2017, which outline the factors of location, time, scale and target of the protest, the grounds for the protest and the nature of demands, the method of mobilization, whether the protest involved violence or foreign interference, and the manner in which it was ultimately resolved.

After collecting the data samples, descriptive statistics were assembled in order to identify a range of characteristics of popular protests in China. Ten variables have been presented in tables, demonstrating these central tendencies. Findings include the general nature of the protests (including scale, location, and district type), structural conditions (grounds for protest, the social background of protesting groups, the nature of their demands, and mechanisms of mobilization), protest actions (protest type and target), and finally the measures taken by the state to resolve the protest.

General Nature of the Protest

Scale

The participation cost of each participant should theoretically decrease as the number of participants increases, bolstering the willingness of citizens joining the protest (Lichbach, 1998; Olson, 1965). Therefore, the scale of a protest may determine how the protesters and the government evaluate their moves in the state–protester interaction (Mason & Murtagh, 1985). As shown in Table 1, the largest proportion of cases (44.86%) involved between 100 and 1000 participants. The scope of protest is therefore relatively small in proportion to the country's total population. Protests of over 10,000 made up just 4.35% of the total. Grounds for protest included dissatisfaction with official law enforcement or tax policies, forced demolition and relocation by the local government, and environmental activism. A deeper look reveals that the majority of the largest-scale protests were "sudden incidents" (突發事件, *tufa shijian*)

Table 1.
Protest Scale

Scale	Percentage (%)
0–100	12.62
100–1000	44.86
1000–10,000	31.53
10,000+	4.35

caused by conflict between the public and law enforcement authorities, and characterized by a lack of organization. These factors will be discussed in more detail in due course.

Location

Where a protest is staged may influence the interaction between state and protesters. For instance, in politically important regions such as provincial capitals, the government may be more willing to clamp down on opposition in order to assert its authority. According to the collected data, the five provinces with the greatest occurrence of protests are Guangdong, Beijing Municipality, Sichuan, Hubei, and Zhejiang, in that order. The highest number of protests took place in Guangdong; in addition to its proximity to Hong Kong and the relatively high quality of its media (such as the *Southern Daily*), which allows for a greater flow of information, Guangdong Province is also an area with a great deal of labor-intensive processing industries, making labor disputes common. Beijing was ranked at number two; as the nation's capital, many citizens come from elsewhere to lodge collective petitions with the central government, often ending in protests. Apart from these two key locations, other "hotspot" areas tended to be either relatively economically developed coastal regions or central industrial provinces. This appears to demonstrate that the social change brought about by rapid economic development is one of the crucial factors behind the high occurrence of protests. The figures for location are presented in Table 2.

Table 2.
Protest Location

Order	Location of Protest	Amount	Percentage (%)
1	Guangdong Province	624	20.36
2	Beijing Municipality	281	9.17
3	Sichuan Province	247	8.06
4	Hubei Province	160	5.22
5	Zhejiang Province	150	4.89
6	Guangxi Zhuang Autonomous Region	119	4.40
7	Jiangsu Province	135	4.08
8	Shanghai Municipality	103	3.88
9	Henan Province	112	3.88
10	Hunan Province	125	3.65

Table 3.
Protest District Type

District Type	Percentage (%)
Urban	48.85
Rural	42.95
Rural to Urban	8.11

Protest district type

Whether the protest takes place in rural or urban areas is another important geographic factor that may determine the strategic interaction between state and protesters, as policy preferences diverge between one area and another. For instance, the government will be more likely to offer concessions to rural residents than urban citizens if it fears a peasant movement. As shown in Table 3, 48.85% of popular protests took place in urban areas, demonstrating the challenges presented by China's rapid urbanization. Many of these protests occurred in the urban fringe where the city meets the countryside. 42.95% of popular protests were reportedly in rural districts. However, local governments may suppress information about protests in their jurisdiction, lowering the proportion of rural protests reported. Furthermore, due to the workings of China's current political system, many rural residents find that their problems are left unresolved by the authorities in their home area or even local township, having no choice but to take their petition to a higher level in the city, which may ultimately end in protest. Such cases are categorized in this research as "rural to urban" and make up 8.11% of the total.

Structural Conditions

Grounds for protest

The type of issue at stake matters greatly, as certain issues are deemed more legitimate than others — for instance, the rights of workers or the livelihood of peasants take precedence over issues of political rights. Table 4 displays data on the reported grounds for protesting. This research reveals that the largest number of cases were brought in relation to salary disputes (27.25%) and land appropriation — at 22.41%. These two categories represent almost half (49.66%) of the protests in the data. Popular protests against improper law enforcement (including officials assaulting citizens) made up 19.36%. Although this is not the highest proportion, it is precisely this type of trigger that leads to the largest-scale protests. In addition, though on the

Table 4.
Grounds for Protest

Grounds for Protest	Percentage of Total
Salaries and wages (including workers, migrant workers, taxi drivers, etc.)	27.25
Land appropriation and compensation	22.41
Improper law enforcement	19.36
Environmental protection	8.43
Disputes of consumption	8.34
Liberal democracy and human rights (including judicial fairness)	4.38
Sudden incidents (short-term), conflict, traffic accidents	3.18
Campus management	3.28
Other	3.37

increase in recent years, protests over issues of environmental degradation comprised just 8.43% of the total. Protests directly connected to liberal democracy and human rights issues made up 4.38%.

Social background of protest groups

In addition to issue type, the composition of its participants may influence the threat a group receives from the government. For instance, if the government prioritizes the welfare of workers over the demands of the rich, it is unlikely to sympathize with a group of investors demanding financial compensation for losses in stock investment and consequently use more violence against them. In our data, we identified two groups of protesters — upper class and lower class, each of which represents certain group interests and government policy preferences. While former CCP leaders Jiang Zemin and Hu Jintao paid more attention to upper classes in their policy discourses (The Three Represents, for instance), Xi Jinping has done the opposite and prioritized the interests of lower class groups. As shown in Table 5, protests by the upper classes, including businessmen and the self-employed, comprised just 15.34%

Table 5.
Social Background of Main Protest Group

Social Background	Percentage (%)
Upper class	15.34
Lower class	84.56

of the total. The remaining 84.56% involved the lower classes made up of the relatively more vulnerable members of society such as workers, migrant workers, drivers, herders, and decommissioned military officers. It is clear that the overwhelming majority of recent protests in Chinese society have been carried out by those at the lower end of the social spectrum.

Nature of protest demands

With regard to its socio-economic development, China has witnessed more and more protests pursuing non-material goals such as environmental movements, religious rights or patriotic demonstrations. It is possible that the government's response to social protesters will evolve with the transformation of society, becoming more accepting of environmental activism that does not involve politics. Judging from the reported demands, this research has divided cases into those relating to material needs, labeled "materialist," and those touching on more abstract demands such as environmental protection, women's rights, peace, and civil rights, categorized as "post-materialist" (Inglehart, 1997). The former made up a huge 88.55%, and the latter 11.45% (Table 6).

Table 6.
Nature of Protest Demands

Nature of Demand	Percentage of Total
Materialist	88.55
Post-materialist	11.45

Mechanisms of mobilization

In addition to these factors, this study now makes use of resource mobilization theory (Tilly, 1978), the theory proposing that social movements are the result of the efficient and organized mobilization of protest participants. However, the collected data show that in the case of China, a mere 2.47% of popular protests displayed any form of organized mobilization (Table 7).[5] The majority thus fall into the category of "sudden incidents" (突發事件, *tufa shijian*). Currently, officials and academics are

[5]This particular figure may be somewhat inaccurate; although the proportion of "organized" protests is low, it is perhaps unlikely to be as low as 2.35%. The figures may be skewed due to two factors: either media reports simply overlooked this fact, or the organization behind the protest was deliberately concealed in order to cover up the involvement of some kind of grassroots official organization such as a village committee or a senior association.

Table 7.
Mechanisms of Mobilization

Mechanism of Mobilization	Percentage (%)
Involves organization	2.47
Use of mobile phone and/or internet	7.82

earnestly attempting to pinpoint why and how originally "non-interested parties" become drawn into protests. Particularly when seen in terms of "peaceful to violent" protests, in which it was noted that the main trigger for the transformation of a protest from peaceful to violent was an inappropriate response by government law enforcement, it is evident why the CCP central authorities attach such importance to the requirement that every cadre must study the official guide "The Handling of Sudden Mass Incidents," in order to prepare themselves for this very real possibility. Additionally, it is also worth noting that 7.82% of the protests involved high-tech methods of communication such as the internet or mobile phones. This trend appears to be increasing rapidly from year to year.

Protest Action

Protest type

Perhaps the most important trigger for a government crackdown is the escalation of the event into a violent confrontation between the state and protesters. As shown in Table 8, the data analysis reveals that in terms of protest type, by far, the largest proportion was peaceful (72.92%). This includes such methods as street demonstrations and processions, sit-ins, hunger strikes, work strikes, driving strikes, or boycotting classes. Non-peaceful protests made up a total of 27.09%, a figure which can be broken down yet further: 16.19% of protests were violent, a classification including conflict, containment, terrorist attacks, the destruction of property, collisions, and

Table 8.
Protest Type

Protest Type	Percentage (%)
Peaceful	72.92
Peaceful to violent	10.90
Violent	16.19

armed fights. 10.90% of protests were categorized as "peaceful to violent," which means that when peaceful methods failed to bring about any response, the protesters turned to violent methods. Interestingly, the most common trigger for the turn to violence in the latter category was an inappropriate government response to the initial protest.

Protest target

Another reasonable expectation is that a protest targeting the government will more likely suffer repression than one against other targets such as companies or foreign countries. This argument rests on a proposition that any opposition to an authoritarian government poses a direct threat to the survival of the regime. As shown in Table 9, possible targets were divided into five broad categories: administrative units, public security forces, state-owned and collective enterprise, non-governmental sectors, and foreign governments and institutions. Of these, targets which could be categorically labeled as "governmental" (administrative units and public security forces) made up the largest proportion at 67.14%. One further category — "non-government to government" — was included to refer to protests which were originally targeted at non-governmental bodies or state-owned or collective enterprises, but later transformed into protests against "public units" classed as governmental in nature. If this category at 4.25%, and the category of state-owned and collective enterprises at 7.53% are added to the purely governmental target figure of 67.14%, then protests targeted at government bodies constitute a massive 79.01%, while protests targeted exclusively at non-government sectors or foreign-related institutions collectively make up 20.99%.

Table 9.
Protest Target

	Protest Target	Percentage of the Total	Comprehensive Totals
Governmental	Administrative units	53.65	79.01
	Public security forces	13.59	
	State-owned and collective enterprises	7.53	
	Non-government to government	4.25	
Non-governmental	Non-governmental sectors (private enterprise, foreign investment, etc.)	20.50	20.99
	Foreign governments, units, and organizations	0.49	

In addition to these nine main factors, this research also took into account popular protest involving "foreign influence." According to the data, only 1.10% of the cases featured any involvement of foreign or transnational government or non-government organizations, including such examples as Falun Gong, the Jasmine Revolution, or some movements relating to ethnic minorities. "Foreign influence" played a major role in the third wave of democratization, the spread of democracy in the Eastern European bloc, and even the Arab Spring in the Middle East and North Africa. The CCP is thus extremely wary of the "intervention of foreign forces" and will spare no effort to clamp down on any such influence. Moreover, local governments in China have a certain degree of freedom in the implementation of their policies, depending upon how the central government views their role (Yang, 2012). We have therefore used the geographic distance of the provincial capital from Beijing as a control variable in the model to control the leeway a local government has to quell protests without permission from the central government.

Overall, the data reveal that the size and scope of protests are not particularly large in comparison with the country's massive population. The district type and grounds for protest tend to carry certain broad tendencies, whereas the social background of protesters demonstrates an overwhelming tendency toward the lower, more vulnerable classes, with the vast majority of protests concerning materialist demands. Very few protests are organized, and even fewer record foreign involvement. Two important insights are that, first, the target of the protest is most often a government body, both categorically and by association; and second, most protests are peaceful in nature.

State Response

The use of repression to quell protests in China is recurrent and widespread. The data portrayed in Table 1 show that the state employed repressive actions in 49.66% of cases. By way of comparison, a study of the US by Soule and Earl shows that on a yearly basis from 1960 to 1986, cases of law enforcement using force reached a maximum of 31%. However, the use of actual violence by police never surpassed 14% (Soule & Earl, 2005). The Chinese government shows a marked tendency toward repressive action, and either downplays the situation or offers no response at all in other cases. Considering Table 10 alongside the findings shown in Table 8, which showed that 72.92% of protests were peaceful, it is evident that the state is relying excessively on repression.

This high proportion is partially due to the fears of local government officials that the situation might snowball out of control, encouraging a mindset of "repress first,

Table 10.
State Response

State Response	Percentage of the Total
Repression	49.66
Negotiation	8.60
Repression to negotiation	5.22
Downplay or no response	36.52

then watch and wait." The political system itself is another factor; the top leaders must take ultimate responsibility for all incidents under their jurisdiction. As such, they have the discretion to mobilize any resources at their disposal, with few restraints on the capricious use of repression. In addition, certain governmental units seem to be benefitting or expanding their power along with the increased emphasis on social stability in recent years. There are signs that police stations, police manpower, and the budgets of public security bureaus are all on the rise. Also, on the ascent is the ratio of provincial public security bureau chiefs (often also working as secretaries and vice-secretaries of the Politics and Law Committee) entering Party committees. In short, the CCP is relying increasingly on the machinery of repression to maintain basic social stability.

The Statistical Relationship between Popular Protest and State Repression

Identifying trends in the nature of protests and the state's typical response to them allows us to understand the general context of popular protests in China more comprehensively. However, descriptive statistics cannot reveal the link between the nature of popular protest and the use of repressive state capacity. This study therefore presents the empirical findings of both correlation and regression analysis of the data in order to ascertain precisely which factors trigger the state's decision to employ the machinery of repression.

Correlation Analysis

Correlation analysis can clarify the relationship between any two given variables. The findings of the correlation analysis are presented in Table 11. This study's

correlation analysis made the preliminary discoveries that the use of state repression was positively related to the following factors:

(1) the target of the protest was the government;
(2) the protesters employed violent methods;
(3) there was foreign involvement;
(4) the main protest group was from the lower class;
(5) the protest occurred in a rural area;
(6) demands were post-materialist in nature;
(7) the protest involved ethnic minorities;
(8) the year in which the protest occurred.

In addition, there was a negative relation between repression and the scale of the protest. A negative correlation was also found between repression and the involvement of an organization, in addition to improper law enforcement. This negative correlation may suggest that when a protest attracts enough participants who are able to organize in opposition to government wrongdoing, state repression may be less likely to take place. However, although correlation analysis provides many interesting insights, it is only able to reveal the relationship between two variables with possible influences from other related variables, which can lead to misinterpretations of their true impact. It is therefore necessary to perform regression analysis with appropriate theoretical support in order to assess the statistical impact of a chosen explanatory variable on the explained variable.

Regression Analysis

This study made use of Probit regression analysis to further investigate the data. Regression analysis depicts the effect of one or more explanatory variables on an explained variable. Since the explained variable in this study — repression — is discrete (it either exists or does not), the study here made use of binary choice Probit regression analysis. The results are shown in Table 12. In addition, marginal effect analysis was also performed, the results of which are shown in Table 13.[6]

Holding all other factors on their means, regression analysis uncovered that the existence of mechanisms of mobilization (organization/high-tech communication), lower class protesters, the use of the internet, post-materialistic demands, and the

[6]It is worth noting that our analysis can show only a one-shot game due to limited data. In other words, our analysis does not show the sequential play of the government–protester game, which theoretically would contain different sets of responses for each party.

Table 11.
Correlation of Repression and Other Factors

	Repression	Scale	Target	Involved Organization	Involved Violence	Foreign Involvement	Improper Law Enforcement	Social Background (Lower Class)	Location (Rural)	Nature of Demands (Post-Materialism)	Ethnic Minority Involvement	Year
Repression	1.000											
Scale	−0.0285	1.000										
Target	0.0496	−0.363	1.000									
Involved organization	−0.0087	0.0122	0.0235	1.000								
Involved violence	0.212	0.0735	0.0241	−0.0492	1.000							
Foreign involvement	0.0161	−0.0247	−0.0006	0.133	0.0113	1.000						
Improper law enforcement	−0.0402	0.0757	0.2205	0.0314	0.0575	−0.0256	1.000					
Social background (lower class)	0.0366	0.0891	0.0736	−0.0597	0.1349	0.0183	0.0378	1.000				
Location (rural)	0.0868	0.0166	0.0872	−0.0158	0.1764	−0.0117	−0.007	0.2326	1.000			
Nature of demands (post-materialism)	0.0333	0.0175	0.031	0.0883	−0.0073	0.1221	0.0306	0.0509	0.017	1.000		
Ethnic minority involvement	0.0236	−0.071	0.037	0.0172	0.0561	0.1715	0.0054	0.0515	0.1015	0.0773	1.000	
Year	0.0409	0.0112	−0.0481	−0.0104	−0.1241	−0.0541	0.1451	−0.0812	0.0871	0.0191	0.0649	1.000

Table 12.
Probit Regression Analysis

Repression	Coefficient	Standard Error	z-Value	p-Value
Constant	−70.390***	15.470	−4.55	0.000
Scale (over 10,000 participants)	−0.111**	0.051	−3.13	0.015
Government target	0.188***	0.060	3.01	0.001
Involved organization	0.0353	0.165	0.21	0.415
Involved violence	0.687***	0.058	11.84	0.000
Foreign involvement	0.284	0.266	1.07	0.143
Grounds for protest: Improper law enforcement	−0.245***	0.063	−3.89	0.000
Lower class protesters	−0.005	0.068	−0.07	0.471
Rural district type	0.110**	0.052	2.12	0.017
Use of internet/mobile phone	−0.052	0.093	−0.56	0.288
Nature of demands (post-materialist)	0.118*	0.080	1.48	0.070
Ethnic minority involvement	−0.005	0.156	−0.03	0.487
Western province	−0.067	0.092	−0.73	0.233
Directly controlled municipality	0.224***	0.077	2.91	0.002
Distance from Beijing (100 km)	0.008**	0.004	2.00	0.023
Year	0.035***	0.008	4.38	0.000
Loglikelihood	−1,919.1895			
Total samples	2,931			

Note: *, **, ***, respectively, denote a statistical significance of 10%, 5%, and 1%; the lower the percentage, the more conclusive the relationship between the variables.

involvement of ethnic minorities or foreign organizations all had no discernible effect on the use of repression.

First, in terms of methods of mobilization, the existence of some form of organization within the protest did not have a significant effect on the use of repression. This may arguably be because there has been no meaningful organized opposition to the prevailing system since to the total suppression of the Falun Gong movement. Only 2.47% of the data collected reveal any organization whatsoever, and many of the urban enterprise committees, trade unions, rural village committees, seniors' associations and other formal organizations involved actually acted as conduits for the government to negotiate and communicate with the protesters.

Second, Table 12 indicates that there was no significant association between repression and the lower social background of the main group of protesters. Though the Chinese state has moved toward left since Xi came to power in 2012, fighting against corruption and carrying out several policies aimed at improving the economic

Table 13.
Marginal Effect Analysis

Repression	Variable dy/dx	Significance Level at 5% or Lower
Scale (over 10,000 participants)	−0.042	✓
Government target	0.070	✓
Involved organization	−0.013	×
Involved violence	0.258	✓
Foreign involvement	0.106	×
Grounds for protest: Improper law enforcement	−0.092	✓
Lower class protesters	−0.002	×
Rural district type	0.041	✓
Use of internet/mobile phone	−0.020	×
Nature of demands (post-materialist)	0.044	×
Ethnic minority involvement	−0.002	×
Western province	−0.034	×
Directly controlled municipality	0.084	✓
Distance from Beijing	0.003	✓
Year	0.013	✓

conditions of the poor, our analysis shows no sign that the state makes any particular concessions to protests initiated by lower classes.

Third, the statistical analysis reveals that post-materialistic demands had no significant influence on the government's decision to crack down violently on a protest. In other words, the type of issue at stake is not a factor triggering government repression — value-oriented protests involving political rights or the environment are sometimes seen as harmful to the government policies and the careers of local officials. They are therefore seen to be just as threatening as protests triggered by the grievances of specific social groups such as peasants or workers.

Fourth, the use of internet/mobile phone variable had no significant impact on repression. According to King, Pan, and Roberts (2013), the Chinese government's censorship program is aimed at curtailing social mobilization and collective activities in the present and future. First-rate censorship capabilities allow governments in China to obtain related information on the protests and take appropriate action in the face of internet mobilization. It is therefore highly possible that governments in China usually have better strategies than repression at their disposal. As such, it is not surprising that the use of information technology in social movements has no effect on a government's choice to repress a protest.

Finally, although Table 11 shows a positive correlation between the involvement of ethnic minorities and state repression, and particularly well-known incidents such as the Tibetan and Xinjiang riots were put down through repressive means, the regression analysis showed that there was in fact no correlation between the involvement of ethnic minority groups and state repression. There are two possible reasons for this: first, the amount of protests involving minorities made up only 2.47% of the data and its influence was limited. Second, it is possible that the riots in Xinjiang and Tibet were extraordinary examples; in general, local governments are particularly cautious when dealing with minority affairs due to the CCP's intense sensitivity to them. In addition, the statistical analysis showed that there was no link between repression and foreign involvement, and that protests located in the Western provinces of the country also showed no link to increased repression. The marginal effect analysis shown in Table 13 corroborates that these factors did not correlate significantly with the use of repression. In other words, in terms of the involvement of ethnic minorities, foreign influence, and organized mobilization within the protest, there was no significant increase in the use of state repression by the Chinese government.

As organized mobilization, protesters of lower social classes, use of internet/mobile phone, western provinces, ethnic minorities, and foreign involvement exerted no discernible effect on repression, there are clearly other more sensitive factors at play. The findings of the regression and marginal effect analyses shown in Tables 12 and 13 reveal the factors with a significant influence on the use of repression: the scale, targeting the government, the use of violence, a municipal location, and the timing of the protest. These are each addressed in turn as follows.

Protest scale

In terms of the scale of a protest, it is often mistakenly believed that the larger the protest, the more threatened the state will be, and thus the more likely it will be to employ methods of repression. However, this research reveals that protests with over 10,000 participants are not in fact more likely to be repressed. Instead, when compared to protests involving less than 10,000 participants, protests with over 10,000 participants were significantly less likely to be suppressed by the government, suggesting that the larger the scale of the protest, the more cautious the state deals with the protest and its participants.

Targeting the government

This analysis tested for a connection between repression and the protest being targeted at the government. As was mentioned previously, the definition of

"government" includes administrative units, public security forces, state-owned and collective enterprises, and "non-government to government" categories. The result shows that the targeting of the government has a significant impact on the use of state repression. In comparison to protests against non-government targets, those targeted at the government have experienced more state repression. This result is not surprising since the government possesses the resources to deploy police or security forces to repress the dissenters and is more willing to use force when it feels threatened. Being a target of a protest poses a credible threat to the government and accordingly increases the probability of the use of force.

The use of violence

According to the regression and marginal effect analyses represented in Tables 12 and 13, there was a very strong positive correlation between the use of violence by the protesters and state repression. As discussed earlier, states theoretically tend to rely on repression as a reaction to the highest levels of perceived threat. As such, it is clear that the Chinese state perceives mass violence to be one of the most serious threats posed by a popular protest. In addition, it has been identified that the mutation of peaceful protests into violent protests is most often a reaction to an inappropriate state response. It is clear that the behavior of the two actors — the state and the protesters — is mutually triggered by their respective actions and reactions. Such results are a reminder of the importance of strategic interaction between the state and protesters.

Improper law enforcement

Another interesting finding is that popular protests against improper law enforcement have a negative impact on state repression. This means that if the protest is actually caused by the miscarriage of justice by a government unit, the state reduces the level of repression administered. This is because the protests were sparked by improper law enforcement or officials assaulting citizens. Finding these actions indefensible, the government reduces the use of repression.

Location of the protest

This research examined two sets of variables relating to the location of the protest. The first was the district type (rural versus urban areas) and the second was the region (western provinces or directly controlled municipalities). Effects on state repression were mixed. From Table 12, it can be seen that there was a significant

positive correlation in the relationship between repression and popular protests in rural areas. This may be due to the manner in which local governments habitually handle issues in rural jurisdictions or because the flow of information can be more easily contained in such areas, granting authorities more leeway to act at will. The second interesting set of outcomes showed that there was no connection between the use of repression and the protest being located in a western region. However, when protests occurred in the directly controlled municipalities (Beijing, Shanghai, Tianjin, Chongqing), according to both the regression analysis and the marginal effect analysis, the level of significance was highly conclusive at less than 5%, demonstrating that in these cities, the "maintenance of social stability" is one of the major tasks of municipal governments.

Timing and the distance

It can be seen in Tables 11–13 that the timing of a protest shows a very strong correlation with repression. In short, state repression has been increasing year by year. Although this study only covers a timescale of 11 years, the trend is still evident and statistically conclusive. This may be closely related to the CCP's increasing emphasis on the "maintenance of social stability" as well as the transition of leadership and the concentration of power under Xi's rule after 2012.

Distance from Beijing is often used to account for differences in central control over local governments. Our analysis showed a significant positive relationship between the distance from Beijing to the capital of the province in which the protest occurred and was suppressed. It is clear that the farther away the protest is, the less it is perceived as a threat by Beijing. The central government therefore grants more latitude to local officials in distant capitals as they deal with protest campaigns. Since the severity of the protest influences the promotion of local officials and particularly provincial ones, local governments are usually hesitant to make concessions and willing to use force as a quick solution for civil conflict. The relative autonomy and preference for repression by local officials may be the reason why provinces more distant from Beijing see a higher probability of state repression in social protests.

Local governments are on the front line in the battle to maintain social stability, representing the public authority directly tasked with handling any protest. Such governments are deeply involved in the economic and public life of civil society, and are quite possibly both the trigger and the target of protests. Under such circumstances, the "maintenance of social stability" represents a catch-all justification for the actions of the government. "Development is the number one priority" has been mutated into "maintaining social stability is the number one responsibility," allowing local

governments to fall back on the use of repression in the name of maintaining social stability.

Conclusion

This paper makes use of both theoretical perspectives and statistical analyzes, identifying specific characteristics of popular protests and government responses in China to explain which factors trigger the Chinese state's employment of its repressive capacity. In terms of theory, this study argues that it is necessary to identify the role of the state in popular protests, especially its capacity for repression. It is important to pay attention not just to static structural factors like political regime type, but also to dynamic factors such as the strategic interaction between the state and the protesters. With regard to empirical analysis, this research collected and analyzed a large amount of data consisting of news reports from open media sources and covering a long-term timescale of eight years. Although there are certain limitations to this methodology, at the least it is possible to extrapolate the key characteristics of popular protests in China today.

The most critical part of this research is centered around a statistical analysis of the factors causing the state to implement repressive actions. This research identified that the main factors leading to a repressive response are scale, the targeting of the government, violence, improper law enforcement, a rural location or location in a directly controlled municipality, and the distance from Beijing. These strong positive correlations were shown in both the regression analysis and the marginal effect analysis. The data collected in this research also demonstrate that in recent years, the use of repression has been increasing alongside an ever stronger emphasis on the "maintenance of social stability."

Faced with an unstoppable trend of increasing popular protests, the CCP central authorities have been formulating many new policies relating to the right to employ repressive actions. These policies reinforce "fundamental rights." The most prominent of such policies has been "strengthening innovative social management and government," a goal which the CCP has been promoting since 2011. The difficulty of implementing sweeping new policies such as this is the divided jurisdictions and responsibilities of different official departments and local governments, each with their own separate interests. In addition, the country still runs on the basic principle of the Party-state at the core while the participation of civil society remains limited, creating a bottleneck for popular dissatisfaction and frustration.

An even bigger challenge is the interlinked nature of many different social problems in China, which may easily trigger a chain reaction and a great shock to society. Though they are not currently direct threats to the stability of the CCP regime, many such social problems are at risk of becoming a "political football" within the competition between different inner circles of the CCP. In other words, though threats are arising to the CCP from civil society, what is more of a threat to the Chinese state is the state itself; the state machinery of repression is not monolithic, and the ruling groups are not entirely unified. The importance of the actions of the state in response to societal unrest should not be underestimated.

The materialization and expansion of many social problems are manifested in the outbreak of popular protests. An exploration of the various aspects of popular protest therefore provides a useful angle from which to analyze overall social stability. This study in particular offers an examination and analysis of which precise factors of popular protest trigger repression from the Chinese state; it is hoped that this research can lay a foundation for more profound future investigations into the role of popular protest and state interaction in contemporary China.

References

Becker, J. (2012). The knowledge to act: Chinese migrant labor protests in comparative perspective. *Comparative Political Studies*, *45*(11), 1–25.

Cai, Y. (2008). Local governments and the suppression of popular resistance in China. *The China Quarterly*, *193*, 24–42.

Cai, Y. (2010). *Collective resistance in China: Why popular protests succeed or fail.* Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Carey, S. (2010). The use of repression as a response to domestic dissent. *Political Studies*, *58*(1), 167–186.

Chen, X. (2012). *Social protest and contentious authoritarianism in China.* New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Cunningham, K. G., & Beaulieu, E. (2010). Dissent, repression, and inconsistency. In E. Chenoweth & A. Lawrence (Eds.), *Rethinking violence: States and non-state actors in conflict* (pp. 173–195). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Dahl, R. (1971). *Polyarchy: Participation and opposition.* New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Davenport, C. (2007a). State repression and political order. *Annual Review of Political Science*, *10*, 1–23.

Davenport, C. (2007b). Licensing repression: Dissent, threats and state repression in the United States. *Minnesota Journal of International Law*, *16*(2), 311–333.

Deng, Y., & O'Brien, K. (2013). Relational repression in China: Using social ties to demobilize protesters. *The China Quarterly*, *215*, 533–552.

Ferrara, F. (2003). Why regimes create disorder: Hobbes's dilemma during a Rangoon summer. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *47*(3), 302–325.

Hoover, D., & Kowalewski, D. (1992). Dynamic models of dissent and repression. *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *36*(1), 150–182.

Inglehart, R. (1997). *The silent revolution: Changing values and political styles among Western publics*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

King, G., Pan, J., & Roberts, M. (2013). How censorship in China allows government criticism but silences collective expression. *American Political Science Review*, *107*(2), 326–343.

Li, L., & O'Brien, K. (2008). Protest leadership in rural China. *The China Quarterly*, *193*, 1–23.

Lichbach, M. I. (1987). Deterrence or escalation? The puzzle of aggregate studies of repression and dissent. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *31*(2), 266–297.

Lichbach, M. I. (1998). *The rebel's dilemma*. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.

Lin, N., & Chen, C.-J. J. (1999). Local elites as officials and owners: Sharcholding and property rights in Daqiuzhuang. In J. C. Oi & A. G.Walder (Eds.), *Property rights and economic reform in China* (pp. 145–170). Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

Linz, J. (2000). *Totalitarian and authoritarian regimes*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner.

Linz, J., & Stepan, A. (1996). *Problems of democratic transition and democratic consolidation: Southern Europe, South America, and post-communist Europe*. Baltimore, MD: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Mann, M. (1993). *The sources of social power: The rise of classes and nation-states, 1760–1914*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Mann, M. (2008). Infrastructural power revisited. *Studies in Comparative International Development*, *43*(3–4), 355–365.

Marx, G. T., & McAdam, D. (1994). *Collective behavior and social movements: Process and structure*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall.

Mason, T. D., & Murtagh, J. A. (1985). Who riots? An empirical examination of the "new urban black" versus the social marginality hypotheses. *Political Behavior*, *7*(4), 352–373.

McAdam, D., Tarrow, S., & Tilly, C. (2001). *Dynamics of contention*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Meyer, D. S. (2004). Protest and political opportunities. *Annual Review of Sociology*, *30*, 125–145.

Moore, W. (2000). The repression of dissent: A substitution model of government coercion. *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, *44*(1), 107–127.

O'Brien, K., & Deng, Y. (2015). Repression backfires: Tactical radicalization and protest spectacle in rural China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, *24*(93), 457–470.

O'Brien, K., & Li, L. (2005). Popular contention and its impact in rural China. *Comparative Political Studies*, *38*(3), 235–259.

O'Brien, K., & Li, L. (2006). *Rightful resistance in rural China*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Oi, J. (1989). *State and peasant in contemporary China: The political economy of village government*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Oi, J. (1999). *Rural China takes off*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Olson, M. (1965). *The logic of collective action: Public goods and the theory of groups*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Perry, E. J. (2002). *Challenging the mandate of heaven: Social protest and state power in China*. New York, NY: M.E. Sharpe.

Perry, E. J., & Selden, M. (2000). *Chinese society: Change, conflict, and resistance*. New York, NY: Routledge.

Regan, P., & Henderson, E. (2002). Democracy, threats and political repression in developing countries: Are democracies internally less violent? *Third World Quarterly*, *23*(1), 119–136.

Soule, S., & Earl, J. (2005). A movement society evaluated collective protest in the United States, 1960–1986. *Mobilization: An International Journal*, *10*(3), 345–364.

Taiwan Foundation for Democracy. (2007). *China human rights watch report 2006*. Taipei, Taiwan: Author.

Tilly, C. (1978). *From mobilization to revolution*. Boston, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Tilly, C., & Tarrow, S. (2007). *Contentious politics*. Boulder, CO: Paradigm.

Walder, A. (1986). *Communist neo-traditionalism: Work and authority in Chinese industry*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

Walder, A. (1995). Local governments as industrial firms: An organizational analysis of China's transitional economy. *The American Journal of Sociology*, *101*(2), 263–301.

Wang, H. H. [王信賢]. (2006). *Zhongguo dalu guojia quanli yu shehui yundong fenxi* [中國大陸國家權力與社會運動分析, Analysis of state power and social movements in Mainland China]. *Chinese Political Science Review*, *40*, 85–114.

Wank, D. (1999). *Commodifying communism: Business, trust, and politics in a Chinese city*. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

Wright, T. (1999). State repression and student protest in contemporary China. *The China Quarterly, 157*, 142–172.

Yang, D. L. (2012). *Beyond Beijing: Liberalization and the regions in China*. London, UK: Routledge.

Yu, J. [于建嵘]. (2006). *Jiti xingdong de yuandongli jizhi yanjiu: Jiyu H xian nongmin weiquan kangzheng de kaocha* [集體行動的原動力機制研究：基於H縣農民維權抗爭的考察, Research into the driving forces of collective action: Investigation of human rights protests by farmers in H county]. *Xuehai* [學海, Academia Bimestrie], *2*, 26–32.

Yu, J. [于建嵘]. (2010). *Kangzheng xing zhengzhi: Zhongguo zhengzhi shehuixue jiben wenti* [抗爭性政治：中國政治社會學基本問題, Contentious politics: A fundamental problem of Chinese sociology]. Beijing, China: Renmin Press.

Zhao, D. (2001). *The power of Tiananmen: State–society relations and the 1989 Beijing student movement*. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Zhongguo xuezhe: *2010nian 18wan qi kangyi shijian, Zhongguo shehui dongdang jiaju* [中國學者: 2010年18萬起抗議事件，中國社會動盪加劇, Chinese scholar: Over 180,000 protests in 2010; social unrest in China intensifies]. (2011, September 26). *Duowei News Net*. Retrieved from http://china.dwnews.com/big5/news/2011-09-26/58160315.html

LIBRARY RECOMMENDATION FORM

Route via interdepartmental mail

Dear Librarian / Library Acquisition Committee

I would like to recommend the **Issues and Studies (IS)** for the library. Please include it in your next serials review meeting with my recommendation.

If you require further sample copies, please contact your nearest World Scientific Office. You can also obtain further information at www.worldscinet.com.

NAME

POSITION

DEPARTMENT

I recommend the journal for the following reasons:
(please tick)

- ☐ REFERENCE: I will need to refer to this journal frequently for my work
- ☐ STUDENT REFERRAL: I will be referring my students to this journal regularly to assist their studies
- ☐ I have other reasons for recommending this journal which are as follows:
- ☐ BENEFIT FOR LIBRARY: This journal will complement the library's collection and I will regularly recommend articles to my colleagues / students
- ☐ OWN AFFILIATION: I am a member of the journal's sponsoring society / editorial team. I therefore strongly support the journal

ORDER FORM

Subscribe now through our journal website: **www.worldscinet.com** or fax the completed order form to **(65) 6467 7667**

☐ Please send me a complimentary copy of the **Issues and Studies (IS)**
☐ Please process my subscription:

ISSN: 1013-2511 **Vol. 55 • 4 Issues • 2019**

Institutions/Libraries (Print* + Electronic)	☐ US$352	☐ £282	☐ S$478
Institutions/Libraries (Electronic Only)	☐ US$320	☐ £256	☐ S$435
*Please add postage	US$40	£31	S$53

- Customers from Asia Pacific and Australasia (except Hong Kong and China), please pay in Singapore Dollars (**S$**).
- Customers from Europe, please pay in GBP (**£**).
- Customers from the rest of the world (including Hong Kong and China), please pay in **US$**.

Please enclose your personal cheque or details of your credit card for individual journal subscriptions.

Name: _____ Email: _____

Organization: _____ Department: _____

Address: _____

City: _____ State: _____ Zip: _____ Country: _____

METHODS OF PAYMENT :

☐ Cheque/Bank draft enclosed for the amount of US$/£/S$ _____

- For cheque payment, please make cheque payable to "**World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.**"

Charge my ☐ VISA ☐ MC ☐ Amex

Card No: ☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐☐ Expiry Date: ☐☐☐☐☐☐

Tel: _____ Signature: _____

☐ Bill my company/institution: _____ (Please attach purchase order)

Credit Card Authorisation

By completing this Credit Card Authorisation Form, I am authorizing and giving consent to World Scientific Group of Companies to
1) debit my credit card account for one-time payment for the purchase of the product stated above;
2) retain my credit card information for a period of one year for audit purposes.

Back volume prices are available upon request

Affix
Stamp
here

World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.
Farrer Road, P O Box 128
Singapore 912805
Republic of Singapore

Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

AIMS AND SCOPE

Issues & Studies (ISSN 1013-2511) is published quarterly by the Institute of International Relations, National Chengchi University, Taipei. *Issues & Studies* is an internationally peer-reviewed journal dedicated to publishing quality social science research on issues — mainly of a political nature — related to the domestic and international affairs of contemporary China, Taiwan, and East Asia, as well as other closely related topics. The editors particularly welcome manuscripts related to China and Taiwan.

SUBMISSION OF MANUSCRIPTS

Submitted manuscripts should meet the guidelines spelled out in the "Information for Authors" that is available on our website: http://issues.nccu.edu.tw. Any questions regarding submissions or general policy should be addressed to <issues@nccu.edu.tw>.

Editorial Office:

Issues & Studies
Institute of International Relations
National Chengchi University
No.64, Wanshou Road, Wenshan District 116, Taipei City, Taiwan (ROC)
Tel: 886-2-8237-7377
Fax: 886-2-2939-7352
E-mail: issues@nccu.edu.tw
Website: http://issues.nccu.edu.tw

INDEXES AND ABSTRACTS

Articles in *Issues & Studies* are indexed by *Scopus*, *Google Scholar*, *EBSCO*, *ProQuest*, *Current Contents*, *Research Alert* (Institute for Scientific Information, Philadelphia), *ABC POL SCI* (ABC-Clio, Inc., Santa Barbara, California), and *IBZ* (International Bibliography of Periodical Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences) and *IBR* (International Bibliography of Book Reviews of Scholarly Literature in the Humanities and Social Sciences) (Osnabrueck, Germany); abstracted by the *International Political Science Abstracts* (*Documentation Politique Internationale*, Paris) and *International Development Abstracts* (Oxford, England); and abstracted and indexed by the *International Bibliography of the Social Sciences* (London) and *Sociological Abstracts* (San Diego, California).

Issues & Studies

A Social Science Quarterly on China, Taiwan, and East Asian Affairs

Vol. 55, No. 1 **March 2019**

CONTENTS

ISSN: 1013-2511 MCI (P) 046/08/2018