

*Self-identity and Political Socialization Experience of the Overseas  
Compatriots*

**Su-feng Cheng**

Research Fellow

Election Study Center

National Chengchi University

**Ying-lung Chou**

Assistant Professor

Department of Global Politics and Economics

Tamkang University

**Cheng-hao Pao**

Professor

Department of Global Politics and Economics

Tamkang University

## *Self-identity and Political Socialization Experience of the Overseas Compatriots*

### **Introduction**

"The overseas Compatriots are the mother of the revolution" is a fairly familiar phrase in Taiwan. Many overseas compatriots have contributed to the success of revolution including in the North America, Southeast Asia and Europe. Overseas compatriots have long-standing contributions to Taiwan since the period of "revolutionary state building", "anti-Japanese war", "investing in rejuvenating the country", "love and protect the country" to the present "living power and benefiting the country". Overseas compatriots can be said to be an important pillar for the development of Taiwan. <sup>1</sup>They are concerned about Taiwan. Whenever Taiwan was facing some major disasters in the past, such as the Typhoon Morakot in 2009, the Kaohsiung gas explosions in 2014, and the Tainan earthquake in 2016, we can always witness the enthusiastically launching fundraising news by the overseas compatriots. <sup>2</sup>Previous presidents in Taiwan have always thanked the overseas compatriots for their contributions during the inauguration tea party. For example, President Chen, Shui-bian praised the overseas compatriots as the driving force for the country's development; President Ma, Ying-jeou said that he has never forgotten the attachment of overseas compatriots in every corner of the world towards Taiwan; President Tsai, Ing-wen said that the transmission of internal news to overseas countries during the era of authoritarian regime by overseas compatriots is very important to the

---

<sup>1</sup> The five-stage name is proposed by the Overseas Community Affairs Committee of the Republic of China. The reference URL is <https://www.ocac.gov.tw/OCAC/Pages/VDetail.aspx?nodeid=2>. For the history of the important contributions of overseas Compatriot, please refer to the history of overseas compatriots and the overseas compatriots memory bank: <http://dap.ocac.gov.tw/cht/index.php?code=list&ids=1>.

<sup>2</sup> Central News Agency, 2009, "The Overseas Community Affairs Committee: Overseas compatriots are concerned about the disaster, and the donations are constantly flowing." Central News Agency Newsletter, August 31, <http://www.cna.com.tw/postwrite/Detail/36358.aspx#>. Wkg7zFWWaUk, search date: December 1, 2017; Liu Ping, 2014, "The relief of the Kaohsiung economy, the overseas compatriots raised 2.3 million yuan", China Times Newsletter, August 19, <http://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20140819000417-260102>, search date: December 1, 2017; Chen Yuxuan, 2016, "Taiwan earthquake disaster, overseas compatriots donated more than 37 million yuan", Free Times Newsletter, February 25, <http://News.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/1612969>, search date: May 1, 2019.

development of Taiwan's democracy, which is still an important force to protect Taiwan's democracy.<sup>3</sup>

As a result of being in various parts of the world, Taiwan's overseas compatriots can provide substantial assistance to our diplomatic work. Overseas compatriots have a very rich network of contacts at their country of residence. They have a certain influence on the governments and the mainstream society there, especially in the countries where we have no formal diplomatic relations. The government needs the utmost help from the overseas Chinese to build a channel for dialogue with the local government in order to deepen their friendly position towards us. In the New Southbound Policy actively promoted by the government, overseas compatriots can help Taiwanese businesses to operate in Southeast Asia due to their bilingual ability in Chinese and the local languages. The government also hope the overseas compatriots are able to nurture the next generation of young talents in the overseas compatriots community and continue to connect Taiwan with the world.<sup>4</sup>

In order for the overseas compatriots to maintain their roles and functions mentioned above, they must have a sense of identity with Taiwan continuously and exert influence in the communities where they live. Therefore, the self-identity, political attitudes and behaviors of overseas compatriots from Taiwan are actually worthy of our attention. What will change on the issue of identification when overseas compatriots migrate to foreign countries? From the perspective of trans-nationalism, immigrants can be dualistic in terms of national and cultural identity (Faist 2000). The dualism here refers the country originally resided and the country that migrated to, but

---

<sup>3</sup> Wang Pingyu, 2004, "British praise of overseas Chinese, the advancement of the country's development," Free Times Newsletter, May 22, <http://old.ltn.com.tw/2004/new/may/22/today-p1.htm> , search date: December 3, 2017; Wang Pengjie, 2012, "Peace on the two sides / President: accept challenges, enhance Taiwan's competitiveness", Central Daily Newsletter, May 21, <http://www.cdnews.com.tw/touch/detail.jsp?coluid=106&kindid=0&docid=101915197>, search date: December 3, 2017; Lin Liangsheng, 2016, "Cai Yidang folk ambassador, overseas Chinese enthusiastic good", Free Times Newsletter, May 22nd, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/992263>, search date: May 3, 2019.

<sup>4</sup> Presidential Palace, 2016, "The Vice President is looking forward to uniting overseas Chinese forces and supporting the sustainable development of the Republic of China." The website of the Presidential Palace of the Republic of China: <http://www.president.gov.tw/NEWS/20826>, search date: 2017 December 3; Lu Yizhen, 2016, "Promoting Practical Diplomacy, Cai: Overseas Chinese are Indispensable Keys", Free Times Newsletter, October 25, <http://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/Paper/1045403>, search date: May 3, 2019.

Taiwan's overseas compatriots are facing a rather difficult situation compared to other foreign countries' immigrants. This is due to the active effort from mainland China to attract overseas compatriots originated from Taiwan. In other words, Taiwan's overseas compatriots may be affected by three parties namely Taiwan, the country of residence, and mainland China, from the policy perspective. In addition, if we want the 1.5 generations and the second generation of overseas compatriots to continue to identify with Taiwan<sup>5</sup>, we must first understand their current self-identity. What is the impact of political socialization of different agencies?

In the past, there are not many studies on overseas compatriots in the political science academic community. In order to make up for this deficiency, this study will select some overseas compatriots to be interviewed. By analyzing the interview data, we can understand the differences between the types of overseas compatriots identity, and the impact during the identification process, as well as its political socialization experience.

## **Literature Review and Discussion**

The first focus of this research is "identity". Since there have been limited studies on the identity of overseas compatriots in the past, we begin with the identification research by the Taiwanese academic community followed by the review of research conducted on overseas compatriots.

### **( 1 ) Identification Research in Taiwan**

Identity has always been one of the important research topics in social science. The focus of identity research is on the formation of "me", the analysis of interpersonal interactions, the shaping of people's perception of themselves, and the understanding of their own conscious (Chen, Chen, and Wang 2012). All conscious behaviors stem from the "horizon of interpretation" produced by the behavioral subject's own "identity" (Taylor 1989, 27). When linked with different groups, such recognition forms different types of identity, such as religious identity, ethnic identity,

---

<sup>5</sup> 1.5 generations refer to children born in Taiwan and emigrate with the family (Hsu 2013, 123)

national identity, and so on. For example, we can conservatively define national identity as "a personal sense of psychological attachment to a political community, in which members who identify themselves with this political community feel that they belong to this community and are different from other communities" (Lin 2012). Such a statement is of course a relatively simple and conservative definition. If we want to further define various types of identification, a very complicated scenario will occur. Some types of identity will be embedded in other identities, or different types of identities can actually be hierarchical. For example, Yi-huah Jiang believes that when defining national identity, it can be divided into three different aspects namely "ethnic identity", "cultural identity" and "institutional identity" (Jiang 1998).

The most popular topic when discussing identity issues in Taiwan's political science empirical research is "Taiwanese/Chinese" identification. The earliest classification of this was proposed by Mau-kuei Chang and Hsin-huang Hsiao (1987), who asked respondents to identify themselves as Taiwanese or Chinese. They regard the respondent's answer to this question as a kind of "self-identification".<sup>6</sup> Since then, apart from Kuang-hui Chen and Chi-lin Tsai (2010) who also use this classification to refer to self-identification, the classification of this identity began to be given different names. Some studies use the classification "Taiwanese/Chinese identity" or "Taiwanese identity" directly (Lin 2008; Hsu and Fan 2001; Chen and Chou 2013; Chen, Chen, and Wang 2012; Cheng 2007; 2009; Liu and Ho 1999); some studies use this classification to refer to national identity (Lin 2012; Hsu, Tsai, and Huang 2005; Wu 2007); besides that, some studies use this classification to refer to ethnic identity (Wu 2005; Wu, Tan, and Lee 2003; Shyu 2004; Sheng 2002).

Apart from using the "Taiwanese/Chinese" classification to examine identity (no matter which name is used), there is definitely some scholars who use different measurement methods. For example, Naiteh Wu (2005) thinks "Taiwanese/Chinese" classification only examine the ethnic identity. He uses two questions to measure the national identity of the Taiwanese people. The respondents are divided into three

---

<sup>6</sup> Liu and Ho (1999) pointed out that such problems are unlikely to occur until Taiwan's democratization, because during the period of martial law, "I am Chinese" is the only correct answer. In other words, Taiwan's political science community's concern about the issue of identity comes with Taiwan's political democratization.

categories according to their answers on these two questions: Taiwan nationalists, Chinese nationalists, pragmatists. <sup>7</sup>Su-feng Cheng (2013) created the term "Taiwan Identity". She argues that if the perspective of Taiwan's modern political history is developed, the essence of Taiwan's identity should be a combination of cultural and political factors. The Taiwanese people's consensus and disagreement on identity are mainly portrayed on the relationship between the original bloodline and history, the cultural connection with China, and the political outlook on Taiwan's future. Therefore, the Taiwanese identity could be divided into four categories conceptually: "culturally identify with Taiwan, politically identify with Taiwan", "culturally identify with Taiwan, politically identify with China", "culturally identify China, politically identify with Taiwan", "culturally identify with China, and politically identify with China". She measured the cultural identity and political identity of the people through the following two questions. The first one is "We often say 'Chinese culture'. What do you think when you say 'Taiwanese culture', do you think it is part of "Chinese culture" or is it a completely different culture from 'Chinese culture'?" The second one is "Some people say, 'Taiwan's future should be unified with China so the life of the people of Taiwan can be made better.' But some people say that Taiwan should go its own way as the people can live a good life too. Which statement do you agree with?" However, after the telephone interviews and in-depth interviews, she found that those who think that Taiwanese culture to be different from Chinese culture in the telephone interview, did not deny the relevance of Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture when interviewed in-depth. In terms of political identity, the dichotomy between unity and independence should be removed, and changed to the willingness to unify with China based on their self-awareness. Therefore, she changed the two questions in 2012 and 2016. Finally the cultural and political identity questions are changed to "Concerning the content of Taiwanese culture and Chinese culture, do you

---

<sup>7</sup> The two topics are "If Taiwan can still maintain peace with China after independence, do you agree with Taiwan independence?", "If the political, economic and social development of the two sides is roughly equal, do you agree with China's reunification?" Those who agree to the first question and do not agree to the second question are "Taiwan nationalists", because they are unwilling to reunify with China regardless of whether China is free and democratic and economically prosperous. Those who agree to the second question and do not agree with the first question are "Chinese nationalists." Even if Taiwan independence does not bring war, they are not willing to choose Taiwan independence. Those who agree on both issues are defined as "pragmatists" (Wu 2005, 13-14).

think it is exactly the same, mostly the same, mostly different, or completely different?" and "Some people say: 'Taiwan and China are two independent countries,' while some people say: 'Taiwan and China are same country, just separate temporarily.' Which statement do you agree with?" The construction of "Taiwan Identity" indicator was based on the respondents' answer.<sup>8</sup> According to the analysis of the 2012 and 2016 presidential vote of Taiwanese people, it is found that the explanatory power of "Taiwan Identity" indicator is higher than that of the variables of traditional Taiwanese/Chinese identity and stance on unification.

## (2) Influencing Factors of Taiwanese Identity: Mainland China Factors and Political Socialization

What are the possible factors for the shaping and changing of Taiwanese people identification of "Taiwanese/Chinese"? From the literature in the past, we can first observe this factor in mainland China. The shaping of the "Taiwanese identity" of the Taiwanese people seems to be self-identified. However, the object of the reference includes the self-identification of being a "Taiwanese" or "Chinese". Therefore, the relationships and interactions between Taiwan and mainland China will naturally further influence the continuation and change of this identity. In Naiteh Wu's (2005) study, although he examined national identity, but the questionnaire is still basically composed about the relationship between Taiwan and China. The nationalist theory has two opposite orientations for the understanding of the essence of national identity: rational interest considerations and emotional community connections, which is like the choice between bread and love. For the people, the attraction of the economic market in mainland China represents the bread, and the identification of Taiwanese cultural identity represents the love. The conclusion that was made at that time was that the emotional identity was greater than the pulling force of material interests. The

---

<sup>8</sup> In terms of cultural identity recognition, when constructing the "Taiwan Identity" indicator, those who believe that the culture is different (including "mostly different" and "completely different") is represented by 1, and those who believe culture is the same (including "exactly the same" and "mostly the same") is represented by 0. In terms of political identity recognition, those who believe that Taiwan and China are different countries is represented by 1, and those who think Taiwan and China are same country is represented by 0. The higher the number, the greater the degree of Taiwan's recognition.

research of Lu-huei Chen, Ying-nan Chen and Hsin-hsien Wang (2012) cuts through the aspects of "rational self-interest" and "sensual identity". It is found there was cross-strait reconciliation between 2008 and 2010, mainland China continues to deliver benefits to the people of Taiwan, and does not change the upward trend of "Taiwanese" identification. Does this represent that if more people can benefit from it, this can push Taiwanese people away from the position of the Taiwanese identity? The author believes this need more observation. The study by Lu-huei Chen and Ying-lung Chou (2013) found that when the mainland government appears to be unfriendly to the Taiwanese government or the Taiwanese people, the Taiwanese people will magnify and examine the relevant actions. The specific response is to stay away from the identity of China.

Yung-ming Hsu and Yun Fan (2001, 7) pointed out that "Identity is not purely inherited or fixed. On the contrary, it is the result of learning." From the perspective of learning, another factor that shapes Taiwanese identity and influences its subsequent sustainability and change is the political socialization process of personal growth background and the political education of the country. The so-called definition of political socialization should be summarized into two main perspectives. The first is to emphasize the idiosyncratic personal growth. As Greenstein (1968) puts it: "A broader conception (about political socialization) would encompass all political learning, formal and informal, deliberate and unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle." Another angle of observation is from the perspective of the social system, which regards political socialization as "the process by which society transfers its political culture from the previous generation to the next generation" (Langton 1969). Since the process of democratization in Taiwan in the 1990s, political education has gradually transformed from the long-term "Great China" proposed by the Kuomintang, to the "Taiwanese consciousness" advocated by Teng-hui Lee and the Democratic Progressive Party. People of different provinces and "generations" will naturally have different degrees of influence due to their difference in life experiences. The study by Lu-huei Chen and Ying-lung Chou (2013) found that young people have a more and more similar Taiwanese identity when they are in the same historical context.



### (3) Research on the Identity of Overseas compatriots

There are only a few studies conducted by Taiwanese academic community on the issue of overseas compatriots, and only part of them involve the identification of overseas compatriots and the experience of political socialization. Therefore, the authors will conduct the follow-up literature through the reviewing the articles each by each.<sup>9</sup>

Li-Ying Lai (2005) used a questionnaire survey to analyze the differences in national identity among different generations of overseas compatriots in the Toronto area. She believes that Taiwan's national identity has five major dimensions, namely "national identity," "cultural identity," "institutional identity," "national identity," and "awareness of unification and independence." Through the assistance of the Overseas Community Affairs Committee, the study completed a total of 579 valid questionnaires. The study found that more than 30% (35.41%) of Taiwan's overseas compatriots consider themselves to be Taiwanese, accounting for the highest proportion among all national identity categories. The younger the generations, the higher the proportion of having "Taiwanese identity" in the generations, followed by the recognition that they are both Canadians and Taiwanese, with 25.91%. In terms of cultural identity, the proportion of overseas compatriots who have culturally recognized Taiwan is the highest, at 47.5%, the second is Canada, the proportion is 25.91%, and the proportion who culturally recognized China is only 15.03%. Although there are differences in generations, but the proportion of the youngest generation (16-25 years old) who recognize the culture of Canada is less than 30%. This study is one of the few studies about overseas compatriots that have adopted quantitative research methods. It is worthwhile to follow the example of sampling method in which the sample will be randomly selected from the list of members provided by the leaders of overseas compatriots' association, who are contacted through the assistance of the Overseas Community Affairs Committee. However, this study only uses age to classify the generation, which is its inadequacies. The reason

---

<sup>9</sup> In the past, the Overseas Community Affairs Committee has commissioned scholars to conduct research on overseas Chinese in places such as Australia, Canada, and Los Angeles. However, the research topics have not touched the issue of identity, and most of them are aimed at emigrants' immigration motives, employment status, community participation, and overseas Chinese service status. Discussion (Hsu and Chen 2006; Hsu, Qi, Liao, and Chang 2004; Chiang and Hsu 2003).

for adopting classification using generations is that people born in the same era often have the similar political, economic and social environment and share the similar political experience, so their political attitudes may be quite similar. If such a concept is applied to people who "have lived in a single country for a long time", then it will have no problem. However, if they are to be applied to immigrants, there is a must to add the factor of period of immigration time, because overseas compatriots of the same age may experience different political and economic environments, with different political experience, due to the period of immigration time.

Chiang and Liao (2008) studied young immigrants returning to Taiwan from Australia. They interviewed 22 interviewees. The main axis of their research was the reason for the return, but they also asked about the identity issue of these returnees. More than half of the interviewees answered that they are Taiwanese while only one answered that he is an Australian. Due to the fact that the researchers are studying immigrants who are returning to Taiwan, who are all 1.5 generation immigrants, and have gone abroad after a certain number of years of education in Taiwan, thus their Taiwanese identity has not much changes.

Lan-hong Chiang and Li-chiang Huang (2009) studied Canadian immigrants from Taiwan. They interviewed 10 overseas compatriots with in-depth interview. The research on identity found that, the "middle-term Taiwanese emigrants" have a deeper recognition than that of new emigrants, as their children used to study in local schools, and most of them have started their family in Canada. This is when compared with the "new Taiwanese emigrants" who travel more frequently between home and the immigration countries. These respondents were quite integrated into the mainstream society, and have assisted in arranging Canadian officials visit to Taiwan. Although they have a deeper understanding of the immigration country, they have also actively returning to Taiwan to participate in the presidential election. This is also one of a few studies that mentions overseas Taiwanese participation in Taiwan politics.

Pei Tsai (2010a; 2010b) studied the cross-border ethnic identity of Australian-born Taiwanese people. She interviewed 37 immigrant families with a total of 65 interviewees using in-depth interviews with Brisbane as the area of study. The

study found that there are eight different classification of respondents, namely, "Taiwanese in Australia", "also (not) Taiwanese and (not) Australians, or two different proportions of combination", "Taiwanese Australians", "Chinese Australians", "Chinese or Chinese from Taiwan", "Taiwanese in Taiwan, Australians in Australia", "global citizens", "Asian and Australian". The unique part is that no respondents think they are fully "Australians" or "Taiwanese." Among the 65 people, a total of 45 Australians have been identified themselves as having a cross-border identity, and 76% of these 45 are 1.5 and second generation immigrants. Among the influencing factors that generate Australian identity on the Taiwanese emigrants include birth in Australia, parental influence, teachers' influence and peer-to-peer treatment on the early arrival, homecoming alienation, and positive interactions between colleagues during adulthood.

## Interviewing Data Analysis

This study explores how overseas compatriots identify their own identity, and the impact of political socialization on the formation and transformation of their identity. This is done through interviews with overseas compatriots. A total of 8 overseas compatriots were interviewed. Their basic information are as follows:

Table 1: Data of respondents' basic information					
Respondent	Gender	Age	Country of residence	Place of birth	Generations of emigrants
A	male	69	Malaysia	Taiwan	first
B	female	49	Malaysia	Taiwan	first
C	male	25	Malaysia	Malaysia	second
D	female	49	Malaysia	Malaysia	fourth
E	male	59	Indonesia	Taiwan	first
F	female	52	Indonesia	Indonesia	third
G	male	20	Indonesia	Indonesia	second
H	female	22	Indonesia	Indonesia	second

Firstly, it is important to note that random sampling is not used when collecting the sample of the data of this qualitative interview, thus it is not representative of the sample and cannot be used to make any inference.

# 1. Self-National/Ethnic identity and Change of National/Ethnic Identity of Overseas compatriots

Every respondent will be asked, “In terms of national ethnic groups, do you think you are Taiwanese, Chinese or Malaysian/Indonesian? What do you think your national identity is? ” According to the respondents' responses, there are five different types. From the responses, we can clearly see the differences between the first generation emigrants and other emigrants. The identity of the first generation emigrant respondents A, B, and E, basically does not cover the immigration country, because they were born and grew up in Taiwan. Thus, Taiwan still occupies a very important part in the national ethnic identity. In the response of respondent E, he believed that he is Taiwanese and Chinese because the ancestors came from China. He said: "Now, we are Taiwanese, but also Chinese, because our ancestors were all in China, because our ancestors also immigrated here."

Table 2: National ethnic identity of respondent	
Type of identity	Respondent
Taiwanese	A 、 B
Taiwanese and Chinese	E
Malaysian/Indonesian	C 、 F 、 G
Chinese Malaysian	D
Half Indonesian and half Taiwanese	H

The generation after the second generation, three (respondents C, F, G) think they are Malaysians/Indonesians. They strongly emphasize the place of birth. For example, the respondent C's statement is “Malaysian, because I was born in Malaysia. ” Respondent F said, “***I think I am Indonesian because I was born in Indonesia and grew up in Indonesia.***” Respondent G also said

***“Indonesian, because I was born and raised in Indonesia.”*** Judging from the answers of the above six respondents, the birthplace and the growing environment are the main factors affecting their identity.

Respondent D’s identity is Chinese in Malaysia. Although she was born and raised in Malaysia, she believes that Malaysians refer to Malays. She said, ***“I am a Chinese in Malaysia. I feel that I am part of Malaysia, not a Malay. I don't think I am China's Chinese. I also don't think I'm Taiwanese.”***

In other words, she clearly distinguishes the Malays from the Chinese. Respondent H’s answer is half Indonesian and half Taiwanese. Her answer is ***“ Half Indonesia and half Taiwan. The birthplace and the place growing up during childhood was Indonesia, more incline to the culture and life of Taiwan.”*** Thus, her self-identity is not just the objective conditions, such as birthplace and growing environment, but also include the living habits and cultural connotations.

In terms of identity change, they have indicated that their identity has not changed, except for respondent G and H. The recognition of the respondent G and H has always been a dual recognition. The change refers to the change in the proportion of being Indonesians and Taiwanese. Respondent G said: ***“Before senior high school, I thought that I was 70% Taiwanese. During the senior high school period, friends around me asked me or said to me, ‘Are you Taiwanese? Where will you live for a long time in the future? Which nationality will you choose in the future?’ Thus, I started to think which country I belong to. From that time onwards, I started to change. Now, I feel that I am 60% Indonesian and 40% Taiwanese.”*** Respondent H said: ***“When I was a kid, I felt that I was more Taiwanese. After coming to Taiwan (to study at university), I felt that the proportion of Indonesians has increased because I don't want to lose another identity or recognition.”*** She did not deepen her Taiwanese identity due to the fact that she came to Taiwan, but she reminded herself to increase the proportion of Indonesian's identity because of worrying about losing the Indonesian's identity.

## 2. Cultural Identity of Overseas compatriots

In terms of cultural identity, the three respondents chose Taiwanese culture happened to be the first generation of emigrants. Respondent E said, “**Culturally identified with Taiwan, because growing up in Taiwan, is more familiar with Taiwan, our belief and religion come from there.**” In other words, the first generation of emigrants will bring his culture from the emigrated country to the immigrated country, and continue to identify such cultures and religious practices.

The respondents who chose Malaysian/Indonesian culture are respondents C, D, F, G. Respondents C, F, G think they are Malaysian/Indonesian when asked about national ethnic identity. Thus, they make the same choice on the cultural identity, which is not surprising. The unexpected one is respondent D who's national identity is Malaysian Chinese, did not choose Chinese culture when asked about culture identity. Her explanation is “**I will not specifically prefer Taiwan or China, because I was born and raised here(Malaysia). I have been influenced by the culture here since I was a child. I got to know about China's and Taiwan's (culture), but I will not change.**” In other words, she used Malaysian culture as a whole to represent culture identity, instead of deliberately distinguish the Malay and Chinese culture.

Respondent H's cultural identity is “Chinese type culture” . She did not choose Indonesian culture, because she believes that culture she was exposed to when growing up did not belong to the Indonesian culture but the Chinese type culture. She believes, “**Cultural identity is Chinese type culture, but the Chinese type culture is not much different from the Taiwanese culture. The close relatives of the maternal side practice Chinese type culture because they are not emigrants from Taiwan. However, some festivals use Taiwanese culture. It's just that I think Chinese type culture and Taiwanese culture have not much difference.**” It can be seen from the cultural identity of the eight respondents that there is an absolute relationship between the cultural identity and the environment in which the respondents grow up.

Table 3: Cultural identity of respondent	
Type of identity	Respondent
Taiwanese culture	A 、 B 、 E
Malaysian/Indonesian culture	C 、 D 、 F 、 G
Chinese type culture	H

### 3. The Influence of Family Political Socialization

We focus on whether the parents pass on their identity to the next generation in the family, so we asked the three first-generation respondents (A, B, E) that “Do you wish that your child to recognize Taiwan when they are growing up? In what ways did you use to increase your child's recognition of Taiwan?” Among the three respondents, respondents A and B stressed that they did not deliberately do something to promote their children's recognition of Taiwan. However, respondent A said: “***There is no special request, it is just normal chatting, then they will buy Taiwan-related books themselves, such as her son who like Taiwanese history.***” Respondent B said, “***No, they know that their mother is a Taiwanese, and they all recognize Taiwan by themselves. They will compare the culture and education.***” It can be seen from the responses of the two respondents that although they did not deliberately cultivate the identity of being Taiwanese to the next generation, but they will remind the next generation the fact that they are the descendants of Taiwanese through chatting and understanding the identity of the previous generation. As for respondent E, he is more active. He said, “***By sending children to study in Taiwan means the recognition of Taiwan, but we are still belonging to the Chinese ethnicities, children going back to Taiwan is to learn Chinese.***” His national ethnic identity is Taiwanese and also China's Chinese. Thus, the identity he hopes to pass on is the dual identity, the same as his. Based on the responses of these three respondents, we can understand that family education can provide a certain degree of political socialization, whether deliberately or unintentionally.

## **Concluding Remarks**

This study hopes to understand Taiwan's overseas compatriots' self-identity and the possible impact of political socialization through interviewing them. According to the preliminary interviews of the eight respondents, the place of birth and the place of growth have great influence on the national ethnic identity of Taiwan's overseas compatriots. However, there are also respondents who prioritize the life experience and cultural habits in the growing environment, as well as the reality of local ethnic differences besides the objective conditions of place of birth and place of growth. In terms of cultural identity, the responses tend to have a consistency. The vast majority of respondents use the place of birth and the place of growth as the basis for cultural identity.

In terms of the impact of political socialization, the interview records of first generation show that their next generation do have the opportunity to get to know more about the identity of the previous generation through family life, and understand that they are the descendants of Taiwanese, whether or not the first generation deliberately pass on their identity recognition. This is helpful in establishing a certain degree of Taiwanese identity.



## References

- Chen, Kuang-Hui, and Chi-Lin Tsai. 2010. "School Education and Political Socialization: Exploring Strength of Association between Education and Self-Identity in Taiwan." *The Taiwanese Political Science Review*, 14(1): 55-103.
- Chen, Lu-Huei, and Ying-Lung Chou. 2013. "Change and Continuity of People's Taiwanese identity" In *The Opportunity and Challenge of Cross-Strait Relations*, eds. Qi Su and Zhen-Yuan Tong. Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Inc.
- Chen, Lu-Huei, Ying-Nan Chen, and Hsin-Hsien Wang. 2012. "Economic Interest and Symbolic Attitudes: Analyzing the Dynamics of Taiwan Identity" *Soochow Journal of Political Science* 30(3): 1-51.
- Cheng, Su-feng. 2007. "A Preliminary Study on Deep-Green Voters." *Issues and Studies (Chinese edition)* 46(1): 33-61.
- , 2009. "Ethnicity, Identity, and Vote Choice in Taiwan." *Journal of Electoral Studies* 16(2): 23-49.
- , 2013. "Identity in the 2012 Taiwanese Presidential Election." *Issues and Studies (Chinese edition)* 52(4): 101-132.
- , 2018. "Taiwan Identity and Vote Choice." in *2016 Presidential Election : New Public Opinion and New Challenge*. Taipei: Wu-Nan Book Inc.
- Chiang, Lan-Hung Nora, and Li-Chiang Huang. 2009. "Reluctant Exiles History, Lived Experiences and Identity of Taiwanese-Canadians." *Bulletin of the Geographical Society of China* 42: 25-42.
- Chiang, Lan-Hung Nora, and Pei-Chun Sunny Liao. 2008. "Back to Taiwan: Adaptation and Self-Identity of Young Taiwanese Return Migrants from Australia." *Journal of Population Studies* 36: 99-135
- Chiang, Lan-Hung Nora, and Richard Jung-Chung Hsu. 2003. *The Study on the Overseas Chinese in Australia*. Taipei: Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China(Taiwan).
- Faist, Thomas. 2000. *The Volume and Dynamics of International Migration and Transnational Social Spaces*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- Greenstein, Fred I. 1968. "Political Socialization." In *International Encyclopedia of the Social Science*, Vol. 14, ed. David L. Sills. New York: The Macmillan

Company & the Free Press.

- Hsu, Richard Jung-Chung. 2013. "'Returning Migrants': The Movement and Adaptation of Taiwanese One and a Half Generation Migrants between Taiwan and Australia." *Journal of Population Studies*, 46: 121-161.
- Hsu, Richard Jung-chung and Li-ju Chen. 2006. *Qualitative Research of Adaptation and Development of Taiwanese Immigrants in Los Angeles*. Taipei: Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan).
- Hsu, Richard Jung-chung, Li Qi, Pei-Jun Liao, and Hui-ping Chang. 2004. *A Survey Research of Contemporary Taiwanese Immigrants in Canada*. Taipei: Overseas Community Affairs Council, Republic of China (Taiwan).
- Hsu, Yung-Ming, and Yun Fan. 2001. "Learning To Be Taiwanese: The Paths of Forming Taiwanese Identity." *The Taiwanese Political Science Review*, 5: 3-63.
- Hsu, Yung-Ming, Chia-Hung Tsai, and Hsiu-Tin Huang. 2005. "Referendum: A New Dynamic of National Identity in Taiwan." *Taiwan Democracy Quarterly*, 2(1): 51-74.
- Jiang, Yi-Hua. 1998. *Liberalism, Nationalism and National identity*. Taipei: Yang-Chih Book Co., Ltd.
- Lai, Li-Ying. 2005. "The Generation Difference of Overseas Chinese' National Identity: a case study on the Overseas Compatriot Associations in Toronto from 1971 to 2004." Master's thesis. National Normal University.
- Langton, Kenneth P. 1969. *Political Socialization*. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Lin, Chiung-Chu. 2008. "Issues, Candidate Evaluations, and Partisanship: Competing Characterizations of the 2006 Taipei Mayoral Election." *Taiwan Democracy Quarterly* 5(2): 59-87.
- , 2012. "Change and Continuity: An Analysis of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and Position on the Cross-Straight Relations." *Journal of Electoral Studies*, 19(1): 96-127.
- Liu, I-chou, and Szu-yin Ho. 1999. "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People." *Issues & Studies* 35(3): 1-34
- Sheng, Shing-Yuan. 2002. "The Issue Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland and Voting Behavior in Taiwan: An Analysis in the 1990s." *Journal of*

*Electoral Studies*, 9(1): 41-80.

Shyu, Huo-yan. 2004. "Taiwan-China Complex and Taiwan-China Concern: Symbolic Politics in Taiwan's Elections." *Journal of Electoral Studies*, 11(2): 1-41.

Taylor, Charles. 1989. *Sources of the Self: The Making of the Modern Identity*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tsai, Pei. 2010a. "The Diasporic Identities of Taiwanese Immigrants in Brisbane, Australia." *Journal of Population Studies* 40: 91-155.

-----, 2010b. "How Do Taiwanese Become Australians? Communication Interaction in Cross-Border Identity." *Chinese Journal of Communication Research* 18: 193-233.

Wu, Chin-En. 2007. "Analyzing Three Dimensions of Political Trust in Taiwan: Politicians, Governments, and Democracy." *The Taiwanese Political Science Review* 11(1): 147-200.

Wu, Chung-Li, Yin-Yin Tan, and Shih-Hung Lee. 2003. "Empowerment Theory and Voting Behavior: The 2001 County Magistrate/City Mayoral and Legislative Yuan Elections in Taiwan." *The Taiwanese Political Science Review* 7(1): 91-156.

Wu, Naiteh. 2005. "Romance and Bread: A Preliminary Study of the Identity Change in Taiwan." *The Taiwanese Political Science Review* 9(2): 5-39.