

**May Fourth Movement and Modern Nation-Building:  
Discourses of “national Territory” in the KMT and CCP Nationalisms**

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“The nationality of the worker is neither French, nor English, nor German. It is *labour*, *free slavery*, *self-huckstering*. His government is neither French, nor English, nor German, it is *capital*. His native air is neither French, nor German, nor English, it is *factory air*. ***The land belonging to him is neither French, nor English, nor German, it lies a few feet below the ground.***”

Karl Marx<sup>1</sup>

“The territory passed on by old ancestors cannot be lost, not even just an inch of it.”

(老祖宗留下來的領土，一寸也不能丟。)

“The sacred territory of the fatherland cannot be split, not even just an inch of it”

(祖國的神聖領土，一寸都絕不能分割出去。)

Xi Jinping ( 習近平 )<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Karl Marx, *Draft of an Article on Friedrich List's book: Das Nationale System der Politischen Oekonomie*, 〈<https://www.marxistsfr.org/archive/marx/works/1845/03/list.htm>〉, (Sep, 10, 2019.)

<sup>2</sup> From Xi's two talks respectively on June, 27, 2018 and December, 17, 2018 , 〈<https://www.chinatimes.com/newspapers/20180628000645-260108?chdtv>〉 , (Sep, 10, 2019.) , 〈<https://www.ettoday.net/news/20181218/1334008.htm>〉, (Sep, 10, 2019.)

## 1. The May Fourth Movement and Modern Chinese National Consciousness

The famous historian Wang Ermin (王爾敏), in his analysis of the development of modern Chinese nationalism, has pointed out that a number of new terms such as “guomin, (國民)” “guoquan, (國權)” “guodi/guotu (國地／國土)” and “guojiao (國教)” first appeared in the “Baoguoahui zhangcheng (保國會章程)” (Charters for the Assembly of National Protection” written by Kang Youwei (康有為) in 1898. According to Wang, this new development indicates that the late Qing intellectuals had embraced a new national consciousness, which came to see China as a nation-state with definitive national territory and sovereignty, equivalent to the modern nation-states in the West.<sup>3</sup>

Indeed, as Wang has argued, this new kind of national consciousness, which emerged during the late Qing period, is a very important issue in the study of the construction of modern Chinese national identity. In this paper, I will point out that a number of key features of KMT and CCP “national territory”(guotu) discourses are literally rooted in the late Qing discourse. First of all, I will look into how the late Qing intellectuals challenged some old conceptions in order to construct a new sense of collective ownership of the so called “guotu.” Secondly, I will also examine how some old and foreign ideas were appropriated by the late Qing intellectuals to articulate and characterize the significant status of “guotu.” Furthermore, I will also probe into how some “guotu” discourses have become paradigms, particularly in terms of their use of specific symbols and “national humiliation” narrative framework, exercising profound and lasting impact on later similar discourses in modern China.

As well known, the main historical factor that prompted Kang Youwei in 1898 to form the “Assembly of National Protection” was the dispute between Germany and the Qing court regarding concession issue in Shandong. Incidentally, 20 years later, the concession issue in Shandong again became the main driving force that provoked the famous May Fourth Movement, a patriotic movement with lasting legacy. During the Movement, a famous slogan in the widely circulated “Declaration by the Beijing

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<sup>3</sup> 王爾敏,〈清季學會與近代民族主義的形成〉,收入氏著,《中國近代思想史》(北京:社會科學文獻出版社,2003),頁191-192。

Scholars” drafted by Lo Chia-luen (羅家倫), is as follows: “The land of China can be conquered but cannot be ceded! The Chinese people can be killed but cannot be succumbed!” (中國的土地可以征服而不可以斷送! 中國的人民可以殺戮而不可以低頭! )<sup>4</sup>

If we compare and contrast the statements by Kang in 1898 and Lo in 1919 regarding the national territory issue. It is not difficult to see a similar perplexing sense of crisis of “wangguo (亡國)” (demise of the nation) expressed in them. Both have argued that if the Shandong issue is not resolved in China’s favor, China will certainly be doomed. However, there is significant difference between them as well. Indeed, the sense of crisis was very real to Kang and Lo as well. Yet, for Kang, there were only a minority of intellectuals who seem to realize the impending national crisis. Just as Liang Qichao(梁啟超) repeatedly complained in his famous article “On Patriotism” in 1899, Chinese people as a whole could be viewed as a people with no sense of patriotism. In short, according to Liang, the great majority of the Chinese people has barely any sense of patriotism, not to mention any sense of “wangguo” resulting from the “guotu” issue.<sup>5</sup>

On the other hand, in Lo’s statement in 1919, the appeal of the sense of national crisis apparently was targeting to the whole nation, the whole Chinese people. Actually, the obligation and responsibility to protect the national territory lies in the hands of every Chinese. As the slogan vividly and emotionally proclaims, the life of every Chinese should be sacrificed for the protection of the national territory. Although it is hard to estimate the real effect of this manifesto, the real significance is that it indicates the sense of national crisis had truly made progress in becoming a more publicly concerned issue among common people by 1919, rather than a very limited issue among reformed thinkers.

Nowadays in China, it is very easy to take Lo’s appeal to sacrifice one’s life in order to safeguard the national territory for granted. However, if we take Liang’s complaints more than a hundred years ago regarding the “senseless” of the patriotic feelings of the Chinese people into consideration, then we should be curious about the remarkable development of the national consciousness since the late Qing period. Some

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<sup>4</sup> 羅家倫,〈北京學界全體宣言〉,轉自億萬,〈一周中北京的公民大活動〉,《每周評論》,第21期,(1919年5月11日),頁89。

<sup>5</sup> 梁啟超,〈愛國論〉,收入張品興編,《梁啟超全集》,第一冊(北京:北京出版社,1999),頁272。

of the important changes taking place since then will be the foci of the following investigation.

## 2. From Emperor's Family Property to People's Ancestral Inheritance

When Liang Qichao and other reform thinkers in late Qing tried hard to imbue the Chinese people with a new collective sense, i.e., national consciousness, one important concept they were trying hard to redefine was precisely the true “ownership” of the Chinese territory. Yan Fu (嚴復) once remarked in his famous article “on Strength” (Yuanqiang 〈原強〉) that the westerners, such English and French people, whenever they hear the name of their “guotu,” where they were born, they express strong feelings to toward it as if we hear the name of our parents. Yan concluded that the urgent issue for China in his day, is how to combine and transform people's private concern and feelings into something for the public good.<sup>6</sup> Likewise, in the same year when Kang wrote the Charters mentioned above, Kang explicitly pointed out that because only the emperor and a few officials ruled the whole country, the common people, without any political rights, are totally indifferent to “guojia” and “guotu.”<sup>7</sup>

In the same vein, in his severe attack on the long tradition of despotism in China for its negative impacts on the Chinese minds, Liang reiterated the aforementioned viewpoint expressed by Yan and Kang as follows: “In today's China, the so-called guotu is nothing but a private property of one family. The international affairs are only private businesses of one family. The national crisis is only one family's bad fortune. The so-called national humiliation is a shame on one family. As a result, the people in general has no idea of the nation. The nation in turn has no sense of the people. As such, the country might manage to survive in the past. Yet, under the circumstance of the fiercest international competition nowadays, how can it sustain itself?”

Liang has repeatedly criticized that the Chinese people has long become used to the idea that the whole country is belonging to the ruling house alone, and only the emperor is entitled to the ownership of goutu.<sup>8</sup> As a result, it is quite natural to see that

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<sup>6</sup> 嚴復, 〈原強〉, 收入麥仲華編, 《皇朝經世文新編》, 卷一上 (臺北: 文海, 1972), 頁 80。

<sup>7</sup> 康有為, 〈請君民合治滿漢不分折〉, 收入湯志鈞編, 《康有為政論集》, 上冊 (北京: 中華, 1998), 頁 340。

<sup>8</sup> 哀時客稿, 〈論近世國民競爭之大勢及中國之前途〉, 《清議報》, 第三十冊 (1899 年 10 月 15

the Chinese people were indifferent to China's national crises, including its guoto lost to foreigners.

In order to challenge and change such a mindset of the Chinese people, Liang and other late Qing intellectuals were eager to promote the new idea that guoto actually belongs to the people, to the whole nation. Meanwhile, this new idea was combined with and reinforced by another late Qing national myth, i.e., the Yellow Emperor as the common ancestor. Therefore, according to this new discourse, guoto was redefined as an ancestral heritage passed on by the Yellow Emperor and collectively owned by all the descendants of the Yellow Emperor.

### 3. “Sacred and Inviolable”: From (Meiji) Emperor to Guotu

Among all the efforts trying to promulgate the new idea about guoto during the late Qing period, Chen Duxiu (陳獨秀)'s related discourse deserves special attention. Chen once emotionally recalled how he came to realize the fact that China is only a nation among nations in the world, and he only became aware of himself as a member of China, which is just like a big family for the whole Chinese people, when he was 20 years old, after experiencing the turmoil of the Boxer Rebellion.<sup>9</sup>

By redefining China as a big family for every Chinese people, Chen further elaborated the importance of viewing and protecting China as one's own family. He emphasized that any country in the world won't give up an inch of its guoto to others, and bitterly depicted the unbearable fact that China has lost many lands, such as Hong Kong, Kowloon, Weihaiwei, to foreign powers.<sup>10</sup>

In his article “On the Demise of Nation”(1904), Chen emotionally decried that the valuable inheritance left by the Yellow Emperor, i.e., China's national territory, has now been wasted randomly by the incapable descendants, and many parts of guotu were lost to the hands of foreigners. Most significantly, in the same article, Chen not only repeated the point that guotu “cannot be given up to others, not even just an inch” but also has depicted the status of guotu with the phrase “sacred and inviolable.”(神聖不

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日), 頁 1926。

<sup>9</sup> 陳獨秀, 〈說國家〉, 收入任建樹編, 《陳獨秀著作選》, 第一卷 (上海, 上海人民出版社, 1988), 頁 55。

<sup>10</sup> 陳獨秀, 〈亡國篇〉, 收入任建樹編, 《陳獨秀著作選》, 頁 69。

可侵犯)<sup>11</sup> Very likely, this is the first time in modern Chinese history, that such a phrase is used to characterize the noble status of guotu. In the numerous discourses regarding goutu ever since, the so called “sacred and inviolable goutu” utterance has repeatedly appeared, figuring most prominently in the modern Chinese discourse of goutu. In light of this historical development, it is not difficult to see that there are striking similarities between Chen’s way of describing the status of guotu and what Xi Jinping (習近平) has said in the 2018 statements aforementioned .

However, though maybe Chen can get the credit of being the first one in Chinese history to depict the status of goutu as “sacred and inviolable,” yet the term “sacred and inviolable” was actually not coined by him. Indeed, if we read carefully the political discourses in late Qing, the term “sacred and inviolable” was mainly utilized to depict the prominent status of the emperors. For example, in Liang’s comments on why few scholars dared to criticize Confucius, he made such an analogy: because (scholars) are just like common people facing the sacred and inviolable authority of the emperor. They (Confucius and emperor) were regarded as being belonging to different class, which forbids any criticism upon them.<sup>12</sup>

However, if we look into the issue further, we can soon find out that the term itself was actually introduced into late Qing intellectual universe from Meiji Japan. In fact, the term “sacred and inviolable” did not appear in the Chinese traditional discourses concerning the status of the ruler before. By contrast, in 1889, when the Meiji Constitution came into force, the article 3 of which explicitly stipulates that “The Emperor is sacred and inviolable.” (天皇ハ神聖ニシテ侵スベカラズ)<sup>13</sup>

The article 3 had triggered a lot of debates in Meiji Japan. Though not everyone agreed to give the emperor such an eminent status, it won the support from the prime minister and many enthusiastic nationalists, who believed that the ruling house should be worshiped as the most reputed symbol representing the Japanese empire.

During the late Qing period, when the Qing reformers eagerly discussed the possibility of setting up a constitutional monarchy system in China, the Meiji Japanese constitution became an important reference. In many late Qing discussions about

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<sup>11</sup> 陳獨秀, 〈亡國篇〉, 收入任建樹編, 《陳獨秀著作選》, 頁 68。

<sup>12</sup> 中國之新民 (梁啟超), 〈論中國學術思想變遷之大勢〉, 《新民叢報》, 第 58 號 (1904 年 12 月 7 日), 頁 7。

<sup>13</sup> 〈大日本帝國憲法〉, 〈<http://www.ndl.go.jp/constitution/etc/j02.html>〉, (May, 20, 2018.)

constitutional monarchy, the article 3 of the Meiji constitution was referred to as a salient feature of the Japanese model. For example, in Liang's article on reforms in 1902, he explicitly pointed out that anyone who has ever sojourned in Japan must have realized that the Japanese emperor was rich and well respected, enjoying the sacred and inviolable status.<sup>14</sup>

However, for Liang the reformers, and for some more radical revolutionists as well, such an esteemed status of the emperors was viewed by them as exactly the very negative feature of the Chinese despotism for thousands of years. Either through reforms, or even revolutions, the high authority of emperors of China was to be challenged or deprived. Significantly, in the late Qing discourses, the prominent "sacred and inviolable" status was therefore transferred from the emperor to guotu. On the one hand, the nation, the whole people has come to replace the emperor as the new/true owner of guotu. On the other hand, guotu also acquires the prominent "sacred and inviolable" status, which was originally reserved for the emperors. Ironically, because of the new prominent status of guotu, the people, though now being redefined as the so-called new owner of guotu collectively, has been constantly asked to sacrifice their lives in order to protect their "sacred and inviolable" guotu ever since.

As we can see, by the end of the 19<sup>th</sup> century, quite a few late Qing intellectuals tried hard to redefine the meaning and status of guotu in order to imbue the Chinese people with a new national consciousness. As Chen Duxiu's related statements vividly illustrates, during the first decade of the 20<sup>th</sup> century, more and more similar discourses appeared, aiming to cultivate national consciousness in terms of topics such as collective ownership of /responsibility to guotu, national humiliations resulting from concessions, and the sacred and inviolable status of guotu.

Another significant example that also demonstrates well the development of this new guotu discourse can be found in another article written by Lu Zhiyi (呂志伊) (1881-1940) in 1907. As a member belonging to the late Qing revolutionists' camp, Lu later on became a key KMT member. In his article "On the Ways of People's Protection of Guotu." Lu reiterated the importance of patriotic feelings, stressing the awareness of collective ownership/responsibility regarding guotu, and criticizing people's indifference to the concessions lost to the foreigners. Again, Lu invoked the term "sacred and inviolable" in his discussion regarding guotu. Yet, he slightly modified its use as the Chinese people's "sacred and inviolable" right of the Chinese territory. Nevertheless, despite such modification, the key point is still that all the Chinese people

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<sup>14</sup> 中國之新民 (梁啟超), 〈釋革〉, 《新民叢報》, 第 22 號 (1902 年 12 月 14 日), 頁 6。



should be determined to sacrifice their own lives in order to protect such “sacred and inviolable” right.<sup>15</sup>

In short, in light of the guotu discourse starting from the late Qing period, the famous slogan concerning the significance and necessity of safeguarding guotu during the May Fourth movement can be viewed as a climax showing the momentum of the development of guotu discourse in modern China. The continuity and elaboration of this discourse in the following decades demonstrates its strong impact on the Chinese people’s imagination of their relationship with the so-called guotu. The following example will show that the further development of this guotu discourse in 1920s, which basically epitomizes the key features of modern Chinese guotu discourse till now.

#### 4. Guotu Imagination in Wen Yiduo’s (聞一多) “Song of Seven Sons”

In 1925, after spending three years in the USA, Wen published a number of so-called patriotic poems. Among them, “Song of Seven Sons” is specifically concerned with the guotu discourse. Its lasting significance can be shown by the fact that in 1999, when Macao was handed over to PRC, a song based on this poem was chosen as the theme song for this historical event. Apparently, even after half a century, Wen’s statement of patriotism in this poem is regarded as an appropriate expression of the “true” feelings of the Chinese people (and presumably people in Macao as well), at least from the Chinese official point of view.

So, what does “Seven Sons” mean by Wen? In the preface for the poem, Wen has explained how he analogizes the relationship between the seven “lost land” and the fatherland (祖國) as the one between seven sons being taken away and their original mother. Moreover, interestingly, instead of taking the role of fatherland(motherland) in lamenting the pain of losing these lands(sons) to foreigners, as what we have usually seen in the previous guotu discourses, Wen has taken the position of the seven “lost sons,” expressing their painful mood and deep sorrow for being taken away from their “mother” (the fatherland).

Wen’s narrative strategy could be viewed as an upgraded version of the late Qing guotu discourse, which stressed guotu as the family property of all the Chinese people, left by the common ancestor. Yet, in Wen’s writing, this kind of family analogy of guotu is even more close, more intimate because it is more like a geo-body imagination. The

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<sup>15</sup> 俠少 (呂志伊), 〈論國民保存國土之法〉, 《雲南》, 第 5 號 (1907 年), 頁 2-4。



“separation” of any parts from guotu is more like a “separation of bone and muscle” (骨肉分離) situation of a family being broken down.

To be sure, using the so-called “lost lands” such as Hong Kong, Macao, Weihaiwei, etc., as important symbols for articulating the sacredness and inviolableness of guotu is a common practice in previous guotu discourses. What truly makes Wen’s discourse distinguished is how he “others” the seven sons, i.e., the seven “lost lands,” by voicing/representing their “inner voice,” as if he fully realizes their true feelings and identifications. In other words, most of the guotu discourses in the past, whenever they mentioned the lost lands, the main purpose is to provoke the so-called national humiliation, to stimulate people who are still living in the fatherland to be patriotic, to fight against any foreign invasions. By contrast, Wen focused on the mood of sorrow and nostalgia feelings of those “sons,” who were forced to be taken away from their “mother.” In Wen’s depiction of the seven sons’ anger and sorrow, without exception, each son ends up with the same crying: “Mother! I want to return home. Mother!”<sup>16</sup> By doing so, Wen, in an emotional way, has aimed to justify the claim that all the Qing empire’s “lost lands,” regardless whether they were handed over under international treaties or not, should be the “inseparable” parts of the “fatherland.”

On the other hand, it should be pointed out, even though Wen has made him a self-appointed representative of the seven “lost sons,” no historical evidence has shown that he truly knows much about these seven places, or has personal living experiences in any of them. Indeed, the real living experiences and/or feelings of the people who live in these “lost lands” were actually not Wen’s concern at all. These “lost lands” appear to have subjectivities in expressing their own feelings in Wen’s writing. However, in this poem, their feelings can only be expressed as deep nostalgia feelings toward the fatherland or their sufferings and trauma after being separated from their mother. Even in some parts of the poem, they were allowed to complain a little bit about why they were given away to thieves/robbers and abandoned by their mother. Nevertheless, after all, the repeating and powerful conclusion “Mother! I want to return home. Mother!” makes it clear that no any other feelings whatsoever can challenge the sublime and patriotic feelings toward the “sacred and inviolable” fatherland.

## 5. Guotu: the “Sacred and Inviolable Ancestral Property”?

In his study of “banal Nationalism,” Michael Billing has argued that a key issue in

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<sup>16</sup> 聞一多, 〈七子之歌〉, 〈<https://www.wenyiduo.net>〉, (May, 20, 2018.)

the construction of national identity is how “the national we” is constructed and defined.<sup>17</sup> Although my study of the guotu discourses in modern China seems to be more concerning the land, the material dimension, yet, as my discussion has demonstrates, these discourses reveal a lot information concerning how the “national we” in modern China was imagined/constructed and defined.

Since the late Qing period, the sense of crisis of an imminent “demise of the nation” has become the major narrative framework in articulating the guotu discourse, with concessions and so called “lost lands” as important symbols indicating the impending demise. Moreover, in order to imbue people with a new sense of guotu, the late Qing intellectuals has tried hard to advocate that guotu was actually a common ancestral property passed on by the Yellow Emperor and should be carefully protected by all the Chinese people. In turn, by defining guotu as “sacred and inviolable,” a phrase originating from the constitution of Meiji Japan, the guotu discourse in modern China has urged, or even forced the Chinese people, who are the presumably new masters/owners of guotu, to sacrifice their own lives, if needed, to protect their “sacred and inviolable” guotu.

Undoubtedly, this modern guotu discourse has tremendous impact on the constuction of Chinese national identity for more than 100 years. In particular, it has aroused a lot of emotional reactions, such as what happened during the May Fourth Movement. Still, emotionally powerful as it has been, yet in light of a more critical viewpoint, this discourse contains some blind spots, which cannot be easily ignored.

First of all, by randomly mixing up the domain traditionally ruled by the emperors with the guotu of a modern nation-state, the new guotu discourse, in trying to define the people as the true owners of the national territory, has unwittingly confused the elusively defined domain belonging to the emperors in the past with the modern national territory, which is much clearly defined by precise borderlines. In short, to what extent, can all the lands used to be directly and indirectly ruled by the emperors, now be taken for granted as the collective property of the people of a modern nation-state? More precisely, should the cessions and concessions given away by the Qing emperors be viewed “naturally” as parts of the “sacred and inviolable” guotu of the modern nation?

In addition, as the late Qing political history attests, the claim of the so-called common ancestral property passed on by the Yellow Emperor could be a calling for cohesion, or a calling for divisiveness. In the hands of reformers, such Kang Youwi and

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<sup>17</sup> Michael Billing, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage Publications,1996), 70-74.

Liang Qichao, this “myth” was aiming to unify all the people in the Qing empire to fight against foreign powers. But, for the anti-Manchu revolutionists, such as Zou Rong (鄒容), this myth served as a powerful justification for taking back the ancestral property of the Han people from the “Manchu barbarians!”<sup>18</sup>

Lastly, as the quotation of Marx in the beginning of this paper evidently shows, he has pointed out long time ago that the nationalist discourse of collective ownership of national land is nothing but a coaxing discourse in favor of greedy capitalists. For the proletariats in particular, the only “land” that he can own, is nothing but where his body is buried. Nevertheless, the magic power of the guotu discourse, just as what Benedict Anderson has vividly described, has tremendous emotional calling power that made it possible “for so many million of people, not so much to kill, as willing to die for such limited imaginings.”<sup>19</sup>

Minogue has skillfully utilized both “Sleeping Beauty” and “Frankenstein’s Monster” symbols to depict the Janus characteristics of nationalism: A nation is like a peaceful and harmless sleeping beauty before it was aroused, becoming a terrifying and awesome monster out of control after it was created.<sup>20</sup> Likewise, when the late Qing intellectuals bitterly complained the majority of the Chinese people were “senseless,” without any patriotic feelings, not to mentioned any modern sense of the significance of guotu, the national consciousness concerning guotu barely mattered in the mind of the Chinese people. Yet, as the guotu discourse progressed over the past century, being elaborated during important historical periods, such as the May Fourth Movement, with the help of mass media, governmental propaganda, educational indoctrination, and laws, etc., the idea of the “sacred and inviolable” status of guotu has become deeply rooted in many people’s minds, not only becoming important part of both KMT and CCP ideologies, but also exercising its “monstrous” power in driving people to enthusiastically safeguard their “ancestral property.” As a result, in the name of the “sacred and inviolable” guotu of the fatherland, whoever is in power can “naturally” call on the Chinese people to protect their guotu at all costs, in fighting against enemies inside or outside. Therefore, in terms of the guotu discourse in modern China, how the “sleeping beauty” has transformed into a “monster” remains to be a significant historical issue to be investigated fully in order to shed new light on our understanding of its possible development and impact in the future.

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<sup>18</sup> 鄒容, 〈革命軍〉, 收入張玉法編, 《晚清革命文學》(臺北: 經世書局, 1981), 頁 127。

<sup>19</sup> Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities* (New York: Verso, 1991), 7.

<sup>20</sup> K.R. Minogue, *Nationalism* (New York: Basic Books, 1967), 7-8, 154-155.

## Supplement 1

陳獨秀，〈亡國篇〉，收入任建樹編，《陳獨秀著作選》（上海：上海人民出版社，1988），頁 67-85。

### 第一章 亡國的解說

「亡國」這兩個字怎樣解說？我們中國人懂得透的很少，先要懂得「國」字怎樣解說，那自然就明白亡國是怎樣解說了。這國原來是一國人所公有的國，並不是皇帝一人所私有的國，皇帝也是這國裡的一個人。這國裡無論是那個做皇帝，只要是本國的人，於國並無損壞。我們中國人，不懂得國字和朝廷的分別。歷代換了一姓做皇帝，就稱做亡國。殊不知一國裡，換了一姓做皇帝，這國還是國，並未亡了，這只可稱做「朝」，不可稱做「亡國」。必定這國讓外國人做了皇帝，或土地主權，被外國占去，這才算是「亡國」。不但亡國和換朝不同，而且亡國還不必換朝。只要這國的土地、利權、主權，被外國占奪去了，也不必要外國人來做皇帝，並且朝廷官吏，依然不換，而國卻真是亡了。照這樣看起來，我們中國，還算是一個國，還是已經亡了呢？依我說現在的國勢，朝廷官吏，雖說還在，國卻算是世界上一個亡國了。諸位若不相信，讓我再將我們中國已經滅亡的現象，說給諸位聽聽罷。

### 第二章 中國滅亡的現象

上章所說的土地、利權、主權三樣，被外國占奪去了就算是亡國，我們中國已經滅亡的現象，正是這三樣呀！

#### 一、土地滅亡的現象

土地是國家第一件要緊的東西。第五期報上說國家那一篇裡也曾說過，現在世界各國，神聖不可侵犯的國土，是尺寸都不肯讓人的。常言道人人有三不讓：一祖墳不讓，二田地不讓，三老婆不讓。況且是一個堂堂皇皇國家，豈可隨便將上地讓給外國嗎？我中國土地雖大，也擋不住今朝割一塊，明朝又割一塊，不上幾年，這全國不要一齊割完了麼。除現在各國總占的土地不算，今將北京政府，明明的訂個條約，把中國的土地送給各國的列表於後。諸位請看呀！請看呀！！請看呀！！

道光二十二年	英國	割取香港	
咸豐八年	俄國	割取黑龍江省北境和吉林省東境	
光緒二十一年	日本	割取台灣和澎湖列島	
二十四年	德國	租借膠州灣	以九十九年為期
二十五年	俄國	租借旅順口和大連灣	以二十五年為期
同年	英國	租借威海衛和劉公島	以二十五年為期
同年	法國	租借廣州灣	以九十九年為期
同年	英國	租借九龍	以九十九年為期

以上所列的幾處地方，不是我們中國神聖不可侵犯的國土，睜著眼睛讓外洋各國占了麼。況且香港、旅順、膠州、威海、九龍、廣州灣，是我中國五個頂好的海口，送了外國，尤其可惜。現在想在世界上算個強國，通商行軍，都必定要有海上的權力，因為現在五洲萬國，都是海上往來，若一國沒有海權，便活像人沒有手足，不能行動了。但是想攬海上的權力，必定要大興海軍。想大興海軍，必定要本國沿岸，有頂好的海口，才好做海軍的根據地。像那香港、旅順、膠州、威海、九龍、廣州灣，都是山圍水繞，天造地設。祖宗遺留的海口，怎奈已經拱手讓了他人。即使中國異日能夠大興海軍，已沒了絕好的軍港，將兵輪放在什麼地方呢？到（倒）是他們英、俄、德、法各國，在中國地界有了屯兵停船的軍港，一旦有事，不是反客為主麼。唉！我們黃帝老祖宗丟下來幾千年的好江山，到了今日子孫們無用，糊裡糊塗的讓了外人。我每回北到天津，南到廣東，路遇外國占領我中國的旅順、威海、膠州、九龍、香港這些地方，眼見得故國山河，已不是我漢種人的世界，既悲已往，又思將來，豈不是一件可惱可哭可驚可怕的事體麼！

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## Supplement 2

聞一多，〈七子之歌〉

邨有七子之母不安其室。七子自怨自艾，冀以回其母心。詩人作《凱風》以愍之。吾國自《尼布楚條約》迄旅大之租讓，先後喪失之土地，失養於祖國，受虐於異類，臆其悲哀之情，蓋有甚於《凱風》之七子，因擇其中與中華關係最親切者七地，為作歌各一章，以抒其孤苦亡告，眷懷祖國之哀忱，亦以勵國人之奮鬥云爾。國疆崩喪，積日既久，國人視之漠然。不見夫法蘭西之 Alsace- Lorraine（亞爾薩斯-洛林）耶？「精誠所至，金石能開。」誠如斯，中華「七子」之歸來其在旦夕乎！

### 澳門

你可知「媽港」不是我的真名姓？  
我離開你的襁褓太久了，母親！  
但是他們擄去的是我的肉體，  
你依然保管我內心的靈魂。  
那三百年來夢寐以求的生母啊！  
請叫兒的乳名，  
叫我一聲「澳門」！  
母親！我要回來，母親！

### 香港

我好比鳳闕階前守夜的黃豹，  
母親呀，我身份雖微，地位險要。  
如今寧惡的海獅撲在我身上，  
啖著我的骨肉，咽著我的脂膏；  
母親呀，我哭泣號咷，呼你不應。  
母親呀，快讓我躲入你的懷抱！  
母親！我要回來，母親！

## 臺灣

我們是東海捧出的珍珠一串，  
琉球是我的群弟，我就是臺灣。  
我胸中還氤氳著鄭氏的英魂，  
精忠的赤血點染了我的家傳。  
母親，酷炎的夏日要曬死我了，  
賜我個號令，我還能背水一戰。  
母親！我要回來，母親！

## 威海衛

再讓我看守著中華最古老的海，  
這邊岸上原有聖人的丘陵在。  
母親，莫忘了我是防海的健將，  
我有一座劉公島作我的盾牌。  
快救我回來呀，時期已經到了。  
我背後葬的盡是聖人的遺骸！  
母親！我要回來，母親！

## 廣州灣

東海和硃洲是我的一雙管鑰，  
我是神州後門上的一把鐵鎖。  
你為什麼把我借給一個盜賊？  
母親呀，你千萬不該拋棄了我！  
母親，讓我快回到你的膝前來，  
我要緊緊地擁抱著你的腳踝。  
母親！我要回來，母親！

## 九龍島

我的胞兄香港在訴他的苦痛，  
母親呀，可記得你的幼女九龍？  
自從我下嫁給那鎮海的魔王，  
我何曾有一天不在淚濤洶湧！  
母親，我天天數著歸寧的吉日，



我只怕希望要變作一場空夢。  
母親！我要回來，母親！

### 旅順、大連

我們是旅順、大連，學生的兄弟。  
我們的命運應該如何地比擬？——  
兩個強鄰將我來回地蹴踏，  
我們是暴徒腳下的兩團爛泥。  
母親，歸期到了，快領我們回來。  
你不知道兒們如何的想念你！  
母親！我們要回來，母親！