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亞洲政治經濟：2019年的中國香港事件案例

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作者/Author：金泰完(Taewan Kim)

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# 亞洲政治經濟： 2019 年的中國香港事件案例

金泰完

公共人才學系教授  
人文社會科學學院  
韓國東義大學

**關鍵字：**政經關連模型、中國國家目標、香港事件、六四  
天安門事件、國家完整

## 中文摘要

2019 年的香港反對逃犯條例修訂草案事件適逢天安門事件卅週年。示威情況看來已超越港府的能力。北京中央政府傳出武力干預的可能性。全球輿論熱烈討論北京是否會武力鎮壓。認為六四天安門事件可能重演的與相信終將和平解決的兩派勢力堪稱五五波。

本文主旨在應用國際關係的政經關連 (politic-economic linkage model) 的模型來剖析北京決策者的決策制訂標準及其對亞洲政治經濟的衝擊。當北京當局認為香港反送中示威對中國共產黨 (CCP) 的政權構成挑戰時將會使用武力鎮壓示威。最近的媒體報導越來越聚焦於軍事干預的可能性。至少北京已運用各種非正式介入的方式強化了香港警察的能力。因此，沒有必要進行像 1989 年天安門事

件一樣的武力鎮壓，除非示威者突然轉向暴力，並試圖推翻香港的基本法治秩序或公開反對北京的中共當局。

**作者簡歷(BIO):**

Taewan Kim is a Professor at the Department of Political Science, Dong-eui University, Korea, a recipient of 2019 Taiwan Fellowship, and a visiting scholar at the Center for WTO Studies, National Cheng Chi University, Taipei, ROC. He received his Ph. D. from the University of Colorado at Boulder and served as a visiting scholar at the Institute of International Studies, Tshinghua University, Beijing, PRC. Before joining Dong-eui University, Dr. Kim taught at the School of International Service, American University in Washington, D.C.

# Political Economy of Asia: A case of China in 2019 Hong Kong Incident

*Taewan Kim (Dong-eui University)*  
[taewandavid@gmail.com](mailto:taewandavid@gmail.com)

**Key Words:** Politico-economic Linkage Model, China's National Goals, Hong Kong Incident, Tiananmen Square Incident, National Integrity

## **Abstract :**

Current Hong Kong incident has developed with the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Tiananmen Incident and a bill proposal regarding extradition in June, 2019. Ceaseless demonstrations look beyond the capability of authorities in Honk Kong. Beijing regime leaks the possibility of physical intervention to the Hong Kong incident. Global opinions busy to discuss and predict if Beijing crack down with forces or not. Both sides, which bets to the peaceful resolution and forecasts another 6.4 Tiananmen tragedy, have their own plausible reason. Of course, the possibility of the intervention is half and half.

This paper delves the criteria of decision-makers' would-be conclusion in Beijing, and the impact of the decision in Asian political economy, using the politico-economic linkage model. Beijing would use military forces to repress the Hong Kong demonstration when the CCP leadership regards it as a critical challenge to the CCP regime in Beijing. Recent media reports are getting to put

more weigh on the military intervention. At least Beijing informally intervenes by strengthening the capability of Hong Kong police with diverse ways. No need to directly crack down like previous 1989 Tiananmen Scare incident unless the protesters abruptly turn to brutal violators overthrowing fundamental order of Hong Kong or defying against Beijing's ruling Communist Party.

## ***1. Introduction***

Current Hong Kong incident has developed with the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of Tiananmen Incident and a bill proposal regarding extradition in June, 2019. Ceaseless demonstrations look beyond the capability of authorities in Honk Kong. Beijing regime leaks the possibility of physical intervention to the Hong Kong incident. Global opinions busy to discuss and predict if Beijing crack down with forces or not. Both sides, which bets to the peaceful resolution and forecasts another 6.4 Tiananmen tragedy, have their own plausible reason. Of course, the possibility of the intervention is half and half.

This paper delves the criteria of decision-makers' would-be conclusion in Beijing, and the impact of the decision in Asian political economy, using the politico-economic linkage model. China would use military forces to figure out when it regards the Hong Kong incident as a critical matter for Beijing CCP regime. Furthermore, the media reports encourage to put weigh on the military intervention. At least Beijing informally intervenes by strengthening the capability of Hong Kong police with diverse ways. No need to directly crack down like previous

1989 Tiananmen Scare incident unless the protesters abruptly turn to brutal violators overthrowing fundamental order of Hong Kong or defying against Beijing's ruling Communist Party.

## **II. Theory:**

### **1. Politico-economic Linkage Model<sup>1</sup>**

It is the bottom line of the politico-economic linkage model that each factor never functions independently; thus, emphasizing one factor and ignoring the others leads scholars and policy makers to fail in predicting the decisions of Chinese foreign policy. In a nutshell, all factors of [Figure 1] interact with one another despite their importance independence respectively. The mingled relation of politics and economy depends on the feature of the situation. In urgent times, political logic takes precedence of the economic one in decision-making process while economic benefits overwhelm politics.

In his edited book, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, James Rosenau<sup>2</sup> affirms the necessity of a linkage approach to analyze a country's foreign policy. Robert

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<sup>1</sup> See pages 112-116 of the author's article in Taewan Kim, "Beijing's Dilemma and Preference on the Korean Peninsula: Responses to the 2010 Korean Crises," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013: 109-138.

<sup>2</sup> James Rosenau, *Linkage Politics: Essays on the Convergence of National and International Systems*, (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1969).

Putnam<sup>3</sup> also argues that the foreign policy-making process can be understood as a 'two-level game'. In other words, policy-makers play at the politics of both the domestic and the international arena. Sociologist James Coleman<sup>4</sup> argues that individuals behave in accordance with their own interests and also by the society in which they live and have been socialized. That is, each factor at the micro level (individual level) transfers to the social or collective behavior at the macro level (domestic and International system level). In fact, the factors at the micro and the macro levels interact with each other. Quansheng Zhao<sup>5</sup> analyzes Chinese foreign policy with a modified 'micro-macro linkage approach'. He analyzes Chinese foreign policy by the interaction of diverse factors in micro and macro levels.

Although these authors are primarily concerned with foreign policy issues, I believe that one gains greater understanding of Beijing's reactions to external stimulations. I analyzed the Beijing leadership's responses to the 2010 Korean crises and argued that Beijing stood by Pyongyang because it conceived the crises as a critical situation to Beijing, in which it did not have enough time to calculate costs and benefits of the decision.<sup>6</sup> In the same

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<sup>3</sup> Robert D. Putnam, "Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games," *International Organization*. Vol 42, No. 3 (summer, 1988): 427-460.


<sup>4</sup> James Coleman, *Foundations of Social Theory*, (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1990).

<sup>5</sup> Quansheng Zhao, *Interpreting Chinese Foreign Policy: The Micro-Macro Linkage Approach*, (New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 1996).

<sup>6</sup> Taewan Kim, "Beijing's Dilemma and Preference on the Korean Peninsula: Responses to the 2010 Korean Crises," *International Journal of Korean*

vain, I see the response to current Hong Kong incident depends on how Beijing authorities see: Normal situation or critical situation.

**Figure 1: Politico-economic Linkage Model**



The domestic level has two kinds of factors: unit factors and group factors. The unit means individual decision-makers who are subjects of behavior in the groups. Decision-makers do not independently behave. They interact with one another within the groups, such as the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), governmental branches, and any informal *guanxi*<sup>7</sup> system. Groups and individual decision-makers are also interdependent on each other.

*Unification Studies*. Vol.22, No. 1, 2013: 109-138.


<sup>7</sup> In Chinese, *guanxi* literally means relationship.




The international level implies sovereign states as a unit factor, and international organizations and structures as group factors. A sovereign state is a main unit of behaviors in the international community. They independently behave and sometimes form groups, such as international organizations, through which they play in the international arena. These unit and group factors independently interact with counterparts of the domestic level besides interacting with each other; simultaneously, as an international system they influence domestic factors. This interacting mechanism should be lighted in two different dimensions: the political and economic dimensions.

In a general situation, the political dimension is dependent on the economic dimension and the economic dimension has greater influence on the political dimension than vice versa. However, in moments of national urgency, the relations between the two dimensions are reversed. Most notably, the wills and choices of decision makers come to be crucial. [Figure 2] and [Figure 3] contrast the interactive relations of the political and economic dimensions.

**Figure 2: Causation of Political and Economic Dimensions under Long-term Normal Situation**



**Figure 3: Causation of Political and Economic Dimensions under Short-term Critical Situation**



Then, why does the priority between economy and politics differ in situations of national urgency? This is because of the characteristic variance of economy and politics. The economy follows interests and efficiency while politics tend to manage them. If one accepts David Easton's definition of politics, the authoritative allocation of value, the economy pursues values while politics are concerned with how values should be distributed in society. In most cases in society, the economy contributes expectable allocation by the market, but it takes time; that is why politics go prior to economy in urgent times.

Meanwhile, China has a planned economy; that is to say the CCP leadership designs its specific strategy of economic development. China adopts the capitalist market economy. Simultaneously, however, it wishes to modify it into a Chinese style. The result is a more state intervened and managed capitalism than those of other countries. This means that a political logic likely goes prior to the economic one in China.

The 2010 Korean crises urged Beijing to choose its position between the two Koreas in a short time. It seemed that Beijing was at a loss by facing the pressure of Seoul and the international community. In fact, on December 15, 2010,<sup>8</sup> Zhu Feng, a Korean peninsula specialist at Peking University, defended Beijing's Pyongyang-leaned excessive behavior in the Korean crises and the

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<sup>8</sup> Professor Zhu's keynote speech at the opening ceremony of the Center for Chinese Studies, Korea National Diplomacy Academy (former Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security; <https://www.knda.go.kr/knda/hmpg/kor/main/HmpgMain.do>).

*Senkaku/Diayudao* incident saying that Chinese authorities were not yet prepared well for dazzlingly rapid changing situations in both of the domestic and international arena. Professor Zhu's comments can be interpreted as that the Crises were from emergent situations which did not allow Beijing enough time to decide its position.

In any case, however, China finally chose to stand by Pyongyang despite the international burden, which is infringement of China's national dignity as a responsible stakeholder.

## **2. National Goals of the People's Republic of China<sup>9</sup>**

In order to understand the reason for China's specific behaviors including current Hong Kong incident, one should pay attention to the national goals of China that cannot be renounced. China has some innate national goals which restrict its internal and external policies. They result from the authoritarian attributes of Chinese domestic politics. The Bo Xilai scandal<sup>10</sup> shows that the Beijing leadership seriously limits diverse opinions as well as even different styles of behavior in domestic politics. The

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<sup>9</sup> See pages 117-118 of the author's article in Taewan Kim, "Beijing's Dilemma and Preference on the Korean Peninsula: Responses to the 2010 Korean Crises," *International Journal of Korean Unification Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 1, 2013: 109-138.

<sup>10</sup> For the Bo Xilai scandal, see the website, <<http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-china-17673505>> (accessed August 21, 2012).

inalienable goals of the inner circle of the CCP can be analyzed by three levels.<sup>11</sup>



[Figure 4] shows the three levels' national goals set up on the foundation of the continuous and stable economic development. The successful economy is crucial to achieve the national goals. First, at the individual level, Chinese leadership's proximate goal is to continue the CCP's hold on power. It tends to be the superior goal to the others because of the supreme political power holder's attributes that cannot be yield without force.

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<sup>11</sup> Regarding three major Chinese national goals, see the following article and Table-3 in it. Taewan Kim, "China between the Two Koreas: Dilemma of the Korean Peninsula Policy," *Journal of International Politics*, vol. 16, no.2 (2011), pp. 37-73. [Figure 4] is a modified version of Tabel-3 and Figure-2 from the article.

Second, national integrity is the crucial goal at the state level. Modern China, People's Republic of China, differs from common states on the globe; rather than a state, it is a world. Traditionally, it is called *Tianxia* which literally means 'under heaven'; that is to say, the whole civilized world under heaven or sky. During several millennia political subjects in the Chinese continent have tried to make one country of *Tianxia*, where has existed diverse people and cultures. Still, Beijing government concern the national integration. the CCP leader ship believes that Western pluralistic democracy is not suitable for China. That may erode the national integrity by stimulating diverse ethnic minorities.

Finally, at the international level, the innate goal is to be a global superpower despite China never officially pursues hegemony. To achieve these three national goals, Beijing's policy preference is focused on economic development. Many see that China's dream(*Zhongguomeng*) is to replace the US as a hegemon by 2050.

China's successful and continuous economic growth has provided the CCP regime the legitimacy of continuing domestic rule for the national integrity and the desire to be a global power. Therefore, rapid economic growth is not a deniable option for the Beijing leadership; through economic success they can show the world the capability of the CCP regime.

However, it is not possible for countries such as China to continuously maintain a high growth rate in

economy. China needs to prepare for an impending low growth rate era. According to Ruchir Sharma,<sup>12</sup> for instance, around six percent of national economic growth is an enviable to most of other countries, but for China it might cause serious instability in domestic politics. Maintaining continuous CCP's political rule and national integrity requires a high growth rate of economic development in China unless some other factors set off the failure of rapid growth. Therefore, domestic factors, such as preparing for a low economic growth era and maintaining stable politics, may be major challenges and primary considered elements in the foreign decision-making of the newly launched Xi Jinping regime.

### ***III. Application to the 2019 Hong Kong Incident***

#### **1. Domestic Considerations**

Domestic challenges diverse. Ceaseless anti-Beijing sentiments and riots from domestic ethnic minorities are chronic; besides, big economic and social inequalities between regions and ethnics. Ongoing Hong Kong incident is one of most serious challenge to Beijing leadership.

#### ***National Integrity***

In domestic, China has both of challenges and opportunities at the same time. China has been facing unprecedented chance to be global power since Xi Jinping

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<sup>12</sup> See Ruchir Sharma, *Breakout Nations: In Pursuit of the Next Economic Miracles* (New York, NY: W.W. Norton, 2012).

regime in Beijing launch in 2013. however, the challenges that China faces are serious as much as the opportunities. the Checks of Washington has been growing since the Beijing shows the rhetoric of China's dream (*Zhongguomeng*) as its national goal and its plan, 'made in China 2025(*Zhongguozhizao 2025*)' in 2015.

Xi Jinping, general secretary of the CCP, officially became a President of the PRC by the confirmation of the National People's Congress on March 14, 2013. He first mentioned *Zhongguomeng* (China's dream) at the visit of National Museum of China just after his taking office of General Secretary of the CCP in November, 2012.<sup>13</sup> In summary, Despite of official deny of Beijing regime, Xi's Chinese dream is to be a global super power by strong economic and military forces. That dream requires continues economic development to support the strong military build-up and the Beijing-CCP-leadership centered Xi Jinping from domestic Chinese people as well. That can be picturized by my China's National Goals (see Figure 4), and be explained by my Politico-economic Linkage Model (see Figure1).

Zongguomeng looked to be realized in accordance with the CCP's schedule, so called the double centennial goals (兩個百年目標). President Xi has efforded to achieve the goals and even declared the Taiwan unification by 2050 through Taipei's acception of 'one country two

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<sup>13</sup> See “General Secretary Xi set forth China’s dream(*Xizongshujishenqingch anshu*; 习近平总书记深情阐述‘中国梦’)”, [http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2012-11/30/c\\_124026690.htm](http://www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2012-11/30/c_124026690.htm) (access on October 10, 2019).



system(一國兩制)' principle; he urged Taiwan to follow Hong Kong model for the unification.<sup>14</sup>

Beijing seems to believe that the one country two system principle has been successfully settled down in Hong Kong. However, Hong Kong citizens have not been satisfied with the Beijing's policy toward Hong Kong. Current mass demonstrations in Hong Kong proves the citizens' perspective have not matched with Beijing leadership since the 1997 return of Hong Kong.

Superficial reason of the Hong Kong incident is the extradition bill proposal of Hong Kong government. The protesters extremely fear<sup>15</sup> that the 2019 bill of Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matter Legislation (Amendment)<sup>16</sup> can be abused to suppress their diverse democratic freedoms. However, it is hard to explain that the ostensible motive causes current serial mass demonstrations in Hong Kong; rather Hong Kongers doubts and afraid Beijing harms their political and

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<sup>14</sup> Teddy Ng and Lawrence Chung, "Chinese President Xi Jinping urges Taiwan to follow Hong Kong model for unification," *South China Morning Post*; January 2, 2019; See <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/politics/article/2180391/chinese-president-xi-jinping-urges-taiwan-follow-hong-kong-model> (accessed on July 4, 2019).

<sup>15</sup> Holmes Chan (13 Feb. 2019), "'Trojan horse': Hong Kong's China extradition plans may harm city's judicial protection, say democrats," *Hong Kong Free Press*. See <https://www.hongkongfp.com/2019/02/13/trojan-horse-hong-kongs-china-extradition-plans-may-harm-citys-judicial-protections-say-democrats/> (access on June 20, 2019).

<sup>16</sup> In Chinese, 2019年逃犯及刑事事宜相互法律協助法例(修訂)條例草案.

individual freedoms despite of the one country two system by Beijing regime.

Besides Hong Kong, there are many other troublesome regions in China: Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region (XUAR), Xizang Autonomous Region (Tibet), and so on. XUAR had been called East Turkestan Republic before 1949 New China in Beijing. Mostly Muslim Uygur people in XUAR are still strongly long for their own independent government. Beijing regime never accept the desire and has been harshly cracking down the anti-Beijing and independent activities. Recently, diverse international organizations including the UN are urging Beijing to stop the oppression on Muslim people.<sup>17</sup> Tibet also had occupied by Beijing authorities in 1950 and has become a part China. Regarding the 84 year-old Tibetan spiritual leader Dalai Lama's successor issue, Beijing accuses Washington for meddling in its domestic affair.<sup>18</sup> As see on [Figure 4], national integrity is a top priority of China.

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<sup>17</sup> Steven Lee Myers, "A Crackdown on Islam Is Spreading Across China," <https://www.nytimes.com/2019/09/21/world/asia/china-islam-crackdown.html> (access on October 10, 2019); "China's Repression of Uighurs in Xinjiang," <https://www.cfr.org/background/chinas-repression-uighurs-xinjiang> (access on October 10, 2019).

<sup>18</sup> AFP, "Our Internal Affair: China Accuses US Of Using UN To 'Meddle' In Tibet," <https://www.outlookindia.com/website/story/world-news-our-internal-affair-china-accuses-us-of-using-un-to-meddle-in-tibet/342135> (access on November 11, 2019); James Flynn, "Will China's Next Crisis Be in Tibet?" <https://www.the-american-interest.com/2019/08/13/will-chinas-next-crisis-be-in-tibet/> (access on October 10, 2019).

In a nutshell, despite the rhetoric ‘one country two system,’ China would not allow Hong Kong to empower more than the abovementioned troublesome autonomous regions in order to consolidate its domestic national integrity.

### ***Brief Timeline of Hong Kong Incident Development***

In fact, it is hard to say that Hong Kongers has been come out on streets merely because of the extradition bill proposal of Hong Kong government. The number of demonstrators once reached two millions<sup>19</sup> of about seven millions<sup>20</sup> of Hong Kong population; it means actually most possible people went out streets, allowing for people who have to stay their working places such as hospital workers and patients, public officials including police, the elderly and infirm and so on. The five demands<sup>21</sup> of protesters prove that they want democracy: Full withdrawal of the extradition bill, a commission of inquiry into alleged police brutality, retracting the classification of protesters as “rioters”, amnesty for arrested protesters, and Dual universal suffrage, meaning for both the Legislative Council and the Chief Executive.

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<sup>19</sup> SCMP reporters, “As it happened: A historic day in Hong Kong concludes peacefully as organisers claim almost 2 million people came out in protest against the fugitive bill. *South China Morning Post*, June 16, 2019. “ See <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3014695/sea-black-hong-kong-will-march-against-suspended> (access on July 4, 2019).

<sup>20</sup> <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/hk.html> (access on July 4, 2019).

<sup>21</sup> Wong Tsui-kai, “Hong Kong protests: What are the ‘five demands’? What do protesters want?” <https://yp.scmp.com/hongkongprotests5demands> (access on October 10, 2019).

Indeed, they request a full political democracy and individual political freedom; of course, that does not necessarily mean that they want the independence of Hong Kong from China. Some argue that the protesters plot the independence of Hong Kong. However, it is not reasonable that they really want independence because they know Beijing authorities never allow it and brutally crash down their demonstrations. At least, demonstrators would not request Hong Kong's independence at least superficially; rather they would concentrate on the five demands, which logically matches with 'one country two system' of Beijing.

However, nobody can expect how recent Hong Kong incident develops because for the first time Hong Kong demonstrators experienced a death casualty directly related to police action.

First of all, the proposal of Hong Kong government's extradition bill in February 2019 ignited the serial mass demonstrations. Demonstrations against the bill began in March and April, 2019. After mass demonstration on the 30<sup>th</sup> Anniversary of the 6.4 Tiananmen Square Incident in June, they escalated into mass protests for several months. Although Hong Kong authorities declared withdrawal of the extradition bill, which is the first one of five demands, mass demonstrations have not decreased with the other four demands. Finally, the first death casualty occurred on November 6.

Hong Kong citizens who call the Tiananmen Square

Incident as the 6.4 slaughter (屠殺)<sup>22</sup> were shocked and angry with the first death of protesters.<sup>23</sup>; Before the death, Hong Kong police ever shoot 18-year old protester in the shoulder, and 14-year old boy in his thigh on the first and fourth of October respectively.

Recent reports on the Hong Kong demonstrations include beating of protesters by police as well as beating of policemen by protesters, and quarrels and physical collision between anti and pro-Beijing demonstrators.<sup>24</sup> This kinds of chaos in Hong Kong are partly because of the lack of leadership of Hong Kong protesters and heavier hand of Beijing and Hong Kong authorities.<sup>25</sup>

### ***Regime Security***

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<sup>22</sup> Hong Kong University, the oldest and one of the most prestigious higher educational institutions in Hong Kong, has a red sculpture on its campus to commemorate the victims of the 6.4 Tiananmen Square incident.

<sup>23</sup> Alice Su, Ryan Ho Kilpatrick, "Another red line is crossed in Hong Kong as a 22-year-old protester dies after all," <https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2019-11-08/hong-kong-protesters-call-for-revenge-after-22-year-old-student-dies-in-fall> (access on November 8, 2019).

<sup>24</sup> Mimi Lau and Timmy Sung, "Collision course set over threat to remove protest barriers," <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/article/1615924/collision-course-set-over-threat-remove-protest-barriers> (access on Oct 10, 2019).

<sup>25</sup> Su xinqi and Victor Ting, "Hong Kong's 'leaderless' protest movement looks to minimize public's wrath through peaceful and organized non-cooperation," <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3015688/hong-kongs-leaderless-protest-movement-looks-minimise> (access on November 1, 2019); Reuter, "U.D. concerned about some Hong Kong protest tactics, heavier China hand: Pentagon," <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-hongkong-protests-usa/us-concerned-about-some-hong-kong-protest-tactics-heavier-china-hand-pentagon-idUSKBN1WU2J6> (access on November 1, 2019).

Hong Kong issue is deeply related in regime security and economic development, and national integrity as well. Hong Kong is crucial for stable economic development for its unreplaceable financial role in China. It retains role as China's financial center and Asia's as well. It has been playing a financial bridge between China and international community. Global investments that are still doubtful on China's domestic financial market have flowed to China through Hong Kong. There has been none domestic city to replace Hong Kong's role in terms of international political economy; thus, Hong Kong is instrumental and crucial for China's national goals such as national integrity and continuous CCP regime based on the continuous and stable economic development as seen on [Figure 4].

## 2. International Considerations

The US-China trade war affect China's domestic affairs now. Beijing authorities already warned Washington not to intervene in Tibet (Dalai Lama's successor issue) in November and in Hong Kong earlier, arguing them as domestic affairs of China. Chinese foreign ministry spokesman Geng Shuang admonished Washington not support the democracy in Hong Kong and respect China's sovereignty when US President Trump mentioned Hong Kong issue at the UN General Assembly in September.<sup>26</sup> However, President Trump warned that any Tiananmen Square-style crackdown in Hong Kong would harm the trade negotiation.<sup>27</sup> Formal mentioning the 1989

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<sup>26</sup> <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/diplomacy/article/3030365/china-warns-us-hong-kong-bill-support-democracy-will-harm> (access on October 10, 2019).

<sup>27</sup> "Tiananmen Square' crackdown in Hong Kong would harm trade deal:

Tiananmen Square incident is an affront to China in Beijing's view.

The Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) is a smart power strategy to expand Beijing's influence toward surrounding neighbors and to construct a friendly network on globe. Beijing has afforded to spend huge money to set up soft power foundation for long time. If Beijing militarily intervenes and oppresses Hong Kong without globally excused reason, like previous 1989 Tiananmen Square incident, that would hurt and lose the embryo of Chinese soft power in international community.

In short, Beijing concerns over the possible international sanctions and condemnation; That would seriously encroach so called 'Chinese soft power' that Beijing government has built for paying huge national efforts.

#### **IV. Conclusion<sup>28</sup>: Normal Situation vs. Critical Situation**

In Beijing's view, the turbulence of Hong Kong should be settled down soon for the domestic stability and

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Trump, *AFP*. August 19, 2019.

<https://www.afp.com/en/news/15/tiananmen-square-crackdown-hong-kong-would-harm-trade-deal-trump-doc-1jm2p61> (Access on August 19, 2019).

<sup>28</sup> Jude Blanchette, "How Close Is Hong Kong to a Second Tiananmen?" <https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/08/14/how-close-is-hong-kong-to-a-second-tiananmen/?fbclid=IwAR1wvXPc1OcLU9JyY3eQomHEwsPQOwo2WtP8nW0JI54wPirkWKt7jcfule> (Access on August 15, 2019).

efficient external behaviors regarding the BRI and the US-China trade war. One country two system (OCTS) policy in Hong Kong is a peaceful icon of China's national integrity; Beijing wants to apply it to Taiwan. If people in Hong Kong do not satisfy or not accept the OCTS policy, the policy cannot be settled down for the reunification.

Beijing faces in a dilemma how to resolve the Hong Kong issue. Physical intervention in Hong Kong would result in acknowledging the failure of the OCTS policy; it is also hard to allow Hong Kong to have a democratic government based on universal suffrage, which is one of crucial element of the protesters' five demands, because Beijing regime fear the political liberation in Hong Kong would propagate in nationwide.

Up until recent days, Beijing has leaked the possibility of military intervention in Hong Kong.<sup>29</sup> It might be a psychological warfare tactic rather than actual preparation of military deployment.<sup>30</sup> Meanwhile, Hong Kong's former justice secretary Elsie Leung said that

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<sup>29</sup> Catherine Wong, Gary Cheung, Denise Tsang, and Teddy Ng, "Chinese military can be deployed at Hong Kong's request to contain protests, Beijing says," *South China Morning Post*, July 24, 2019. See <https://www.scmp.com/news/china/military/article/3019854/chinese-military-can-be-deployed-hong-kongs-request-contain> (access on August 1, 2019).

<sup>30</sup> Su Xinqi, "No reason for Beijing to send troops to Hong Kong to deal with protests, says former justice secretary Elsie Leung," *South China Morning Post*, August 18, 2019. See <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3023301/no-reason-beijing-send-troops-hong-kong-deal-protests-says> (access on August 19, 2019).



Beijing would not enter the city because Hong Kong would not request it yet.<sup>31</sup>

Hong Kong is crucial for China continuing economic development. The city is a financial gate for international economic actors to China. Global investments flow into China through Hong Kong despite the lack of China's domestic financial system in accordance with global standard. Thus, military intervention should be the last option for Beijing. Global actors in economy would turn against China if direct intervention occurs; if so, China loses many valuable international assets such as an embryo of soft power based on the BRI project in undeveloped neighboring countries, because the BRI project would be sluggish when China faces bad economic outcomes as well. That results in huge costs of China for continuous and stable economic growth.

In a nutshell, China would reluctantly intervene in the Hong Kong incident if Beijing leadership perceives the recent development of the incident in Hong Kong as a critical situation that harms China's national goals based on the stable economic development; however, if the CCP leaders see it as an endurable situation, the quagmire in Hong Kong will last until the tiredness of citizens and protesters reaches a boiling point in mire of ceaseless demonstrations and authorities' unresponsiveness.

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<sup>31</sup> Su Xinqi, "No reason for Beijing to send troops to Hong Kong to deal with protests, says former justice secretary Elsie Leung," *South China Morning Post*, August 18, 2019. See <https://www.scmp.com/news/hong-kong/politics/article/3023301/no-reason-beijing-send-troops-hong-kong-deal-protests-says> (access on August 19, 2019).