國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程

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碩士論文

Master's Thesis

香港人在台灣：身分認同與生活經驗

Hong Kongers in Taiwan: Identity and Living Experience

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Abstract

This thesis seeks to analyse the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. Drawing primarily upon theories of nationalism and national identity, and through in-depth interviews with students, dependants and investors from Hong Kong, and secondary literature analysis, this thesis examines the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan from the aspects of national identity, cultural identity and social identity. The main finding of this research is that all Hong Kongers interviewed have multiple or dual identities, with Hong Kong identity being the strongest identity even for those who have obtained Taiwan citizenship and identity cards. As for the factors that have affected the national identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, the policy of the Hong Kong government, such as the Free and Independent Travelers policy towards mainland Chinese visitors to Hong Kong, and the consciousness of the differences in the ethnic sense between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese people stand out. As far as cultural identity is concerned, 'collective memory' of living in Hong Kong constitutes the core of their cultural identity, with Hong Kong-style restaurants for instance being the most common 'carrier' of this cultural identity in Taiwan. Social identity understood by way of the 'sense of community', with the use of the Social Networking Sites (hereafter SNSs) and the existence of 'Yellow Economic Circle' in Taiwan being the two most prominent examples. This thesis concludes that first, Hong Kongers in Taiwan strongly identify themselves as 'Hong Kongers'; secondly, the conscious differences between Hong Kongers and the Chinese have shaped their identity; and finally, the sense of community is positively correlated with their identity.

KEYWORDS: *Identity, Nationalism, Collective Identity, Hong Kongers, Sense of Community*

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摘要

本論文運用深度訪談，對在台灣居住之香港人進行研究，其中主要研究對象為學生、依親及投資移民三個身分。透過集體認同中之：國家認同、文化認同及社會認同三個面向，了解他們的身分認同。此論文發現：不同群體的香港人，移居到台灣的動機與挑戰均不同，對於身分認同的觀點也有差距。部份人可能有著雙重甚至多重身分，或是已經拿到台灣身分證，但他們多數仍然將自己定義為香港人。受訪者之國家認同主要會被兩個因素影響；香港政府之政策、中國、香港身分之對比；文化認同則透過在台灣呈現之集體回憶，來保存香港本土文化；他們的社會認同與社群意識有高度連結，其中兩個例子是社群媒體的使用與在台灣之黃色經濟圈。此論文發現：1) 在台之香港人有著強烈的身分認同，並將自己定義為「香港人」、2) 中國與香港身分認同之間的差異有助塑造香港身分認同、3) 社群意識與身分認同有正相關，並影響在台香港人在社群媒體上之行為。

關鍵字：國族主義、身分認同、集體認同、香港人、社群意識

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Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1 Research Background

Both Hong Kong and Taiwan share some "Chinese culture" and have been affected by the pan-Chinese nationalism[1] to differing degrees. Over the past decade or so, political protests triggered by policies involving China's relationships with Hong Kong and Taiwan respectively have drawn attention to the identity issues in both societies. In the Taiwan case, it is the Sunflower Movement occurring in 2013 against the background of the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA). In Hong Kong, it is the 2014 Umbrella (also called Occupy) Movement protesting against the decision issued by the Standing Committee of the National People's Congress regarding the proposed reforms to Hong Kong's electoral system. Ma Man-fai, a politician and social activist from Hong Kong, proposed that Hong Kong should be listed as one of the "Non-self-governing Territories". Hong Kong is now an autonomous administrative region of China, but it was heavily controlled by China as the result of Beijing's practicing "One country, Two System". In recent years, the political conflicts in Hong Kong have been argued to reflect the dissatisfaction of Hong Kongers with the Hong Kong government and the Chinese central government. Moreover, the widely shared dissatisfaction has affected negatively the level of trust of general Hong Kongers in Hong Kong governments and Beijing. As Steinhardt, Li & Jiang (2018) has pointed out, the trust in the central government affect the national identity of Hong Kongers.

The concept of "One Country, Two Systems" was established by Deng Xiao-ping in the 1980s. It was adapted to Hong Kong since 1997, after the transfer of Hong Kong sovereignty. The "50 years unchanged" principle will expire in 2047. The immense success of Hong Kong's economy has shown that the system itself is perfect for a win-win situation for both Hong Kong and China. According to the 2019 Global Competitiveness Report, Hong Kong ranked 3rd out of 141 economies globally, it is the highest of all Asian economies. However, Hong Kong's democracy was deeply

[1] Pan-Chinese Nationalism: The pan-Chinese nationalism is one perspective of "new nationalism" in China in the 1990s to promote a set of shared values and cultural identity to hold the overseas Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongers.

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concerned by the world in 2019. In the 2019 Democracy Index, established by the Economic Intelligence Unit (EIU), a photo from the Hong Kong's demonstration was selected as the report's cover page, the report also addressed the reason behind the protest. The report divided the countries into four grades, Hong Kong belongs to "flawed democracy", similar to most Asian countries. In the report, Hong Kong ranked 75th, down from most Southeast Asian countries.

Since 1997, the Chinese Central Government began to promote the national identity in Hong Kong, which contrasts to the local identity formed under colonial period. Also, the influx of mainland immigrants has already begun to provoke new social tensions in Hong Kong society. Each day, 150 Chinese residents obtain a one-way entry permit to legally reside in Hong Kong. The 2003 National Security Bill (Legislative Provisions) was the straw that broke the camel's back and caused discontent among the Hong Kongers over the Chinese central government. The bill implementing Article 23 of the Hong Kong Basic Law, which stated that:

> *"The Hong Kong Special Administrative Region shall enact laws on its own to prohibit any act of treason, secession, sedition, subversion against the Central People's Government, or theft of state secrets, to prohibit foreign political organisations or bodies from conducting political activities in the Region, and to prohibit political organisations or bodies of the Region from establishing ties with foreign political organisations or bodies."*

Many Hong Kongers think the Article 23 might affect the freedom of speech in Hong Kong and it violates the "One country, Two systems". On 1 July 2003, 500,000 Hong Kong citizens joined a massive protest calling for the withdrawal of the bill. In the latest book published by a famous Hong Kong writer – Chip Tsao, he recalled the peaceful demonstration and said that these protesters were so well-behaved.

After the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, the support for the anti-China localism has grown rapidly among the younger generations (Wong, Zheng and Wan, 2020). Young Hong Kongers have become the leaders in social movements. The role of the political generation in identity processes also helps explain how individuals who share a socially devalued identity, but have little else in common, develop new standards of

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self-approval (Brown and Rohlinger, 2016). In 2019, 2,000,000 Hong Kong citizens joined another massive demonstration to pull back the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill. The movement highlights the opposition of the Hong Kong government and the protesters. The protesters called on the Hong Kong government to respond to the "five demands", which include a complete withdrawal of the Extradition Bill, withdraw the proclamation of the "riots" at the protests on June 9 and 12; withdraw all criminal charges against all protesters; investigate the abuse of power by the Hong Kong police and the implementation of Dual Universal Suffrage.

In the survey conducted by Hong Kong University's Public Opinion Program, the ethnic identity of "Hong Kongers" in 2019 has reached its highest level since 1997 and the number also reached a higher level in the year the political incident occurred. According to Klandermans (2013), collective identity, politicized collective identity, dual identity, and multiple identities are concepts that help to understand and describe the social psychological dynamics of protest. This explains why the social movements in Hong Kong and the Hong Kong identity have had an impact on each other.

In 2019, EIU compared the cost of living in 133 cities with New York, and Hong Kong is one of the most costly cities – alongside Paris and Singapore. Another research was conducted by MERCER, the world's largest human resources consulting firm, also comparing the cost of living of 209 cities with New York City, Hong Kong has the highest rent in the world. According to data from the Census and Statistics Department of Hong Kong, the median monthly employment earnings of employed persons aged 20 to 59 were 16,600 Hong Kong dollars in 2017. Social problems in Hong Kong have become severe, in particular the issue of housing, quality of life and mental health. In the 2020 World Happiness Report, which evaluated people's happiness level in 2017-2019, Hong Kong ranked 78 out of 153 countries in the world. Taiwan ranks 25th in the same report, which is the highest in Asia. In the 2018 report, it also analyzed the foreign-born migrant's happiness ranking in different countries. In this report, Taiwan ranks 38th, 3rd among Asian countries.

Since the mid-19th century, Hong Kong has been the main nodal port linking trans-Pacific Chinese migration. Beginning with the 1984 Sino-British Joint

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Declaration, Hong Kongers have been concerned about their future. The huge contrasts in the socio-political systems and economic development between Hong Kong and China have worried many Hong Kongers. From 1984 to 1995, an estimated 500,000 Hong Kong residents had immigrated to countries such as Canada, the United States, Australia and the UK (Chan & Fung, 2018) to avoid political risk. Today, the trend of international migrants has grown from 153 million in the 1990s to 244 million in 2015 (World Happiness Report, 2018). In addition, an estimated 700 million people want to move but have not yet moved. As for the recent trend, many Hong Kongers choose to migrate to Taiwan – a place that has a similar ideology and culture with Hong Kong; a better geographic location (not connected to China); lower living expenses when compared to Hong Kong. And more importantly, Taiwan has a lower migration threshold than other countries, which have attracted a lot of young migrants aged 30 to 40. Those young people were very much affected by the political incident in Hong Kong, the decision to emigrate was taken on complex reasons and motives. What makes the Hong Kongers come to Taiwan? Has the living experience in Taiwan strengthen their sense of identity? How's their life in Taiwan? To answer the above questions, this paper explores the stories of Hong Kongers who now live in Taiwan.

Table 1. Number of Hong Kongers who received ARC/APRC in Taiwan, 2016-2019

Year	Approval for ARC	Approval for APRC
2016	4057	1086
2017	4015	1074
2018	4148	1090
2019	5858	1474

Note. Data Retrieved from: The Ministry of the Interior, National Immigration Agency, Republic of China (2020). 統計資料:外僑居留人數統計表. https://www.immigration.gov.tw/5385/7344/7350/%E5%A4%96%E5%83%91%E5%B1%85%E7%95%99/

The above data was retrieved from the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan. However, it did not provide individual data on migrants from Hong Kong until 2016, the data was calculated with migrants from Macau. The Taiwanese

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government has provided many friendly policies to the Hong Kongers, and the number of migrants from Hong Kong and Macau has grown since 2013. Since 2013, the number of approvals for the Alien Resident Certificate (ARC) and Alien Permanent Resident Certificate (APRC) have increased slightly, and even decreased from 2016 to 2017. From 2018 to 2019, the number of approvals for ARC and APRC increased by 41% and 35% respectively. In 2019, there were 5858 Hong Kongers obtained the ARC and 1474 Hong Kongers obtained the APRC. Growth is strong in comparison to previous years. For sure, following the political incidents in Hong Kong, there will be more Hong Kongers deciding to migrate. Why they come to Taiwan and what they are looking for are important, this paper will try to find them out.

1.2 Motivation and Purpose

As a master's student in the IMAS program who has lived in Taiwan for over 8 years, the changing political situation and current migration trend in Hong Kong has inspired me to study the identity issue of Hong Kong and migrants from Hong Kong to Taiwan.

Since the 1990s, many Hong Kongers have already chosen to migrate abroad to avoid political risks, they have settled all over the world. And from 2014, another wave of migration has begun. To pursue a better life and avoid political risks, migration has become one of the popular issues in Hong Kong. As one of the Hong Konger who lives in Taiwan, in my everyday life, I did meet more Hong Kongers when compared to 8 years. Taiwan - a place near Hong Kong, attracted a lot of Hong Kongers considering moving here. Many Hong Kongers strive for a "better life" in Taiwan, but is Taiwan an ideal place for them? Some Hong Kong migrants share their living experience on social media, which broke the myth of living in Taiwan. In my own opinion, one thing that most of the Hong Kongers ignored is the monthly earning in Taiwan. Generally, the monthly earning in Hong Kong is 4 times of Taiwan, the living expenses in Taiwan is around 2~4times cheaper than Hong Kong. For most of the Hong Kongers who haven't moved to Taiwan, they were expecting to have lower

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living expenses in Taiwan when compared to Hong Kong. But when they earn money here, the situation will be totally different. In proportion, the expenses in Taiwan just fit the monthly earning. These Hong Kongers also expect to enjoy urban life in Taiwan. While most of them have chosen to migrate to Taichung or Kaohsiung, which are more rural in comparison to Taipei, their life is far below their expectations. Even some students can't cope with life in Taiwan and decided to drop out from school.

This thesis uses the case of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. Hong Kong and Taiwanese media frequently interviewed migrants from Hong Kong to Taiwan and tried to find out why they came here. When I collect data from interviewees, I have notice that some of them have been interviewed by certain media, but these media focus only on a specific issue. For example how these migrants apply for the migration or why they came here, which only provides the perspective of a certain individual. If we need to understand more or an overall trend, a study of Hong Kongers in Taiwan with different occupations, different ways to come to Taiwan and with more samples is important and meaningful for Hong Kong and Taiwan society, to understand this potential ethnic group in Taiwan and deepen our understanding of their point of view.

Research on Hong Kong identity is very limited. Most of the research focuses on the notion of diaspora, some focuses on the way Chinese diaspora takes place in Hong Kong, the diaspora of the ethnic group in Hong Kong, or the identity of overseas Hong Konger after these people returned to Hong Kong. Where Indian and Pakistani identity has appeared in most of the research, some research focuses on Hong Kongers living in Canada or the United States, but only very few of them discuss Hong Kongers in Taiwan. In addition, research on Hong Kong generally focuses on a certain political issue or social problem, with few collections of migrants' daily life experiences. In these researches, identity issues have always been mentioned and the method of interview has been adopted in most research.

There are a few study about Hong Kongers in Taiwan, two of them are: in the book "New Chinese Migrations: Mobility, Home and Inspirations", Chan & Fung

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wrote a chapter on migration to Taiwan, interviewing 13 Hong Kongers who have migrated or are planning to migrate to Taiwan. They explained the reason why these Hong Kongers chose to migrate to Taiwan from three perspectives: quality lifestyle and justifiable urban space, political space and alternative Chinese space. They pointed out Hong Kong, China and Taiwan are impossible to untie one's linkage no matter where one dwells. Another one is from a paper written by Chiang & Lin in 2018. They interviewed 40 Hong Kongers between the age of 39 and 77 to study the socio-economic integration of these migrants. They found that most of them had developed a successful career in Taiwan, not considering returning to Hong Kong and well integrated with Taiwanese society.

1.3 Research Questions

This research addresses two questions: first, how Hong Kongers in Taiwan define themselves and their perspective on their identity. Second, how is their life in Taiwan, and how Hong Kong identity presents in their life. Some sub-questions were raised in support of the main questions: the main factor encourages Hong Kongers to migrate to Taiwan; the methods used to migrate here; the differences in their lives in Hong Kong and Taiwan; what are the challenges of their lives in Taiwan and how they have integrated into the Taiwanese society.

The first question is addressed through the narration of the interviewees and the differences between Hong Kong and Chinese identity; and the second question is addressed through an evaluation based on their living experience in Taiwan.

1.4 Research Method

This study involves qualitative research. Horowitz (2012) suggested that understanding self-identity in relation to culture requires qualitative studies. What are qualitative and quantitative data? To explain them simply, qualitative data measures "type" and data can be represented by a name, symbol, or numeric code; quantitative

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data measures value or counts and expresses them as numbers[2]. This paper uses qualitative data. Initially, data are collected through in-depth interviews and second-hand data from the Internet. By defining relevant concepts, then through the narration of the interviewee's living experience - to discover and represent their identity. To allow these people and the others understand one another through interviews. Finally, this study will use all these data to analyze their voices and reach a conclusion. The source to be analyzed is secondary data retrieved from the Public Opinion Program of the University of Hong Kong, the Hong Kong Government and the migration-related data from the National Immigration Agency of Taiwan. These data included surveys and official reports. This research also covered library research, which includes books, journals, and academic papers.

In-depth interviews were conducted to support the research analysis. According to Robinson (2014), there is a four-point approach to sampling: (1) To define a sample universe; (2) Deciding on sample size; (3) Selecting a sample strategy and (4) Sourcing sample. In this paper, all samples share common characteristics: they all come from Hong Kong and they live in Taiwan. For a better understanding, a judgmental sampling method will be used; all interviewees should be in one of the following categories: currently studies at universities in Taiwan/ graduated in Taiwan and currently works in Taiwan/ came to Taiwan through investment migration/ married in Taiwanese/ dependents.

The general aim of sampling in qualitative research is to acquire information that is useful for understanding the complexity, depth, variation, or context surrounding a phenomenon, rather than to represent populations as in quantitative research (Gentles et.al., 2015). The target sample size of this paper is 8 persons from different categories and age groups. I post on three different Facebook groups and ask if the Hong Kongers living in Taiwan are willing to be my research sample. After collecting basic information from some of them, I found that most of them are students or people who work in Taiwan after graduation, and most of them are under

[2] Retrieved from: https://www.abs.gov.au/websitedbs/D3310114.nsf/Home/Statistical+Language+-+quantitative+and+qualitative+data

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the age of 30; only a few of them are investment migrants or Hong Kongers who are married to Taiwanese.

These students are willing to share their own experiences, which makes this study more focused on the perspective of young Hong Kongers'. All of the interviewees provided me with basic personal information for my writing, some of which requested to be anonymous for personal reasons. In order to have a clear presentation and to identify each of them in the paper, a code was given to each interviewee as shown in Table 2.. The interviews take place from late June to December 2019 and in May 2020; the method of phone interview and face-to-face interview have been applied so that I can collect samples from different cities in Taiwan. All interviews were held independently in Cantonese - the mother language of all interviewees.

The basic research question needs to be sufficiently focused so that a relatively homogenous group will have shared experience about the topic (DiCicco-Bloom & Crabtree, 2006). Interviewees will answer the basic research question: "How do you define your identity?" as the first question, with approximately 10 more specific questions to deepen their aspects of identity and daily life experience in Taiwan in one hour. Depending on the occupation and age of the interviewee, the interview questions and the wording used were slightly different. The transcripts will be translated into English for further analysis. Yau (2016) pointed out that one of the problems with empirical studies of Taiwanese identity is the use of over-simplified measurements based on the responses to a question involving choices. Hence, to avoid this issue, the analysis of this study will rely on three initial lines of identity: national, cultural and social identity and its components.

A total of 8 interviewees participated in this research: one of them is a student who defers her graduation for one year at Soochow University; one of them is a MA candidate in Performing Art at Taiwan Normal University; one of them just migrated to Taiwan using student visa and dependency policy; two of them found a job after graduating in Taiwan; two of them married to Taiwanese and one of them migrated to Taiwan through investment migration.

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Table 2. Information of In-depth Interviews

Code	Age	Gender	Medium	Title/ Job	Introduction	Date of Interview
A	53	F	Phone	Elementary School Teacher	A lived in Taiwan for 33 years. She studied at National Normal University when she was young and then married to Taiwanese after graduating.	June 2019
B	42	M	Phone	Logistics	B has been planning to leave Hong Kong since 2010, after the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, he decided to migrate and provide better education to his daughter. He set up his own logistics company in Taiwan in 2017 and now lives in Kaohsiung.	June 2019
C	34	M	Phone	Self-Employed	C married Taiwanese in 2012 and arrived in Taiwan. He started a tortoise jelly store in Taipei.	June 2019
D	26	M	Face to Face	Customer Service Specialist	D came to Taiwan in 2013 for his bachelor degree. After graduating, he obtained the work visa through the new scoring criteria for foreign and	Nov 2019

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					overseas Chinese students to work in Taiwan.	
E	22	F	Face to Face	Student	E came to Taiwan in 2015 for her bachelor degree. After graduating, she began her M.A. in Performing Arts at the National Taiwan Normal University in 2019.	Nov 2019
F	23	F	Face to Face	Student/ Dependent	F came to Taiwan in Sept 2019 as her parents decided to migrate after the protest in Hong Kong. Her mother is Taiwanese, but since she's over 20, she cannot use the dependency policy to move to Taiwan with her family. She then applied and began her master's degree in business at a university in Taiwan.	Dec 2019
G	23	F	Face to Face	Student	G arrived in Taiwan in 2015. She first enrolled in the Division of Preparatory Programs for Overseas Chinese Students for one year, and received an offer from a private university in Taipei. After graduating, she used the internship program to stay in	Dec 2019

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					Taiwan. She is currently seeking a job.	
H	24	M	Phone	Consultant	H came to Taiwan a few years ago for his bachelor degree. After graduating, he obtained the work visa through the new scoring criteria for foreign and overseas Chinese students to work in Taiwan.	May 2020

Note. Data provided by interviewees, edited by author.

The research limitations of this study are: first, all of the interviews will take place in Taipei or by phone, the interviewer cannot observe the facial expression of some interviewees, which could affect the accuracy of the results; second, all interviews will take place in Cantonese, all transcripts need to be translated. As I am not a professional translator, I am not sure of the accuracy of the translated transcript; third, the majority of interviewees under the age of 30 and this study only focus on one ethnic group of migrants in Taiwan (Hong Kongers), which may have an impact on the outcome of this paper; fourth, this thesis discussed the Hong Kong identity. However, there are many theories and facets in identity studies, this study only covers some of them and has provided some perspective on Hong Kong identity.

1.5 Chapters Structure

Chapter 1 presents the background of the study, the motivation for conducting this research, the research questions, the research method used and the chapter outline with the research framework.

The next chapter – Chapter 2 presented a review of current research on two main concepts relevant to this study: nationalism and identity. The section of nationalism

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covers the nationalism in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. Then, in the section on identity, the components of nationalism will be used to analyze the identity of Hong Kongers. These include the collective identity and its three aspect: cultural identity, social identity and national identity. Some relevant concepts are also included in this chapter: sense of community and diaspora identity.

Chapter 3 introduced different groups of Hong Kongers living in Taiwan: students, investment migrants and dependents. This chapter also explained the reasons behind their move to Taiwan.

Chapter 4 explores the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. This chapter first highlighted the perspectives of different age groups. Then, the three aspects of identity introduced in Chapter 2 were used to analyze the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. The sub-sections also include the policy of the Hong Kong Government and the relevant concepts raised in Chapter 2.

Finally, Chapter 5 is the conclusion of all the findings, and it also includes suggestions to future studies as well as the limitations of the research.

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

Figure 1. Research Framework

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Chapter2. Literature Review

This chapter addresses two key concepts: nationalism and identity. To begin with, nation means when a group of people believes they share common characteristics (blood, language, culture, lifestyle, history, experience, etc.) and their welfare should be protected by a state, a state will be built and these people will govern it. Such a state can be described as a "nation-state", the ideology that underlies it can be described as "nationalism". Anderson (1993) defined the nation as an imagined community, and nationalism is the sense of belonging to it. From He & Guo (2000), nationalism may include dimensions such as the sense of belonging, collective identity and loyalty to a nation. In the section on nationalism, only loyalty to a nation will be covered and in the section on identity, sense of belonging and collective identity will be discussed.

Identity was formed in different circumstances and it can be defined as: an individual's sense of self defined by a set of physical, psychological, and interpersonal characteristics that is not wholly shared with any other person and a range of affiliations (e.g., ethnicity) and social roles[3]. Here, the idea of belonging is important as our sense of identity is founded on social interactions that show our belonging to particular communities through shared beliefs, values, or practices (Social Issues Research Centre, 2007). There are many aspects of identity and this chapter will cover some of these, to understand the Hong Kong identity from different perspectives.

2.1 Nationalism

Since the 1970s, nationalism has served almost exclusively as the ideological instrument for political mobilization (Tang and Barr, 2012). Traditional Chinese nationalism serves as the basis of nationalism in Taiwan and Hong Kong. The two places contain the cultural heritage of Chinese nationalism while developing its unique characteristics followed by the colonial experience and the democratization

[3] Retrieved from: American Psychological Association https://dictionary.apa.org/identity

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process. Debates over nationalism between China, Taiwan and Hong Kong are generally based on two initial lines of nationalism: ethnic nationalism and civic nationalism. Ethnic nationalism represents the identity in which given but not selected by individuals (primordialism in collective identity) and civic nationalism represents the identity formed in the progress of socialization (constructivism in collective identity).

2.1.1 Chinese Nationalism

China's historical background has influenced its development of nationalism. Throughout history, there were many facets of nationalism exist in China, with most of the studies on Chinese nationalism focusing on one or two. The aim of Chinese nationalism is to restore its "greatness" and the national interest is the ultimate goal of it, the Chinese national identity has been used as a tool to strengthen the Chinese national state. China is a state inherited the legacy of an empire (Tang and Barr, 2012), after the turning point – the Opium War, it began to transform into a nation-state. From Cabestan (2005), several forms of nationalism co-exist in China. Traditional Chinese nationalism belongs to ethnic nationalism, but its exclusive and non-Han people have been excluded from it. The strong "Chineseness" feeling is important in Chinese nationalism. Some scholars have emphasised the relationship between globalization and the development of nationalism in China. For example, Shameer (2016) described four stages of nationalism in China and indicated that the nature of Chinese nationalism changes depending on its relationship with Western countries.

On the other hand, the "new nationalism" in China in the 1990s differed from the "old nationalism" that developed between the Qing Dynasty and the May 4th movement. One version of Chinese nationalism in this period is the pan-Chinese nationalism. Promote a set of shared values and cultural identity to hold the overseas Chinese, Taiwanese and Hong Kongers. In the 1990s, when Hong Kongers felt uncertain about the transfer of sovereignty, pan-Chinese nationalism was frequently promoted in Hong Kong to reduce the anxiety among Hong Kongers. Another version of Chinese nationalism in this period is the "banal nationalism", a concept raised by Michael Billig in 1995. This version of nationalism exists in people's everyday lives,

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and it's the everyday routines and discourses. In Hong Kong, two examples are the national anthem and the flag-raising ceremony: the Chinese national anthem will be broadcast daily on television at 5 p.m.; the flag-raising ceremony is part of national education and daily practice at Golden Bauhinia Square in Wanchai. It is even a tourist attraction in Hong Kong. In my memory, I would say the flag-raising ceremony has been shaped as a sacred ceremony. In our primary school, only those who are very outstanding can be chosen as the flag-raiser. The ceremony is also an important section of certain government events such as October 1st, to celebrate the formation of China, Hong Kong officials will all participate in the ceremony and the entire section will be broadcast on television.

From Billig's word, the national "we" is the key to the construction of national identity. For instance, the concept of "fellow" (tong bao) has been frequently used in China's propaganda against Taiwan and Hong Kong. From Yang (2018), "fellow" is a symbol to recall collective recognition and it shaped the identity in China.

2.1.2 Taiwanese Nationalism

The construction of Taiwanese nationalism was based on regime change on this island from the 19th century, is Taiwan a nation-state? This is still an unsolved problem. Those who claimed Chinese sovereignty over Taiwan emphasized that Taiwan was incorporated by the Qing Dynasty, and used the blood-connections to proof that Taiwan belongs to China. However, the Cairo Declaration announced in 1943 declared that: *"all territories Japan has stolen from the Chinese, such as Manchuria, Formosa and the Pescadores shall be stored to the Republic of China."*. In 1949, the "Republic of China" regime moved to Taiwan as a result of the Chinese Civil War. Since then, the Communist party took over China and became the only party in power. Then, should Taiwan be owned by the Republic of China or the People's Republic of China? Of course, this is not the focus of this study. But, to understand the Taiwanese nationalism, history is also important. Throughout history, Taiwan has played a major role in the development of the Asia-Pacific region, and its development and ideology are very different from those of China. For instance, in 1971 - Taiwan lost its membership in the United Nation (UN) and has been replaced

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by China. Previously, Taiwan was an active member of the world. During the cold war period, with help of the U.S hegemony, the Taiwanese state has formed (Wu, 2016).

As Kaeding (2011) said, the rise of Taiwanese identity is seen as directly linked to its geographical and political separation from China and its subsequent democratic development. Taiwanese nationalism is no "ordinary nationalism". The mainlanders who arrived with Chiang Kai-Shek in 1945-1949 only count 13% of the population today, while the native Taiwanese count 87% (Cabestan, 2005). Today, Taiwan contains mainly four ethnic groups of people: the aborigines, people from China, the Hoklo and the Hakka. According to Anderson (1991), printed national languages connect people speaking different dialects in Taiwan. The Taiwanese local culture formed since 1949 has differentiated Taiwan from the Chinese culture, and throughout history, the greater differentiation between China and Taiwan strengthen the sense of belonging of Taiwanese.

The creation of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) in 1986 has changed the one-party politics in Taiwan; it was led by native Taiwanese and promoted Taiwanese identity. The main difference between the two parties is their position on the issue of Taiwan's sovereignty and how they manage the relationship with China. The DPP's Taiwan-centric policy is a contrast to the KMT's pro-China policy. The alternation of parties can be seen in Taiwan's presidential election, it reflects the change in policies and it has affected the identity of the Taiwanese people. For example, the DPP promoted the concept of "Taiwanization", from the context of local history and culture to differentiate their identity from China, and President Tsai Ing-wen took a firm stand on the issue of Taiwan's independence. In 2020, Tsai again won the presidency, which is kind of a reflection of the attitude of some Taiwanese.

Scholars usually discuss nationalism in Taiwan and Hong Kong together, as both of them are affected by Chinese nationalism and there are certain similarities between Hong Kong and Taiwan. First, "Chineseness" is a significant factor in shaping the identity of Taiwan and Hong Kong; second, people in different age groups have different views on politics and self-identification; third, both Hong Kong

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and Taiwan have been colonized during their history; fourth, the economic interaction and relationships with China will influence identity formation. From Kwan (2016), in 2014, another similarity has appeared with the occurrence of Hong Kong's Umbrella Movement and Taiwan's Sunflower Movement. Student protestors reject the notion of "political China", which reflects their growing concern about China's influence over both places.

2.1.3 Hong Kong Nationalism

Before I start this section, I would like to address one question: if Hong Kong is not a nation, can the identification of Hong Kongers be called nationalism? Hong Kong nationalism and identity became popular issues again in 2014, following the Umbrella Revolution. The notion of Hong Kong nationalism developed on the basis of Chinese nationalism, distinctions were created to differentiate them, in the political, cultural, social and economic context. Some studies have pointed out that the Hong Kong nationalism has changed from time to time depending on who lives there. So (2015) discussed the formation of Hong Kong nationalism based on Chin Wan's book published in 2011 – "Xianggang Chengbang Lun" (香港城邦論). In the book, Chan explains the concept of city-state through the political development and history of Hong Kong. Above all, he thinks that Hong Kong does not have to be independent, but being autonomous is a must. The aim is to defend the tradition of Hong Kong rather than challenge China's sovereignty, while Hong Kong is a cultural community that differs from China and the Hong Kong nation has been formed through the historical process (Wu, 2016). Just insisting that "Hong Kong belongs to China" is not going to solve the problem.

From Druckman (1994), loyalty includes both emotional and cognitive aspects that interrelate to form images of groups and nation is viewed as one type of group that fosters loyalty. Hong Kongers in different age groups have a different degree of loyalty to China. Those who arrived in Hong Kong earlier and those with more ties to China, they are more loyal to the nation. The book "Four Generations of Hong Kongers" published in 2007 divided Hong Kongers into four generations, using their year of birth or the year they arrived in Hong Kong and their characteristics:

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Table 3. Four Generations of Hong Kong people

Generation	Title	Year of birth or year arrived in Hong Kong	Characteristics
1st	Parents of "After war baby"	Before 1946	Connection with China
2nd	"After war baby"	1946-1965	Distance with China, Rise of Hong Kong's indigenousness
3rd	30th generation	1966-1975	Indigenousness of Hong Kong, Resist recognizing China
4th	Children of "After war baby"	1976-1997	Facing system change after the return of Hong Kong

Note. Retrieved from "四代香港人," by F. K. Hung, 2016, Cultural Studies @ Lingnan, 52.

Most members of the 1st generation moved from China to Hong Kong in the post-war period. These Hong Kong Chinese who came to Hong Kong before 1949 were "sojourners" (So, 2015), meaning that Hong Kong was not home to them and they continue to embrace Chinese nationalism. Druckman (1994) suggested that group loyalty engaged individuals to distinguish groups where they belongs to and do not belongs to. These Hong Kong Chinese are loyal to the Chinese nation-state and maintain connections with China, they still identifying themselves as "Chinese" rather than "Hong Kongers" and treated China as their mother country.

The 2nd generation was formed by 1st generation's children or Chinese who came to Hong Kong after the 1949 revolution and the World War, they became refugees in Hong Kong and they cannot return to China. They still have ties with China, but when compared to the 1st generation, they have kept some distance, and they have no choice but to make money for their lives rather than against the colonial government who tried to manipulate their Chinese identity. The Cultural Revolution in the mid-1960s called for the downfall of the colonial state, some Chinese fled to Hong Kong under political repression, they seek a new life and a new identity in

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Hong Kong. They have no loyalty to China and even hated the communist party. These people became part of the 3rd and 4th generation in Hong Kong.

Most of the 3rd and the 4th generation are those who were born and raised in Hong Kong, their identity was built under host country: the colonial culture, society and ideology and they became alienation. They have very few links to China and strong identification as Hong Kongers. Many of them entered university and became middle-class professionals in the 1970's. They formed the foundation of Hong Kong's indigenousness and some chose not to recognize China. To these people, the host country is their mother country.

Nowadays, there are conflicts between different generations in Hong Kong, in particular the issue of identity. These people have different levels of loyalty to China and they have different views of China. Between the 1980s and 1997, Hong Kong's identity and nationalism changed rapidly as a result of decolonization and social transformation. According to Turner (1995), a local lifestyle displaced many traditional cultural connections as the basis for personal identity among hèung góng yàhn (Hong Kongers). The Y and Z generations (those who were born after the 1980s) have formed a new kind of nationalism – cyber nationalism based on the popularity of the internet, people expressed their point of view through the social network.

In many cases, Hong Kong has been treated differently as separate region from China. From Wu (2016), during the colonial period, the colonial government successfully made Hong Kong an international trading port and enters international organizations with independent status. One example is on diplomatic level, a Hong Konger can enter most of the countries without applying for a visa, while a Chinese must apply for a visa when visiting most of the countries of the world. Another example is from most of the airlines or shopping websites, Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau have always been defined separately. Even on China's online shopping website – Taobao, it also defines Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau as "Haiwai" - overseas (海外) area. Starting in 2019, customers of these three places have not been allowed to shop on the Taobao China's website but they must access the new websites:

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Taobao Taiwan and Taobao Hong Kong. In this case, these people have been differentiated from “Chinese”.

This section addressed the notion of nationalism, which includes nationalism in China, Taiwan and Hong Kong. First, in explaining certain facets of Chinese nationalism, we understand how it affected the formation of Taiwanese and Hong Kong nationalism. Then, throughout Taiwan’s history, we conclude the similarities between Taiwanese nationalism and Hong Kong nationalism. Finally, by evaluating Hong Konger’s loyalty to China, we can understand some of Hong Kong nationalism. The next section will look at the notion of identity through three aspects, which also cover certain elements of nationalism that affects one’s identity formation.

2.2 Identity

Norton (2000) defines identity as: *"how a person understands his or her relationship to the world, how that relationship is constructed across time and space, and how the person understands possibilities for the future."*. Our self-identity is important to understand who we are, whereas beyond self-identity, there are still many facets of identity and these concepts have been widely discussed in different studies. Since the 1970s, the concept of identity politics has created social movements. Minorities raise consciousness against the dominant opinion, especially on the issue of gender and race. Sociologists were among the first to emphasize the importance of collective identity in protest participation (Stekelenburg, 2017). Taylor and Whittier (1992) defined collective identity as the shared definition of a group that derives from member’s common interests, experiences, and solidarity. Generally, the collective identity can be explained through three theories: the primordialism, structuralism, and constructivism. In which primordialism and constructivism have been widely used to discuss the identity of Taiwan and Hong Kong:

Primordialism means that our identity is based on features that cannot be changed or questioned, they appear to be given by nature (Tempelman, 1999). Donald Horowitz (1985) argues that what makes ethnic meaningful is the birth connection or

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at least the fact that a group accepts someone as if that person had been born into it (Cornell, 1998). The Chinese government, the Kuomintang (KMT) in Taiwan and the pro-Chinese camp in Hong Kong have all used primordialism to explain why Taiwan and Hong Kong should belongs to China, based on a famous idiom: “blood is thicker than water”. But can the connection of blood above all other factors to conclude that Hong Kongers and Taiwanese are equal to Chinese?

Constructivism agrees that collective identity was not inborn but an on-going process of social construction. Identity itself is a process which will never complete – it’s always in progress, and it bridges the gap between the personal and the public world (Stuart, 1996). Hong Kong, a place geographically linked with China, has a complicated identity formed in its unique history. From Stuart (1996), identity is about questions of using the resources of history, language and culture in the process of becoming rather than being. The significant others of Hong Kongers are Chinese, and by pointing out the differences between “us (Hong Kongers)” and “them (Chinese)”, Hong Kongers should be able to create their self-identity.

There are many aspects of identity, however this section will only use three of these on the case of Hong Kong: national identity, cultural identity and social identity. Then, some relevant concepts: sense of community and diaspora will also be covered. The aspects of identity covered in this section are collective identities, they are all relevant to each other and highly affected by the sense of belonging. Here, both collective identity and sense of belonging are the components in nationalism. However, from Liu (2008), the sense of belonging should not only be defined by “nation” or “country” but an intangible concept to respect and position our own culture and identity.

2.2.1 Cultural Identity

From Stuart (1996), cultural identity is a matter of “becoming” as well as “being”. The identity of Hong Kong was built up from its unique history. Especially from cultural perspectives, the cultural differences between Hong Kong and China also formed a strong distinction between Hong Kongers and Chinese. A person’s

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culture is an essential element of their identity and it influences their group identity (Mercuri, 2012). Identification of Hong Kongers changed under different circumstances, they are culturally Chinese, but they always struck between their multiple 'local' and 'Chinese' identity (Chow, Fu and Ng, 2019). The study of the linguistics, culture, and literatures of Hong Kong has always included the notion of identity, nationalism and localism. Articles and books reflect the changes of identity in Hong Kong. From the 1940s to the 1960s, literature in Hong Kong mostly focused on repudiating Hong Kong and the diasporic experience of Chinese migrants in Hong Kong. Then after the 1967 leftist riot in Hong Kong, the Hong Kong government tried to form a new identity for Hong Kongers, not Chinese but a more westernized identity (Chan, 2019). Since the 1970s, Hong Kongers have been a distinct local identity, rooted in consumerism and canton-pop culture (Veg, 2017). During this period, the television broadcast, movies, pop song and even literature in Hong Kong demonstrated a strong sense of localism. Then in the 1980s, the transfer of sovereignty in 1997 worried Hong Kongers, their identity became vague.

In addition, many factors influence the construction of identity, linguistic is an essential factor. There are many studies on the relationship between identity, culture and linguistics, and some have pointed out that linguistics is part of cultural identity: according to Higgins (2014), language is one of the most tangible symbols of cultural and group identity and from Rovira (2008), language is a fundamental aspect of cultural identity. Wei & Hua (2010) studied the relationship between language and identity by interviewing diasporic Chinese in the United Kingdom, Australia and Singapore. They found that interviewees seemed to agree on the general significance of the Chinese language, but that different generations have different opinions. This reflects the tension within the Chinese diasporic group regarding the relationship between language and identity. Children who grew up abroad do not speak Chinese but they nevertheless define themselves as Chinese. They want to develop their distinctive identity as multilingual and multicultural individuals and as a new group of Chinese trans-nationals. This research also highlighted that the younger generation can adopt a more flexible approach to identity – more on broad sociocultural practices. Here, I would like to raise a question: how is the identity of Hong Kong children who

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grew up in Taiwan? Of course, this is not part of my research, but I do think it will be one topic worth studying in the coming years.

2.2.2 Social Identity and sense of community

One aspect of collective identity is social identity, group identification connects social and collective identity (Klandermans, 2013). According to Tajfel (1979), social identity is the sense of belonging to the social world, groups which we belong to were the important source of pride and self-esteem. Cameron (2004) raised a three factor model of social identity, the three factor ties facet of social identity. Which includes: (1) centrality - refers to the frequency which the group comes to mind and the subjective importance of the group to self-definition; (2) ingroup effect – refers to specific emotion that arise from group membership; and (3) ingroup ties – refers to the psychological ties that bind the self to the group. According to Davidson and Cotter (1989), the aspects of group consciousness, belongingness and identity are the facets of "membership" in sense of community.

The study of the sense of community located under the study of social psychology, McMillan & Chavis (1986) define sense of community with four elements: membership, influence, reinforcement and shared emotional connection. Sarason (1974) defined sense of community as: *"the perception of similarity to others, and acknowledged interdependence with others, a willingness to maintain this interdependence by giving to or doing for others what one expects from them, the feeling that one is part of a larger dependable and stable structure"*.

Some studies investigates the relationship between community and identity, and the results indicate that identity is positively correlated with the sense of community: Barbieri and Zani (2015) study the relationship between migrant's identity, sense of community and well-being, the result indicates that immigrants have a strong sense of belonging to their community of origin, but have also developed a specific sense of community in the receiving context; Kenyon and Carter (2010) study the ethnic identity, sense of community and psychological well-being of American Indian youth, the results indicate that adolescents with a stronger ethnic identity had a

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stronger sense of community as well; Connor et al. (2004) studies the sense of community, identity statuses and loneliness on Italian and Belgian adolescences, the result indicate that identity-achieved individuals exhibit a higher level of civic involvement in the community. For Hong Kongers in Taiwan, what's the relationship between sense of community and their identity? Did their identity have a positive correlation with their sense of community?

Furthermore, there are also a few studies on the sense of community in Hong Kong, for example, Mak, Cheung & Law (2009) conceptualized the sense of community in Hong Kong along two dimensions: the territorial and the relational element which refers to people's identification to a shared geographical location and the quality of social ties and relationships, without reference to specific locations; Au et al. (2020) found that the sense of community mediated between social participation and community support and health services. However, sense of community related studies of Hong Kong rarely discuss the relationship between the sense of community and identity.

Individual have multiple identities. In most studies, Chinese identity (nation) usually counts as the superordinate identities and the Hong Kong identity (region) usually counts as subordinate identities. Klanderman's study in 2004 is an example. According to his word, one example of multiple identities is dual identities, which occur when superordinate identities and subgroup identities going together. Thus, in the case of Hong Kong, the superordinate identity should be ethnic "Chinese" and one of the subgroup identities should be "Hong Konger". However, some studies discuss Hong Kong identity in another way. Here, the concept of multi-social identity can be touched upon.

Brewer (1999) explains the identity transition using three alternatives to show how individual might experience the relationship between one social identity (A) and another one (B):

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

Figure 2. Three alternatives of social identity by Brewer, 1999

Brewer applied these figures to explain Hong Kong's identity during 1985-97: The circle A represents the social identity "Hong Kongers" and B represents the social identity "Chinese". In 1985-95, combined group identities satisfy needs for inclusion and distinctiveness. Most of the respondents identify themselves "Hong Kongers" or "Hong Kong Chinese", as shown in the figures above: fig. b) represents the compound identity which differentiated itself from mainland Chinese; fig. c) represents Hong Kongers is the superordinate social category while Chinese ethnic identity is the subordinate identity. In 1995-1997, more support the Hong Kong identity and differentiated themselves from Chinese identity, and more claim themselves primary Hong Kongers. In the section "Beyond 1997", Brewer predicted that those who are more identified with the Hong Kong's distinctive regional identity

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would be more likely to leave and migrate to other countries where substantial Chinese communities already exist. In which related to the migration trend in Hong Kong nowadays, people usually migrate to countries and cities where a large group of Hong Kongers live. These figures also represent the way in which most Hong Kongers identify themselves: purely Hong Kongers or Chinese Hong Kongers.

2.2.3 National Identity

National identity is the last aspect of identity to be discussed in this study. National identity is an important form of collective identity (Wong, Zheng and Wan, 2020). It refers to the identity of the citizens of a country with their own country's historical and cultural traditions, moral values, ideals, beliefs, national sovereignty, and so on (Liu & Turner, 2018). According to Bao & Guo (2000), the strong source of national identity in modern society includes civic and territorial identity. As an international city with a complex demographic composition, territorial identity may be one aspect of identity of Hong Kong. "Hong Kongers" are not simply equal to the Chinese and the identification of Hong Kongers should not only be limited to their nationality. Territorial identity is located under the study of geography and has acquired a considerable position in the geographic analysis (Grasso, 1998). Capello (2018) defines territorial identity as: *"the presence of socio-economic context conditions allowing convergence between collective and private interests, and feeding a sense of belonging and loyalty to a community"* and Guermond defines it as: *"an individual feeling restricted to a small area, is instrumentalised politically, via a change of scale, in order to construct regional or national identities"*.

Some studies on Hong Kong's national identity focuses on its comparison with the local identity or identifications. The development of Hong Kong identity has been affected by many factors. One is the makeup of people: most Hong Kongers are immigrants from China or their descendants. Until the Qing dynasty, Hong Kong was treated as a part of Guangdong Province. The population growth of Hong Kong began in the 1840s, during the First Opium War. From the 1930s to the 1960s, due to the Sino-Japanese War and the Great Chinese Famine, plenty of Chinese stowaways to Hong Kong by sea. In 1949, the Hong Kong government began issuing identity

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document and banned all illegal immigrants from China. The Chinese who settle down in Hong Kong are now part of Hong Kongers and their descendants had become the local Hong Kongers.

The figure below shows how Hong Kongers identify themselves between 1997 and 2019:



Figure 3. How Hong Kongers identify themselves, 1997-2019.

Note. Data retrieved from the Kong Public Opinion Research Institude (2020). The annual average values have been calculated by the author.

From 1997 to 2018, "mixed identity" is still the answer which most of the respondents chose, while the number of people who chose "Hong Kongers in China" remains between 20 and 30%. Changes in political structure create changes in the context in which social identities are forged and take their meaning (Brewer, 1999). When we look at the detailed figures for 2008, in the first half of the year, those who think they are Chinese continued to increase. The reason might be the Beijing Olympics in August, which enhance the sense of belonging of Hong Kongers. However, this was followed by a sharp decline in the second half of the year. In 2008, some incidents occurred in China, which might decrease the trust in the central government. Among these incidents, the Chinese milk scandal broke out in September

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2008 affected Hong Kong the most. Many deformed babies were found in China and the Chinese government tried to cover the news for over six months and these powdered milk have already poisoned a lot of babies. Chinese people flocked to Hong Kong, make a run for the powdered milk produced in Japan. This leads to a shortage of milk powder in Hong Kong and raises dissatisfaction of Hong Kongers with the Chinese Central Government and the Chinese people.

Since 2011, the number of respondents who answered “Hong Konger” has already doubled the number of those who answered “Chinese”. In the year 2019, the data faced a rapid change: over 50% of respondents identify themselves as “Hong Konger”, which is the highest number since 1997 and it has become the most popular choice; 11% of respondents identify themselves as “Chinese in Hong Kong” and “Chinese” with both figures being the lowest number since 1997; “mixed identity” also saw a rapid decline from 41% in 2018 to 34% in 2019. Based on these data, it is clear that the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement has strengthened the notion of “Hong Konger” and accelerated the indigenization of Hong Kong. However, the above discussion provides only data and information without further analysis; for example, personal experience and the reason behind it, the data couldn’t let us understand the Hong Konger's identification. Digging answers with in-depth interviews is important for us to understand Hong Konger’s perspective.

In the previous section, I’ve mentioned that linguistics affect one’s identity and discussed how language affects the formation of cultural identity. Miller and Miller’s (1996) pointed out that for nationalism, education and language are important for the construction of national identity. Indeed, since 1997, China used language and education as tools to shape the national identity in Hong Kong, which reflects on the changes of the education system and course structure in Hong Kong. As one of the Hong Kongers who have born after the 1990s, I experienced most these changes. The promotion of Putonghua in school is one example that China utilizes language to shape the national identity in Hong Kong. One difference of Hong Kongers and Chinese is the language they speak and the character used in daily life. For Hong Kongers, most of them speaks Cantonese and use traditional characters, while Chinese speaks Putonghua and use simplified characters. Right after the transfer of

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sovereignty, the Hong Kong government began to promote biliteracy and trilingualism (兩文三語) in Hong Kong. One important policy goal of higher education is to graduate students with a reasonably high level of ability to speak Cantonese, English and Putonghua, and to read and write Chinese and English (Li, 2009). In 1998, Putonghua became one of the courses of the primary school of Hong Kong, and the Beijing accent was used as the basis of it.

Besides, right after 1997, the Hong Kong government began to promote the National Education in Hong Kong, which includes the national flag-raising ceremony, the China study trips and exchange programs in China. Students are familiar with the Chinese national anthem and have been taught about everything in China, including the history, the national flag and the meanings behind it since primary school. The selective dimensions of China are exposed to the students in these trips and exchange programmes (Kuah-Pearce and Fong, 2010). During my secondary school, I've been to one of these study trips too. Actually, we spent most of the time sightseeing, with a guide explaining the history of the spots. From my own perspectives, I do agree that what we saw in the trip is the selective dimensions of China.

In 2012, the Education Bureau of Hong Kong proposed the school curriculum of moral and national education, some suggested that it's a "brain-washing" course to students. A few protests were organized to against this curriculum in 2012, which draws students and parent's attention to review the China-related contents in current studies. In the same year, the 3-2-2-3 educational system (3 years junior high school, 2 years high school, 2 years of matriculation course and 3 years of university education) was replaced by the 3-3-4 scheme (3 years junior high school, 3 years high school and 4 years of university education) in Hong Kong. A new course - liberal studies became one of the core subjects, part the curriculum included the development of China, Hong Kong, and globalization. Critical thinking is one important that must be learned. In 2020, one of the Liberal studies exam questions of the Hong Kong Diploma of Secondary Education Examination (HKDSE) asked about press freedom and social responsibility, which leads to a discussion of what should be taught in liberal studies and what students should learn from it. Indeed, after the storming of the Legislative Council Complex on July 1, 2019, former chief executive Tung Chee-hwa

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said that the liberal studies he promotes are a failure, and the Anti- Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement stems from a lack of understanding of China (Citizen News, 2019).

With the change of school curriculum, education in Hong Kong will continue to affect identity construction. In the 2017 policy address, the new chief executive of Hong Kong - Carrie Lam Cheng Yuet-ngor requested all secondary schools to define the Chinese history course as the main subject, starting with the 2018-19 school year. Then in 2018, the Education Bureau of Hong Kong announced the revised curriculum frameworks for Junior Secondary Chinese History and History, it will be implemented progressively starting from September 2020 at the earliest. From Lau (2017), the revised curriculum can be concluded in three main points: understanding historical facts, reviewing and analyzing the historical facts and understanding the development of Chinese history and promoting national identity and sense of belonging. In the 2020's HKDSE exam, a question in the history exam paper draws the attention of the Hong Kong society. The question asked whether Japan bring more advantages or disadvantages to China during 1900-1945. The Education Bureau of Hong Kong soon announced and requested the Hong Kong Examinations and Assessment Authority (HKEAA) to cancel the question as they believe that the question and the source provided students with a guide to answer in a certain stance. While this type of questions frequently appears in the HKDSE history exam and the aim of the history course is how students cite and analyze the source to support their own views (Lau, 2020). How the Education Bureau of Hong Kong handle this case did reflect that education of Hong Kong has been affected by politics, this led to the dissatisfaction of the society and the academia (Tang, 2020).

2.2.4 Diaspora and identity

Diaspora means a group of people who spread from one original country to other countries. Under globalization, countries have a closer connection; people could flow to another country more easily. Study of diaspora located under the study of multiculturalism - promoting inclusive and respect choices of people, the purpose is to understand the living experience and voices of those who live in host countries.

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Identity under any circumstances is a complex construct, it's even more complicated by the diaspora experience and the many influence that experience yields (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Most of the papers related to Hong Kong diaspora are about Chinese diaspora, which included Hong Kong, Taiwan and Macau in "Greater China". But it's not precise to include these three places in "Chinese diaspora" when we only study one of them, as all three of them actually have a different historical path from China.

Hong Kongers are diasporic people. After the 99 years colonial experience by the U.K., changing political and economic environment affected their choices to stay or leave Hong Kong. Migration changes the diasporic experience of people. For Hong Kongers, they chose to migrate to the U.S., U.K., Canada or Australia in the 1990s and now some of them also decided to migrate to Taiwan. One research related to Hong Kong diaspora is: in Sin's paper published in 2007, he discusses the Chinese diaspora in Vancouver and he pointed out that during the 1980s and 1990s, the popular representation of successful, well-educated immigrant entrepreneurs was from Hong Kong and a wave of Hong Kong diaspora can be observed.

For Hong Kongers in Taiwan, they are at another level of the diaspora. Sheffer (1986) defines modern diaspora as ethnic minority groups of migrant origins, residing and acting in host countries but maintaining strong sentimental and material links with their country of origin. Generally, Hong Kongers in Taiwan can be divided into a few groups: students who currently studying in universities in Taiwan; students who graduated in Taiwan and obtained the work visa; investment migrants; dependents. Hong Kongers in Taiwan still maintain a strong connection with their homeland, through geographic convenience in the past and also through the popularity of the internet now. These Hong Kongers still has strong ethnicism, although they might stay in a host country for a long period of time, they still have frequent interaction with their mother country - society, politics, culture and economics (Liu, 2008). Especially after the popularity of social media, these had been frequently used to maintain and link with their homeland. Virtual community created a space to express people's identity, allows migrants constantly, actively and closely interacting with Hong Kong.

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Diaspora identity lives with and through, not despite, difference; by hybridity (Hall, 1990) and identity transforms migrants from the physical reality of dispersal into the psychosocial reality of diaspora (Butler, 2001). The mix of characteristics from Hong Kong and Taiwan, and lived experience might leads to diasporic hybrid identity, and it encompasses important distinctions: between those who have migrated and those who remain in the home country (Brinkerhoff, 2009).

This section discussed the concept of identity, which focuses on three aspects of collective identity: cultural, social and national identity. Linguistics and the differences between "local" and "Chinese" continue to affect Hong Kong identity. However, in order to understand the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, the diaspora identity could also be an aspect. Will Hong Kongers in Taiwan define themselves as hybrid identity? What perspective will they take to define their own identity? How do they present their identity in the host country?

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Chapter 3. Hong Kongers in Taiwan

Hong Kongers in Taiwan can be divided into several groups, this chapter will introduce three groups of them: students, dependents and investment migrants. Through their narration, this chapter will address why they moved to Taiwan and their characteristics. The reason behind their decision is complicated, and it seems that no matter how or why these Hong Kongers moved to Taiwan, there are political implications that affect their decisions or actions. However, the sample in this study may not represent all Hong Kongers in Taiwan. After knowing their background, the next chapter will begin to discuss their identity.

Immigration nonetheless constitutes a strategic domain wherein external changes and internal factors (demographic, political, legal, socioeconomic, and cultural) intersect to influence the definitions of identity and the forms of distinction in society (Ku, 2004). In recent decades, Hong Kong migrants in Taiwan can be mainly divided into several groups; most of them are students, Hong Kongers who married to Taiwanese, investment migrants, or dependents. From Chan & Fung (2018), quality lifestyle and justifiable urban space, political space and alternative Chinese space are the main reason why Hong Kongers migrate to Taiwan. According to the interviews, what these migrants pursue affects the place where they live: those who pursue Hong Kong-style living will migrate to Taipei City or New Taipei City, those who pursue a relaxed and comfortable life will migrate to Taichung or Kaohsiung. The main reason for migration has also changed from time to time, political events in Hong Kong is one factor affecting migrant's decision.

For Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan, some came to Taiwan as there are various major in universities; some came to Taiwan as they have no university offer in Hong Kong. For dependents, their decision to move to Taiwan is relatively simple in comparison to students or investment migrants – to live with their family/ spouse. For investment migrants, most came to enjoy life after retirement and some wants to provide better life for their next generation.

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3.1 Studying in Taiwan and career

The median monthly earnings in Taiwan is approximately 41,000 Taiwan Dollar (TWD), with most of the new graduate earning 28,000 to 36,000 TWD per month; the median of monthly earnings in Hong Kong is around 17,750 Hong Kong Dollar (HKD), most of the new graduate earning 12,000 to 15,000 HKD per month. Compare two of them, a new graduate from Hong Kong makes 2/3 more than a new graduate from Taiwan, why do some Hong Kong students still choose to study in Taiwan? What is their career plan after graduation from Taiwan?

In Hong Kong, studying in other countries has been a popular trend since 2012, after the change in the education system. Following the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, more students decided to leave Hong Kong. Especially those who participated in the movement, they were forced to leave and avoid the political score-settling. Compared to other countries, it's more affordable to study in Taiwan. For Hong Kong students, there are several ways to apply to Taiwan universities: individual application, joint admissions, or direct application [4]. In the school year 2019-2020, there are 6,824 Hong Kong students studying at universities and colleges in Taiwan (Ministry of Education, 2019). I organized the data from the University Entrance Committee for Overseas Chinese Students, in order to understand the trend of Hong Kong students who: admitted to universities through the individual application; admitted to master's or doctoral program through the individual application and admitted to universities or masters or doctoral through joint admission.

[4] Retrieved from: https://cmn-hant.overseas.ncnu.edu.tw/from/hongkong

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Table 4. Number of Hong Kong Students admitted to universities of Taiwan, 2014-2020

Year	Admitted to universities through individual application	Admitted to master's/doctoral program through individual application	Admitted to universities/ master's/doctoral through joint admission	Total
2014	2012	121	3356	5489
2015	2661	133	2961	5755
2016	2101	142	2011	4254
2017	1949	192	1185	3326
2018	1093	219	987	2299
2019	867	218	847	1932
2020	1404	375	No data	1779

Note. Data retrieved from the University Entrance Committee for Overseas Chinese Students

In the 2010s, the Department of International and Cross-strait Education of Taiwan modified the policies related to Hong Kong and Macau students[5], which attracted lots of Hong Kong students to study in Taiwan. In particular, following the change in the education system in Hong Kong in 2012, many Hong Kong students have chosen to study abroad as they cannot enter universities in Hong Kong. According to the figure above, the overall trend is downward, but it's reasonable as the total number of day school students taking the HKDSE exam has also declined since 2012: from 70282 in 2012 to 47005 in 2019 (HKEAA, 2020), the trend has dropped by 33%. However, even the number of students who taking the HKDSE exam declines, from 2019 to 2020, the number of students who admitted to universities in Taiwan increased, which proves that political incidents in Hong Kong in 2019 affected students decision to study abroad. Another main point here is the trend of students who are admitted to master's or doctoral programs through

[5] Retrieved from: https://depart.moe.edu.tw/ed2500/News_Content.aspx?n=79D4CEEC271FCB57&sms=70BE182A03B427A5&s=D78C03C7981301C8

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individual applications: the number of students has grown steadily since 2014 and has grown rapidly from 218 in 2019 to 375 in 2020, with an increase of 72%. What's the reason behind their decision?

According to the interviewees, there are a few reasons that encourage students to come to Taiwan. An interesting reason for their choice to study in Taiwan is: there are many choices on the major in Taiwan. For instance, the interviewees' study diverse majors in Taiwan: E applied for a master's degree in performing arts after graduation from a university in Taiwan. She thinks that there are a few opportunities in Hong Kong to study in this field, but in Taiwan, she has more freedom to choose what she likes to study. E also shares her roommates experience in choosing her path after graduation, Hong Kong has no chance for students who have studied in her major (wildlife conservation) and Taiwan offers a chance for her to continue studying what she likes. Other interviewee, D also provided similar point of view, and said there are three Hong Kong students in his class, they all came to Taiwan as they are interested in this specific major (animal science).

Some students also have dual identity. For F, she came to Taiwan through applying the student visa, but her mother is Taiwanese. As her age is older than 20, she can't use the dependency policy to move to Taiwan. Her reason for coming to Taiwan is a bit different from the others. Her parents decided to return to Taiwan after the 2019 demonstration (the Anti- Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement), when she just finished her university studies and ready to find a job in Hong Kong. It's a bit difficult for her to accept the decision because she thinks that Hong Kong is her homeland, even if she is half-Taiwanese. She then decided to apply to the master's program in Taiwan because she believes that she's not familiar with life in Taiwan and that entering society immediately is not the best choice.

And for G, her case is more ordinary, when compared to other interviewees: G's HKDSE score is low and her only choice is to study in Taiwan. She entered the National Taiwan Normal University Division of Preparatory Programs for Overseas Chinese Students as her HKDSE score is too low to enter any university in Taiwan. After a year of study, she began her studies at a private university in Taipei. As for

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her life in it, she said it was completely beyond her expectations: *"It's like spending another year prepare for the HKDSE exam…And it's competitive there. Everyone works so hard for a better university offer, especially the Malaysian students, they always rank high in the exams and most of them received a good university offer. My result is average, so I only received the offer from private universities."* Another Hong Kong student – Myolie shares a similar perspective on her blog, and she said most of the students in the preparatory program have a goal; they will work hard to get the offer[6].

A few decades ago, many students from Hong Kong came to study in Taiwan. In the 1970s and 1980s, it was easier for an overseas Chinese student to become a Taiwanese. A recalled her twenties: *"When I arrived in Taiwan, I received a Taiwanese ID card with my name on it and I just became Taiwanese."* The Nationality Law of the Republic of China published in 1929 included all overseas Chinese as their citizens, on the basis of the right to blood[7]. Plenty of overseas Chinese students include Hong Kongers, Malaysians, Filipinos, etc. obtained a Taiwanese ID card right after their arrival in Taiwan to study. A Malaysian facebooker – Lu, who was actively participated in the Taiwanese social movement before the 1990s, also recalled that the National Act of Taiwan prior to 1986 was relatively easy. All overseas Chinese can easily naturalize by registering at the Household Registration Office[8].

For students who graduated in Taiwan, most of them choose to return to their homeland, while some choose to stay and explore their career. For students who have studied and graduated from any universities in Taiwan can apply for a working visa via two systems: apply through wages and work experience or apply through new scoring criteria for foreign and overseas Chinese students to work in Taiwan[9]. For the first one, you must complete your degree in R.O.C., have more than two years of work experience, and find a job in Taiwan with a monthly wage of more than $47,971

[6] Myolie's Blog. Retrieved from: https://amypuipui.pixnet.net/blog/post/383311907
[7] Nationality Act. Retrieved from: https://www.ris.gov.tw/app/portal/96
[8] Interview with Lu. Retrieved from: https://www.thenewslens.com/feature/darimalaysia/129491
[9] Overseas Chinese or Foreign Student Graduated in the R.O.C. to Work in Taiwan. https://ezworktaiwan.wda.gov.tw/Content_List.aspx?n=90B5EEEBE3049C9B

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TWD. It's difficult for a new graduate to meet the criteria; most of the applicants work two years in their hometown after graduating from universities in Taiwan and then they return to Taiwan, to find a job and obtain a work visa through this system. The second one is easier for a new graduate to apply. There's a list of scoring criteria, including education, wages, language, work experience, etc. Once you scored 70, you can apply for a work visa, while this system also has certain requirements for employers. For example, the employer would have to meet the criteria for capital, turnover rate, franchising business, etc.

Under current policies, Hong Kong students graduating in Taiwan can obtain the APRC if they work in Taiwan for five years, and in the 5th year, their salaries should double the minimum wage in Taiwan.[10] Their self-identity is less complex without dual identity (i.e. dependents and students) and most still identify themselves as Hong Kongers. But will they have a different perspective if they get the APRC in the future? Some of the interviewees told me that they plan to return to Hong Kong after graduation. However, some of them had recently changed their decision to stay in Taiwan due to the chaotic political situation in Hong Kong.

3.2 Family reunion

Family reunion is a common form of Hong Kong migration to Taiwan (Chan & Fung, 2018). Hong Kongers who have family members or a spouse living in Taiwan can apply for the dependents program and migrate to Taiwan. Those who are married to Taiwanese have more ties to the Taiwanese society, in comparison to students or investment migrants, and are more willing and need to integrate into Taiwanese society. Interviewee A married a Taiwanese after graduating from

[10]在台畢業港澳生申請定居台灣 (HF168+HF171). Retrieved from: https://medium.com/%E6%BE%B3%E9%96%80%E4%BA%BA%E5%9C%A8%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3/%E5%9C%A8%E5%8F%B0%E7%95%A2%E6%A5%AD%E6%B8%AF%E6%BE%B3%E7%94%9F%E7%94%B3%E8%AB%8B%E5%AE%9A%E5%B1%85%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3-hf168-hf171-44c8881f2853#:~:text=HF171%EF%BC%9A%E7%B6%93%E4%B8%AD%E5%A4%AE%E7%9B%AE%E7%9A%84%E4%BA%8B%E6%A5%AD,%E4%BA%8C%E5%80%8D%E8%80%85(HF168)%E3%80%82

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university in Taiwan, she thinks it's really hard to integrate into the surroundings. The family of her husband based in Taoyuan, she relocated with her husband after the wedding. *"I followed my mother in law to get familiar with the area and the neighbours. Once they know who you married, they will treat you in a really friendly way."* C also faced the same issue. From his words, he believes that investment migrants are the most difficult to integrate into Taiwanese society as both of the couples are from Hong Kong; but for Hong Kongers who have married to Taiwanese, they can still maintain certain links with the society, through the membership of the family.

Chiang and Lin (2018) study early immigrants from Hong Kong to Taiwan. According to their study, marriages between Hong Kong women and Taiwanese men were not generally hypergamous during the last century as Taiwan was quite poor compared to Hong Kong. G is a rather new generation when compared to immigrants in Chiang and Lin's study; she has a different perspective. G has not yet married her boyfriend but she intended to do so in the coming year. Her Taiwanese boyfriend is the prince of a tribe at Pingtung. She shares the photos of the festival in the tribe and in comparison with her life in Taiwan and Hong Kong, she doesn't that think Taiwanese are poorer than Hong Kongers. She lives in a public estate in Hong Kong, sharing a room with her siblings. In the traditional Chinese concept, the relationship between mother-in-law and daughter-in-law is always an issue. As for G's relationship with her potential mother-in-law, she said everything was good and it was not bad as she had imagined. A's age is more similar to immigrants in Chiang and Lin's study, she also worried about this when she just got married: "*When I just moved to my husband's house, I was really afraid of my mother-in-law."* Her mother-in-law doesn't treat her too badly but only has a different viewpoint on her job.

Here, the identity of migrants who married to Taiwanese or those who have relatives in Taiwan is more complicated than that of other migrant groups. They can obtain the Taiwanese ID card by the dependency policy, but most of them still consider Hong Kong as their homeland and recognize their Hong Kong identity rather than the Taiwanese identity.

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3.3 Enjoy the retired life v.s, pursuing a better life for the next generation

The investment migration policy of Taiwan has a relatively low requirement when compared to rest of the world. There's a specific policy for residents of Hong Kong and Macau, they only need to invest six million Taiwanese dollars - can choose to set up your own business, or invest in a business. Then, those Hong Kong and Macau residents have to live in Taiwan for a year and they cannot leave Taiwan for more than 30 days in that year. They can obtain the passport and ID card from Taiwan just in one year; they can take advantage of most of the rights as Taiwanese, including health insurance and most above all, they need not give up the identity card and passport of their homeland. Indeed, following the increase in the number of investment migrants in Taiwan, the Taiwanese government has also attempted to tighten the policy and ensure that these migrants follows the rules and manage their business for three years. In March 2020, the Investment Commission, Ministry of Economic Affairs (MOEAIC) updated the rules for the application of investment migration, added a new rule: investment migrants should hire at least two Taiwanese in their business for at least three years.

According to H's word, most of the investment migrants aged 45-65 or 30-35 years, and they all have different reasons for migration: for those between the age of 45 to 65, they may not have children or their children have already grown up, they can leave Hong Kong to pursue a better living environment and enjoy their retirement; and for those between the age of 30 to 35, their children are young, for the future of their children, they have decided to migrate and offer them a better environment to grow up. The political issue is also one of the main reasons that affected migrants' decisions. B is one examples, he migrated to Taiwan after the 2014 Umbrella Revolution as he believes that: *"the political situation and education system in Hong Kong not suitable for a child's growth."* Both B and H agree that migrants from Hong Kong to Taiwan have different characteristic, one of which is their attitude towards political incidents in Hong Kong. According to H, most of the investment migrant's plans to migrate after 2014, then the political incident in 2019 urges them to migrate

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immediately. For investment migrants, those who move to Taiwan with political motivations, they have a stronger self-identification as Hong Kongers.

This chapter introduced three groups of Hong Kongers in Taiwan and explained the reason they moved to Taiwan. In the study of diaspora identity, the migrant's living experience might change their self-identity. The next chapter will begin to discuss the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, did they change their perspectives on their identity after living in Taiwan?

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Chapter 4. Identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan

This thesis explores the self-identification of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, through two identity categories: the "Chinese" and "Hong Kongers" and three aspects of collective identity. By pointing out the difference between "us (Hong Kongers)" and "them (Chinese)", the interviewee's self-identity can be created. The discussion begins with understanding the notion of "Hong Konger". From Leung's book "First lesson of Hong Kong (香港第一課)" published in 2020, Hong Kong as an international city, the formation of the community - "Hong Konger" is complex. Because Hong Kong is a site of continuous transition, its unique identity remains elusive (Ellis, 2018). The minorities in Hong Kong are an example, some "Hong Kongers" came from India or Pakistan, they did not inherit the Chinese cultural identity but they are "Hong Kongers". In this case, it's inappropriate to define them as "Chinese". It's quite clear that nationality is only a small part affecting Hong Konger's identity.

4.1 Perspective of different age groups and sense of community

To understand the interviewee's self-identification, the interview always begins with one simple question: how would you define your identity? From their answers, there are significant differences between different age groups and different motives of migration. Most of the interviewees responded "Hong Kongers" without any hesitation, and some of them provided more views, including highlighting the differences between "Hong Kongers" and "Chinese"; referred to the historical background of Hong Kong and the issue of sovereignty; one think that the identity "Hong Konger" was given to people who were born in Hong Kong; one said after obtaining the Taiwanese ID card, he might be a Taiwanese Hong Kongers (台籍香港人).

I then asked them: will you define yourself as "Chinese Hong Kongers"? Most of them just replied "no" while some have other opinions, for example, one interviewee

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agrees that Hong Kong does belongs to China, but won't define himself as "Chinese Hong Konger", which reject the "Chinese" ethnic identity; and some agrees that they are culturally Chinese but not a "Chinese". Their responds covers different aspects in collective identity and correspond to the multi-social identity transition raised by Brewer (1995), in which the "Hong Kong" identity shows a superordinate power in relation to the "Chinese" ethnic identity. However, it seems that the distinction between two identities has become stronger and that the "Hong Kong" identity has become an even more dominant than in the past. As for interviewees who have already been living in Taiwan for a few years or more, they still define themselves as "Hong Konger", even they already obtained the Taiwanese ID card and passport. Some of their perspective is less political oriented (especially for those who married to Taiwanese) and simply defines themselves by where they were born.

Previous research indicates that sense of community is positively correlated with political participation (Davidson & Cotter, 1989; Anderson, 2009). Age has always been used to explain political behaviour. Wong, Zheng, and Wan (2017) hypothesize that age and political satisfaction are in a curvilinear relationship. In Hong Kong, the perspectives of different political generations are quite different. For those who were born in the late 1990s, they were in high school during the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, the movement didn't affect them very much; then during the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, they are in their 3rd or 4th year of university. The movement changed their life and they began to concern about the politics of Hong Kong. From the interviewees, some of them told me that they were a "Hong Kong pig (港豬)" in the past. From The Encyclopedia of Virtual Communities in Hong Kong (EVCHK, 香港網絡大典), the word "Hong Kong pig (港豬)" refers to those who are politically apathetic.

Chow (2007) studied the sense of belonging of Hong Kong adolescent immigrants in Canada. He found that young immigrants or those who have studied in the country as foreign students generally have a weaker sense of belonging; whereas those whose motives for migration were political and culturally oriented will have a stronger sense of belonging. From Chapter 3, we understand that the motives of Hong

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Kong students in Taiwan are complex. Then how's the identity of young Hong Kongers in Taiwan?

F is one of the significant cases of former "Hong Kong pig" who born after 1997, the transfer of Hong Kong's sovereignty to China. She has been heavily affected by China's cultural output; admiring Chinese pop-stars and enjoys travelling to China. In 2018, she's still a "Hong Kong pig" who frequently travels to Shenzhen with her friends to enjoy food and shopping, they think it's cheaper than in Hong Kong. She even went to Shanghai for an internship. During the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in 2019, F was in the last year of her university. Almost all of her peers changed: they started worrying about politics, participating in social movements, and severing their connection with China – no longer visiting China anymore, distinguishing themselves from the "Chinese" and choosing not to use the China's product (E.g Taobao). And even her parents, they started to discuss politics and decided to return to Taiwan.

As for G, she was also born after 1997, but she doesn't really care about politics since she arrived in Taiwan before the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. She doesn't have many Hong Kong friends (peers) in Taiwan and the movement does not affect her too much as she's in Taiwan. But then in 2019, she began working as an internship in Taipei. Her teammates are all young Hong Kong students currently studying in Taiwan: *"They discussed lots of political issues in the office, and they share news or posts on their Instagram (one of the SNS)."* After months, they affected her and she started to concern about politics too. In order to understand the perspectives of her colleagues, she began reading related news. G's case fit what Anderson (2009) suggested: the sense of community that is built within certain communities (i.e. the workplace) can have a significant influence to individuals to engage in political discussion of local issues. However, when compared to other interviewees, G is not keen on politics and she focuses more on her life in Taiwan. *"I will not say that I have a very strong political stance, but I'm trying to understand what is going on in Hong Kong."*

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E and H are in similar age with F and G, but both have begun to concern about politics at high school. H came to Taiwan for personal reasons: said he doesn't like Hong Kong and even hates "Communist China". During his secondary school, he joined an exchange trip to visit Taiwan and some of the universities here. After that, he plans to study in Taiwan; and for E, she has been affected by both family and peers: Her father is very pro-China and even worked in China for a decade. When her father returned to Hong Kong, she saw the conflicts in her family. It also occurs in many families in Hong Kong as well. During the 2014's Umbrella Revolution, her high school classmate was very concerned about the issue and they always discuss it at school. E thinks she's politically neutral in 2014 as studying hard at school is the only thing she should do in order to enter the university. *"We (classmates) will discuss the political issue at school, but we will have no stance on it."* E said. Then in 2019, a quarrel of her sister and her father changes the relationship of her family: they have different political views and her mother tried to stop the argument by saying harmony in a family should come before politics, and her dad tried to force her older sister to compromise by saying: *"I'm your father and you should respect me."* E agrees that every person can have a different opinion about politics, but after listening to their view, she concluded that her father just blindly supports China and believes in what he wants to believe, instead of the truth. Then, she begins to dig for the answer by herself.

Compared to other young interviewees, D's age is a bit older (born in the early 1990s) and he begins to think about his own identity after he arriving in Taiwan. Some of his family members work as police in Hong Kong and his girlfriend is a "Yellow ribbon" since they first met in 2011. However, they respect each other and do not discuss politics at home to avoid conflicts. After D came to Taiwan, he met some roommates from Hong Kong who study politics in Taiwan and they frequently exchange views on politics and identity. From the dialogue, D also began to rethink his own identity. The turning point is the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement. His mother became a "blue ribbon" to show support for family members who worked as police and scolded D and his girlfriend. D could not understand the change in his mother and began to question the reason behind.

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From Braungart and Braungart (1986), young people are more liberal and critical as they focus on the relationship between self and society, and they search for independence, identity, and fidelity in their life-cycle. For the interviewees who born in the 1990's, they usually have different paths in search of their own identity. Some of them started to explore their identity after they came to Taiwan or after the political incidents occurred in Hong Kong. Family and peers have had the greatest impact on how they explore their identity.

The upcoming sections will use three perspectives on collective identity and the word of interviewees to understand the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, in which the sense of belonging of the interviewees and the differences between "us (Hong Kongers)" and "them (Chinese)" are important in the analysis.

4.2 National Identity

Hong Kong as an international city, its economic development always prevails over other elements of society. There is no doubt that the identification of Hong Kongers has always been vague, and strongly affected by Chinese factors, especially political and economic factors. However, the civic character of Hong Kongers was reaffirmed in the political movements in 2014 and 2019, to resist both political and economic integration with China. The definition of "Hong Konger" is still under construction, the political incidents of recent years have forced Hong Kongers to deal with their identity and other elements other than the economy of Hong Kong.

The Chinese tourists are one of the main sources of Hong Kong's economy, while from Lin (2014), they also have negative effects: they overrun downtown shopping areas and attractions, local and other tourists have become reluctant to visit these areas. From Wong, Zheng and Wan (2020), there is evidence that the increasing number of mainland tourists and decreasing level of political satisfaction with the central government have contributed to the rise in a local identity over a national identity. Immigrants and students from China have also affected Hong Kong, for example, the mainland mothers flock to Hong Kong to give birth and obtain residency

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for their children, and they bid the prices of real estate in Hong Kong. It seems with more interaction with these people, more Hong Kongers understand the differences between “Chinese” and “Hong Kongers”.

According to the response of the interviewees, some attempted to exclude the Chinese ethnic identity from their self-identification. Their identity might belong to territorial identity in the study of national identity. But more important is, what’s the reason behind it? Last year, a friend of mine started her MA in social work in Hong Kong. Her first assignment is to organize an event in class to eliminate the prejudice against the Chinese, for example: Are the Chinese ignorant? Are the Chinese impolite? etc. After discussion, almost the entire class agreed that these are the facts, not prejudices, and even herself was convinced by her classmate. Some interviewees also speak of similar views in the interviews that there are differences in behaviour between Hong Kongers and Chinese, and the boundary between “us (Hong Kongers)” and “them (Chinese)” is very clear.

The national identity of Hong Kongers was closely linked to the policy of the Hong Kong government, which increase the dissatisfaction to the Chinese central government. These policies also show the worst image of the Chinese people and allow a large number of mainland immigrants to live in Hong Kong. These well-educated students cannot represent all Hong Kongers, but when the term “Chinese people” has so many negative meanings, how will Hong Kongers define themselves as “Chinese”?

4.2.1 The anchor babies and social resources

The contradiction between Hong Kong and China begins with the “anchor babies (雙非嬰兒)” issue (Leung, 2020). Since 2003, the free individual travel policy allows Chinese tourists to visits Hong Kong in person, in order to enhance economic growth. It has succeeded in stimulating the economy but has also led to numerous livelihood issues in Hong Kong. One of them is the issue of “anchor babies”, which has affected Hong Kong for nearly a decade. The parents of the “anchor babies” are Chinese, they are not permanent residents of Hong Kong, but they have chosen to give birth in Hong Kong, their children can become permanent residents of Hong Kong according to the

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Basic Law of Hong Kong and enjoy the benefit. The one-child policy in China is one of the reasons that encourage them to do so (Chang and Haiao, 2012). The free individual travel policy allows pregnant mothers to visit Hong Kong, lots of them have chosen to give birth while in Hong Kong.

One of the interviewees – B shares his experience when he met the parents of an "anchor baby" at the hospital. He has heard of the "anchor baby" issue in the past, and this did not affect him prior to the birth of his children. Several years ago, when his wife was in a hospital in Hong Kong after giving birth to their children, B heard a lady speak Mandarin lying on the bed right next to his wife's bed. She told her husband: "Our children will be Hong Konger". That moment changed B's future, he was shocked at the time and he wondered if one day his children might become friends with this Chinese woman's children, so he decided to migrate right after that.

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Table 5. Births born in Hong Kong to mainland women whose spouses are not Hong Kong Permanent Residents, 2001-2017

Year	Number of live birth	Number of live births born in Hong Kong to mainland women whose spouses are not Hong Kong Permanent Residents
2001	48219	620
2002	48209	1250
2003	46965	2070
2004	49796	4102
2005	57098	9273
2006	65626	16044
2007	70875	18816
2008	78822	25269
2009	82095	29766
2010	88584	32653
2011	95451	35736
2012	91558	26715
2013	57084	790
2014	62305	823
2015	59878	775
2016	60856	606
2017	56548	502

Note. Data retrieved from: FA4, Hong Kong Monthly Digest of Statistics, December 2018

In 2012, the Chief-executive elect Leung Chun-ying, announced his first public announcement on policy: there will be a “zero” quota for “anchor babies” starting from 2013, to ensure the right of local pregnant mothers to use hospital

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services. As of April 2012, the Hospital Authority of Hong Kong will not accept any reservation from a non-local pregnant mother. The above table covers the number of live births born in Hong Kong to mainland women whose spouses are not Hong Kong Permanent Residents. From the figure, the trend is clear: starting from 2003, the number of births born in Hong Kong to mainland women increases rapidly, followed by the free individual travel policy. In 2011, the total number of births born rose to four times that of 2003. Following the "zero anchor baby" policy announced in 2012, the number of births born to mainland mothers in Hong Kong is rapidly decreasing from 26,715 in 2012 to 790 in 2013. From 2003 to 2012, over 200,000 "anchor babies" were born in Hong Kong.

4.2.2 Mainland immigrants and housing issue

These "anchor babies" are not the only newcomer to Hong Kong society. After 1997, the "one-way permit" (OWP) allowed Mainland residents to reunite with family members in Hong Kong if approved by the Chinese authorities (Post, Pong and Ou, 2015). Then in 2003, the Hong Kong government also announced the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Professional and the Capital Investment Entrant Scheme, both attracting many immigrants from China to move to Hong Kong, particularly the wealthy mainland investors. The city has become packed and by the different languages they speak, Hong Kongers can distinguish the "Chinese" easily.

In addition to the "anchor babies" issue, the free individual travel policy of Hong Kong has also led to plenty of livelihood problems. Two of the most severe problems are inflation and the high price of rents/real estate in the city. From Wong and Wan (2018), both global and regional factors helped create the housing boom of Hong Kong, but China's factor seems the most important one among them. In 2004, Hong Kong became the first market in the world to conduct offshore Renminbi (RMB) business. The RMB internationalization heavily relied on Hong Kong, which implies an enormous capital influx into the city, not surprisingly it stimulates its housing market (Wong and Wan, 2018).

Sense of belonging can affect identity and many factors can influence an individual's sense of belonging. From previous studies, housing issue is one of the

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measures in Hong Kong. Grange and Yip's (2001) assessed whether homeowners in Hong Kong have a greater sense of belonging. Since 1997, the Hong Kong government has promoted home ownership in order to increase the community's sense of belonging and reduce the rate of emigration. However, according to Demographia's 16th Annual International Housing Affordability Survey, Hong Kong has the least affordable housing for the tenth consecutive year. In this case, when Hong Kongers cannot afford to own a house, the sense of belonging of the community in Hong Kong should be low and the rate of emigration should increase, which corresponds to the current situation in Hong Kong. Indeed, the housing boom in Hong Kong is the main reason why young people in Hong Kong people need to apply for public housing, the housing issue is also one of the factors that affect interviewees to move to Taiwan. According to C, the size of housing has affected the quality of life, the size of the housing in Taiwan is much larger than in Hong Kong and "it's more comfortable to live in Taiwan." As for D, he shares the sad reality of young Hong Kongers: most of them cannot afford to rent a house, many of them have decided to marry when they can afford it. Some young couples have decided to live with their families after marriage, and some even live separately with their own families. As for couples, the only way to have time in private is to rent a hotel room.

Generally, if one agrees that to some extent, the new immigrants bring threats to society and have a stronger cultural identity, they tend to oppose giving new immigrants social welfares (Chou, 2013). According to D, the public housing in Hong Kong is one of the social welfares which the new immigrants nibbled the most. E also shares what she has heard from her grandmother, who also lives in a public estate in Hong Kong: the family that lives next to her grandmother's house plays Mahjong every day. Then E's grandmother found that only one family member in their house have a job, and the others chose not to work and obtain the comprehensive social security assistance from the government to support their life and to ensure that they can continue to live in the public housing. E thinks it's super ridiculous, whereas many Chinese immigrants tend to use this way to take advantage of the low rent public housing. "I'm ashamed to be such a person." E sighs. The new immigrants could easily obtain the public housing since most of them meet the requirement to

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apply for the public housing: most of them have no job and they married in Hong Kong.

This section discussed the relationship between the policies of the Hong Kong government and the national identity of Hong Kongers. First, we understand how the interviewee identifies themselves through their narration. Then, to understand the reason behind their thought, the policy announced by the Hong Kong government, which led to an influx of Chinese people and capital was examined. The housing issue is a factor that affects the Hong Kongers sense of belonging. In addition, through the narration of the interviewees, we can understand how these policies have affected their life and the change in their self-identification.

4.3 Cultural Identity and collective memories

From the 1970s, the identity of "Hong Konger" has been promoted through the collective experience of Hong Kong and the pop-culture of Hong Kong, which included Cantonese songs, literature written in Cantonese characters and vocabularies and Cantonese films. Since 1997, the local identity of Hong Kong is under threat after the transfer of sovereignty to China, the construction of collective memory has allowed Hong Kongers to understand who they are. The new wave of heritage preservation activism emerged over development projects of the historic Star Place Ferry and Queen's Pier, Wedding Card street and Tsoi Yuen Village, popular contention increasingly carried sentiments against China (Steinhardt, Li and Jiang, 2018). These are the important spots during the colonial era, but they also contain the history of Hong Kong. By defending them, the history of "us" (Hong Kongers) can be preserved. It's not about to recall the memory but it's the process of decolonization (Chu, 2007; Cheung, 2016).

Assmann (1988) argues that collective memory includes the notion of communicative and cultural memory: communicative memory includes the collective memory in daily communication, it relates to everything that takes place in our daily life. Each individual belongs to more than one group and their memories contain their

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self-image in various groups; as for cultural memory, it has its fixed point, it does not change over time, for example, festivals, literature or images. The identity constructing function of collective memories implies that not all shared memories are collective memories, the memory can only be considered collective if it's widely shared and if it helps to define and bind together a group (Assmann, 1995; Brown, Kouri and Hirst, 2012).

Immigrants neither wholly accept their host country culture, nor do they automatically embrace their traditional ethnic culture to the exclusion of other influences (Brinkerhoff, 2009). Migrant's ethnic identity can be described as multiple and complex processes between the home culture and the receiving context (Barbieri & Zani, 2015). For Hong Kongers in Taiwan, recalling collective memories is one way to preserve Hong Kong culture. One example is the interior design of most of the Hong Kongese restaurants in Taiwan, they added plenty of Hong Kongese elements in the design. When Samson and Samantha, the owner of We Love HK Restaurant in Kaohsiung opened their restaurant, they included a Cantonese menu and displayed the old stuff of their grandparent's in the restaurant. The purpose of this is to recall their childhood memories. [11]The chained Hong Kongese restaurant in Taiwan has also done the same thing, and the interior design of these restaurants is usually similar to the "Cha Chaan Teng" in Hong Kong. For example the "Tai Hing" "Cha Chaan Teng" opened in Taipei Station has designed its tables as follows, which looks similar to "Cha Chaan Teng" in Hong Kong and it's almost the same as the design of the "Tai Hing" "Cha Chaan Teng" in Hong Kong.

[11] Retrieved from: https://topick.hket.com/article/2465816/%E3%80%90%E7%A7%BB%E5%B1%85%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E3%80%9180%E5%BE%8C%E5%A4%AB%E5%A9%A6%E6%8A%95%E8%B3%8750%E8%90%AC%E8%A9%A6%E5%B1%85%E9%AB%98%E9%9B%84%E3%80%80%E5%89%B5%E6%A5%AD%E9%96%8B%E6%B8%AF%E5%BC%8F%E8%8C%B6%E9%

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Figure 4. Interior Design of “Tai Hing” “Cha Chaan Teng”[12]

Another example relates to Hong Kong’s pop-culture: Dickie Wong is a fan of Leslie Cheung – the famous Hong Kong singer who passed away in 2003. Every year, fans will visit the place where Cheung commits suicide to remember their beloved singer every year: the Mandarin Oriental Hotel in Hong Kong. Before Dickie moved to Taiwan, he also visited the hotel every year since 2003. After moving to Taichung in 2019, he opened a café and worries that he will be unable to visit the hotel in 2020. He then decided to host an exhibition of Leslie Cheung in his café from late March to early April 2020. Dickie displayed CDs, photos and magazines in the café and he posted details of the event on Facebook groups to invite other Leslie Cheung’s fans in Taiwan to join. Many Hong Kongers who live in Taichung have also visited the café and recall their memories with this singer together.

[12] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/%E5%A4%AA%E8%88%88%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3-2174644959454447/photos/2468827313369542

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Figure 5. Leslie Cheung Exhibition in Taichung, Taiwan[13]

The more minority group people who identify with their ethnic group, they are more likely to consider the importance of preserving their home culture (Verkuyten and Brug, 2004). Food is culture (Montanari, 2006), societies produce their own food. Interestingly, every interviewee mentioned something about Hong Kongese food in their interviews. In Hong Kong, the "Cha Chaan Teng" (茶餐廳) culture is one of the most important local food culture. Lots of chained "Cha Chaan Teng" in Hong Kong open their restaurants in Taiwan, to share this unique culture with Taiwanese and to explore overseas markets. As I mentioned earlier, lots of migrants also chose to open their Hong Kongese style restaurants in Taiwan and Hong Kongers in Taiwan are willing to visit these restaurants. In Taiwan, it's clear that "Cha Chaan Teng" is one of the collective memories that help shape the collective identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan.

"Zoizoi Cha Chaan Teng" is one of the restaurants opened by Hong Kongers in Taipei. In 2018, one city explorer Barbra W. interviewed the owners – Hebe and Sam

[13] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=10157507502115735&set=g.141097056524700

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[14]. Both of them love the food in "Cha Chaan Teng" and to make it authentic, they both learned how to make Hong Kong-style dishes. Another "Cha Chaan Teng" – We Love HK Restaurant in Kaohsiung was opened by Samson and Samantha, who migrated to Taiwan using the Entrepreneur Visas.[15] To reproduce the Hong Kong style "Cha Chaan Teng", they included lots of Hong Kong elements in their restaurant and to reproduce the taste of Hong Kongese food. As Samson said, Hong Kongese food is the only thing he misses the most.

Some interviewees agreed with what Samson said. They also often visit "Cha Chaan Teng" and Hong Kongese style restaurants. For instance, D always visits "Cha Chaan Teng" near his office. The owner of the restaurant is also a Hong Konger. The owner seldom asks for D's opinion on food. D think that the coffee there is bad, but the owner said: "I can't find a better raw material of Cantonese style coffee in Taiwan, or the cost is too high." Many Taiwanese people lined up for the chained "Cha Chaan Teng" in Taiwan, to enjoy the "taste of Hong Kong". But D thinks that these "Cha Chaan Teng" are not the best, being delicious is not the only criterion to judge the food as lots of Hong Kongese restaurants in Taiwan change their recipe to adapt to the Taiwanese taste. Sometimes D orders Hong Kongese food for his lunch and waits for delivery, of course, not the chained restaurants. He and his friends from Hong Kong will also be looking for the "Cha Chaan Teng" which tastes similar to Hong Kong.

H missed Hong Kongese food too. Since his first year in Taiwan, he already visited Hong Kongese restaurant every weekend. At that time he lives in Changhua, but he still drives and seeks Hong Kongese restaurants nearby, sometimes he even drives to Taichung for delicious Hong Kongese food. H doesn't like Taiwanese food mucha lot and these Hong Kongese restaurants have helped him to adapt to life in Taiwan.

[14] Retrieved from: https://www.adaymag.com/2019/10/24/zoi-zoi-hk-tea-restaurant.html
[15] Retrieved from: https://topick.hket.com/article/2465816/%E3%80%90%E7%A7%BB%E5%B1%85%E5%8F%B0%E7%81%A3%E3%80%9180%E5%BE%8C%E5%A4%AB%E5%A9%A6%E6%8A%95%E8%B3%8750%E8%90%AC%E8%A9%A6%E5%B1%85%E9%AB%98%E9%9B%84%E3%80%80%E5%89%B5%E6%A5%AD%E9%96%8B%E6%B8%AF%E5%BC%8F%E8%8C%B6%E9%A4%90%E5%BB%B3%EF%BC%9A%E8%B6%81%E9%9D%92%E6%98%A5%E8%BF%BD%E5%A4%A2%E3%80%90%E6%9C%89%E7%89%87%E3%80%91

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As for C, he decided to open a Tortoise Jelly store in Taipei after marrying a Taiwanese, as there are a few Tortoise Jelly store in Taiwan. Tortoise Jelly is a functional Cantonese style food, made with certain Chinese medicines and also very popular in Hong Kong. He knew that migrants from Hong Kong usually choose to open "Cha Chaan Teng", but to differentiate the market and to promote this healthy food to Taiwanese, he decided to sell Tortoise Jelly. C's Tortoise Jelly store located in one of the most popular areas of Taipei, but he wishes that people can visit his store to enjoy a Tortoise Jelly in Hong Kongese flavor. Despite the high rent in the city, the price of the Tortoise Jelly sell in C's store is still cheaper than in Hong Kong.

This section discussed how is the cultural identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, through their collective memories. Which specifically examines the case of Hong Kong food culture and how people reproduce Hong Kong's culture in Taiwan.

4.4 Social Identity and Sense of Community

Group identification connects social and collective identity, collective identity politicized when it becomes the focus for a struggle for power (Klandermans, 2013). In the previous chapter, the studies related to sense of community and identity were introduced. According to Anderson (2009), sense of community can be used to address the questions of political behaviour. For Hong Kongers in Taiwan, how's their sense of community? Did their sense of community or their identity influence their political behaviour? This section will discuss the relationship between the sense of community, identity and political behaviour of Hong Kongers in Taiwan through three examples: the identity of young Hong Kongers in Taiwan, the use of social media and the formation of the "Yellow Economic Circle" in Taiwan.

In Hong Kong, following the Umbrella Revolution in 2014, two large communities (or groups) were formed in the society according to people's political views and the disparities between these two communities have increased: the blue ribbon (藍絲) and the yellow ribbon (黃絲). The yellow ribbon represents those who support the strike and demonstration in the Umbrella Revolution and the blue ribbon

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represent those who do not support the strike and demonstration in the Umbrella Revolution. Then during the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in 2019, the term yellow ribbon represent those who support the democratic movement[16]; the term blue ribbon represents those who support the pro-China camp in Hong Kong[17] or those who support the government.

The next section will discuss the use of SNSs among different age group of migrants. For students, some of them used Dcard as one of the channel expressing political views and discuss with other students who study in Taiwan; for most of the Hong Kongers in Taiwan, they used Facebook as the platform to connect each other and hold offline events to gather migrants in Taiwan or support Hong Kong's social movements.

4.4.1 The use of SNSs

Following the 2014 Umbrella Revolution, social media was widely used as one of the channels for expressing Hong Kongers political views. From Liu (2008), although migrants might stay in a host country for a long period, they still have frequent interaction with their mother country - society, politics, culture and economics. And in the research report done by the Center of Youth Studies at the Chinese University of Hong Kong (2017), Hong Kong youth frequently participated in online political activities and they usually expressed their political views on the SNS. Some Hong Kongers in Taiwan use the functions of some social media sites to organize events in Taiwan, to support the political events in Hong Kong. Among the popular SNSs, Hong Kongers in Taiwan have frequently used Facebook, YouTube and Dcard. According to the Taiwan Internet Report 2019, which studies the behaviour and trend of Internet users, Facebook is the 1st and Dcard is the 3rd social media site in Taiwan. In this section, I will discuss the role of different social media among Hong Kongers in Taiwan, and its impact to the Taiwanese society.

[16] Yellow Ribbon (黃絲帶). Retrieved from: https://evchk.wikia.org/zh/wiki/%E9%BB%83%E7%B5%B2%E5%B8%B6
[17] Blue Ribbon (藍絲帶). Retrieved from: https://evchk.wikia.org/zh/wiki/%E8%97%8D%E7%B5%B2%E5%B8%B6

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Figure 6. Main website or brand (Taiwan Internet Report, 2019)

From online to offline – platform connecting host and mother country

Facebook is one of the most popular SNS in the world. For March 2020, the average daily active users of Facebook were 1.73 billion[18]. The use of Facebook groups allows Hong Kong migrants to connect to each other. As for Facebook events and the Facebook page, Hong Kong migrants usually share their political views or life experience on it and organize offline political events. People can set up Facebook groups and allow others to join, the group owner can decide the group's privacy, and those who want to join must answer certain questions and wait for the approval. Some Hong Kongers in Taiwan have set up several groups on Facebook, allowing migrants and potential migrants to ask questions and hold events in the group. B told me the secret behind these groups: most of the people think these groups are managed by certain migrants, in fact the migration agency set up the groups, but only a few people know about it. These agencies have lots of experience assisting Hong Kongers to migrate to Taiwan. Those who set up the groups also used other SNSs to connect Hong Kong migrants in Taiwan. For example, in one of the Facebook groups – "Hong Kongers in Taiwan", they created a Telegram channel (one of the SNSs). Once they've organized gatherings in Taiwan, they will release the news there. If migrants have any questions, they may also ask them in the channel. Besides, Facebook has also organized hot topics in the groups, people can click on topics and browse the posts that they are interested in.

[18] Facebook Reports First Quarter 2020 Results. Retrieved from: https://investor.fb.com/investor-news/press-release-details/2020/Facebook-Reports-First-Quarter-2020-Results/default.aspx#:~:text=Facebook%20daily%20active%20users%20(DAUs,%25%20year%2Dover%2Dyear.

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Figure 7. A post on Facebook group introducing the Telegram account and hot topics in the group [19]

I joined two of the Facebook groups to observe the online behaviour of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. There are a few types of people who frequently joined these groups: potential migrants in Hong Kong and Taiwan, Taiwanese living in Hong Kong, or Hong Kongers living in Taiwan, and students studying in Taiwan.

Figure 8. List of Facebook Group observed

[19] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/photo?fbid=509491463097715&set=gm.528899664411102

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Most of the groups provide a platform for people from both places to discuss problems in their daily life and allow them to join other SNS groups for further contact. The hot topics in these groups have changed from time to time, in different political environments. Before June 2019, for most of the Hong Kongers in Taiwan, they usually discuss issue of everyday life, such as where to buy Hong Kongese ingredients in Taiwan. But after that, many potential migrants join the group and ask migration related question and seek opinions. For example, the investment migration process, the list of schools accepting students from Hong Kong and the city where these migrants should move to are the most popular issues among potential migrants. And as a result of Taiwan's Corona virus lockdown in February 2020, more Hong Kongers and Taiwanese joined the group and expressed their views on being separated from their families or spouses in both locations.

These groups included people of different age groups, when compared to Dcard, which only allows students to use, the topic discussed within the group is more diverse. Hong Kongers in Taiwan and Taiwanese also have frequent interactions in these groups: they do not only talk about their daily life in Taiwan but also about political issues. From Larsson & Teigland (2020), those who are foreign-born express their political views online through social media more easily; digitalization has changed the political dialogue. The formation of the Hong Kong Outlanders is one of the examples, they are a group of Hong Kongers who are located in Taiwan and wish to contribute to their homeland. They used the function of Facebook events, to organize and promote offline events, to gather Hong Kongers in Taiwan.

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

Figure 9. Facebook Page of the Hong Kong Outlanders[20]

People from all over the world can easily access political dialogue through Facebook. The Facebook event - the 9/29 demonstration in Taipei in 2019 is an examples. The Hong Kong Outlanders organized the event with some Taiwanese NGO's and local organizations to support the protesters in Hong Kong, and respond to the demonstration in Hong Kong. Taiwanese and Hong Kongers are welcome to participate in this event.

Figure 10. Event page of the 9/29 Demonstration[21]

[20] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/HKOutlanders/

[21] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/events/392770148103285/?acontext=%7B%22source%22%3A5%2C%22action_history%22%3A[%7B%22surface%22%3A%22page%22%2C%22mechanism%22%3A%22mai

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They also listed details of the events and the advocates on Facebook, people can access the event page and even invite friends to view and like the page. These events allow Hong Kongers in Taiwan to join the demonstration to show their support to their homeland, and even invite friends to view and like the page.



Figure 11-12. Details of the 9/29 demonstration and the advocates on the event page [22]

Besides, H is one of the successful cases using social media to build his personal brand, by sharing his own experience in Taiwan and introducing himself to potential migrants, he quickly became very popular among them. He shares his experience in consulting with potential migrants with me in May 2020, at which time he already told me that about 50 or 60 families had contacted him through social media and that they plan to migrate to Taiwan in 2020. However, since the Taiwanese government has closed the border since February, some are postponing the plan while others are still sending the application.

Anonymous dialogue – channel that students used to shared their political view

Dcard – a Taiwan-based online forum found in 2011, open only to students who studying in Taiwan, allows students to talk anonymously online. Hong Kong students

n_list%22%2C%22extra_data%22%3A%22%5C%22[]%5C%22%22%7D]%2C%22has_source%22%3Atrue%7D

[22] Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/events/392770148103285/?acontext=%7B%22source%22%3A5%2C%22action_history%22%3A[%7B%22surface%22%3A%22page%22%2C%22mechanism%22%3A%22main_list%22%2C%22extra_data%22%3A%22%5C%22[]%5C%22%22%7D]%2C%22has_source%22%3Atrue%7D

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in Taiwan are allowed to ask questions and collect information from it. In November 2018, they set up a sub-forum in Hong Kong and included a sub-forum targeting only overseas Chinese students (僑生), and Hong Kong students studying in Taiwan are included. Hong Kong students in Taiwan are allowed to express their views on the forum, for instance, minority and political issues are the most popular one on Dcard. In October 2018, a Hong Kong student expressed her perspective on same-sex marriage in Dcard and compared the differences in how people treat minorities in Hong Kong and Taiwan. The comments below are highly positive and support her decision to stay in Taiwan. Some Hong Kong students in Taiwan have also commented on the post and they are connected through the platform.

Starting from 2014, Hong Kong and Taiwanese students frequently share their perspective on political issues and discuss on Dcard. In the past, the only way they can understand the whole story is to read news or articles online, while by Dcard, they can read people's story, discuss the issue and even ask questions to better understand. Two significant cases are the Sunflower Student Movements in 2014 and the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement in 2019. These topics are really hot in the year occurred. At the Dcard Annual Review announced in January 2020, the Hong Kong "Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement" is one of the most popular issues on the forum in 2019.

Just after the movement began, on June 10, 2019, a Hong Kong student studying in Taiwan posted an article on Dcard, explained the Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement to Taiwanese students, more than 2000 Dcard users liked the post.

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Figure 13. June 9 Call from Hong Kongers (A post from Dcard) [23]

As Dcard is open to all students who studying in Taiwan, students from China can also read the post. Some students from China and Hong Kong argue under this post, here are some of the comments in the post:

[23] Retrieved from: https://www.dcard.tw/f/trending/p/231460538

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Figure 14-16. Comments from June 9 Call from Hong Kongers (from Dcard) [24]

According to the above comments, some Taiwanese students do not only show their attitude of support toward Hong Kong students but also rethink their political issues. For example: the presidential election in Taiwan and the cross-strait issues, some even suggested explaining Hong Kong's issue to their family members or friends from other countries. Hong Kong and Taiwan have always been connected on

[24] Retrieved from: https://www.dcard.tw/f/trending/p/231460538

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the political issues, both people struggle for democracy and the separate identity from China. Today, the political issue in Hong Kong has alarmed Taiwanese youth and forced them to rethink the future of Taiwan. As a platform, Dcard allows students to exchange views and even affected their peers from other places, it has brought positive effects and allow students to think.

When comparing interviewees of different ages, it's clear that those who are younger are more willing to participate in politics using SNSs, especially on local issues (the political incidents in Hong Kong). This is consistent with Davidson and Cotter (1989) research, people with a strong sense of community expressed themselves politically through a variety of channels. Through their conversation with family and friends, they have begun to reflect on their self-identity. For the interviewees who are older, they still maintain certain ties with political incidents in Hong Kong, but they may not have much political dialogues with family and friends publicly. They are more willing to focus on helping other Hong Kongers in Taiwan to solve their daily life issues.

4.4.2 Yellow Economic Circle in Taiwan

The ethnic economy may be defined as an economic sub-system within a larger economy (Collier, 2001), and the ethnic economy exists whenever any immigrant or ethnic minority maintains a private economic sector in which it has a controlling ownership stake' (Light & Karageorgis, 1994). An ethnic economy consists of two sectors: the ethnic-controlled economy and the ethnic ownership economy (Light, 2005). Here, the "Yellow Economic Circle (黃色經濟圈)" in Taiwan may be defined as one of the potential ethnic economy. Following by more Hong Kongers move to Taiwan, and after they set up more restaurants or stores here. The scale of this potential ethnic economy will enlarge, how it will affect Taiwanese society is still unpredictable and observable.

The "Yellow Economic Circle" in Hong Kong was formed by shops or restaurants that support the yellow side. Those who support the yellow side will also choose to visit such shops or restaurants rather than the blue side. On H's Facebook page, he always uses the "Yellow Economic Circle" hash-tag when visiting Hong

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Kongese restaurants in Taiwan. According to him, the “Yellow Economic Circle” in Taiwan is also possible. As B said, Hong Kong migrants in Taiwan build a strong connection in different cities, with regular meetings and gatherings to help new migrants get familiar with their life in Taiwan. The setup of “Yellow Stores(黃店)” in Taiwan is one example that the sense of community affects the political behaviour of individuals. Indeed, most of the Hong Kong migrants have chosen to set up the Hong Kongese restaurant or shops in Taiwan, and they usually show their political attitude in their restaurants or shops. Hong Kongers in Taiwan also selectively visit restaurants or shops that have the same political stance with them.

Recently, D ordered a lunch delivery from a Hong Kongese restaurant in Taipei with his colleagues. He sends me a photo of a memo received in the delivery:



Figure 17. Memo from Interviewee D

D doesn’t know at first that the restaurant is a “yellow store”, but after receiving this memo, one of his Hong Kong colleagues told him that the owner of the restaurant had studied in Taiwan and opened the restaurant after graduating. When D’s colleagues order delivery, they sometimes send a message and say “Add oil Hong Kong (香港加油)!” to the restaurant, and the restaurant’s owner responded through memos. According to the interviewees, most Hong Kongers in Taiwan share the same political stances and have a strong self-identification as “Hong Kongers”. The set-up

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of “Yellow Economic Circle” in Taiwan further enhances their sense of belonging to their Hong Kong identity even if they live in Taiwan.

According to my own observation, before 2019, it’s not popular in Taiwan to show one’s political attitude in restaurants or shops, even though it’s opened by Hong Kongers in Taiwan. But following the contradiction between Hong Kongers and the Hong Kong government, Hong Kongers in Taiwan express their political stance in Taiwan to show support to their people. In 2020, two iconic “yellow store” opened in Taipei, which began building the “Yellow Economic Circle” in Taiwan. One of them is the Aegis restaurant (保護傘) opened by Daniel Wong Kwok-tung, a lawyer from Hong Kong who volunteered to provide legal assistance to protesters arrested as part of the 2019 Anti-Extradition Law Amendment Bill Movement, to support protesters who came to Taiwan. Another one is the Causeway Bay Books (銅鑼灣書店), which was opened by former Causeway Bay Books’ owner, Lam Wing Kee.

When deciding where to shop or where to eat, Hong Kongers in Taiwan prioritizes to visit the yellow stores or restaurants, to show their support for their people, as well as representing their political views. And Taiwanese people often visit these restaurants to enjoy Hong Kongese cuisine.

In addition, the “Yellow Economic Circle” does not only affects Hong Kongers in Taiwan, but it’s more localized and includes local Taiwanese stores or restaurants that support the Hong Kong protestors. A symbolic example of the local Taiwanese “yellow store” is the restaurant “Ahua’s store (阿華的店)”. The restaurant was established in the 1970s, at the golden age of the Taiwanese social movement. It has been considered as the holy land of democracy in Taiwan[25]. The store owner – Ahua supports Hong Kong democracy and has displayed political brochures and posters in the restaurant.

[25] 阿才的店老闆阿華去世 台灣味見證民主史 Retrieved from: https://www.cna.com.tw/news/firstnews/202002210341.aspx

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Figure 18. Hong Kong related Stickers and Slogan in Ahua's Store [26]

Another example is the Café Philo, the founders showed their attention to social issues, in particular democracy and equal rights. They also show their support for the Hong Kong protesters by setup the "Lennon Wall" in the store and use stickers to write "STAND WITH HK" on the display window.

[26]阿才的店 Facebook Retrieved from: https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2730670737058427&set=a.1163913303734186

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Figure 19. Lennon Wall in Café Philo[27]

Figure 20. “Stand With HK” Slogan on Café Philo’s display window[28]

[27] Retrieved from:
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2419184831451681&set=a.1144959755540868

[28] Retrieved from:
https://www.facebook.com/photo/?fbid=2647878818582280&set=a.1207345102635666

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This is just the beginning of the "Yellow Economic Circle" in Taiwan. But we can be sure of that: Hong Kongers in Taiwan will play an important role in its development and it will be able to strengthen the cohesion of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. In the previous section, the case of young Hong Kongers has been used to discuss the relationship between the sense of community, identity and political behaviour of Hong Kongers in Taiwan. Combined the analysis with the discussion on the Yellow Economic Circle in Taiwan, it indicates that the Hong Konger's sense of community has had a positive correlation with their identity and both affect their political behaviour.

This chapter began with the self-identification of the interviewees. There are significant differences between different age groups: for the young Hong Kongers, they have different paths exploring their identity, politics is one factor affecting their self-identification. For other interviewees, politics might not be the factor affects their self-identification. Then, three perspectives of collective identity were discussed using the case of Hong Kongers in Taiwan: national identity, cultural identity and social identity. In the analysis, factors affecting identity formation were identified and the differences between "Hong Konger" and "Chinese" are significant in distinguishing the Hong Kong identity from Chinese ethnic identity. In terms of national identity, immigrants from China and the policies of the Hong Kong government are two main factors. For cultural identity, preserving the local culture of Hong Kong in Taiwan is one way for Hong Kongers to present their identity. Which consistent with Verkuyten and Brug's study in 2004: the more minority group people who identify with their ethnic group, they are more likely to consider the importance of preserving their home culture. For social identity, the study of sense of community was used as a discussion aspect. The use of social media and the formation of the "Yellow Economic Circle" in Taiwan are covered in this section too.

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Chapter 5. Conclusion

This thesis seeks to provide a better understanding of a potential ethnic groups in Taiwan – the Hong Kong migrants, focusing on their identity. It has done so by answering the following questions: How do these Hong Kongers identify themselves? Do they share any collective identity? If so, what is it and how is it embodied? In-depth interview and secondary literature analysis have been adopted to examine the identity- the sense of belonging- of Hong Kongers.

This thesis found that: for different groups of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, motives for moving to Taiwan and the challenges they faced are vary. For students, two main motives include diverse majors in university and personal political stance. If they want to stay in Taiwan after graduation, it's difficult for them to apply for a working visa because of the lack of knowledge of the system, especially for those studying "unpopular majors". Dependents are the most common form of migration to Taiwan and they are willing to integrate into the society when compared to other migrants, their identity is less complex when compared to other groups of migrants. The investment migrants usually aged 45-65 or 30-35, they move to Taiwan for their own interest or the future of their children. Their motivations change from time to time, starting in 2014, it's more political oriented.

Nationalism is the sense of belonging behind the concept of nation (Anderson, 1993). "Hong Kong nationalism" understood as the ideology of building an independent nation of Hong Kong did not appear to have attract much attention until recently and studies of it are rather scant. According to the finding of this thesis, it should be noted and indeed emphasized that although Hong Kongers in Taiwan do have a very strong and distinctive collective identity which identify themselves as 'Hong Kongers' with the Taiwanese and the mainland Chinese as their main 'the Other', it would be misleading to argue that a Hong Kong nationalism aiming to pursue an independent nation of Hong Kong is in the making.

As for the factors that have affected the national identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan, the policy of the Hong Kong government, such as the Free and Independent

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Travelers policy towards mainland Chinese visitors to Hong Kong, and the consciousness of the differences in the ethnic sense between Hong Kong and mainland Chinese people stand out. This thesis concludes that first, Hong Kongers in Taiwan strongly identify themselves as 'Hong Kongers'; secondly, the conscious differences between Hong Kongers and the Chinese have shaped their identity; and finally, the sense of community is positively correlated with their identity.

The most prominent aspect of the identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan is their sociocultural identity which is embodied for instance in their efforts to preserve Hong Kong culture by consciously forming a Hong Kong community through the SNSs, supporting the so-called Yellow Economic Circle, and speaking the language used by the vast majority of Hong Kong people, that is, Cantonese. As stated in previous chapters, the "reproduction" of Hong Kong culture in Taiwan and the recall of collective memories reinforced the collective identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan.

What should be noted is that politics, specifically the substantial change of the "One Country, Two Systems" in Hong Kong, has been crucial for shaping the identity of young Hong Kongers in Taiwan. Some of the interviewees have a multiple or dual identities after marrying Taiwanese, and some of them already obtain the Taiwanese ID card. However, most of them still identify themselves as purely "Hong Konger". The analysis in this research is based on the three aspects of collective identity: national identity, cultural identity and social identity:

The national identity of Hong Kongers can be affected by the policy of the Hong Kong Government and the comparison of two identities: Hong Kongers and Chinese. Here, the housing issue is a factor affecting sense of belonging; The cultural identity of Hong Kongers can be explained through the concept of collective memory, which includes the notion of communicative and cultural memory (Assmann, 1988). For Hong Kongers in Taiwan, recalling collective memories is one way to preserve their home culture. Food culture is one of the examples; the social identity of Hong Kongers in Taiwan is highly linked to their sense of community. The political participation on social medias is highly related to identity and sense of community too. The use of SNSs and the Yellow economic circle in Taiwan are two examples. Social

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media allows Hong Kongers in Taiwan to connect, both online and offline. Hong Kongese restaurants or stores in Taiwan shows their political attitude and Hong Kongers in Taiwan also selectively visit restaurants or stores which share the same political stance with them. Their actions corresponded to the three factor model of social identity raised by Cameron (2004) and also linked with the component of "membership" in the study of sense of community. Hong Kongers in Taiwan developed a multiple sense of community, and some strengthen the sense of belonging to their personal identity. Here, the ethnic economy and the Hong Kongese entrepreneurship might also be two potential research topics in the future.

As such, this thesis concludes that: Hong Kongers in Taiwan has a strong self-identification as "Hong Kongers", the differences of "Hong Kongers" and "Chinese" shaped their identity, and that the sense of community correlates positively with their identity and both influence their political activities in Taiwan. This statement is derived from the analysis of the interviewee's behaviours and words. The evaluation is based on the theories of nationalism, identity and sense of community covered in Chapter 2.

I would like to further highlight the challenges faced by students graduating in Taiwan on applying the work visa. As a reference for all prospective overseas Chinese students who want to stay in Taiwan to explore their careers:

From this study, various university majors is one motive to attract students to study in Taiwan, and some of these are the unpopular majors. In the research paper published by the Workforce Development Agency of Taiwan, Ministry of Labour, they evaluated the effectiveness of the employment policy for foreign students, overseas Chinese students, and foreign students of Chinese origin in Taiwan. They draw seven conclusions; some of which correspond to the findings of this thesis: both students and enterprises have insufficient knowledge about the system; for the student who wants to apply for the work visa, they only have a few channels to ask or to understand the policy; only a few successful cases shared online. As suggested in the research paper, an internship program for overseas Chinese students could help these students to find a job in Taiwan. While for students studying unpopular majors, more

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assistance is needed as even if they have internship experience in their own professions, they still failed to find a job.

As an example, two of the interviewees in this study studies unpopular majors in university. Interviewee H studied environmental engineering at university, and another interviewee D studied animal science. Both of them were unable to find a job in their own profession after graduation and their only wish is to stay and work in Taiwan, For some industry, it's too troublesome to apply a work visa for overseas Chinese students as the application process takes time to complete and they would rather seek other Taiwanese candidates for the same position, and some would not readily accept a young Hong Kong co-worker. And even if these students found a job, they still need to make sure the company meet the requirement to apply the work visa. Some overseas Chinese students like D are trying to find a job that requires their mother language, while there are also students like H, gave up and finding a job that he never thought of, to achieve his goal to stay in Taiwan. The two jobs were unrelated to their profession and they obtained the work visa within two or three months of summiting the application.

Some research limitations should be noted. As far as the potential contribution this thesis has made to the existing literature on the subject, this study only focuses on one specific group of migrants in Taiwan, that is the Hong Kongers. Moreover most of them studied in this thesis are students. The author of this thesis is fully aware that some factors such as the differences in the ages and original nations of the migrants, and the motives of migrating to other countries could have crucial impact on the findings. In addition, as demonstrating in the literature review chapter, existing studies on identity have drawn upon various theories and explored the subject from different aspect. This thesis examines mainly and only the formation of national, cultural and social identity of Hong Kongers- the Hong Kong identity- in Taiwan.

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Appendix

Interview with A

June 2019, Phone Interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

我是 1970、1980 年代就來到台灣讀書，即使我已經住在台灣這麼久了，我還是覺得自己是一個香港人。就算我嫁給了台灣的老公，我拿的是台灣身分證，但我仍然是一個香港人，這是不可改變的。當然對於我的下一代，我不會勉強他們，因為他們就是土生土長的台灣人。

1.1. 那你會覺得自己是「中國香港人」嗎?

不會。

2. 你當年是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

我當年是來讀書的，那時候在香港讀不了大學又想當老師，就報考了台灣的師大。我還記得我當年一來到台灣，就拿到了台灣的身分證，我就變成了台灣人。留在台灣的原因，當然是因為認識了我先生。大學之後我就跟他結婚了，自然就留在台灣了。那時候在台灣當老師沒有這麼難，基本上畢業後都是用分發的，當時我被分發到桃園的小學，一直就做到現在了。

2.1. 香港人當時可以在台灣當老師嗎?

其實我也不知道，但當時我已經是台灣人了，所以可以。

3. 你在台灣有遇到任何的困難嗎?

老實說一開始我覺得真的很難融入社會，特別是因為結婚後我就跟我先生一起搬到桃園，鄰居明顯有排斥外籍人士。還好的就是我婆婆當時帶著我到處去認識鄰居，久而久之他們就比較不會用異樣的眼光看你。另外就是因為要跟先生的家人同住，始終有些不習慣。特別是很多香港女生就算結婚、生小孩還是會工作，但是我的婆婆比較傳統，覺得我應該要待在家裡照顧小孩，因為他自己也是這樣。

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Interview with B

June 2019, Phone Interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

很簡單的，香港人。不是什麼中國香港人、中國人，畢竟我們出生在香港，當然就是單純的香港人。現在我拿了台灣身分證，或許可以說是入了台籍的香港人吧。

2. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

我是投資移民過來的。之前來旅遊的時候，就覺得跟香港比起來，台灣的醫療、教育跟生活都比香港好很多。你應該也認同吧? 光是健保這一樣就比香港好太多，香港看醫生要等一年，台灣的拿著健保卡進去任何一間醫療診所都可以看。我自己在香港的時候也很關注社會議題，有在 NGO 裡面做義工，例如會到不同區域派飯。其中讓我最深刻的是跟麥難民聊天，麥難民不僅是你想像的人會做，就算是穿著西裝的人，也會成為麥難民。這些經歷讓我看到很多香港社會的黑暗面。

那最主要的原因當然是 14 年雨革，在 14 年之前其實我自己對於政治是完全沒有參與的。我印象很深刻的是當年我太太上班的地方樓下就有警察在放 tg(催淚彈)，我去接她的時候目睹了衝擊的畫面。我當下是覺得香港的政治環境跟教育系統已經不再適合小朋友的成長，再加上我跟女兒經過示威的場地時，我女兒問了我一句：為什麼這些人睡在街上，不回家睡覺? 做為一個父親，我當下深深地被她的話觸動，為何香港下一代的小孩連安睡都沒辦法做到? 所以為了女兒，我就決心移民來台灣。另外一個原因是好幾年前，我老婆生小孩的時候，我還記得，隔壁床就是一個大陸女人，她跟她老公說的第一句話就是:「我們的小孩將會是香港人」。我當時的第一個想法就是，不是吧，將來我的小孩有機會跟她的小孩一起讀書嗎? 想想都是一件很可怕的事。那時候開始我就有在計劃移民了，其實我本來 first choice 是澳洲，因為我有家人在那邊。但是考慮到台灣的物價比較便宜，而且澳洲那邊其實很多種族歧視問題，所以來到台灣。

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3. 你在台灣有遇到任何的困難嗎?

其實我在香港本來有自己的公司，移民來的時候直接開一間新的同類型公司在台灣。本來的業務已經都給別人了，這邊的公司跟香港的也沒有關係，我自己打理台灣這間而已。當時我是透過移民公司辦的，所以其實也沒有遇到很多大問題。好像你 po 文的 facebook group，很多人都誤會是移民來台灣的香港人開的，其實後面都是移民公司在操作，不過沒什麼人知道。移民公司可以幫你辦移民，但像住屋跟找學校這兩樣其實還是需要在地或是有相關經驗的人幫忙，我自己已經拿到台灣身分證、也建立了一些人脈，現在我也會在這兩方面幫助想要移民的人。

其實在台灣的香港人圈子很大，不少是嫁來台灣的香港女生。我自己是覺得想要融入台灣社會不難，如果有宗教信仰的基本上去參加一些聚會就可以認識很多人。台北相對比較少，但是台中、高雄都很多香港人的 gathering，台中的人最多，一次可以有 200~300 人參加，高雄的相對少，但也有 50~60 人左右。大家都很團結。

4. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異?

從政治的層面來看，很多事香港不能做但是台灣可以做。例如在香港當老師或醫療人員，你的工作跟政治是可能會有矛盾的。看移民來的人其實也反映了越來越多人會因為政治的因素移民。特別是近年移民來的、跟佔中 (2014) 前後來的人，他們有很明顯的差別，近年移民來的真的 8,9 成都是黃絲。

生活上，我自己覺得香港的生活緊湊很多，在台灣就是「hea」，像我之前在香港都幾乎沒有時間陪伴家人，到台灣這邊多出了很多親子的時間。當然生活空間比香港大很多，小朋友學習的風氣也相對比較開放。

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Interview with C

June 2019, Phone Interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

香港人。

1.1.那你會覺得自己是「中國香港人」嗎?

嗯…我覺得不可否認的是香港屬於中國，這是事實。但我還是覺得香港人跟中國人之間的差距很大，所以我不排除這個說法，但我也不會主動把我自己定義成「中國人」。

2. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

我當初是跟我的太太結婚後，一開始是住在香港，但是她沒有辦法適應香港的生活。後來我們就決定一起來到台灣生活了，來這邊之後我也在台灣開設了自己的店舖賣龜苓膏。

2.1.請問一下為何會選擇開設龜苓膏店呢?

其實我也知道很多人會做餐飲相關的行業，特別是開餐廳。但係我覺得跟他們一樣的話其實很難競爭，不如開一些台灣比較少人做的食品。鋪租的話開在那條街當然不便宜啦，但龜苓膏是健康的食品，也希望多些人可以認識。

3. 你在台灣有遇到任何的困難嗎?

我自己覺得可能是我娶了台灣人的關係，我覺得並沒有遇到太大的問題。但我覺得如果是投資移民，兩夫妻都是香港人的話，可能會遇上比較多的問題，畢竟周邊的環境、鄰居都跟香港的太不一樣了。

4. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異?

其中一個當然是住屋比香港大很多，而且去哪裏都可以開車真的很方便。

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Interview with D

Nov 2019, Face to Face Interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

香港人。的確我們跟中國有很多文化上的共同點，但是我完全不覺得自己是中國人，他們的行為跟素質實在太差了，讓人無法苟同。

1.1.撇除他們的行為不談，你認為自己是「中國香港人」嗎?

不認同，但我必須承認我以前可能也會將自己定義為「中國香港人」。在我大學時期，我的室友都是讀政治的，我也是因為他們才開始想這些問題。我認為不可否認的是如果撇除那些中國人的行為，很多香港人其實並不抗拒所謂中國人的身分。現在的話從歷史上的角度來看，我覺得香港處於一個灰色地帶吧。

2. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

六年前我來到台灣讀書，主要是想逃離我的家庭事務。因為我很喜歡動物，所以我想到台灣來讀獸醫，可惜獸醫很難考，最後我就進了動物科學系。畢業後，我用評點制申請工作證留在台灣。

一開始其實我有考慮過回去香港工作，但我家裡其實有人當警察，在這個政治環境下家庭關係越來越差。特別是我媽媽，她在 14 年的時候其實算是黃的，但不知道是不是為了支持她的兄弟，在今年(2019)開始越來越藍，甚至還罵我跟我女友或是硬要我們接受她的想法，這也是我決定繼續留在台灣的原因之一。

P.S: 雖然我家裡有人當警察，但其實我女友從我認識她(2011) 到現在(2019) 都是很黃的，這麼多年他們都沒有爭執或是對對方不滿，但是到今年很明顯就真的不想聯絡了…

2.1.好奇問一下動物科學系是?

主要是研究經濟動物，例如牛、豬跟雞，就是我們平常會吃的動物! 其實不少香港人都對動物產業有興趣，但是考不進獸醫就讀了動物科學系，想要畢業後可以做獸醫助理，跟我同班就有三個香港人！

3. 你是如何申請工作證留在台灣的? 你在台灣有遇到任何的困難嗎?

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對我來說最困難的應該是找工作。我本來想找類似獸醫助理的工作，在學期間我也在獸醫診所實習了兩個月。去診所面試的時候，他們都滿意我的經驗的知識，也有不少間給我 offer 了，但是當我跟他們說我要申請工作證，部分立刻拒絕了我，部分說請我給他們資料看看，就不了了之了。在我解釋申請過程的時候，他們也有老實跟我說這對他們來說太麻煩了，要做這麼多事，請一個台灣人不就好了? 其實我還蠻傷心的，畢竟我唸動物科學就是想要從事獸醫助理，但最後居然因為太麻煩而被拒絕。之後我找工作就更難了，像我唸這個特殊的科目，其他公司幾乎都覺得我唸的太偏門，不符合他們的需求。其實當時我也有同學問我要不要去他們家的豬場上班，但地點大多在比較偏遠的地區如雲林，所以我就沒有考慮去那邊。最後我找到的工作是需要用廣東話的，公司裡面也有不少香港人。

4. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異? 或是說你有什麼不適應的嗎?

對我自己來說，居住空間是很重要的。特別是來到台灣之後，我住的房子比香港的大上至少 2 倍，附近也有很多公共空間例如公園、圖書館，但在香港的話絕對沒有辦法在這麼休閒的地方居住。在台灣的生活可以說是我夢想中的生活。而且我在香港的朋友都會遇上很多問題，例如因為跟兄弟姊妹 share 房間，跟另一半完全沒有私人空間，常常都要在周末的時候住飯店或時鐘酒店才可以有一些二人世界的時間。特別是社會運動之後很多人跟家人關係變得很差，他們根本就不想待在家裡，更何況是跟另一半一起在自己家裡二人世界? 其實很多人都想租屋的，但新一點的房子可能就要租 7000-8000 甚至上萬港幣，對於剛畢業不久的人實在很難負擔。

說到這個也不得不提到香港的公屋，其實很多人都有申請公屋，但據說一人的公屋要等 10 年以上。最大的原因是很多新移民的人沒有工作或是低收入，又有很多人已經結婚，全家一起申請的話就很快有公屋，有小孩的就更快，所以我覺得香港人討厭他們也是有原因的。畢竟香港人在沒有能力租房的時候就絕對不會先結婚，難道要為了公屋先結婚、生小孩等到申請到公屋才一起住嗎?

最不適應的應該就是吃的方面吧，因為我住在台灣比較久，常常會想要吃港式料理。可惜的是要找到香港味道的真的不容易，還好公司附近也有茶記、也可

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以點外送，我跟其他香港同事常常 lunch time 都會吃港式料理。但是很多在台灣的茶餐廳吃起來都不太正宗，就算是香港人開的也一樣。舉個例在我公司附近那家的咖啡真的很難喝，老闆問我的時候我曾經說過，但是他也說在台灣很難找到原材料，不然就是成本太高。至於你說連鎖的茶餐廳，通常都是藍店或者根本不像香港口味但是一堆台灣人在排隊的。

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Interview with E

Nov 2019, Face to Face Interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

香港人，總之絕對不會是中國香港人或是什麼中國人。

1.1 為何會這麼篤定呢?

我覺得自己在身分認同上其實是有一些轉變的，特別是今年的政治事件，影響是最大的。在 14 年的時候，其實我還在念中學，沒有人會很在意政治這一塊。當然在學校還是會有一些討論，我的同學也都會常常講到政治，但是大家都會保持比較中立的態度。最大的轉變其實是在今年，因為我爸爸在中國工作很長一段時間，他的立場非常親中。但是我在念大學的姐姐非常的黃，家裡出現很大的分歧。特別是我媽常常想要阻止他們吵架，就跟我姐說要忍一下、家和萬事興。但是我爸不停的用極度不理性的態度盲目支持中國跟警察，甚至還跟我姐說要尊重他所以不可以不認同他所說的話。對在香港接受香港教育的我跟我姐姐都覺得這是極度荒謬的，因為我們所學的就是 critical thinking，要判別是非黑白。

我就是從今年開始吧，去認真思考這些政治的議題，甚至參與家裡的討論。後來自己也看了一些相關的書，才真正開始覺得自己不需要將自己定義為什麼中國人或是中國香港人，因為香港人是獨一無二的。

2. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

我當初是想要讀自己喜歡的科系才會來到台灣的，因為我覺得香港的出路很少。特別是我中學時期有讀過跳舞，一直很想在劇場這一塊繼續進修。但是如果我在香港的話，就只有一個選擇，就是進去某間特定的學校就讀。也是因為這樣，我在大學畢業後也選擇繼續留在台灣就讀表演藝術研究所。

當然，其實除了我，也有很多人因為不同的原因來到台灣念書。像我的室友，她就是家裡經濟狀況比較差，來台灣的話她家裡才可以負擔她的學費讓她繼續讀大學。她大學念的是森林保育，她大學畢業後也選擇繼續留在台灣唸研究所。雖然是在屏東，但是可以繼續念她喜歡的東西。如果她回香港的話，她的出路

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就很少，甚至可能沒有辦法在相同產業工作，所以她也是選擇留在台灣。

3. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異? 或是說你有什麼不適應的嗎?

我自己覺得生活節奏是其中一個，在香港居住我覺得壓力很大，但是來到台灣是真的放鬆很多。另外一個是居住環境，我在香港的時候跟我外婆住在公屋，大家都睡在同一個用簾子隔出來的房間。在台灣可以住在更大的地方，有自己的私人空間，這點我覺得是很不同的。在香港買不起房子就算了，連公屋都沒得住，真的很難可以有自己的私人空間。

最不適應的應該是我覺得很難交朋友，我大學時期常常坐在前面，發現其他人都選擇坐在教室偏後的地方。到第二個學期我才跟部份班上同學變成朋友。

3.1 為何會連公屋都沒得住?

很多香港人都會 18 歲就申請公屋，但也每個人都知道絕對等不到，除非等爸媽 60 歲或是結婚生小孩才有可能比較快。你想想每天 150 個單程證來香港的人，多少是來霸佔我們的資源的? 外婆跟我說鄰居的老人家過世後，通常搬進來的說話都是不正的，分明就是新移民。而且最過分的是，外婆發現其中一家人一天到晚都在打麻將，一問之下才發現那家人只有一個人工作，其他人全部都是拿綜援的。結婚生小孩後很快就申請到公屋了! 老實說我真的做不出來，他們不會覺得很羞恥嗎?

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Interview with F

Dec 2019, Face to Face interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

雖然我媽是台灣人，但我在香港土生土長，當然是香港人啦!

2. 你是如何來到台灣的?

我是在幾個月前用學生簽證入境的，因為我已經超過 20 歲了，不能直接用依親入境，所以我申請了來讀 master。進來之後再申請身分證，拿到之後我就可以自由出入台灣了。我來的時候在飛機上哭到空姐也嚇到，因為我們家本來沒有打算這麼快搬來台灣，但因為今年的事件，就算我弟大學還沒畢業，我爸媽都決定一定要搬回來了。而且是連香港的房子都賣掉了，所以我跟弟弟也一定要跟著一起來…那時候我也想了很久到底是找工作還是繼續念書，但是因為對台灣的生活不熟悉，還是決定先繼續念書。

2.1 那如果你拿到身分證之後，你還是會覺得自己是香港人嗎?

這個問題問得好…的確我算是半個台灣人，拿到身分證後就更加算是台灣人了，但也不能改變我是香港人的事實。我是在香港出生的，也是在香港長大的，就算我拿著台灣的身分證，我也是香港人。

3. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異? 或是說你有什麼不適應的嗎?

我自己覺得最大的差異是一切都要重新開始，雖然說是全家一起搬來，相較之下總算是有個家，但在這邊完全沒有朋友，要重新建立自己的社交圈子。另外就是以前住的地方很近地鐵，但現在住的地方相較之下離捷運比較遠，出入會搭公車比較多。

3.1 你剛剛提到社會運動是導致你全家移民的原因，除此以外對你有其他影響嗎?

其實我以前是很典型的港豬，大學時期常常跟朋友或同學到深圳玩、吃海底撈、shopping，甚至還去上海 intern 了幾個月，也會追中國的明星。但很明顯的是 2019 後不僅是我，身邊全部的人都好像忽然很排斥中國，不再做這些行為、甚至連淘寶也不買、更 focus 香港本土政治，所以我覺得影響其實算很大。

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Interview with G

Dec 2019, Face to Face interview

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

香港人… 吧…其實我也不太確定。

2. 你認為自己是「中國香港人」嗎?

我覺得不可以否認可能有這個選項，但如果你問我的話，我還是會說自己就是香港人而已。

其實我自己本身是不太關心這些的，但我開始 intern 之後就發現其他香港同事常常都會講政治。他們都是年輕的，所以 IG 上面也常常會分享很多政治的新聞或內容。我發現如果我自己不關心的話，常常在他們說的時候我都只能和應，跟他們一起生氣，但我其實不知道發生什麼事。也因為工作內容的關係，我會開始接觸到一些香港的新聞，因此我也開始可以參與討論。但當然比起他們，我還是覺得自己算是比較中立，但至少我希望自己不要跟香港脫節。

3. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

我一開始來的時候是先讀僑先部的，那時候主要是因為 DSE 分數不夠、在香港沒有大學 offer，就選擇來到台灣念書。那一年其實跟中學準備 DSE 一樣辛苦，競爭也很大，大家都想要進更好的大學。特別是來自馬來西亞的學生，他們真的很努力念書，很多成績很好也拿到很好的 offer。我自己成績算中段，最後考上台北的私立大學就繼續留在台灣了。

3.1 請問一下為何你會選擇延畢，是因為想要繼續留在台灣嗎?

其實最大的原因是我不知道畢業後我要做什麼，因為我大學讀中文，但是我不想當老師。就想說先用英檢為原因延畢，先到處上 parttime 找一下自己將來想做什麼。另外一個原因也跟我男朋友有關，因為不想回去香港跟他分開，但我也還沒有打算立刻就要嫁給他。或許我們之後會一起搬到屏東，應該也是一兩年後的事了，但我怕無法適應不是市區的生活。

3.2 屏東? 你男朋友的家在屏東嗎?

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對，他家在部落…我給你看照片，這是他們部落的慶典，我也不知道叫什麼，但是可以穿這些傳統服飾跟跳舞。他(男朋友)是王子，所以帽子上面有很貴的羽毛，好像一條都要幾萬的。我借了他妹妹的衣服(公主服)，但像我如果嫁給他，就不能穿這個，因為我算是平民，只能穿特定的衣服。但是因為他媽媽也是平民，所以好像對我也比較親切。

4. 你覺得在香港跟在台灣生活有什麼差異? 或是說你有什麼不適應的嗎?
我個人覺得好像沒有太大差別，不過在台北的花費比我想像中高，一個月差不多會花 16000, 17000，這樣算多嗎?

4.1 除了花費以外，或者你可以說說衣食住行上有什麼差異?
可以比較早跟另一半同居算嗎? 在香港的時候我要跟兄弟姊妹 share 房間，家裡的空間也是比較小。但是搬來這邊，至少有自己的空間，在香港應該沒有辦法出去租屋自己住吧。

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Interview with H

2020/05, Phone Interview (LINE)

1. 你會如何定義自己的身分?

香港人。

2. 你是如何來到台灣的? 為何你會選擇繼續留在台灣?

其實我在中學的時候已經很不喜歡香港，我實話說我真的很討厭共產黨，所以才會想走。我是一個比較喜歡自由、慢活的人，到中五的時候有機會來到台灣 exchange，參訪了五、六間大學，那時候我就決定了自己大學的時候要來台灣念書，最後選擇了遠離城市的彰化落腳。我覺得彰化的生活很舒適、很 green、很適合我，相較之下我不太喜歡台北、新北這些大城市。

3. 你是如何申請工作證留在台灣的? 你在台灣有遇到任何的困難嗎?

說起來我申請的過程真的是很波折。評點制裡面的要求有一項是資本額，我本來其實找好了工作，對方也願意請我，但是交了申請文件上去之後才發現資本額不夠，要一千萬台幣。因為我本科是環境工程，在台灣這行很多都是年紀比較大的台灣人、會講台語的在做，不然就是各種條件都不符合評點制的要求，其他工作則是連面試邀請都沒有給我。當時其實我是很慌張的，因為從收到第一份申請不通過到畢業，沒有多少時間可以再找工作。因為我的 ultimate goal 就是留在台灣，做什麼都沒有關係，最後就毅然決定考牌進了這行。幸運的是公司很願意幫我跟政府那邊溝通申請 visa、契約的種種問題，再花了差不多三個月才成功申請到 visa。

4. 你可以大概描述一下你接觸到的香港移民有什麼特色嗎?

在我的工作上我接觸到很多香港的移民，那因為封關的關係，很多人沒有辦法來台灣親身跟我碰面。但是跟我聯繫上、預計封關後會來台灣看看的至少會有 50-60 組，比起之前是一個很大的增幅。

我自己經驗來說，最多投資移民香港人的地點會是台中、新北跟台北。移民來台灣的主要有兩個年齡層的人：一是退休移民來的，兒女都已經長大或是沒有下一代。他們通常會選擇遠離城市的地方居住，希望體驗台灣的慢活，但是他

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們需要比較多時間適應，特別是交通。舉個例子好了，很多香港人來到台中都會說等公車等很久，平常在香港可能十分鐘就到的地方，在台中要三十分鐘；另外就是 30 出頭的年輕父母，通常他們的小孩都很小，幼稚園或小學，他們是為了下一代發展移民的。他們大多會按學校跟方便程度選居住的地點，我目前接觸到的是台中或新北比較多。

老實說，移民來的人都有著比較明確的政治立場，他們全部都是黃絲。很多人都是 2014 雨傘之後開始計劃移民，到 2019 年反送中之後就立即選擇移民來台灣。很多香港人一來都會說我要買房子，但其實我都會很老實地跟他們分析每個地方的居住環境怎麼樣、叫他們先租房住幾年才決定要不要買。不是說他們沒有錢或是其他原因，而是太多人不了解台灣的生活怎麼樣，如果一來就買，最後發現當區交通或是生活環境不適合，那怎麼辦? 所以如果來找我的香港人，我都會老實跟他們說，畢竟大家都是香港人，我也是想幫忙讓他們可以順利移民來台灣。

5. 我常常看到在你的 fb 文章上都會 hashtag 黃色經濟圈，請問一下你對於在灣的黃色經濟圈有什麼看法?

我覺得在台灣的黃色經濟圈是可行的，但是需要人去做領頭羊。畢竟現在越來越多人選擇投資移民，那他們是需要開設公司的，大批的香港移民其實是會建立一個香港人的消費圈。特別是很多香港移民都會開設餐廳，但其實台灣人是不欣賞的，特別是價錢，他們會覺得很貴。所以其實台灣的黃色經濟圈可能會是香港人互相幫忙、光顧而建立起來。

6. 你認為你在台灣最不適應的是?

我自己覺得一定是交通跟食物，我大一來的時候就已經很想念香港的食物，每到 weekend 我都會找港式餐廳吃飯，到現在這麼多年還是會這樣。交通的話，在香港不論去哪裡都很方便，但來到台灣真的差距很大。那時候我住在彰化，從學校搭校車到市區要 30 分鐘，真的很誇張。後來我考了機車駕照、買了機車，方便很多。身邊的香港同學們大多也都會買機車/車子，雖然投入的錢比較多，但就是用金錢買時間吧!

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