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更自由或是更依賴探究：阿根廷與中國、印度的關係，對其於國際政治中的選擇自由之影響（2003-2015）

Towards Autonomy or A path to Dependence: Argentina relations with China and India (2003-2015)

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Advisor: Dr. Yuan I

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y mi escudo; mi corazón
en él confía; de él recibo
ayuda. Mi corazón salta
de alegría, y con cánticos
le daré gracias.

Salmo: 28:7



Abstract

The Kirchners' administration (2003-2015) attempted to try autonomy in a country that was used to peripheral realism. In order to achieve autonomy in the political and economic realm, Argentina tried to have positive interactions with China and India. The previously mentioned interactions were done bilaterally and multilaterally. While economic interactions with both India and China originally looked promising, with Argentina having immense trade surplus with both Asian countries and moving away from Western Europe and America. However, as time went by, Argentina's relationship with India and China resembled more a North-South relation, where Argentina had the role of the South. On the political ground, America's focus on the Middle East and the 2008 financial crisis as well as a partially shared agenda enabled Argentina's interactions with India and China to reshape global governance. However, Argentina's liberal values in addition to some differences in goals for the global agenda prevented a wider degree of autonomy taking place.

Key Words: Autonomy- Dependency- Reshaping global governance- North-South relations- multilateral organizations

論文大綱

基什納政權(2003-2015)企圖讓阿根廷這個曾經奉行邊陲現實主義的國家在國際政治上更自由。為了能在國際政經關係中更自由，阿根廷不斷增加與亞洲兩大強權的互動-中國與印度；這樣的互動是雙向甚至是多向的。當阿根廷與中國、印度的經貿互動越來越蓬勃，阿根廷對美國與歐洲國家的經濟依賴程度也越來越低。但隨著阿根廷對中國或印度越來越依賴，阿根廷在與這兩個國家的互動中，漸漸變成南北關係中的南方 - 我們可以從阿根廷與中國的關係中觀察到。在國際政治上，美國過度聚焦在中東情事及 2008 金融海嘯，造成阿根廷與中國、印度的互動更加頻繁，最終導致國際治理重分配。不過阿根廷堅守自由價值，再加上其對於國際現實主義的信仰，也阻止了更大程度的國際治理重分配。

關鍵字：獨立-依賴-國際治理重分配-南北關係-多邊組織



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1.0 Introduction

It can be said that the 21st Century for Argentina started in a bumpy way. The economic crash of 2001, triggered the biggest political crisis in Argentinean history. The neoliberal economic model which started in 1976 totally collapsed after 25 years. In Argentina, 2001 is remembered as the year the country nearly imploded. Just to give a quick picture, the country used to have 23 different currencies. Argentina was in default, owing more than 100.000 million US dollars to its foreign creditors. The Argentinean middle class was almost wiped out. Families had no choice but search into the rubbish for eating. The Argentinean people were wandering if they were witnessing the country's death (AFP, 2016). After continuously following the financial advice from the Washington Consensus and its economics institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and, the World Bank, which raised the importance of liberalization and the non-State intervention in the economy of the country to achieved economic growth. And yet, Argentina experienced its worst economic crisis ever. The country declared bankruptcy, its people were extremely poor, there were no positive prospects (Ozarow, Levey, & Wylde, 2016).

The political elite's fate was strongly linked to the economic performance of the country. It should not be a surprise that when the crisis took place, the political elite faced harsh criticism. Not only, the Argentinian people lost their fate in their leaders, the political elite also was unable to rule the country. When the country had five presidents in eleven days, it was clear how bad the situation was (Ozarow, Levey, & Wylde, 2016).

From 1989 onwards Argentina was clearly aligned with the United States of America (U.S.A) as it needed American support in financial organizations like the IMF or the World Bank (Simonoff, 2009). Argentina started to review its relation with the U.S.A when George Bush Jr. became the country's president, at least partially. This was due to the fact that George Bush's ideas of how underdeveloped countries should pay their debt were not good for Argentina. In addition, as a consequence of George W. Bush Jr. policy of War on Terror and its focus on the Middle East, Argentina found itself in a completely different situation from the 1990s (Simonoff, 2009).

The effects of the economic collapse of 2001 were terrible. Not only the economy and the image of politicians were harmed, the country itself was also extremely weak in the

international arena (Simonoff, 2009). In this grim context, in 2003 to be more precise, Nestor Kirchner was elected President of Argentina. Facing the challenges that laid ahead, Nestor Kirchner applied a completely different strategy to its predecessors. The political-economic rationale of the country was going to be changed. That change was going to be made by applying Juan Carlos Puig autonomy theory, which was the complete opposite of what was done in the 1990s. In short, Puig's theory will allow Argentina to pursue its national interests by working together with other non-hegemonic actors thus having a wider degree of options in the international arena (Puig, 1986).

According to Nestor Kirchner's thought¹, the country was going to stand up again by applying a heterodox approach. On the political realm, this meant looking for new partners, using multilateralism as a tool to achieve a stronger position in the international arena. Multilateralism, would help Argentina's claim for Malvinas (Falklands) Islands. Originally, Latin America was the new partners Kirchner meant (Di Tella, 2003), but it later included countries like China, and to a lesser extent India.

On the economic realm, it looked for new partners too. In addition, Argentinean exports diversification was pursued (Di Tella, 2003). Nestor Kirchner attempted to create an economy that was not only based on selling agriculture products, industrial products had to be exported too.

1.1 Rationale of Study

Having briefly explained in the previous section Kirchners' administration goals, I will proceed to explain why did I choose to study Argentina's relation with India and China. In the narrative of Autonomy, America has an important role. In Puig's though Argentina should endorse America as the global hegemon but still keep in mind Argentina's own strategical goals. In order to achieve Argentina's national goals, disagreeing with America's proposals is a possibility (Puig, 1986).

For the autonomy theory, Argentina should work together with other non-hegemonic countries that also wish to transform the global governance. Both India and China desired to change its global position, they seek to have a bigger saying in decision making in the

¹ Which would be continued by his wife, Cristina Kirchner, during her two terms as President of Argentina

international arena. Therefore, it can be said that both India and China seek autonomy. Since China and India want to have a bigger degree of autonomy Argentina should work with them. As both Asian powers are essential for Argentina to achieve its national interest.

The autonomy theory takes into consideration the structure of global trade. The structure of global trade is divided between the center, the industrialized countries that have the wealth, and the periphery the poor countries that export raw materials. According to the autonomy theory, if peripheral countries work together this structure could be changed. India and China were extremely important for Argentina's trade. In the 1980s Argentina-China exchange was 0.5 Billion US dollars (Zhao, 2012), while in 2014 was 15 Billion US dollars (Girado & Burgos, 2015), China has become the second largest partner of Argentina, being the destination of 8% of Argentina's exports (Salvador, 2017). The downside of this economic relation with China, is Argentina's trade deficit with the Asian giant from 2008 onwards which is 5.5 Billion US dollars a year (Girado & Burgos, 2015). In the Indian case, starting in 2003 the bilateral trade was around 600 Million US dollars, by 2012 was around 1.8 Billion US dollars. More importantly, Argentina has been experiencing a trade surplus with India (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014), which helps to mitigate the Chinese trade deficit. After explaining the importance of Indonesia, India and China for the Kirchners' administration economic goals, I can proceed to why these countries matter for the political goals. The three selected countries have a desire of reshaping the current world order², for achieving what was previously mentioned multilateralism plays a big role.

1.2 Research Motivation

Having as one of my research interests' Asian international relations, I chose a topic that can link my academic studies with my homeland. Being a young scholar who is living in Asia, I think that my work can help to create a better understanding between Argentina and Asia. I believe that as an Argentinian studying in Taiwan, I should contribute to the foreign policy scholarship of my country from the Asian perspective.

² Each country has a different way of doing it.

Even though Argentinean scholars have analyzed Argentina's bilateral relation with China and to a lesser extent with India, their researches had other purposes. Most of the papers I have analyzed are based on the economic aspect of these relations and less frequently on the political aspect of it. However, the idea of analyzing these relations as a way to determine if Argentina was trying to construct an a more autonomous position has not been done. Therefore, my thesis can fill this void.

I am also interested in doing this research, as Argentina's top political and international analysts have said that Argentina was an isolated country. To be more precise, according to these writers, Argentina was an isolated country that only focused in its domestic affairs, while neglecting or even ignoring the international arena (De la Balze, 2010)

Finally, it is not a coincidence that I choose to do this thesis now. Since in October 2019 Argentina had presidential elections. The results of the election made Cristina Kirchner the vice-president, the Kirchners' party came back to power. Because of the election results, my analysis can be useful for understanding Argentina's future relations with China and India. In addition, international relations specialist can have some clues on what to expect on Argentina's foreign policy. Scholars will not be the only ones that benefits from this research. The public and private sectors from Asia can have a better idea of what Argentina wants when it deals with Asian counterparts.

1.3 Thesis goal and Research Questions

This thesis aims to describe the Kirchners' foreign policy main goals. In this thesis I will explain why did the Kirchners' followed the autonomy theory guidelines in order to achieve their administration target. The Kirchners' administration goal was to pursue national interest, through the theory of autonomy they tried to do this. Though it may be surprising for the reader, Argentina's foreign policy was not always guided by national interest, rather it was made to meet the recommendations made by America. In chapter 4 I will explain this with detail.

I believe that the Kirchners' administration tried to have a good relation with both China and India to achieve autonomy. The reason behind this thinking is that both China and India were able to provide an alternative from both Western Europe and America.

Economically speaking, China and India provided an immense market for Argentinean goods. In Argentina's view, both Asian powers were powerful actors for attempting to construct autonomy. Therefore, it makes sense that the Kirchners' administration tried to be in good terms with both China and India.

Research Questions

- 1- Did China and India provide an alternative for Argentina's diversification strategy?
- 2- Were China and India useful for Argentina in its autonomy attempt?
- 3- Could China and India be considered partners for Argentina's autonomy during the whole examined period?

1.4 Methodology

For this research, I will use the comparative method designed by Arend Lijphart (Lijphart, 1971). I will compare the political and economic interactions between Argentina and China and Argentina and India. After carefully comparing them, I will be able to tell how useful or not they were for Argentina's autonomy attempt.

Lijphart's method suits my research as I have a small number of cases (Argentina-India relations and Argentina-China relations) which I am unable to expand. This is because no other Asian regional power had a similar political economical interaction as both India and China did. Japan cannot be included since it was active through all the 20th Century in Argentina, but from the first years of the 21st Century, Japan has kept infrequent interactions with Argentina. Korea had some interactions but quite limited, and only in the realm of the economy. Finally, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations(ASEAN) countries like Indonesia had a greater degree of interaction since the 21st Century but since they are not regional powers as China and India are, I do not think that they are appropriate for this research. Though in the mid-term future Indonesia might become a regional player.

Both India and China share a great number of similarities in their relation with Argentina, though that's not to say they are the same. Before the 21st Century both Asian countries were irrelevant for Argentina. However, since the beginning of the 21st Century, both

India and China become increasingly important in economic and political terms. The two Asian powers absorbed a large number of Argentinean agricultural products, while Argentina's traditional partners like the USA or Western European countries decreased the purchases of Argentinean goods. However, as time went by India and China have different reaction to Argentinean economy policies. In addition, India's way of doing investment it was different from China's way as well as smaller.

On the political realm, both India and China endorsed some of Argentina's moves in the international arena. Nevertheless, the bilateral relations between Argentina and China took a different turn from the ones between Argentina and India. While the former relation started originally as a South-South relation, it developed into a North-South relation. While the latter one, did not have same the level of engagement that Argentina China relation has, it is still a South-South relation for now.

Autonomy: this concept is expressed in two ways, economic sense and political sense.

Economic autonomy: it has two parts. Firstly, diversify the international trade from the hegemon and its allies (USA and Western Europe). Secondly, allow the country that is pursuing its autonomy to "escape" the raw materials curse and have a more diversified trade relation.

Political autonomy: while not antagonizing in strategic matters with the hegemon, the country that is pursuing autonomy can have a bigger influence in global affairs by working with other non-hegemonic countries.

How to measure autonomy? By analyzing trade flows, we can know the answer. Regarding the political aspect, it is necessary to analyze Argentina's attempts for reforming the international arena in organizations like the G-20, G-77, UN, WTO and the CELAC and see the reaction of China and India to Argentina's moves. If India and China supported it, they helped Argentina in its path towards autonomy. Finally, it is also important to analyze the bilateral relation and see if there a joint position for attempting to reform the global governance.

1.5 Data Sources

In order to get data for this qualitative research, I will use a wide range of sources, reports provided by the I.M.F, the World Bank and the National Institute of Statistics of Argentina (I.N.D.E.C). Further data includes, Argentinian agreements or joint statements in international forums with the targeted countries. Because Argentina does not publish white papers on foreign paper, I will pay particular attention to interviews conducted to the Kirchners' administration top officials for instance, the one done by Di Tella to President Nestor Kirchner (Di Tella, 2003) or the chapter published by former Minister of Foreign Affairs Taiana (Taina, 2006) among others. In addition, I will use the statements made by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

For the economic aspect, I will use data provided by official institutions, WTO, and IMF. I will also incorporate previous studies conducted by other scholars such as Rubiolo, Laufer and Oviedo, just to mention some. To robust the qualitative data of my study, I will interview Argentinian scholars, such as Ezequiel Ramoneda. I will use the previously mentioned authors works because they are experts in the field. To be more precise they are the most well know scholars in Argentina in Argentina-Asia relations. I will try to allocate some funds for travelling to the Argentinian embassies on India in order to conducts interviews there. I will not go to the Argentinean embassy in China, as the current director of the Argentinean Office in Taipei was the former Argentinean Consul in Shanghai. He accepted to be interviewed for this topic.

1.6 Limitations of the study

This research presents some limitations. Firstly, if a country wants to achieve its strategic goal needs to keep them as such for a long time. Sadly, it is quite hard to do this in a democracy. A direct consequence of having Presidential elections every four years, is that the leadership of the government might change. Therefore, what was strategic for one administration, might not be strategic for the following one. In addition, the means of achieving the strategic goals can be changed, so having a continuous policy can be harder than expected.

I will illustrate what I have said before with some examples of Present-day Argentina. The President that came after Cristina Kirchner is Mauricio Macri. Macri's foreign policy was totally opposite to the one carried on by the Kirchners. Rather than attempting

autonomy, Macri followed the peripheral realism thought, therefore eroding the Kirchners' accomplishments.

The current political landscape in Latin America prevents any serious attempt to try autonomy. The political chaos that many Latin American countries suffer like Chile or Venezuela makes the region weaker. In addition, the constant sabotage to regional forums like CELAC makes it impossible for autonomy to prosper.

Only when the political elites of a peripheral country realize that their country is dependent, a heterodox autonomy project can be attempted. Nestor and Cristina Kirchner realized Argentina dependency, after realizing this they tried to create an autonomous Argentina. However, if the political elites of a peripheral country do not realize its dependency, the idea of autonomy is impossible. What is more, the construction of autonomy takes time, it has to be an ongoing process for a long time. Going back to the Argentinean case, Macri's administration went closer with the U.S.A. This in practice meant that the autonomy project was not a priority anymore.

Though it would be interesting to include Macri's term in this research, due to time constrains I will not be able to do so. Nevertheless, in future researches I will try to make a comparison between Macri's administration and the Kirchners' one.

2.0 Literature Review

The topic that I am covering, Argentina relations with India and China during the Kirchners' times is quite a controversial one. Bibliography is sharply split between Argentina/ Latin American authors and Chinese and Indian authors. Americans and Europeans writers also showed concern, though at a lesser degree than Argentineans, for the way that Argentina-China and Argentina-India relations are going. The sharp contrast in the analysis is not divided by nationality, but also between right-wing and left-wing academics. Right-wing academics tend to have a serious doubt about China's policy to Argentina, while left-wing academics tend to see China as an effective actor against American hegemony. Regarding the Kirchners' government itself, most of the academics label it as a left-wing government that tried to build autonomy. However, some authors disagree.

2.1 Categorizing the foreign policy of the Kirchners' administrations

As I just mentioned before, there is almost a consensus among Argentinean scholars to label the Kirchners' government as a government that sought autonomy. Mainstream Argentinean scholars think that the Kirchners' followed an autonomy foreign policy. Though the writers of this way of thinking use different terms. For scholars like Sandra Colombo, the Kirchners' governments followed a policy of non-automatic bandwagon, while using Argentina's foreign policy as a way of pursuing Argentina's economic interests. The multilateral organizations are an important element of this plan, East Asian countries also played a relevant role for the Kirchners (Colombo, 2005). Other authors like Alejandro Simonoff, mentioned that Argentina left its "special relation with America³" in order to have an autonomy oriented policy while working with a wide range of countries (Simonoff, 2009). Anabella Busso states that both Nestor and Cristina Kirchner had a autonomy oriented foreign policy, but Nestor Kirchner's one was more successful because he had a better international environment (Busso, 2015). Writers like

³ The special relation that Argentina had with the USA went from 1989 to 2001. Basically, it meant for Argentina complete subordination to American interests.

Miranda added that while Kirchners' administrations attempted to have a wider range of possibilities in the international arena, that's to say to have autonomy, they failed (Miranda, 2007).

As it can be seen there is almost a consensus between Argentinean scholars about labelling the Kirchners' administration as autonomy oriented administration, though there are two exceptions. First one is Felipe de La Balze who labels the Kirchners' administrations as far-left isolationist administrations, that brought tensions between Argentina and its neighboring countries as well as the USA (De la Balze, 2010). The other exception is Carlos Escudé, for this writer the Kirchners' administrations applied a soft peripheral realism, rather than attempting autonomy (Noticias, 2010). This minority way of thinking has some serious flaws. Firstly, the authors of this way of thinking mix their political values with the research they are doing. Because they support a more conservative way of doing politics they tend to have a bad view of more progressive governments. Secondly, they tend to think that the Argentinean past of being close to the British Empire was the most prosperous times for Argentina. So, in their own view, any kind of policy that is not being close to the hegemon is bad.

2.2 Argentina-China relations

The relation between Argentina and China is far more controversial with the literature fairly split. While the majority of Chinese writers tend to see the relation between Argentina and China highly positive, the Argentinean and Hispanic writers usually tend to be at least worried. There are some exceptions as some Chinese writers do not share the mainstream view in China and some Argentinean writers do not share the majority's view in Argentina. Finally, Americans and European scholars have diverse views on the topic. There are three different ways of analysing the Argentina-China relation.

The first way of thinking is the analysis made by mainstream Chinese scholarship. Chinese scholar Sun Hongbo, sees the relation of Argentina and China as a complementary one. China provides the investment and trade that the region is needing, Latin America provides the raw materials China needs. However, he states that sometimes the lack of communication has generated distrust between the parties, in his view this issue has to be solved for a better relation (Sun, 2016). Other Chinese writers

like Xiang Lanxin, stated that Argentina as well as Latin America are a central actor for Chinese geopolitical strategy as Latin American countries can aid China in reforming global governance rules. In his own view China's geopolitical moves in Latin America will not affect the Asian country economic goals in the region (Xiang, 2016). Xiang's opinion is also shared by Niu, who believes that from the beginning of the 21st Century Latin America has become a geostrategic priority for China. A proof of this, its Xi Jinping and Li Keqiang visits to the region as well as China's endorsement of CELAC (Niu, 2017). Zhao Zhongxiu states that the economic relations between Argentina and China are complementary. In addition, he adds that China's investment can be a blessing for Argentina. Finally, he imagined Argentina-China as a win-win relation, though he noted that the parties had to solved its trade disputes (Zhao Zhong, 2012). The worriedness for the imbalanced trade relation is also shared by Zhao Xue-mei, who thinks that they are a big obstacle. But Zhao adds that if the imbalanced is removed, Argentina-China relations can become a win-win one (Zhao, 2012). Writers like Zhang Ziyang, go as far as stating that despite the economic challenges that China presents to Latin America, the relation has far more opportunities than threats. Eventually, China-Latin America relations will have an immense impact on the international order (Sun & Zhang, 2016). Academics like Cui Shoujun have a similar view from the previous writers and see that China has become a central player for Latin America with a possibility of reshaping geopolitical significance in Latin America (Cui, 2016).

The Chinese mainstream vision has some support from a small number of Argentinean scholars. Conservative Argentinean scholar Carlos Escude, thinks that the relation with China might help Argentina get out of its "outcast" position in the international order. This may happen, as long as Argentina keeps a cordial relation with China. As in Escude thought China represents the new hegemon that Argentina should endorsed. Though he mentions that Argentina relation is complementary in economic terms, he adds that Argentina must find a way to reach industrial integration with China (Escude, 2016). In a similar line, Felipe de la Balze, states that China is a blessing for Argentina. According to him, the relations between China and Argentina look like the British Empire ones and Argentina in the 19th Century. This, was positive for Argentina as it meant development.

De la Balze, believes that China will also mean prosperity, as long as Argentina endorse it as the hegemon (De la Balze, 2011).

This first way of thinking tends to be openly pro-China, finding no flaws in Chinese behaviour in Argentina and constantly repeating that China be a key partner for Argentina's development. It is surprising that these writers do not evaluate the trade between Argentina and China which shows a different reality. Moreover, it is intriguing why do these writers do not analyse the investment agreements between Argentina and China, specially those that were signed after 2011. Should they take those factors into consideration they analysis will be different.

The second way of analysis the Argentina-China relation is the mainstream Argentina/Latin America view. The regional view from Argentina and Latin America differs greatly from the Chinese one. With a few exceptions, most Argentinean scholars reject the idea that Argentina is relevant to Chinese international strategy. Moreover, some scholars understand that Argentina has become dependent on China. The Argentinean scholar Raul Bernal- Meza denies the idea that Argentina/Latin American relations with China are based on win-win, rather they are North-South relations by which Latin American countries become dependent on China. He furthers adds that China only is interested in acquiring Latin American raw materials (Bernal-Meza, 2016). Argentinean writers like Beckerman and Moncaut highlight the threat that China might be in the long run for Latin American economies. As interactions between the previously mentioned countries only offer benefits on the short term, but on the long term these interactions will mean large trade deficits, heavy dependency on raw materials and vulnerability for the Latin American side (Beckerman & Moncaut, 2016). Argentina's leading expert on China, Eduardo Oviedo, agrees with the previous authors and in his view, Argentina is following a centre-periphery model by which Argentina becomes more dependent on Chinese investment and trade while having a bigger trade deficit. At the same time, the political asymmetry between the two countries enlarges (Oviedo, 2016). Other academics like Nacht, highlight the fragile position in which Argentina is regarding its relation with China. Argentina's overreliance in soybean not only affects the country food security it also leaves it weak vis a vis China, as if something happens to the

soybeans harvest Argentina cannot do much about it. Argentina-China relation is a North-South one, by which China is the north exporting industrial goods and capital and Argentina is in the South by exporting raw materials (Nacht, 2012). Writers like Laufer, also share the previously mentioned concern, stating that economic interaction with China is not conducive for Argentina's economic development, at most it helps Argentina diversifying its trade partners (Laufer, 2013). Turzi adds that Chinese demand for food, added to Argentina's good condition for producing cheap soybeans might push the country into being a low value food producer. The challenge is to invest the money that Argentina gets for its soybeans in a way that it helps economic development of the country (Turzi, 2016). It is also good to add the view that the Argentinean scholar Ezequiel Ramoneda has on Argentina-China relations. In his view, Argentina-China relation has mutated from being highly positive for Argentina in economic and political terms to becoming a new hegemon for Argentina. The consequences of this are Argentina's dependency on China (Ramoneda, 2019).

In addition, some Chinese writers shared some points of this view. Scholars like He Li, reject the idea of Latin America being a priority for China's diplomacy. In his own thought, China has mainly an economic interest in Latin America. He also rejects the idea that China presence means a win-win for Latin America, though that's not to say China's economic interaction is something bad for the Latin American countries (Li, 2017). Other scholars like Yanran Xu, also point out the difficulties that the Sino-Argentinean relation has. Trade disputes, unequal trade structure make the relation shake despite the existence of a strategic partnership between Argentina and China (Xu, 2017). I believe that this second way of thinking is the more balanced one, as it takes political and economic factors before giving its final judgement.

Finally, the last way of analysing Argentina-China relations is the one given by American and European scholars. European scholars tend to have a more split vision. Scholars like Butt Philip see the current China-Latin America relation as a revival of the old colonial times, when Latin American countries (under Spanish colonial domain) export silver and gold to China in exchange of industrial goods. Today, Latin America exports a wider range of raw materials but it keeps importing China's industrial goods (Butt Philip &

Fornes, 2013). One of America's leading experts on China-Latin American relations, Kevin Gallagher, thinks that during the commodity boom of the first years of the 21st Century, China demands for commodities caused a boom for Latin American countries. However, Latin American countries did not manage that income properly. Now that commodities prices have fallen, Chinese engagement with Latin America might cause deindustrialization, job losses and commodity dependent economies (Gallagher & Ray, 2016). This way of analysing is well balanced and does a good job at pointing out how is the current situation between Argentina and China while remaining unbiased. In addition, rather than trying to determinate who is to blame, this way of thinking tries to solve the challenges that the Argentina-China relation has.

2.3 Argentina-India relations

Relations between Argentina and India is not a trendy topic for most scholars. The few Argentinean writers that cover Argentina-India relations focus on India's joint work with Argentinean in the international arena, specially the G-20, UN and WTO, as well as covering the economic relationship. Regarding the last point, even though that Argentina has enjoyed a trade surplus with India for a long time, Argentinean scholars suggests that this might not be the case forever. In other words, Argentinean researchers are worried about the Argentinean Indian relations, as it might follow the China-Argentina model. The few Indian scholars that cover the relation between India and Argentina tend to point out two things: A- That Argentina has not supported India's attempt to access the Security Council; B- That concerns that Argentineans scholars have about the economic relation is exaggerated, in other words in their own vision India is an economic opportunity for Argentina, not a threat.

The first way of thinking expressed by Argentinean scholars is confident that the Argentina-India relation has good prospects on the political side, but at the same time they are sceptical of the economic side. Argentinean writer Cardozo says that India's economic engagement with Argentina has meant an immense trade surplus for Argentina as well as fresh investment. Nevertheless, he also states that it is important for Argentina to find a smart way of engaging with India, implying that otherwise Argentina might become overdependent on its raw materials (Cardozo, 2012). Other scholars, like Rubiolo

have the same doubts about Argentina-India relations. Despite Argentina's trade surplus with India, trade with India follows the trade pattern Argentina has with other Asian countries dependence on soybeans, which could be bad for the future. Nevertheless, Rubiolo also highlights the importance of India for Argentina in multilateral negotiations in the WTO or the UN (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014). According to some other Argentinean authors like Zalba, Argentina's economic engagement with India is a consequence of Argentina's trade partner diversification. However, this diversification is incomplete as Argentina concentrates its offers around soybeans, sunflower and wheat. Zalba agrees with Rubiolo regarding India's importance for Argentina's autonomy plans (Zalba, 2014). The unequal trade structure between Argentina and India has been a constant issue for Argentinean scholars, as Baez pointed out. Argentina overreliance on exports based on primary goods is something to worry about, especially when India has a more diversified export offer to Argentina (Baez, 2005). Other Argentinean writers like Rodriguez de la Vega, tried to see the economic relation in a more optimistic way by focusing on the investments India has made in Argentina as well as saying that the economic relation has a room for keep growing. She makes special emphasis on the importance that India has for Argentina foreign goals in multilateral forums (Rodriguez de la Vega & Massot, 2015). The previously mentioned point is also shared by Mendoza and Muda who see the great similarities in the Indian and Argentinean foreign policy agenda, especially in the G-20 and the WTO (Mendoza & Muda, 2008). This way of thinking does a really good job at balancing the political benefits that India can bring to Argentina, but at the same time it explains the economical threats that India might have as well.

There is an intermediate way of thinking that while acknowledges that India can become a new China for Argentina, at the same time it is Argentina's duty to change this. The Chilean scholar, Heine, highlights that despite India's trade with South America is smaller than the one China has, India offers interesting opportunities for South America. That's because India could be the market in which South American countries upgrade their exports and sell top quality food rather than just raw materials. Also, India's investment in the region is guided to services or manufacturing which means jobs for South Americans, where the Chinese is guided to mining or farming (creating few unskilled jobs) (Heine, 2012). Other South American writers are not so optimistic about

the future of India-South America relations. Mesquita Moreira argues that the tariffs that both India and South America applies are so high that they are a big obstacle for increasing trade. Regarding services, India's advantage leaves South America in a bad spot. Finally, even though India has not started its industrialization process, it has many conditions for doing it. In the event that this happens, South American countries will have a hard time responding to it (Mesquita Moreira, 2011). These scholars try to make Argentina as well as other Latin American countries realize that they have to change their international trade structure.

On the other hand, Indian scholars offer a different analysis to the Argentinean-Indian relations. Indian writers tend to dismiss Argentinean concerns. Indian scholar and ambassador to Argentina Viswanathan, states that India does not only export manufactures and services, but that a big part of its exports to Argentina are raw materials for making clothes. He agrees with the Argentinean vision that India and Argentina share a common international agenda (Viswanathan, 2008). Tharoor agrees with Viswanathan's views, he adds that South American countries have a chance in India for upgrading their exports composition, though food will always be important (Tharoor, 2012). Other Indian authors like Bhojwani emphasize the joint work between India and Latin America in multilateral forums like the G-20. In addition, he adds, the importance of the increasingly bigger trade relation between India and Latin America (Bhojwani, 2013). The Indian writer Shidore, points out that while Argentina and the MERCOSUR are important for India's desire to reshape global governance, at the same time Argentina opposes India's attempt to become a permanent in the Security Council. He also highlights that despite that India has a trade deficit with Argentina, the trade relation is inter-industrial, India sells manufacture and Argentina sells raw materials. This in turn leaves India in a better position for the future (Shidore, 2013). Seshasayee believes that originally the India-Latin America approach was a consequence of economic factor, an economic factor that is beneficial for Latin America. However, as time went by both India and some Latin American countries realized that they shared some common goals, so joint work in multilateral forums started to happen (Heine & Hari, 2016). What Indian scholars fail to include in their economical analysis is that India is becoming a more relevant exporter of high-tech goods, while Argentina only exports raw materials. The previously mentioned

situation paved the way for a new North-South relation despite the claims made by Indian writers.



3.0 The tale of two narratives: Anti-Americanism and Autonomy

I believe that before covering the Kirchners' foreign policy it is important to explain by which foreign policy they were inspired, which is autonomy. At the same time, it is necessary to make a distinction between Autonomy and Anti-Americanism, as sometimes autonomy has been described as a synonym of Anti-Americanism.

In Consequence, the aim of this chapter will be to explain what is autonomy and what is Anti-Americanism. The latter one is a story well known in Latin American. Going back in time to the 19th Century it is possible to identify the first notions of Anti-Americanism. The American-Mexican War, the Monroe Doctrine, the Spanish-American war among many other events evoke negative thoughts on the Latin American People. With the begging of the 20th Century the negative feelings that the Latin American people increased rapidly. When America became the global hegemon after World Ward 2, Latin America was a witness to the hardships of sharing the continent with the global hegemon. Interventions across Latin American countries, the Cuba issue, America's support for iron fist dictators in the region were just some of the events that Latin American people had to endured.

The 21st Century reinforced the mindset created by the events of the 19th and 20th Century. Iraq and Afghanistan Wars made the United States looked like the World Police. On the other hand, a wave of left-wing governments in Latin American seemed to bring hope of changes trying to establish a relationship with American based on equality.

So far, I named some of the reasons that created a very strong historic memory on the Latin American People. A historic memory based on suffering and inequality with its big neighbor, the United States. This historic memory generated a sense of distrust and rejection to the America and its policies. But what is Anti-Americanism?

3.1 Anti-Americanism

The question that I asked in the last paragraph has more than one answer. The answer depends greatly on the view of each scholar. However, in this thesis I will take the definition given by Keohane and Katzenstein. As for a first concept of what Anti-Americanism is I follow this idea: “*a physiological tendency to hold negative views of the United States and of American society in general*” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). This concept of Anti-Americanism is based on ideas, though, prejudices that a certain group of people at a certain time have. This phenomenon has an emotional component, the anger, the negative feelings towards America, its society and its values. Also, it sometimes can correspond with a way of creating an identity. For example, in North Korea the idea of Anti-Americanism is part of the North-Korean identity. The concept of Anti-Americanism has its roots in feelings, ideas and concepts (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). Nevertheless, Anti-Americanism is a contradictory feeling. While people dislike things about American and its society, ultra-capitalism, its attitude towards the poor, among others. At the same time, that same people like American pop-culture, or is interested in American science. An extremely small number of people dislike everything about America and its society, what Keohane and Katzenstein called “Radical Anti-Americanist” (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007).

Anti-Americanism can be measured too by using polls. The Pew Research Center conducted a poll in 2002 regarding attitudes towards America (Pew Research Center, 2002). In this poll, the contradictory feelings for America can be seen clearly. On the one hand, people like certain things of the USA like its culture. On the other hand, the same people dislike the influence of the USA in its own country (Pew Research Center, 2002). The problem with Anti-Americanism is that it can create a bias in addition to a general distrust feeling of anything that comes from America. In the political aspect, this can be dangerous for the American government, as its policies could be doomed to fail from the beginning. Joseph Nye makes an interesting argument in this regard, he believes that Anti-Americanism can hurt America’s soft power. That’s the ability that America has to attract other by its values and policies (Nye, 2004). He stressed that Anti-Americanism is linked to the reduction of America’s soft power. Should this continue on the long run, American foreign policies could be less effective (Nye, 2004). Nye established a relation between Iraq War, Anti-Americanism and the serious decline of the American soft power.

He stated that despite that American culture was immensely popular in the countries that were having Anti-American views, the attraction of America and its values decreased (Nye, 2004b).

Nye reflections on Iraq war Consequences bring us to the next point, what does it cause Anti-Americanism. A global poll done by Pew Research Center in 2003 brought interesting conclusions. It was discovered that rather than disliking America itself, Anti-Americanism was related to concrete issues. Just to name some America's global economic ideas which increased wealth gap, President Bush Jr, or support for Israel were among the reasons to blame (Pew Research Center, 2003). Moreover, the same report warned that the Anti-American feeling of 2003 was going to get worse due to America's hawkish policies. In the case of Latin America other reasons could be added too. According to Yudice, the continuous interventions in Latin America done by the USA, the feeling of humiliation that these interventions produced on the Latinos created a bound between the Latin American people. This bound was a reaction to what Yudice called American arrogance attitude when dealing with the region. The same author continues by saying that the Latin American people distrusts and rejects what comes from America (Yudice, 2004).

Coming back Keohane and Katzenstein Anti-Americanism, it is worth to mention that the writers divided Anti-Americanism in four categories. Though they mentioned each category is not enough to explain the Anti-Americanism phenomenon (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007).

The first type of anti-Americanism is the liberal one, though it might look like contradictory as America is home to the liberal ideas, liberals view is different. Liberals critics that America's hypocrisy, for instance despite being a democracy America supports dictators or despite being a free market it subsidizes its agricultural sector.

The second type is the social anti-Americanism. This type of anti-Americanism is concerned with America's lack of support to the poor, its policies that only increases the wealth gap. Social anti-Americanism is opposed to America lack of sympathy.

The third type is the Sovereign-Nationalist Anti-Americanist. In this case, the opposition to America and its values arises when the sovereignty of a country or its identity is threatened by America's project. For this category, sovereignty and national identity are extremely important, these values can be in danger with America's policies.

The last type, is the radical Anti-Americanism. This group rejects and hates everything that is related to America, in addition to rejecting America's policies. For this group America's actions and values are contrary to what is better for the world. The Soviet Union was the classical example of this view.

If Anti-Americanism is found in a society, does that determinates that the leadership of that country will take into account its people's opinion. In the event that the country is a dictatorship, the answer is clearly no. Now, if the country is a democracy the situation is different. It is almost obvious that when a country does its foreign policy it takes into account its strategic interests, which could be different from the people's voice. Nevertheless, if Anti-Americanism is strongly present in a society for a long time it may influence the decisions of the policy-makers. As Nye already said, Anti-Americanism weakens America's soft power. Katzenstein and Keohane gave examples of how Anti-Americanism played a role when Turkey refused to let American troops attack Iraq from its soil. Or how did Anti-Americanism play a role in the Iraq related diplomacy when America was defeated in the Council of Security of the United Nations (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007b)

To sum up, Anti-Americanism, this attitude of bias and rejection of the United States and its society which can be embed in a certain group of people in a certain country affects America. It diminishes the effectiveness of its Soft Power, its influence and the power of attraction by its values and its culture. If Anti-Americanism persists for a long time with a strong influence it can influence the decision-making process of a country.

3.2 Autonomy Theory

Juan Carlos Puig's autonomy theory has the advantage that it can be applied to Latin American cases while taking into consideration their circumstances of economic and political weaknesses. In addition to Puig works, I will use theoretical developments made

by scholars who continued his work, like Alejandro Simonoff, Dallanegra or Bernal Meza.

In order to understand the autonomy theory, it is first required to understand the dependency theory. Raul Prebisch, an Argentinean scholar, was the father of the dependency theory. His theory was a counter-argument to the idea of Free market. In Prebisch view, the economic structure of the world was divided between the center and the periphery. The center, represented by the industrialized countries, exported manufactured goods as they have the know-how to produce manufactures. On the other hand, the periphery lacked the know-how, being forced to export raw materials. This unequal economic structure produced sharp contrast on the living standards of the center and the periphery. In order to change the global economic structure, the State of the peripheral countries have to be involved in the economic transformation of the domestic economy. By importing capital goods and getting the know-how, the State could generate an industrialization process (Pérez Caldentey, Sunkel, & Torres Olivos, 2012).

Juan Carlos Puig agreed with Prebisch on the existence of an unequal global economic structure. But rather than relying only on the State role as a provider of know-how and as a importer of capital goods, he had a different conception. Puig understood that the State also had to take strategic decisions on the international politics for changing this structure. Moreover, he criticized that the dependency theory was used for maintaining the status quo. Puig stated that instead of trying to change the situation of underdevelopment, scholars and people in Latin America were resigned, as they thought that they were poor because a global economic structure that could not be changed. In his own words the dependency theory was reassuring for many Latin American as they accepted their fate of underdevelopment, an underdevelopment that came from outside (Puig, 1986).

At a first glimpse, the autonomy theory is meant to give more options to the peripheral country. Autonomy gives the peripheral country the possibility to make its own political and economic choices. This does not mean that the choices taken by the peripheral country are going to be the right ones. But being able to make choices different from the ones that the hegemon impose is usually good. As usually, the hegemon will provide a set

of choices that only consolidate its power (Puig, 1986). In other words, Puig's theory tries to be a mean of pursuing national interest, something that sometimes it could go against the hegemon wishes.

Puig perceived the world according to the tasks that people perform, dividing them in three different groups of people. Firstly, the ones that deliver power (supreme dealers), who are represented by the rulers of the world powers who create and give commands. Secondly, those who make sure that those commands are implemented (low rank dealers), who are represented by the rulers of all the countries that are no powers. Finally, those who obey (recipients), who are represented by the rest of the world population (Simonoff, 2016). Another aspect this theory claims is that the international order is set by: having or not having weapons of mass destruction, the relative prohibition to use force, impermeability of the block⁴ and the degree of autonomy within the block. Essentially, the first element provides an order to the international system, those countries who have access to nuclear weapons are those who make decisions⁵ with global consequences. Autonomy within the block means that dynamics inside a block would not be influenced from outside. The last element is the capacity that a minor partner of the block has for perusing its own foreign policy while considering the restriction of the block (Simonoff, 2016). Following the above rationale two ideas emerge: the idea of anarchy, where there is no hegemon in the international system, and the idea of flexibility, in which countries can find some ways to pursue their national interests (Simonoff, 2016). Peripheral States can pursue their national goals when despite to be contrary to the hegemon wishes they are not a threat to the hegemon, or its main interests. Working with other peripheral States it is a good choice.

There are four stages in which a peripheral state can be found: 1) the colonial dependence, the peripheral state is formally an independent state, but in reality, its rulers blindly follow the hegemon commands as if they were the same unity. 2) National dependence,

⁴ This theory was originally designed during the cold war. The author defines blocks in term of economic and political ideologies. When he is talking about blocks, he means the capitalist blocks led by the U.S. and the socialist block led by the former Soviet Union.

⁵By the time the theory was written North Korea did not have access to nuclear weapons. The case of Israel is a particular one because even though there is some evidence that might confirm the existence of nuclear weapons the confirmation of its nuclear arsenal is unsettled. India and Pakistan did not have them either at that time.

where the elite of the peripheral state realizes its dependence with the hegemon State, and the peripheral State starts thinking a possible way of changing this situation in the future.

3) The heterodox autonomy, where the ruling class of the peripheral state acknowledges that the hegemon State is the leader of the block, respects its strategical goals, but it has its own economic model, and its own material interests differ from the hegemon. For this stage, the peripheral country does not have a strategical value for the hegemon. Secessionist autonomy, not recommended by Puig, where the peripheral country severed its ties with the hegemon (Simonoff, 2016).

The idea of autonomy is getting a wider range of choices for the peripheral country. For reaching the third stage, accurate analysis of the current state of affairs must be done (Simonoff, 2016).

Writers like Dallanegra followed Puig thoughts but incorporated new ideas. He believes that peripheral countries could follow an autonomic foreign policy that enabled them to create a counter-power to the current hegemon (Dallanegra Pedraza, 1998).

Other scholars like Bernal Meza developed this theoretical approach. Bernal claims that at a first glance the dependency theory has weakened, in reality, it has become stronger. He advocates for integration between peripheral countries as a way of counter-dependency. Finally, he states the importance of having a national elite that wants a heterodox autonomy to reach a foreign policy that might go against the hegemon wishes but takes into account the country's strategic goals. (Bernal Meza, 2013).

For the autonomy theory, the goal of peripheral countries working together can be achieved in two different ways. In other words, Puig speaks of two types of integration. First one is the economic one, the economic interdependence between economies. This one is achieved through complementary economies that after some time sign economic treaties, or Free Trade Agreements. On the other hand, integration can be achieved by solidarity. This is to say that the States share something in common. States can share two things. Firstly, they can share a status. On other words they have a similar economic or military development. Puig stated the difficultness of this type of integration for Latin America. Because the region was so different, so diverse it was hardly possible to achieve. The second option is working together because sharing similar ideas or goals. This last

choice is particularly powerful, as it tries to make peripheral countries analyze the global context. After a careful analysis they might discover that around the world there are other countries which are trying to construct similar policies (Puig, 1986). The interesting thing about integration is that economic, military differences are not an obstacle. Since the States have a higher goal, while sharing values working together is possible. Among the shared policies or goals, autonomy should be present.

To sum up, Puig's autonomy theory is a theory of action to pursue national interest. Autonomy theory accepts the unequal global structure that the dependency theory states, but it rejects its lack of usage of political strategy to change this. Autonomy theory particularly criticizes that the dependency theory has been used for many Latin American scholars to accept the fate of underdevelopment rather than trying to change it. The autonomy theory, states the existence of an unequal world where a small number of countries have privilege and many other countries do not. In order to change the current state of affairs, the autonomy theory first asks to do a precise analysis of the international situation. Only after doing a proper assessment can the leadership of a country start working on its autonomy policy. The end game of this policy should be to have a wider range of options and decisions for the country itself. For achieving that working with other peripheral countries that share the goal of autonomy is the key to success.

4.0 Argentina's Foreign and Economic Policy

4.1 Argentina's Foreign Policy during the 1990s

The narratives of Anti-Americanism or Autonomy cannot be applied in this section. The reason for this, is that Argentina's foreign policy during the 1990s was influenced by Carlos Escude theory, peripheral realism (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). In Escude's theory, there is no place for Anti-Americanism or autonomy.

Escudé is an Argentinean scholar, the creator of the Peripheral Realism theory. This theory, which has a realist foundation is meant to be applied for peripheral countries. In his own thought, the international community is structured in an unequal way. On the one hand, central powers with the hegemon at the top enjoy privileges. On the other hand, countries on the periphery either suffer or try to reject the orders that come from the center (Escude, 1999). Escude makes an emphasis on the importance of being insert in the global community for the peripheral country. Because being part of the community is a top priority for the peripheral country, conflicts or disagreements with the hegemon and its allies⁶ it's too much of a risk (Escude, 1992).

When applying his theory to Argentina, Escude stated that the country had two choices. First one, would involve confrontation with the United States of America (U.S.A) and its allies in order to achieve Argentina's strategic goals. According to him, this option would not be conducive for Argentina's goals. Moreover, it would have generated tensions with the main actors of the international community. Therefore, Argentina had to eliminate the confrontation path and accept the rules of the international politics, going as far as leaving its national interests behind (Simonoff, 2003). By following the American policies recommendations and coming close to America's allies, Argentina would enjoy the economic benefits of being inserted in the American order (Simonoff, 2003). Interestingly enough, for Escude there is no middle point, Argentina or any other

⁶ By hegemon I meant the United States of America. The Allies of the hegemon refers to Western Europe as well as the Western World.

peripheral country is either the rival of the United States or its closest friend. Reality shows us different though. A country can pursue its own national goals, while not antagonizing with the global hegemon.

The 1990s were a time of change, the world saw how the U.S.A won the Cold War against the Soviet Union. America's triumph, paved the road for America's attempt to shape the world to its image. In order to make the world more American, free market and democracy were spread world-wide. The U.S.A was quite eager to see how governments across the globe implemented steps for achieving democracy and free market (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). The U.S.A was particularly interested in helping this consolidation of democracy and free market in Latin America. Presidents George Bush Sr. and Bill Clinton conducted policies on the region in order to strengthen democracy and free market. For instance, the Organization of American States adopted the Commitment for democracy in 1991 which was the basis for defending democracy in a continental forum. The efforts of the Commitment, had effects on Paraguay and Haiti where the local governments transitioned from autocracy to democracy. On the economic field, the American lead Brady Plan helped Latin American countries with its debts while pushing forward with market reforms (Boniface, 2011).

In order to fulfill America's wishes, Argentina started its "new foreign policy". This new foreign policy, had its basis on ending Argentina's isolation and confrontation with the Western World (De La Balze, 1997). In Consequence, among Argentina's top priorities was to have excellent relations with the U.S.A (Cisneros, 1998). As it was said before, Argentina endorsed America as the victor of the Cold War. Not only the U.S.A was the victor, but also the global trader and global investor (De La Balze, 1997). Argentina during Menem administration went as far as abandoning the Non-Aligned Movement, as a gesture to the U.S.A (Rapoport, 2000). On the economic realm, it was mandatory to eliminate tariff and non-tariff barriers for imports, as well as deregulating the financial sector. The combination of the three previously mentioned policies would be conducive for re-integrating to the "First World". From this re-integration, Argentina would in theory, enjoy the economic benefits of being part of the industrialized nations (De La

Balze, 1997). It is quite clear that while Argentinean officials believed in these recommendations the recommendations itself were not according to Argentina's interests.

A consequence of following the logic that was stated on the previous paragraph, was that having any type of disagreement with the global hegemon was not possible. Argentina had to accept the new distribution of power with the U.S.A at the top of it (Bernal-Meza, 1999). Though it can be said that there was a need for being America's friend. This was particularly true during Menem's second term. As Menem's administration started to ask loans to the International Monetary Fund (I.M.F). The necessity for these loans was the direct consequence of the structural problems that Menem's economic model had (Busso, et al., 2016) . The international behavior that Argentina was doing had more to do with supporting its president, rather than with the country national interests. I will come to this issue later when I talk about Menem's economic model.t Argentina's relation had to be good with the U.S.A. As the North American country had a strong influence in the I.M.F (Simonoff, 2009).

Not only did Argentina endorsed U.S.A as the global hegemon, it followed a foreign policy that was in accordance with American interests. For instance, even though Argentina has no interests in the Middle East, during the First Iraq War Argentina sent vessels and military personnel for supporting the American attack. A consequence of this action was that it brought international terrorism to Argentina. First, in 1992 the Israeli embassy on Argentina suffered a terrorist attack that killed 22 people. Two years later, in 1994, the building of AMIA in Buenos Aires (a Jewish organization) was attacked with a bomb killing 85 people. Both terrorists' attacks are partially related to Menem's decision of sending military personnel to Iraq, as Menem himself admitted in 2004 (Clarín, 2004).

On Latin America affairs Argentina sent mixed signals. On the one hand, Argentina supported U.S.A position on a tougher approach to Cuba on the United Nations. On the United Nations Committee on Human Rights, Argentina echoed America critics to Cuba's human rights violations (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). On the other hand, Argentina worked with Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay in order to create the Southern Cone Market (MERCOSUR). Though it can be said that the MERCOSUR is an important milestone in Latin American integration, at that time it was influenced by the liberal paradigm of open

markets and free trade. It also aimed to attract foreign investment, and make the Southern Cone part of the globalization process. So rather than being a tool for promoting Latin American economic interests, the MERCOSUR was just following the recommendations on global trade made by the U.S.A (Jaquenod, 2018).

Due to Argentina's policy of blindly following the global hegemon, there was not much room for taking into account national interests. In Escude vision, the only kind of competition that Argentina could engage with the U.S.A and its allies was in the economic aspect. In the military and political realm, Argentina had no choice but to accept its fate as a subordinate. Argentina should not attempt to have the same weapons as the hegemon had (Escude, 2012). Following this logic, Argentina cancelled the development of the indigenous developed missile "Condor 2" (Rapoport, 2000). By doing this, Argentina pleased the U.S.A demands.

It was unadvisable for Argentina to pursue its political agenda against hegemonic countries interests, as it would lead to confrontation. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that during the 1990s Argentina used a "seduction" approach to deal with the United Kingdom (U.K) for the Malvinas (Falklands) Islands issue⁷ (Rapoport, 2000). Argentina tried to defrost the relation with the U.K by proposing joint exploitation of the abundant resources have, such as fisheries and off-shore oil (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). Argentina followed a bilateral non-confrontational approach in this issue, Escude's thought at its best. By using a bilateral approach, Argentina was in a much weaker position. The issue of sovereignty was not discussed. Naturally Argentina did not use international organizations to fuel its claim. In particular, Argentina did not use the United Nations, which provide the perfect forum for presenting its case. After more than a decade of using this method, Argentina did not take any important step in the quest for the Malvinas Islands (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002).

⁷ This issue started in the 19th Century when the United Kingdom illegally occupied the islands that were under Argentinean control. From that time onwards Argentina have tried to dialogue with the European country in order to recuperate them. Relations between the countries deteriorated after 1982 when the Argentinean Military Junta attempted to retake them by force. Until Carlos Menem became the President of Argentina, relations were frosty with the United Kingdom.

To sum up, despite the absence of confrontation with the global hegemon and its allies Argentina did not get any significant gain in the international politics. The absence of a policy guided by national interest is to blame for the previously described situation.

4.2 Argentina's economic policy during the 1990s

In order to understand the full picture of Argentina during the 1990s, it is necessary to comprehend that the economic policy was guided by two factors, the foreign policy and the domestic context. As it was said at the previous section, Argentina was following a policy of being extremely close to America. This is especially true in the economic aspect. Argentina fully accepted the Washington Consensus and its economic policies. Briefly explained, the Washington Consensus recommended a series of economic liberalization measures (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). Argentina's decision to follow the orthodox economic policies was also due to the country's recent memories. In the late 1980s and during Menem's first years Argentina was suffering from hyper-inflation. To tackle this issue, Menem's administration created the convertibility law. By this law, 1 American dollar, equaled to 1 Argentinean Peso. By tying the Peso to the American dollars, inflation was controlled. In order to sustain the convertibility, Argentina needed American dollars. In Menem's first term (1989-1995), dollars were obtained by selling State owned companies. (Rapoport, 2000).

The reason to sell State Owned Companies was also to shrink the State. The state was regarded as inefficient as well as a barrier to the free market. With less State, the market would in theory be more efficient. In addition, it had to erase imports barriers and end with laws that gave priority to the national industries. The combination of these policies on the long run damaged severely the national industries (Rapoport, 2010).

While during the first years of the Menem administration Argentina experimented economic growth, in the last years this trend reversed it. From 1991 to 1994 the Argentinean GDP was growing over 5% a year. In 1995 Argentina, was affected by the Mexican crisis, therefore the South American country suffered a crisis. 1996 and 1997 were the last years with a GDP growth over 5% (World Bank, 2019). In 1993, the GDP decreased by 3.38% (World Bank, 2019). The neoliberal model was starting to crumble, with a GDP shrinking year by year. Reaching its lowest point in 2002, with a GDP

reduction of 10% (MEA, 2003). More shockingly was how the wealth gap increased during Menem administration. By using the Gini coefficient, it is possible to measure the wealth gap, 0 represents equal distribution of the wealth and 1 when a single person has all the wealth. The closer to 0 the more equal, the closer to 1 the more unequal. In 1991 Argentina Gini coefficient was 0.468, it decreased briefly until 1993 when it reached 0.449. In 1994, it became 0.459. From that year onwards it started to grow rapidly reaching 0.538 in 2002 (World Bank, 2019b)

During the second term of Menem (1995-1999), the neoliberal model was showing its limits. Deindustrialization, poverty raise, Argentina's GDP reduction were all symptoms of the failure of the neoliberal model. On top of this, the country borrowed heavily from the I.M.F, which asked for austerity measures which made the economic situation even worse. Argentina had to ask money to the IMF as it ran out of assets to sell, shrinking the influx of American dollars. By borrowing money to the IMF, convertibility could live longer (Rapoport, 2010). As Argentina become more dependent on the IMF, there was a bigger need for having good relations with the USA.

4.3 De la Rúa and Duhalde Presidencies

Fernando De la Rúa won the Argentinean Presidential elections of 1999. His government was a coalition of parties named La Alianza. De la Rúa won with the promise of ending corruption and bringing back economic growth to the Argentinean economy. Nevertheless, on the economic realm, De la Rúa kept the neoliberal model that Menem left. De la Rúa decision of not modifying the economic model, was a fatal blow to his government. The Argentinean State had no assets to sell, the national industries were collapsing, so the only way of getting American dollars to sustain convertibility was through IMF loans (Rapoport, 2010). Borrowing money cannot be sustained forever, in 2001 the Argentinean economy finally collapsed. Austerity measures set by the IMF destroyed the local economy. In addition, the Argentinean State was not able to pay its debt to the IMF.

December 20th 2001 was the day when finally, this unsustainable model collapsed. The President at that time, Fernando de La Rúa, had to resign. The country was in a political chaos, having 5 presidents in a week. Finally, Eduardo Duhalde became the

interim president until 2003. His bold policies, which take national interest into account, like refusing to repay the debt to the IMF until the domestic situation was under control gave some fresh air to Argentina. What is more, Duhalde started to move away from the orthodox neoliberalism, setting the basis for an alternative economic model.

Just to give a quick picture of the collapse of December 2001 I will bring some data provided by the National Institute of Statistics and censuses of Argentina (INDEC). Poverty reached 53% of the total Argentinean population, while extreme poverty was as high as 24.8% of the Argentinean population (INDEC, 2002). This was a steady increase from the already high 30% poverty in 1998 (Lozano, 2002). Unemployment rate hit the record number of 23% of the population when in 1998 was 13.2% (Lozano, 2002). Argentinean GDP shrink almost 4.5 % in 2001 (MEA, 2002) and 11% in 2002 (MEA, 2003). Nestor Kirchner had to start his Presidency in May 2003 with this dark panorama.

4.4 Nestor Kirchner Presidency Context

In order to understand the policy goals that Nestor Kirchner set for his administration, first it is required to analyze the context that he had to endure. First of all, 2001 collapse was still fresh in the memory of the Argentinean people. The effect of the crisis such as the massive rate of unemployment as well as the poverty levels were part of the new Argentinean reality (Rapoport, 2010). The neoliberal economic model was crumbling not only in Argentina but in the region too. From Brazil to Venezuela the neoliberal order was under heavy fire. People in Latin America wanted a different kind of development. The desire for a new economic model were based on past experiences. The neoliberal model recommended by America did not bring the positive results that the people were experiencing (Boniface, 2011).

That's why, citizens desired an economic model where the State provides the basic conditions for them. The 1990s showed that in Latin America the free market was not going to create the conditions for people to develop themselves, quite the contrary. Across Latin America the rich became richer and the poor became poorer. (Marconetto, 2014).

During 2003, the international community was shocked by the American invasion of Iraq. George Bush Jr. “War on Terror” was highly controversial and got the attention worldwide. Most of the international community was extremely infuriated with the American decision of invading Iraq. Argentina was no exception and had one of the lowest opinions of America in Latin America (Katzenstein & Keohane, 2007). A consequence of America’s focus on the Middle East was that Latin America was not a priority for the American foreign policy (Boniface, 2011). This in turn set the bases for an Argentinean foreign policy that took into account Argentina’s national interests, or to put it in another way it created the bases for autonomy.

America’s was highly focused in the Middle East, but it had a big political project in Latin America. That project was the Free Trade Area of the America (FTAA), a mega Free Trade Agreement that covered the whole American region with the exception of Cuba (Rapoport, 2010). Should the FTAA have been approved, the regulations that it aimed to create would have meant a serious danger for Nestor Kirchner economic plan. Particularly dangerous was the reduction of tariff and non-tariff barriers. Without them an industrialization process, like the one proposed by Kirchner would have been hard to conceive. In 2005, after a heated debate between many Latin American leaders and U.S.A the FTAA was buried. The FTAA was rejected by most of Latin American Presidents, including Nestor Kirchner, ending the project. This is not to say that relations between Argentina and the U.S.A were bad. Argentina endorsed America as the global hegemon, nevertheless Argentina made different choices in non-strategic affairs. Just to give a quick example, Argentina supported the anti-terrorist initiatives made by the U.S.A but in the domestic sphere Argentina tried an economic model that did not follow America’s recommendations (Simonoff, 2006)⁸.

After the American lead FTAA was defeated, the North American country kept the focus on the Middle East. Thanks to this Argentina, as well as countries like Brazil have a wider range of possibilities (that took into account national interest) when making decisions on foreign policy. Argentina kept during Kirchner Presidency a civil relation

⁸ America’s recommendations on liberalization of the economy, non-state intervention in the economy as well as free trade were endorsed and propagated by international organizations like the IMF and the World Bank.

with the USA, as having American support was key for negotiating the debt with the IMF. With the USA concerned with the Middle East, South American integration became easier to achieve. International organizations like the Common Market of the South (MERCOSUR) advanced rapidly.

Analyzing the bigger picture, East Asia economic boom had consequences in Argentina as well as Latin America. With China on top, but followed by India and the ASEAN countries Asia quest for raw materials created an economic boom for many Latin American countries, including Argentina (WB, 2011). The rapid increase in the trade relationship, was the kick start for closer political relations between the two regions.

4.5 Nestor Kirchner's economic policy

Neoliberal economic was no longer a possibility, therefore an alternative model needed to be applied to Argentina. According to Nestor Kirchner's thought, a model in which the State intervened in the economy was the right one. State intervention will aim to reindustrialize the economy, leading to a healthy economic growth while reducing the wealth gap. Economic and foreign policy would be closely related, as it was a priority to diversify the exports and the trade partners (Di Tella, 2003). Argentina has usually been an exporter of primary goods, more precisely wheat, beef and milk, more recently soy. The aim of the diversification was to also exports industrial products so not overly in a small number of primary goods, which are very volatile (Rapoport, 2010).

For achieving the industrialization process a wide range of protectionist measures were taken. Quota system for exports, tariff and non-tariff barriers or soft loans for manufacturing companies (Actis, Calderon, Lorenzini, & Zelicovich, 2016). Argentina's industrial exports growth considerably from 8 billion US dollars in 2003 to 17.3 billion US dollars in 2007 (INDEC, 2019). Clearly, the policies that Nestor Kirchner employed were being useful, the Argentinean industrial sector was making big profits (Actis, Calderon, Lorenzini, & Zelicovich, 2016).

Diversification of trade partners was as important as diversifying the exports. Being over dependent on a single trade partner can be dangerous, as trade can be used as a tool for political reasons (Rubiolo, 2017). Therefore, if trade between Argentina and the rest of

the world is equally distributed is harder to suffer the effects of a political crisis with a trade partner. Nestor Kirchner spoke about diversifying trade with the whole world (Di Tella, 2003), that's to say moving from Argentina's traditional partners (Western Europe and the U.S.A) to new ones. In practice, trade with Latin America increased greatly. Argentina had an intra-industrial trade relationship with the region, especially with Brazil. Between Argentina and Brazil trade of auto parts increased greatly.

In order to sustain the industrial model that Nestor Kirchner wanted to implement; American dollars were required. American dollars were essential for importing the manufacturing equipment. Since Nestor Kirchner refused to take loans, the only possible way of getting American dollars was through exports. East Asia was key for accomplishing the previously mentioned task, it became one of the most important sources of American dollars. Argentina's massive exports of raw materials, such as soybeans, to East Asia kept the influx of American dollars (Rubiolo, 2018). The high prices of the soybeans, which were as high as 450 American dollars a ton in 2007 (Sticco, 2015), during Nestor Kirchner administration allowed Argentina to had a trade surplus with East Asia. It must be noted that the trade relation between Argentina and East Asia was inter-industrial, a pattern that intensified during the Kirchnersits administrations. By inter-industrial I mean that Argentina exported soybeans and wheat while it imported manufactured goods. Nevertheless, the American dollars brought by soybeans exports to East Asia allowed the Argentinean government to implement the industrialization program (Gallagher, 2016).

East Asia become an extremely relevant trade partner for Argentina, therefore it made sense that Argentina attempted to have a relation with Asian regional powers. China absorbed an increasing amount of Argentinean goods, while India and ASEAN members (particularly Indonesia) did too, but at a smaller scale (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014a). This will be analyzed later in the thesis but for a first look exports to China, India and Indonesia growth enormously. From exporting 2.2 billion US dollars to China in 2003 Argentina was exporting almost 6 Billion US dollars in 2007 (Zhao, 2012). In addition, Argentina experienced a trade surplus, reaching a peak of 3.068 Billion US dollars in 2007 (National Bureau of Statistics of China). Argentina's trade with India increased

slowly from 600 million US dollars in 2003 to 800 million in 2007 (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014b). Argentina had a trade surplus during those years, reaching a peak in 2005 with a trade surplus of almost 600 million American dollars (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014c). Regarding Indonesia, Argentina was exporting 61.1 million US dollars, fast forward to 2007 Argentinean exports were 400 million (Rubiolo & Ramoneda, 2012). Regarding Indonesia, in 2003 the trade relation was balanced, there was no trade surplus nor trade deficit. In contrast, in 2007, Argentina's trade surplus was almost 200 million American dollars (Rubiolo & Ramoneda, 2012)

4.6 Nestor Kirchner's Foreign Policy

As it was said some paragraphs before, the economic policies of Nestor Kirchner have to be analyzed together with the foreign policies. Kirchner's economic policies must be researched through the eye of its political goals. When the Argentinean President started his tenure in 2003, he realized his country was a country in formality. It is true that the country had elections, the people were able to choose their own representatives, the government was able to issue its own currency as well as make use of its army. But, if anyone tried to research more, deep down reality was different. The neoliberal economic model that was applied, put the country on its knees (Rapoport, 2010). Thanks to the economic model that was applied, Argentina severely restricted its material capacity for making decision on the international arena. As the country became so dependent on the good will of the U.S.A for negotiating its debt with the IMF it was hard to disagree with America on the international affairs. It should not be a surprise that Argentina did not pursue its claim for the Malvinas Islands in a conductive way. Bothering a core partner of the U.S.A like the U.K was not a possibility (Bernal-Meza R. , 2002). Argentina had to sacrifice the claim for the Malvinas Islands. Moreover, the country turned its back to the region where it belongs, Latin America. Not to mention that it was not paying attention to the area with the most dynamic economies, East Asia. In sum, Kirchner realized that Argentina during the 1990s, did not make the right decision in regards to the economy, which in turn limited the choices in the international politics (Marconetto, 2014).

By opting for an alternative economic model, different from the neoliberal one, Kirchner aimed to improve Argentina's material capacity. To be more concrete, the economic

transformation, being less dependent on the hegemon and its allies would allow the country to more options for its own strategic goals (Taiana, 2006). That's not to say that Argentina would seek confrontation with the U.S.A and its allies. Foreseeing the future, Kirchner realized that the World Order was mutating from a unipolar one to a multipolar type. In a multipolar order, international organizations become increasingly important, they are the platform where countries can debate and create regulations, set decisions and make important decisions.

For the Kirchner administration, participating in multilateral organizations was a must. As they provided a conducive way of pursuing national interests. Regional organizations like MERCOSUR were strongly used, not only for the original purpose which was trade but for regional politics too. Particularly important for this study is how Kirchner administration used the G-77 (G-77, 2005), the World Trade Organization (CARI, 2015) and the United Nations. (United Nations Committee on Decolonization, 2007) On the later one, Argentina made particular emphasis on using the Committee on decolonization as a way of solving the Malvinas issue. What Argentina wanted is to start the dialogue with the U.K, thing that was constantly rejected by the U.K. Fueling the claim for Malvinas was among the most important goals for the Kirchners' administration. It is important to remark that from 2003 until 2007 the United Nations Committee on Decolonization approved by consensus Argentina's petition for dialogue with the U.K regarding the Malvinas issue (United Nations, 2003) (United Nations, 2004) (United Nations, 2005) (United Nations, 2006) (United Nations, 2007). The members of the Committee on Decolonization include India, Indonesia and China (Committee on Decolonization).

While the United Nations Committee on Decolonization was among the most important instruments in order to fuel the Argentinean claim for Malvinas, it was not the only mean used by Kirchner. When Nestor Kirchner or his Minister of Foreign Affairs visited a country or received an authority from another country the Malvinas Issue was present. I will briefly introduce the relevance that India, China and Indonesia had in the previously mentioned method, later on the thesis I will develop them properly. When Chinese President Hu Jintao visited Argentina in 2004, President Kirchner thanked him for

China's historic support of Argentina's position regarding Malvinas (El Pais, 2004). Consequently, Argentina supported China's position on Taiwan issue (El Pais, 2004). India is one of Argentina's traditional supporters for Malvinas, in consequence Argentina condemned terrorist attacks against India (Marconetto, 2014). This support was stated again by Indian Prime Minister Singh in 2009 while President Cristina Kirchner was visiting India (LMNeuquen, 2009). Indonesia has traditionally supported Argentina position in multilateral institutions but it has also reaffirmed this position when receiving with Argentinean authorities. When President Cristina Kirchner visited Indonesia, she thanked the country for its support to Argentina's claim (Cheade, 2013).

Multilateral organizations were used by Nestor Kirchner not only for Malvinas' issue, they were also used as an attempt to partially shape the rules of the international community (Taiana, 2006). Argentina shared the desires of shaping the international rules, something also wanted by India, Indonesia and China. The joint work between Argentina and the previously mentioned countries also was used for defending what the Kirchners' administration deemed as important. For instance, Argentina was looking for ending the agriculture subsidies, this desired was shared by India and Indonesia (CARI, 2015). The countries had used joint positions in the World Trade Organization to achieve this.

In sum, the economic model that aimed exports diversification and trade partner diversification were the material basis for an autonomy policy. In other words, in order to have a wider range of possibilities in the international arena it was key to have a stronger economy, what was achieved during Kirchner term. Then, Nestor Kirchner used international organizations and non-traditional partners like India, Indonesia and China to achieve the economic goals and the political ones. Those political goals were advancing in the Malvinas' claim and having a bigger saying in the international politics. At the end of his term in 2007, Argentina looked like a country that realized its dependency state and it wanted to finish it. It was the time for pursuing national interests.

4.7 Context during Cristina Kirchner administration

It is necessary to describe the context in which Cristina Kirchner was the President of Argentina, from 2007 to 2015, as it is completely different from the one Nestor Kirchner had. As it was said before, even though Nestor Kirchner started his tenure in a hard

moment of the country, where the effects of the 2001 economic crisis were still visible, the international context was better. East Asia high demand of raw materials and U.S.A focus in the Middle East were essential for Nestor Kirchner to apply his heterodox economic and foreign policy approaches.

When Cristina Kirchner started her presidency, she had to endure two fronts, a domestic one and an international one (Actis & Zelicovich, 2012). On the domestic side, the inflation started to grow rapidly, being over 22.8% in 2008. Inflation was a serious problem during Cristina Kirchner's administration that could not be fixed. (Actis, Calderon, Lorenzini, & Zelicovich, 2016). In addition, Argentina faced a shortage in the production of oil due to the lack of investment in the sector. Due to this, Argentina needed to import increasingly bigger amount of oil which became a massive burden for the government (Varesi, 2016). On top of everything that was said before, soybeans prices decreased sharply during the last years of Cristina Kirchner administration (Sticco, 2015). With lower prices of soybeans, the influx of American dollars decreased sharply. The combination of the previously mentioned factors created a situation where the economy was stagnant while suffering from high inflation.

Relations between the government and part of the society began to deteriorate. The middle class, which traditionally supported the Kirchners' government, started to criticize it. There were many reasons for it, the stagnant economy with high inflation specially during the last years of Cristina Kirchner government were to blame. The government took measures to revert the previously mentioned issues, such as increasing social welfare programs or giving tax breaks to the industries (Politica & Mamone, 2014). While they had some success, they also increased the tax pressure. The middle class was among the most affected it, therefore the middle class slowly started antagonizing with Cristina Kirchner (Gutierrez, 2013). Some writers like Busso, stated that this conflict was as a consequence of an improved economic situation. Because of a better economic situation, the middle class started to ask for more socio-economic demands (Busso A. , 2016). Demonstrations against the government became more frequent. The middle class used to be among the strongest supporters of Nestor Kirchner, as it benefited from the economic measures of his administration (Gutierrez, 2013). Following Busso thought,

this deterioration with the middle class was partially caused by the downgrade of the relationship with the largest media company in Argentina, Clarin. Its fierce criticism of the government was hard to handle (Busso A. , 2016). As Clarin articles, which were highly critic of the Kirchner administration fueled middle-class discontent with the administration. This deterioration in the relationship with the Middle class and the Clarin started 2008 becoming worse year by year.

It cannot be ignored the struggle that Cristina Kirchner had with the landlord class. The landlord class in addition to small farmers, organized demonstrations and even blocked routes reaching a momentum in 2008. The causes of these actions were due to the government attempt to tax their extra-large profits. These extra-large profits were possible thanks to high price of soy in the international markets. The aim of this extra-tax was to keep developing industries. The administration of Cristina Kirchner wanted to tax strongly the raw material, in this case the soy bean. The tax aimed to stimulate the processing of the soy beans. The landlord class, uninterested in the development of the country was not willing to participate in the development of the national industries. Therefore, the landlord class organized massive demonstrations across the country. This confrontation can also be seen as a clash of two economic models, an economy based on diversification of the economy and another one based on agricultural products (Simonoff, 2008). Following the thought of the Argentinean economist Aldo Ferrer, the government of Cristina Kirchner tried to use the extra tax on soy beans in order to enhance a more diversified economy (Ferrer, 2008). With the tax money, the government could keep fueling the industrialization process. Relationship with the landlord class was on its lowest point, and from 2008 onwards this social class stop supporting Cristina Kirchner's policies.

On the international front, Cristina Kirchner had to endure the global financial crisis of 2008 (Actis, Calderon, Lorenzini, & Zelicovich, 2016). The effects of the financial crisis are well known, a sharp decrease in global trade, high rates of unemployment in the developed world and a tendency for imposing protectionist measures world-wide. While Argentina was not as affected as Europe, thanks to its diversification and increasing importance of its Asian and Latin partners, some effects were felt (Varesi, 2016).

Nevertheless, it should be noted that as a consequence of the global financial crisis the G-20 became a relevant platform for discussing solutions to the crisis. Countries like Brazil, China, India and Argentina among others claimed for a bigger saying in the global governance. Later in the thesis I will come back to this point.


Political tensions with some of its partners like Brazil and China started to become an issue. This was the consequence of new protectionist measures imposed by Argentina to China and Brazil, situation was quite tense (Actis, Calderon, Lorenzini, & Zelicovich, 2016). I would come back to this issue when I am analyzing Argentina-China relations. But it is good to remember that during Cristina Kirchner term, relations with China have tense moments.

When Barack Obama became the President of the U.S.A, the policy that the North American country had towards Latin America was quite different. In his first's week as the President of the U.S.A he promised a new approach to Latin America, one that would be based in equality and respect for the decisions taken by the Latin people (Brenner & Hershberg, 2013). The enthusiasm did not last long, as American policy to the region resembled the old way of dealing with Latin America. Even though Argentina was the least affected in this issue if compared to for instance Venezuela had to deal with this, effects were still present.

When I was explaining the context of Nestor Kirchner government, I stated how important was to be in good terms with the U.S.A so to have its support with the negotiations with the IMF for the debt Argentina had with the organizations. Nestor Kirchner fully paid its debt in 2005, but Argentina still owed money to other creditors. These creditors who were not paid back in 2001 as Argentina was in default provided to be a major problem for Argentina. In 2010, the country paid most of them, more than 90% to be more precise. But the minority that did not accept the Argentinean offer asking to be fully paid, took their case to the U.S.A court (Guzman & Stiglitz, 2016). This was possible as even though the debt was issued by Argentina, it stated that in case of conflict the U.S.A would be the country where to solve the controversy. As these group of creditors were not paid, Argentina was unable to ask for loans in the foreign markets, something that we will later see was exploited by China (Laufer, 2013). In the trial that

started in the U.S.A, Argentina was forced to pay to its creditors, something that Cristina Kirchner administration rejected it. Cristina Kirchner refusal to accept the sentence of the American court severely damaged the relation with developed countries.

The Kirchners' administration aimed to put national interest as a priority, therefore it followed the guidelines of autonomy. Working together with non-hegemonic actors, using international organizations and attempting to diversify trade were the main strategies. Argentina took this approach as it realized that it had the room for doing this kind of approach, since America was focus in the Middle East. Later on, the 2008 financial crisis gave the possibility to non-hegemonic actors to express their disconformity with the power distribution at that time. The pursue of autonomy was not linked to anti-Americanism, rather it was the consequence of sizing the opportunity to pursue national interest.



Argentina's imports by origin

	USA	European Union	China	India
2000	18.9%	23.5%	4.6%	0.57%
2005	13.9%	17.0%	7.8%	0.70%
2010	10.7%	17.2%	13.5%	1.0%
2011	10.4%	15.7%	14.3%	0.85%
2012	12.3%	18.0%	14.6%	0.96%
2013	11.0%	18.4%	15.4%	1.04%
2014	13.7%	17.6%	16.5%	1.06%
2015	13.19%	17.8%	19.66%	1.21%

Argentina's exports by destination

	USA	European Union	China	India
2000	11.8%	18.0%	3.0%	1.66%
2005	11.1%	17.3%	7.9%	1.80%
2010	5.2%	16.4%	8.5%	1.94%
2011	5.1%	16.9%	7.4%	1.17%
2012	5.0%	14.4%	6.4%	1.44%
2013	5.6%	13.0%	7.5%	1.43%
2014	5.6%	14.2%	7.0%	2.65%
2015	5.97%	14.5%	6.52%	3.53%

5.0 Argentina-China relations

Prior to the beginning of the 21st Century, economic and political relations between Argentina and China were marginal. Sporadic visits were done by the Argentinean government when it switched its recognition from the Republic of China to People's Republic of China in the 1970s. The economic relation between Argentina and China was tiny until the late 1990s. Interestingly enough, the Argentinean exports to China were quite different from the Argentinean exports in the 21st Century. While it was true that at that time Argentina exported raw materials like wheat, it is also true that it exported industrial goods (Oviedo, 2010).

China's economic boom that accelerated from the late 1990s onwards meant change for Argentina-China relation. Because China needed an ever-increasing amount of raw materials, like soybeans or oil, the bilateral relationship started growing steadily. As Argentina became a provider of soybeans and oil for China, meanwhile China started exporting a diversified sophisticated range of industrial goods. Argentina's 2001 crash, meant a diminished trade between the South American country and the rest of the world (Oviedo, 2010).

5.1 Argentina-China economic relations

The fierce currency devaluation that Argentina applied to the Argentinean peso, meant that its exports were more competitive. In consequence, by 2003/2004 a steady recovery in Argentinean exports can be seen. At the same time, Argentina's soybeans production took off while the prices in the international markets was increasing (Nacht, 2011). But why did Argentinean farmers switch from wheat or corn to soybeans? Soybeans have never been part of the Argentinean diet, tomatoes, lettuce, onions among others are the vegetables that most Argentines grow up with. So, if soybeans were not meant for local consumption, it is right to assume they were for exports, which was the case. Keeping the trend that was initiated during the 1990s, Argentina's soybeans exports to Asia grew incredibly fast during the first years of the 21st Century. This process, usually

commoditization, meant that Argentina heavily relied in its commodities exports (soybeans) to earn hard currency. According to Nacht, for every 4 dollars that entered Argentina 1 entered as a consequence of selling soybeans (Nacht, 2012). To make it even clearer, in 2001 soybeans represented 17,7% of Argentina's total exports, by 2007 it represented 24,4% of the total (Varesi, 2010).

Argentinean soybeans exports include many different markets, ASEAN countries, India, but by far the most relevant was the People's Republic of China. By the 1990s soybeans represented less than 50% of Argentina's exports to China, by 2005 they represented more than 80%. Argentina's tendency to concentrate its exports to China in soybeans, specially pellets, kept increasing reaching almost 96% through the 2010s. There is an explanation for Argentina's exports to China. Firstly, in the past used to be an oil exporter, but due to the lack of investment in finding new oils sources, Argentina became an oil importer (Laufer, 2013). Secondly, while China is on the top 5 of soybeans producers, in 2004 it renounced to the old Maoist goal of being self-sufficient in food. China understood that Mao's goal was impossible to achieve when the Chinese population was over a billion people. In consequence, China's thirst for imported food became increasingly bigger (Velloso, 2019).

Starting from Nestor Kirchner's Presidency and finishing in his wife's (Cristina Kirchner) second term you can how important China became for Argentina's trade. From representing 3% of Argentina's total exports in 2000, it became 7.9% in 2005 and it reached its peak in 2010 when it represented 8.5% of Argentina's total exports. It decreased in 2012, being a 6.4% of Argentina's exports and from that time up to 2015 it was around 7%. If the exports numbers are impressive, having a quick look to the import numbers is even more impressive. In 2005, China represented 7.8% of Argentina's total exports a number that kept growing (unlike the Argentinean exports to China) reaching the impressive 16.5% of Argentina's total imports (Machinea & Castro, 2017). This was in accordance with the autonomy theory guidelines which recommend to find new partners (different from the USA and Western Europe). Specially, since the previously mentioned actors created barriers for agricultural products. The Kirchners' find a way to

pursue national interest, at least partially, by being close to China. As Argentina could export the raw materials that Western Europe and the USA rejected.

From the previous paragraph, something is very obvious to identify. While Argentina's exports to China had its peak in 2008 being around 6 billion and representing more than 8% of Argentina's total exports, then the exports started falling sharply. Only returning to its place 2 years later. It should be noticed that at that time, Argentina enjoyed a trade surplus of over a billion US dollars. From 2009 onwards Argentina suffered a chronic trade deficit with China being around 3 billion US dollars in 2014 (Laufer, 2017).

As the Argentinean scholar, Felipe de la Balze, said in a conference about strategies for approaching China, the Argentinean-Chinese trade relation could almost perfectly (only exchanging soybeans by beef and cereals) fit in the Argentinean-British trade relation during the 19th and mid-20th Century (De la Balze, 2011). While initially Argentina enjoyed a large surplus, the trade relation became averse to Argentina as the country needs to sell a larger amount of raw materials in order to reduce the deficit. What it proves impossible to do, as Chinese industrial imports that are diversified outweigh Argentinean raw materials. In other words, while China originally provided hard currency for Argentina, which Argentina needed for its industrialization policies, then the relation shifted to a North-South relation (Bernal-Meza, 2016). This North-South relation became more when the Chinese swaps are analysed⁹.

A worrying trend became clear in the 2010, Chinese industrial goods exports to Latin America not only generated trade deficit like in Argentina's case but also fuelled the issue of *reprimarisation*. To put it shortly, reprimarisation is the process by which a country becomes more dependent on the export of raw materials¹⁰ as they represent a bigger share of the country exports. In the previously mentioned process, industrial good become less relevant. The other thing to be noted is that a country that is experiencing reprimarisation usually concentrates in one or two products. Coming back to Argentina's

⁹ I prefer to do that on the next section, as Chinese swaps to Argentina have become a political tool for the Asian country.

¹⁰ It is implied that say country used to export industrial goods or other products rather than raw materials.

case¹¹ the reprimarization process can be observed not only when examining Argentina-China trade relation, but also when examining Argentina-East Asia trade relation. As it has been explained before, soybeans constitute 96% of Argentina's exports to China (Oviedo, 2013). That percentage is usually around 70% when analysing Argentina's exports to other East Asian economies. In this sense, it looks like Argentina is establishing a new type of dependency with a new partner. The trade relation shifted from being a source of hard currency income for Argentina to a deficit where reprimarization is a big issue (Ramoneda, 2019). In this sense, the autonomy guidelines were not followed a 100% since they recommend to diversify the exports baskets.

It could be argued that while Argentina-China trade relation consolidated Argentina's role as raw material producer with China, it did not affect Argentina's trade relation with other Latin American countries which constitute Argentina's priority. Contrary to that assumption, the influence of international factors also changed what was previously said. The 2008 world financial crisis had immediate consequences, not only developed economies suffered recession, they also started applying protectionist measures. This in turn meant that developed countries could no longer absorb manufactured goods from China. As a consequence of this, Chinese companies started looking for new markets like South America or Africa. The arrival of the Chinese goods to South America, meant that Argentinean goods in the region faced a fierce competition. Ultimately, Argentinean companies lost an important share of the market in traditional partners like Brazil. Argentinean companies were not alone, as Brazilian companies suffered similar consequences in regards to the share of the Argentinean market (Nacht, 2016).

To sum up, while originally being an important element for finishing Argentina's dependence with the developed world, trade relations with China changed radically. The constant trade deficit, its ever-increasing share of Argentina's total imports along with China's trade policies to South America, have reshaped the trade relation. By 2015, Argentina was repeating the relation it had with the British Empire only this time it was

¹¹ Which is a similar one to other big economies from Latin America when dealing with East Asian countries. In Brazil's case soybeans and iron are among its top exports to East Asia.

the People's Republic of China. In other words, regarding trade it could be said that Argentina established a new dependency with China.¹²

5.2 Argentina-China political relations during Nestor Kirchner's tenure

Going back to the first part of this research, the reader might recall that the 2001 crash had devastating effects for Argentina. As it was mentioned, the terrible consequences were not only felt in Argentina's economy but also in the country international's image. The country was labelled as a pariah state by Western Europe, the United States and Argentina's traditional Asian friend, Japan. Argentina's inability to pay to its creditors, isolated the country from its traditional Westerners friends. It should not be a surprise that when taking that into account plus Argentina being part of the pink wave, the country turned its back to its traditional partners.

The most relevant trip that Nestor Kirchner made, was the one he did to China in July 2004. The motivations for this trip, were mostly economical ones. President Kirchner goal was to attract investment and increase trade. While the goal attracting investment makes sense, as most Chinese investment in Argentina comes from State owned companies, the trade aspect does not make much sense. In the next paragraph I will explain why the trade part does not make much sense. It is worth to add that Kirchner had one political goal, that was to make sure that Hu Jintao would visit Argentina during his visit to Latin America in late 2004. He accomplished that; however, Kirchner once again only focus in the economic aspect.

Kirchner's visit to China in July 2004, enabled the visit of Hu Jintao to Argentina. Hu Jintao, was visiting Argentina as part of his South American tour which included Brazil and other South American countries. Mr. Hu Jintao did not only come to Argentina (and South America) to talk about trade, he had more ambitious political goals. At that time, China was recently admitted to the WTO¹³. Nevertheless, in the WTO China was labelled as non-market-economy. Which in turn meant that the PRC prices could not be used for setting prices of goods, a third country can be used as reference. This is especially

¹² Like Gabriel Garcia Marquez explained in its famous book "Cien Años de Soledad" history does not move forward in Latin America, it just goes in circles repeating itself.

¹³ People's Republic of China was admitted in 2001

important for applying anti-dumping measures, which China was often having them applied by other countries. Mr. Hu Jintao main purpose during that visit to Argentina, was to be recognized as a market economy by Argentina and the other countries he visited. Argentina agreed on China's petition, using foreign policy as a tool for economic goals. Argentina "recognized"¹⁴ China's as a market economy, in exchange for China's commitment to more trade and investment. The Chinese promise was crystalized by signing the Strategic Association with Argentina (Oviedo, 2006). While China's commitment to more investment was not a bad idea, since traditional investors like Western European countries or the USA were dubious of Argentina's stability, it cannot be said the same about trade. Back in 2004, trade between Argentina and China was going to increase as China's renouncement to being self-sufficient in food, meant that the Asian country was going to get the food from somewhere else. That somewhere place, was likely to be Argentina because Argentina is among the most important food producers in the world (Velloso, 2019). To be fair, Argentina's lack of attempts to make a political move with China can be understood in the context. At that time the G-20 was not relevant as it become after 2008, regarding the IMF Argentina was only interested in paying. Finally, regarding the UN, Argentina's concern at that time was the Malvina's issue, which Hu Jintao expressed China's support when he visited Argentina. Because the 2001 crash was so severe, Argentina did not set reforming the global governance as a priority. Only after 2007, when Argentina's economy was more solid and the world financial crisis started did Argentina tried a more proactive role.

Speaking of global governance, we should make a brief analysis of Argentina's interaction with China in international governance during Nestor Kirchner administration.¹⁵ One of the few platforms that Argentina proactively used during Nestor Kirchner's tenure to change global governance was the G-77. This forum constituted by non-developed countries (which also includes regional powers like India or China) has a

¹⁴ Though Argentina recognized China as a market economy, in real life Argentina kept applying anti-dumping measures as if China was a non-market economy. Specially after 2007 until 2015 Argentina's anti-dumping measures and complains at the WTO against China increased by a lot.

¹⁵ As the most relevant interactions were done when Cristina Kirchner was the President.

defined autonomy¹⁶ purpose. Argentina most relevant achievement was that during the Doha Declaration of 2005 its interests for the Malvinas' issue was endorsed by all members included China and India (G-77, 2005). Though it is not a game changer for global governance, it is interesting to see that sometimes Argentina used the tools it had to its part to at least attempt to change global governance. Argentina also used a similar methodology in the UN Committee on Decolonization also integrated by non-developed countries and China. A large number of favorable resolutions on the Malvinas' issue were passed according to Argentina's interests (United Nations, 2007). Sadly, because those resolutions are not binding did not have much effect on real life. Though, at the same time this small moves were a clear indicator that Argentina was trying to pursue its national interests by working with non-hegemonic actors.

While Argentina's interaction with China in the UN and in the G-77 was good for Argentina's interests, the interaction in the WTO was quite different. In the WTO Argentina's economic interests were stronger than its goals of changing global governance. In order to protect its infant industry, Argentina applied anti-dumping investigations against many countries like the USA or Western Europe but specially against China. By doing this, Argentina hoped to keep Chinese goods away from Argentina, which did not happen. As a matter of fact, Argentina was the Latin American country with the biggest numbers of anti-dumping measures taken against China. This in turn generated displeasure in Chinese authorities (Xu, 2017). To be fair, Argentina attempted to make a change in global governance but by working with different countries, like India or Indonesia, or more specifically Cairns' Group. Which makes sense, since the previously mentioned countries want what Argentina wants, no agricultural subsidies.

To sum up, during Nestor Kirchner's tenure, Argentina interactions with China had more to do with ending economic dependence with the West. Kirchner's meetings with Hu Jintao were used primarily for an economic purpose, at least from the Argentinean side.

¹⁶ Autonomy as Juan Carlos Puig's autonomy theory. A large group of non-developed countries meet and talk together trying to make a change in global governance structure. By working together, the members of the G-77 want to have their interested represented or at least listened in the international community. Though the G-77 has its own contradictions, as the PRC is one of its most important members. The contradiction comes from the fact that China is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, which usually represents the interests of powerful countries.

But it must be remembered the context at that time, Argentina's economy was still weak. In addition, the hegemon and their allies were much stronger than after 2008, the crisis was one of the main reasons that triggered a demand for a new global governance. Finally, during the last years of Nestor Kirchner's presidency, it can be seen that China's objective start to differ significantly from Argentina's ones, which will deepen as time goes by.

5.3 Argentina-China relations under Cristina Kirchner

The context in which Cristina Kirchner started her first tenure as President of Argentina was a challenging, but challenges can also represent opportunities. The challenge that Kirchner had to face did not come from Argentina itself or from Latin America, rather it came from the developed world. The 2008 crisis that took place in the developed world, mainly the USA and Western European countries hit not only the previously mentioned countries, but also disrupt global trade. International trade came to a halt, even worse the trade volumes started getting lower. The fallout generated by the crisis was felt world-wide, Argentina was no exception. Naturally, Argentina's foreign trade shrunk, economy growth was negative but not alarmingly bad. Nevertheless, effects in Argentina were mild, as the country did not have a large debt with foreign creditors, and it had a somehow diversified net of trade partners. Argentina was not the only country that was mildly affected by the 2008 global crisis, countries like China, India, Brazil or Indonesia among other were in a similar situation. Argentina plus the previously mentioned countries had something in common, at that time their economy was doing well and they did not fell properly represented in global governance. The 2008 crisis was the perfect timing for asking for new rules, rules that take into account "third-world countries" interests (Li, 2012). Those interests of course were different from the hegemon (the USA) and its allies Western Europe. In other words, third-world countries were seeking autonomy even if they use a different terminology for it. The proper channel for accomplishing the autonomy goals was through international organizations. Though the autonomy theory that Kirchners' administration applied is a realist theory, the previously mentioned administration hold hardcore liberal views, for instance believing that State equality is a real thing. The combination of a realist goal while holding liberal values, is one of the

things that ultimately prevent a good joint work between Argentina and China in order to achieve Argentina's autonomy goals. I will explain this point later.

It is first important to clarify that while Argentina as well as China, were looking for autonomy, their end goals were quite different. While China intended a more ambitious reform of global governance that enable the country to be an equal to the USA, Argentina had a more modest goal. In addition, Argentina had no interest in reshaping credit institutions like the IMF or the World Bank¹⁷. To be more concise, the institutions in which Argentina tried to apply its autonomy were rather limited, G-20, G-77, UN, the CELAC and at some points the WTO. I will analyze the previously mentioned interactions and at the same time analyze the bilateral relationship between Argentina and China.

As an introductory comment, I must say that the interaction that Argentina had with China in international organizations were quite inconsistent, sometimes joining forces with China while some other times turning its back to China. Starting with the WTO, it can be observed that Argentina put its economic interests before its political ones. Through all the Kirchners' period Argentina put anti-dumping investigations against China (Xu, 2017). To be more precise, the China was on the top five of Argentina's anti-dumping investigations. The anti-dumping measures enlarged greatly from 2009 until the end of Cristina Kirchner's second term, they were actually in accordance to Argentina non-tariff and tariff barriers against Chinese goods. It was during 2009 that a political crisis between Argentina and China erupted. The combination of Argentina's anti-dumping investigation plus domestic non-tariff and tariff measures, plus China's plans of processing soybeans to produce soybean oil unleashed a big political crisis between Argentina and China. The immediate consequences of the political crisis were China's refusal to buy Argentinean soybean and soybean oil on the basis it did not meet Chinese health standards. As Oviedo¹⁸ stated before, Chinese refusal was the consequence of the political crisis, the Argentinean products were perfectly fine. The second consequence

¹⁷ Argentina's approach was extremely different to its neighbor Brazil, which wanted a reform in the credit institutions as it wanted to use them in order to exercise its economic power. Argentina's lack of interests in those institutions was due to Argentina's recent past, where the reforms that were suggested the IMF end badly for the country.

¹⁸ One of Argentina's top experts in Argentina-China relations.

was that Argentina was forced to find new markets, this crisis showed Argentina's vulnerability to China (Oviedo, 2012). More importantly, it showed that China was becoming more of a hegemon rather than a partner for building autonomy. As it will be explained in the Argentina-India chapter, the crisis was partially solved when India accepted to buy Argentina's soybeans. The crisis solution also came from Argentina's willingness to accept Chinese investment¹⁹. Though the crisis was solved, China's purchase of soybeans never reached the amounts that they had previous to the crisis. It makes sense that there were little points in common between Argentina and China in the WTO, as both had radically different situations (Oviedo, 2010). The former is an agricultural producer that attempted to industrialize itself, so naturally its interests are no subsidies to agricultural goods and no liberalization of industrial goods. While China was not interested in subsidizing agriculture, it was especially interested in industrial goods liberalization. So, it was quite hard to make things work in the WTO. As it will be seen later, India proved to be a much better alternative for Argentina's interests.

By exploring Argentina's behavior in the UN, it is quite obvious to see that Argentina had realist goals while holding liberal views. It was explained in the first chapter how important is the Malvinas' issue for Argentina. The UN Committee on Decolonization was one of the most relevant forums in which Argentina discussed this issue. Through all the Kirchners' period, the resolution that asked the UK to sit and negotiate were passed. China always provided support to Argentina²⁰, not only in the UN but bilaterally as it has stated before in this research. Yet, Cristina Kirchner's speeches in the UN stressed the idea of eliminating the Security Council in which China is a permanent member (Shidore, 2013). This kind of behavior does no good to autonomy goals, as autonomy does not suggest the ideas of radical change in international organizations. It rather suggests that a country works together with other countries to have its interests represented. However, Argentina's behavior in the UN was more like a hardcore liberal position, asking to eliminate the Security Council. Despite all the mistakes that were done during Cristina Kirchner's speeches, China still supports Argentina in the Committee on Decolonization.

¹⁹ The conditions of the investment made by Chinese State-owned companies were harsh and included hiring Chinese labor, or buying spare parts from China. Later I will give more detail about this.

²⁰ One of the reasons for this is that China is in a similar position to Argentina regarding the Senkaku (Diaoyu) Islands. A positive resolution for Argentina would create a leading case for China's claim.

While Argentina had committed mistakes in its interaction with China in the UN, in some other organizations it did an acceptable job. Keeping in track the good job done by her husband, Cristina Kirchner kept using the G-77 as a forum for pursuing the Malvinas' claim (G-77, 2011). Also, in there, China's support continued to happen like in the New York meeting of 2011, that had a similar text regarding Malvinas to the one issued in 2005.

The most relevant institution that Argentina used for attempting to reshape global governance and having more influence was the G-20. Though the G-20 was created in the 1990s, it became relevant after the world financial crisis of 2008 as it was explained before. In the G-20 Argentina's introduced proposals like reforming credit for infrastructure, or expressing its concern about the current financial system (Ramoneda, 2019). Though it may be look like small, it is important to know that Argentina actually attempted to work together with other underdeveloped countries in order to have its interests represented. In the chapter of Argentina-India relations I will cover this more extensible.

Perhaps the most relevant international organization in which both Argentina and China participated together was the CELAC. CELAC which stands for Community of Latin American and Caribbean States was created back in 2011. It is an organization that represented Latin America's momentum in which left-wing organized themselves to create a forum for political coordination, that included all American countries but the USA and Canada. CELAC is autonomy at its best, a group of undeveloped countries organize together in order to understand each other and fuel regional interests. Those regional interests are usually different from the USA ones. China has been the first observer to be admitted in the CELAC. China's presence meant support for the organization and give more credit to it. For China, the CELAC represented the opportunity to engage with countries that recognize Taiwan like Paraguay or Haiti (Niu, 2017). For Latin American countries, China's representation equaled to being endorsed in their experiment of a new foreign policy that reflected the region interests rather than the American ones.

I already cover most of the Argentina-China bilateral and multilateral relationship, so by now the reader must be aware of some things. Originally, China was seen as an actor that could help Argentina in its quest for autonomy, but by now it can be clear that the relation was moving more to a center-periphery relation. The previously mentioned situation became more obvious since 2011. As Argentina's foreign trade deteriorated, in addition to lack of investment and lack of access to credit the Argentinean government realized that it did not have many options. So, when Xi Jinping visited Argentina in 2014 a series of deals were signed. As China was the only country that was willing to provide investment and loans for Argentina, the conditions of some of those deals were harsh (Oviedo D. E., 2017). For starters, China signed swap agreements with Argentina. By no means the Chinese had intentions of using Argentinean Pesos, rather they could be used if Argentina had a liquidity problem (Chiaccheira, 2017). Secondly, Argentina urgently needed infrastructure in energy and trains. A series of agreements were signed for those purposes. In order to solve the energy issue, China compromised to build one nuclear reactor and two hydroelectrical plants. The credit conditions for these projects were harsh, with high interest rates, the obligation of using Chinese workers or even giving priority access to Chinese firms interested in the projects were some of these conditions. The train agreements were had similar characteristics, even going as far as forcing Argentina's to buy Chinese spare parts for the trains. Despite the possibility of buying them in Argentina for a cheaper price (Uriburu Quinta, 2017). Among these series of humiliating agreements, the most controversial was the Deep Space Observation Station. Built in South of Argentina by a Chinese Company owned by the People's Liberation Army, the contract that Argentina signed cannot be seen. It allows Argentina to use the facility only 10% of the available time. Also, it leases Argentina's land to China for a period of 50 years (Dinatale, 2019). The price that Argentina pay for the Chinese investment was extremely high. Moreover, it did not look anything like "South-South cooperation" as the Chinese government said. It looked like Argentina's relation with the UK during the 19th and 20th Century (Bernal-Meza, 2016).

5.4 Chapter Conclusion

Argentina's relation with China went through a complete transformation. Originally, China was seen as an immense market with never ending opportunities, which could make Argentina less dependent on the USA and Western Europe. While for Argentina indeed Europe and the USA become less important than China in trade, it was not so much for Argentina's policy but for a combination of factors. Then China became a source of worriedness for Argentina due to its aggressive economic policies in markets where Argentina had a bigger share like Brazil. In addition, the trade deficit only add more worries to whole situation.


Politically speaking, China went through a similar transformation. Initially it was seen as the country that could help Argentina fuel its autonomy desires. Nevertheless, a series of Argentinean inconsistent moves added to China's own interests prevented that from happening. In addition, China sized Argentina's difficulties for getting investment and credit. While for China it was a win, for Argentina this meant a new dependency with a new actor.

Argentinean imports from China composition

	Primary products	Manufactures natural resources	Manufactures low technology	Manufactures medium technology	Manufactures high technology	Others
2001	0.5%	11%	35%	28%	25%	0.5%
2005	2%	15%	14%	45%	24%	0%
2010	1%	11%	14%	33%	40%	1%
2015	1%	7%	12%	34%	42%	2%

Argentinean exports to China composition

	Primary products	Manufactures natural resources	Manufactures low technology	Manufactures medium technology	Manufactures high technology	Others
2000	76%	3.83%	12%	5%	2%	2%
2005	65%	25%	7%	9%	0,5%	0,3%
2010	90%	6%	4%	2%	1%	1%
2015	88%	10%	2%	2%	0	0



6.0 Argentina-India Relations

6.1 The evolution of the economic relations between Argentina and India

If compared with China's presence in Latin America, India's presence is rather small. While China's trade with the region is over 140 billion USD a year, India's trade with the region is around 20 billion USD (Heine & Viswanathan, 2011). The immense difference between India's and China's economic involvement in Latin America would suggest that trading with India is not a priority. Even though the trade difference is enormous, India has an untapped trade potential with Latin America, in particular with Argentina. The reason for the previously mentioned statement lies on India's trade structure with Latin America. India's trade with Latin America is basically done with a small group of Latin American countries, among them we can mention Brazil, Mexico, Venezuela, Chile and Argentina (Heine, 2012).

During the 20th Century, trade relations between India and Argentina (as well as Latin America) were very limited. The small trade interaction between the South Asian country and Argentina was due to a number of domestic and logistics reasons. From its independence until the 1990s India was almost a closed economy with extremely high tariffs for imports, tariffs were especially high for agricultural products. From the Argentinean side, during the 20th Century, the most important markets were in Western Europe and in the United States. Moreover, the distance between Asia and Latin America acted as a barrier to any attempt of establishing large influx of trade.

The end of the Cold War, the triumph of capitalism meant changes for the India-Argentina relations. During the 1990s, India started an economic liberalization process, which included reducing or eliminating tariffs in goods like edible oils as well as simplifying non-tariffs barriers. On average tariffs went down from 128% in the 1990s to 32% in 2002 then to 15,8% (Mesquita Moreira, 2009). On the Argentinean side, Asia started to be more of a priority market for Argentinean primary products like beef, edible oils, wheat, soybeans, soybean flour among others. The combination of these factors triggered the initial growth in the economic relations between the two countries (Rubiolo

& Baroni, *The role of emerging economies in the 21st Century: India in Latin America and its relation with Argentina*, 2014).

Moving on to the first years of the 21st Century, it can be seen that the India-Argentina trade relation was growing, though at a slower pace than the Argentina-China one. Argentina's economy was stabilizing after the 2001 crash. Not only the economy was stabilizing but a new administration, the Nestor Kirchner administration, started to rule the country in 2003.

The economic reforms that India started at the end of the 20th Century were having noticeable effects after more than 10 years of being implemented. India was able to transform its economic structure. From the 1990s up to now, agriculture has decreased its participation in the GDP being 17% of it. While services and at a lesser degree industry have increased its participation in the Indian GDP, with services being around 65% of India's GDP. At the same time, agriculture went from being 70% of India's job's source agriculture to 55% . India's successful reforms transformed the country into an economic powerhouse, with an average growth of 8% a year. The economic boom that India has been experiencing has been compared to China, its big neighbor. Even though, China transformation is even more impressive, the Indian case should not be overlooked. India's spectacular transformation meant that poverty was reduced from 55% in the late 1970s to less than 30% in the 21st Century (Mesquita Moreira, 2009). At the same time, people started to eat more calories from a wider range of food products. Soybeans, sunflower oil, flours started to be consumed at faster rate.

I previously mentioned that India partially opened some of its market. Even though the agricultural sector largely remained unopened, some exceptions were made. The edible oils sector, was one of the previously mentioned exceptions. As it was said before, edible oils constitute a valuable source of calories, vital for India's growing population. The Indian state takes food safety very seriously. Apart from having a distribution supply line, the Indian state seeks to make sure that cheap imports of edible oils will be ready for Indian consumers (Ramaswamy, 2017).

India's need for a cheap supply of edible oils as well as other agriculture products such as soybeans were met with Argentinean needs for selling the previously kind of products

that the country have in abundance (Viswanathan, 2017). Asia as a whole, but particularly India, China and the ASEAN countries became promising markets. There is more than supply meet demand. To be more precise, the tariffs that the European Union has to protect its agricultural sector, has prevented larger sells of Argentinean agricultural products to European countries. As I have shown in the Argentina-China case, once again Argentina used the guidelines of autonomy and diversify its trade partners.

As Argentina's traditional markets, Western European countries and the United States were hard to access, it is natural that Argentinean farmers started to look for new markets. Being India a superpower, which needs an ever-increasing amount of food, it should not come as a surprise when the data gives a great increase in the Argentinean exports to India. Sunflower oil constantly increased its participation in Argentinean exports to India, representing more than 70% of the Argentinean exports to India (Rubiolo & Baroni, The role of emerging economies in the 21st Century: India in Latin America and its relation with Argentina, 2014).

On the other hand, India has always had a more diversified export basket to Argentina. Having industrial goods and chemicals as it main exports. Nevertheless, it is important to add that Indian trade with Argentina is quite different from Argentinean trade with China. There are three main differences: Firstly, while Chinese exports to Argentina are mostly integrated by industrial goods, Indian ones have a large share of raw materials. To be more precise, that raw material is fabric that Argentinean industries need for manufacturing clothes. Secondly, as it was shown in the previous chapter, Argentina has been experimenting a massive trade deficit with China since 2008.while Argentina has been enjoying a trade surplus with India for decades, which in 2010 reached 1.6 Billion USD. Thirdly, India has always shown willingness to accept other countries industrialization processes (Viswanathan, 2011).

In the previous paragraph, I stated that India is a country that is willing to accept other countries industrialization processes. Rather than applying tariffs or non-tariffs barriers for edible oils, India has opened the market, letting countries that excel at edible oils like Argentina, sell their products. Moreover, India quest for food security is planned in a completely different way than the Chinese strategy (Viswanathan, 2014). In the previous

chapter, I explained on the incident between China and Argentina back in 2009 regarding the soybean oil issue. India sized the opportunity of having cheap soybean oil for its people, rather than trying to process the soybeans in India for manufacturing soybean oil. India's quick move was a blessing for Argentina which was able to keep exporting its edible oils, rather than just exporting raw soybeans (Oviedo, 2012).

Speaking of different approaches to region, I would like to briefly discuss how Indian companies have approached to Argentina when compared to the Chinese strategy. In the previous chapter it was already stated that China's approach to Argentina is dependent on Chinese State-owned enterprises (SOE). In different fields like oil, edible-oils, soybeans farm the Chinese method is always similar, a Chinese SOE usually buys the company or at least becomes the major share-holder. China uses its SOE as its part is of a grand strategy of securing energy security and food security, thus enhancing its industrialization process. To be clearer, by having the ownership of Argentinean soybean farms or Argentinean oil deposits, China can secure its quest for energy and food security, ship the goods to China and enhance its industrialization process.

On the other hand, India's strategy is completely different to China's one. In India's approach to Argentina private owned companies are by far the most relevant, SOE have a neglectable role (Turzi, 2016). Indian investments in Argentina are not concentrated in the primary sector, that's not to say that India has not been invested in farms or other raw materials. The most relevant investments that India has done in Argentina are on the services sector, groups like TATA consultancy employ a large number of Argentines (Cardozo, 2012). When investing on the primary sector, India's goals involves more on the idea of food/energy security rather than attempting industrialization of the raw materials (Turzi, 2016). This in turn, allows Argentina to add value to the raw materials. If we add to what was previously said, India's investment in some manufacturing sectors like agrochemicals with United Phosphorus, it can be said that it can help Argentina to export more industrial goods (Tharoor, 2012).

The trade exchange between Argentina and India growth steadily since 2003 when the exchange was 500 million USD to 2012 when it reached almost 2 billion USD (Rubiolo & Baroni, *The role of emerging economies in the 21st Century: India in Latin America*

and its relation with Argentina, 2014). As it was said before, India's quest for food security is the main reason behind it. Indian purchases of edible oils represent a large part of the bilateral trade exchange. In addition to the regular sunflower oil purchases, India become an extremely important destination for soybean oil after the political crisis that Argentina had with China in 2009. Though bilateral trade between Argentina and India growth substantially during the Kirchners' era, it looks like the relation had potential for more. As both Argentina and India have signed a Preferential Trade Agreement in 2005 as part of the MERCOSUR-India talks. In the next section of this chapter I will analyze with more detail the PTA. It is important to remark two things more, first one Argentina has had a trade surplus through all Kirchners' time, even nowadays the surplus still goes on. Secondly, while its true that Indian exports to Argentina include raw materials, Argentina's exports are basically edible oils. So, Argentina is repeating its trade structure with other Asian countries, inter-industrial trade patterns. Nevertheless, India represented an alternative way of doing trade and investment. As former Indian ambassador to Argentina Viswanathan said, India brings an Indian story, not a Chinese story.²¹

6.2 Argentina-India political relations during the Nestor Kirchner's administration.

Political relations between Argentina and India in the 20th Century were similar to the economic relations between the two countries. Distance, the Cold War environment prevent any important political contact between the two countries. Though there were visits from the Indian Prime Ministers and the Argentinean Presidents, those visits were rather infrequent. In spite of not having a frequent political contact, it is worth that Argentina and India had some agreements in the international politics arena. Both countries were members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), until Argentina left it in the 1990s (Rubiolo & Baroni, *The role of emerging economies in the 21st Century: India in Latin America and its relation with Argentina*, 2014). Also, India supported

²¹ In Argentinean culture a Chinese story means something that is not true. The Ambassador point was that when India said win-win relationship or mutual development they really meant it.

Argentina's position on the Malvinas Islands by expressing it in Argentinean Officials visits as well as by openly saying it in forums like NAM.

Before analyzing in detail, the evolution of the bilateral relationship between Argentina and India, it is best to state some coincidences between the Kirchners' administration foreign goals and India's international aspirations. As it was previously explained in the initial chapters, Nestor and Cristina Kirchner international goals were based by the idea of autonomy. In international relations, autonomy can be described as the path towards making a country have more options on its political goals. Those options have to be different from the ones that the hegemon offers to the country that is attempting autonomy. In order to achieve this, a reform of global institutions is required as the current setting responds to the interests of the hegemon and the other powers. Though the idea of autonomy is an Argentinean concept which is hard to apply to countries like India, India's foreign policy goals have some interesting similarities with the autonomy ideas. India as an emerging power desires to exercise a bigger degree of influence on global affairs, in order to do that the country has realized it needs to change the global governance organizations (Rodriguez de la Vega & Massot, 2015). That's why India has determined that it needs to lobby for change in the UN, the IMF and in the WTO. Ideally, a reconfiguration of this institutions would allow a fairer representation of power structure, allowing developing states like India to have a louder voice (Shidore, 2013). As it will be seen later, India's goals might or might not (depending in each institution) match Argentinean goals.

The World Trade Organization is a good example to analyze how India's and Argentina's aspirations can match, thus fueling Argentina's idea of autonomy. The WTO main goal is to make trade easier by removing tariff and non-tariffs barriers. The issue that the WTO has, is the clash of positions between developed countries and non-developed countries. While the former ones want to eliminate tariffs to industrial goods while protecting their agricultural products the latter ones want the exact opposite. Being Argentina and India agricultural producers, both countries want tariffs and non-tariffs barrier on agricultural products to be gone. In addition, both India and Argentina wanted agricultural subsidies to be gone. During the Doha round of 2003 Argentina joined forces with India as well as

other agricultural producers demanding the end of tariff and non-tariffs barriers on agriculture (Shi, 2010). The position of Argentina and India, as well as other countries, went against the desires of the USA, the European Union and Japan. Because neither party was ready to backtrack the round collapsed (Rodriguez de la Vega & Massot, 2015). The collapse, thanks to the joint work of Argentina with India and other countries, meant that Argentinean interests were not hurt. From this success in 2003 onwards Argentina and India would share similar positions in the WTO. Later on, I will provide more details.

The great result of the joint work in the WTO between Argentina and India, was followed by other big success. A new milestone in the relationship between Argentina and India came with the signature of the PTA signed between MERCOSUR-India in 2003. This economic agreement between the MERCOSUR and India eliminated and reduced tariffs on around 650 products from MERCOSUR and 400 from India. With the help of Brazil which was one of the countries that was most involved in pushing with the deal, the MERCOSUR was able to sign one of its most important trade agreements so far.²² The MERCOSUR-India PTA came as a way of attempting to size the potentials that the trade between MERCOSUR biggest members (Argentina, Brazil and later Venezuela) had with India. Being them producers of edible oils in the case of Argentina and Brazil, oil in the case of Venezuela it was in India's interests to have these products with a reduced tax. So fulfilling its energy and food security needs could become more feasible. On MERCOSUR side, India provided cheap pharmaceutical and chemicals goods with the region was needing (Rimoldi de Ladmann, 2006). Though the economies were complementarians, the PTA was not fully used. Non-tariffs barriers were not always removed both in India and the MERCOSUR. So the potential benefits that the agreement had were not completely sized.

MERCOSUR-India PTA, was an important milestone on the bilateral relationship between Argentina and India. The last years of the Nestor Kirchner administration were marked by a larger political interaction with India on the bilateral relation. In 2006,

²² The PTA with India has actually been enforced. I don't personally think that FTA with the EU can be ratified by both EU members and MERCOSUR members, specially since the new Fernandez administration is ruling the country. That's why I believe the PTA with India is the most important agreement that MERCOSUR has.

Kirchner's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Taiana, went on a visit to India. Though Mr. Taiana's visit to India was a consequence of a bigger trade interaction, as it was explained before India's demand of edible oils triggered a sharp increase in the bilateral trade, politics also played a role. During this trip, Mr. Taiana and his Indian counterpart had some topics on international politics issues. Just to mention some, reform of global governance organizations, like the United Nations or the International Monetary Fund, as well as agriculture subsidies on the World Trade Organization (Rubiolo & Baroni, 2014). At the same time, Mr. Taiana thanked his Indian counterpart for expressing support to the Argentinean position on the Malvinas Islands.

6.3 Argentina-India relation during the administration of Cristina Kirchner

Continuing the line of his husband and predecessor, Cristina Kirchner kept the good understanding between Argentina and India during her tenure (2007-2015). The large interaction during Cristina Kirchner's government was not only due to bilateral factors like trade, but it was also a consequence of the international situation. The devastating effects of the 2008 global financial crisis not only meant economic disaster, it also was seen for many underdeveloped countries as a way of attempting to reform the global institutions. Countries like Argentina, India or China, just to mention a few examples, felt that because the economic model that was "recommended" by developed countries failed, something must be done. Not only the economic failure was big among developed countries, at the same time, emerging countries like India, China or even Argentina were doing comparatively better (Li, 2012). Because the previously mentioned countries, among others, were doing comparatively better, they thought that the current distribution of power in the global governance was not representing them. Therefore, those countries demanded change.

Though institutions like the UN or the IMF were the priorities of emerging powers like India or China, Argentina had milder reforms for those institutions. After the outbreak of the global financial crisis, an existing organization, the G-20, became extremely relevant. Being Argentina part of the G-20 and realizing how important it had become, the Argentinean leadership attempted its reformist agenda on the G-20. With the aid of

India as well Indonesia, Argentina was to have it passed a resolution on investment in infrastructure in 2012 (Elias, 2014).

The good trade relation between Argentina triggered Argentina's move to open a consulate in Mumbai in order to facilitate business (Elias, 2014). The year immediately after the global financial crisis, 2009, Cristina Kirchner visited India. It was the first visit of an Argentinean President after 15 years. Once again, the warm relation that the countries were experimenting was a consequence of both bilateral interactions and international circumstances. During her visit, President Kirchner expressed her gratitude to Prime Minister Singh for India's support for Argentina's position on both the UN decolonization committee as well as on the Doha meeting of 2005 of the G-77 (G-77, 2005). Keeping on the political line, both President Kirchner and Prime Minister Singh agreed on the necessity for a reform of the global governance. In other words, both India and Argentina agreed that the international institutions, the way they work and their results was shaped according to the interest of the hegemon and its allies. Therefore, both Argentina and India agreed on their need for institutions that did not only respond to the hegemon and its allies' interests but to a bigger degree of countries (Rodriguez de la Vega & Massot, 2015).

The words that Mr. Singh and Ms. Kirchner shared were more than polite words. Two years later, on the 2011 New York's declaration of the G-77 (G-77, 2011), India once again supported Argentina's claims for the Malvinas Islands. India's support to the Argentinean cause was not only limited to the G-77, it also was accompanied by Indian support to the resolutions in the United Nations Committee on Decolonization, a historic support that can be traced back to the 1980s (United Nations, 2006).

Keeping the line of her predecessor, Cristina Kirchner kept demanding the end of agriculture subsidies in the WTO. Once again, Argentina teamed with India as well as other countries that demanded the same. Though agriculture subsidies could not be achieved due to the fierce resistance of the developed nations, Argentina as well as India and other countries did not have to eliminate tariffs and non-tariffs barriers on industrial goods (Rodriguez de la Vega & Massot, 2015). The elimination of tariffs and non-tariffs barriers on industrial goods was a demand made by the developed nations. I consider this

as a victory that Argentina achieved working together with underdeveloped countries, but above all with the support of emerging powers like India. The joint work of the previously mentioned countries was strong enough to have the power to make a different decision than the one that developed nations wanted. As what developed nations wanted was not the best for Argentinean interests.

Even though Argentina and India had done an immense joint working attempting to have their interests protected on global institutions, the full potential of the relation was not sized. The reason for that is mostly a consequence of Argentina's own ideas. To clarify I will give two important cases. Firstly, while India wanted to reform the global financial institutions like the IMF in order to exercise a bigger degree of world economic matters, Argentina took a different approach. Argentina during the Kirchners' times, after paying its debt to the IMF in 2005, refused to pay an active role in the institution. Argentina's mistrust on the IMF prevented serious interactions with countries like India which were desiring to change the power distribution of it. This serious mistake that Argentina made, prevented it from having a bigger role on the decision making of global affairs.

The second mistake that Argentina made, was due to a liberal conception of world affairs. A strict liberal vision of international affairs states that all countries are equal, the issue is that countries are not equal as their power determinates the position that they can have. Argentina's liberal vision during the Kirchners' times stated that the Security Council of the United Nations must be eliminated, allowing the General Assembly to take the decisions that the Security Council usually does. This is because in the General Assembly no country has veto power, so countries are equal. India has been trying to modify the Security Assembly but in a different way. India, with Brazil and Japan has tried to expand the number of permanent members with veto power. Being a permanent member of the Security Council is main priority (Shi, 2010). Argentina's lack of support to the Indian proposal was a wrong decision, since it is better for Argentina to have India and Brazil in the council as both countries have historically supported Argentina's claim on Malvinas (Shidore, 2013). In addition, both countries shared similar concerns with Argentina in forums like the G-20 or the WTO.

Perhaps, one of India's biggest support to Argentina's endorsement of the CELAC. Following what was said in the China chapter, CELAC represented the biggest coordinated attempt done by Latin American countries for reshaping global governance. The endorsement that both China and India provided was extremely important, as it from that time onwards it has been having the support of two big regional players (Shidore, 2013). Despite having powerful countries that endorsed CELAC, the organization did not seize the moment. As time went by, CELAC has become another Latin American institution without a clear direction or purpose.

6.4 Summary of Argentina-India relations

The vibrant economic relation between Argentina and India was the kickstart for warmer political relations. Even though, the trade relation means a trade surplus for Argentina, so far, the trade structure is replicating a developed-underdeveloped pattern. On the political aspect, similar concerns and a changing international environment made India and Argentina come closer. Their similar concerns, which were reshaping global governance, were expressed in international forums with some success. Ultimately, the reason for a limited success was due to a harsh regional panorama in Latin America which included weak economies across the region. As well as the conservative restoration in most Latin American countries.

Argentinean imports from India composition

	Primary products	Manufactures natural resources	Manufactures low technology	Manufactures medium technology	Manufactures medium technology	Others
2000	4%	40%	20%	22%	10%	
2005	1%	32%	15%	40%	12%	
2010	3%	40%	15%	25%	15%	
2014	2%	30%	20%	33%	15%	

Argentinean exports to India composition

	Primary products	Manufactures natural resources	Manufactures low technology	Manufactures medium technology	Manufactures high technology	Others
2000	4%	90%	2,5%	3,5%		
2005	10%	85%	2,5%	3,5%		
2010	3%	92%	2,5%	3,5%		
2015	5%	92%	2%	1%		



7.0 Conclusion

In the first sections of this thesis, I stated that the Kirchners' used the guidelines that the autonomy theory provides to pursue Argentina's interest. That's why, Argentina tried to have a solid relationship with India and China. Both Asian regional powers could, in theory, provide the economic and political alternatives that Argentina was trying to get. After reading the main analysis is quite clear, that while India could, up to some extent, fulfill the Kirchners' goals, China was quite different.

According to the Kirchners' plans, national interest was pursued in two ways. The first one was economic autonomy. This concept can be understood in two ways, diversification of the trade partners and the creation of a new economic structure of the country itself. The country that is attempting autonomy will reduce the dependence that it has on the hegemon (USA) and its allies (Western Europe) by finding new trade partners. The latter one, involves industrializing the country in order to cut the country's dependence on raw materials. As according to the autonomy theory, exporting only raw materials and importing industrial goods on the long run tend to deteriorate the foreign exchange of the raw material exporter. Most importantly, economic transformation is required to have a successful political autonomy. Attempting political autonomy while being a raw material exporter is doomed to fail.

Pursuing national interest in the political sphere, is linked to the concept of political autonomy. This is to say that the country that is applying autonomy must pursue its own interests, rather than following the hegemon wishes. That's not to say that the country that is applying autonomy needs to antagonize with the hegemon. Because the autonomy theory is a realist theory, the power difference between the hegemon and underdeveloped countries is taking into account. So basically, the autonomy suggests pursuing a country interests, while working with other underdeveloped countries and avoid antagonizing with the hegemon.

During the Kirchners' time, but specially during Cristina Kirchner two terms Argentina attempted an autonomy policy, as a mean to pursue Argentina's national interest. On the

economic side, East Asia became increasingly important as a trade partner, making the USA and Western Europe secondary markets. This trend became extremely clear by the end of Cristina Kirchner second term, but this was more due to the economic facts that have been explained before rather than an achievement of policy. On the transformation of the economic structure of Argentina, the Kirchners' administration fueled some industrial transformation. Though most of the industries created targeted the local market or the Latin American market.

On regards to political autonomy, Nestor Kirchner's administration was quieter about it, because the economic situation of the country did not allow much room for an autonomy policy. Nevertheless, he took some steps towards autonomy like refusing to get Argentina involved in the Iraq War, or making a clear policy of forcing the UK to engage in talks for the Malvina's issue. Multiple resolutions from the Committee on decolonization supporting Argentina, or the statement of the G-77 in 2005 are proof of Kirchner's work. In addition, I believe that choosing an alternative economic model to neoliberalism as Nestor Kirchner did it is also a way of expressing autonomy. Back in 2003 the USA and American lead institutions like the IMF lobbied for keeping neoliberalism, which already had terrible consequences for Argentina, so being able to choose a different model that considered Argentina's circumstances is a way of constructing autonomy. As the Argentinean economy recovered, and international circumstances changed due to the international crisis of 2008 it makes sense that Argentina tried pushed forward with autonomy. National interest was pursued through international organizations like G-77 or the G-20. Nevertheless, Cristina Kirchner's foreign policy was erratic because she had a realist goal like autonomy while holding liberal values like equality between States. This contradiction prevented Argentina from pursuing its national interest in a more conductive way. Moreover, from 2011 when the economic situation started deteriorating, Argentina became more dependent on China as it had no other country which could provide investment and loans.

Did the Kirchners' attempt to have a good relation with India and China had a positive influence in pursuing Argentina's national interest? The answer to this question is rather complex. While initially, China was an economic hope for Argentina with its immense

market, this situation changed fast. From 2008 onwards, China became a source of concern as the trade deficit that China meant for Argentina increased constantly. In addition, Chinese products displaced Argentinean goods from traditional markets like Brazil or other Latin American countries. The political relation with China went through a similar path. While at first China seemed to be a good partner for Argentina's attempt to pursue national interest, it did not last long. Originally, China supported Argentina in its claims, as well as supporting Argentina in forums like G-77 or G-20. However, problems soon appeared. Issues happened for two causes, first Argentina's autonomy or idea of reform went against Chinese interests. For example eliminating the Security Council or going against liberalization of industrial goods in the WTO went against Chinese interests. In addition, the financial crisis gave China a momentum that it sized, abandoning the idea of third world solidarity and changing it for a classic North-South relationship. If we also take into account Argentina own financial problems from 2011 onwards, it should not come as a surprise that China became a sort of new hegemon for Argentina, rather than helping it in its quest for autonomy.

On the other hand, India's initially kept a low profile. While it is true that the economic trade between Argentina and India is much smaller than the Argentina-China trade relation, it is also true that India's always provided a trade surplus for Argentina. India's exports did not threaten Argentina's trade with Brazil like in the Chinese case. However, that's because until now India's has not been able to boost its industrial sector. On the political side, India's has been a supporter of Argentina's ideas in the G-20, G-77 and in the UN. India's support has continued despite Argentina's call to end the Security Council in which India wants to be a permanent member. India's endorsement to Latin American autonomy organizations like CELAC give the organization more credibility. In addition, India's way of foreign policy looks "benign", so it has been an important partner for building autonomy. If Argentina left its liberal values behind, much more could have been done.

Ultimately, Argentina's lack of consistency in the way it did its foreign policy added to Argentina's incomplete economic transformation limited Argentina's ambitious goals. Thinking for the future, even though China has become a hegemon for Argentina,

Argentina cannot turn its back to it. What Argentina needs, is a regional approach to China in order to be able to have better outcomes. Regarding India, despite India having a much milder approach when compared with China, I will give the same recommendation that I did with China. Latin American countries need a regional approach to India as well. I think both India and China have become extremely important partner for Argentina, but if Argentina does not act carefully, it will have two Asian hegemons rather than an American one.



8.0 Appendix

8.1 Interview to Ezequiel Ramoneda

Professional Profile: Professor Ramoneda teaches at Salvador University in Buenos Aires, Argentina. He specializes in Argentina-East Asia relations. Also, his research interests include Southeast Asian countries relations with Latin America. He is currently doing his PhD at La Plata's National University, in La Plata, Argentina.

Interview Date: August 15th, 2019

- 1- How would you characterize Argentinean foreign policy during the administrations of Nestor and Cristina Kirchner? Which theory of international relations could be applied to their administrations?

As an introductory comment I can say that the autonomy theory is the most suitable one.

- 2- Can you describe the goals of the Nestor Kirchner's administration foreign policy? First of all, it is important to understand the context in which Nestor Kirchner became the President of Argentina. Back in 2003, when Kirchner became the President of Argentina, the country was going through an immense crisis, which affected the economy, the society and the political stability. In addition, Argentina was isolated from the international community due to the default of its national debt. At that time, Nestor Kirchner's top priority was to normalize Argentina's relations with the international community.

In Nestor Kirchner own thought, the crisis that the country was experiencing was the consequence of the implementation of neoliberal measures during the 1990s. Those neoliberal measures were recommended by Western lead institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank. Because in Kirchner own thought, the previously named institutions were to blame, he decided to move closer to the Third World. In constructing this third world identity, South American countries played a central role. South American integration process became a relevant goal for the Kirchner administration. In this sense, regional

blocs like MERCOSUR were re-thought as platforms for empowering its members (Argentina, Brazil, Uruguay and Paraguay). MERCOSUR started to be projected to its inside by having a better political understanding between its members as well as bigger infrastructure connectivity.

To sum up, I believe that the goals the Nestor Kirchner had were re-inserting Argentina into the international community and strengthening the local integration process.

- 3- Can you describe the goals of the Cristina Kirchner administration foreign policy? Do you see changes or continuities?

I would like to start answering this question by explaining that according to the autonomy theory, the end goal of a government should be the increase of its available options in the international arena. A classic interpretation of the autonomy theory believes that the power is static, and the decisions that country take in the international arena are driven by a 0 sum game. In the early 21st Century, autonomy thinkers stated that the autonomy does not necessarily mean a 0 sum game. In other words, a group of countries could win autonomy without affecting other countries autonomy.

Having said that, I will now examine Cristina Kirchner administration. In her first term (2007-2011) I see a continuity with her husband policies. Her initial term tried to acquire autonomy in a modern definition of the theory. In this first stage, Cristina Kirchner followed the trend started by her husband of getting new partners with shared interests. Resulting in an increased autonomy.

In contrast, during her second term (2011-2015) confrontation was present, to be more precise it was a classical way of looking for autonomy. “When I win autonomy you lose yours”. Rather than winning autonomy or getting new partners during Cristina Kirchner second term Argentina’s diminished its partners. With less partners, the idea of autonomy also diminished as Argentina had less countries to work together with.

- 4- I would like to go back to one of the points you made before. At one point, you stated that Argentina rejected the ideas of Western lead institutions like the IMF or the WB. Is it correct to say that Argentina was anti-American?

The idea of breaking relations with the United States might sound romantic for some people in Latin America. Breaking a relation, severing it means ending all type of contact and exchanges between two States. There are economic exchanges, political exchanges, cooperation exchanges, among others. Breaking a relation means, ending them all.

What can be said though, is that during Cristina Kirchner second term there was a cooling down of the relations between Argentina and America. There was a strong language present against the United States in the speeches of Cristina Kirchner. But that does not mean that Argentina was anti-American.

- 5- In your view, is it correct to see Chavez movement in Venezuela and Kirchners' administration as sharing a similar Anti-American values?

Though both administrations shared a similar dissatisfaction with American policies in the region, as well as a similar dissatisfaction to American neoliberal policies, the degree of intensity was extremely different. While Argentina, showed a mild reaction, Venezuela's answer was a strong one. Venezuela went as far as trying to create its own bloc, the ALBA, to counterweight America's presence in the region. Political friction between Venezuela has been increasingly worse, going as far as closing its embassies at times. Nevertheless, during the whole time period the United States kept being the biggest trade partner of Venezuela.

To sum up, Venezuela strong reaction to America and its end goals are completely different from the Argentinean ones.

- 6- Can you describe which methods did the Kirchners' administrations use for achieving its foreign goals? Did they use international organizations like G-20, G-77, UN, WTO or others?

Through all the Kirchners' administrations, the G-77 was a relevant platform for pushing Argentinean claims. It should not be a surprise, as in the G-77 Argentina was able to construct its third world identity. After the world financial crisis of 2008, the G-20 became more relevant. So Argentina became more vocal in it, specially to criticize first world countries while supporting countries like China or Russia.

- 7- Could you please tell me how was the relationship with China during the Kirchners' administration? Which role did the Asian country fulfil?

Leaving aside the political affinity that at times China and Argentina had, the relation was based on economic exchanges. From the 1990s onwards, China started to become a relevant trade partner of Argentina. From the first years of the 21st Century China became one of Argentina main trading partners. Originally, Argentina had a trade surplus with China, then it became a trade deficit. This is due to the lack of diversification of Argentinean exports (to China and East Asian countries in general). Argentina has concentrated its exports goods around commodities like soybeans, while China has diversified its export goods.


After the world financial crisis of 2008, Argentina found extremely hard to get loans from traditional financial markets. This was not only due to the world financial crisis, but to Argentina's issue with the hedge funds. In this context, China presented itself as a creditor to Argentina. A flexible type of creditor who is not interested in the political circumstances of the country that receives the loan. At the same time, China became an important investor for Argentina. The relation between Argentina and China should not be seen as a government type of relation, but as State to State relation. In other words, the type of relation that Argentina has with China will not (and has been not) affected by the end of the Kirchners' terms. What is more, Argentina will likely have this kind of relation with many East Asian countries. Relation by which Argentina sells primary goods and buy industrial ones from Asia, while depending on Asian investment for its development. East Asian countries have become for the Argentinean political class the new market for Argentinean products.

- 8- How did Argentina solve its political crisis with China back in 2008?

The crisis is related to the trade structure of Argentina-China trade. Because Argentina did not diversify its exports in East Asia (Argentina exports diverse goods to Latin America) the problem existed. While China diversified its exports goods to Argentina, China gained a stronger position in the bilateral relationship. Therefore, it should not be a surprise that China used its power against by

refusing to buy Argentinean soybeans. China decision presented a big economic problem for Argentina, as China was the main destination for Argentinean soy. Argentina solved the issue thanks to India, as India decided to buy Argentinean soybeans. But the solution is only temporal, as Argentina has a similar concentration of its exports goods with India and China. So, if an issue is to happen between Argentina and India, I wonder what could Argentina do.

- 9- Which is the final conclusion you can reach regarding Argentina-China relations? The presence of China in Argentina cannot be ignored, its immense community in Argentina, its Confucius Institutes are too big to be ignored. The political elite of Argentina has realized the influence that China has in Argentina. On the economic side, I do not think that the trade structure will change in the near future. I think that the role that China plays in Argentina today is both impossible to ignore and essential for the Argentinean economy.



8.2 Interview to Miguel Velloso

Professional Profile: Mr. Miguel Velloso is an experienced diplomat from Argentina. During his career, he has been assigned to different posts in East Asia like Japan and China. He was the Argentinean Consul in Shanghai from 2000 to 2008. Nowadays, he is the Director of the Argentinean Trade and Cultural Office in Taiwan.

Date April 20th 2019

- 1- Which were the goals of the Kirchners' administration with East Asia as whole? Which targets did Argentina at that time have with China?

In a context in which Argentina took distance from the traditional credit institutions like the International Monetary Fund or the World Bank, China became an important creditor for Argentina. This must be seen through the new reality by which China has been building its own financial institutions as well as becoming a lender for many countries that cannot have access to traditional credit institutions. The swaps that Argentina and China signed are a part of this new reality.

China's importance is also related to political issues. Both Argentina and China have territorial claims that are a core of their politics. In China's case, it is the one China policy by which Taiwan is a province of China. In the Argentinean case, it is the Malvinas (Falklands) islands case, which are part of Argentina despite the British occupation of them. Therefore both Argentina and China support each other claims. China's support in multilateral forums like the United Nations Committee on Decolonization was quite strong through all the Kirchners' times.

Finally, China's thirsts for raw materials was extremely important for Argentina and South American countries in general. Due to China's massive purchases of South American raw materials, South American economies benefit greatly. But, it is worth mentioning that the trade relation between South American economies (including Argentina) and China has become inter-industrial.

- 2- In your one of your previous answers you stated that Argentina took distance from the United States, did that have any influence in the Argentinean behavior with China?

First of all, it is important to understand that since George Bush Jr. administration until the second term of Barak Obama as the President of the United States, Latin America was not a priority for the American foreign policy. The top priorities for the U.S.A were the Middle East and later the Asia-Pacific as a consequence of China's increasing importance. Because of this reason, China sized the opportunity and filled the power gap in Latin America. In addition, Argentina behavior toward China can be explained by using the concept of third world solidarity.

- 3- What were the reasons behind the 2009 Argentina-China political crisis?

Well the answer is quite simple, China started to process its soybeans in order to produce soybean flour among other products. Argentina was already producing soybean flour and was interested in keep selling it to China rather than just selling soybeans. From a realist point of view, China applied its power through sanctions in order to reach its goals.

- 4- How did China's presence in South America changed the dynamics of the region? What China has been doing is making South American countries compete against each other for Chinese investment as well as Chinese purchases of raw materials. In addition, China presence in South America meant having a competitor for selling industrial goods to other South American countries. For instance, Argentinean industrial goods in Brazil cannot compete against Chinese ones.

- 5- What should the region do to stay relevant?

I think that South American countries need to start planning together in order to stay relevant in the future. Joint infrastructure projects, like the bi-ocean network that Argentina and Chile are doing, is a great way of staying competitive.

- 6- What are your closing remarks about Argentina-China relations?

Relationship between the two countries has grown immensely since the first years of the 21st Century. Relation is mature enough to change smoothly from

Cristina Kirchner administration to Mauricio Macri one. Even though some small changes were made by Macri, all in all, the relationship was not affected. This is a reflection of how important and how much does Argentina cares of its relation with China.



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