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When Does Economic Interdependence Lead to Political Integration? A Comparison Between the EU, East and West Germany, and Cross- Strait Relations

經濟互賴何時導致政治整合？
歐盟，兩德和兩岸關係的比較

Master's Thesis 碩士論文

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Abstract

Political integration has been studied for years, yet it is still unclear when and why political integration occurs. More specifically, why has political integration taken place within the European Union and between East and West Germany but not between Taiwan and China – although all three cases share the same independent variables, such as economic interdependence, functional cooperation, social transactions, and actor's pursuit of self-interest. This thesis attempts to fill this gap by arguing that for political integration to occur, there have to be three additional independent variables: a cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion. These are of equal importance and all form necessary conditions. Thus, the three independent variables have to be given for political integration to be accomplished. These were and are given for the EU and East and West Germany, but not in the case of Taiwan and China. Rather, in Cross-Strait relations, the political leadership has been uncooperative, the international system has been unfavorable, and the public opinion has been unfavorable for political integration as well.

Keywords: Political Integration, Economic Interdependence, Cross-Strait Relations, EU, East and West Germany.

摘要

政治整合已經研究多年，但政治整合何時以及為何發生仍不清楚。更具體地說，為什麼在歐盟內部和東德和西德之間發生了政治一體化，而在台灣和中國之間卻沒有發生——儘管這三個案例具有相同的自變量，例如經濟相互依存、功能合作、社會交易和行動者追求出於自身利益。本文試圖通過認為要發生政治一體化來填補這一空白，還必須存在三個額外的獨立變量：合作的政治領導、有利的國際體系和有利的輿論。這些都是同等重要的，都構成了必要條件。因此，要實現政治一體化，必須給出三個自變量。這些過去和現在都適用於歐盟和東德和西德，但不適用於台灣和中國。相反，在兩岸關係中，政治領導不合作，國際體系不利，輿論也不利於政治一體化。

關鍵字: 政治整合，經濟互賴，兩岸關係，歐洲聯盟，東德和西德。

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List of Abbreviations

ARATS	Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BRD	Bundesrepublik Deutschland
CAP	Common Agricultural Policy
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CFSP	Common Foreign and Security Policy
CSSTA	Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement
DDR	Deutsche Demokratische Republik
DPP	Democratic Progressive Party
DRV	Democratic Republic of Vietnam
ECB	European Central Bank
ECFA	Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement
ECSC	European Coal and Steel Community
EDC	European Defense Community
EEC	European Economic Community
EEAS	European External Action Service
EMU	Economic and Monetary Union
EPC	European Political Community
EU	European Union
EURATOM	European Atomic Energy Community
FRG	Federal Republic of Germany
GDR	German Democratic Republic
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
HST	Hegemonic Stability Theory
IAS	Institute for Advanced Study
KMT	Kuomintang
Mercosur	Southern Common Market
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCCU	National Chengchi University
OECD	Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development
OEEC	Organization for European Economic Co-operation
PhD	Doctor of Philosophy
PRC	People's Republic of China
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PTA	Preferential Trade Agreement
RIA	Regional Integration Agreement
ROC	Republic of China
RVN	Republic of Vietnam
SEA	Single European Act
SEF	Straits Exchange Foundation
TAIPEI	Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act
TRA	Taiwan Relations Act

UC	University of California
UK	United Kingdom
US	United States
USA	United States of America
US\$	United States Dollar
WTO	Warsaw Treaty Organization
WTO	World Trading Organization



Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Motivation

One of the many intriguing aspects of the relations between Taiwan and China is the state of integration between the two entities. Taiwan and China have been historically, culturally, and since recent years, economically highly intertwined. On both sides have been considerations for rapprochement, integration or even unification. However, unlike in Europe, so far no initiation of political integration has taken place across the Taiwan Strait. Why is that the case and why did political integration occur successfully between East and West Germany or within the European Union (EU)?

The study of political integration has been conducted for decades. With the end of World War II more and more nation states gained their independence. Thus, the number of states increased. However, these states increasingly have been joining supranational or intergovernmental institutions and international trade agreements, since the effects of integration have been widely regarded as beneficial. Organizations like the Asian Cooperation Dialogue or the African Union with a continental focus, or smaller regional organizations such as the European Union, the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) or the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) emerged. Nonetheless, the nation state did not become obsolete, it is still important.

Yet why does political integration occur in the EU, between East and West Germany but not between Taiwan and China? This thesis attempts to answer this by addressing the relationship between Taiwan and China and exploring to which degree Cross-Strait relations are located in the process of political integration. Hence, the motivation for this research stems from this intriguing and puzzling relationship of Taiwan and China and the urge to solve the puzzle of simultaneous economic integration but lack of political integration.

1.2 Purpose of Research

In the case of the EU, political integration has occurred over the last decades as a consequence of economic interdependence. The European Union constitutes a political and economic union of 27 member states as of since the Brexit in 2016/2020. These states not only share geographic proximity, but also historical, cultural, and religious similarities. The starting point for the European Union can be found in the establishment of European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 and the European Economic Community

(EEC) in 1957. These were found by the “Inner Six”, i.e. Italy, France, West Germany, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands. Over the years more and more countries joined and more and more policy areas were incorporated. The European Union was ultimately founded in 1993 with the Maastricht Treaty coming into force. The European Union constitutes a single market, a monetary union, and possesses a common foreign and security policy. It is the most politically integrated multi-state entity in the world.

The case of East and West Germany is another example for successful political integration. After having been divided by the Allies of World War II, two Germanys emerged: West Germany (Federal Republic of Germany (FRG), *Bundesrepublik Deutschland (BRD)*) was founded on May 23, 1949 on the territory occupied in the West by the United States, the United Kingdom, and by France, and East Germany (German Democratic Republic (GDR), *Deutsche Demokratische Republik (DDR)*) was founded on October 7, 1949 on the territory occupied by the Soviet Union. East and West Germany did not only share ethnic, linguistic, historical, cultural, and religious similarities, they also had close economic relation which were used as a means to stay connected albeit being separated. Finally, on November 9, 1989 the Berlin Wall fell which initiated the process of political integration between East and West Germany. On October 3, 1990 political integration occurred and East Germany merged with West Germany.

Nonetheless, similar to the European Union and the two Germanys, close economic, historic and cultural bonds also exist between Taiwan and China - one might argue even closer bonds than between any two European states. Both countries speak the same language (Mandarin), both people largely identify as the same ethnicity (Han), both countries basically share the same religion (Daoism and Buddhism) and culture and traditions (Confucianism). Furthermore, the economies are highly intertwined. Taiwan has increasingly invested in China. The cumulative direct investments from 1991 to 2014 amount to US\$ 144 billion (Lin 2016: 4-6). In 2014, Cross-Strait trade amounted to approximately US\$ 125 billion which accounted for roughly 23 per cent of Taiwan's total GDP (US\$ 535 billion) (see Mainland Affairs Council 2014, Taiwan). In the same year, 58.3 per cent of all Taiwanese foreign direct investments went to China. The economic relation consists of capital investment rather than trade, as up to 85 per cent of Taiwan's technology exports are produced in vertically integrated supply chains outside of Taiwan. Thus, Taiwanese businesses systematically seek investments in China in order to compete on the world market. In addition, the export volume to China increased from

zero in 1990 to US\$ 82.1 billion in 2014, which is 26.2 per cent of all export (Lin 2016: 4-6). If Hong Kong is included, the total exports in 2014 nearly reach 40 per cent (Ibid.). Since 1999, China has become Taiwan's biggest export market before the USA and Japan. The Cross-Strait economy is also shaped by approximately over a million "Taishang", Taiwanese entrepreneurs, living and working in China, who reap the benefits of a cost advantage by producing and selling their products in China.

Additionally, all the three cases share other preconditions such as functional cooperation (functionalism), social transactions (transactionalism) and the actors' pursuit of self-interest (neo-functionalism) that according to the respective theory ought to lead to political integration. So how could political integration take place to such a high degree within Europe and between the two Germanys but not among Taiwan and China? How can that be explained? Therefore, Taiwan and China constitute an interesting case to further explore conditions that facilitate the initiation political integration. The purpose of this thesis is to examine the following research questions: why has political integration occurred within the European Union and the two Germanys but not (for the time being) among Taiwan and China given they all constitute similar cases in regards to the independent variables?

1.3 Research Question and Methodology

The research question for this thesis is derived from a comparative case study of a most similar system design. The case of the Cross-Strait relations will be compared with the EU and East and West Germany. They all constitute similar cases in terms of their many potential explanatory variables but differ in outcome, i.e. political integration in the case of EU and East and West Germany, lack thereof between Taiwan and China. Qualitative research is helpful to understand causal mechanisms, as well as causal effects, in as to why political integration has occurred within the EU and East and West Germany, but not between Taiwan and China. In contrast to quantitative research, a case study can identify and contextualize variables better (George and Bennett 2005: 21). A comparative case study can pay more attention to causal complexity, as the comparison of different cases allows for equifinality, i.e. the possibility of many potential paths to the same outcome, and multifinality, i.e. the possibility of many potential outcomes from the same path. Besides, path dependencies, feedback loops, and sequential interactions can also be grasped (Ibid.: 9-10). Therefore, a comparative case study allows for distinction between different contexts, different sets of conditions and correlation or causation. The advantage

of a comparative case study as opposed to a single case study can be explained due to the fact that outliers or deviant cases can be better understood because they are put in to context. Furthermore, case studies may generate new hypotheses and questions which is useful for further research (Ibid.: 20).

There are several different approaches to case studies. According to Bennet and Elman (2007: 173-176), the most used being least likely, most likely, most similar, and least similar cases. The case study method for this thesis is a most similar and most likely case study method. First, a least likely case constitutes a case selection which should not be able to be explained according to a certain theory. However, if the theory can in fact explain such a least likely case, it gains leverage, i.e. explanatory power, and can likely explain other cases. Second, within a most likely case selection, the chosen case is supposed to be easily explained. If the theory is unable to explain such an allegedly easy case, then theory lacks explanatory power. Third, a most similar case selection constitutes two or more similar cases in regards to the independent variable, the outcome, however, is different. Thereby, the researcher is able to examine what causes the outcome to be different. Lastly, a least similar case study works the other way around. Among two or more cases the outcome is the same, but the independent variable is difference. Hence, the task is to trace what caused the same outcome.

The analytic tool required for the analysis of a most or least similar case selection is called process tracing. It is – as the name suggests – the tracing of a process, to be more specifically the tracing of a causal mechanism within a given case. By closely examining a temporal sequence of events, the researcher attempts to find evidence to draw causal inferences (Collier 2011). Process tracing can proceed inductive as well as deductive. An inductive examination may lead to causal processes that have not been anticipated beforehand. Within a deductive approach, “theories can suggest which intervening events should have occurred within a case if the theory is an accurate explanation of the case (Bennett and Elman 2007: 183). Furthermore, another strength of process tracing is that it allows for the exploration of alternative explanations and “the focus on the question of “what else must be true” of the process through which the outcome arose if a proposed hypothesis explained the outcome” (Ibid.).

The case of Taiwan and China will be compared with two similar cases, i.e. the European Union and the two Germanys. Table 1 (below) depicts this comparison. The three cases are similar in their independent variables but differ in the outcome (political

integration). Similarities exist in regards to the following independent variables: 1. economic interdependence, 2. culture, 3. religion, 4. historical affinity, and 5. a conflictual past. Besides, the three driving forces of political integration, i.e. functional cooperation (functionalism), social transactions (Transactionalism), and the actors' pursuit of self-interest (neo-functionalism), postulated by the various theories (see literature review) are prevalent in the three cases as well. Therefore, a most similar system design can be justified and is applicable. However, as Table 1 shows, the Taiwan-China case is different in regards to the outcome. In the case of the European Union and East and West Germany political integration has successfully occurred. Yet it has not occurred in regards to Cross-Strait relations. By contrasting it with the other cases, one is expected to find causal mechanisms or at least causal effects that are prevalent in the successful cases of the European Union and the East and West Germany but are missing in the Taiwan-China case, and hence, can explain the lack of political integration between Taiwan and China.




Table 1 Most Similar System Design

	European Union (EU)	West and East Germany	North and South Korea	Taiwan and China
Economic Interdependence	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Culture	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religion	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical Affinity	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflictual Past	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	No	Yes	Yes	Yes
Independent Variable 1: Functional Cooperation	Yes	Yes before being separated	No	Yes, gradually after 2008
Independent Variable 2: Social Transactions	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Independent Variable 3: Actor's Pursuit of Self-Interest	Yes	Yes	No	Yes
Dependent Variable: Political Integration	Yes	Yes	No	No

Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author

Another case which justifies this most similar system design but which will not be included in the main analysis is the case of North and South Korea (see Table 1). This case shares a few independent variables with Cross-Strait relations, EU, and Germany's: culture, religion, historical affinity, and a conflictual past. Nonetheless, North and South Korea are missing further independent variables, such as economic interdependence, functional cooperation, social transactions, and the actors' pursuit of self-interest. Hence, accordingly, the most similar system predicts that no political integration can occur. However, albeit the fact that the case of North and South Korea justifies the puzzle in regards to Taiwan and China, it is a puzzle for itself that cannot be covered in this thesis.

At this point, the case of North (Democratic Republic of Vietnam, DRV) and South Vietnam (Republic of Vietnam, RVN) has to be discussed as well. The North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong won over the South Vietnamese after fighting for 19 years. The political integration of North Vietnam and South Vietnam to Vietnam (Socialist Republic of Vietnam) was the result of the Vietnam War which ended in 1975 with the fall of Saigon. As political integration is considered to be a peaceful process (see literature review), and since, the case of North and South Vietnam involved war, this thesis excludes Vietnam in its research design.

This leads back to the case of Cross-Strait relations. The most similar system predicts correctly that political integration should not occur between North and South Korea but within the EU and between East and West Germany. Since the independent variables are congruent with Taiwan and China, then why does political integration not take place? By applying this most similar system design through process tracing, one is expected to find other causal mechanisms or conditions that inhibit political integration to occur across the Taiwan Strait.

Thus, the methodology for this thesis is three fold: First, the most similar and most likely system design raises the puzzle (why no political integration between Taiwan and China?). Second, the related theories from the literature lead to the argument which will be briefly stated in the next section. Third, the cases will be analyzed through process tracing in order to verify the argument.

1.4 The Argument in Brief

The argument in brief is that for Cross-Strait political integration to occur, there have to be three additional conditions existent, besides functional cooperation, social transactions, and actors' pursuit of self-interest. Those three conditions are a cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion. These three independent variables are equally important and are all necessary conditions, i.e. they all have to be given to achieve political integration. If the political leadership is not cooperative, a favorable public opinion for political integration cannot translate into policy output (e.g. European integration would have been impossible without a cooperative political leadership despite a favorable public opinion). Even if the political leadership and public opinion are favorable, the international system might interfere with the political integration of two or more entities due to great power competition (e.g. German unification was only possible when the Soviet Union collapsed). Lastly, a cooperative political leadership alone does not suffice for political integration without the support of the public opinion (e.g. the cooperative political leadership between Ma and Xi lacked support from the Taiwanese public). Only if all three conditions are fulfilled can political integration take place. The three additional independent variables appeared within the EU and between the two Germanys and have been crucial in the advancement of political integration. However, these three conditions are missing in the case of Taiwan and China.

The three conditions are important for several reasons. Political leadership is vital for political integration because it requires leadership that initiates and advances the integration process by absorbing the costs for smaller states, while coordinating and regulating the various policies (Mattli 1999). Also, other studies point to the significance of political leadership in regards to a state's decision making process, diplomatic and military power or economic growth (Byman & Pollack 2001 and Jones & Olken 2005). The international system affects political integration, too. From a political economy point of view, a hegemon is interested in advancing integration through economic agreements because of economic gains, the possibility of military upgrading and the formation of political alliances (Mansfield & Solingen 2010). The role of the international system is further important since, for instance, the hegemonic stability theory (HST) indicates that the international system is more stable when one single dominant power takes the role in maintaining the order of the international system (Gilpin 1987). Lastly, the public opinion

is another vital conditions for political integration. Political integration can be pushed further, stopped, or reversed depending on the interests of societal groups (Schneider 2017). “Office-motivated political leaders” need to consider the views of the general public in order to be reelected. Hence, the public opinion is an important factor. In addition, research has shown that the “democratic peace” at least partially exists due the public opinion (Tomz & Weeks 2013). Another reason which illustrates the relevance of the public opinion are domestic audience costs which are the price a leader would have to pay if that leader backs down from threats that were made towards other states (Tomz 2007).

In sum, this thesis’ hypothesis is that for political integration to take place, there need to be three other conditions, which are cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion. They seem to be given for the EU and East and West Germany but not for Taiwan and China. Hence, no political integration has occurred across the Taiwan Strait.

1.5 Examination of Rival Explanations

This section looks at potential rival explanations as to why the initiation of political integration does not take place and refutes these. The goal is to enhance the credibility of this research and the explanatory power of my argument. There are four main rival explanations that could be invoked to explain why there has not been any initiation of political integration between Taiwan and China: Cross-Strait relations are shaped by the Chinese Civil War, an ongoing sovereignty issue, a size and an ideology difference. The initial condition for Cross-Strait relations is different than the one in the German case due to the Chinese Civil War and the Kuomintang’s (KMT) escape to Taiwan which might impact upon the prospects for political integration. Germany, on the other hand, was divided by the superpowers after World War II. It could be argued that the lack of acknowledgement in regards to the respective sovereignty of Taiwan and China prevents the initiation of political integration. Furthermore, the ideological difference might inhibit any rapprochement between Taiwan and China, since the former is part of the liberal international order and the latter a socialist country. There is also a large size difference between Taiwan and China which – it could be argued – poses unequal preconditions for any cooperation or integration. However, these rival explanations can be refuted by pointing to the other case study.

The case of Germany shows that questions of sovereignty, ideology and size differences, and initial conditions of partition do not have to inhibit the initiation of political integration. Germany was parted mainly by the USA and the Soviet Union. On the contrary, the status quo of nowadays Taiwan and China evolved due to the Chinese Civil War. Nonetheless, the result is the same – whether it is through the division by superpowers or due to civil war – mutual political trust gets hurt which without a doubt exacerbates the initiation of political integration. Still, East and West Germany overcame this obstacle. Like, Taiwan and China, East and West Germany initially did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the respective other and each claimed to represent the whole of Germany. Furthermore, there was a significant divergence in state ideology. East Germany belonged to the Eastern Bloc and regarded itself as a socialist country, whereas West Germany was part of the liberal international order with close ties to the USA. Also, West Germany was much larger than East Germany, more than twice as large to be precise (249.000 km² and 108.00 km²) and had almost four times more inhabitants (63,7 Million and 16 Million) in 1989 (*Statistisches Jahrbuch der DDR 1990*: 7, *Statistisches Jahrbuch 1990 für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland*: 49). Despite these divisions, East and West Germany successfully politically integrated. Therefore, issues of sovereignty, ideology and or size differences, and initial condition of the partition do not constitute independent variables that inhibit the initiation of political integration between Taiwan and China.

1.6 Organization of Thesis Chapters

The thesis will be organized as follows: Chapter 1, the introduction, illustrates the research motivation, the research question and structure of this thesis. Thereby, the chapter exhibits the thesis' background. Chapter 2 is the literature review. It provides an overview on and a contextualization of the already contributed literature on the theoretical aspect of this thesis. Chapter 3 introduces the central argument of this thesis. After I proposed my argument, Chapter 4 analyzes the successful political integration within the EU. Chapter 5 illustrates the political integration between West and East Germany. These chapters serve the purpose to show that (my argument) the preferable conditions are present. Chapter 6 looks at Cross-Strait relations and the absence of these decisive conditions for political integration. Finally, chapter 7, the conclusion, summarizes the key findings.

Chapter 2: Literature Review

This literature review serves as a means to contextualize and to gain a better understanding of the various theories and concepts that are associated with political integration and as a framework for the main analysis as to why political integration occurs in some cases but not in others. The first section of the literature review addresses the definition of political integration. The second, third, and fourth section concern itself with three theories that explain political integration: functionalism, transactionalism, and neo-functionalism. Subsequently, 2.5 compares these three theories in a table, while 2.6 explains why these theories are unsatisfying.

2.1 Political Integration

When one is to study integration and to apply various integration theories, the first task is to define political integration. According to most dictionaries, the general meaning of integration is that it is the action or process of uniting different entities. In the realm of political science, however, there is not one agreed-upon definition of integration. Some view integration as a condition, while others view it as a process. There are three definitions that are commonly quoted in regards to political integration. These definitions come from Deutsch, Haas, and Lindberg.

Deutsch conceptualizes political integration as a condition. His definition of integration is “the attainment, within a territory, of a “sense of community” and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to assure, for a “long” time, dependable expectations of “peaceful change” among its population”. By a “sense of community”, Deutsch refers to “a belief on the part of individuals in a group that they have come to agreement on at least one point: that common social problems must be and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change”. And by “peaceful change” Deutsch means “the resolution of social problems, normally by institutionalized procedures, without the resort to large-scale physical force” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). Integration can be achieved through two means. The first one is labelled as amalgamation. Amalgamated integration occurs when two or more states - which previously have been independent from each other - amalgamate into one larger unit. This newly created political unit possesses a central decision making institution. The second one is coined pluralistic security-community. In such a construction, the independent states maintain their legal

independence. And thus, a pluralistic security-community does not have a central decision making institution (Ibid.)

Haas defines political integration as the “[...] process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states” (Haas 1958: 16). Haas’ definition of political integration is process-oriented. For him, integration proceeds dynamically, i.e. there are developments that accelerate or curb integration. Moreover, there is no end goal implied. According to Haas, integration unfolds openly and does not “[...] presuppose the emergence of a federal state, though this one possibility and certainly the aim of many contemporary European statesmen and thinkers” (Ibid.: 7). Nonetheless, Haas holds that “the end result of a process of political integration is a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones” (Ibid.: 16).

Similarly, Lindberg views integration as a process. “[...] Political integration is (1) the process whereby nations forgo the desire and ability to conduct foreign and key domestic policies independently of each other, seeking instead to make joint decisions or to delegate the decision making process to new central organs; and (2) the process whereby political actors in several distinct settings are persuaded to shift their expectations and political activities to a new center” (Lindberg 1963: 6). However, unlike Haas, Lindberg does not attribute political integration to an end point. Later on, Lindberg made the following definition: Political integration refers to an inclusive process in which “larger groupings emerge or are created among nations without the use of violence” (Lindberg 1970: 649). Hence, integration can occur through various links. First, the population of two nations can be bound by amity. In that case, this would signify a social community. Second, if leaders of states can have confident expectations that problems between their states can be mediated without the use of force, these states constitute a security community. Third, states that are bound through their economic transactions are an economic union. Fourth, political integration occurs “when the linkage consists of joint participation in regularized, ongoing decision making” (Ibid.). Political integration involves the creation of collective institutions in the pursuit of common goals while partially yielding up sovereignty and decision making autonomy. Consequently, Lindberg defines political integration as “the evolution over time of a collective decision making system among nations” (Ibid.: 650).

These are the three most important definitions of political integration. However, the dependent variable for this thesis is not political integration, since it is too vague. There can be different levels or stages of political integration, such as unification or cooperation, which would make this thesis' argument too difficult to conceptualize. Rather, this thesis dependent variable is the initiation of political integration.

2.2 Functionalism

One of the earliest theories of integration was functionalism. Functionalism was developed by the British political scientist David Mitrany (1888-1975) during World War II. He dedicated his lifetime to a peaceful construction of the international system. Influenced by the contemporary power politics, Mitrany viewed the root of international conflict in competing political units. He argued that a peaceful international system can only be achieved through the functional cooperation between states. As a scholar Mitrany's research mainly addressed international relations, specifically liberalism, and regional problems of the Danube region. He attended the London School of Economics and Political Science, was a visiting professor at Harvard University and Yale University, and worked most of his life at the School of Economics and Politics at the Institute for Advanced Study (IAS) in Princeton. He is most known for his pamphlet "A Working Peace System" (1943) in which he established the foundations for functionalism and modern integration theory as a whole. This section consists of four parts. The first part will briefly introduce the origins of Mitrany's thinking and the development of functionalism. Second, the content of Mitrany's functionalism will be presented. Third, the effect of functionalism on bilateral relations, integration, and peace in general will be discussed. Lastly, the limitations of functionalism and where it lacks explanatory power shall also be depicted.

The Intellectual Origins of Functionalism

Mitrany's thinking and his development of functionalism is rooted in contemporary debates at that time. Scholars have thought about the international system, the prevention of war and the establishment of peace even before the start of the Second World War. Loose arrangements like the League of Nations or a federal system were widely discussed. However, Mitrany saw many disadvantages to either one. The League of Nations failed as "the proper ingredients were there, but the political dosage was inadequate" and because "it could not further that process of continuous adjustment and settlement which students of international affairs call "peaceful change"" (Mitrany 1943:

5-6). Regarding federalism, his main criticism was that federalism constitutes a political or theoretical framework without a “living body”, and hence is unlikely to provide long lasting peace and prevent war. “A political authority without active social functions would remain an empty temple. Society will develop by our living it, not by policing it” (Ibid.: 54). Therefore, if states have the intention to wage war, any written framework is meaningless. In addition, the adherence to political agreements may suffer given the competitive economic environment. Moreover, federalism is not efficient due to the fact that even in regards to issues where consent avails, the slowest member dictates the pace of the federation’s decision making process. For Mitrany, federalism was a mere a tool for a new nationalism, as it does not bridge the political division between states. It is not the required new internationalism to bring about peace, as it does not change the nature of nationalism, merely its dimension (Mitrany 1948). According to Mitrany, federalism based on a constitutional framework may sound intriguing, especially the declaration of rights. However, people would prefer the accomplishment of goals, i.e. that their needs are properly met. Furthermore, it is not guaranteed that federations are more peaceful, “the prospect of two powerful federations, for instance, facing each other in Europe is not enchanting” (Mitrany 1965: 352).

The Content of Functionalism

What then is functionalism? Mitrany’s functional alternative aims to achieve peace within the international system through the functional cooperation between states. For Mitrany the root of international conflict lies in competing political units. Through functional cooperation states can overcome these divisions. Functional arrangements serve as means to solve a specific problem without relating to a framework, paradigm or system. Thereby, one functional arrangement may require the establishment of another functional arrangement in order to solve an issue. Mitrany compares this functional development with the “functional subdivision of organic cells”, where “in every case the appropriate authority was left to grow out of actual performance” (Mitrany 1943: 21).

Hence, from the function respectively the performance emerges an appropriate authority, which can lead to the establishment of a political or constitutional framework. In Mitrany’s approach, function leads to form. The focus on common problems and the requirement to find practical solutions leads to a mechanism in which states have to emphasize their communalities and minimalize their differences in order to cooperate.

Thus, Mitrany's functional approach initiates peace building measures through cooperation.

A functional approach may not possess a framework. However, through "active organic development" it will eventually create a "living body" (Ibid.: 10). For instance, a functional approach regarding transportation initiated by a small group of countries allows for the inclusion of new members. Dissatisfied old members would have the option to withdraw from the specific functional agency. This approach, besides, is flexible in the sense that it enables different states to participate to different extents. In the aforementioned example regarding transportation, one country may participate in railroad, sea and road transportation, while another solely participates in road transportation. The self-determination of every state allows for specific efforts targeting specific solutions. A functional approach grants each state equal opportunity and ensures non-domination of one country over another. Although functionalism does not negate sentiments of pride or nationality (Mitrany 1965: 139). This flexibility would not be possible within a political framework. As Mitrany puts it: "Functional "neutrality" is possible, where political "neutrality" is not" (Mitrany 1948: 358). International organizations build upon functionalism are permeable. New members can join; old members leave without impact on the specific function. Federations, on the other hand, are the contrary, i.e. exclusive and not permeable (Mitrany 1965: 139). Unlike a federation which would prescribe a specific time frame and rules, functional cooperation is ought to be initiated on the basis of a certain need and with a certain goal in mind, giving the cooperating states the time and conditions necessary. Mitrany views this approach, the emergence of impromptu functional arrangements, as the underlying principle of modern states. Nonetheless, this functional organization of inter-state cooperation can work without but also within a constitutional framework. Mitrany does not oppose it. Still, he emphasizes the practical nature of the state and that functional development may proceed without any or even despite of a constitutional framework (Mitrany 1943).

For Mitrany, the post war world comprises two opposing aspects: the linkage of shared interests and self-determination. In a peaceful international system, the linkage of shared interest between several states should not harm a state's self-determination. Accordingly, the world community has to proceed through "natural selection". Thereby, states with common interests act together on the solution of a specific problem. Functional cooperation remains intact where and to which degree these states have common interests.

Furthermore, such a functional approach would consider the specific nature of the cooperation and its condition (Ibid.: 31-32). Hence, functional organization gives states the freedom and flexibility to develop a specific solution without having to rely on fixed, inflexible patterns. Mitrany calls this “technical self-determination”. As a consequence, the function determines its appropriate organ. It is further argued that for this very reason, it is not necessary to implement any rigid regulations, constitutions or separations between powers.

Regarding the wider coordination of functional agencies, Mitrany emphasizes that each agency should act autonomously. He does not deny, however, the option of several functional agencies to link or merge with each other, assuming it serves the functionality. In the manner of functionality, coordination has to develop organically and functionally. Nonetheless, there are four possibilities and needs to be considered in advance that Mitrany mentioned. First, functional agencies of the same nature may require technical or functional coordination. For instance, functional agencies regarding communication and transport may require technical cooperation in regards to transport via air or railroad.

Second, as a next step it might be necessary to establish the coordination of several functional agencies. Third, another step would be the coordination of several functional agencies on the international level. Fourth, Mitrany reiterates that international cooperation does not require top-down political authority. As function determines its organ, a specific function can still be organized through an agreement (Mitrany 1943). It is further argued by Mitrany that a functional approach is not necessarily new, it would just be amplified and the legalistic appendage reduced. Thereby, cross-border issues can be addressed more efficiently. Most importantly, “national problems would then appear, and would be treated, as what they are – the local segments of problems” (Ibid.: 42). Besides, especially given the scientific-technological advancement, functional arrangements proliferate due to their pure necessity (Mitrany 1971: 541).

Functionalism and Peace

After having presented the content of functionalism, this section explores functionalism and its effect on bilateral relations, integration, and peace in general. Mitrany’s functional approach aims to achieve peace through the functional organization of cooperation between states. States that functionally work together have stakes in the well-being of other states - at least in regards to the functional agency. International

cooperation leads to a system of interdependence in which states are driven by the need to solve mutual problems. Accordingly, the goal is to “bring the nations actively together, not to keep them peacefully apart” (Mitrany 1971: 538-539). Unlike federalism, a functional approach is able to do so by focusing on problems and their solutions, consequently, overcoming several divisions between nations. The focus on common problems and the requirement to find practical solutions leads to a mechanism in which states have to emphasize their communalities and minimize their differences in order to cooperate. Consequently, cooperation in one area may lead to cooperation in another area.

Thus, Mitrany’s functional approach initiates peace building measures through cooperation and the emphasis on communalities, i.e. the integration of functions between states and not what divides them. Consequently, the focus of international organization shifts from power play and political bargaining to purpose and addressing social problems (Mitrany 1948). For Mitrany, the ultimate goal in functional integration was not “local peace and strength, but world peace and well-being” (Mitrany 1965: 144). Unlike subsequent scholars, Mitrany had in fact world unity in mind and not just a regional unity, when he proposed his functional approach. In his view, functionalism does not only pacify bilateral relations, it pacifies the international system. And integration through functional cooperation serves as means to do so.

The Limitations of Functionalism

Lastly, this section elaborates the limitations of functionalism, i.e. what it is unable to explain. One of the major criticisms addresses the theoretical nature of functionalism in. Mitrany’s functionalism depicts what has been so sharply criticized by Karl Popper: a theory has to be falsifiable to be scientific. Hence, it does not constitute a theory in the Popperian sense (McLaren 1985: 141). However, Mitrany counters that functionalism constitutes an approach or “a concept of community for the development of a lasting international community” (Mitrany 1975: 541). His main aim is to have “a “working” theory of how to fit into an international mold the new kind of “service” state and government that are here to stay” (Ibid.). A second objections touches upon the notion of realpolitik and argues that functionalism neglects the reality of the working of politics. It is implied that states such as India and Pakistan or Israel and Palestine would never functionally cooperate. Subsequently, this erodes the explanatory power of functionalism. From Mitrany’s point of view, however, this resistance indicates that state leaders are aware that “visibly beneficial practical arrangements [...] might overlay old political spites

in the minds of their people” (Ibid.: 538). Moreover, leaders cannot be forced to cooperate if their objective is to keep fighting. Third, functionalism has been criticized for assuming that humans possess a natural willingness to cooperate, and ultimately, that states are willing to cooperate. Mitrany denies any assumption regarding human nature and human’s willingness to cooperate. Humans can be anything from war waging to being good. Humans or states cooperate through functional arrangements due to their necessity. Through “natural selection” states find mutual problems and to solve these they build functional agencies (Ibid.: 539-541). In sum, although some deficiencies are debatable, the main criticism is valid: Functionalism cannot constitute a theory, as it is not falsifiable. It solely has to be viewed as an approach to integration and peacebuilding.

Conclusion

In conclusion, Mitrany argues that functionalism leads to a peaceful international system. Although not explicitly stated, for Mitrany the independent variable is functional cooperation and the independent variable is peace. Functionalism leads to integration and integration leads to peaceful relations. In functionalism states cooperate to solve mutual problems. In turn, this leads to a system of interdependencies. As states become increasingly integrated, they have stakes in the well-being of cooperating states. Thereby, states actively come together and the international system becomes pacified through functional cooperation.

2.3 Transactionalism

Transactionalism constitutes another essential integration theory. Transactionalism (or communication theory or pluralist approach) emerged in the 1950s and focuses more on the social aspect of integration, rather than on the economic or political dimension. It is most widely associated with Karl W. Deutsch (1912-1992), although he is not the only scientist who developed the theory. Rather, Deutsch and many of his colleagues developed transactionalism in their work “Political Community and the North Atlantic Area” (Deutsch et al. 1957). Deutsch was an American political scientist of Czech-German origin, whose main work focused on nation building and international relations. These interests culminated in his research on integration. He studied law at the University of Prague from which he obtained a PhD, and later on, he received a second PhD in political science from Harvard University in 1951. Deutsch was Stanfield Professor of International Peace at Harvard University, and later in his life, he was the director of the International Institute for Comparative Social Research in Berlin. This

section is divided into four parts. The intellectual origins of transactionalism and Deutsch's thinking shall be briefly discussed in the first part. The second part depicts the content of transactionalism. How bilateral relations, integration, and peace in general are effected by transactionalism will be looked at in the third part. Lastly, the criticisms of transactionalism shall be explored.

The Intellectual Origins of Transactionalism

Deutsch has been stimulated to think of transactionalism and integration as a whole due to several personal events: first and foremost, the conflict of nationalities in the Czech Republic and the seizure of power by Nazi Germany. Like other scholars of regional integration, his personal biography compelled him to explore questions of war and peace, and "[...] ways in which men someday might abolish war" (Deutsch et al. 1957: 3). According to Deutsch, considering the catastrophic circumstances of World War II and the severity of the Cold War, "[...] war is now so dangerous that mankind must eliminate it, must put it beyond serious possibility. The attempt to do this may fail. But in a civilization that wishes to survive, the central problem in the study of international organization is this: How can men learn to act together to eliminate war as a social institution?" (Ibid.). Furthermore, Deutsch pointed out that the study of nationalism and political communities have, in fact, much in common with the study of political integration. Deutsch stated that communication is the key mechanism in the mobilization of communities which, consequently, allows for the development of nation states (Deutsch 1966). Lastly, from a transactionalist point of view, Mitrany's functionalist approach put not enough emphasis on the conditions of integration but rather on the goal, i.e. the functional cooperation in regards to the solution of a technical problem. Additionally, communication on a functional level is not sufficient to secure peace. Loyalties among the societies would have to be also be generated. For these reasons, Deutsch was stimulated to develop transactionalism.

The Content of Transactionalism

What then is transactionalism? Deutsch et al. analyzed several different successful cases of integration in their work "Political Community and the North Atlantic Area" (1957). They came to the conclusion that integration needed a "sense of community" between the different people of the integrating states (see Deutsch's definition of integration earlier). And this sense of community can be achieved through social transactions. Hence, transactionalism holds that social transactions, i.e. trade, travel,

communication, etc., between two different people lead to cognitive-psychological changes in regards to identity or community which, in turn, increase mutual trust among the people of the integrating states and lead to a “sense of community”. Within such a community, war is not likely anymore and “[...] common social problems must be and can be resolved by processes of “peaceful change” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 5). Such a community is coined as a “security-community”. According to the authors, a security community is considered the successful integration of a group of people.

Hence, a security-community is an integrated community in which war is unlikely. Deutsch and his colleagues, however, distinguish two types: the “amalgamated” and the “pluralistic” security-community (see Deutsch’s definition of integration earlier). An amalgamated security-community constitutes the fusion of two or more separate states into one new unit with a central decision making institution. Deutsch et al. refer to the United States as an example, which developed into “[...] a single governmental unit by the formal merger of several of a several formerly independent units” (Ibid.: 6). On the other hand, within a pluralistic security-community integration occurs without the establishment of a supranational entity. The involved states remain legally independent. The United States and Canada depict a pluralistic security-community type.

While it is fair to say that federalists and supporters of neo-functionalism (will be discussed in detail further on) envisioned an amalgamated security-community, Deutsch preferred pluralistic security-communities. First, amalgamated security-communities have several weaknesses, i.e. the question of military finance, increased social mobilization and political participation, and disparity between governmental action and societal expectations. Second, Deutsch viewed the pluralistic approach as more stable and practical. In a pluralistic security-community there are only three conditions to be fulfilled, i.e. shared values among the different units, the capacity for communication between the different political groups, and “a mutual predictability of the relevant aspects of one another’s political, economic, and social behavior” (Deutsch 1968: 195-196).

Transactionalism and Peace

This third part discusses the effect of transactionalism on bilateral relations, integration and peace in general. Essentially, transactionalism asserts that peace can be achieved through integration on a social level. Unlike other integration theories, it is not concerned with federal, functional, supranational organs or other institutional structures.

Integration occurs due to social transactions between two or more different people. These transactions create a sense of community. This sense of community, “[...] a matter of mutual sympathy and loyalties; of “we-feeling”, trust, and mutual consideration; of partial identification in terms of self-images and interests; of mutually successful predictions of behavior, and of cooperative action in accordance with it” (Deutsch et al. 1957: 36), in turn, decreases the likelihood of violent conflict, and hence, leads to peace.

The Limitations of Transactionalism

In the last part of this section, we look at the critique of transactionalism. Deutsch’s merits in the realm of political science, especially in international relations are undeniable. Yet, transactionalism is not his most known contribution. This is partially due to the criticism that transactionalism has received. First, one issue with transactionalism is the operationalization and measurement of integration. Since Deutsch considered integration to be a quantitative concept, it has to be measured by the number of social interactions. This constitutes an advantage, as a large number of cases can be generated through this approach. However, this is problematic due to the fact that historical data cannot be incorporated and surveying techniques not being widely available and advanced. Additionally, it is difficult to identify, how these social interactions impact on identity or community (Puchala 1981). A second problem with transactionalism concerns the change from integration to amalgamation. It is not clear how social interactions between people lead to the establishment of formal institutions. Put differently: How can cognitive-psychological changes in regards to identity or community translate into state behavior (Ibid.)? Lastly, it is debatable whether social interactions necessarily impact positively on a people’s sense of community – or at least it might be argued that there is no straightforward causal mechanism. Social interactions between different groups of people also could have no effect at all.

Conclusion

In sum, Deutsch’s transactionalism neither intended to overcome the nation state, nor was concerned with the establishment of supranational institutions. Transactionalism holds an approach to integration in which nation states stay intact and still play a key role in the international system. Nonetheless, integration simultaneously reduces the likelihood of international conflict. Furthermore, transactionalism incorporates a society-state relations approach. For Deutsch and other transactionalists, social transactions constitute the independent variable which impacts on the dependent variable peace. The

more transactions between states, the more integration (first social, then political), and the more peace.

2.4 Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism was mainly developed by Ernst B. Haas and Leon N. Lindberg in the 1950s and 1960s on the basis of Mitrany's previous work on functionalism and following the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) and the European Economic Community (EEC). It is one of the most known integration theories and closely attached to the analysis of the European integration process. The theoretical groundwork has been elaborated in Haas' "The Uniting of Europe" (1958) and "Beyond the Nation-State" (1964), and in Lindberg's "The Political Dynamics of European Economic Integration" (1963). Haas was an American political scientist of German origin whose main work focused on international relations and integration theory. He is considered to be the founder of neo-functionalism. He received his PhD from Colombia University and worked throughout his life at UC Berkeley. Lindberg is Professor Emeritus at the University of Wisconsin-Madison and has researched and published on comparative and international political economy. With his above mentioned work he also contributed greatly to the development of neo-functionalism. The structure of this section is as follows: The first part will briefly present the intellectual origins of neo-functionalism and its development by Haas and Lindberg. The second part outlines the content of neo-functionalism. Third, the effect of neo-functionalism on bilateral relations, integration, and peace in general will be analyzed. The last part looks at the limitations and criticisms of neo-functionalism.

The Intellectual Origins of Neo-Functionalism

The intellectual origin of neo-functionalism in regards to Haas can clearly be found in his personal biography. Haas was born in Frankfurt, Germany, in 1924. He was of Jewish origin. Due to the seizing of power by the Nazis and increasing anti-Semitism in Germany, his family fled in 1938 to the United States. At university, his background intrigued him to focus on international relations within political science, especially on how states and the international community could change or merge together in order to constrain the power of nation states to prevent wars. The maintenance of peace was his lifelong purpose (Haas 2004). The central question of his work was "[...] how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge, and mix with their neighbors so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring

new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves” (Haas 1970: 610). The developments in post-war Europe came in handy and served as a living laboratory. The establishment of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1951 provided Haas with an empirical example to which he in response formulated his theory of neo-functionalism. Additionally, the intellectual roots of neo-functionalism can be traced back to the discourse of international relations theory in the 1950s. Haas was stimulated to develop neo-functionalism as a means to challenge the dominating theories of international relations, i.e. classical realism (Morgenthau, Wolfers, and Wight) and idealism (Kant).

According to Haas, the main themes that realism stresses, first and foremost the struggle for power, are not as prevalent as claimed by the supporters of realism. Nonetheless, Haas was also not persuaded by the Kantian idealism that claimed peace can be achieved through the implementation of international law. Haas’ chosen task was “[..] to show that there are other ways to peace than either power or law” (Haas 2004: xiv).

Functionalism and Neo-Functionalism

Neo-functionalism is essentially – as the name suggests - the advancement of functionalism (Mitrany), albeit also having been influenced by transactionalism (Deutsch), democratic pluralism (Truman and Dahl) and behavioralism. Haas draws upon Mitrany’s functionalism to a great extent. Both thinkers stand in the tradition of liberalism. Haas believes that “man is by nature good, rational and devoted to common weal; when society is organized so as to bring out man’s tendency to mobilize his energies for the general welfare, the forces of peace and harmony rule” (Haas 1964: 8). Hence, Haas shares Mitrany’s notion that peace within the international community can be achieved if states are linked by what unites and not what divides them. Furthermore, Haas’ neo-functionalism agrees that the root of international conflict is competing nation states. Therefore, in order to overcome conflict and to tame the nation states, Haas holds similarly to Mitrany that “technicians” ought to be entrusted to work together. They are “[...] interested in tasks rather than power. They will be unconcerned with “rightful” authorities and jurisdiction” (Ibid.: 11).

What is the difference then to functionalism? Functionalism is a normative, prescriptive peace theory which argues that peace can be achieved through political integration which occurs when states engage with each other in matters of functional

cooperation. Haas extended this functionalist logic with a rational choice model. Since it is assumed societal actors behave rationally, they pursue their interests in hopes of maximizing their utility. To maximize their benefit, societal actors push for integration because it is assumed that integration enhances their (economic or societal) gains. Thus, the main driving force between integration is not a technocratic mechanism like functional cooperation as postulated by Mitrany, but the actors' pursuit of self-interests. Consequently, neo-functionalism constitutes its own theory.

In addition, there are further important distinctions between functionalism and neo-functionalism. Haas criticized the automatism of integration as postulated by Mitrany. He was more interested under which conditions do economic cooperation lead to integration. Hence, neo-functionalism allows for more political agency in the integration process. Integration is dependent on the behavior and decision making of actors. Haas, thereby draws upon on contemporary debates regarding behavioralism which attempts to include political behavior in the analysis of political processes. Moreover, Haas criticized functionalism for its normative nature: "As far as the normative point is concerned, it is simply irrelevant for the quest" (Ibid.: 36). Albeit also being a normative peace theory, neo-functionalism has been developed to an empirical-analytical theory by Haas, which can be seen in his analysis of the ECSC.

The Content of Neo-Functionalism

Against this background, this section examines the essence of neo-functionalism, i.e. what it assumes, argues, and hypothesizes. Neo-functionalist theory holds that political integration occurs when societal actors comply with supranational institutions instead of with their own government in order to realize their preferences. As Haas stated, integration is a "[...] process whereby political actors in several distinct national settings are persuaded to shift their loyalties, expectations and political activities toward a new center, whose institutions possess or demand jurisdiction over the pre-existing national states" (Haas 1958: 16). In turn, the supranational institutions become increasingly important and gain legitimacy and authority due to the fact that they satisfy the preferences of the societal actor. This process of political integration is open-ended but eventually leads to "a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones" (Ibid.: 16). The reason being is that it is assumed that states have certain preferences and are inclined to cooperate with other states when cooperation is perceived to be necessary to achieve the realization of these preferences. A state's preference results from the

dominant domestic interests, and therefore, is fluid and able to change. Domestic interests, on the other hand, derive from the values of political actors. As Haas (2004: xiv) put it, “neo-functionalism carried the assumptions of democratic pluralism over into policy formulations relating to international matters by disaggregating the state into its actors-components”. Thus, the main mechanism, according to neo-functionalism, for political integration actors’ pursuit of self-interests. The secondary mechanism is the so-called spillover effect that occurs when the increased demands by societal actors leads to the expansion into other sectors that can meet these additional demands (Haas 2001: 23).

However, first a few important premises that ought to be examined when discussing neo-functionalism. The first assumption in neo-functionalism concerns its ontology. It is assumed that social actors follow a “soft” rational choice approach, i.e. an actor’s behavior can be explained through his choices based on rational calculations derived from his values and preferences in order to realize his interests. Thereby, neo-functionalists accept the notion of utilitarianism. Haas stresses the fluidity in this approach. Actors may change their values, and hence, their interests can alter just like the means to fulfill these. Because of this ontology the initial nationalism of a state will be undermined by the utilitarian desire of each individual to improve and attain its interests, and clears the way for inter-state cooperation and integration. On a related note, it must be noted that in the neo-functionalist ontology interests are not inherently materialistic. Interests are shaped by values which also account for normative aspects (Haas 2004: xv).

Second, neo-functionalists assume a pluralistic society. Contrary to realist theory, states are not viewed as the only relevant and predominant actors in the international system. Moreover, they are not unified actors. The alleged primacy of foreign policy is negated. According to neo-functionalist scholars, domestic actors play a key role, for instance: interest groups, businesspeople, elites, and political parties. These domestic actors not only act within their own state but also cooperate with other societal actors in different countries. Hence, there are multiple connections and interdependencies between the involved actors. These interdependencies may lead to new supranational structures. However, since interests and preferences of actors change, the above mentioned interdependencies have to be viewed as fluid. Nonetheless, neo-functionalist theory views this pluralistic logic as one of the essential reasons how and why the nation state and its capacity to act can be constrained. Third, both Haas and Lindberg emphasized the significance of elites in the integration process. Whereas Haas (1958) focused more on

non-governmental elites, Lindberg (1963) explored the impact of governmental elites. However, as much as neo-functionalists embrace the notion of pluralism, the general public and its stance on integration has not been incorporated into neo-functionalist reasoning. The role of the civic society has been as such that it approves of integration through the means of a “permissive consensus” (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41). Besides (political, economic, and societal) elites, supranational institutions and national governments constitute other key actors.

Fourth, neo-functionalist practitioners hold that integration is not designed but the result of incremental decision making. It is assumed that political actors are not able to foresee or even plan their decisions and its unintended consequences regarding integration. Integration starts with rather less salient areas and because of the spillover effect may touch upon more salient issues. Thus, integration is not a purposive behavior (Haas 1970: 627). This property of neo-functionalism can be read as a path dependency. “Choices, once made, carried their own internal logic for producing specific eventual outcomes; the rationality imputed to the actors’ choices initially made it likely, in later decisions, that branching points consistent with the initial objectives be chosen” (Haas 2001: 23). Lastly, neo-functionalism was developed “in order to give the study of European political integration a theoretical basis” (Haas 2001: 22). Nonetheless, the theory originally attempted to serve as a grand theory with universal application (Haas 1961).

If integration occurs because actors seek supranational institutions to meet their demands instead of national governments, what then is the driving force behind the integration process? The driving force behind integration is the spillover effect and the self-interest of the actors. Haas presumed that the integration process would advance quasi-automatically. This is because the supranational institutions cannot keep up with the increased demands by societal actors, and hence, have to expand into other sectors that can meet these additional demands. This is what is called the concept of “spillover”.

First introduced by Haas (1958: 283-317), it was described that the “expansive logic of sector integration” in one integrating sector between states leads to pressure to integrate in another sector because of the interdependencies between sectors and states. In “The Political Dynamics of European Integration” (1963), Lindberg provides the most distinct definition, “[...] “spill-over” refers to a situation in which a given action, related

to a specific goal, creates a situation in which the original goal can be assured only by taking further actions, which in turn create a further condition and a need for more action, and so forth. [...] the initial task and grant of power to the central institutions creates a situation or series of situation that can be dealt with only by further expanding the task and the grant of power” (Lindberg 1963: 10). Further on, he specified that “spill-over implies that a situation has developed in which the ability of a member state to achieve a policy goal may depend upon the attainment by another member state of one of its policy goals” (Ibid.). As an example for a spillover effect may serve the example of the coal and steel industries in West Europe (Haas 1958): if the coal and steel sector of various countries was to be integrated for the sake of economic benefits, other related sectors to the coal and steel industries would have to be integrated as well in order to realize the full economic potential. In this example, transport would have to be regulated coherently across the participating countries to guarantee the functioning of the integrated coal and steel sector.

According to Lindberg, spillovers have six features. First, integration is dependent on the convergence of goals and expectations, and therefore, serve as a basis allowing for further integration. Second, divergence in goals and expectations among governments may lead to enhanced role of the supranational organ, as member states may delegate certain issues in which discords prevail to the supranational organ. Third, elite’s demands and expectations can be interpreted through the actions taken by the supranational institution. Fourth, situations may emerge in which the only possibility to solve a problem is the further development of the supranational organ. Fifth, economic integration may accelerate spillovers between different sectors. Arising conflicts that halt further integration can be mediated through bargaining between different sectors. Lastly, a custom union may evoke reactions from nonmember states. Hence, problems may arise which can only be solved by enhancing the role of the central supranational institutions (Ibid.: 10-11).

Neo-functionalists differentiate three different kinds of spillover: functional, political, and cultivated spillover (Tranholm-Mikkelsen 1991: 4-6). A functional spillover refers to a situation when the cooperation in one policy area requires cooperation in another area. If states are to integrate functional tasks, problems unavoidably arise which can only be overcome when more tasks are integrated. As an example may serve the above mentioned case of the integration of the coal and steel industries in West Europe.

This is what was intended by Jean Monnet, one of the intellectual forefathers of the European integration process. He envisioned that the integration of the coal and steel industries would require the integration of other energy sectors and then the whole economy to realize the full potential benefits and to ultimately decrease the chances of another war. A political spillover is the political process in which political and economic elites and interest groups push for supranational cooperation as a means to solve certain issues because they are more confident in supranational than national solutions. Consequently, actors shift their loyalties and expectations to the supranational rather than the national level. A cultivated spillover occurs when the integration process is pushed by supranational actors during mediation between member states. If two states have particular interests in two different policy areas, they may be inclined to support each other, albeit state A does not share state B's interest. Nonetheless, given that state B supports state A's interest, state A benefits and in turn returns the favor. Thereby two policy areas interconnect and states further integrate. Hence, it becomes obvious that integration is not necessarily intended but rather a by-product. States pursue concrete political or economic goals and view integration as a tool to reach these. Attempting to achieve certain goals leads to spillovers.

The second driving force behind integration is the attainment of actors to pursue their self-interest. Societal actors, in particular domestic elites, support political integration, as it is in their own self-interest to do so. Supranational institutions are capable to satisfy their demands better than domestic institutions given the functional-economic logic mentioned earlier, i.e. more integration is necessary to enhance the functionality of a certain integrated sector. In neo-functionalism this behavior of the elites is conceptualized as a learning process through which the elites' expectations and even loyalties are gradually shifting to a new supranational center. Thus, elites act as a motor for further integration, as they expect to reap more benefits economically or structurally from the integration process. As mentioned earlier, Haas adhered a central role to non-governmental elites. And so he asserts that political parties and interest groups, such as trade unions or business association, increasingly seek the supranational organs to realize their interests. Furthermore, Haas mentions even "civil servants, national government offices, central banks and technical advisors" that gradually shift their activities to the new established center (Haas 1958: 313). Consequently, these actors accelerate the integration process through their behavior. Lindberg accredited more impact on

integration by governmental elites which recognize a need for functional and technocratic integration. Thus, they progressively seek supranational solutions, which, in turn, creates bureaucratic interdependencies, as interaction patterns among the governments' civil servants emerge. These repeated interaction patterns lead to a socialization process that enhances the likelihood of integrative solutions (Lindberg 1963). The supranational institutions serve as another actor that facilitates integration. They facilitate integration through cultivated spillovers which occur when the integration process is pushed by supranational actors during mediation between member states. According to Haas (1964: 369-372), supranational systems function as a bargaining platform in which the involved participants split their differences, upgrade common interests and swap concessions. The supranational organ depicts a mediator that mediates among the nation states. It urges countries to compromise, i.e. take a concession in one field for a benefit in another field. Hence, albeit partially conceding no country opposes the integration process because it can pursue its self-interest giving integration further impetus. Therefore, it is not the often stated shared sense of identity or community (especially in the case of the European Union), it is the self-interest of societal actors that pushes integration.

Neo-Functionalism and Peace

This section analyzes the relationship of neo-functionalism and bilateral relations, the international system and peace. Neo-functionalists stand in the liberal tradition (Locke and Kant) that the human nature is rational and that humans are capable of cooperation. Hence, it is assumed that states can also act in a cooperative manner. Neo-functionalism denies the alleged *Primat der Außenpolitik*, according to which the self-interest of states overtrumps any inter-state cooperation or even makes it impossible. Furthermore, neo-functionalists stand in the liberal tradition in thus far that they view (economic) dependencies as a means to constrain nation states and to attain peace. Whereas Kant and others emphasized the significance of commerce and trade, Haas and Lindberg viewed the structural institutional interdependencies as more important. Nonetheless, there is no doubt in neo-functionalist thinking regarding the importance of economic integration, given that integration is initiated to a great extent through the economic self-interest of various actors. However, neo-functionalism follows a more functionalist approach to integration and peace: Societal actors in the pursuit of their own interests shift their political activities to a supranational center in hope to maximize their demands. This supranational institution becomes subsequently more important, and, because of the

expansive logic of the spillover effect, widens and deepens its scope. Thus, the various actors can increasingly reap benefits through this integration process and also become more interdependent. The result are higher levels of interactions between actors across countries. Political and economic elites, supranational institutions, and national governments develop a net of interdependencies and cooperation. The benefits that the actors gain lead to a self-sustaining effect. Any halt or even break of this process is costly. Hence, the involved actors have an interest in one another and stable relations. This is what is described by neo-functionalists as a learning or socialization process. Thereby, integration constrains a nation state's capacity to act and nation states even "[...] lose the factual attributes of sovereignty while acquiring new techniques for resolving conflict between themselves" (Haas 1970: 610). To summarize, neo-functionalism holds that the pursuit of the self-interest of political actors leads to the emergence of a supranational center and "a new political community superimposed over the pre-existing ones" (Haas 1958: 16). The result is a net of interdependencies that makes bilateral relations and the international system by necessity more peaceful since the involved actors would face high exit costs.

The Limitations of Neo-Functionalism

This last part looks at common criticism and backlash that neo-functionalism received over the years. First of all, the founder of the theory itself, Ernst B. Haas, is presumably - at least partially - responsible for the demise of neo-functionalism. Albeit he did not declare his theory obsolete, Haas wrote one book (Haas 1975) on the obsolescence of neo-functionalism. As pointed out by Schmitter (2005: 264), "[...] it became literally impossible for any scholar to take the approach seriously [...]. Who could dare to contradict its founder?". As a consequence, Haas applied his self to other research topics. It was just shortly before his death that he returned to the study of neo-functionalism (Haas 2004). He had come to call neo-functionalism obsolescent due to the empirical falsification of his theory. French president Charles de Gaulle became increasingly reserved regarding the supranational power of the European Commission, and consequently, stopped the gradual expansion of power of the Commission when France took on the presidency of the Council of the European Union. French wanted to enforce its own interests and threatened to not take its seat in the Council unless France's demands would be met, which led to the "Empty Chair Crisis". Furthermore, France even vetoed the British membership application.

The intergovernmentalist critique is closely attached to the Empty Chair crisis. Namely, that neo-functionalists neglect and underestimate the nation state's sovereignty and autonomy of which France's behavior is a prime example (Hoffmann 1964, 1966). Although Hoffmann accepted the notion of spill-overs in "low politics", he asserted that in the realm of "high politics", i.e. foreign and security policy (which impact on a state's national sovereignty) spill-overs are less likely. Hence, the empirical evidence contradicted the neo-functionalist's prediction and gave support to the theoretical thinking of realism. Intergovernmentalist viewed the political integration process in Europe as dependent on the mutual interests of the different national states. Haas worried that a regional integration bloc might be as nationalistic and hostile as a nation state. For Hoffmann, this is not even the case, since nationalism hinders the integration process.

Another criticism referred to the functionalistic explanations made by neo-functionalists (Elster 1979). This critique arose from a fundamental debate on whether functionalistic explanations can generally be made in social sciences. It was contended that functionalistic explanations could only be made in the field of biology (theory of evolution). Rational actors pursue their own interest and are not operated by an "invisible hand". Functionalistic explanations, however, neglect the actors and attribute any explanatory power to the structure. The halt in the integration process can (also as described earlier) not be explained with a functionalistic logic. Other critics have taken issue with the proclaimed automatic spillover effect and its dependence on economics. Especially liberal intergovernmentalist (Moravcsik 1993) and other thinkers of liberal interdependence theory criticized Haas for not providing a set of specific conditions on when the spillover occurs. Marxist critique asserted that neo-functionalism is a means to reinforce the power relationship between the ruling elite and the working class. Integration just serves to strengthen the exploitation strategies of the powerful capital. Thereby, the capital not only receives economic gains, but also is able to undermine the social welfare system (Holland 1980). Further, it was put forth that the neo-functionalist assumption of a pluralistic society does not correspond to reality, as it neglects the existing power relations.

Lastly, it has been protested that neo-functionalism does not consider the external relations outside of Europe or the international system in general, given that the neo-functionalists developed their theory in accordance with the development in Europe. Europe cannot be understood without its relations with the USA and the USA being a

hegemon. Additionally, the economy in Europe is not isolated, it is part of the world economy. Thus, there exists an interdependence which is not taken into account (Hoffmann 1964).

Conclusion

In conclusion, neo-functionalism asserts that political integration proceeds because societal actors comply with supranational institutions to fulfill their interests. These, on the other hand, become increasingly legitimate and gain authority because they can meet the demands of the actors. This leads to the emergence of a new political community which is superimposed over the pre-existing ones. Thus, the causal mechanism stated in neo-functionalism is that the independent variable, the pursuit of self-interest of the actors, leads to political integration, the dependent variable. The driving force behind integration is the self-interest of the actors and the spillover effect. Furthermore, because of the growing significance of supranational institutions and the various societal actors that push the integration process, the role of the nation state is constrained, making peace more likely and more safe.

2.5 Conclusion and Comparison of the Integration Theories

The goal of this literature review was to provide a comprehensive overview regarding the various integration theories for the main analysis. The literature review started off with definitions of integration. Albeit there not being one mutually agreed upon definition, different stances on whether political integration is a process or a condition, all authors hold that integration is the uniting of different entities and that this new unit constitutes a new political community. Deutsch differentiates an amalgamated and a pluralistic security-community; the difference being that the former possesses a central decision making institution, while the latter does not and the states maintain their legal independence. The central characteristic in both, however, is the resolution of problems through peaceful means. Haas implies this peaceful notion and views integration as (what Deutsch called) an amalgamation. The nations shift their activities, loyalties, and expectations towards a new (decision making) center. The result is the emergence of a new, superimposed political community. Lindberg views integration similarly in the sense that nations shift their focus to a new superimposed center and emphasizes that states yield up key domestic and foreign policies. As a consequence, a new grouping comes into existence that renounces the use of force. Hence, it is fair to deduct from these

three authors and their definitions that integration constitutes a new political community that conducts itself in a peaceful manner, i.e. without resorting to violence.



Table 2 Comparison of the Integration Theories

	Functionalism	Transactionalism	Neo-Functionalism
Scholar	Mitrany (1888-1975)	Deutsch (1912-1992)	Haas (1924-2003)
Main Argument	Functional Cooperation leads to Peace through Political Integration	Social Transactions lead to Peace through Political Integration	Actors' Pursuit of Self-Interests leads to Political Integration through Shift of Political Activities to New Supranational Center
Independent Variable	Functional Cooperation	Social Transactions	Actors' Pursuit of Self-Interests
Mechanism	Political Integration	Political Integration	1. Shift of Political Activities to New Supranational Center, 2. Spillover Effect
Dependent Variable	Peace	Peace	Political Integration
Advantages	Functional Approach	Society-State Approach, quantifiable	Explanatory Power (see EU)
Disadvantages	Not falsifiable	Causal Mechanism problematic	National Sovereignty overtrumps Integration

Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author

Functionalism was the first theory dealt with in this literature review (see Table 2). Developed by Mitrany, the theory introduced a functional approach to integration and peace. If states are to cooperate in order to solve specific problems functionally, a system of interdependencies emerges which leads to political integration. As states become increasingly integrated, the likelihood of war decreases significantly. Hence, functional cooperation leads to integration and eventually peace.

Transactionalism was the next integration theory discussed earlier (see Table 2). To a large extent shaped by the work of Deutsch, transactionalism introduces a society-state relations approach, emphasizing the role of society. Transactions between the people of two different states, such as trade or commerce, travel, communication, etc., impact on the cognitive-psychological perception of people that, in turn, increases mutual trust and leads to a sense of community, a security-community. War is unlikely in this newly accrued community. Thus, transactionalists argue that social transactions lead to integration which entails according to transactionalists by definition peace.

The last theory looked into in this literature review was neo-functionalism (see Table 2). It was mainly developed by Haas and Lindberg and argued that integration occurs because of the pursuit of self-interest of the various societal actors that leads to a shift of expectations, loyalties and activities towards a new supranational center away from the domestic realm. Consequently, this new supranational institution becomes progressively legitimate which self-sustains the just mentioned shifting. As a result, a new superimposed supranational political community comes into existence. Hence, the actors' pursuit of self-interest leads to political integration.

As a comparison of these integration theories and a conclusion for this literature review, it can be said that these three theories do not attempt to examine the same causal mechanism. However, these still allow for a deeper understanding of political integration. For functionalism, the independent variable is functional cooperation and the dependent variable is peace. The causal mechanism postulated in transactionalism is that the independent variable, social transactions, leads to the dependent variable, integration. Lastly, functionalists hold that the pursuit of the actor's self-interest is the independent variable that leads to political integration, the dependent variable. An overview of this comparison is shown with Table 2.

2.6 Why Are These Theories Unsatisfying?

As the literature review has shown, there are several independent variables – one might also say conditions – that facilitate political integration. However, albeit Taiwan and China share these conditions with the successful cases of the EU and East and West Germany, political integration has not occurred. Why do these conditions lead to political integration in the cases of the latter but not between Taiwan and China? Consequently, there have to be further conditions that are needed for political integration that were present in the EU and between East and West Germany but are not given in the case of the Cross-Strait relations. Therefore, the above mentioned theories, i.e. functionalism, transactionalism, and neo-functionalism are unsatisfying because, according to these theories, political integration should occur between Taiwan and China. Since this is not the case, they lack explanatory power. Against this backdrop, the next chapter discusses the preliminary findings and develops the hypothesis.



Chapter 3: Argument and Hypothesis

The goal of Chapter 3 is twofold: to present my argument based on the findings from the comparative method and based off of these to build this thesis' hypothesis. The structure of Chapter 3 is as follows. First, this chapter looks at the argument of this thesis. Then, based off of that, I will develop the hypothesis which will be illustrated in Table 3 (below). Lastly, the research plan informs about the structure of the main analysis and the applied methodology.

3.1 My Argument

The preliminary findings indicate that for political integration to proceed economic factors, such as economic interdependence and inter-state transactions, or social factors, such as historical affinity, culture or religion may not be sufficient. In this research, I argue that there are three further independent variables or conditions that were given in the case of the EU and the two Germanys but that are lacking between Taiwan and China. These three factors have first been discussed by Kenneth Waltz in his book "Man, the State, and War: A Theoretical Analysis" (1959). Albeit applied in reference to the causes of war, these three variables – or levels of analysis or "images" - are useful for this thesis, too. Those independent variable are 1. a cooperative political leadership, 2. a favorable international system, and 3. a favorable public opinion. These three are equally important and all constitute necessary conditions. Hence, all three independent variables have to be fulfilled for political leadership to be attained. A favorable public opinion cannot lead to political integration, if the political leadership is not cooperative and willing to implement the policy input (e.g. European integration would have been impossible without a cooperative political leadership despite a favorable public opinion). The international system might hinder political integration due to great power competition, although the political leadership and public opinion are favorable (e.g. German unification was only possible when the Soviet Union collapsed). Finally, if the public opinion is not supportive, even a cooperative political leadership is unable to realize political integration (e.g. the cooperative political leadership between Ma and Xi lacked support from the Taiwanese public). Political integration can only take place, if all three conditions are given.

Political Leadership

Political leadership is an important condition for political integration. According to James MacGregor Burns, “leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers” (Burns 1978: 18). As pointed out by Waltz (1959), political phenomena can only be explained by looking at human behavior on an individual level: “The evilness of men, or their improper behavior, leads to war; individual goodness, if it could be universalized would mean peace” (1959: 39). Obviously, this is not word for word applicable for the question of political integration. Whether political integration proceeds, does not hinge upon the “evilness” or “goodness” of the political leader. Rather, it becomes evident that the human behavior and the political views of the leader of a country are decisive for political integration to occur. Why is that the case? Since the political leader of any given country possesses decisive power – albeit varying from country to country, the leader’s stance on whether integration is desirable or not, is essential for it to be initiated. Hence, Waltz emphasizes that “the most important causes of political arrangements and acts are found in the nature and behavior of man. This statement represents the minimum of agreement found among those whom we have classified as first-image analysts. They hold in common the conviction that what is important for politics is found beneath the political surface” (Ibid.: 42). If the political leader of country A opposes integration with country B, it is less likely for political integration to happen – no matter how favorable other factors are. If the political leader of country A supports integration with country B, it is more likely for political integration to occur – even given the circumstances are less favorable due to the power of the political leader.

Furthermore, Mattli (1999: 14) highlights “[...] the presence of an undisputed leader among the group of countries seeking closer ties”. Since integration leads to (economic, political, security, etc.) gains but may also lead to disadvantages for certain member states in certain policy areas, the political leadership has to serve as a “regional paymaster, easing distributional tensions and thus smoothing the path of integration” (Ibid.: 56). Furthermore, in order to advance integration this leader does not only have to absorb the costs for smaller states, it also has to act as the political center to coordinate and regulate the various policies. However, the willingness of a political leader to take

this role, accommodate other states, and essentially, pay disproportionately more for integration than others, largely “depends on the payoff of political integration to political leaders” (Ibid.: 13). The reason being is that such a leader would have to ‘sacrifice’ political autonomy, sovereignty, and power for integration. An economically prosperous country might not see the need for such a trade-off. On the other hand, a country that faces economic hardship might be more inclined to trade in political power for the economic benefits of the integration process. Laursen (2010) refers to two examples for political leaders. In regards to the German Zollverein in the 19th century, Prussia acted as the regional paymaster. For the EU, many consider Germany to assume the role of a central leader (Ibid.: 9). Lastly, political integration is associated with the collective action problem. For integration to successfully proceed, the Prisoner’s Dilemma has to be overcome. The leadership has to initiate the integration process. If no one takes the role of the political leader, political integration seems unlikely. Two or more potential leaders, however, may also create a problem.

In a wider sense, Byman & Pollack (2001) have detected further reasons for the importance of political leaders. First, a state’s leader “sets the ultimate and secondary intentions of a state” (Ibid.: 134). Independent from systemic or domestic factors, i.e. geopolitical position, culture, or public opinion, an individual can exceed those factors.

The authors refer to Hitler and Napoleon who both defied the people’s will and attempted to reach a great power status (Ibid.). Second, a political leader is able to influence a state’s diplomatic and military power. Again, the authors point to Hitler and Napoleon. The former decreased Germany’s military power due to his “foolish strategies”, while the latter helped the French army to be even better (Ibid.: 134-135). Third, a state’s strategy, its alliances and balances of power depend on the individual ability of the political leader. Alliances, first and foremost, “rest on the shoulders of individuals” (Ibid.: 135). Forth, individual leaders impact on other states’ perception, and thus, also on the behavior. A charismatic leader may be perceived as more trustworthy than an idiosyncratic leader.

The significance of leadership in terms of economic growth is another reason for this thesis’ hypothesis. Jones & Olken (2005) have found strong evidence that leadership transitions affect a state’s economic growth (Ibid.: 861). Hence, the leadership of a country has “a large causative influence on the economic outcomes of their nations”

(Ibid.). The effect a political leader can have, is stronger in autocratic than in democratic states. These findings suggest that although political institutions shape a state's economic performance, the leadership is powerful in doing so as well (Ibid.: 862).

Additionally, another reason for the importance of the political leadership has been brought to light by Mattes et al. (2015). The authors argue that foreign policy change is likely to happen “when a new leader [...] comes to power” albeit rather in nondemocratic than democratic countries (Ibid.: 280). The causal mechanism behind such a policy change is that the new leader most likely “relies on different societal groups for support than her predecessor” (Ibid.) due to the fact that leaders represent varying particular interests. Furthermore, the foreign policy of democracies is more stable than that of non-democracies (Ibid.: 288).

International System

The international system, i.e. international political factors such as security, has further impact upon political integration. According to Waltz (1959), the international system constitutes the systematic level of all political phenomena due to the fact that the international system is anarchic - meaning that there is no centralized, superimposed, sovereign body that governs the countries of the world. Waltz points out that the international system “in general and balance-of-power analysis in particular are relevant in the present as they have been in the past histories of multi-state systems” (1959: 223). Since there is no “world government”, each country and its strategy in the foreign policy realm is tangent on the strategy and behavior of other states. No nation state can act without creating implications in the international system. Foreign policy does not take place in a vacuum, i.e. every country is facing restriction given the anarchic nature of the international system (Ibid.: 222-223).

As states have to be self-reliant in the anarchic international system, all states drive for favored positions which leads to competition. If the pursuit of a state's self-interest, e.g. the initiation of political integration, promises to be fruitful, other states in turn may be inclined to counter this endeavor, since they feel threatened. This dynamic can lead to the creation of (counter-) alliances or bandwagoning. Therefore, the decision to initiate political integration among two or more countries, may lead to implications that can range from support and the alignment of other countries to discontent and the creation of countering alliance, if other countries see their interests threatened by the political

integration of two or more countries. Waltz summarizes this characteristic of the international system so: “the balance of power is not so much imposed by statesmen on events as it is imposed by events on statesmen.” (Ibid.: 209).

Mansfield and Solingen (2010) argue that an existing hegemon is likely to advance integration through Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs). In recent years, this role has been fulfilled by the USA. The formation of one PTA within a group can lead to a domino effect as other states, non-members, do not want to miss out on economic gains, and thus, initiate integration blocks by themselves. PTAs are more likely to evolve among political allies, since economic gains allow a state to bolster its military. Hence, the political-military power is likely to increase (Ibid.: 151). Trading with a potential adversary entails negative security externalities. Furthermore, economic dependence can affect power relations. Thus, international politics impact on economic and political integration and vice versa.

The hegemonic stability theory (HST) illustrates how impactful the international system can be. Essentially, HST claims that the international system has higher chances to be stable, if a single nation constitutes a hegemon. Or as put by Gilpin (1987: 72), “According to the theory of hegemonic stability as set forth initially by Charles Kindleberger an open and liberal world economy requires the existence of a hegemonic or dominant power”. This hegemon takes the burden of maintaining a liberal world order to serve its interests, i.e. “hegemonic structures of power, dominated by a single country, are most conducive to the development of strong international regimes whose rules are relatively precise and well obeyed” (Keohane 1980: 132). Thereby, cooperation may occur because it is in the interest of the hegemon.

Another reason that depicts the value of the international system has been brought up by Kagan (1997) who touches upon the notion of balance of power and alliances. Kagan invokes the Concert of Europe to prove her point. The Great Powers of Europe at that time (France, Prussia, Austria, Russia, and the United Kingdom) committed to an “unusual high degree of security cooperation” (Ibid.: 2), which has been regarded as a “strong and effective international institution in the security area” (Ibid.: 2). However, countries are inclined to cooperate when they perceive a common threat or, if the hegemon urges a state to do so. Therefore, the anarchic international system may require self-interested states to cooperate.

Public Opinion

The public opinion is another crucial condition for political integration. For Waltz (1959), the internal structure of states is another vital factor in the study of any political phenomenon. And the internal structure of a state is largely determined by its domestic policy which in turn bears on the public opinion. Waltz makes use of the following analogy to describe the importance of the public opinion: “We say that the state acts when we mean that the people in it act, just as we say that the pot boils when we mean that the water boils” (Waltz 1959: 80). Hence, despite the importance of the political leader of any state and the international system in general, the domestic politics impact on any given policy outcome: “[...] the internal structure of states determines not only the form and use of military force but external behavior generally” (Ibid.: 125). For example, if the public opinion is not in favor of political integration, the political leader may not be reelected in the next elections. Or vice versa, if the public opinion favors political integration, but the current political leader opposes the initiation of the aforementioned, the head of state may be punished so to say in the next elections and lose his or her position as the political leader. Consequently, Waltz holds that “the actions of states, or, more accurately, of men acting for states, make up the substance of international relations” (Ibid.: 122).

Depending on the interests of societal groups, these may be interested in the advancement or the regression of the integration process. Schneider (2017: 229) refers to “office-motivated political leaders” who have to include the public opinion in their decision making process. The public opinion is “conveyed, constrained, and calibrated by domestic institutions, which provide an important context for policy making, and in particular for the choice to enter Regional Integration Agreements (RIAs)” (Ibid.: 231). It is argued that groups who benefit from political integration are in support of it. These societal groups are export-oriented firms and multi-national corporations. Also, the general public should support political integration as it is assumed that integration leads to higher economic competitiveness, and therefore, to lower prices (Ibid.: 233).

The significance of the public opinion can also be seen in regards to the so-called “democratic peace”, i.e. democracies rarely engage in war with other democracies. According to the research of Tomz & Weeks (2013), “peace among democracies could be due, at least in part, to public opinion” (Ibid.: 862). The general public views democracies as less dangerous, and hence, is likely to advocate war. Furthermore,

morality constitutes an important variable in the perception of the general public. Non-democracies as a potential adversary impact on the people's amoral calculations in the sense that increases the preference of war (Ibid.).

Tomz (2007) has shown that the public opinion can raise domestic audience costs for political leaders, i.e. the domestic price a leader would have to pay who makes threats towards other nation states but then backs down. These domestic audience costs exist all through society, but in particular "among politically active citizens who have the greatest potential to shape government policy" (Ibid.: 821). The causal mechanism behind this is that the society is interested in a positive international reputation of its country. Leaders who are likely to step down from commitments are less likely to be elected. Hence, citizens are inclined to elect politicians who value and seem capable of protecting their country's international reputation (Ibid.: 837).

The above mentioned argument by Mattes et al. (2015) also emphasizes the role of the public opinion. The authors found that foreign policy change occurs when a new leader comes to power. Although the new leader is important in adjusting the foreign policy, it is the societal groups on whose support the leader relies that determines the policy change (Ibid.: 280). Hence, the public opinion and particular domestic interests can directly translate into foreign policy.

The political integration of East and West Germany can serve as an example in regards to the effect of public opinion. In Spring 1990, over 80 percent of West Germans and almost 80 percent of East Germans favored German unity (Glaab 2009). Finally, on October 3, 1990, East and West Germany became one Germany. 20 years after the fall of the Berlin Wall, in 2009, 86 per cent of all Germans were still content with the German unification. While 85 per cent of West Germans thought so, even more East Germans (91 per cent) agreed (ZDF-Politbarometer 2009).

In sum, the three conditions, i.e. political leadership, international system, and public opinion, are major factors in politics. Hence, these preliminary findings let me argue that these factors are missing in the Cross-Strait relations.

3.2 Hypothesis

The hypothesis that arises from these preliminary findings is that political integration requires three additional conditions which are a cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion. Table 3

(below) illustrates this thesis' hypothesis. Table 3 is essentially the same as Table 1 but extended with the hypothesis of this thesis, i.e. the three above mentioned conditions. I argue that these three conditions were prevalent in the case of the EU and East and West Germany but are not given in the case of the Cross-Strait relations. The main analysis of this thesis will test this hypothesis by examining the case of the EU, East and West Germany, and subsequently, the case of Taiwan and China.



Table 3 Hypothesis Illustrated

	European Union (EU)	West and East Germany	Taiwan and China
Similarities			
Economic Interdependence	Yes	Yes	Yes
Culture	Yes	Yes	Yes
Religion	Yes	Yes	Yes
Historical Affinity	Yes	Yes	Yes
Conflictual Past	Yes	Yes	Yes
Ethnicity	No	Yes	Yes
Independent variables			
Independent Variable 1: Functional Cooperation	Yes	Yes before being separated	Yes, gradually after 2008
Independent Variable 2: Social Transactions	Yes	Yes	Yes
Independent Variable 3: Actor's Pursuit of Self-Interest	Yes	Yes	Yes
Independent Variable 4: Political Leadership	Yes	Yes	No
Independent Variable 5: International System	Yes	Yes	No
Independent Variable 6: Public Opinion	Yes	Yes	No
Dependent variable			
Dependent Variable: Political Integration	Yes	Yes	No

Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author

3.3 Research Plan

The research plan for Chapter 4, 5, and 6 entails the analysis of the three case studies, EU (Chapter 4) and East and West Germany (Chapter 5) and the case of the Cross-Strait relations (Chapter 6). The research design will address the three independent variables: a cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion to three case studies. The methodology for this research design is process tracing.



Chapter 4: The Success Story of the European Union

The research question of this thesis is why has political integration occurred within the European Union and the two Germanys but not among Taiwan and China as they pose similar cases? My argument is that the three independent variables (cooperative leadership, favorable international system, and a positive public opinion) are instrumental for political integration and the goal of this chapter is to provide a positive verification regarding the role of these in the integration process of the EU. Evidence regarding the EU points to the fact that these three independent variables played a decisive role for the political integration of the EU. Whereas the seventh chapter on Cross-Strait relations serves as a negative verification for these three independent variables, as they are not given in the case of Taiwan and China. The content of this chapter consists of the analyses of, first, the cooperative political leadership within the EU, second, of the favorable international system for European integration, and then of the public opinion. Lastly, a conclusion summarizes the key findings of the EU's success story.

4.1 Cooperative Political Leadership

Political leadership, personal diplomacy, and political was crucial throughout the course of, first, economic interdependence, and then, political rapprochement within Europe. Otherwise, the sophistication of the EU as a political and economic union with 27 member states as of 2021 could not be explained. According to James MacGregor Burns, "leadership over human beings is exercised when persons with certain motives and purposes mobilize, in competition or conflict with others, institutional, political, psychological, and other resources so as to arouse, engage, and satisfy the motives of followers" (Burns 1978: 18). Against this backdrop, the main analysis regarding personal leadership as an impetus for European integration starts with the end of World War II.

1945-1950: From World War II to Reconciliation

The new Cold War split Europe along the so-called Iron Curtain with the Soviet Union and the United States and their respective allies on each side. Given the misery and devastation of World War I and World War II and the Cold War being underway, voices were being raised that in order to avoid painful events of the past from repeating, post-war Europe had to be pacified. The Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, Winston Churchill, postulated the need for French-German reconciliation as the essential course of action for a peaceful Europe (see Churchill 1946).

Similar ideas were raised at the same time by Jean Monnet in France. Monnet, who was a businessman and civil servant, developed a reconstruction plan for France (Monnet Plan) that envisioned French control over Germany's steel and coal territories in order to rebuild France and limit Germany's power. Thereby, the likelihood of war could be decreased significantly. Monnet wanted to establish a European federation or entity and he viewed economic cooperation as essential and proposed a gradual transfer of inter-state economic cooperation to the supranational level. Monnet envisioned the starting point for this process in the cooperation of the steel and coal industries. Monnet would later be known as the "Father of Europe" and as one of the most influential architects of European integration (Birkenmeier et al. 2008: 374).

Robert Schuman, the French Minister of Europe and Foreign Affairs, held comparable views as Churchill and Monnet. Schuman, who was a Luxembourg-born French and whose mother tongue was German, recognized the need for Franco-German reconciliation and a friendship between France and Germany in order for a peaceful Europe to exist. On May 9, 1950, the Foreign Minister Schuman gave a speech in the Quai d'Orsay, which would later be termed the 'Schuman Declaration'. So as to achieve Franco-German reconciliation and European harmony, he proposed that "Franco-German production of coal and steel as a whole be placed under a common High Authority, within the framework of an organization open to the participation of the other countries of Europe" (see Schuman 1950). Like Monnet, Schuman recognized the potential dangers of the coal and steel industry, as they are fundamental for war and the production of war goods. Hence, a communalization of the German and French coal and steel production would make war "materially impossible" (Ibid.). The Schuman declaration can be considered as the continuation of the Monnet Plan.

Without the agreement of the other European countries, most importantly the German side, the Schuman Declaration would have just been a declaration without practical implication. If Germany wanted to participate and be an equivalent within the Western bloc, it had to make concessions given the country's past actions. Agreeing to the communalization of the German and French coal and steel production, would constitute such a concession and establish a foundation of trust. Therefore, West German Chancellor Konrad Adenauer immediately agreed when he received Schuman's letter on May 8, 1950. With Adenauer's affirmation, Schuman in turn received approval from his ministry to announce his plan. The next day, May 9, 1950, Schuman declared his plan.

This personal diplomacy between the French and German side paved the way for French-German reconciliation and the European unification process.

1950-1957: From the Schuman Declaration to the European Communities

On June 20, 1950, the so-called “Inner Six” (France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands) initiated a conference regarding the implementation of the Schuman Plan. The talks were held under the chairmanship of Jean Monnet. In the course of the negotiations, the Schuman Plan underwent some modifications. However, the gist of the proposal (the communalization of the coal and steel industries) remained untouched. On April 18, 1951, the “Inner Six” signed the “Treaty establishing the European Coal and Steel Community” (Treaty of Paris) in Paris – the first supranational European institution. As intended, the treaty established a common market for coal and steel. Hence, all member states of the common market are exempted from paying tariffs on either coal or steel. The common market was opened in 1953. Other objectives included the expansion of the economies, a boost in employment, and an enhancement in quality and stability of the coal and steel production. The visions of Churchill, Monnet, Schuman, and Adenauer, turned into political reality and political leadership and personal diplomacy led to the beginning of European integration.

The Messina Conference of 1955 organized by the “Inner Six” was an assessment on the ECSC. The six nations concluded that the community functioned well and put forward the intention of further integration. Having realized that economic integration has to precede political integration, the leaders of the “Inner Six” designated Paul-Henri Spaak as chairman of the Spaak Committee, which was an intergovernmental committee established to develop a framework for a general common market and a European community for atomic energy. It consisted of Spaak, the six leaders from the ECSC member states and a representative of the United Kingdom, Russel Bretherton. The committee began its work in July 1955 and finished in April 1956 with the release of the Spaak Report.

The analysis led to the result that a sector by sector economic integration – as started with the coal and steel industries – would be complicated. Rather, the report suggested, it is imperative to amalgamate the European economies through horizontal integration. The member countries were to progressively eliminate tariffs to create a customs union and eventually a common market with free movement of labor and capital:

“Just as the common market must affect all economic activities, so too the elimination of customs duties must progress simultaneously over the whole range of production activities” (see The Brussels Report on The General Common Market 1956: 1). Additionally, the member countries were to create a common external tariff for third countries.

The Spaak Report was received well and as a result the “Inner Six” convened at the Venice Conference on May 29 and 30 1956 to discuss the Spaak Report. The representatives of the member states evaluated the proposals of the report positively and decided to negotiate the details of the common market and the community on atomic energy at the Intergovernmental Conference on the Common Market and Euratom in Brussels on June 26 1956. On March 25 1957 the six member states of the ECSC signed the Treaties of Rome which created European Economic Community (EEC) and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The EEC with its common market and customs union established the foundation for European integration (see Küsters 2007). The Treaties of Rome depicted the successful labor of personal diplomacy among the “Inner Six”. Once again personal leadership and political will were decisive in what in hindsight represents a major event in the history of Europe’s integration process.

1958-1972: The European Communities

Six years later, in 1957, economic integration gained further momentum with the establishment of the EEC. The member states wanted to achieve a common market and a customs union. Given that World War II just ended 12 years before, this level of political will and cooperation between the leaders of the “Inner Six” and the level of economic interdependence was unforeseen. Besides, the foundation of the EURATOM signified cooperation in the nuclear power sector. The EEC quickly became the centerpiece of the three Communities and the driving force for further integration. The advocates of economic integration first, then political integration seemed to push through, as the European Defense Community (EDC) and the European Political Community (EPC) failed a few years earlier.

The goal of the EEC was to establish a common market. Among the three now existing European Communities, the EEC swiftly gained momentum. In 1962, the EEC launched the common agricultural policy (CAP). It aimed at ensuring and improving agricultural productivity, assisting the farmers of the member states, and enabling a

sustainable and environmentally friendly agriculture (see Ackrill 2000). In July 1968, the member states of the EEC became a customs union, as all customs duties and other restrictions were removed among the member states. Furthermore, a common customs tariff was put in place as the substitute for national customs duties (see Von der Groeben 1968).

The next major event in the history of European political unification happened in 1963, when the “Inner Six” decided to merge the executive bodies of the three existing Communities. On April 8 1965 the Merger Treaty was signed and came into force on July 1, 1967. The treaty merged the legislative, judicial, and administrative organs of the ECSC, EEC, and the EURATOM (see Treaty establishing a single Council and a single Commission of the European Communities 1965).

1973-1993: Enlargement and Deepening Integration

With the Communities having merged, the integration process gathered pace. The next key event in the history of European integration occurred in the early 1970s. On January 1 1973, the “Inner Six” were joined by the United Kingdom, Ireland, and Denmark in the European Communities after having held referenda beforehand. The United Kingdom (UK) was finally admitted to the Communities increasing the membership to nine. The UK’s application in 1963 and 1965 was blocked by France, as Charles de Gaulle thought the UK would side with the USA in case of conflict (see Davis 1997). Another important milestone took place in 1979. Whereas beforehand lawmakers were dispatched by their respective government, 1979 saw the first directly elected European Parliament. Members of the Parliament belonged to transnational political groups and not to national delegations (see Cracknell & Morgan 1999). The first European Parliament elections took place across the nine member states and led to a win for the socialist parties.

The next enlargement occurred almost a decade later. Greece joined the European Communities in 1981. Greece that had just transitioned from a dictatorship to a democracy and hoped to engage the European Communities in order to consolidate its democracy. It already constituted an associate member since 1961. Spain and Portugal followed in 1986 with similar motifs. Both countries overcame their dictatorship and democratized. After having become a customs union in 1968, the next adjacent step in economic integration happened in 1986 when the EEC members signed the Single

European Act (SEA). Thereby, the member states established a single market for its members by 1992. The European single market was intended to be a trade bloc without intra-trade barriers and freedom of movement of goods, capital, services, and people (see Moravcsik 1991). The Single European Act became a decisive impetus for the Maastricht Treaty in 1992 which would lay the foundation for the establishment of the European Union.

1993-2004: The Establishment of the European Union and further Integration

The Maastricht Treaty, or formally the Treaty on European Union, was signed between the member states of the European Communities, became effective in 1993 and constitutes the founding treaty of the European Union – a political and economic union with a single market. The Maastricht Treaty signifies “a new stage in the process of creating an ever closer union among the peoples of Europe, in which decisions are taken as closely as possible to the citizen. The Union shall be founded on the European Communities, supplemented by the policies and forms of cooperation established by this Treaty. Its task shall be to organize, in a manner demonstrating consistency and solidarity, relations between the Member States and between their peoples” (see Treaty on European Union 1992).

With the fall of the Iron Curtain in 1989 several former Soviet satellite states began to express interest in joining the EU, such as Latvia, Poland, Lithuania, Romania, and Bulgaria. The next enlargement occurred in 1995 with the accession of Sweden, Finland, and Austria that held. Norway was supposed to join too, however Norway’s citizen opposed the accession in a referendum – the second time after 1972. On March 26, 1995, the Schengen Agreement came into effect, after it has been signed ten years earlier. The Schengen Agreement marked another essential step in political integration among the members of the EU, as it gradually eradicated passport controls at transnational borders of member states. Besides the economic single market, the Schengen Agreement signified a single state in terms of border control and mutual visa policies. Thereby, the EU reached its objective of free movement of people (see Davis & Gift 2014).

Another crucial development for European integration took place with the establishment of the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) in 1999. It came into effective in 2002 and introduced the euro, the single currency for its members. The euro currency was launched by 12 member states back then. The European Central Bank (ECB)

supervises the monetary policy of the euro area, also known as the Eurozone. Thereby, the EU completed its economic integration – at least for the members of the Eurozone.

2004 until now: Enlargement and Crisis

Political integration endured and became even more attractive within Europe after the establishment of the Eurozone. 2004 saw the largest expansion for the EU in its history, in terms of the amount of nations that have joined and also population wise. The following countries joined the EU on May 1, 2004: Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Hungary, Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, and Slovenia. In 2007, Romania and Bulgaria joined the EU, too. These new member countries were initially lacking in various areas, and hence, first had to implement a series of reforms to fulfill the EU's 'Copenhagen Criteria'. For instance, in areas as democratic practices, human rights, and in the economic realm improvements were pushed by the EU. Additionally, the majority of these countries belonged to the Soviet Bloc. Therefore, this enlargement eastward was considered a key step in the consolidation of post-communist democratization (see Cameron 2007).

Legally, the Treaty of Lisbon marked an important stepping stone in the history of European integration. The treaty was signed on December 13, 2007, and amended the Maastricht Treaty (Foundation treaty of the EU) and the Treaty of Rome (Foundation of the ECC) (see Treaty of Lisbon 2007). The next and until today last enlargement entailed Croatia that joined the EU on July 1, 2013, making Croatia the 28th member of the EU. Albeit many older member states, such as Poland, the Czech Republic, or Sweden, have not entered the Eurozone, several young EU members joined the Eurozone: Slovenia (2007), Malta and Cyprus (2008), Slovakia (2009), Estonia (2011), Latvia (2014) and Lithuania (2015). Despite the high level of political and economic integration, the EU also experienced setbacks and crises. The financial crisis hit the Eurozone hard and led to a debt crisis, especially in Greece, Portugal, Ireland, and Spain. The biggest setback, however, took place with the so-called Brexit in 2020 when the United Kingdom left the EU.

Political Leadership: Conclusion

Nevertheless, the high level of political integration in Europe which led to the foundation of the EU is a success story and, if it was not for political leadership, personal diplomacy, and political will, especially in the first, decisive years of European

integration, it would not have been possible. From Churchill, Monnet, and Schuman to Adenauer – all the leaders were aware of the importance of leadership, especially in terms of French-German reconciliation which could only come about, if French and German politicians actively cooperated and overcame their rivalry. Schuman's declaration and the idea of a common European coal and steel community was only possible through personal will and personal diplomacy. In further personal negotiations, it was decided horizontal economic integration seemed more promising than sector by sector integration which ultimately led to the foundation of the EEC. The success story of political integration through economic integration was crowned by the foundation of the EU.

4.2 Favorable International System

The international system constitutes another vital factor that allowed for political integration to take place in Europe. It was and has been favorable for the European integration process. Without the given circumstances in global politics, economic and political unification would have been less likely. The global constellations of states and the general status-quo of global politics benefitted European integration. According to the view of the realists, the international system is characterized by anarchy. There is no 'world government'. Hence, nation states have to be self-reliant and, therefore, prioritize their security. Besides, a country's behavior and strategy is tangent on other country's behavior and strategy. The balance of power between the states is of crucial interest. Therefore, it might be useful to build alliances or even integrate politically (see Waltz 1959). Against this backdrop, what made the international system so favorable for the European integration process?

1945-1950: From World War II to Reconciliation

The main analysis regarding the international system as an independent variable that enabled and facilitated European integration starts with the end of World War II. The end of the war signified a turning point in the landscape of the international system. Nazi Germany posed a common threat. With the defeat of Nazi Germany, however, the contrast between the former Allies of World War II became apparent and their temporary alliance ended. Tensions between the USA and the Soviet Union increased due to ideological (capitalism versus communism) and geopolitical differences. The USA adhered to the Monroe Doctrine of 1823 for over a century which outlined the foreign policy of the USA as a policy of non-intervention. However, given the experiences of World War II, the American president Harry S. Truman announced the so-called Truman Doctrine in 1947.

The doctrine provides a new foreign policy approach, “One of the primary objectives of the foreign policy of the United States is the creation of conditions in which we and other nations will be able to work out a way of life free from coercion. This was a fundamental issue in the war with Germany and Japan. [...] We shall not realize our objectives, however, unless we are willing to help free people to maintain their free institutions and their national integrity against aggressive movements that seek to impose upon them totalitarian regimes” (see Truman 1947).

This marked the beginning of the Cold War and the start of American containment policy towards the Soviet Union. Subsequently, both attempted to expand their area of influence. Two blocs evolved, the Western and the Eastern Bloc. The USA wanted to hinder European countries from joining the Soviet Union. Consequently, the USA found it essential to bolster its relations with Europe and ensure a vital and peaceful Europe that could be integrated into the liberal world order. Thus, in 1948, the US Congress passed the Marshall Plan, officially known as the European Recovery Program, in order to grant aid to Europe’s recovery and economy, “to promote world peace and the general welfare, national interest, and foreign policy of the United States through economic, financial, and other measures necessary to the maintenance of conditions abroad in which free institutions may survive and consistent with the maintenance of the strength and stability of the United States” (see Economic Cooperation Act of 1948).

The Marshall Plan which followed the ideological footsteps of the Truman Doctrine provided that several Western European countries were to receive financial aid from 1948 to 1951 to reconstruct their countries, recover their economies, and ultimately, to integrate Western Europe into the liberal world order to contain the Soviet Union. The total amount of aid that 16 European countries received accounted for roughly \$13.3 billion which is equal to \$143 billion in 2017 dollars (see Tarnoff 2018). The US aid consisted largely of credits given to the receiving countries, raw materials to rebuild the infrastructure, and food. The Marshall Plan was developed as capacity building, i.e. aid to self-help. The plan was conceived to stimulate Europe’s recovery but was linked to conditions, such as the removal of trade barriers and the promotion of European economic integration. The plan was created by US foreign minister George C. Marshall who realized that it is in the self-interest of the USA to have a politically and economically stable Europe, “It is logical that the United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be

no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation and chaos. Its purpose should be the revival of a working economy in the world so as to permit the emergence of political and social conditions in which free institutions can exist” (see Marshall 1947).

Subsequently, the Organization for European Economic Co-operation (OEEC) was founded in 1948 to coordinate the financial aid of the Marshall Plan and to promote economic integration across the European recipients. It is the predecessor for the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) which also deals with non-European countries. The OEEC intended to promote co-operation and harmonization between the economies, reducing tariffs and other barriers to trade and commerce, and generally, overcome bilateralism and engage multilaterally (see Gordon 1956). Thus, the USA helped to lay the foundation for economic integration in Europe.

Militarily and ideologically, European integration was facilitated first by the Brussels Pact (1948) and then by the foundation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) (1949). The Brussels Pact was a military pact between France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Belgium, and Luxembourg as a potential countermeasure against Soviet expansion in Europe. A year later in 1949, the NATO was founded as a military alliance. This time with the involvement of the USA. The treaty was signed by the USA and Canada and ten European countries (France, UK, Benelux, Portugal, Denmark, Iceland, Norway, and Portugal). The purpose of the NATO was and is the defense of its territory and - during the Cold War period – the containment of the Soviet Union, “The Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be considered an attack against them all and consequently they agree that, if such an armed attack occurs, each of them, in exercise of the right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations, will assist the Party or Parties so attacked by taking forthwith, individually and in concert with the other Parties, such action as it deems necessary, including the use of armed force, to restore and maintain the security of the North Atlantic area” (see The North Atlantic Treaty 1949).

1950-1957: The Paris Protocol and West Germany's Accession to the NATO

In 1954, the Paris Protocol was signed between the US, the UK, France, and West Germany. The protocol stipulated the end of Allied occupation of West Germany. Thereby, the country received its full sovereignty over its internal and external affairs.

Under this agreement, West Germany finally became a sovereign country but it also solidified Germany's divide in East and West Germany. Nevertheless, the protocol marked a considerable event in Europe's path to peace due to the settlement of West Germany's status. In 1955, West Germany joined the NATO six years after the establishment of the NATO which posed another important impetus for economic and political integration in Europe. The country was considered vital given its geopolitical location in containing the Soviet expansion in Europe. Ten years after the defeat of Nazi Germany and Allied occupation of Germany, West Germany's NATO accession marked its completed West integration. Although the remilitarization of West Germany – just ten years after World War II – was not uncontroversial, the French side in particular was highly critical due to the historic Franco-German rivalry, the NATO needed a strong West Germany. It was allowed up to 500,000 soldiers which were under the NATO authority (see Richardson 1966).

1958-1972: The Cold War Crises

The European process of integration as a means for unity within the Western Bloc gained further importance through several crises that occurred throughout the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 was a confrontation between the Soviet Union and Cuba on the one side, and the USA and NATO on the other side. After NATO had deployed missiles in Turkey, the Soviet Union sent nuclear missiles to be stationed in Cuba as a response. As a consequence, the USA ordered a naval blockade. The situation was soothed after intense talks between both sides leading to the dismantling of missiles on both sides. The Cuban Missile Crisis was the closest the Cold War almost turned 'hot' (see Allison 1969). Another Cold War crisis occurred in 1968 when the Soviet Union and the other members of the Warsaw Pact invaded Czechoslovakia with over half a million soldiers to suppress the Prague Spring – a mass movement under the leadership of the Czechoslovak government that demanded political liberalization. Alexander Dubček, the First Secretary of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia, was a reformist who wanted to liberalize the country to implement a 'socialism with a human face'. However, the movement was undermining the Soviet ideology and was therefore violently terminated by the Soviet Union (see Svec 1988).

1973-1993: Further Division and Increased European Confidence

The division in great power relations between the East and the West was further enhanced in the 1970s. The Vietnam War which was a Cold-War proxy war saw the US'

withdrawal in 1973. The communist powers won the Vietnam War and the country sided with the Soviet Union. By that time, the Cold War had reached the so-called ‘Third World’ – countries that were technically neither aligned with the Western Bloc nor the Eastern Bloc in Africa and Asia. In Europe, however, the economic success of, first, the ECSC of the “Inner Six” and, second, of the EEC resulted in great self-confidence among Europe’s leader. Whereas in the immediate aftermath of World War II, the Western European countries highly depended on the goodwill of the US, the positive results of Europe’s economic and political integration led to a growing sense of autarky. This development, and the intensifying cleavage in great power relations, in turn, stimulated further focus on the development of the EEC. Furthermore, a mistrust in American leadership on the world level also led to an increased awareness for a Western European foreign policy (see Ludlow 2010).

1993-2004: Dissolution of the Eastern Bloc and Consolidation of the EU

The Cold war was over and the great power relations between the USA and the Soviet Union came to an end. With the fall of the Iron Curtain, the international landscape changed drastically and many Eastern European states (re-)gained their independence and sovereignty. The success story of European Integration has to be viewed vis-à-vis the dissolution of the Eastern bloc. The economic prosperity and political stability of Western Europe contributed to the destabilization of the Communist regimes. (West) Germany which from the Soviet perspective posed a threat as the successor of Nazi Germany, now constituted as “the great advocate of multilateralism and international co-operation rather than national expansion (Ludlow 2010: 197). What followed was a ‘return to Europe’. Various former Soviet satellite states were interested in joining the EU and NATO. First, the Czech Republic, Poland, and Hungary joined NATO in 1999. Five years later, in 2004, several East European countries became members of the EU and of NATO. Bulgaria, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Romania, Slovakia, and Slovenia joined NATO. The EU saw the largest expansion with the accession of the before mentioned countries as well plus Cyprus, Malta, Poland, and the Czech Republic.

2004 until now: The Emergence of the EU as a Great Power

By the mid-2000s, the European Union had solidified its economic and political integration. The European integration project evolved from a ‘by-product’ of great power relations to an independent player within the international system. Due to the end of the Cold War and the consolidation of the EU, the idea of a bigger role for the EU in

international relations gained more and more momentum. Although the EU had initiated a ‘Common Foreign and Security Policy’ (CFSP) ever since 1993 with the Treaty of Maastricht, the EU’s CFSP substantiated with the Treaty of Lisbon in 2009. The treaty foresaw the establishment of the position of the *High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy* who essentially serves as the EU’s foreign minister. The High Representative is leading the European External Action Service (EEAS) that serves as the EU’s foreign office in third countries. By now, the EU has been referred to as a “Superpower” by various scholars due to several reasons: inhabitants, economic strength, political influence, and soft power. Nonetheless, it has been remarked that the EU is lacking hard power, in the sense of military power (Moravcsik 2009 & Leonard 2005).

International System: Conclusion

Thus, the international system and the constellation of global politics facilitated the integration process in Europe and arguably laid the necessary cornerstone. Without the support of the USA, European economic and especially political integration might not have happened. Economy wise, the Marshall Plan and the financial and technical aid that was given to the European countries helped to retrieve Europe’s economy. Politically and militarily, the foundation of the NATO facilitated Western Europe’s accession to the liberal world order. Since 1953, the USA and the European Union (then still European Coal and Steel Community) have engaged in diplomatic relations. Nowadays, the US-EU relations are regarded as one of the most critical bilateral relationships in the world. One might argue that the European integration project was a ‘by-product’ of the Cold War. However, over the time with increasing success in terms of the its economic integration, the EU has become an important actor on the global stage and has attracted many countries. Thereby, the EU has emerged as another great power besides the traditional powers. Nonetheless, if it was not for the favorable constellation in the international system that emerged with the Cold War, the degree of economic and political integration in Europe would be uncertain now.

4.3 Favorable Public Opinion

How the public opinion impacted on the European integration process is not that straight forward. There was no systematic survey regarding the Europeans attitude towards European integration before 1973 when the European Commission started to conduct the so-called ‘Eurobarometer’. The Eurobarometer is a public opinion survey that

addresses topics related to the EU, such as integration, economy, and politics. From 1973 to 2009 the following was asked: “Generally speaking, do you think (your country’s) membership in the Union is a good thing, a bad thing, or neither good nor bad?”. I will take this question as an indicator for European integration, as “membership in the European Union represents the existential fact of the integration process – endorsing membership is therefore endorsing the process of integration itself. In addition, the ‘good thing’ question is available for the longest time span” (Eichenberg & Dalton 2007: 133). Thereby, I follow Eichenberg’s & Dalton’s (2007) operationalization of European integration. Unfortunately, this question has no longer been asked from 2010 on.

Moreover, before the 1980s the public opinion in the research area of European integration has not been taken into account (Hooghe & Marks 2009). Additionally, the first European elections took place in 1979 which signifies that beforehand, Europeans could not actively vote or participate in European politics. At least in domestic elections the public could have elected parties that opposed European integration. However, that was not the case. Hence, academics describe the role of the public in the early decades of European integration as giving a ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41).






Figure 1 Public Opinion on European Integration 1973-2009



Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author, based on the Eurobarometer Surveys



1945-1973: A Permissive Consensus

After the end of World War II, the discourse regarding European integration was shaped by speeches from important political leaders (among others Churchill and Schuman (see before)) that made extensive use of pathos to emphasize the necessity of economic integration. As Sternberg (2016: 28) put it, “a persuasive storyline positioned the early Communities as absolutely necessary and indispensable, a matter of no alternative and even survival. [...] The enormity of the stakes at hand belittled any differences of opinion regarding how exactly to proceed, and how to divide up the burdens and benefits involved”. The contemporary rhetoric alluded to the common good, that economic integration was inevitable to avoid another war, to achieve peace, and economic prosperity. “Again, the implication was that this European common good was and could only be the object of general agreement. Evoked was a kind of Rousseauian “general will” oriented towards the common good, and emanating from insight into what this consisted of. Discourses projecting a common European good often implied a given moral predisposition towards it, and a principled obligation to pursue it through integration”, describes Sternberg (2016: 29) the discourse back then. The scholar thereby implies that the public opinion had no other choice than to consent regarding the early integration.

Nonetheless, many Europeans were enthusiastic about the rapprochement of former enemies and hoped for European unity, especially since the proclaimed goals of peace and stability were universal and hard to reject. Therefore, the initial beginning of European integration was considered positive. Furthermore, in the early days of the European Communities the practical questions were very technical, such as regarding the prices of coal and steel or on trade barriers and taxes. Thus, the integration process was perceived as ‘top-down’ from the political, economic, and administrative elite and had no direct implications for the majority of the citizen – at least in the early days of integration (Hooghe & Marks 2009: 5).

As the goals of integration were inherently positive and there were no direct consequences, the citizens had little reason to dissent. This is why the public opinion has been regarded as insignificant: “It is as impracticable as it is unnecessary to have a recourse to general public opinion and attitude surveys, or even to surveys of specific interested groups, such as business or labor. It suffices to single out and define the political elites in the participating countries, to study their reactions to integration and to assess changes in attitude on their part”, so was the opinion of Ernst Haas who developed

the theory of neo-functionalism (Haas 1958: 17). Consequently, the role of the civic society has been viewed as giving a 'permissive consensus' (Lindberg and Scheingold 1970: 41).

1973-1993: From a 'Permissive Consensus' to a 'Constraining Dissensus'

Yet, with time and the initial integration having succeeded (the European Communities were successfully established), the public opinion gained importance in Europe's political integration. Denmark and Ireland held referenda regarding an accession to the European Communities which were positive and led to a membership. Norway's referendum, however, led to a rejection. In 1973, the UK also joined after having been blocked by France for many years. Two years later a referendum was held on whether the UK should stay and the public voted for staying. Thus, the public opinion was taken into consideration (the Norwegian people even impeded an accession). Hence, there has been increasingly public legitimization for the European integration project starting in the mid-1970s away from the 'permissive consensus'. According to the Eurobarometer, support for European integration among the citizen was at 56 percent in 1973 (see Figure 1).

The first ever elections for the European Parliament took place in 1979. The citizens of the member states are eligible to vote in the European Parliament elections every five years by universal adult suffrage. The intended purpose of the elections was for one to establish more democratic legitimization and also to incorporate the public opinion in its interests and preferences in the integration process. Thereby, it was hoped, to mobilize public support in favor of active endorsement of the European integration (Sternberg 2016).

With the implementation of the Eurobarometer in 1973, data became available on the citizen's perspective on European integration, identity, and policy related issues. One benefit of the Eurobarometer was the building of a 'European consciousness'. By surveying Europe's citizen on various issues, the citizens themselves were able to engage with each other, as the Eurobarometer revealed the opinions of other European nations. Furthermore, the realization was that integration had to be aligned with the citizen's views. As a result, the rhetoric shifted towards 'listening to the ordinary citizens' rather than a purely top-down approach. The idea was to build a stronger connection between Europe's citizen and the European Communities. This policy continued through the 1980s and led

to a European flag, anthem, stamps, and also a common European driver's license. The consequence was steadily rising levels of support for the European project up until 1989 with 70 percent approval rate (see Figure 1).

The importance of public support for European integration became apparent in 1992. Denmark held a referendum on the Maastricht Treaty which stipulated the foundation of the EU. The Maastricht was only to become effective, if all member states ratified it. However, the Danish dismissed the referendum by 50.7 percent with a voter turnout of 83.1 percent. Later on, however, the Treaty of Maastricht was in fact ratified after a successful referendum in 1993 which was possible due to several exceptions that were granted to Denmark in the implementation of the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish rejection signified a major setback for the integration process. The support for European integration has decreased from 70 percent in 1989 to 57 percent in 1993 (see Figure 1). For this reason, scholars remarked that the Danish referendum of 1992 constituted the final end to the 'permissive consensus' towards a 'constraining dissensus' in regards to the European public opinion. (Hooghe & Marks 2009).

1993-2004: Euroscepticism

In the wake of the Danish referendum, the Member of the European Commission, Pascal Lamy stated that "Europe was built in a Saint-Simonian [i.e., technocratic] way from the beginning, this was Monnet's approach: The people weren't ready to agree to integration, so you had to get on without telling them too much about what was happening. Now Saint-Simonianism is finished. It can't work when you have to face democratic opinion" (Eriksen & Fossm 2000: xii). A realization that the public opinion, in fact, mattered. The Danish referendum did not only lead to this acknowledgement of the power of the public opinion and to the 'constraining dissensus' (the Danish almost halted the entire integration project) but it also caused a decline in public support. Only 46 percent of Europe's citizen were in favor of European integration in 1997, compared to 70 percent in 1989 (see Figure 1).

This lowering levels of approval for European integration have been attributed to so-called 'Euroscepticism'. Euroscepticism is the skepticism about the EU and European integration. It is mainly rooted in the EU's perceived democratic deficit. Another common critique points towards the EU's elitist, top-down nature, since the first European elections were held in 1979, while the ECSC existed since 1951. Critics may seek a

‘democratization’ and change of the existing EU or even a withdrawal. The criticism comes from left-leaning and right-leaning parties which are to a large extent populist (Hooghe & Marks 2007).

Europe’s leaders faced another defeat in 2001 in terms of public opinion. The Treaty of Nice was signed in that year and provided for institutional changes, such as the mode of voting, in view of the EU’s admission of several East European countries. Yet, the referendum for Ireland’s ratification was rejected by 53.87 percent. The voter turnout was 34.79 percent. A decade after the Danish referendum for the Treaty of Maastricht, the public opinion put a stop on the further development of the EU again. However, the government decided to repeat the referendum and after intense political mobilization, the Irish accepted the referendum a year later (Gilland 2002).

2004 until now: Further Euroscepticism and the Brexit

The public opinion remained euro-skeptical through the 2000s and 2010s. The approval rate for European integration oscillated between 49 and 58 percent between 2000 to 2009 (see Figure 1). The Irish, again, rejected a referendum in 2008 regarding the Lisbon Treaty. The Treaty of Lisbon intended to amend the Maastricht Treaty and the Treaty of Rome, and also EURATOM. The treaty also provided qualified majority voting instead of unanimity. The Irish halted the process of European integration again. However, after concessions were made towards Ireland, a second referendum accepted the Treaty of Lisbon and the treaty came into effect in 2009 (Quinlan 2009).

The most severe incident for European integration occurred when the British public voted to leave the EU in a referendum on the UK’s EU membership in 2016. With a voter turnout of 72 percent, a majority of roughly 52 percent voted for ‘Leave the European Union’, making the UK the first country to withdraw from the EU. The British exit (‘Brexit’) took four years of negotiations between the UK and the EU and was at last finalized in January 2020. However, the UK constitute a special case, one may argue, as it is not part of continental Europe. Therefore, identity may play a role. Despite the criticism that many Europeans have, the majority (61 percent) is still supportive of the EU, saying that a EU membership is valuable (Eurobarometer, Spring 2019).

Public Opinion: Conclusion

Nevertheless, “while few scholars would argue that European integration is driven solely by public sentiments, even fewer would argue that public opinion plays no role in

the process of integration. If the EC is to deal forcefully with issues such as monetary union, social policy, foreign policy, and constitutional reform, it will require active public support for political change. As international relation specialists are arguing with increasing frequency, attempts to achieve international cooperation involve the domestic ratification of international bargains. EC elites may have initiated the international bargains involved in the expansion of the community's authority [...], but implementation of those bargains will require domestic support" (Eichenberg & Dalton 1993: 508-509). Thus, it is fair to say that the public opinion was not the initial impetus for European integration. It was the cooperative leadership of European politicians that gave the impetus. At least, however, the public opinion has not dissented political integration, hence the term 'permissive consensus'. With the first European elections, the public opinion received more and more attention. Several referendums shook Europe's integration. The perceived democratic deficit and top-down approach led to extensive discontent voiced in the foundation of euro-skeptical parties. The most visible discontent constitutes the withdrawal of the UK from the EU.

4.4 Conclusion

In sum, political leadership and a favorable international system have been crucial for political integration in Europe. In the aftermaths of World War II, political leaders recognized the need for a peaceful Europe and saw that this could be achieved first through economic integration and then through political integration. They engaged in personal diplomacy to overcome differences for the greater good. The international system was in thus far favorable, as the USA wanted to contain the Soviet Union and hence, was interested in a peaceful and strong Europe integrated into the Western Bloc. Political leadership was the decisive factor in European integration, while the international system built the framework that allowed for personal and national reconciliation. Regarding public opinion, it can be said that it was less critical for European political integration. The public generally supported the ideals of European integration in hopes of a peaceful and prosperous Europe. However, it was at least initially not directly involved, as the term 'permissive consensus' adequately describes. Over the years, the public opinion gained importance and increasingly expressed dissatisfaction with the course of integration, leading to the term 'constraining dissensus'. In recent years, Euroscepticism did not only lead to constrain but even to withdrawal as with the Brexit. In sum, ever since the end of World War II, the European political leadership engaged in

a cooperative manner and the international system was favorable for European integration due to US support. Furthermore, over the time, the European public opinion has become more important and favorable for political integration. Thus, all three conditions have been given early on in the integration process.





Chapter 5: The Success Story of German Reunification

The goal of this chapter is to provide another positive verification regarding the role of the three independent variables (cooperative leadership, favorable international system, and a positive public opinion) for political integration. The positive verification in this chapter stems from the case of East and West Germany. The next chapter on Cross-Strait relations serves as a negative verification for these three independent variables because they are missing between Taiwan and China. The structure of this chapter is as follows: The cooperative political leadership between East and West Germany will be examined first in 5.1. Second, the analysis of the favorable international system for German political integration proceeds in 5.2. Third, the role of the public opinion will be explored in 5.3. Finally, 5.4 concludes the main results.

5.1 Cooperative Political Leadership

1945-1962: The Emergence of East and West Germany

With the end of World War II and the emergence of the Cold War, Germany was split up by the Western Allies and the Soviet Union into West and East Germany. Berlin, the biggest German city, was separated as well. West Germany was formally founded on May 23, 1949, as the Federal Republic of Germany. East Germany was formally founded on October 7, 1949, as the German Democratic Republic. East Germany chose East Berlin as its capital and West Germany selected Bonn as a temporary capital to reiterate its viewpoint that the separation was temporary. While West Germany was founded on the principles of democracy and market economy, East Germany was controlled by the Socialist Unity Party which exerted complete political power. East and West German leaders were largely influenced in their policies by the Cold War due to the ideological and military rivalry. Thus, the first years of German-German leadership and personal diplomacy were shaped by the East-West conflict and were therefore tensed. Yet, the Cold War was not the only reason for the frigid German-German relations. East and West Germany respectively insisted on being the ‘main German state’ and doubted the other’s legitimacy. While East Germany emphasized its anti-fascism and accused West Germany of fascism, West Germany criticized East Germany’s lack of democratic legitimization. The East German President Wilhelm Pieck was keen on West Germany’s acknowledgement and recognition of the East German state. West Germany under the lead of Chancellor Konrad Adenauer, however, insisted on its *Alleinvertretungsanspruch*, i.e. West Germany’s exclusive mandate on the entire German territory making it the sole

legitimate German state (see Bleek 1995). Subsequently, West Germany announced the Hallstein Doctrine (after Walter Hallstein, a civil servant of the German foreign office) which intended that West Germany would not engage, establish, or maintain, diplomatic relations with countries that recognize East Germany. It was regarded as an unfriendly act if third countries were to recognize East Germany, except for the Soviet Union. Rather than personal diplomacy and reconciliation with East Germany, West German Chancellor Adenauer focused on the retrieval of West German sovereignty in the eyes of the former Western Allies. Political unification with East Germany was less urgent (Ibid.).

With the construction of the Berlin Wall and escape-proof borders in 1961, East Germany stabilized its political system, and additionally, East Germany's economy became more prosperous. West Germany had to realize that East Germany was meant to stay. Besides, the Cold War hit bottom with the Cuba crisis in 1962. As a consequence, these two developments led the political leaders to the realization that a new, more practical policy – grounded in closer personal exchange between the leaders - had to be conducted. Egon Bahr, a politician for the Social Democratic Party in West Germany, suggested a new approach in 1963 in dealing with East Germany which he referred to as *Wandel durch Annäherung* (Change through Rapprochement). Rather than an all-or-nothing approach, i.e. demanding immediate unification or free elections for East Germany, West Germany should rather conduct a policy of 'little steps' ("*Politik der kleinen Schritte*") that mitigates against the suffering that has been caused by the emergence of two German states (see Bahr 1984).

1963-1970: Détente and Efforts for Rapprochement

The change of narrative away from confrontation to 'change through rapprochement' led to a first success shortly after Egon Bahr's proposal. In December 1963, East and West Germany agreed upon a so-called *Passierscheinabkommen* (Crossing permit agreement) for West Berliners to enter East Berlin. After the construction of the Berlin Wall in 1961, West Berliners have not entered East Berlin. The crossing permit agreement finally – after two years – allowed for a visit during the Christmas holidays. East Berliners, nonetheless, were not allowed to visit West Berlin, for the very same reason the Berlin Wall was built, i.e. East German leaders attempted to hinder East German escape (see Bleek 1995).

The year of 1969 saw a turning point in German-German relations. In the West German federal elections, the Social Democratic Party and the Free Democratic Party won and formed a coalition under Chancellor Willy Brandt. Brandt - unlike his predecessors who adopted a tough stance towards East Germany - followed Bahr's suggestion of *Wandel durch Annäherung* (Change through Rapprochement) as a new approach in dealing with the East German leadership. "The job of practical politics in the years lying ahead of us is to maintain the unity of the nation by easing the current tensions in the relationship between the two parts of Germany. Germans are not only linked by their language and their history – with all its glory and its misery; Germany is home to all of us. We also have common duties and a common responsibility: to secure peace among ourselves and in Europe. Twenty years after the founding of the Federal Republic of Germany and the GDR, we must prevent a further drifting apart of the German nation; in other words, we must try to progress first by way of orderly coexistence to togetherness", said Brandt in his inaugural address on October 28, 1969 (see Brandt 1969). He furthermore explained that West Germany was willing to communicate regarding "mutual and non-discriminatory negotiations at the government level leading to cooperation based on treaty agreements" and that it was ready "to enter into binding agreements on mutual renunciation of the use or threat of force" (Ibid.).

Five months after Brandt's inaugural speech, on March 19, 1970, West German Chancellor Brandt and East German Prime Minister Willi Stoph met in Erfurt, East Germany. The encounter of the heads of state of East and West Germany constituted a historic moment, since the two German states did not maintain diplomatic relations and it was the first official contact on the highest government level. Albeit no concrete results were produced, the meeting signified a major step towards détente in German-German relations but also in East-West relations. The personal leadership, especially of Brandt, was decisive in commencing peaceful relations and 'change through rapprochement'. Two months afterwards, on May 21, 1970, a second meeting occurred; this time in Kassel, West Germany. This meeting also did not yield any results – not even an agreement on a third summit. As a matter of fact, the communication was tensed to say the least. East German Prime Minister Stoph demanded political recognition for East Germany and an acknowledgment of the political reality that two German nation states exist. From East Germany's point of view, compliance with international law was the groundwork for mutual respect and communication. On the other hand, West German Chancellor Brandt

respected the existence of East Germany. Yet, he wanted to achieve political unification. Hence, he denied Stoph's demand, leading to a deadlock (see Schoenborn & Niedhart).

1970-1974: Policy of Normalization

To circumvent the deadlock with East Germany, West German Chancellor Brandt realized that West Germany first had to normalize relations and ease tensions with the Soviet Union, as East Germany was dependent on Moscow. On August 12, 1970, Brandt and the Premier of the Soviet Union Alexei Kosygin signed the Treaty of Moscow which depicted a significant incident in the normalization of the East-West conflict. The treaty provided that both sides refrain from the use of force and recognize the new post World War II borders. Thereby, West Germany and the Soviet Union normalized its relations and West Germany acknowledged the de facto territory of East Germany. Brandt further reduced tension with the Eastern Bloc four months later, when he and Polish Prime Minister Józef Cyrankiewicz agreed upon the Treaty of Warsaw on December 7, 1970 which aimed to normalize the Polish-West German relations. Similar to the Treaty of Moscow, this treaty acknowledged the renunciation of violence and acceptance of the existing borders. Within several months, Brandt managed to improve and normalize West Germany's relationship with the Eastern Bloc, and, in this way, enabled a new window of opportunity regarding East Germany (see Niedhart 2002).

Finally, the 'change through rapprochement' policy led to a concrete result between the two Germanys a year later when East and West Germany signed the 'Transit Agreement' (*Transitabkommen*) on December 17, 1971. The agreement provided for West Berliners to be allowed to visit East Berlin and East Germany and vice versa. After having normalized relations with the Soviet Union and Poland, West Germany now aimed to do so with East Germany. Chancellor Brandt understood that West Germany had to abandon the Hallstein Doctrine and recognize East Germany as a sovereign nation. Otherwise no normalization or détente could be achieved. Subsequently, the breakthrough came when East and West Germany agreed upon signing the *Grundlagenvertrag* (Basic Treaty) on December 21, 1972. With the Basic Treaty, both nations formalized their relations and recognized each other as sovereign countries – after over 20 years of existence. The treaty emphasized that peace was only to be attained through “respect for the territorial integrity and sovereignty of all states in Europe within their present frontiers” and “that therefore the two German states are to refrain from the threat or use of force in their relations” to “create the conditions for co-operation between the Federal Republic

of Germany and the German Democratic Republic for the benefit of the people in the two German states” (see Basic Treaty 1972). Nonetheless, both parties agreed to disagree on the issues of nation and citizenship. The signees intended to further cooperate in the realm of economy, transit, and culture. Additionally, both countries agreed to apply for membership of the UN which was granted in 1973. In 1974, semi-official embassies were opened in Bonn (for East Germany) and in East Berlin (for West Germany). Brandt’s ‘change through rapprochement’ policy and emphasis on personal diplomacy bore fruits.

1975-1987: Impasse between Bonn and East Berlin

The positive developments in German-German relations, above all the mutual recognition of sovereignty, undoubtedly resulted in détente. Paradoxically – despite a normalization in relations – these circumstances solidified the status quo and East Germany gained a new confidence and nationalism by West Germany’s recognition and having become a member of the UN. Brandt’s hope for an amelioration in the relationship with East Berlin was subjected to a setback, as East Germany was rather focused on further increasing its international scope and capacity to act. Consequently, a German unification seemed less likely than ever, after more than 20 years of separation. So it took more than a decade for another meeting between the political leaders of East and West Germany. In December 1981, the new West German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt went to East Germany for three days to meet with the new East German Head of State Erich Honecker. In light of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and an afresh threat of nuclear war, the Cold War intensified again after a period of détente. For this reason, the meeting between the two political leaders constituted an important symbolic act to soothe the tensions between East and West. Moreover, West German Chancellor Schmidt intended to exert influence, insofar as to showcase West Germany’s commitment to the East Germans who increasingly suffered under the government’s totalitarianism. Albeit tangible results were not agreed upon, the meeting between Schmidt and Honecker signified willingness to communicate – something valuable in a time of heightened tension (see Brunner 2011).

The next noteworthy incident occurred in 1983: The East German economy was almost about to collapse due to its inefficiency and rising prices of oil and raw materials. The Soviet Union rejected East Germany’s inquiry regarding financial aid. West Germany was willing to help, provided that East Germany improved the human right’s situation for East Germans in return. In personal negotiations between Bavarian Minister

President Franz Josef Strauß for West Germany and East German politician Alexander Schalck-Golodkowski, both sides agreed upon a loan of 1 Billion Deutsche Mark in exchange for dismantling the self-firing system at the Berlin wall and facilitating family reunions and visits from West Germany (see Graf 2020).

1987-1990 The Way to Unification

In September 1987, East German Head of State Erich Honecker visited West Germany for five days and met with West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl. West Germany intended further reconciliation as a means for eventual unification, while East Germany utilized the meeting as another incident to prove its international recognition of sovereignty. Despite the fact that the meeting served different purposes for East and West Germany, Honecker's visit constituted a considerable step in the German-German rapprochement and détente. Meanwhile, several developments in domestic and international politics would change the course of German-German relations. First, East Germany's economy continued to struggle, since its socialist planned economy was not competitive compared to the West. Consequently, this resulted in increased discontent among the East Germans who started to protest vehemently against the government from 1989 on. Second, the eighth head of state of the Soviet Union, Mikhail Gorbachev, initiated reforms that aimed to open and reform the Soviet Union. Although similar reforms were rejected by Honecker, other Eastern Bloc states (Poland and Hungary) followed Gorbachev reforms and granted its citizen more freedom. Subsequently, the emerging protest movements amplified the East German protests. The protests gained momentum and the pressure on the East German government intensified on November 9, 1989, so much that the government had to give in and open the Berlin Wall and the German-German border. The pressure on the East German government was so high that it agreed to negotiate reforms with opposition groups. As a consequence, the first free elections were held on March 18, 1990, which were won by The Alliance for Germany, the East German branch of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU). The Alliance for Germany advocated for German reunification. Now, the oppositions party's win in the East German elections paved the way for a unified German nation. The last step was the approval of the former allies: On September 12, 1990, the Two Plus Four Agreement was signed between the USA, the UK, the Soviet Union, and France, and East and West Germany. It constituted the Peace Treaty. Finally, on October 3, 1990, East Germany merged with West Germany (see Evans 1997).

Political Leadership: Conclusion

In sum, although political leadership and personal diplomacy did not directly lead to German unification – rather the developments in international politics created a window of opportunity for political integration (more on that in the next section) – the efforts of particularly West German leaders (Willi Brandt, Helmut Schmidt, and Helmut Kohl) regarding the human right's situation of East Germans strengthened the feeling of solidarity and shared identity among the Germans, keeping the idea of a united Germany alive.

5.2 Favorable International System

A favorable international system was crucial for the political integration of East and West Germany, especially, since the international system was responsible for the emergence of two German states in the first place: West Germany on the occupied territory of the Western Allies and East Germany on the territory occupied by the Soviet Union. The Cold War which was primarily taking place between the USA and the Soviet Union inhibited any potential rapprochement between East and West Germany. However, the Soviet Union underwent economic and political turbulence which weakened the Soviet Union vis-à-vis with the United States. Consequently, the Soviet Union gave up the Brezhnev Doctrine which gave the Eastern bloc nations more self-determination. Finally, the collapse of the Soviet Union made way for German political integration and East Germany could ultimately merge with West Germany in 1990. Against this backdrop, the next section will delve into the analysis in detail.

1945-1962: The Cold War and the Division of Germany

The ultimate aftermath of the Second World War for East and West Germany was similar to that for European integration (see chapter before). The victory over Nazi Germany and Japan not only ended World War II but also the alliance between the Soviet Union and the Western Allies. Ideological and geopolitical differences resulted in a bipolar world divided between the Soviet Union and the USA. The so-called iron curtain ran through Germany, to be exact, between East and West Germany. The two Germanys became a pawn in the hands of the great powers, as they both attempted to increase their power and influence. East and West Germany would remain a pawn in the hand of the Soviet Union and the USA until their reunification.

The Soviet Union tried expand its territory, as much as the USA did. They both supplied (financial) help for ideologically similar minded countries and fought over influence in neutral states. In 1947, as a consequence of the lessons learnt from World War II and threatened with the rise of the Soviet Union, the USA changed their foreign policy from non-intervention to the Truman Doctrine. The goal was to strengthen the ties with democratic countries with market economies, essentially to build a liberal world order. Furthermore, the USA intended to fill the power vacuum that emerged after the surrender of Nazi Germany. US President Truman realized that the national security of the USA is also impacted on by external relations. The prosperity of the USA could only be safeguarded, if the prosperity in other countries is preserved. This problem was encapsulated by the causes of World War II. According to Truman, Nazi Germany and Japan posed a threat because they opposed freedom and democracy, and therefore, endangered the free world (Truman 1947).

As West Germany was occupied by the Western Allies, the USA planned to include West Germany in this endeavor, seeing that West Germany bordered with East Germany and the Eastern Bloc. Accordingly, the Western Allies foresaw a democratization and denazification for West Germany to align their values. On top of that, the USA initiated the Marshall Plan in 1948 which was an economy development program for West Germany and other Western European states. Its purpose was to help recover the countries' economy and rebuild destroyed infrastructure. If the USA wanted to balance against the Soviet Union, it was necessary not only to align values, such as democracy and freedom, but also to enable Europe to flourish economically. Congruent with the logic of the Truman Doctrine, it was in the US' self-interest to provide aid for Europe, in particular for West Germany, in order make Europe stable again, politically and economically (Marshall 1947). Hence, West Germany was integrated into the Western political hemisphere.

East Germany, on the contrary, was pulled in to the Eastern Bloc, as there were similar considerations on the Soviet side. Originally, the USA offered help to East European countries, too. However, the Soviet Union perceived this as an expansion of American influence and rejected the Marshall Plan. For the purpose of counterbalancing the American influence in Europe, the Soviet Union implemented the Molotov Plan in 1947 – named after Vyacheslav Molotov, foreign minister of the Soviet Union. Like the Marshall plan, the Molotov Plan was intended to help the like-minded countries in the

Eastern Bloc to rebuild their countries and recover their economies after the destructive war. Consequently, the Council of Mutual Economic Aid (CMEA) was founded in Moscow in 1947 and was in charge of the realization of the Molotov Plan. The recipient countries received financial help in form of long-term loans. Yet, East Germany as the former enemy had to pay reparations. The members of the CMEA were, besides the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries, also Vietnam, Mongolia, and Cuba (Cattell 1960).

The divide between the Eastern and the Western Bloc, and thus also between East and West Germany, was further increased when the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) was founded in 1949. NATO was established as a military alliance. The founding members were among others the USA and several Western European countries. NATO was conceived as a military block against the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc. Whereas the Marshall Plan was created due to economic reasons, NATO was conceived as the military equivalent. Its purpose is to be a military counterbalance towards the Eastern Blocs and the defense of the liberal world order, i.e. democracy, freedom, and human rights. The main principle on which NATO is based upon is the principle of collective defense, meaning an attack against one is an attack against all. As West Germany was occupied and not fully sovereign, it did not belong to the founding members of the NATO. It was only in 1955 that West Germany was allowed to join the NATO. West Germany was viewed as essential for the defense of the Western Bloc and as the first line of defense against the Eastern Bloc. Shortly before, the country was given its sovereignty back from the Western Allies and was allowed to remilitarize (Richardson 1966).

In the same year, the Soviet Union and its allies founded their counterpart to NATO: The Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) or also called Warsaw Pact. It was a military alliance very similar to the NATO in thus that its main goal was to balance NATO militarily. It was signed by the Soviet Union, Bulgaria, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Czechoslovakia, and Albania on May 14, 1955, in Warsaw, Poland. In the vein of the main principle of NATO, the Warsaw Pact stipulated the principle of collective defense. Thus, after East and West Germany sided with their respective Bloc ideologically and economically since the end of World War II, they also committed militarily from 1955 on. Just seven years later, in 1962, the two military alliances almost

clashed in the Cuban Missile Crisis. Turkey received missiles from NATO and as a countermeasure, the Soviet Union responded by sending nuclear missiles to Cuba. The conflict was prevented but it revealed the severity of the Cold War. The Cuban Missile Crisis and the emergence of NATO and the Warsaw Pact did not only enshrine the division between the two blocs but also for the two Germanys, it made political integration seem highly unlikely at that point.

1963-1974: The Brezhnev Doctrine and further Polarization

The events of 1968 provided further proof that a unified Germany was more far away than ever. Czechoslovakia was invaded by the members of Warsaw Pact who violently suppressed the liberalization movement under the lead of Alexander Dubček of Czechoslovakia's Communist Party. The so-called Prague Spring aimed for a liberalization of politics and media. The Soviet Union was not willing to accept any deviation ideologically, politically or economically within the Eastern Bloc. Hence, half a million soldiers of the Warsaw Pact violently ended the uprising. This triggered a change in the Soviet foreign policy. The so-called Brezhnev Doctrine came into place: "When domestic and external forces hostile to socialism reverse the development of a socialist country and to push it to the resurrection of capitalist conditions, hence, when a threat to socialism in this country, a threat to the security of the whole socialist community emerges, then this does not only become a problem for the people of country in question, but a common problem, a matter of concern for all socialist countries" (Loth 2001: 104). The emergence of the Brezhnev Doctrine also impaired the German-German relations, as this meant that any rapprochement or behavior of East Germany towards West Germany not accepted by the Soviet Union would be impossible.

Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, the Vietnam War took place – a Cold War proxy war. The USA withdrew their troops in 1973 and the Soviet and China supported socialist powers in North Vietnam who won the war in 1975. The Cold War carried out between the Eastern and Western Bloc also affected increasingly non-aligned countries in Africa and Asia which led to further division between East and West. At the same time, the UN accepted the membership application of East and West Germany in 1973. Shortly before, both Germanys recognized each other as sovereign nation states by signing the Basic

Treaty. Both nations formalized their relations without agreeing on the issues of nation and citizenship. While this led to détente, the national and international recognition

through the UN that East and West Germany are independent countries, made any political integration unimaginable in the mid-1970s. This was reinforced because of the exacerbation of the Cold War on the global stage.

1975-1987: Soviet-Afghan War and Liberalization in the Soviet Union

Another proxy war was fought in Afghanistan throughout the 1980s between the Afghan government and the Soviet Union on the one side, and the so-called Mujahedeen backed by the USA and other members of NATO on the other side. Interestingly, the East German government supported the Soviet side, while West Germany supported the Mujahedeen. Due to the Brezhnev Doctrine the Soviet Union intervened in Afghanistan in order to support the communist government. The opposite rebel groups among other reasons fought against the secularization of Afghanistan. The Soviet's intervention for the Afghan government led to a "Second Cold War" (Hughes 2008: 326).

The Soviet Union experienced economic problems, as its planned economy was not as competitive as the market economies of the Western Bloc and because the arm race with the USA was a heavy economic burden. The intervention in Afghanistan hurt the economy further. Mikhail Gorbachev, the Soviet head of state since 1985, realized that changes were necessary. Thus, he initiated the reforms of *Glasnost* and *Perestroika*. The first one signifies the liberalization of politics, meaning a more open debate about politics among politician's and citizens. The latter referred to structural changes in the economy (Battle 1988).

1987-1990: The Way to Unification

The liberalizations in the Soviet Union also led to more freedom in the Eastern Bloc. Gorbachev rejected the Brezhnev Doctrine and the Soviet Union did not intervene when it came to protest movements in Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and East Germany. The economic system of the Eastern Bloc was not functioning properly and the governments had lost political legitimation. The Berlin Wall fell in 1989 and the Soviet Union granted self-determination to the people of the Eastern Bloc. It was not long until the Soviet Union itself collapsed and dissolved into 15 successor states in 1991 (Walker 2003).

The fall of the Eastern Bloc cleared the way for German political integration. Finally, after 45 years of division, East and West Germany became unified on October 3, 1990. The two Germanys signed the 'Treaty on the Final Settlement with Respect to

Germany' (Two Plus Four Agreement) with the France, the USA, the UK, and the Soviet Union in Moscow a month earlier. The treaty stipulated the full sovereignty for a united Germany and the withdrawal of any claims on German territory from the former Allies. Sensitive questions in regards to Germany's role in the international system were also clarified. The Soviet Union made the concession that Germany could remain a NATO member. Moreover, the Soviet Union declared that all Soviet military would leave the territory of former East Germany. In turn, Germany was to reduce its number of soldiers to 370,000 and renounced the use of weapons of mass destruction (nuclear, biological, or chemical). Most importantly, Germany agreed by signing the treaty to adhere to its borders and renounce any claims in regards to the German-Polish border. Thus, besides unifying Germany, the treaty also constituted a peace treaty and marked the end of Europe's post war period (Quint 1997).

International System: Conclusion

Ironically, the international system that was responsible for the divided Germany, also brought a reunified Germany. As the time went on and the ideological gap between East and West widened, the chances for a politically integrated Germany shrunk. The Vietnam War which broke out in 1955, the Cuban Missile Crisis in 1962, and the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan in 1979 made any rapprochement impossible. The first, as a matter of fact, almost led to the Cold War 'turning hot'. As long as the Cold War had continued and the Eastern and Western Bloc stayed on collision course, a unified Germany was not feasible. Not until the Soviet Union and the Eastern Bloc started to struggle economically since the early 1980s, change was possible. When Gorbachev implemented the first reforms and renounced the Brezhnev Doctrine, the East Europeans had more leeway and their protest movements led to transformation, the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, and German reunification.

5.3 Favorable Public Opinion

The public opinion played an important role in East and West German relations. The establishment of East and West Germany led to a people of the same ethnicity separated though a border and families essentially not being able to visit each other due to East Germany's restrictive policy. Despite not being the central force for political integration between East and West Germany, the public opinion still was an important force. Nonetheless, unlike in the case of the EU with its Eurobarometer, there have been no systematic attempts to document the public opinion on East and West German political

integration. The vast majority of data focuses on the differences of public opinion between East and West German since the reunification (in terms of evaluating Germany's reunification, economic prospects, etc.) and not beforehand. Additionally, the East German totalitarian regime did not allow independent surveys and the media was in state control. Due to East Germany's restriction, it was also not possible for West German institutions to interview East Germans. Why West German institutions did not conduct surveys regarding West German's stance on a potential reunification remains obscure. In hindsight it can only be assumed that reunification seemed so distant and unrealistic that it was not something that was considered. These obstacles complicate this part of this thesis' analysis. However, there is still data that can be used to trace the influence of the public opinion in East (especially) and West Germany for German reunification. For instance, in Spring 1990 the amount of West Germans that were in favor of reunification was over 80 percent, while the share of East Germans supporting German political integration accounted for almost 80 percent (Glaab 2009). Against this backdrop, this section examines the importance of the public opinion more carefully.

1945-1962: A Divided People

After Germany was split up among the Allied Nations and even before East Germany was founded as a nation state, millions of East Germans left the Soviet Occupation Zone or later East Germany and fled to West Germany. According to estimations, almost four million people left East Germany since its establishment in 1949 until its dissolution starting in 1989 (Stepper 2016). However, the majority left before 1961 when East Germany built the Berlin Wall. The number of East Germans that fled the country on a tourist visa after the construction of the Berlin Wall is roughly half a million people (Effner & Heidemeyer). This already indicates that a large amount of East Germans feared the division of Germany and the totalitarian regime

The Berlin Wall was built to contain the people and avoid further exodus of East Germans. It was the only answer that East Germany had. The German-German border and the Berlin Wall were protected by East German border soldiers that even had the order to shoot at anyone trying to cross the border. This was an informal order first but was put into law in 1982. During the co-existence of East and West Germany a minimum of 140 people were killed by East German border soldiers (Hertle & Nooke 2009).

1963-1987: Separated Families

The construction of the Berlin Wall not only consolidated the separation between East and West but also marked the separation of families. Freedom of travel posed a significant threat for the government and was hence severely restricted. Travels to other socialist countries were allowed but to non-socialist countries more or less impossible. Only pensioners were allowed to visit their West German relatives once a year. Citizens under 65 years old were granted a visa, if they had spouses or children. Thereby, the possibility of escape was lowered. The same logic applied to pensioners who – so was assumed – had little incentives to leave their East German family behind. The Transit Agreement signed in 1971 improved the situation slightly and facilitated travels of East Germans to West Germany and vice versa (see Transitabkommen). Nonetheless, German families were still divided and would remain divided.

1987-1990: Monday Demonstrations and the Fall of the Berlin Wall

The most significant indicator for a supportive public opinion were the so-called *Montagsdemonstrationen* (Monday demonstrations) in East Germany that started on September 4, 1989, in Leipzig and constituted a central component in the peaceful revolution. The Monday demonstrations went on for thirteen consecutive Mondays. They also spread to other East German cities such as Dresden, Chemnitz, Magdeburg and Schwerin. The demonstrators demanded freedom, liberalization and German unification (Lohmann 1994: 42). The St. Nicolas Church (*Nikolaikirche*) in Leipzig organized peace prayers every Monday. Members of oppositional groups and other citizens (approximately 1,000) joined the prayer and held signs up that demanded democracy and freedom. The East German State Security Service violently removed these and tried to dissolve the demonstration which in turn angered the demonstrators. As a consequence, the demonstrators demanded an end to the State Security Service. In the following weeks, more and more people joined the peace prayer and expressed their resistance through signs and chants, such as “No Violence” and “We are the people”. The former, in particular, would become the central chant of the movement.

After one month, on October 2, 1989, there were already roughly 20,000 people at the St. Nicolas Church – a week later 60,000 (Lohmann 1994). Despite this being the largest opposition movement for decades, neither did the East German government nor the Soviet military intervene. At this point in 1989, the Brezhnev Doctrine had been renounced by Gorbachev and East Germany as much as the Soviet Union were on the

verge of collapsing. Moreover, the demonstrators remained peaceful. The dissatisfaction with the suppressed political rights and a stagnating economy led to even greater numbers of protestors. The pressure intensified so that the head of state Erich Honecker had to resign on October 18, 1989. As a consequence, his successor Egon Krenz promised reforms for East Germany, similar to Gorbachev in the Soviet Union. Yet, the protest movement gained immense momentum. On November 6, over 300,000 people protested in front of Leipzig's oldest church, demanding an end to the government and a unification with West Germany (Ibid.). These ongoing demonstrations and *Republikflucht* ("Desertation from the Republic") led to the fall of the Berlin Wall and the opening of the entire German-German border on November 9, 1989, the crumbling of the East German government and the disintegration of East Germany (Hertle 1996).

German reunification was no doubt desired among all Germans. Over 80 percent of West Germans and almost 80 percent of East Germans supported German political integration in the Spring of 1990 (Glaab 2009). Nonetheless, the integration process did not go as smoothly as wished for – 45 years of separation did not pass without a trace. Given the long durations, many Germans only knew "their" Germany and never had been or were allowed to visit the other Germany. This has led to a split in identity. Especially among East Germans is the feeling prevalent of being "proud to be East German". Reasons were and still are that the "East Germans wanted to be received and supported as long-lost brothers while their West German countrymen would much rather have treated them as distant cousins – the more distant the better – and without the financial sacrifices that majorities of West Germans refused from the beginning" (Merkl 1992: 328). Given the economic failure of East Germany, the West part had to pay by increased taxes for the economic development programs that were implemented to upgrade the Eastern German economy.

In particular, "Young West Germans [...] were widely quoted as saying that they felt that East Germans were no closer to them than Czechs and perhaps less so than the Italians and the French" (Ibid.). With the Eastern German economy worsening, the initial euphoria for German unity had vanished, replaced with a feeling of nostalgia that the days of the past were better. Many East Germans used their new received freedom and moved to the Western part for hopes of better opportunities. West Germans worried about the increased competition in regards to work and housing and received the East Germans with consternation. West and East Germans had started to develop prejudices: West Germans

were called arrogant and East Germans liked to complain. The term Western German (*Wessi*) respectively Eastern German (*Ossi*) has even been used as an insult (Schneider 1997).

Thirty years after political integration, East and West Germany are still in the process of societal and economic integration. There are still major differences in terms of economy and society between Western and Eastern Germany. A mutual German identity is still developing. According to a survey, two thirds of all Germans think the process of reunification is not completed due to economic and societal differences between East and West. In the territory of former East Germany even 83 percent think so (YouGov 2020). Yet, it is fair to say that East and West Germans are delighted about the reunification, since it also meant the end of the Cold War and the oppression of the East German government. The road to overcome the 'mental border' between East and West Germany, however, still seems long.

Conclusion: Public Opinion

It is fair to say that the East German public and its protest movement proved to be the mortal blow for East Germany. If it was not for the East Germans, the government might have held on to its power. Nonetheless, the reason that the role of the public opinion became so significant at last was due to East Germany's economic struggle and the due to the dwindling support of the Soviet Union. Yet, the courage of the East Germans increased the speed of the downfall of East Germany. 300,000 people protesting and chanting "We are the people" in Leipzig in the autumn of 1989 showcased the lack of political legitimation of the East German government. Finally, when the Berlin Wall fell and thousands of East Germans crossed the border, West and East Germans joined in together and chanted "We are one people" and not "We are the people".

5.4 Conclusion

To conclude the analysis regarding the political integration between East and West Germany: Albeit the political leadership between the two governments, in particular the efforts of the West German side, kept the bond between both Germanys alive; and albeit the East German public in its efforts for a peaceful revolution gave the East German government its deathblow, the developments within the international system led to a politically integrated Germany. The international system was responsible for the division, i.e. the Cold War, and therefore, it was also responsible for the end. The fall of the Eastern

Bloc cleared the way for a united Germany. Naturally, the political leadership and public opinion were necessary auxiliary factors. In summary, the public opinion was the first condition that was favorable, followed by the cooperative political leadership. However, all three conditions had to be given for German unification to take place. The independent variable ‘favorable international system’ was missing until 1989, when the Soviet Union collapsed. With the dissolution of the Eastern Bloc, all three independent variables were fulfilled and German political integration could proceed.





Chapter 6: Impasse in Cross-Strait Integration

Why has political integration not taken place between Taiwan and China but within the European Union and between East and West Germany is the research question of this thesis. I argue that the three independent variables (cooperative leadership, favorable international system, and a positive public opinion) are essential for political integration to occur and these are missing in the case of Taiwan and China. The goal of this chapter is exactly to do this: to provide a negative verification regarding the role of the three independent variables (cooperative leadership, favorable international system, and a positive public opinion) for political integration in Cross-Strait relations. This chapter is arranged as follows: First, the lack of cooperative political leadership between Taiwan and China will be analyzed. Then the unfavorable international system for Cross-Strait political integration will be examined. Third, the role of the public opinion will be looked into. Lastly, the main findings will be summarized in the conclusion.

6.1 Uncooperative Political Leadership

In the case of Taiwan and China, the respective political leaders for the most part have not acted in a cooperative manner with the respective counterpart. Rather, the political leadership can be described as hostile. The Chinese Civil War resulted in the win of the Chinese Communist Party (CPC) which gained control over the Chinese Mainland. The CPC founded the People's Republic of China (PRC). Meanwhile, as a consequence of the CPC obtaining control over Mainland China, the Republic of China (ROC) ruled by the Kuomintang (KMT) fled to Taiwan. Due to the aftermath of the Chinese Civil War, there are conflicting views towards Cross-Strait relations, and the status of Taiwan in particular. Subsequently, the leadership of the PRC (hereafter China) and the ROC (hereafter Taiwan) engaged with each other in a hostile manner, if at all. It would take decades until China's and Taiwan's leadership became more cooperative. However, the underlying problem of hostility in Cross-Strait leadership has not vanished until today which also inhibits any rapprochement in terms of political integration.

1949-1987: No Contact, No Compromise, and No Negotiation

According to Leng (1998: 495), the relations across the Taiwan Strait until 1987 can be characterized as "extensions of the Chinese Civil War". Until 1987, there was no contact between Taiwanese and Chinese leaders. On the Taiwanese side, President Chiang Kai-shek (蔣中正) established a martial law and ruled in an authoritarian manner.

On the Chinese side, Chairman Mao Zedong (毛澤東) intended to establish socialism in an authoritarian manner, too. In the aftermath of the civil war, several military clashes took place, the most severe being the First (1954) and the Second (1958) Taiwan Strait Crisis.

In 1954, the People's Liberation Army (PLA) attacked Taiwan's offshore islands in order to "liberate Taiwan" which marked the beginning of the First Taiwan Strait Crisis (Sheng 2008: 477). Albeit Taiwan was not "liberated", Mao Zedong's endeavor bore fruits, as the PLA was able to seize smaller offshore islands. As a consequence, US president Dwight D. Eisenhower signed the Formosa Resolution, a mutual defense treaty with Taiwan. The USA sent air-naval force on behalf of Taiwan and even the possible use of nuclear bombs was discussed. The alliance of Eisenhower and Chiang did not stop Mao Zedong from threatening a nuclear war. If a nuclear happened, "half of the world's population would die, but the other half would live. Imperialism would be annihilated, and socialism would prevail all over the world" (Ibid.: 487). The conflict eventually ended when Mao ordered the PLA to stop its bombing. In 1958, the PLA started to attack Kinmen and the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis broke out. Mao wanted the US military to leave Taiwan and Taiwan to withdraw its soldiers from Kinmen and Matsu Island. However, the US military supported Taiwan and The USA dispatched fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles. Subsequently, the PLA stopped attacking and Mao announced a cease fire (Ibid.). Mao and Chiang did not sign a peace treaty and until today, Taiwan and China have not engaged in peace talks.

In 1979, the USA switched their diplomatic ties to China which posed a major shock for then President Chiang Ching-kuo (蔣經國) and the whole country, as this led to an increased diplomatic isolation and diminished international space for Taiwan. In the same year, China made use of Taiwan's impaired situation and proposed the establishment of the 'Three Links' (三通), meaning a postal connection, transportation (first and foremost through air), and trade across the Taiwan Strait. Contact between Taiwan and China had proceeded mainly through Hong Kong previously. Chiang Ching-kuo, however, sensed danger from this newly emerging power imbalance and declared a policy of the "Three-Noes" (三不政策). The three noes stood for no contact, no compromise and no negotiation in dealing with China (Tsang 1993). However, due to pressure from high-level politicians and military personal that identified as *waishengren*

(外省人), i.e. mainlanders who came to Taiwan after the KMT retreat, Chiang lifted his policy in 1987 and allowed family visits. Nevertheless, cooperation on the leadership level between President Chiang and Paramount Leader Deng on the Chinese side was non-existent.

1987-2000: 1992 Consensus and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis

After President Chiang had died, Lee Teng-hui (李登輝) became the new president in 1988, making him the first Taiwanese-born president. Starting from the mid-1980s, the government – pressured by the Tangwai (黨外) movement – initiated a democratization process and lifted martial law. Lee continued this development and later became known as “Mr. Democracy”. In China, Deng Xiaoping was succeeded by Jiang Zemin (江澤民) in 1989. The political leadership was still not interested in neither cooperation nor communication. Yet, economic relations between the two sides made communication necessary. China implemented special economic zones in several coastal cities and the investments came among others from Taiwanese business people. Therefore, Taiwan established the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) in 1990 for dealing with China and in turn the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was founded by China in 1991 to deal with Taiwan. The purpose of this was to communicate with the counterpart regarding economic and technical questions in an institutionalized conduct. This form of contact was semi-official and constituted an important rapprochement, as Cross-Strait contact up until this point was non-existent. In 1992, the SEF and ARATS held a meeting in which both sides agreed on the so-called ‘One-China Principle’, meaning that both governments agree that there is just one China but that both sides have different interpretations of the meaning of China. This consensus was later coined ‘1992 Consensus’ and established a basis for Cross-Strait contact and communication (Xu 2001).

While on the hand Cross-Strait contact – at least semi-official, not between Lee and Jiang – was initiated and the relations improved, on the other hand Taiwan’s democratization led to a ‘taiwanization’ which meant an enhanced sense of Taiwanese identity. Lee Teng-hui’s policy was coherent with this development and he allowed the first free election for the Legislative Yuan in 1992. The first democratic presidential elections were scheduled in 1996. A year before, Jiang Zemin presented his ‘Eight-Point’ Proposal for unification to which Lee Teng-hui responded with his ‘Six Principles’,

indicating that was willing to negotiate. Cross-Strait relations deteriorated when Lee accepted to give a speech at his alma mater, the Cornell University. This was interpreted as US support for Lee's separatist intentions by the Chinese side. As a consequence, China conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait which led to the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis. The PLA engaged in naval and amphibious exercises to which the USA responded by sending an aircraft carrier to the Taiwan Strait. The same scenario repeated in 1996 shortly before the first democratic presidential elections in Taiwan, when China conducted further missile tests, attempting to influence the Taiwanese voters. This strategy was not successful, however, as Lee Teng-hui was reelected. After an initial high Cross-Strait relations hit a severe low and talks between SEF and ARATS were halted indefinitely (Roy 2003).

2000-2008: Non-Contact between Chen Shui-bian and Hu Jintao

Chen Shui-bian (陳水扁) was elected Taiwanese president in 2000 and thus became the first president of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). Chen becoming president signified the end of over 50 years of KMT rule and the transfer of power from KMT to DPP consolidated Taiwan's democratization. Chen himself was part of the Tangwai movement and leaned towards an independent Taiwanese state. Therefore, China was opposed to his run for office. Nevertheless, in his inaugural speech, Chen adopted a more conciliatory tone and stated his policy of the 'Four Noes and One Without' (四不一沒有), "as long as the CCP regime has no intention to use military force against Taiwan, I pledge that during my term in office, I will not declare independence, I will not change the national title, I will not push forth the inclusion of the so-called "state-to-state" description in the Constitution, and I will not promote a referendum to change the status quo in regard to the question of independence or unification" (Chen 2000). Regarding the 'One-China Principle', however, Chen was more opposing and demanded talks without China insisting on the 1992 Consensus (Wang 2002). As expected, China's new paramount leader Hu Jintao (胡錦濤) viewed the 1992 Consensus as a requirement for any contact with Chen. Cross-Strait talks between SEF and ARATS were not picked up as a consequence.

Yet, Chen and his administration initiated some rapprochement towards Hu and China, as they were willing to open up the so-called 'Little Three Links' (小三通), i.e. postal, transportation, and trade linkages between the Taiwanese islands of Matsu and

Kinmen and the Chinese province of Fujian. In 2004, to China's dismay Chen got reelected as Taiwanese president. Chen's reelection was interpreted as an amplified trend towards Taiwanese independence. A change in the status-quo would have constituted a threat for Hu Jintao's political survival. Hence, Hu pushed for the Anti-Secession Law which was implemented on March 14, 2005. The law provided that China could use military force to counter a separation Taiwan's from China (Wei 2010). The Anti-Secession Law marked another low point in the relations between Taiwan and China. Until the end of Chen's presidency in 2008, there was no contact between Hu Jintao and Chen Shui-bian, and not even between the SEF and ARATS.

2008-2016: Ma Ying-jeou's Presidency and Cross-Strait Détente

After eight years of DPP rule, Ma Ying-jeou (馬英九) of the KMT won the presidential election and the KMT returned to power in 2008. Being a *waishengren* and born in Hong Kong, Ma had a different relationship to China than his predecessors, Teng and Chen. In particular, Ma supported the idea of "One China" and hence acknowledged the 1992 Consensus which was seen as a necessary condition for Cross-Strait talks from Beijing's point of view. Therefore, Cross-Strait relations improved from 2008 onwards. Hu Jintao held meetings with KMT politicians and indicated his willingness to reinstate the SEF-ARATS talks, provided Ma adheres to the "One-China Principle" which he did. However, despite Ma's recognition of the 1992 Consensus, he proclaimed a policy of "Three Noes" in favor of maintaining the status quo: no independence, no unification, and no use of force. On this basis, the SEF and ARATS communicated again and negotiated the opening of the 'Three Links'. On June 13, 2008, the SEF and ARATS signed an agreement which allowed direct flights across the Taiwan Strait and Chinese visitors to Taiwan. The agreement on the 'Three Links' constituted the first Cross-Strait agreement between the two sides. Albeit there still was no contact or communication, the political leadership of Ma Ying-jeou and Hu Jintao was cooperative. Additionally, the SEF and ARATS continued to meet regularly. The fifth meeting resulted in the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) which was signed by representatives of SEF and ARATS in 2010 in Chongqing, China. ECFA is a preferential trade agreement with the purpose of becoming a free trade agreement eventually. The signing of the ECFA was a major breakthrough in Cross-Strait relations (Matsuda 2015).

Regarding Cross-Strait leadership and personal diplomacy, the most significant event occurred in 2015. By this time, Xi Jinping (習近平) had succeeded Hu Jintao as the paramount leader of China. For the first time since the end of the Chinese Civil War leaders from both sides of the Strait met in Singapore on November 7, 2015. Xi and Ma addressed each other as 'Mister' instead of 'President' and shook hands while being filmed and photographed. Both leaders gave short speeches and emphasized the harmonious nature of the meeting. Afterwards Xi and Ma talked behind doors. In the evening both had dinner together and presented gifts. This meeting suggested a more pragmatic approach in Taiwan-China relations, also because both parties reiterated the necessity of the 1992 Consensus as a basis for exchange which they intended to consolidate (Chai 2015). Thus, it is fair to say that the Cross-Strait political leadership was the most cooperative under Ma Ying-jeou's presidency due to the fact that he acknowledged the 'One-Chine Principle'.

2016 until now: Cross-Strait relations in Deadlock

Tsai Ing-wen (蔡英文) became Taiwan's president in 2016 when Ma's presidency ended. Tsai who is a member of the DPP became the first female president. In 2012, she lost to Ma. Four years later, however, she won and the DPP regained power after eight years of KMT rule. Like Chen Shui-bian and the DPP in general, Tsai has had a more critical attitude towards China. Tsai rejects the 1992 Consensus and views Taiwan as an already independent nation but is still open to talks with Xi Jinping. Nonetheless, Tsai's refusal to acknowledge the 1992 Consensus led to the suspension of all high-level talks. Since Tsai took office, there has not been another meeting between SEF and ARATS (Casteban 2017).

As a result, Tsai has demanded that Taipei and Beijing should initiate a new model for Cross-Strait relations, warning that "if we keep sticking to these past practices and ways of thinking, it will probably be very hard for us to deal with the volatile regional situations in Asia" (Taipei Times 2017). Yet, at the 19th CCP Congress in 2017, Xi Jinping declared the necessity of Tsai and Taiwan to acknowledge the 'One-Chine Principle' for Cross-Strait talks, exchanges, or negotiations. Xi also referred to the overarching goal of unification with Taiwan and that Taiwanese independence and or separatism will be opposed, stating that "we will resolutely uphold national sovereignty and territorial integrity and will never tolerate a repeat of the historical tragedy of a divided country. All

activities of splitting the motherland will be resolutely opposed by all the Chinese people. We have firm will, full confidence, and sufficient capability to defeat any form of Taiwan independence secession plot” (Bush 2017).

Two years later, in 2019, Xi reiterated his stance towards Tsai. He gave a New Year’s speech regarding Taiwan and Cross-Strait relations in which emphasized that Taiwan eventually will be reunified with China. A unification is the ultimate goal and Xi reserves the right to use military force and “to take any necessary measure”, including towards any “interference of external forces” which referred to a possible US involvement (Bush 2019). Tsai was reelected in 2020 and insisted on her stance towards Xi and China, too. According to Tsai, Xi must realize the reality that Taiwan is already independent and that “we are an independent country already and we call ourselves the Republic of China, Taiwan” (Kuo 2020). Tsai remains open to dialogue with Xi provided that China reviews its stance towards Taiwan. The political leadership between Xi and Tsai has become entrenched with little prospect of change or compromise.

Political leadership: Conclusion

The analysis of Cross-Strait political leadership offers inconsistent results which can be explained by the adherence or refusal of the 1992 Consensus of the incumbent Taiwanese president. In the early years of Lee Teng-hui’s presidency, the political leadership between him and Jiang Zemin was more cooperative. Albeit no personal contact was established, the SEF and ARATS engaged with each other in a representative manner. When Lee deviated with his policy, cooperation deteriorated and the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis occurred. During Chen Shui-bian’s presidency, there was no high-level talks at all. Cross-Strait relations improved significantly with Ma Ying-jeou taking office. Taiwan and China agreed on the ‘Three Links’ and signed ECFA. Ma and Xi even met which was a milestone in Taiwan-China relations. Besides cooperative political leadership, the meeting also indicated some kind of personal diplomacy between Ma and Xi. When Tsai Ing-wen succeeded Ma, the relations across the Taiwan Strait worsened again. Despite phases of political willingness and active effort between Taiwanese and

Chinese leaders, the Cross-Strait political leadership is nowhere near as cooperative as the European and German leadership. Hence, the common denominator that impacts on whether the political leadership is cooperative is the 1992 Consensus. If

the Taiwanese president accepts it, relations improve. If the opposite is true, relations deteriorate.

6.2 Unfavorable International System

The international system in regards to Cross-Strait relations is another factor which impedes political integration between Taiwan and China. Cross-Strait relations have always been shaped by the United States. With China's economic and military rise, China has become a superpower and has challenged the US hegemony. Hence, the USA have become critical of China's global role. A strategy that has been pursued by the USA refers to the containment of China in a geopolitical sense. Therefore, Taiwan plays a key role in this strategy due to its democratic values, the alignment of its economic philosophy and its importance in security due to its strategical position in the Pacific. Hence, the USA have an interest in opposing political integration between Taiwan and China because it would weaken the US' containment strategy of China which benefits from a free and democratic Taiwan.

1949-1987: The Emergence of the Taipei-Beijing-Washington Triangle

The Korean War of 1950 between North and South Korea and their respective allies resulted in what would later define Cross-Strait relations until today, namely the Taipei-Beijing-Washington Triangle. It was the first time that the US got involved in Taiwan-China relations. In 1950, North Korea attacked South Korea with the support of the Soviet Union and China. The UN and above all the USA supported South Korea. Taiwan provided aid to South Korea, too. After the Chinese Civil War, the USA expected Taiwan to be seized by China and initially did not want to intervene. However, due to rising tensions with the Soviet Union and the beginning of the Cold War, US President Truman intended to counterbalance the North Korean invasion. The US feared that a domino effect could take place and that after Korea also Taiwan would fall into communist hands. Therefore, the Seventh Fleet was sent on behalf of Taiwan into the Taiwan Strait to prevent a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan. Besides military aid, the US also provided for economic aid throughout the 1950s (Lin 1992).

The First Taiwan Strait Crisis of 1954 constituted an extension of the attempted "liberation" of Taiwan by China. The PLA attacked Taiwan's offshore islands and as a response, then US President Eisenhower deployed air-naval forces in support of Taiwan. Amidst the confrontation China was able to conquer smaller offshore islands. The USA

considered the use of nuclear weapons. Eventually, China declared willingness to negotiate. However, the issue remained unsolved and reappeared 1958 with the Second Taiwan Strait Crisis. Again, China attacked Taiwan's offshore islands but the USA sent fighter jets and anti-aircraft missiles. China stopped its attacks and declared a cease fire. Albeit the conflict fizzled out, the conflict was not solved and no peace agreement was signed (Sheng 2008).

Due to the Taiwan Strait Crises, the USA and Taiwan had signed the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty by 1954 which came into effect in 1955. The treaty compromised the formation of a military alliance between the USA and Taiwan. In case of threat both countries would help each other. Given the power dynamics and Taiwan's threatened situation, the treaty intended to inhibit China from attacking Taiwan. Thereby, the USA had formalized their support for Taiwan. The dynamics of Taipei-Beijing-Washington relations changed in 1979 when the USA switched diplomatic ties to China in order to exert political influence after the Sino-Soviet Split. As a consequence, the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty was terminated. Nonetheless, in the same year, US President Jimmy Carter signed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) which essentially provided for very similar mechanisms as the original treaty of 1955. The TRA regulates the US' non-diplomatic relations with Taiwan. It also declares that "the United States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capabilities" (Taiwan Relations Act 1979). However, the law is characterized by strategic ambiguity. Hence, it does not provide for a guaranteed intervention, if Taiwan is being attacked. Still, ever since the Korean War, the United States have become an important player in Cross-Strait relations due to their role as a hegemonic power in the international system, attempting to contain China's influence.

1987-2000: Growing Importance of Taiwan and Clinton's 'Three Noes'

In the 1990s, Taiwan democratized and further gained economic power as one of the four 'Asian Tigers'. Taiwan transitioned from an authoritarian country to a free and open market economy – something that resonated with policy makers in the US very well. Due to these two developments, the US support for Taiwan or at least for the status-quo in the Taiwan Strait was now not only based on the containment of China's power and influence but was also reasoned in Taiwan being one of the few regional democracies and an important trade partner for the US. The US continued to engage its role as a safeguard

or the region. Abandoning Taiwan might lead to instability in the Asia-Pacific and question the US' commitment towards South Korea and Japan. Furthermore, Taiwan had developed into a major player in terms of computer and telecommunication component technology and therefore "maintaining the stability and viability of Taiwan's economy has become important to the health of the global and American economies" (Bergsten et al. 2008: 177).

In 1995-1996, the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis led to the first military clash in decades across the Taiwan Strait and the US were involved, too. President Lee Teng-hui was asked to give a speech at his alma mater, the Cornell University. The US provided a visa for Lee which angered Beijing claiming that the US involvement signified support for a Taiwanese separatism. As a consequence, China conducted missile tests in the Taiwan Strait and military exercises in the Southern provinces. Moreover, naval exercises were executed as well. US President Clinton deployed an US aircraft carrier and other ship in the Taiwan Strait to deter China. No outbreak of conflict occurred but shortly before Taiwan's first presidential elections, the PLA conducted further missile tests to intimidate the Taiwanese voters (Roy 2003).

Two years later, in 1998, President Clinton visited Jiang Zemin in Shanghai after Jiang had come to the US in 1997. Clinton declared that "we don't support independence of Taiwan, or two China, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don't believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a requirement" (Sutter 1998: 1). Clinton thereby indicated that the US favors the status-quo of Cross-Strait relations, meaning that the US opposes a Chinese invasion (see Taiwan Strait Crises) but also rejects de jure Taiwanese independence. This position is coherent with the US interest in containing China's rise, maintaining peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific and aiding Taiwan as a democratic market economy.

2000-2008: Instability and Volatility during Chen's Presidency

Chen Shui-bian succeeded Lee Teng-hui as president which was historical, as Chen was the first DPP president in Taiwan's history after decades of KMT rule. While from China's perspective Chen's election was conceived with skepticism, the USA initially were enthusiastic. Chen was perceived a dynamic democrat with solid domestic support and good relations to the White House. Also, the transfer of power indicated for the USA that Taiwan's democracy was consolidated. In 2001, US President Bush spoke

out clearly - arguably clearer than any US President before him - on the US relations with Taiwan, strengthening the US' commitment to Taiwan and deterring China. Bush stated that the US would do "whatever it takes" to help Taiwan in the case of a Chinese attack, that military force was "certainly an option" and that "the Chinese have got to understand that is clearly an option". Yet, he adhered to the "One-China Principle", saying that "I certainly hope Taiwan adheres to the one China policy, and a declaration of independence is not the one China policy. We'll work with Taiwan to make sure that that doesn't happen. We need a peaceful resolution of this issue" (Kettle & Hooper 2001).

However, Chen's stance on Cross-Strait relations and his leaning towards Taiwanese independence led to suspicion in Washington. US President Bush was first and foremost interested in stable and peaceful Cross-Strait relations, in short he wanted to maintain the status-quo as his predecessor Clinton. Chen, however, wanted to conduct a referendum in 2003 regarding issues on Cross-Strait relations, such as whether China should be asked to withdraw its missiles targeted at Taiwan. This referendum had been interpreted as signaling willingness towards independence from Chen's side. This resulted in warnings from the White House that the US is not supporting Taiwan unconditionally. Chen's behavior was perceived as provoking Beijing. While adhering to the "One-China Policy", the US realized it had to deter China from attacking Taiwan and Taiwan from moving towards independence (Sutter 2006).

For the remainder of Bush's presidency, his relations with Chen further cooled off. Chen's policy towards China and the notion of Taiwanese independence resulted in Bush saying that "if Taiwan were to declare independence unilaterally, it would be a unilateral decision, that would change the US equation" (Hickey 2015). The relations worsened so much that Chen did not receive permission to transit in big US cities, he was only allowed to transit in Alaska. Moreover, Washington ignored Taipei's request to buy warplanes (Ibid.). During Chen's presidency, it became clear that the US insists on the status-quo in Cross-Strait relations and ceases support for Taiwan, if Taiwan deviates from the status-quo.

2008-2016: Détente within the Taipei-Beijing-Washington Triangle

In 2008, Ma Ying-jeou of the KMT succeeded Chen Shui-bian and the power was transferred back to the KMT. As mentioned before, Ma supported the 1992 Consensus and Cross-Strait relations improved immediately. Ma's policy of the "Three Noes", i.e.

no unification, no independence, and no war, came at the right time because the Taipei-Beijing-Washington triangle suffered from considerable instability during Chen's presidency. Hence, Ma's election was not only welcomed by Beijing, his "Three Noes" policy was also directed towards Washington to reassure Taipei's stable and peaceful intentions. Taiwan and China proceeded with their communication through SEF and ARATS. The "Three Links" were established and the ECFA was signed. This Cross-Strait détente also improved US-Taiwan relations. President Obama and other US officials supported Taiwan's new China policy, as it led to increased stability across the Taiwan Strait. This development led a number of improvements in US-Taiwan relations. Unlike in the case of Chen, Ma was allowed a layover in Los Angeles during which he held phone calls with Bill and Hillary Clinton among others. Taipei and Washington agreed on several 'updates' regarding their "unofficial" embassies in terms of privileges and immunities for the diplomats. Increased arm sales to Taiwan and cooperation for intelligence-sharing were other important result of Taiwan's changed policy (Hickey 2015). In an interview in 2003, President Ma even stated that Taiwan's relations "with the United States are closer now than prior to the severance of our diplomatic ties in 1979" (Ibid.).

Nevertheless, despite relatively harmonious relations between Taiwan and China and Taiwan and the USA during Ma's presidency, Cross-Strait rapprochement has also been observed with skepticism in Washington. Whereas Chen Shui-bian deviated from the status-quo by moving towards independence, Ma Ying-jeou might be too accommodating towards China and hence also deviating from the status-quo. Taiwan is a democratic and economic partner for the USA with a unique strategic position in the Asia-Pacific. A Taiwan that moves too close into the Chinese orbit might lead to a 'Hongkongization', violating US security interests. From Washington's perspective, the prospects of Taiwan-China relations that are too close endangers the stability in the Taipei-Beijing-Washington triangle due to the fact that China constitutes the biggest threat to Taiwan's national security while the US are Taiwan's biggest supporter (Cabestan 2016). The period of Ma Ying-jeou's administration showed once more the difficulty of balancing Cross-Strait relations and the role of the USA for Taiwan and China.

2016 until now: New Dynamics in Taiwan-China-US Relations

In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen was elected as Taiwan's new president, bringing the DPP back to power. This, however, also resulted in more complicated relations with China due to Tsai's and the DPP's opposing view on the 1992 Consensus. Whereas Beijing's and the US' position regarding Cross-Strait relations has been consistent over time and only Taiwan's position changed depending on the ruling government, the triangular relationship gathered a new dynamic when Donald Trump became the 45th US President in 2017. One might even argue that Trump defied the 'One-China Policy' partially. Unlike his predecessors, Trump's approach to Taiwan and China was more flexible and favored Taiwan. Trump was highly critical of US-Chinese economic relations, arguing that the US has to decrease its trade deficit with China by implementing tariffs towards China which led to a trade war. On the other hand, Trump was more open-minded in his approach towards Taiwan. After Trump won the presidential elections, Tsai called him to express her congratulations. Trump picked up the phone and the two talked for around ten minutes. This phone call constituted the first communication of presidents since the US switch of diplomatic ties in 1979 (Paletta et al. 2016).

Naturally, China did not receive this well. Nonetheless, the Trump administration implemented several beneficial policies for Taiwan, albeit within the framework of the 'One-China Policy'. First, in 2017 and 2018, the Trump administration approved several arm sales of higher sophistication. Second, in 2018, the Taiwan Travel Act was passed. It provided for high-level US officials to visit Taiwan. Third, the USA invested in a new building for the unofficial embassy in Taiwan. The new \$250 million American Institute in Taiwan was completed in 2018. Fourth, the Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act came into effect in 2020. The act can be seen as another upgrade to the TRA of 1979. It aims at improving US-Taiwan relations and Taiwan's participation in international organizations. As a result of the Taiwan Travel Act, US Health and Human Services Secretary Alex Azar visited Taiwan and met with President Tsai in 2020. This marked the first visit of a US official since 1979 (Aspinwall 2020).

Therefore, it can be observed that the Trump administration has tilted towards Taiwan while still adhering to the status-quo. This can be explained due to the steady rise of China in economic and military terms. China is the US' main economic and strategic rivalry. This requires a more flexible approach in order to counterbalance China. Thus,

more leeway for Taiwan emerged. How the new President Biden handles the Taipei-Beijing-Washington triangle remains to be seen. Nevertheless, Taiwan's representative to the US, Hsiao Bi-khim, was invited to Biden's inauguration which was another 'first' since 1979 and Furthermore, former Senator Chris Dodd met with President Tsai later that month to reassure the commitment of the Biden administration towards Taiwan (Aspinwall 2021). These events indicate that Biden intends to follow the direction Trump started to take – a more resolute approach towards China and a more supportive policy towards Taiwan.

Conclusion: International System

This section has illustrated the important role of the international system for Taiwan and China. Due to the US hegemonic power, Cross-Strait relations are not purely a dyad but rather a triangular relationship between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. The USA is willing to exert its influence to defend its security interests. That meant for a long time to defend Taiwan against a Chinese attack because of the US interest to contain spread of communism within East Asia. Over time, Taiwan has democratized and has become a crucial economic partner for the USA, adding another reason for Taiwan's significance. Under the Chen Shui-bian's administration, however, Taiwan's behavior led to instability within the triangle due to Chen's deviation from the status-quo towards independence. Ma's presidency initially resulted in détente, as he emphasized the status-quo. Later in his presidency, nonetheless, Washington was skeptical whether Ma's China policy was too accommodating and hence, threatened US security interests.

Trump brought a new dynamic into the triangular relationship between Taipei, Beijing, and Washington. He has taken a harder stance towards China, while implementing more beneficial policies for Taiwan. Biden seems to continue this approach. It seems that Washington intends to counterbalance its main economic and strategic rival more fiercely. The importance of the US for Cross-Strait relations illustrated that the international system is rather unfavorable for political integration. The USA as the hegemon has a say in the Taiwan Strait and for the time being, the US is not interested in Cross-Strait political integration.

6.3 Unfavorable Public Opinion

The role of the public opinion in Cross-Strait relations is not easy to assess which complicates the examination of the public opinion in Cross-Strait relations. For the

majority of recent history, Taiwan and China were authoritarian and China still is authoritarian. Hence, the public opinion during these years was and still is severely restricted. The public discourse does not impact on policy making in an authoritarian state. Therefore, there are no surveys available that might infringe on the ruling government's power to rule. When Taiwan democratized, the Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University (國立政治大學) started to survey Taiwan's public opinion on core political attitudes from 1992 onwards. The questions deal with identity (Taiwanese or Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese identity) and Cross-Strait relations (unification, independence, or status quo). This survey will lay the quantitative foundation this section's analysis for Taiwan's public opinion. Regarding public opinion in China, similar arguments as for public opinion in East Germany can be made. As an authoritarian state, the Chinese government controls state media and does not allow independent surveys. Furthermore, through its state media and censorship, the Chinese government is first and foremost responsible for the Chinese public discourse, i.e. they control what Chinese read or listen to. Thereby, the notion when Chinese leaders rely on the will of the public opinion for certain policies, which are often fueled by nationalism, has to be taken with a grain of salt. This is because China has manufactured the public opinion in the first place (Sun 2011).

Nonetheless, this helps to operationalize Chinese public opinion. Whereas Taiwanese public opinion ever since democratization is volatile depending on current political events, Chinese public opinion is coherent with the government's political attitude. Naturally, this is not the case but as China is an authoritarian state, public opinion that deviates from the government's position cannot be articulated. A powerful public opinion requires democracy. Therefore, it is assumed for the sake of this thesis that the public and the Chinese government correspond regarding their opinion on Cross-Strait relations which is maintaining the status quo with eventual unification under Chinese rule. The focus is therefore rather on Taiwan's public opinion in respect to political integration with China.

1949-1987: Oppression of Public Opinion

Taiwan established martial law in 1949 which went on for 38 years until 1987, making it one of the longest duration of martial law. The KMT declared martial law to stabilize its rule in Taiwan. Hence, several restrictions were implemented that restricted public opinion. New parties were not allowed to be established and strikes and unlawful

assembly were forbidden. Freedom of speech was critically limited, as well as the usage of the Taiwanese language. Moreover, media such as print and radio became controlled by the government. Critics of the government were arrested and put into prison without court judgement and many were even killed. This period has been termed “White Terror”. After decades of authoritarianism, Chiang Ching-kuo initiated democratic reforms and lifted martial law in 1987. Other parties were allowed to be founded, such as the DPP that emerged from the Tangwai Movement. Additionally, freedom of speech, the right to assembly, and other civic rights were restored. The first fully democratic elections for the Legislative Yuan were held in 1992 (Jacobs 2012).

Whereas Taiwan transitioned from an authoritarian one-party state to a multi-party democracy, China has been and still is an authoritarian country – from Mao Zedong’s leadership in 1949 to Xi Jinping’s leadership today. From the beginning onwards, diverging views and political positions have been oppressed in China. During Mao’s leadership so-called ‘struggle sessions’ were conducted that served the purpose of humiliated and even torturing dissidents. Through the use of force, the victims were urged to confess crimes which they may have or not have done. Thereby, Mao was able to signal that any deviation from the Communist Party’s view could result in consequences. With the Hundred Flower Campaign in 1956-1957, Mao asked the public to express criticism in order to improve the country. What seemed like an improvement for Chinese civil rights, turned into the Anti-Rightist Campaign in which critics were put in to labor camps or even executed. The Cultural Revolution from 1966 to 1976 aggravated the worsening of civil rights and oppression of dissidents. Deng Xiaoping liberalized China’s economy and the economic betterment also led to hopes for more freedom and democracy. However, the democracy movement in China came to an abrupt end, when the Tiananmen Square protests were suppressed by the military (Vogelsang 2012). The Chinese government has kept a tight grip on freedom of speech. Especially with the advancements of technology, the government has been able to censor unwanted content. Hence, the above mentioned operationalization: For the sake of this thesis, the Chinese public opinion equals the government’s opinion which is the ‘One-China Principle’, i.e. maintaining the status quo with eventual unification under Chinese rule.

1987-2000: Rise of Taiwanese Identity

Taiwan’s first legislative elections were held in 1992 and hence the country took a first step towards the consolidation of democracy. 1992 was also the first year that the

Election Study Center at the National Chengchi University (NCCU) surveyed Taiwanese on core political attitudes. In 1992, the majority of the people (45 percent) identified as both Taiwanese and Chinese, followed by 26 percent that identify as solely Chinese, and 18 percent that identify as Taiwanese. Regarding Cross-Strait relations it was asked in 1994 how people view the question of unification and independence. 39 percent preferred “maintain status-quo, decide at later date”, 21 percent did not give an answer, 16 percent chose “maintain status quo, move toward unification”, and ten percent gave “maintain status quo indefinitely”. Thus, in the beginning of the 1990s, the people in Taiwan rather identified as Chinese and preferred to maintain the status-quo. With Taiwan’s democratization also came a rise of Taiwanese identity. By 1996, the share of people that identified as Taiwanese (24 percent) surpassed the percentage of people that identified as Chinese (18 percent). This development concurred with the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 1995-1996 and an increase in Taiwanese identity politics. Rather than yielding to Chinese pressure, the Taiwanese reelected the outspoken Lee and more and more identified as Taiwanese (Wang 2013).

In 1997 after the Third Taiwan Strait Crisis, 31 percent of survey participants preferred to “maintain the status quo, decide at later date”, 17 percent chose “maintain status quo, move toward unification”, and 16 percent felt the best option would be to “maintain the status quo indefinitely”. This indicates that although Taiwanese identity had gained momentum, the majority of the people preferred the status quo, neither unification nor independence. As of 1999, 40 percent identified as Taiwanese which is an increase of 22 percent from 18 percent in 1992. In the same time span, the percentage of people who identify as Chinese sunk from 26 percent to 12 percent. The amount of people that chose “both Taiwanese and Chinese” remained relatively stable (46 to 43 percent from 1992 to 1999). In terms of Taiwan-China relations, the public opinion remained relatively unchanged. The vast majority felt that the status quo was the best choice: 31 percent voted for “maintain status quo, decide at later date”, 19 percent preferred “maintain status quo indefinitely”, and 15 percent chose “maintain status quo, move toward unification” (Election Study Center, NCCU).

2000-2008: Taiwanization and De-Sinicization

In 2000, the DPP politician Chen Shui-bian became Taiwan’s new president who leaned towards independence and opposed the 1992 Consensus. This was interpreted as being coherent with the increase of Taiwanese identity since Taiwan’s democratization.

Nonetheless, this did not necessarily mean that the people also supported *de jure* independence in the aftermath of Chen's election. In 2001, the survey on independence/unification/status quo remained stable. The vast majority still preferred to maintain the status quo. 36 percent of interviewed Taiwanese were for "maintain status quo, decide at later date" and 17 percent chose "maintain status quo indefinitely". Another 18 percent opted for "maintain status quo, move toward unification" and 11 percent chose "maintain status quo, move toward independence" (Ibid.)

During Chen's presidency, several policies of his were driven by a stronger emphasis on Taiwanese identity. For example, the passport received the word 'Taiwan' on the front and history books focused more on Taiwanese and not just on Chinese history. Overall, Chen put more emphasis on Taiwan's 'taiwanese-ness'. In 2004, Chen got reelected by a small margin. Associated herewith was a further rise of Taiwanese identity. In 2005, for the first time, more people (45 percent) identified as solely Taiwanese than both, Taiwanese and Chinese (43 percent). The share of people who identify had dropped to 7 percent which constituted an overall drop of 19 percent from 26 percent in 1992 (Ibid.). The deteriorating Cross-Strait relations could be another factor in the de-sinicization of Taiwan. Since Chen took office, the contact between SEF and ARATS were halted by China. Hu Jintao used an increasingly more aggressive rhetoric towards Taiwan. Hu's rhetoric culminated into the Anti-Secession Law in 2005 that reserved the right to use military force against Taiwan, if it came to separatism (Wei 2010)

Albeit the people in Taiwan more and more identified as Taiwanese and or Taiwanese and Chinese, rather than solely as Chinese, this still did not mean a significant support for independence. It is to be noted, however, that it is not possible to infer from this data what the causal mechanism for the constant support for the status quo is. It is possible that Hu's rhetoric and the Anti-Secession Law impacted on the people. So although people less likely identify as Chinese but that does not necessarily mean that they support independence. A possible reason could be Chinese retaliation. At the end of Chen's presidency, the survey results remained stable, i.e. the majority identified as Taiwanese (45 percent) or Taiwanese and Chinese (46 percent) and supported the status quo (37 percent "decide at later date" and 18 percent "indefinitely") (Election Study Center, NCCU).

2008-2016: Taiwanese Identity and the Sunflower Movement

After eight years of DPP rule, the Taiwanese elected Ma Ying-jeou from the KMT who acknowledged the 1992 Consensus. Relations with China improved immediately and contact between the SEF and ARATS was restored. It can be speculated that the people were longing for more stable relations with China which was not the case in the previous eight years. Electing Ma signified warmer relations across the Taiwan Strait. Interestingly, however, a year after the elections in 2009, the percentage of people who solely identify as Taiwanese further increased to 52 percent. The share of people who identify as both, Taiwanese and Chinese, further shrunk to 40 percent. Lastly, people who identified as solely Chinese made up four percent. Hence, closer relations with China and a consolidated Taiwanese identity do not necessarily contradict each other. To elect Ma Ying-jeou and the KMT also does not necessarily mean support for unification. In 2009, people that wanted “unification as soon as possible” just accounted for one percent. Beside, people that preferred “maintain status quo, move toward unification” were nine percent. Unexpectedly, these numbers were higher during Chen’s presidency (“unification as soon as possible”: 3 percent in 2001; “maintain status quo, move toward unification”: 18 percent in 2001) (Ibid.).

The relations across the Taiwan Strait improved significantly with Ma’s election and Taiwan and China agreed on the “Three Links” and signed the ECFA in 2010. In 2012, Ma won his reelection and served another term (see before). Simultaneously, Taiwanese identity became more predominant, while the majority still preferred the status-quo. In 2014, the KMT wanted to ratify the Cross-Strait Service Trade Agreement (CSSTA) that was signed with China within the framework of the ECFA. When it came to ratification, the DPP and civil society became upset, as the agreement was signed behind doors. As a result, the so-called Sunflower Student Movement occupied the Legislative Yuan to protest against the KMT who posed the legislative majority for 24 days. The Sunflower Movement was skeptical of this agreement, as the service industry is a major industry in Taiwan (Rowen 2015).

During the Sunflower Movement in 2014, the percentage of people that exclusively identified as Taiwanese rose to a staggering 61 percent. 33 percent identified as Taiwanese and Chinese, while just 4 percent identified as solely Chinese. Nonetheless, despite one of biggest pro-democracy movements in Taiwan’s history, the Taiwanese view on Cross-Strait relations did not change significantly. The vast majority still

supported the status-quo (34 percent for “status quo, decide at later day”, 25 percent for “status quo indefinitely”, and 18 percent voted in favor of “status quo, move toward independence”) (Election Study Center, NCCU).

Hence, the trend of rising Taiwanese identity is stable, as well as the public opinion regarding Taiwan-China relations. Ma’s election and the Sunflower Movement indicate two insights. First, Ma’s election shows that the public is not opposed to a political leader who prefers closer ties to China. The public prefers the status quo and Ma promised to provide stable Cross-Strait relations – that is what the public wanted. Second, however, given Taiwan’s rise in identity and nationalism, the public does not want relations that are too close to China or even restrict Taiwan – as it was perceived with the CSSTA.

2016 until today: Further Rise of Taiwanese Identity

Tsai Ing-wen replaced Ma Ying-jeou as president in 2016 and thus the DPP returned to power. Tsai’s election can be read as a correction by the public opinion due to Ma’s rapid Cross-Strait economic rapprochement which was not supported by the public. Tsai opposes the 1992 Consensus and albeit Tsai indicated willingness to talks with Xi, contact between SEF and ARATS has been halted. That the public voted for Tsai does not, however, mean that the Taiwanese now want independence. The perception of Cross-Strait relations – still – remains consistent. The large majority favors to maintain the status quo. In 2018, 33 percent opted for “maintain status quo, decide at later date”, 24 percent chose “maintain status quo indefinitely”, and 16 percent supported “maintain status quo, move toward independence”. Regarding identity, the public opinion has remained relatively stable, too. In the same year, 56 percent identified exclusively as Taiwanese, 37 percent as Taiwanese and Chinese, and 4 percent as exclusively Chinese (Ibid.).


Two years into Tsai’s presidency, Taiwanese identity has further gained importance. In 2020, 64 percent of all people identified as exclusively Taiwanese which marked the highest percentage since this data has been recorded. The share of people who identify as both, Taiwanese and Chinese, has decreased to 30 percent – the lowest value since this survey has been conducted. The same applies to the amount of people who solely identify as Chinese with 3 percent. Regarding Cross-Strait relations, “maintain status quo, move toward unification” experienced a serious drop from 13 to 6 percent

since Tsai was elected. The majority of Taiwanese still prefers to maintain the status quo. However, more and more people favor “maintain status quo, move toward independence” since the election of Tsai. The percentage rose from 15 to 26 percent after from 2018 to 2020 (Ibid.).

Conclusion: Public Opinion

The examination of the role of the public opinion in Cross-Strait relations has shown that the people in Taiwan from 1992 to 2020 increasingly identified as Taiwanese (from 18 to 64 percent) and decreasingly as Chinese (from 26 to 3 percent). The percentage of people that identify as both shrunk from 46 to 30 percent. Thus, democratization led to a steep rise in Taiwanese identity. However, Taiwanese still identify with their Chinese heritage. Furthermore, the ‘taiwanization’ did not impact significantly on the public opinion in terms of Cross-Strait relations. In 1994, the majority of the people wanted to maintain the status quo: 39 percent “maintain status quo, decide at later date”, 16 percent “maintain status quo, move toward unification”, 10 percent “maintain status quo indefinitely”, and 8 percent “maintain status quo, move toward unification”. 26 years later, in 2020, most people still prefer the status quo: 29 percent “maintain status quo, decide at later date”, 26 percent “maintain status quo indefinitely”, 26 percent “maintain status quo, move toward independence”, and 6 percent “maintain status quo, move toward unification”. What does this mean for the analysis? When it comes to political integration between Taiwan and China, the greater part of Taiwanese has preferred to maintain the status quo from 1994 until 2020. Even with the rise of Taiwanese self-conception, people still want the status quo. If a president or party deviates too much from the status quo, the public opinion conducts a correction. Simply put: Chen deviated towards independence and Ma followed. Ma deviated towards unification and Tsai followed. The public opinion with regards to China remained incredibly stable. Therefore, it is unlikely that the public opinion changes in the near future which makes Cross-Strait political integration less likely.

Figure 2 Changes in Taiwanese Identity 1992-2020



Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author, Source: NCCU Election Study Center





Figure 3 Taiwanese Attitude towards Cross-Strait relations 1994-2020



Note: Compiled and Organized by the Author, Source: NCCU Election Study Center

6.4 Conclusion

Cross-Strait relations are complicated to say the least. The analysis has shown that depending on the incumbent Taiwanese president, Cross-Strait political leadership can be cooperative and possibly have potential for political integration (Ma-Xi). However, the political leadership can also be hostile (Tsai-Xi). It all depends on whether the Taiwanese presidents accepts the 1992 Consensus. The role of the international system and especially the role of the USA is impactful. Throughout history, the USA made sure that the status quo remains unchanged. When Chen threatened the status quo with his rhetoric and policies, the US exerted pressure in order to keep the status quo. The same can be said in regards to Ma. His approach to China threatened the status quo, too, and hence the USA were concerned regarding their security interests. Trump and Biden, the former especially, applied a firmer approach towards China and a more supportive approach towards Taiwan. Nevertheless, it became clear that the USA are not interested in any deviation from the status quo. The same – it has become apparent – applies to the Taiwanese public. Despite the people increasingly identify as Taiwanese, they prefer the status quo – ever since data is available. Thus, the Taiwanese public opinion favors the status quo, the US favor the status quo, and the Cross-Strait leaders rarely agree. Hence, Cross-Strait relations are in an impasse and political integration – unlike in the case of the EU and Germany – remains unlikely in the near future. In short, only during Ma's presidency the political leadership has been cooperative. Nonetheless, the international system and the public opinion have not been favorable at any point during Cross-Strait history. Hence, as all three conditions have to be given, no Cross-Strait political integration has taken place.

Chapter 7: Conclusion

The title of the thesis is “Why Does Economic Interdependence Not Lead to the Initiation of Political Integration? A Comparison Between the EU, East and West Germany, and Cross-Strait Relations”. This thesis dealt with the research question of why did political integration took place within the EU and East and West Germany, but not between Taiwan and China - although they all constitute similar cases (same independent variables: economic interdependence, culture, religion, historical affinity, a conflictual past, functional cooperation, social transactions, and actor’s pursuit of self-interest). Hence, there must be other independent variables that can explain the differing outcome for Taiwan and China.

My argument was that for political integration to occur, there have to be three additional independent variables: a cooperative political leadership, a favorable international system, and a favorable public opinion. These are of equal importance and all form necessary conditions. Thus, the three independent variables have to be given for political integration to be accomplished. These were and are given for the EU and East and West Germany, but not in the case of Taiwan and China. Rather, in Cross-Strait relations, the political leadership has been uncooperative, the international system has been unfavorable, and the public opinion has been unfavorable for political integration as well.

The main analysis confirmed my argument. The cases of the EU and East and West Germany resulted in a positive verification, while the Cross-Strait case provided a negative verification.

Regarding the EU, a cooperative political leadership and a favorable international system were the driving forces for political integration. European political leaders - in particular the French and German – realized that a stable and peaceful Europe can only be attained when rivalries and hostilities are overcome, personal and national reconciliation reached, and political integration is achieved. Through personal diplomacy, the conflictual past was left behind. Economic integration was intended to make war materially impossible. Over time, economic integration led to political integration and Europe moved from a negative peace to a positive peace. The international system facilitated European integration due to the fact that the US wanted to contain the Soviet influence. Hence, the US provided economic, ideological, and military support in order

to include Europe into the liberal world order. The public opinion was less essential for European integration. Hence, scholars have used the term 'permissive consensus'. The public did not oppose integration, as the ideals of the European integration project are universally appealing. However, they were not actively involved. In sum, the cooperative European leadership was the most influential factor in the emergence of the EU. The international system was favorable, first and foremost through the involvement of the USA. Lastly, the public opinion approved political integration albeit it was not decisive for European integration.

The political integration of East and West Germany took place primarily because of a favorable international system. The divide of Germany was due to the international system, more specifically due to the Cold War. Hence, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War resulted in a favorable international system for the political integration of East and West Germany. Only when the Soviet Union was about to tumble, a window of opportunity emerged. The Soviet Union no longer had the means to keep up its sphere of influence and thus cleared the way for German political integration. Nonetheless, during the 45 years of East and West German existence, the (West German) political leadership was vital in maintaining German-German ties. The meetings of the East and West German leaders kept the connection between East and West alive. The emphatic approach of West German leaders and their efforts to improve the lives of the East Germans also indicated to the East German population that they are not forgotten and that the people of East and West are the same. When the East German leadership struggled to maintain its power and the Eastern Bloc was about to dissolve, the East German public with their peaceful revolution gave the leadership its coup de grace and the East German leadership surrendered. In sum, the favorable international system was decisive for German political integration. The political leadership laid the foundation for political integration and the East German public gave the final push for political integration between East and West Germany.

Political integration across the Taiwan Strait has so far not occurred due to impeding factors in all three independent variables. The political leadership between Chinese and Taiwanese leaders can be cooperative, if the Taiwanese leader acknowledges the 1992 Consensus. When Ma Ying-jeou did so, Cross-Strait relations improved substantially. Nevertheless, if the incumbent Taiwanese president deviates from the 1992 Consensus, Cross-Strait political leadership is rather hostile, as can be seen during Chen's

and Tsai's presidency. In terms of Cross-Strait political integration, the international system is unfavorable, too. The USA can be viewed as the hegemon within the international system. Therefore, they have been involved in Cross-Strait relations ever since. During the Cold War, the USA supported Taiwan as a means against Communist expansion. Another reason emerged to support Taiwan when the country democratized and became a major economic partner. With the rise of China, the US' hegemony has been threatened, in particular in the Asia-Pacific. Hence, a change in the status quo between Taiwan and China is against US' security interests. Therefore, the US prefer a stable and peaceful status quo which for Cross-Strait political integration is unfavorable. The public opinion is not favorable for political integration between Taiwan and China as well. Ever since data has become available, the large majority of Taiwanese has preferred to maintain the status quo. Additionally, the people of Taiwan have progressively identified as Taiwanese. This did not significantly impact on the public's view on de jure independence, as the majority is in favor of the status quo. Still, such a divergence in identity between Taiwanese and Chinese is not favorable for political integration either. Consequently, in regards to Cross-Strait political integration, the political leadership is uncooperative because the political leaders seldom consent, the international system is unfavorable due to the fact that the US favors the status quo, and lastly, the public opinion is unfavorable because most Taiwanese want to maintain the status quo. Thus, political integration between Taiwan and China remains unlikely in the near future.

Considering that Cross-Strait political integration is in an impasse and German reunification was successful, what about the future of European integration? Based on my argument regarding the role of the political leadership, the international system, and the public opinion, it can be expected that European integration further proceeds. Given the experience of European integration, a cooperative political leadership and a favorable public opinion have become the norm for the EU. The success of political and economic integration in Europe led to an emergence of European identity. For instance, the Franco-German rivalry is a relic of the past. French and German politicians not only act in the framework of national politics but within a European framework. The same applies to the European public. A common European identity transcended nationalism. These developments have remained stable and are unlikely to change.

The international system seems favorable for further political integration in Europe, too. Changes in the international system pressure the EU to react in order to maintain the balance of power. The EU's capacity to act can be significantly improved, if further European integration occurs, specifically vertically. The rise of China – economically and militarily – threatens the stability of the liberal world order not just in the Asia-Pacific but also beyond, mostly due to China's assertive behavior and its Road and Belt Initiative. The EU with its joint foreign and security policy is contemplating how to deal with China's growing power. One consideration is vertical integration in the realm of military with the possibility of creating a European army. German Chancellor Merkel and French President Macron have both been supportive of this idea. Another consideration is horizontal integration by countering China's Road and Belt Initiative with a EU infrastructure program. Furthermore, the relations between the EU and NATO on the one side and Russia on the other side are still not as stable as one might have hoped for after the end of the Cold War. This and also further immigration to Europe call for joint European answers.

Lastly, the success of the EU has attracted several interested candidates that would like to join: Turkey, North Macedonia, Montenegro, Albania, Serbia, Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Georgia, Moldova, and Ukraine. Hence, more European integration – horizontally as well as vertically – can be expected.

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