

International Master's Program in International Studies
National Chengchi University
國立政治大學國際研究英語碩士學位學程
Master's Thesis
碩士論文

Colonial Legacies and Democratic Development in Latin America and the Caribbean (1982-2018)



殖民遺緒與拉丁美洲與加勒比國家的 民主發展 (1982-2018)

Kevin Guillermo Berganza
Advisor: Dr. Yen-Pin Su

July 2021

*For my country, Belize
For the day we can all flourish under the shade of the same tree*



ABSTRACT

Previous research shows that economic development matters for explaining the variation in levels of democracy. Yet, few studies focus on the effects of colonial legacies on democratization in new democracies. This thesis aims to fill the gap in the literature by examining the relationship between colonial legacies and democratic development in Latin America and the Caribbean. I argue that, compared to other European colonizers, British forms of liberal colonial rule helped create a more open environment for civil society, and thus facilitates democratic development in these post-colonial countries. Using data in thirty-three countries in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1982 through 2018, my empirical analysis demonstrates that ex-British colonies tend to have higher levels of democracy than countries that were colonized by other European countries. Additionally, my comparative case studies of Belize and Guatemala also provide support for my hypothesis. The case of Belize suggests that the British liberal colonial legacies provide a more open environment for social mobilizations, which catalyzed stronger democratic representation. In contrast, the case of Guatemala suggests that Spanish mercantilist colonial legacies impede the growth of civil society, and thus produce a lower level of democracy. Overall, this thesis provides solid evidence to show the importance of colonial legacies in understanding democratic development in post-colonial countries.

Keywords: colonialism, democracy, Belize, Guatemala, liberalism, civil society

摘要

許多既有的研究發現經濟發展對於不同的民主程度有相當的解釋力。然而，研究殖民遺緒如何影響新興民主國家的民主化之相關研究成果並不多。為了補充既有文獻的不足，本論文試圖以拉丁美洲與加勒比海國家為例，探討殖民遺緒與民主發展之間的關係。本研究主張，相較於其他的歐洲殖民強權，英國的自由主義殖民統治為殖民地的公民社會提供了較開放的環境，也因此有助提升這些國家在獨立後的民主發展。本論文利用拉丁美洲與加勒比海 33 個國家、橫跨 1982 年到 2018 年的總體資料進行實證研究，分析結果顯示，相較於曾被其他歐洲強權殖民的國家，曾被英國殖民的國家在獨立後確實有較高的民主程度。其次，本研究亦針對貝里斯與瓜地馬拉進行比較案例研究，其研究結果也支持了本文的假設。貝里斯的案例顯示由於英國的自由主義殖民遺緒為社會抗議動員提供了開放的環境，使貝里斯能有較強健的民主代表性。相對而言，瓜地馬拉的案例顯示西班牙的重商主義殖民遺緒則阻礙了公民社會的發展，因而對其民主發展造成負面影響。總結而言，本論文的實證研究顯示，殖民遺緒對於吾人理解後殖民國家的民主發展有相當的重要性。


關鍵字：殖民主義、民主、貝里斯、瓜地馬拉、自由主義、公民社會

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Throughout the writing of this thesis, many individuals provided support and helpful comments.

First, special thanks to the Taiwan International Cooperation and Development Fund for giving me this opportunity to complete my master's studies in Taiwan and to the dedicated staff of the International Master's Program in International Studies (IMPIS) for making my academic and social life more enjoyable.

It is a pleasure to express my thanks and gratitude to my advisor Dr. Yen-Pin Su. Without his dedication, keen interest and invaluable expertise, this study would not have been completed. His timely and scholarly advice served as guidance and as the right motivation needed for the writing of this thesis.

I would also like to thank my committee members Dr. Fu-Chuan Huang and Dr. Jaw-Nian Huang for their scholarly advice and special interest that also enabled me to complete this thesis.

A debt of gratitude is owed to doctoral candidate Paula Perez Romero for her scholarly advice and for her overwhelming assistance in the creation of the dataset and the writing of this thesis.

Lastly, I would like to thank my friends and family for their undying support and wise counsel that served as a fountain of inspiration for this thesis. Without them, I could not have found the courage to complete this academic journey.

Chapter 1: Introduction

1.1 Research Motivation and Background

Recent years have seen a surge in the publications concerning the colonial legacies of democratic development in the developing world but not on the varying levels. Undoubtedly, democratic development prevailed in Latin America and the Caribbean (“LAC” hereafter) after the third wave and a decolonization process, but to what extent? Can colonial legacies account for the quality of democracy in these regions? The origins of the varying development patterns are what constitute the unique political and social nature of developing countries - particularly in LAC. Thus, since the past is inextricably linked with the present, this paper builds on the premise that colonialism had a tremendous effect on present levels of democratic development in LAC. Colonialism in LAC is one of the most conspicuous historical events explored by many scholars and students who wish to investigate the causes and effects of the region’s most pressing issues concerning democratization as an intricate part of national development.

The general research question that this thesis aim to address is: *What explains the cross-national variation in levels of democracy?* Using a structural perspective that focuses on the impacts of colonial legacies, the more specific question that this thesis addresses is: *How did colonial legacies affect the current levels of democratic development of Latin America and the Caribbean?* Furthermore, I present existing data gauging the democratic development among countries of LAC and test a hypothesis that resonates with the effects of colonialism on postcolonial political development. I also provide a synopsis of the pre-colonial and colonial statuses of the region before engaging in any robust discussion of contemporary development patterns.

Several scholars have also argued that postcolonial institutions are extensions of colonialism which constitutes the mechanisms of modern societies’ development (see Bolland 2003; Lange 2009; Lange et al., 2006; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013; Victor Bulmer-Thomas 2012). The prevalence of these institutions is a direct result of colonial administrations that heavily invested in economic and political institutions, infrastructures, technologies, and education systems according to Eurocentric standards. The institutions that European colonizers created in the New World produced inequalities as a consequence of the establishment of a hierarchical society, and exploitation of factor endowments via a high concentration of land ownerships that planted the seeds of globalization (Lange et al. 2006, 1413; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, 222).

Meanwhile, despite the fortunes that many colonists amassed due to their tight grip on the means and modes of production (Williams 1994, 74, 87-88) extreme inequality distorted many crucial aspects of national development well into the 19th and 20th centuries. It became more pronounced throughout the years that LAC's underdevelopment was a consequence of highly unequal distributions of wealth and political instability reproduced by institutions that were reminiscent of colonialism (De Ferranti et al. 2004, 112-113).

The rise of democracy in LAC is rooted in popular resistance and elite politics. The success of the European conquest of the region can be partially attested to the exploitation of Native Americans and Africans brought over as slaves. Naturally, rebellions against oppressive authority were common activities carried out by these two ethnic groups such as the indigenous uprising led by Tupac Amaru, the successful slave rebellion in Haiti, which culminated in the first black Republic in the region, and the Maya rebellion in *Tipu*, Belize that expelled Spanish invaders and the constant raiding of British logwood camps, just to mention a few (Bolland 2003, 18-19; Peeler 1998, 36). All of these popular rebellions had one thing in common, they fought for liberty and self-determination against tyranny and oppression at the hands of their colonial masters. In this sense, indigenous and African slave resistance are underpinnings for analyzing revolutionary egalitarian democratic reactions (Peeler 1998, 36) in LAC. Popular resistance against authoritative oppression in modern LAC societies have drawn and will continue to draw significantly from colonial rebellions that serve as a fountain of inspiration.

Yet, elite politics in colonial LAC took on a different role due to different colonial legacies. Spanish colonization of the Americas began at the turn of the 15th century which was more than a century before the first British colonization of the Caribbean islands and ended with the independence struggles of the 19th and 20th centuries respectively. Central to elite politics in colonies that were not ruled by Britain but by the Spanish is the concept of centralism that was embedded in royal absolutism as a pressing ideology. In contrast to the special privileges and tax exemptions given to the church and other nobles known as *fueros*, the Anglo-American or Lockean tradition conceived the state first before concealing any rights to other institutions. The Spanish and Portuguese found it challenging to withdraw these rights from the monarchy (Peeler 1998, 26). Moreover, ambivalence towards central authority also made its way into postcolonial Latin America in the form of personified *caudillismo* due to a shared centralized and bureaucratic state and a mercantilist identity that was reflective and loyal to the Spanish Crown. Thus, the political development of Latin America in the 19th and 20th centuries was dominated by a royal absolutism

ideology and by *caudillos* with military prowess and authoritarian style of leadership that maintained power through corruption, repression and international assistance (Peeler 1998, 28-30; Tulchin 2002, 122; Wolf and Hansen 1992, 62-65). In contrast, former British colonies of the Caribbean during slavery and after the abolition of slavery, pursued a liberal approach to political and state development which minimized an extreme hierarchical relation of dependency (in the long run), enforced the rule of law, enacted and protected private property (though first as a strategy to divide and conquer) encouraged commercial production, erected infrastructures, and created several institutions needed to maintain a capitalists market economy (Lange 2009, 35-36; Lange et al., 2006, 1416; Williams 1994, 210-212).

The stark contrast between the colonialization styles of Spain and Britain provides a strong motivation for this study. This thesis joins an important body of scholarship that has emphasized ways in which colonialism produce unintended consequences. Specifically, I focus on examining the impacts of different forms of colonialism on levels of democracy in postcolonial LAC. A vital aspect of colonialism in the Americas consists of the fundamentality of the empowerment of the mercantile and industrial groups that stabilized political and economic institutions in the form of European identities. It is noteworthy that different domestic development in the colonial powers might shape how colonial legacies affect postcolonial states leading scholars to argue the contrasting legacies of European colonial identities such as Spanish mercantile institutions vs British liberal institutions in particular. The former is centered on attaining national economic self-sufficiency through productive activity, foreign trade, state power, and personal wealth through short-term gains, trade balances, and exploitation (Heaton 1937, 265-266; Lange et al., 2006, 1416). In this system, resources tended to divert towards the few elites that culminated into a strong oligarchy that became the quintessential hierarchical and dependent society.

On the other hand, the liberal model established by the British did not create a strong hierarchical relation of dependency but a state that enforces the rule of law, protects private property, encourages commercial production and built the infrastructures needed to maintain a market economy (Lange et al., 2006, 1416). For instance, from a macroeconomic point of view, one reason that Britain witnessed massive economic growth during the colonial era was that Britain's parliamentary gained credibility after its throes with the monarchy to ascertain its people's role in governance and social change. In contrast, because the Spanish monarchy maintained a stronghold on the social, political, and economic institutions, Spain experienced a gradual economic decline and institutional vulnerability in the long run (Acemoglu and Robinson

2017, 1). For example, this phenomenon usually alludes to the consequences of the Bourbon reforms, and Napoleon invading the Iberian Peninsula in the early 19th century, which ultimately tightened central authority in the colonies and attracted the ire of the creole elites in return. Thus, the reactive effect broadened the gap between local elites, specifically creole elites who were jealous of the new privileges of the *Peninsulares*. This caused ambivalence toward central authority that fueled nationalist attitudes for independence (Peeler 1998, 28).

This paper also seeks to test the arguments surrounding the effects of colonial legacies on political development in postcolonial states by conducting quantitative empirical analyses and a comparative-historical analysis of Belize and Guatemala. Specifically, I argue that countries with liberal British colonial legacies tend to have higher levels of democracy, compared to those with other European colonial legacies.

1.2 Why Democracy Matters?

Previous studies have demonstrated that the levels of democracy matter for many aspects in the domestic and international political domains. First, scholars have pointed out that high levels of democracy reduce corruption (McMann et al. 2019, 11; Montinola and Jackman 2002, 167; Sung 2004, 187). Corruption, being a multidimensional concept, is generally defined as the abuse of public power and trust for personal gains usually in the form of money (Johnston 2005, 11; Nye 1967, 419). It permeates political and social advancement in developing and developed countries by weakening institutions. A growing amount of study has shown that corruption also inhibits investment, distorts government spending, and compounds social injustice and inequality through nepotism and cronyism (Kaufmann and Wei 1999, 2-3; Mauro 1995, 705; Morris and Blake 2010, 9). How does democracy reduce corruption? As Bangura and Hedberg (2007) argue, democratic institutions and democratic values are generative forces of development initiatives to tackle corruption and reduce poverty.

In addition, many studies have shown that higher levels of democracy enhance economic development such as Acemoglu et al. (2019), Doucouliagos and Ulubaşoğlu (2008), Gerring et al. (2005) and Tabellini and Persson (2007). Acemoglu et al. (2019) elaborated that democracy promotes higher GDP via enacting economic reforms, boosting fiscal capacity, providing education and health care, encouraging investments, and reducing social discontent. Bates, Fayad, and Hoeffler (2012) argue that democracy promotes economic growth in some African countries

because democratic governments promote favorable conditions for agriculture in rural areas. Ghardallou and Sridi (2020) argue that democracy increases growth via the protection of property rights, human capital accumulation, and technological advancement and innovation. Furthermore, Gründler and Krieger (2016) mentioned that studies that disprove the benefits that democracy has on economic growth used inappropriate measurements, which failed to consider the varieties of political institutions. To address the measurement issues, Gründler and Krieger (2016) utilized a machine learning technique for a more sensitive and accurate measurement of democracy. Their empirical results show that increases in economic growth, in the long run, is triggered by democracy.

Studies also show that democracy might help reduce the likelihood of civil wars and violence as demonstrated in Gleditsch and Ruggeri (2010) Testa, Young, and Mullins (2017). For instance, Testa, Young, and Mullins (2017) find that as the respect for the rule of law is being consolidated, levels of lethal violence and terrorism tend to decrease. Other studies show that a democratic country negatively affects the risk of civil war and institutions of partial democratic regimes are not susceptible to the onset of conflict while autocratic regimes may enact democratic reforms and political reforms that may end up in violence via social mobilizations. In contrast, Krain and Myers (1997) show that non-democracies are likely to experience civil wars as opposed to democracies. Furthermore, Reynal-Querol (2005) argues that a higher level of democracy might not be sufficient for reducing civil wars. More importantly, Reynal-Querol (2005) finds that democracy with an inclusive political system, such as proportional representation electoral systems, is more likely to prevent the onset of civil wars than a democracy with a majoritarian electoral system, which favors political exclusion.

Furthermore, many studies argue that democracy reduces the probability of interstate wars as elaborated by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998) and Bremer (1993). However, Dixon (1994) notes that there is a trend in the literature concerning the democratic peace theory deriving from the universal democratic norms for peaceful conflict management despite differences in norms and values between states. Thus, democratic states manage conflicts better than other types of regimes at an early stage before they intensify into full-blown military violence even when other factors are controlled. This norm-based logic lends support to the direct positive effect on settlement due to democratic norms to resolve disputes via democratic leaders. Empirically, Hegre (2014) suggests that pairs of democratic states experience lower risks of interstate conflict because of non-violent conflict resolution procedures that are embedded in democratic institutions. The

democratic peace theory holds in this case and the possibility of conflict is frequently determined based on the political behavior of less-democratic states (Oneal and Russett 1997, 268). Gleditsch and Hegre (1997) find that for a pair of democracy and non-democracy, the prospect of war is much higher when compared to a pair of non-democracies.

Given that democracy matters for economic development and peace, what explains the levels of democracy? In Chapter 2, I will review existing literature that aims to explain the variation in levels of democracy. More importantly, I will test a hypothesis regarding colonial legacies for studying why some LAC countries are more democratic than others.



Chapter 2: Theoretical Perspectives

2.1 What Explains Levels of Democracy? A Literature Review

The most prominent theoretical perspective for explaining democratization is arguably the modernization theory. In his seminal study, Lipset (1959) argues that economic development was conducive to democracy. Lipset's (1959) empirical analysis shows that wealthier, less agricultural and more urbanized societies tend to have higher levels of democracy, though these differences were more striking in Europe than in other areas, they remained significant across continents. Similarly, Cutright (1963) argues that higher levels of communications, education, and urbanization were correlated with higher democratic development. Burkhart and Lewis-Beck (1994) remark that even though the effect of economic development on democracy is influenced by the geographical location of states, regardless of those in the semi-periphery or periphery are less affected by it, the positive correlation between economic development and democracy is still substantially significant.

Lipset's contribution to modernization theory in more general terms opened a new perspective on democracy and democratization, providing a logical explanation for the establishment of this type of regime and hints on how to promote a transition from autocracies. Such theoretical contribution has since then been reassessed on multiple occasions leading other scholars to support his findings (Helliwell 1994, 244; Inglehart and Welzel 2005, 15-16). Diamond (1992) states that socioeconomic development improves legitimacy and stability, especially during the early stages of the democratic regime. Furthermore, Diamond (1992) highlights the importance of the social changes created by economic development on promoting democracy. This implies that it is not economic growth per se that leads countries to democratize but the changes that occur within the population, such as improvements in literacy, are the main drivers for democratization. Inglehart and Welzel (2010) stated that economic development changes people's behavior by creating a large, educated, and articulated middle class with a characteristic of independent thinking that challenges the existing political structures; education becomes then a critical means to achieve democratization as it prepares citizens to intervene in politics.

Moreover, Ceftci (2010) examined the levels and support for democracy in Muslim nations and concluded that while religiosity does not affect whether a country is democracy or not, modernization does impact democratization by improving the level and quality of education and by changing cultural values (such as those related with gender inequality or intolerance). Chisadza

and Bittencourt (2018) incorporate more indicators involved in development instead of merely relying upon per capita income, and the authors find strong support for modernization theory in sub-Saharan Africa. However, Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2003) find that, unlike the rest of the world, the impacts of per capita income on democratization in Latin America are often contradicting. The nonlinear relationship between the level of development and democracy in Latin America may be a result of the lasting effects of democracy when per capita incomes were low and when authoritarian regimes were present at high per capita incomes after the third wave (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2003, 1057)

Another literature suggests that social mobilization matters for explaining democratization. Wood (2001) finds that subordinate classes radically mobilize against the oligarchic society to advance democracy as regime and economic elites are tightly interwoven and therefore cannot be challenged from cross-class alliances of political actors. Moreover, social mobilization by labor organizations has a strong effect on democratization. Collier and Mahoney (1997) focus on the collective actions of labor movements at the initial stages of democratization that sparked agitation towards the legitimization projects of the incumbents. In the late stages of democratic transition, labor mobilization's constant pressure via protest accelerated the transition until the very end until a halt.

Eder (2003) contends that the process of capitalist development and urbanization has created the opportunity for collective mobilization. Labor movements rose to prominence as they became the defenders of justice and equality, while bourgeois movements rose against the authoritarian rule in order to implement their vision of modern society. Rossi and Porta (2015) argue that while some social movements have deterred democracy, many more social movements have supported democracy by pressuring governments for full suffrage and the legitimization of association rights. They have also created conditions for destabilization of authoritarian regimes such as in Argentina via civic networks and international forums and in the Czech Republic through student protests.

Additionally, activists play a crucial role in democratic transitions not only in post-communist Europe and Latin America but also in Southeast Asia according to Dibley and Ford (2019). The case of Indonesia concerning the 1998 social movements against the regime of Suharto is a good example of how social movements can pressure authoritarian political leaders to resign. After the democratic transition, Dibley and Ford (2019) demonstrate that social movements in

Indonesia have redefined the relations embedded in the state-society structures and their symbolic elements that influence democratic transitions.

In addition to the effects of economic development and social mobilization, other studies focus on examining how ethnic fractionalization affects democratic development. Horowitz (1993a) argues that monoethnic societies are better environments for democratic consolidation. Because democracy implies inclusion and exclusion of political access, in some ethnically divided societies, ethnicity determines who will have access. Moreover, the distribution of goods and services is also affected along with the ethnic lines. At the community level, Habyarimana et al. (2007) argue that a greater level of ethnic heterogeneity is linked with low levels of public goods provision. Specifically, Habyarimana et al. (2007) contend that homogenous ethnic communities are associated with a successful public goods provision because elites tend to use the mechanism of social sanctions and mechanism for facilitating collective actions to ensure more provision of public goods.

In contrast, while Fish and Brooks (2004) demonstrated that heterogeneous societies are conducive to a fractured democracy, they argue that it may not be entirely true when analyzed from a cross-national view. Fish and Brooks' (2004) findings further explain why authoritarian leaders from a few multi-ethnic countries, such as Malaysia, Uganda, and Singapore, had justified their rule because the functionality of a diverse society necessitates strong leadership.

On the other hand, Jensen and Skaaing (2012) observed that ethnic fractionalization is a relevant factor for political devolvement, but the authors also argue that it is a necessary condition for the outcome of modernization. In countries that are experiencing increasing levels of development, ethnic fractionalization becomes a crucial factor for democratic development, compared to countries with low levels of development. Jensen and Skaaing (2012) show that modernization empowers the subordinate classes over elites in their demand for democracy via mass mobilization.

Are ethnically divided societies doomed to undermine democracy? A coalition of communal groups after independence may enact policies that may polarize society and undermine democracy, but Lijphart (1977) argues that a particular constitutional design might ease ethnic tensions and promote better democratic governance. Plural societies can be attested to objective social differentiation that includes segmented cleavages such as cultural, racial, ethnic, religious, ideological, linguistic, or regional boundaries, which makes it difficult to attain stable democracies. However, emphasizing the role that political elites play in managing conflicts in these sensitive

societies, Lijphart's (1977) cross-national study demonstrates that a "consociational democracy," where parliamentary system and proportional representation electoral system are adopted, can help alleviate ethnic tensions and political instability in divided societies.

2.2 Colonial Legacies and Postcolonial Democratic Development

In addition to the previously reviewed studies, this thesis suggests that different colonial legacies matter for explaining the variation in levels of democracy. According to Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2003), per capita income is not the best predictor of democracy in the region when compared to the rest of the world that had the same income levels which may also be a result of its distinct political features. In Latin America, democracy did not decline at some level of development, especially when per capita income increased or when high-income inequality rose. This outcome is important for this thesis because colonial legacies and their distinctive long-term political development characteristics may be the structural variables that can fill in the gap.

This thesis posits that colonial legacies can account for the various levels of democracy in the region and may explain why some countries remain democratic in the face of low levels of development. Therefore, the most significant feature of this thesis is that it warrants merit relative to the deterministic argument posed by modernization theory by incorporating colonial legacies as a crucial structural variable. In this sense, it does not intend to challenge the Modernization theory. Rather, it aims to provide a complementary theoretical explanation for democratic development in post-colonial countries. In this section, I propose a testable hypothesis about colonial legacies for explaining cross-national variation in levels of democracy.

The existing literature suggests that various colonial aspects could affect postcolonial development in countries that were former colonies. This thesis emphasizes the importance of colonial identities shaped by their colonial institutions and their effects on postcolonial political development. The colonizers created institutions to indoctrinate the population in colonies with European ideologies that continue to function in a complex socialization process (Lundgren 1992, 102). European economic modes, colonial legacies and different forms of colonial rule became integral parts of colonial institutions laying the foundation for long-term socio-economic and political development (Lange 2009, 207; Lange et al. 2006, 1413; Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 57-59).

Many scholars have utilized various theoretical perspectives to study the concept and impact of colonialism such as Acemoglu et al. (2001), Lange (2009), Lange et al. (2006), Lundgren (1992), Paredes Fuentes (2016), Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) and Sokoloff and Engerman (2000). Besides institutional development, other relevant topics and debates in the literature about colonialism include colonial models, regional markets, urban and rural cleavages, and ideologies, the study of the indigenous peoples of the Americas, and colonial intuitional frameworks (Lynch 1992, 69).

First, regarding the size of European settlements, however, some studies such as Baker et al., (2011), Easterly and Levine (2016), Lange et al., (2006), Mahoney (2003) and Paredes Fuentes (2016) have noted that territories with larger European settlements and smaller pre-colonial populations seem to have better institutions. Other studies find that colonizers were more likely to have better economic and political control in places with low mortality rates and tend to produce stronger institutions in postcolonial periods. In contrast, colonizers were more likely to have “extractive states” in places with high mortality rates, which tend to produce no important protection for private property, no encouragement of investments nor any checks against expropriation and weak institutions in postcolonial periods (Acemoglu et al., 2001, 1395).

Second, concerning the organization of pre-colonial populations, Seidler (2019) argues that the creation of colonial institutions is conditional to the preexisting levels of urbanization, constraints on political power, and colonial labor market integration. Some studies have analyzed the intuitional role of British “resettling” in reservations that required an “Alcalde or Chief” to govern, who had already existed in the pre-colonial communities, to ensure effective colonial policies, and exacerbating further constraint on Maya political arrangements (Berkey 1994, 50; Bolland 1987, 5-7). Other studies demonstrate that the largely self-governed indigenous communities that had strong political institutions preserved their advanced institutional capacity to organize and bolster their interest and encourage the population by extension (Angeles 2017, 29-30).

Another literature focuses on the “reversal of fortune” hypothesis which analyzes the effects of factor endowments. This hypothesis suggests that colonial societies that were relatively rich in the 1500s are becoming relatively poor nowadays, while those with lower levels of development in the past are becoming wealthier nowadays (Acemoglu and Robinson 2002, 1244). Geographical and demographic factors might help explain the theoretical reasoning. Specifically, Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) suggest that extractive institutions established by colonists were

influenced by the kinds of soil, climate, and demography that were the sources of precolonial wealth and development trajectories. Poor institutions tend to be formed in the colonies of the Caribbean where the climate and geographical location were suitable for plantation economies and in some Latin American colonies where indigenous populations were dense (Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, 223-224). Acemoglu et al. (2001, 2002) argue that compared to sparsely populated areas with favorable disease climates, European colonizers tend to establish liberal institutions in populated areas with less favorable disease climates. Therefore, colonial societies that had a dense indigenous population cultivated unsuccessful social development that is conclusive of the long-term dramatic effects of ethnic stratification vis-à-vis human welfare (Mahoney 2003, 82).

The historical dependence of institutional development and its effects on political and economic domains are well documented (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, 288-289; Coatsworth 2008, 560-561; López 2018, 10). Since colonizers first asserted their presence in the New World via institutions, one study has shown that by studying the informal mechanisms of imperial control and the formal agencies of government, the Spanish crown was able to establish an administration that possessed institutional power and authority that were derived from the legitimacy of the crown (Peeler 1998, 26-35). At the center of the administration were the local elites that dominated colonial socio-economic affairs in an organized hierarchical and bureaucratic states.

A wide range of literature discuss the role of colonial elites in shaping institutions in British and Spanish colonial societies (see Baker et al. 2011; Bolland 2003; Dippel 2011; López 2018; Shoman 2010). Latin America's abundance in natural resources was maintained by institutions, particularly in plantation agriculture and 'haciendas' that required exploitation via slavery and forced labor. These exploitative institutions created unequal societies in Iberian colonies due to wealth concentrations and protected land rights controlled by elites. Extractive institutions that tended to disregard the protection of property and human rights were created by small settler elites wherever there was a dense population of indigenous of Africans people (Coatsworth 2008, 554).

Fuentes highlighted how various colonial aspects affect the creation of institutions and suggested that because institutions tend to be highly persistent, "current institutions still reflect early ones" (Paredes Fuentes 2016, 7). To investigate the mechanisms through which European colonizers affected postcolonial institution development, Fuente's (2016) study identifies four colonial aspects: the size of European settlements, organization of pre-colonial populations, factor endowments, and colonial identity. Also, the socialization process of colonial identities deprives

the colonized people of their full human potential by adhering to a myth that is riddled with one's position in the world and biological differences (Lundgren 1992, 103).

Scholars also explore the relationship between elites and uneven state structures. This type of structures emerged due to a series of modernization processes that involved the top-down hierarchic transformation from plantation economies to sophisticated urban societies. As a result, inequality persisted despite major economic and political changes that protected elites' rights resulting in repressive regimes in the post war period and before the advent of the third wave of democracy (López 2018, 10). Local elites were able to foster political and economic power due to the emergence of an educated middle class (Bourguignon and Verdier 2000, 288) and monopolizing political and economic resources even after the abolition of slavery (Dippel 2011, 5).

Additionally, Broadbent (1985) proposes a new approach via the sequential frame analysis to operationalize structure as components that link structure and micro-interactions. This is essential because of a generalization that exists in structural analysis that focus on one set of actors (elites) and not the other (masses). Since social power involves a relationship, usually with a challenger (social mobilization) this method bridges the gap between the levels of interactions of elites and social mobilization that are often the sources of many changes in structure. Furthermore, McCarthy and Zald (1977) discuss the varieties, sources, and control of resources as potential precursors of mobilization, the relationship of social mobilization with other groups, elites, and structure, and elaborates several propositions to describe social movements activities at different societal levels. McAdam (1982) through a political-process model, argues that the development of structures is crucial for influencing the organization of social movements and that elites who control these structures, can slow down new movements strategies by adjusting their strategies of control.

Moreover, Lipsky (1968) noted that deprived groups, acting as third parties in social mobilizations, need a stable political resource for long-term success and that protest is a bargaining strategy for subordinate groups. Eisinger (1973) demonstrates that protests are determinants of a fluid opportunity structure that is also susceptible to the frequent mobilizations of subordinate groups. Protest is unnecessary in open structures, it is not a feasible strategy in closed structures, and is more frequent in mixed open and closed structures, nonetheless, it is present in the latter two. Both studies rely on the dominance of institutions and the political opportunity structures that either promote or prevent social mobilizations. However, a pluralist approach such as Tilly (1985a,

1985b) and Zald (1979) offer a more flexible position to the usual centrality of the polity and its structures that interact with movements. In this sense, the relationship should not be pitted as two extremes within a spectrum but as parts of one system that reproduces and changes overtime not only through the state-structures but through political elites' interaction with other social actors.

In line with this, several scholars such Lange (2009) and Lee (1967) noted that during the post war period, the British adopted a more tolerant position in the decolonizing process. This was promulgated by opening political participation for locals, especially by creating legislative councils, and providing welfare development to “train” future leaders. In some instances, the colonial government even assisted in organizing social organizations, such as unions, to influence development mostly in the realms of education, health care and the rule of law. Conversely, Ortiz (2016) shows that social movements in Latin America was a challenge towards authoritarianism and corporatist governments. These regime types were established by divided political elites that were pursuing a consolidated power under the guise of an exploitative system that originated from colonialism. This eventually created a pattern of political opportunities-bases and threat-induced that sparked a democratic transition that led to an increase in social-rights and identity-based movements. On a similar note, other literature has discussed new forms of social protests via the internal politics of labor trajectories first by discussing the role of the incorporation of labor in socioeconomic and political transformation and then by the influence of international events (Rock 1994, 59). Moreover, colonial state repression regarding local protest and how political economy and structures of governance are formative aspects to analyze the intent of colonial police. In retrospect, a main activity of colonial police was to constantly repress local mobilization to uphold elite's interest and class division (Thomas 2012, 9). Thus, different colonial identities might have different impacts on post-colonial development. For instance, Lange et al. (2006) compare the sharp difference in Spanish and British colonialisms. While the Spanish mode of colonization is based on the idea of mercantilism, the British model of colonization is based on the idea of liberalism. Below I will generate a testable hypothesis about colonial legacies based on the theory constructed by Lange et al. (2006).

Lange et al. (2006) construct a theory of colonial legacies on postcolonial development patterns, which classifies two economic models, mercantilist and liberal, that capture the traits embedded in the identity of the colonizers and their tendency to create settlement patterns in specific areas. The main argument that this theory suggests is that Spanish mercantilist and British liberal powers enacted different levels of colonialism in territories with the same level of

precolonial development. Spanish Mercantilists are more likely to implement extensive institutions in comparatively more complex precolonial regions and are less likely to pursue a high level of colonialism in comparatively less complex regions. Liberals, on the other hand, are likely to implement low levels of colonialism in more complex precolonial regions. They are also likely to implement high levels of colonialism in less complex precolonial regions (Lange et al. 2006, 1419).

The second argument of this theory concerns the effect of the level of colonialism on post-colonial development. For Spanish mercantilist colonies, a high level of colonialism greatly hinders postcolonial development while for liberal colonies, a high level of colonialism promotes a better socioeconomic development. According to Lange et al. (2006) colonies with mercantilist colonial legacies tend to have lower levels of social development because colonial elites largely protected merchant guilds and implemented trade regulations. Spanish tools of colonialism such as exploitation and oppression, have caused considerably low endowments of human capital while local indigenous populations continue to live in pervasive poverty especially in rural areas that perpetuates chronic underdevelopment (Psacharopoulos 1994, 1-4). In contrast, colonies with liberalist colonial legacies tend to have a high level of social development because colonial elites largely promoted competitiveness and provided greater resources to the state and population.

Despite that the Spanish and the British empires ruled over their territories differently, their colonial characteristics were significant determinants of the levels of postcolonial social and political development. Spain generally colonized highly developed and dense precolonial territories resulting in less developed colonial centers (Lange et al. 2006, 1414). Many Spanish colonies, with the exception of Venezuela in the 20th century, lacked significant export crops, mineral wealth, large indigenous populations for a workforce that were incentives for the establishment of hacienda systems in other colonial centers, and enacted less radical and reform policies (Larry Diamond, Hartlyn, and Linz 1999, 38; Mahoney 2001, 11-14). The long-term effects of poverty and isolation, therefore, produced a limited semi-democracy that had positive effects on the long-term social and political development of not only Costa Rica but also in Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and Barbados in the Caribbean.

In contrast, during the post-war period, British colonies were directly governed resulting in more inclusive and bureaucratic states that promoted the rule of law and fostered democratic procedures especially for Barbados which gained independence in 1966 (Hurwitz and Hurwitz 1971, 181-186; Lange 2009, 187). Barbados is hailed as the most successful country in the

Caribbean in terms of social and political development due to the broad-based development strategies that it promoted as it transitioned into an independent state and well after (Bishop, Corbin, and Duncan 1997, 329-336; Lange 2009, 187). Additionally, the United Nations (2001) reported the institutionalization effects that the British legacy had on laying the foundations for Barbados' developmental success especially in improving the standard of living in terms of education and health just two decades after colonialism. This is not to say that the involvement of colonial citizens in political affairs was synonymous with self-determination. Rather, the active participation in government by colonial subjects or by the subordinate population, especially the act of assigning indigenous administrators and declaring colonial subjects as "full citizens", was an effective method of rule by the British colonists (Kohn and Mcbride 2011b).

In addition to the theory of Lange et al. (2006), I also rely on Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring's (2013) theory of regime legacy, which was built on the concept of "path dependence". This theory assumes that upon the start of a phenomenon, external conditions make it difficult to reverse this phenomenon creating a 'locked-in' process. In the case of regime continuity, it suggests that once a country has developed as a particular regime like a democracy or an autocracy, it is often too costly to change the system. In other words, the theory of regime legacy takes into consideration that a pre-existent system is reproduced over time and that this reproduction enhances the ability for its prolonged existence.

Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) formulated three hypotheses which are as follows: countries that experienced democracy at an earlier time were likely to build formal institutions such as party systems, courts, and other institutions that promoted accountability which is conducive to a higher level of democracy in the contemporary period; an early experience with democracy allows for elites to accept that it was not harmful to their interest and are likely to support high levels of democracy in the contemporary period; finally, a more democratic and tolerant mass political culture was established in the early democratizing countries. In short, regime legacies last through the socialization of elites over time. In this regard, it makes sense to suggest that the legacies of colonial institutions also affect elites' behavior through reproduction and socialization of the institutional norms from generation to generation. The different models of institutions, such as mercantilism and liberalism, are the main domestic conditions that triggered different levels of development in the region and prolonged institutional development.

It is noteworthy that one weakness of Lange et al.'s (2006) theory is that it fails to specify the causal linkage in within-case sequences accounting for the differences of Spanish and British

colonial legacies. To fill this gap, I argue that it is crucial to analyze the role of social actors that link colonial legacies and postcolonial developments. Compared to Spanish colonialism, British colonialism tends to provide a more tolerant environment for social actors to mobilize and organize to pressure governments for policy reforms. This is because, unlike the mercantilist institutions of Spanish America, liberal institutions, reflective of British identity, took a more proactive position, particularly in the interwar period when social movements demanded improved social welfare systems and political participation. Prior to the independence of the Caribbean colonies, British colonial administrations restructured the colonies so that the colonial administration became more inclusive and tolerated the organizations of union and other associations that radically demanded development activities such as the provision of health care, education, transportation, etc. (Lange 2009, 6).

In sum, I modified Lange et al.'s (2006) theory by emphasizing the importance of social actors' agency in postcolonial democratic development. Because the British colonial legacies produced a more tolerant environment for social mobilization, civil society tends to be stronger, which would help increase levels of democratic development. Based on the discussion in this section, I generate a testable hypothesis: *Compared to countries with Spanish colonial legacies, countries with British colonial legacies tend to have higher levels of democracy.*

Chapter 3: Research Design

To test my hypothesis regarding the relationship between colonial legacies and postcolonial development, I utilize a mixed-methods approach. This method goes beyond descriptive and causal inferences by testing arguments that are usually not tested in single-method studies, thereby strengthening theories that are debated subjectively and not empirically (Seawright 2016, 8-9).

3.1 Large-N Tests

In my large N analysis, the unit of analysis is country-year. The research scope contains 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1982 to 2018. The total number of observations in my dataset is 1221. Although Brazil was colonized by Portugal, Haiti by France, and Suriname by the Netherlands, I include these countries in the analysis. As O'Brien (2000) suggests, the colonial ideologies of Portugal, France, and the Netherlands are highly mercantilist. Thus, it makes sense to consider Brazil, Haiti, and Suriname as postcolonial countries with mercantilist colonial legacies.

The dependent variable in my empirical analyses is a composite index of democracy based on the Freedom House's measures for political rights and civil liberties ("FH Index" hereafter). Originally, each measure for political rights and civil liberties ranges from 1 to 7, with the higher value being more constrained.¹ Both dimensions are some of the most conventional measures of the quality of democracy especially since democracy is a complex and evolving multi-dimensional concept (Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring 2013, 380). However, following Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013), the FH Index is calculated as the sum of political rights and civil liberties scores measured on an inverted scale, so that 1 indicates a fully authoritarian system and 13 indicates the highest level of democracy. In other words, the scores are rescaled using the formula: $15 - (\text{Civil liberties} + \text{Political rights})$ to create a 1–13 ordinal scale (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013, 246). For example, the Freedom House civil liberty score is 2 and the political rights score is 1 for Belize 2007. Therefore, the FH Index for Belize 2007 is $15 - (1+2) = 12$, indicating a high level of democracy. For Guatemala 2007, the civil liberty score is 3 and the political rights score is 4. The FH Index for Guatemala 2007 is $15 - (3+4) = 8$, indicating a moderate level of democracy. Regarding the estimation techniques, because the Freedom House Index of Democracy is an

¹ The Freedom House adopts a scoring scheme based on experts' assessments of 10 questions for political rights and 15 questions for civil liberties. The complete research methodology can be seen at: <https://freedomhouse.org/reports/freedom-world/freedom-world-research-methodology>

ordinal variable that takes values from 1 to 13, I will employ ordered logit regression for the estimation of this variable.

The main independent variable is a binary variable for British colonial legacy, coded 1 if a country was colonized by the British Empire, and 0 otherwise. The total number of country-year observations that is coded 1 for this variable is 444, which is about 36% of total observations. If my hypotheses are supported by the evidence, I expect to see that this variable will have a positive and statistically significant coefficient for the two dependent variables.

In the empirical models, I include several control variables that could potentially affect the dependent variable. First, I control for a variable of logged number of years under colonization to consider the impacts of the level of colonialism on levels of democracy. Second, the modernization theory of democratization suggests that a higher level of economic performance fosters the level of democracy (Lipset 1959, 75; Muller 1995, 966). Therefore, I include a logged transformation of lagged GDP per capita. Third, studies such as Larry Diamond (1999), Haggard and Kaufman (1995) and Przeworski et al. (2000) have found that poor economic performance might undermine levels of democracy. Therefore, I control for variables of a lagged GDP growth and log transformation of inflation rates.² The data for the three economic variables are from Coppedge et al. (2021), the V-Dem database. Fourth, Horowitz (1993b) suggests democracy progressed more in countries with few ethnic cleavages, while Fish and Brooks (2004) find that ethnic cleavages might not matter much for explaining levels of democracy. To control for the possible effects of ethnic cleavages, I include an ethnic-linguistic fractionalization variable, developed by Kolo (2012).³

Fifth, to consider the possibility that countries in specific regions tend to have a higher or lower level of democracy, I also control for two regional dummy variables for the Caribbean and South America, respectively, with the region of Central America as the reference category. Sixth, I control for a trend variable, calculated by subtracting the year of the observation from 1981, to consider the possibility that levels of democracy might increase over time. Last, I follow Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013) to include year fixed-effects to consider the possibility that levels of democracy might be affected by changing global international conditions from time to time. Table 1 shows summary statistics for the variables used in the empirical analyses.

² Following Kurtz and Brooks (2008), the impact of inflation below 1% on the dependent variable is assumed indistinguishable from that of an inflation rate of 1%. Thus, the logged inflation rate for the cases is coded zero.

³ I use “distance adjusted ethno-linguistic fractionalization index” from Kolo (2012).

Table 1 Summary Statistics

Variable		Mean	Standard Deviation	Minimum	Maximum	Number of Observations
Freedom Index	House	9.823	2.842	1	13	1220
British legacy	colonial	0.364	0.481	0	1	1221
Logged number of years under colonization		5.584	0.266	4.779	5.914	1221
Logged GDP per capita _{<i>t-1</i>}		8.572	0.737	6.937	10.381	1218
GDP growth _{<i>t-1</i>}		2.849	4.101	-14.878	19.688	1218
Logged inflation _{<i>t-1</i>}		1.890	1.451	0	9.519	1218
Years since 1981		19	10.681	1	37	1221
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization		0.231	0.140	0.010	0.636	1221

3.2 Case Studies of Belize and Guatemala

In addition to the large N analysis, I will also conduct case studies of Belize and Guatemala to illustrate the causal mechanism of my theoretical hypotheses. The main purpose of these comparative case studies is to use qualitative evidence at the within-case level to strengthen the theoretical implications derived from the large N analysis. I select Belize and Guatemala for comparison because both countries are in Central America, and they share a similar historical background in the pre-colonial periods and almost shared the same colonial faith. The birth of modern Belize and Guatemala is not only the result of the European conquest of the New World but as well as the cultural impact of the Maya civilization. Considered as one of the first and the most advance pre-Columbian societies that thrived in Meso-America, the vast territory of the Maya expanded across modern-day Chiapas, Yucatan, Quintana Roo, Campeche, and Tabasco in southern Mexico and most of Central America in modern-day El Salvador, Belize, Guatemala, and Honduras. It reached its zenith in D 750, and its demise around the 9 and 10th centuries. According to a growing consensus between many archaeologists and anthropologists, the major factors that contributed to the civilization's crash are environmental exhaustion, and prolonged warfare (Aoyama 2005, 301-302; Marx et al. 2017, 17). Scholars have termed this event as the 'Maya Collapse' (Marx et al., 2017, 1-2) despite that for many years, scholars could not assert the fall of this great civilization until climate factors were considered (Gill 2000, 284). Nevertheless, the Maya people continued to live in small towns and villages sprinkled all over Mesoamerica practicing religion, trade, in a complex socio-political system with diplomatic relations all around the region. They thrived, despite the precarious state of developments due to European conquest that forged indigenous societies to become Eurocentric.

By the 16th to the mid-20th century, the impact of European conquest extended to the far reaches of the world, particularly in parts of Asia, Africa, and the Americas. The extent of this impact served as the impetus for a new society that was forged out of slavery and forced labor of Africans and Maya people. The new languages, religion, culture, and territorial boundaries quickly spread across the land carrying with them the plight of influenza, measles, smallpox, yellow fever and malaria leading to death (Sessa et al. 1999, 83-84). Coercion and forced assimilation were the basis of strategies that were implemented in colonial societies through several economic, political, and social institutions. These strategies amplified the impact of colonialism resulting in environmental degradation, economic instability, ethnic rivalries, genocide, and ultimately the loss

of an entire civilization as argued by Bolland (2003), Gregory (2017), Shoman (2010) and Turner et al., (2020) that trickled down into contemporary times via institutions.

Both Belize and Guatemala experienced colonialism. However, the Spanish who colonized most of Central and South America since the 14th century, claimed Belize via a grant by the Catholic church but they never settled in Belizean territory because they failed to permanently subdue the Mayas (Perez, Chin-Ta, and Afero 2009, 12). Since Belize and Guatemala are only divided by a land border, it has been difficult for both countries to prevent people from crossing. During colonialism, for centuries runaway slaves and Maya people have crossed the border. Many Mestizos immigrated to Belize during the Caste War and the civil wars of Central America and lived alongside the Creoles creating a new Belizean identity (Shoman 2010, 36). Belize and Guatemala are culturally similar in many ways however, they have very different postcolonial development outcomes in terms of levels of democracy. In my dataset, the average levels of democracy for Belize and Guatemala are 12.4 and 7.4, respectively. The research strategy here is to identify whether there is a key difference that can help explain the differences in the outcomes of the two cases. According to my hypotheses, I argue that the key difference that can help explain the differences in levels of democratic development in Belize and Guatemala is the different types of colonial legacies.

As my theoretical hypothesis of colonial legacies suggests, a crucial factor that links colonial legacies and postcolonial development is the mobilization of social actors. I will employ the approach of comparative-historical analysis to examine how colonial legacies shape the environment for social mobilization, and how social mobilization affects various levels of democratic development in Belize and Guatemala. The comparative-historical analysis approach suggests that causal mechanisms and descriptive inferences are important validations for providing theoretical robustness, credibility and a balanced approach to methodology (Mahoney 2004, 97). Therefore, one purpose of this method is to empirically test the extent to which the necessary cause is common in many cases and is almost always present. For instance, considering a phenomenon A. If B is necessary for condition A to occur, the occurrence of A is conditional to B (Braumoeller and Goertz 2000, 846; Dion 1998, 127-128; Mahoney 2004, 15). In the case of Belize and Guatemala, phenomenon A is levels of democracy (outcome). I aim to use historical evidence to prove that colonial legacy will be B. Specifically, I expect to show that British colonial legacy is a necessary condition for explaining why Belize has higher levels of democracy than Guatemala.

To further examine how colonial legacies influenced on levels of democracy, I will rely on the “comparative sequential method” elaborated by Falletti and Mahoney (2015) to analyze the generative processes of causal associations that spurred sequential events within Belize and Guatemala. Falletti and Mahoney (2015, 214) argues that the temporally ordered events in the process of a sequence is synonymous to a coherent mode of activity. This method can be used to directly test the implications of the hypothesis, infer causation through a theoretically informed discussion, and identify the key variables that make up the processes in the sequence.

The causal patterns derived from these studies broadly suggest that several aspects of colonial legacy had an impact on development in the region. Thus, as a more specific tool of process analyses strategy, I will utilize a “pattern matching” procedure, which allows me to analyze events from within the cases in order to compare patterns from cross-case studies and if these observations are repeatedly consistent, we can assume that the cross-case analyses are very strong (Rueschemeyer and Mahoney 2003, 361). However, it is important to mention that some of the pattern matchings of the within-case analysis of Belize and Guatemala are observed within different political environments but in the context of the same period. For example, social mobilization and state intervention will be compared in Belize and Guatemala during the 1930s, however, during that time Belize was a British colony while Guatemala was already an independent nation since 1821. This will encourage measurement validity by maintaining systemized concepts that will capture the essence of the meaning of the concepts during this specific time. Different indicators can have different meanings across contexts implying the importance of using context-specific indicators that adheres to the norms of a specific historical era (Mahoney 2004, 96). It would be implausible to discuss social mobilization and state intervention of Belize and Guatemala at different periods as the concept is contextual and can skew measurements. Thus, contextual specificity is a key element of concern that arises when differences in context potentially threaten the validity of measurement (Adcock and Collier 2001, 532-533).

Nonetheless, the theoretical argument of this study suggests that different levels of democracy in Belize and Guatemala are consequences of British and Spanish colonial institutions and have multiple within-case implications. In the comparative-historical analyses, I will use historical evidence to show how different colonial legacies shape the capacity of civil society to bring about effective policy demands and by the degree to which the state will accept such policy demands. I will analyze the origins and sequential patterns of interactions between social

movements and the state in Belize and Guatemala to illustrate the effects of colonial identities and regime legacies on postcolonial national development.



Chapter 4: Large-N Tests

4.1 Empirical Results

Table 2 shows the results of the ordered logit regression for predicting the levels of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean from 1982 to 2018. Model 1 is the baseline model, which only includes control variables. Model 2 is the full model, which considers the control variables and the main independent variables. The results in Model 1 demonstrates that the coefficient for the level of economic development is positive and statistically significant. This evidence provides support for the modernization theory, suggesting that a country with a higher level of economic development tends to have a higher level of democracy. In addition, the coefficient for inflation rate is negative and statistically significant, suggesting that poor economic performance has a reduction effect on the level of democracy.




Table 2 Ordered Logit Regression Analyses of Levels of Democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean (1982-2018)

	Model 1	Model 2
British colonial legacy	-	2.455*** (0.307)
Logged number of years under colonization	-1.299*** (0.238)	-0.560* (0.253)
Logged GDP per capita_{t-1}	1.463*** (0.110)	1.147*** (0.109)
GDP growth_{t-1}	0.016 (0.017)	0.028 (0.017)
Logged inflation_{t-1}	-0.110* (0.046)	-0.035 (0.046)
Years since 1981	0.308 (0.418)	0.208 (0.417)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	0.049 (0.444)	-1.084* (0.467)
South America	-0.511** (0.162)	-0.331* (0.163)
Caribbean	0.464* (0.195)	-1.195 (0.313)
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes
Pseudo R-squared	0.089	0.113
Log pseudolikelihood	-2465.467	-2398.2663

Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.

* $p \leq 0.05$. ** $p \leq 0.01$. *** $p \leq 0.001$.

The results in Model 2 show that the coefficient for economic development is still positive and statistically significant. Interestingly, the coefficient for ethnic-linguistic cleavage changes from statistically insignificant in Model 1 to statistically significant in Model 2. The finding suggests that a more ethnically fractionalized country tends to have a lower level of democracy. In both Model 1 and Model 2, the coefficient for the logged number of years under colonization is negative and statistically significant. This finding suggests that holding other variables constant, a country that had been colonized for a longer period tends to have a lower level of democracy.

The most important finding in Model 2 is the coefficient for British colonial legacies. Specifically, I find that the dichotomous variable for British colonial legacies has a positive and statistically significant coefficient, even after controlling for variables that might affect the level of democracy. This result provides strong evidence for my theory, suggesting that a country that used to be a British colony tends to have a higher level of democracy.

To interpret the results in Table 2 in a substantive way, I conduct simulation analyses using Stata's *margins* and *marginsplot* commands for comparing two different scenarios. Holding the remaining variables constant at their mean, Figure 1 shows that the probability for a country that was not colonized by the British to have a medium level of democracy is 21.5%, while the probability for an ex-British colony to have a medium level of democracy is only 10.3%. This finding suggests that an ex-British colony is half as likely to have a medium level of democracy, compared to a country that was ruled by other European colonizers.

Figure 1 Predicted Probabilities for Medium Level of Democracy (FH Index = 10)





Figure 2 Predicted Probabilities for High Level of Democracy (FH Index = 13)



In contrast, Figure 2 shows that the probability for a country that was not colonized by the British to have a high level of democracy is 4.5%, while the probability for an ex-British colony to have a medium level of democracy is as high as 35.3%. In other words, the probability for an ex-British colony to be a country with a high level of democracy is 8 times as much as the probability for a non-ex-British colony to be a country with the same level of democracy. To sum up, the simulation analyses in Figure 1 and Figure 2 suggest that ex-British colonies are generally more likely to be countries with higher levels of democracy.

To further examine the robustness of my finding of the impact of British legacy on levels of democracy, I conduct four additional regression analyses using different operationalization for the dependent variable. The results are shown in Table 3. The dependent variable in Model 3 is the “voice and accountability” measure from World Bank’s Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI). The WGI voice and accountability variable is a continuous variable, with a larger value indicating that a country enables its citizens to freely select their government, and it tends to have freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media.⁴ The dependent variable in Model 4 is the “rule of law” measure from WGI, which is also a continuous variable. A larger value for the WGI rule of law variable indicates a higher level of quality of contract enforcement, property rights, the police, and the courts, and a lower likelihood of crime and violence.⁵ The value of the abovementioned two variables ranges from -2.5 to 2.5.

In Model 5 and Model 6, I test whether British legacies have impacts on the internal mechanisms of a democratic regime. The dependent variable in Model 5 is a continuous variable, capturing to what extent the government is less likely to repress civil society organizations (CSOs). A higher value indicates that the government is less repressive to CSOs. The dependent variable in Model 6 is also a continuous variable, capturing to what extent that the major CSOs are routinely consulted by the government. A higher value of this variable indicates that major CSOs are given more voices on important policy issue areas.

⁴ See <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/voice-and-accountability-estimate>

⁵ See <https://datacatalog.worldbank.org/rule-law-estimate>

4.2 Robustness Checks

As demonstrated in Table 3, the results for British colonial legacy support my theoretical hypothesis. The finding in Model 3 suggests that citizens in an ex-British colony tend to have more voices in the political process, and they are more likely to hold the government accountable. In Model 4, the finding suggests that an ex-British colony tends to have a higher quality of rule of law, compared to countries that were colonized by other European countries.



Table 3 Robustness Checks

	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5	Model 6
	DV = Voice and Accountability	DV = Rule of Law	DV = CSO Repression	DV = CSO Consultation
British colonial legacy	0.900*** (0.101)	0.558*** (0.058)	1.092*** (0.088)	0.154*** (0.047)
Logged number of years under colonization	-0.206** (0.067)	-0.039 (0.071)	1.104*** (0.108)	0.092 (0.063)
Logged GDP per capita_{t-1}	0.395*** (0.030)	0.554*** (0.036)	0.258*** (0.042)	0.170*** (0.026)
GDP growth_{t-1}	0.006 (0.006)	0.006 (0.007)	0.009 (0.008)	0.005 (0.004)
Logged inflation_{t-1}	-0.034 (0.023)	-0.130*** (0.025)	0.067** (.021)	0.072*** (0.011)
Years since 1981	-0.003 (0.005)	-0.014** (0.005)	0.037*** .007	0.012*** (0.004)
Ethno-linguistic fractionalization	-0.732*** (0.150)	-0.862*** (0.153)	-0.690*** (0.204)	-0.355*** (0.097)
South America	-0.160*** (0.046)	-0.113** (0.053)	0.189** (0.072)	-0.030 (0.044)
Caribbean	-0.670*** (0.101)	-0.272*** (0.053)	0.560*** (0.097)	-0.169*** (0.053)
Year fixed-effects	Yes	Yes	Yes	Yes
R-squared	0.542	0.596	0.430	0.256
Number of observations	657	657	922	922

Notes: Robust standard errors are given in parentheses.

*p≤ 0.05. **p≤ 0.01. ***p≤ 0.001.

The results in Model 5 show that the government in an ex-British colony is less likely to repress CSO' s activities. Finally, the finding in Model 6 suggests that the government in an ex-British colony tends to routinely take the voices of important CSOs into account in the policy-making process. Overall, the results in Table 3 show that the positive impacts of British colonial legacy on post-colonial democratic development are robust across different model specifications.



Chapter 5: Case Study (I): Belize

5.1 British Colonial Legacies

The former Anglo-Caribbean colonies have been virtually synonymous with a shared language, colonial history, a plantation production system, timber extractions, and a prolonged political homogeneity that links economic performance with quality of institutions (DaCosta 2007, 3). Hence, in contrast to other multi-region studies, the Caribbean's colonial experience and institutional development provide a compendious analysis of the region's long-term development due to its mutual experience of colonial subjugation by Britain. In addition, there are parallels when accounting for the convergence of per capita GDP at the end of the colonial period, the immense labor mobility, cultural exchange, and a shift towards a united political front that culminated in the West Indian Federation in the mid-1900s. Factors such as endowments, colonial experience and the process of democratization, therefore, are determinants of growth and institutional quality (Acemoglu, Johnson, and Robinson 2001, 1395; DaCosta 2007, 3; Sokoloff and Engerman 2000, 220) that are essential for an analysis of the region's postcolonial political development. Here, the narrative of British colonial identity provides a fundamental background requirement in the form of a critical juncture that postulates certain evolutive changes in the levels of democracy in postcolonial Caribbean countries.

The British conquest of the Caribbean was initially to advance its trade vis-à-vis its European rivals such as Spain, which had the upper hand as it had already conquered and was already exploiting the peoples and territories of LAC prior to Britain's arrival to the Americas. Throughout its vast overseas empire, it ruled either directly or indirectly as both systems were different but fundamental for its survival. Indirect rule encompassed an infiltration of local political institutions by collaborating with indigenous intermediaries that tended to produce administrative institutions that were relatively bureaucratic while direct rule, on the other hand, necessitated the establishment of centralized, territory-wide, and bureaucratic administrative institutions (Lange 2009, 4). Oftentimes the line between the two was indistinguishable as some colonies utilized both forms of domination. However, scholars have pointed out that indirect rule was the superior of the two as it made colonial activities cheaper, adaptive, participatory, more culturally sensitive hence more effective (Lange 2009, 5). For instance, one of the British policies towards the Maya in Belize was the creation of an alcalde system, which derived from the Postclassic Maya "town chief" and his assistants, which the Spanish had also previously adopted,

and became a consequence of indirect rule (Bolland 2003, 121; Thompson 1977, 26-28). Nonetheless, the system was merely to preserve the existing social fabric to not disrupt colonial activity which was essentially economic. Furthermore, domestic activities in the colonies were primarily facilitated by the introduction of slavery as an institution. Meanwhile, the triangular slave trade, as well as the expansion of the internal market in England and the U.S, the introduction of exotic consumption, and important raw materials (cotton, sugar, tobacco), generated large profits that contributed to the industrial development of Britain (Blackburn 2005, 127; Lange 2009, 23; Williams 1944, 210). The beneficent activities of colonialism then were dependent upon the exploitation of factor endowments that later bestowed upon Britain the status of world hegemon throughout the 19th century. The impetus for the folly and injustices of colonialism that precipitated a system of monopoly in the British industry was sustained throughout the colonial project through Britain's trade with distant countries in the form of slavery, the fisheries of the Atlantic system, the New England provision merchants, and a modern banking system (Blackburn 2005, 127; Stuchtey 2011, 4; Williams 1944, 98-100). The slave system first incorporated the indigenous peoples and then the Africans and was a consequence of large-scale economic production and a limited number of European workers due to population size (Williams 1944, 6). As a result, most of the profits earned from Britain's industrial growth could have gone into developing the colonies, however, the movement of troops and export commodities were the only facilities that benefited from infrastructural improvements (Blackburn 2005, 132)

The British colonial legacy in Belize was no different. After several failed attempts by the Spanish to subjugate the Maya of Belize in the mid-1500s, the territory fell into the hands of British buccaneers who, in the mid-17th century after the suppression of privateering, engaged in the exportation of logwood of which a valuable type of dye was extracted. The origins of the British settlement in Belize are still obscure because of the paucity of early records, but there is strong evidence to believe that it may have begun during the English Civil War and after the expulsion, of British settlements on Old Providence (off the coast of Nicaragua) and Roatan (off the coast of Honduras) by the Spanish and on Tortuga (off the coast of Haiti) by the French, during the early 1640s. However, any settlement during this time may have been difficult and may have been limited to the cayes and coastlines which buccaneers used as a base for naval attacks on Spanish ships (Bolland 2003, 19, 2018, 13; Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 36-38). Oftentimes, if British buccaneers weren't plundering Spanish logwood ships, they would enter Spanish domains to cut logwood in their attempt to expand profit and to monopolize the market in Europe

(Bolland 2003, 19). Hence, the first direct evidence, and a more appealing one, of a permanent British presence in Belize was the result of a report from a Spanish *entrada* led by Father Delgado, who, along with his crew, was held captive by Bartholomew Sharp, a famous British pirate (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 33). It now had all the elements to sustain a permanent settlement after the Spanish were unable to patrol the cayes and had abandoned their attempts to subdue the Maya on the mainland (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 35). From this point onward, the British engaged in logwood extraction, which lasted for over 250 years until 1932, and when this profitable trade experienced a sharp decline in the mid-18th century, they turned to mahogany extraction which accounted for a quarter of the total value of exports in 1765 or equating to about 400,000 board feet (Bolland 2003, 22; Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 71).

Similar to its LAC counterparts, Belize has arable land, climate, and demography, that were usually associated with pre-colonial wealth and colonial extractive institutions. These forms institutions tended to retain power in the hands of a small elite producing unequal societies which impeded long-term development (Engerman and Sokoloff 2002, 96) despite this argument relying solely on the domestic conditions rather than on the economic models of colonialism (Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006, 1413). Colonial Belize's economic model then, was essentially liberal as it was an extension of British rise in global capitalism. Its proximity to the Caribbean Sea and the rest of Central America contributed to its financial prosperity, though short-lived, during its time as the arbiter of British commerce in the 1800s. Since the territory of Belize was essentially British domain and was legitimized via the Treaty of Paris in 1763, it wasn't a part of the United Provinces of Central America (UPCA) but allowed for greater leeway of export of raw materials and import of manufactured goods from Europe of which it took great advantage establishing wealthy merchants in the colony (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 77-79). By 1840, about 60% of Guatemala's imports came via the British settlement in Belize, while it controlled around 90 and 100 percent of the value of Central American imports from the UK (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 78; Woodward 1976, 132). During this time, Britain saw the territory merely as a trade entrepôt and though in the possession and protection, not in the dominion and territory of his Majesty the King (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 68). Its economic prosperity was a ripple of Britain's commercial dominance in the Central American market which was the result of a decrease in the duty of all Central American products that entered Britain. Early colonial Belize then, exercised its economic advantage due to its geographical

location on the isthmus, its proximity to the Caribbean Sea and its prestige of being a colony of the most advanced industrial country in the world.

The plantation colonies where European settlement was usually low, experienced rigid racial hierarchies and coercive labor systems. Thus, the exploitation and isolation of the black laboring classes were paramount to British colonial settlement patterns (Lange 2009, 30). Similarly, the short-lived economic prosperity of early colonial Belize along with the benefits of the timber extraction became the vital resource in its early colonial settlement phase, and unlike the Spanish in Guatemala (see Mahoney 2010, 101) the British were able to subdue the small and less complex indigenous societies to establish effective control. Virtually all of the non-whites living in Belize at the turn of the 18th century were suppressed peoples living under the yoke of colonialism.

Similar to a lack of political rights, economic freedom was restricted despite a growth in population size. At this time, the colonial center was at the mouth of the Belize River (modern-day Belize city) after it shifted from St. George's caye. The social structure of the settlement in 1803 consisted of 225 white inhabitants, 775 "free colored" and 3,959 slaves according to one census which also excluded the Maya due to limited contact in the early years of the settlement (Bolland 2003, 41; Humphreys 1961, 15). It was until the mid-1700s when the British went deeper into the interior to extract Mahogany that the Maya frequently expressed their resentment towards the encroachment on their lands by attacking logwood camps despite clashing with British troops (Bolland and Shoman 1975, 29). Nonetheless, the "free colored" peoples had no political rights during this time but owned slaves, and never became economically wealthy. These "free colored" like the poor whites either became employees of rich cutters and tradesmen or were self-employed in a caste-like system.

This social stratum constituted natural prejudices that privileged all white groups, inhibiting the growth of a middle-class (Bolland 2003, 40-43). These oligarchs refused to give up their vast tracts of land after an unsuccessful attempt to contain their extreme monopoly by Superintendent George Arthur in 1817. He was able to ensure that unclaimed lands are Crown Lands and were to be given only by a representative of the Crown similar to other colonies but not to be granted to ex-slaves, and to serve the registration of the interests of land before its sale in 1838 (Bolland 2003, 80; Bolland and Shoman 1975, 34-42; Marsan 2004, 5). In their attempt to profit on their vast tracts of land, however, the oligarchs depended on coercion measures to ensure a constant supply of labor. Such as form of labor coercion was known as "advance" and "truck" system leaving many workers in perpetual debt servitude which became law in 1846 and retarded

the development of local markets and farming as a sustainable livelihood (Bolland 2003, 80; Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 86). This system persisted well into the 20th century and was utilized by employers in other industries of Belize. For instance, it became quite the norm in the chicle industry (chewing-gum) of Western Belize for *chicleros* to start the rainy season with an advance of up to \$150 from the contractor usually for these workers to secure groceries and other amenities for their families before leaving for months in the forest. This was usually all gone within days on what passed for liquor, entertainment, and women in local bars. Chicleros would still be in debt to their contractors even after months in the forest after buying groceries and other supplies from local shops, adding to this debt was the entertainment provided by many bars that the same contractors owned. The chicle season was conventionally started with workers tied to their contractors by debt (Thompson 1994, 154).

The colonial center in the 1850s remained at the mouth of the Belize River. This was the substantial settlement in the colony consisting of mainly Creoles (mixed African and European) comprising of about 5,000 of the total population, which was around 10,000, while whites comprised of 399 and the Maya and Garifuna the remainder (Bolland 2003, 82). After the mid-1800s, the population of Belize experienced a sharp growth due to the large influx of refugees during the 1847 *Guerra de Castas* that lasted for more than fifty years henceforth, while others came from Guatemala to escape anti-vagrancy laws (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 86). During this time, the population was said to be 25,635, half of whom concentrated mainly in the North. This new group of people was subsistence farmers obtaining land mainly by squatting. Hence, resulting from factors such as the lack of investing in proper infrastructure, especially the absence of roads until the early 1900s and the undeveloped agricultural system which stagnated the growth of a middle-class, the economic hub of the colony throughout the 19th century remained centered at Belize city. There were many Creole villages sprinkled along the coastline but the more permanent element in the growing population were the Maya and Mestizo groups. The Maya were constantly raiding British Mahogany camps and the ones who had migrated to the Yalbac hills escaping the *Guerra de Castas*, squatted on lands, and also engaged in conflict with the British. However, these immigrants introduced sugar production to Belize which was exported regularly in the early 1860s (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 86). Other large groups included the Garifuna who arrived in the early 19th century and concentrated mainly in the Southern District. On the other hand, the commercial elite of the settlement, though constituting a small number of the population, remained politically and economically influential by controlling most of the private

land of the settlement and dominating the elected membership of the Legislative Assembly which had replaced the Public Meeting in 1854.

5.1.1 Slave and Indigenous Rebellions

Oftentimes, the movement of troops was to suppress frequent slave and Maya insurrections which merely exacerbated the ire of the rebels. For instance, as a reaction to the frequent Maya raids of British mahogany camps led by Marcos Canul in the 19th century, in 1867, Lt. Col. Robert Williams Harley organized a well-armed troop reinforcement of over three hundred in Belize. Entering San Pedro without opposition on February 9, they burned the village to the ground. San Pedro had been a village with around 50 well-built houses and after the fire nothing remained but a chapel and around 400 people (Bolland 2003, 109). This was in addition to the destruction of multiple Maya villages. When territories were attained through the subjugation of the Maya, Britain relied heavily on African Slaves as a source of free labor to expand their monopoly on the plantation and timber market allowing many colonists to accumulate great wealth and power in Belize.

At the turn of the 19th century, however, slave rebellion and antislavery movements were an irrepressible torrent of motives that produced a trajectory towards the abolition of slavery. The abolition process was also a consequence of the declining importance of the economies of the trade in the Caribbean as the British parliament refused to protect its economic interest, a fall in profits, and a mercantilist rise in the region (Ryden 2012, 5-7; Williams 1944, 149-150). As the main source of rebellion, slaves were subject to inhumane acts as they were considered property and less human by their masters in their efforts to make slavery an institution that demoralized and dehumanized its victims (Bolland 2003, 68-71). Slave masters would inflict severe punishments which included whipping, burning, beating, and even death especially if slaves refused to work, misbehaved, or were caught trying to escape. This hellish nightmare sparked a series of violent unrests and the Caribbean colonies became a hotbed for slave and indigenous uprising throughout the 18th and 19th centuries. These slave revolts were primarily to defend their freedom without and feelings of attachment to a geographical area (Casimir 1992, 7).

Despite the failure of many slaves and indigenous uprisings, they exercised unity in revolts which serves as a prelude to nationalism and patriotism – both consequences of liberation. Many slaves, revolted and escaped into the jungle and became Maroons like those of Jamaica and Belize.

The Jamaica rebellion of 1760-1761 known as the “Tacky’s Revolt” was one of the most important that has not been considered in detail by contemporary scholars. The current interpretation comes from 18th century historian Edward Long’s documentation of the African slave’s experience in the New World (Brown 2016, 178). Another major slave rebellion in the Caribbean, perhaps the most prominent of all, was the Haitian Revolution of 1791 to 1804. Widely considered to be the most successful slave uprising in the Americas, the revolution heightened British sensitivities to the potential outcomes of insurrection and transpired Saint Domingue into the first independent country (Haiti) founded by African slaves. The slaves were cornered to have no other alternative but to revolt in violence as the majority worked in fields, as household servants, and often died from injuries, infections, diseases, starvation while others escaped and became Maroons. Influenced by the Haitian Revolution, Jamaicans who were descendants of the Maroons who established communities in the mountainous regions of Jamaica put up a major fight with British colonialists in the Second Maroon War of 1795 to 1796. Prior to this, Sebastian (2017) has shown that the first Maroon Wars in Jamaica occurred in 1728 and ended with peace treaties in 1739 and 1740. However, in Belize, there were similar revolts by slaves. The economic crisis forced the settlers to struggle to secure provisions that required a tougher treatment towards their two thousand or more slaves. Consequently, the largest slave revolt occurred, in 1773, beginning on the Belize river lasting for five months and was quelled only after the arrival of a naval force. Around 50 or more well-armed slaves took up five settlements and murdered six white settlers before retreating into the woods (Bolland 2003, 27). The rebellion ended until 1773 when Captain Judd arrived in Jamaica with the news that it had ended. Throughout the region, enslaved people engaged in revolts, labor stoppages, and various forms of resistance which impelled some colonial authorities who were eager to create peace and maintain economic stability in the colonies, to consider legislating widespread abolition. Scholars such as Baralt (2014), Jacobs (2008) and Muhr (2009) have documented several indigenous and slave rebellions in the Caribbean.

Finally, slave resistance led members of the British public to question the morality of the institution of slavery. During the 1830s the abolitionists were determined to end slavery in the Caribbean. Religious figures played a prominent role in the long fight against colonial slavery but popular uprisings of the world, such as the French Revolution and the Latin American Wars of Independence, promulgated many slaves and indigenous uprisings in the Caribbean. These slave revolts, according to Gardner (2016) and Welch (2019) along with the popular fight for freedom by the rest of the world, produced anti-slavery societies such as the British and Foreign Anti-

Slavery Society (BFASS) that spread pamphlets about the cruelties and inhumanity of bondage, petitions, and hundreds of thousands of signatures were sent to parliament, many of which came from women's organizations to free slaves. However, the slaves weren't fully emancipated after the legal emancipation of 1834 as a system of apprenticeship was implemented that required slaves to work for their former masters for a period of four to six years. The system of apprenticeship in 1834 was disguised as a way of assimilating former slaves into "civil society". After the emancipation of slaves in the West Indies in 1838, and despite persistent forms of coercion long after, the system proved that freedom was not achieved as it served as a transition system from slavery to freedom whereby slave masters were to guide former slaves in their labors and to prepare them for the responsibilities of free labor and economic independence. However, this system was abandoned without the legislative enactment by parliament while some of the colonies terminated the system via public meetings, discussions, and votes (Wesley 1938, 1-4) less than a decade after. In this regard, the system of apprenticeship was worse than slavery and proved pointless, but not to the white settler oligarchs.

This period should not be considered as a stark break between slavery and emancipation but rather a juncture in the evolutive changes of the prevailing forms of domination in contemporary Caribbean society. The persistent power structures constrained the laborer's freedom due to the settler oligarchs' control of labor and land ownership patterns which are two dialectically related features of prolonged colonial domination (Bolland 2003, 159-160). The British possession and control of the access of land was a means of suppressing and dominating the laborers by creating a dependence which triggered a process to maintain monopolistic claim over land as a few landowners owned the majority of private land. This rudimentary form lasted until Belize's independence when, about a decade earlier in 1971, 3% of landowners owned 84%, and 91% of owners held only 2%. Yet, a high concentration of land ownership in post-colonial Belize remains in the hands of non-nationals, a major aspect of land tenure in Belize (Marsan 2004, 5). Today, the largest private owner of land, the Yalbac Ranch and Cattle Corporation Limited (YRCC) located in Orange Walk District of Belize, constitutes 131,117 acres. The land was acquired by the Belize Estate and Company (BEC), a former British metropolitan-based business that was responsible for the extraction of timber in the area (The Forestland Group Operations n.d.). BEC, at its peak, owned about half of all the privately owned land in the colony allowing it to become the sole force of the Belizean political economy for over a century (Bolland 2003, 162).

Virtually all colonial activities in the Belize settlement were controlled by the oligarchs and since the control of land and labor became synonymous with the distribution of social power, different forms of coercion persisted in the guise of a “free society”. For this reason, there are continuities in the social mobilization of laborers particularly observed in the major political, economic and social events of the first half of the 20th century. The labor movement in this period became the epitome of the process of Belize’s independence and its tradition of democracy.

5.1.2 The Early Political Development of Belize

The events which occurred in the British empire during the latter part of the 18th century were foundational to the political-economic history of Belize. Great Britain’s victory in the Napoleonic Wars, elevated its status as the most powerful country in Europe, and new actors emerged that were the independent countries of Central America, Mexico - that was symbolic of the decadence of the Spanish Empire, and the United States (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 64). Since a large part of Central America’s imports arrived via the settlement, Belizean merchants were the primary suppliers of manufactured imports from Europe and commodity exports from its region (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 79; Woodward 1976, 132). The British form of trade had a tremendous impact on the economy of the settlement as it also planted the seeds for a rising number of Belizean merchants that were to become the settler’s new oligarchy.

The political development of Belize can be traced back to the main *raison d’etre* of British settlers as evident primarily in the 17th and 18th centuries, which was to exploit timber resources but never to permanently settle. It had endured a century of illegal logwood extraction by an illegal settlement which was administered by the geopolitical forces (Spain and Britain) either directly or via proxies such as the Governor of Yucatan and the President of Guatemala and the Governor of Jamaica or the Superintendent of the Mosquito Shore (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 64). The start of the Mahogany trade, therefore, was a consequence of the dying logwood economy and a clash of geopolitical struggles for a legitimate status of Belize, and soon became the most valuable domestic export replacing the century-old logwood economy. However, as previously mentioned, the development of land tenure and the usage of land in 18th century Belize were later influenced by the reinforcement of the 1763 Treaty of Paris, which reserved the right for British subjects to freely cut, load and carry away logwood with an emphasis of Spanish sovereignty over the affairs of the settlement (Bolland and Shoman 1975, 9-13). In addition, the said treaty gave

Belize legal status and would now be called in official documents as the “British Settlement in the Bay of Honduras”.

At the start of the 19th century, however, political-economic power was in the hands of the settler oligarchy who, as previously mentioned, created a system of dependency to sustain economic and political dominance over the settlement. The vast acquisition of land, the denial of its use to others, and the lucrative trade entrepôt, primarily via the mahogany economy and trade with Central America, bolstered the settler’s political and economic dominance (Bolland 1986, 19-20). These were the pitfalls and severe consequences of British liberalism behind strategies crafted to further maintain the subjugation of its enslaved and working-class people. These settler oligarchs constituted a small class of wealthy cutters who had privately owned vast tracts of land as few engaged in commercial agriculture characterized by gender-based division of labor (Pemberton 2012, 183). After the decline of the logwood economy, an increase in demand for hardwood and easily accessible trees became the impetus for the mahogany trade boom between 1835 and 1847. The trade boom was short-lived, however, as it fell from 14 million feet in 1846, it fell to 5.5 million feet in 1859 and then to a staggering 2.75 million feet in 1870 due to an increase in the cost of production and a depletion of timber resources as logwood cutters moved into the interior. A rise in the consolidation of capital and the intensification of metropolitan ownership soon followed the depression (Bolland 1986, 29-31). Prior to this, however, the rules and regulations of the settlement, which was the earliest legislation of Belize, were codified in the Burnaby’s Code in 1765 by 85 inhabitants including two women and without any executive body or permanent police to enforce it, despite the growing chaos (Bolland 2003, 25; Hoffmann 2014, 22; Humphreys 1961, 7; Marsan 2004, 5). The Commanding Officer of any of His Majesty’s Ships of War was responsible to enforce this rudimentary code, thus the absence of an executive body meant that difficulties in the affairs of the settlement frequently arose until Colonel Despard was appointed by the British Government in 1784 (Humphreys 1961, 17).

During the boom in the Mahogany trade then, this form of Public Meeting was dominated by a handful of the richest inhabitants who limited the elections of magistrates to only white groups possessing property, or a habitation, or a Negro slave, or a form of timber work (Bolland 2003, 37). To make matters worse, many discriminatory laws were passed in the early 19th century, such as the forbiddance of “free colored” people to hold logwood works, which made it illegal for “free colored” to even meet the benchmark of qualifications to be able to participate in elections (Bolland and Shoman 1975, 28). As the timber industry in Belize was moving towards Mahogany

extractions, these meetings were made up of merely free men to validate collective and individual practices pertaining to possession of the logwood works, the borders of surrounding land and to avoid future conflict (Hoffmann 2014, 22). The Public Meeting can also be considered as a direct but primitive form of democracy controlled by the ten to twenty of the richest settlers which deprived the lower-class settlers (especially newcomers) of the principal form of economic activity. Through these meetings and the Magistracy, the commercial elites controlled the political and administrative institutions of the settlement and supervised public revenues and spending through their control of taxation (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 87). The economy of the settlement after the 1850s was in a prolonged and permanent state of depression bankrupting many mahogany cutters while metropolitan ownership, such as the BEC, consolidated capital and intensified ownership. Consequently, to contain the problem and to promote British investment, the Legislative Assembly was created in 1854 with the assent of the Crown despite not replacing the name “settlement” with “colony” (Humphreys 1961, 60). This assembly was made up of 18 members elected on a limited franchise and while public revenue and spending rose sharply, patterns of land ownership and usage, the control of the colony’s economy by the metropolitan companies, along with the lack of internal markets, and poor infrastructures, communications and social services became obstacles to Belize’s early political-economic development (Ashdown 1987, 62; Bolland 2003, 162; Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 89).

The capitulation of the Legislative Assembly occurred in 1862 when Belize became a Crown Colony. Henceforth, there were many significant constitutional changes with the most notable occurring in 1871 when the imperial government instituted a form of direct rule through a Crown colony system that appointed members to the Legislative (Fernandez 1989, 16) a step back for Belize’s early democratic development. This change was also affected by the constant Maya attacks on mahogany camps that sparked a stalemate in the assembly between the landowners and the merchants of Belize Town as both failed to raise the necessary revenue for protection. The governor-in-council that now governed Belize consisted of five official and four unofficial members who were all appointed members (Bolland 2018, 28; Fernandez 1989, 16).

5.2 Elite's Response to Social Mobilization and Democratic Development

This section demonstrates the relationship between the colonial administration, the political elites, and the mobilization of social actors in their attempt to consolidate democracy in Belize. Similar to other colonies of the Caribbean, Belize's colonial government during the 1930s maintained an incessant suppression of any social coalitions, while supporting a colonial military that was not as interventionist as its Central American neighbors, and most of its leaders did not succumb to the influence of the growing US imperialism. Rather, the US-supported Britain's colonial system in its efforts to contain the specter of communism in the Caribbean (Shoman 2010, 3). Colonial domination, as we now know, was not perpetual. Beginning in the interwar and post-war periods, the majority of the working population of Belize experience several forms of labor coercion due to the decline in the mahogany trade, the Great Depression, the 1931 hurricane and the devaluation of the Belizean dollar that aggravated the chronic poverty of the masses (Bolland 2003, 172). The series of unfortunate events, nonetheless, was foundational for the establishment of Belize's first union that later promulgated the basis of its nationalist movements and its decolonization process.

Anti-British rhetoric pervaded and affected the leading Creoles enough to join forces with the white elites to topple political dominance in the Legislative Assembly. Nominated by the Crown's Representative (governor) and having equal powers as the officials, in 1890 the unofficial members demonstrated against the Council by staging a "walkout" pressuring the Colonial Office to approve a majority of unofficials on the Council in 1892 (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 92-93). However, parallel with this scheme was the 1894 riot. The riot was the laborers' reaction to the empowerment of the growing Creole middle-class and the white merchant-landowner elite in the hope of becoming allies to participate in the political process of the colony (Macpherson 2007, 48). Allying with the colonial state seemed like a viable solution for the Creole middle class' political inclusion and to conciliate the ire of popular black unrest. These phenomena precipitated claims to legislative rights by enunciating an origin myth that glorified the 1798 Battle of St. George's Caye as a victory for their white ancestor's involvement to secure the colony and their power over loyal slaves (Macpherson 2007, 17). However, the terms under the Treaty of Amiens in 1802 that promoted peace between Spain and Britain, had also restored to Spain all British possessions that had been conquered or occupied during the War of the Second Coalition. Regardless, the settlers proclaimed that through the right of conquest, the settlement was rightfully theirs. This was emphasized in 1882 by the Foreign Secretary, Lord Granville who asserted that

sovereignty was obtained via conquest (Humphreys 1961, 10). This myth created a cross-race consortium, downplayed the maternal origins and the racial hybridity of the middle class while denying the Maya native authenticity (Mcpherson 2007, 16). Such as narrative promoted allegiance to the empire and has obscured the history of Belize with a myth that has permeated and influenced the self-identity of many contemporary Belizeans. Today, the Battle of St. George's Caye is widely celebrated on the 10th of September to mark its anniversary as well as the celebration of the birthday of Queen Elizabeth II.

Nevertheless, the system of labor control, toppled by an economic depression that burdened the working people of Belize after 1838, persisted well into the 20th century. The subjugation of the working peoples of Belize even until the 1894 riots, was a consequence of the lack of an organizational connection and an immense political and economic power of the oligarchs that was epitomized in the appointment of the Legislative and Executive council (Macpherson 2007, 35). Resistance to labor coercion was expressed through convictions for absenteeism, disobedience, assaults on bookkeepers, and breaking contracts that were occasionally accompanied by demonstrations and riots as seen in the 1894 riots by mahogany workers against a severely reduced wage due to a currency devaluation. After the governor and employers refused to adhere to their demands, the workers continued to riot and looted stores in an attempt to propel their demands which ended in a concession to increase the wage by employers as a means to quell the riots (Bolland 2003, 167).

The 1894 riots can be regarded as the start of resistance of organized labor to capitalist exploitation that was precipitated by an uprising in the Constabulary as an extension of the Colony's change of currency. The currency changed from a silver standard base (Guatemalan Sol) to a gold standard base and US dollar which was imperative at the turn of the century due to a depreciation of the Central American silver that started in the 1870s. Even though the depreciation was a severe blow to the colonial economy as premiums on bills of exchange increased and the prices for import goods rose sharply to compensate for the devaluation, it debilitated it from massive currency devaluation and severe inflation (Ashdown 1976, 1; Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 95). The change in currency sparked the ultimate event which was a change in the tide of the powerful expatriates as a shift in trade toward the US was favorable to the growing Belizean merchants. US companies were interested in the extraction of chicle and banana which allowed Robert Sydney Turton, a Belizean merchant in the chicle business, to obtain a seat in the Legislative Council against the BEC representative in 1935 (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas

2012, 95; Grant 1976, 81-82). Henceforth, the U.S.-oriented commercial elites combined with the U.S. Catholic teachers in Belizean schools gave more political power to the Belizean merchants. Nonetheless, like the Creole middle-class, the working-class peoples of Belize were aggrieved with the working conditions and the injustices of the colonial system.

Colonial turmoil was as much political as it was economic. The Legislative Council was stripped of its fiscal powers until 1931 and since then the governor, with his reserved powers, enacted policies that were unfavorable to the interests of the elites (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 93). The preceding event was the agitation of the council for an elective principle in the 1920s which was conditional to a return to the official majority and the granting of reserve powers to the governor giving him supreme power in decision making. After a firm rejection by the council, it was ultimately forced to accept the provisos of the Colonial Office in return for a reconstruction loan from the British government after the 1931 hurricane (Bolland 2018, 104). It was from this Hurricane Loan that the Legislative used for a “reconstruction loan” granted to BEC to construct a sawmill along with a provision of virgin mahogany forest (Grant 1976, 80-81; Macpherson 2007, 125). Thus, the loan was a move meant to salvage the downward spiral of the BEC, initiated by a financial problem caused by the Depression which triggered a global collapse in the demand for Mahogany, the devastating hurricane, and against the sale of its interest to the American companies and its dependence of the mahogany industry on the US buyers (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 109; Grant 1976, 80-81). The financial crisis and the Governor’s reserve powers were grave concerns which the unofficials found harsh and unjustifiable.

A new constitution came into force in 1936 which allowed for an “elective representation” comprising of five elected and two nominated unofficial members provided that the Governor maintained his reserved powers in special cases (Fernandez 1989, 16; Grant 1976, 80; Shoman 2010, 35). The constitution denied communal representation but allowed for certain born Belizeans to participate in elections if they had met the stipulated requirements, which was tantamount to an unencumbered Legislative Council or a hedged elective representation. Thus, there was a geographical imbalance of representation and residence due to local government arrangements and a widespread belief of disregard of rural areas that mirrored the views of the urban Creole elite. The economy of many rural areas was undeveloped, despite having diminutive groups of elites, to the point of not being able to “command the interest of those in Belize City or to catapult the elite in the “outdistrict” towns into the national political arena” (Grant 1976, 103). Furthermore,

qualifications for the electorate such as financial, ownership of real property worth \$500, being fluent in the English language, and being literate, which was lowest amongst the indigenous villagers, further disrupted electoral representation and denied the cultural orientation of the peoples of Belize. In 1936, there were only 772 voters in a population of 21,661 of which conferred a perpetual political advantage of the upper Creole stratum making electoral politics an elitist affair (Grant 1976, 105-106).

However, in 1935, the Governor granted to BEC an extension of three years for the repayment of a loan that was said to have had the consent of both the imperial and the local governments although the latter was never informed. Their denial of political responsibility primarily through a prolonged Treasury control by the Executive Council, the Governors reserved powers, toppled with frustration, were the key factors that fostered a form of “politics of protest” from within the unofficials. For instance, along with public revenue gained from import duties in the 1920s, the Governor forcefully passed a new income tax amendment bill in 1946 as he invoked his reserved powers, and pressing against this new law, the unofficials participated in a “walkout” protest during the meeting (Bulmer-Thomas and Bulmer-Thomas 2012, 111; Grant 1976, 84). This was symbolic of a major setback for the early democratic development of Belize, and one that was undoubtedly exacerbated by the uncertainty of British financial interest in the colony and their consecrated power. It must be noted that the unofficials were self-serving as they were comprised of the commercial elites of the colony and in no way were they catering for the poor and working-class but for a more capitalist approach to governance which is synonymous with loyalty to the Crown.

However, despite the Executive Council’s attempts to improve its working relationship with the Legislative Council, such as adhering to a reformed constitution that would re-examine the Governor’s reserved powers and Treasury control, proposals were made for universal adult suffrage and a quasi-ministerial form of government in the late 1940s. Despite the struggle for democratic representation, in 1945 the number of electorates was 822 in a population of around 60 to 64,000 constituting 1.3% of the total population (Grant 1976, 107; Shoman 1973, 6). This same year, the constitution was modified to increase the unofficial majority to ten, six were elected and four were nominated, and the official members decreased to three, however, all of the unofficial members were still businessmen (Fernandez 1989 16). Further constitutional reforms occurred in 1947 and 1954 when the Legislative council was replaced with the Legislative Assembly, which was first established a century before.

Table 4 The Population and the Electorate, 1936-1948

Election	Population	No. of registered voters	Registered voters as percentage of population
1936	56,071	1,035	1.8
1939	58,759	1,155	2.0
1942	61,723	1,383	2.1
1945	64,327	822	1.3
1948	63,139	1,772	2.8

Source: (Grant 1976, 107).

Nonetheless, the crisis surrounding the political economic domains at the first half of the 20th century influenced the lower social stratum. These interactions affected the daily lives of the poor and working-class of Belize and at times influenced by nature. The disaster devastated the lives and properties of many Belizeans, and as many as over a thousand died in a population of 16,000. Workers endured inferior wages and poverty was rampant mainly among women, children and the elder who suffered security of income, poor diet, malnutrition-related miscarriage and overcrowded housing (Bolland 2003, 162; Macpherson 2007, 125). To make matters worse, imports and exports fell to about half of what they were in 1931, unemployment ensued as wages decreased and government revenues plummeted. Thus, most of the reconstruction loans went towards the middle class while the poor and working-class were mostly neglected (Ashdown 1987, 62). As a result of these conditions, a growing class consciousness pervaded every aspect of the working class leading to collective discussions that incited public demonstrations for better work conditions and welfare. Regardless, the governor refused to address the looming starvation problem, the clergy censored public health literature, as venereal diseases spread along with malnutrition and the unofficials refused to pass minimum wage laws in 1931 and 1932, rejected the legalization of trade unions, and supported lower taxes on exports that benefited the merchant-employer class (Macpherson 2007, 125). Even pregnant women had to work for half a man's wage despite that some were single mothers, some were household heads, and were vulnerable to unemployment. Petitions signed by hundreds of people from all corners of the colony poured into the Colonial Office, some begging and demanding for change, usually concerning wage and

education cuts. The early 1930s was the dawn of a collective consciousness of the working-class people of Belize who grew tired of colonialism and were desperate for political change.

These stagnating conditions sparked a series of uprisings that were formative in the nationalist movements and democratization of Belize. Thus, the consolidation of the elites' monopoly, the dying of the political economy and the social changes occurring at this time had major repercussions in the democratic process of Belize. As previously mentioned, at the beginning of the 20th century, increasing labor demands were frequently met with popular unrest channeled primarily by labor activists, and violently exacerbated by the police and the British Marines. War veterans of the British Honduras Contingent, being exposed to recent activities in the Great War in Europe, rioted and destroyed the largest merchant stores, cutting the town's electric generator and inciting civil unrest as thousands joined in the looting and rioting in 1919 (Bolland 2003, 167; Macpherson 2007, 29).

The many women that participated in the Ex-Servicemen's Riot shared a radical proto-nationalism as their men counterparts, and which was at times, more intense as it came from a constant exclusion and oppression that garnered frustration. For instance, Samuel Haynes, who was a young officer in the returned contingent, organized the riot but became the quintessence of the middle-class Creole's role to end colonial rule via negotiations with the Colonial Government and to become the "colonial state's reformist junior partner" (Macpherson 2007, 34). It should be noted that he was not a radical for the poor and laboring masses as Annie Flowers was, but an embodiment of the Creole middle classes' unfledged patriotism. He was intent to negotiate "good governance" through a colonial framework. Additionally, he is also the author of Belize's national anthem which so glorifies British colonial heritage that pervades and affects the thinking of every Belizeans as they realize their national identity. Despite his role in the riots, there were many reforms that the prewar era experienced including the introduction of compulsory elementary education, price controls and wage increases and an attempt to diversify the economy particularly for the benefit of rural communities to produce their food (Macpherson 2007, 37).

What started as a march through the Belize Town by the "Unemployed Brigade" (UB) in February of 1934 soon culminated into an extensive movement as a corollary to the deep wounds of the depression and the aftermath of the hurricane that destroyed the town causing widespread poverty, unemployment and deplorable housing (Bolland 2003, 176). The working class became increasingly aware of their relative strength towards the colonial administration as they acquiesced by force to colonial policy demands after increasing determination to mobilize. As a result, UB

was formed out of the demonstrations of the unemployed who were leaders of the Progressive Party. The percentage of unemployed was at 40% in 1934 out of a labor force of 4,000 to 5000, all of whom registered at the Belize Town Board for the Hurricane Loan (Ashdown 1987, 62) which served as an outdoor relief for the poor and unemployed. To make matters worse, Governor Kittermaster's Hurricane Loan Board proved woefully inadequate since the daily ration included a pound of spoiled rice, three ounces of local sugar and to keep people from starving, they had to break rocks for an absurd five cents daily in the Public Works Department yard. Yet, about 1,400 registered for the relief, including 300 women, while the governor, proving himself incompetent, thought it to be a "large portion" (Bolland 2003, 176; Macpherson 2007, 137). For the many that were homeless, the government charged 75 cents weekly rent for single rooms in barracks which was less than a day's pay for some, demonstrating incompetency and callous indifference to the suffering. In an act of dissatisfaction with the leadership of the Unemployed Brigade after they resigned in an open letter to the Governor, the workers grew restless and Antonio Soberanis (1897-1975) rose to prominence as he became their new leader (Ashdown 1987, 62-63; Bolland 2003, 176).

The Laborer's and Unemployed Association (LUA) of 1934-36 and the British Honduras Workers and Tradesmen Union of 1939-43 were the first organizations established and utilized by the working class of Belize to demand an increase in the standard of living and working conditions. Although unions were banned via the Masters and Servers Ordinance of 1883, the LUA was far more radical and did not serve the benefits of the Creole-Middle class (Ashdown 1987, 63). Regarded at first by the Governor as insignificant, Soberanis' new organization, the LUA, was far more political than any other in the colony as they utilized techniques such as petitions, demonstration pickets, strikes, and boycotts to bolster the working class' demands despite their medical and food care programs. The LUA held tri-weekly meetings on the Battlefield Park where, through his boisterous speeches, demanded a minimum wage of \$1.50 per day and work for the unemployed that culminated in the presentation of a petition to the Governor during a large demonstration (Ashdown 1987, 63; Bolland 2003, 177). The governor rejected on the grounds that such a wage would put the merchants out of business making matters worse. The LUA was described by the *Clarion*⁶ as more subversive and detrimental to public order as it attracted many working-class people that shared similar radical views. Many labor activists were imprisoned after

⁶ The *Clarion* was the newspaper for the Colonial Government and would usually praise their actions.

the Colonial Government accused them of threatening Superintendents, inciting violence, and not paying their debts as new laws were passed that prohibited protests, redefined sedition which further empowered the Governor (Bolland 2018, 106). The LUA collected funds and donations from merchant stores and when they refused to pay, he insinuated a boycott. To its avail, the demands of the LUA expanded into the removal of superintendents that abused their powers and that the manager of BEC should not be allowed to live in the Government House (Ashdown 1987, 64).

Though the movement pressured the colonial administration into making concessions and gained support from the majority of the people, it was seen as a direct attack on the entire colonial system and gave Soberanis the title, the “Moses of British Honduras” (Bolland 2003, 176-177). It plotted many demonstrations and boycotts against the elites despite constant repression from the colonial government. What started as picketing soon turned into a major riot which occurred in October of 1934. BEC’s sawmill was closed down after the workers were intimidated, as well as Harley’s lumber yard along with other large merchant houses amidst looting, while another crowd demanded from the director of the Public Works Department, and Mr. Esquivel (a coconut exporter) a wage increase. The riots grew to about 1,500 frustrated workers and a fight ensued with the police in front of the Town Board offices ending with the arrival of the acting-Governor and a person getting shot (Ashdown 1987, 65; Bolland 2003, 179). After bailing out some rioters, Soberanis was imprisoned but Governor Brunton admitted that the riots were very serious and that if unemployment persists, then civil unrest is likely to reoccur. He went on to blame the inadequacy of the Treasury to provide the necessary funds for public funds and relief measures after he promised \$3,000 to the Belize Town Board towards outdoor relief. This did not come without repercussions, as 26 of the 32 people who participated in the riot were prosecuted receiving a year of hard work. Succeeding these disturbances was the installation of a new Governor, Alan Burns, who proved more competent in understanding pressing conditions such as the many children who were undernourished and were susceptible to diseases, and the low wages of the workers despite modifying legislation to repress insurgencies.

Colonial development grants for road works, however, deteriorated the fighting spirit of the working class by providing employment. Soberanis was acquitted by the court in 1936 on a charge of offending ‘His Majesty the King’, but the Corozal conviction, along with the split in his organization, the censoring effects of the new laws, the Governor’s efforts to expand relief work and an improvement in the economy in 1935 and 1936 combined to spell the decline of his

influence and of the LUA (Ashdown 1987, 66; Bolland 2003, 181). Soberanis continued to expand the vision of the LUA through the colony and focusing particularly on Stann Creek and Corozal where several strikes were again insinuated. After it lost influence due to the split, the British Honduras Unemployed Association was formed in 1936 by former LUA leaders (Ashdown 1987, 66-67; Bolland 2003, 179). Regardless, the LUA knew that the repression of the colony's workforce was a consequence of a bureaucratic administration that enriched incompetent officials, the workforce had no representation in the local government and for colonial authority to end, the spirit of the movement needed to be felt throughout the colony. It was the most important movement at the turn of the century due to its defined political purpose and its ability to link deploring social, economic and political conditions, that affected the interest and issues of the poor and working-class, with colonialism.

In retrospect, the LUA's constant agitation reaped many concessions in the economic and political domains. Labour relations changed in the 1940s when the Colonial Government legalized trade unions⁷ and the removal of labour contracts from the jurisdiction of the criminal code, which was a reflection of the Master and Servants Acts⁸ of 1846 (Bolland 2003, 168). Employers expressed their resentment when an Employers and Workers Bill was passed in 1943, after it was shunned by the unofficial members two years earlier, which reformed the penal sanctions used for labor control. Governor Burdon was no better than his predecessors who, like him, showed a callous indifference towards labourer's conditions, legalization of trade unions, a minimum wage and an illness insurance (Bolland 2003, 168-169). A massive change came only after constant agitation from the LUA. Thus, national working-class consciousness came to define many of the social and political movements in the succeeding event, most notable were the nationalist movements. During this time, Soberanis became the president of the British Honduras Workers and Tradesmen Union (BHWTU) alongside were the British Honduras Federation of Workers Protection Association (BHFwPA) (Bolland 2018, 111).

The preceding agitations were formative for unionism and the long process of democratic development in Belize. The BHWTU, after supporting a strike of 170 Garifuna road workers in the South, changed its name to the General Workers Union (GWU) and had a membership of 350 when it registered in 1943, attracting around 3,000 more in the next five years. It was an urban-based organization with its tentacles in the far-reaching corners of every district in Belize infusing

⁷ Trade unions were legalized in March of 1941 as a condition to receiving development and welfare funds.

⁸ It became a criminal offense for laborers to breach a contract, punishable with imprisonment and hard labor.

the rural workers with a social conscience of the bitter fruits of colonialism. This was accomplished in part when the GWU popularized with the help of the *Belize Billboard*⁹ as it promoted the cause of the workers from a colonial context (Grant 1976, 111). In 1948, the radical Clifford Betson was the president of the GWU and an advocate for socialism which resulted in a disassociation of the young activists such as Leigh Richardson, Philip Goldson and George Price who were anti-socialists, pro-American capitalists and anti-colonialists. George Price topped the polls for the 1947 Belize City Council elections. His career as a politician galvanized after the devaluation of the British Honduras dollar in 1949 when only a year after, the People's Committee (PC) was formed. The devaluation further encouraged a larger part of the populace, especially in the rural areas, to focus on the perils of colonialism, especially how it affected unemployment and widespread poverty. Thus, organized in the guise of the PC, labor and political leaders had their eyes set towards independence (Bolland 2018, 114-115).

George Price's leading role in the history of Belize was to rid the country of the shackles of colonialism and towards freedom as an independent country. He was born in Belize City on January 15th, 1919, into a family consisting of eleven children. He was baptized at the Holy Redeemer Cathedral and later attended the Holy Redeemer School. Upon graduating, he attended the St. John's College Highschool in Belize City where received a Jesuit-oriented secondary education. He was affiliated with a strong Christian upbringing which inspired him to pursue a priesthood calling. Thus, he studied at St. Augustine Minor Seminary in the U.S. He later attended the Major Seminary in Guatemala that was led by Jesuits from Spain where he was taught an introduction to philosophy (Craig and Musa 2004, 12). These years were formative in instilling in him the idea of an independent Belize as a part of Central America. Due to World War II, Price could not further his studies in theology at a university in Rome and decided to support his family instead by getting a job with Robert S. Turton. As previously mentioned, Turton was a member of the Legislative Council and was pro-U.S. Price received mentorship from Turton and was a part of the Christian Social Action group that became the catalyst of the nationalist movement. This group, that spurred out of a Jesuit rhetoric, instilled in the Belizean young men a Catholic approach to social justice and politics and was part of the St. John's Alumni Association. The group diminished the ethnic division that was prevalent in colony's political process when it sponsored candidates for the Belize City council in the early 1940s. Part of this support allowed Price to be

⁹ The *Belize Billboard* was a daily newspaper founded by Narciso Valdes, a Cuban, in 1946 that captured the attention of the working class and the leaders of the nationalist movements.

elected in the Belize Town Board in 1947. These years were formative in Price's early political career especially since, during this time, these events either unnoticed or were of no significance to the colonial government (Grant 1976, 114-116). After winning several terms in the Belize Town Board, Price and his colleagues, wary of their reputation, formed the PC. In 1982 he became a member of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom.

The agitations of the 1930s movements were vital for a reformation of the constitution and foundational for the nationalist movements, particularly the Peoples United Party (PUP). The People's Committee campaigned against the poverty and harsh labor conditions after another devaluation of the Belize dollar in 1949 when Governor Garvey used his reserve powers to override the Legislative Council. This move triggered a rally at the Battlefield Park organized by the Open Forum¹⁰ and nationalist sentiments and mounting pressure against actions by the colonial government to federate the colony into the wider British West Indies (Macpherson 2007, 195; Shoman 2010, 37). The movement quickly went from a protest against the devaluation to one against the entire colonial system. The preceding crisis merely precipitated a natural response from the masses to further cultivate their nascent reform movement. After the dissolution of the PC in 1950, the PUP was formed adopting a more radical role against the colonial system, the colony's elite and towards economic and political independence. The devaluation caused the formation of the People's Committee which was at first an ad hoc organization before becoming Belize's first political party, the PUP (Smith 2012, 1). The *Billboard* became the official press for the movement, and with the support of the GWU, which was the most significant mouthpiece for the working class, the PUP became successful in promulgating its anti-colonial rhetoric within an established popular base.

Thus, these movements were holding joint meetings discussing pressing issues as the leaders of the People's Committee became the leaders of the GWU, including George Price as a member of the Executive Council. However, these movements became virtually synonymous and the main reason behind the decline of the powerful GWU as it was dependent on these politicians. Though the People's Committee did not have branches in other districts, it was until the formation of the PUP that the GWU was utilized for organizational tasks when district executive committees were formed (Grant 1976, 146). In October of 1950, the leaders of the PUP were John Smith, party leader; Leigh Richardson, chairman; George Price, secretary; and Philip Goldson, assistant

¹⁰ The Open Forum was created in 1948 by labor veterans Antonio Soberanis and Luke Kemp as a platform for criticizing the colonial administration.

secretary and in 1951, five of its six candidates won in the Belize City Council elections placing them in the majority (Bolland 2018, 116; Grant 1976, 146-147). Price climbed the ranks of the GWU in 1951 becoming the vice-president, and later in 1952, its president. This same year, the GWU organized a national strike against the economic conditions that had exacerbated since the devaluation, and to further increase minimum wage since workers were struggling in the daunting milieu of inflation. Large enterprises such as the BEC, United Fruit Company (UFC) and several others were targeted but the protest ended when the government decided to negotiate with the union for improved wages and working conditions (Fernandez 1989, 55).

Mass mobilizations further prompted the spirit of the PUP towards adopting a rhetoric of political and economic freedom for Belize through independence. Despite the usual agitations, the British maintained its firm grip on the colony and took an impudent stand in defending its erroneous claims as the rightful owners of the colony. Upon realizing this, the PUP demanded constitutional reforms such as universal adult suffrage, and a democratic constitution for Belize which gained public support despite enduring constant colonial defiance (Shoman 2010, 37; Smith 2012, 1). Essentially, the objective was “to have a representative and responsible government”. From its onset, the PUP’s objective was unparalleled with a belief shared by the wider Caribbean’s political and economic leaders who accepted a “preparation theory” of British Policy towards decolonization. A strong message was sent to the Queen urging her to free Belize from colonialism or it may result in urging its neighbors in the Western Hemisphere for assistance attaining independence (Shoman 2010, 37). Taking more seriously the emerging support of the nationalist movement, the colonial government responded churlishly by dissolving the Belize City Council on the allegations that it was disloyal to the royal family by refusing to hang a picture of the King and by omitting the customary address of loyalty to the King from the Battle of St. George’s Caye celebration (Bolland 2018, 116; Grant 1976, 147).

Regardless, Belize has maintained mortifying support to the royal family evident in the annual Sovereign’s Day/Commonwealth Day celebration on May 24th, which also veils the commemoration of the birthday of the former Queen Victoria. To make matters worse, it has recently nominated a Maya woman who has become the new Governor-General of Belize after the Queen approved. Belizeans must be reminded that “the most effective methods of colonial administration in the French and British empires involved the native participation in government by members of the subordinated population by employing indigenous administrators or declaring colonial subjects “full citizens” (Kohn and McBride 2011, 56-57). Thus, the current PUP

administration has lost its radical and anti-British rhetoric in its seemingly haphazard plan to modernize the concept of colonization. Despite this, historic recurrence may usher in a new generation of radical politics tantamount to the spirit of the nationalist movements in the 1950s and the UBAD and RAM movements in the 1960s-70s.

The PUP achieved Universal Adult Suffrage in 1954 just in time for the general elections to be held and remained in power for the next two decades after Britain granted self-government in 1962, with claims that it had become “mildly reformist rather than revolutionary”. This was because Price had accepted British policy of decolonization as they had also accepted him as the national leader. It had lost some support in the 1974 elections to the United Democratic Party (UDP) which had been created by the merger of the National Independence Party (NIP), the People’s Development Movement (PDM) and the Liberal Party (Bolland 2003, 213). Regardless, the party echoed a revival of the LUA’s gender-inclusive political culture and the Women’s League, which was as important as the GWU for empowering the PUP’s nationalist rhetoric. The leaders of the PUP were elected in the first full-suffrage elections and relied upon mass mobilization of workers including women’s militant activism and political role henceforth (Macpherson 2007, 199). George Price became the country’s premier under a new constitution in 1965. The events that precipitated independence in 1981 were mainly a consequence of the necessity to address cultural and socioeconomic tensions in the colony championed by returning students Evan Hyde, Assad Shoman and Said Musa in United Black Association for Development (UBAD) and the Political Action Committee (PAC). The coalition merged in 1969 to create the Revolitical Action Movement (RAM) that was geared towards radicalizing the democratic process and critiquing party politics (Nowottny 2007, 21-22) through the lens of neocolonialism.

Coinciding with these movements in 1973, Belize changed its name from British Honduras to Belize. Some of the leaders of these movements became active members of the PUP in the mid-70s serving in ministerial offices thereafter. Said Musa went on to become Belize’s third Prime Minister in 1998. He is a son of San Ignacio, Cayo who was born in 1944 after his father migrated from El Bireh. Musa first attended St. Michaels College in Belize city and then St. John’s College Sixth Form (Caribbean Elections 2020, 1). Later, in 1966, he studied at the University of Manchester in England where he earned a degree in law. He was a member of the crown council before setting up a private firm with two other lawyers including Assad Shoman. Musa entered politics full time in 1974 when he became a senator in Belize’s parliament and served as Attorney General and Minister of Economic Development in 1979. He was also a part of the committee that

wrote the Belizean Constitution and later foreign minister before becoming Belize's Prime Minister under the PUP (Mwakikagile 2014, 95-97). The PUP's agenda at this time, however, centered on the aspect of economic growth via cheap labor and higher education drawing many women in the labor force defying domestic patriarchy, the party's paternalism and partisan politics (Macpherson 2007, 243). There was also a push towards a more grassroots approach from the young PUP radicals while UBAD legitimized discussions of sexuality and domestic oppression. Thus, the leading radicals played an active role in shaping the environment surrounding Belize's independence in 1981.

For Belize, independence meant the dawn of a new era where justice and liberty can prevail under a new nation guided by democracy and not colonialism. However, the 1981 constitution was created from the one in 1964 and created months before independence (Bolland 2018, 124). The procedures for constitutional reform of 1960, however, was by far the most progressive in the history of the colony as it initiated a ministerial system, provided for a majority in the legislative council via elected principle, serving as the impetus for internal self-government. It was short-lived and comprised of structures such as the Governor, Cabinet and a bicameral National Assembly. The 1964 Constitution gave the Governor immense power over the external defense and internal security, public service and to 'pardon'. The governor, with the advice of the premier, appointed the prime minister and the ministers who formed a cabinet – the sole policy-making organ of the government. After independence, and with a new constitution that delineates the rights and freedoms of the individual and the collective, it had established the structural and formal norms of democracy and had all the salient characteristics of a political democratic model such as functioning and autonomous legislatures, courts, and various autonomous interest groups, political parties and media communication (Fernandez 1989, 45-46).

The political structure stems from a constitutional monarchy with the Queen as the Head of State, represented by a local Governor. It is comprised of an autonomous judiciary comprising of a supreme court and a magistrate court. This framework limits and guides the political power via constitutionalism and is reflective of the early colonial days with the rules and regulations of both the Public Meeting, legislative assembly, though primitive versions of democracy. The new country had become a sovereign democratic state with a Westminster system of parliamentary democracy with a new constitution that outlines democratic structures and procedures. The National Assembly consisted of a House of Representatives elected from each constituency and a Senate comprising of appointed members (Bolland 2018, 125; Fernandez 1989, 46). The new

constitution also borrowed from Great Britain and the US governmental structures and principles comprising of the Executive, the Legislative and the Judiciary (3 branches of government). The judiciary is independent of the legislative and the executive branches of government and based upon an English law legal system. Though the current role of the Governor of Belize is merely symbolic, it held great power after independence with the responsibility of appointing the Prime Minister, the ministers of the cabinet, members of the Elections and Boundaries Commission, permanent secretaries, and heads of departments as well as ambassadors. Currently, however, for a law to become operational, it has to be signed by the Governor-General. Real power, however, lies in the three branches of government and other local government institutions (Bolland 2018, 125). Belize has 31 electoral constituencies, comprising 31 seats in a first-past-the-post voting system, 13 senators appointed by the Governor-General which makes up the National Assembly (Government of Belize 2021, 1).

At the district level, the local administration consists of municipal and village institutions governed by a set of laws that assigned powers and regulations and is a major component as to why the democratic process has worked so well since it is an extension of national politics. Electoral representation via constitutionalism maintains an equipoise between the rule of elites and the social and political democratization of society via a “standard account” of representative democracy. Thus, inhabitants and territories make up a constituency which are the fundamentals of political representation of a modern state (Urbinati and Warren 2008, 389). However, constitutionalism alone cannot bring about the democratic development of Belize or any other country, for part of it lies within the political actors’ policy preferences and value preferences that shape the domestic political sphere.

Since 1981, there have been great strides toward democratic development and stability via state-society interactions. Belize had become independent with the uncertainty of the Guatemalan claim dangling around until 1991 when diplomatic relations had been established. Perhaps a major part of the UDPs success in winning several general elections in the early years after independence owes itself to making the Guatemalan issue a central role, oftentimes against the PUP, in a resounding ‘hispanophobia’ or the fear of ‘latinization’ that is particularly evident in the 1993 general elections (Bolland 2003, 214-215) and has found its way in other facets of society. The motives behind this occurred about a decade before when the procedures of settling the Guatemalan claim precipitated the Heads of Agreement. Guatemalan officials refused a 20-year lease on some cayes, later one caye, off the coast of Belize on the premise that the proposal was

“absolutely frivolous, tinged with insolence and arrogance.” (Shoman 2010, 172). The Heads of Agreement contained 17 proposals, with the lease of the cayes to Guatemala which was written in vague terms, “rights of presence, use and enjoyment” of the cayes, that sparked social upheaval when the government published it to the public. Despite that the agreed settlement would be submitted to a referendum, members of the civil society and their opposition expressed their disapproval by demonstrating and striking. The negotiations were squashed. Nonetheless, the many elections that Belize has had since independence are illustrative of a commitment to orderly democracy procedures in a Westminster model. The PUP was able to dominate the political arena before independence mainly because it was organized, widely based, thanks to the GWU and the Women’s activists, and it had a strong anti-colonial agenda that sympathized with the poor and working classes of the colony.

In the domains of labor and civil society, there have been great strides in the development of unionization since the creation of the first union in Belize that was foundational for its future democracy. The process of democratization has an insuperable relationship with civil society as the latter produces a civilizing process making democracy a means of attaining civility (Nowotny 2007, 29). The underlying institutional norms and values that permeate Belize’s political society often necessitate reform for pivotal changes as it evolves. These changes often occur via constant pressure by civil society organizations that demand political participation, democratic representation and government transparency, making them important features of the process of democratization. The act of ‘civilizing society’ means that democracy must incorporate a civilizing process that is most feasible through civil society. In other words, while the state can influence social life, the creation of social practices is different and can affect the civility of state-society interactions (Hall 1995, 4). As events have demonstrated so far, the civilizing aspect of Belize’s democracy is a consequence of sporadic protests against colonialism.

After the creation of the GWU in 1956, the Federation of Christian Trade Unions became significant as a consequence of the internal power struggle of the PUP, along with nine unions during this time, however, only four survived into the ‘60s. The GWU merged with the Southern Christian Union to create the United General Workers Union (UGWU) around the same time that the Public Officers Union registered as an official union. Hence, emerging out of colonialism, the democratic process of Belize has incorporated civil society as a central role – a feature often overlooked in democratic theories (Levin 1995, 403). It is within this light that democratic consolidation in Belize can be better understood. Moreover, the National Trade Union Congress

of Belize was formed in 1966 and is currently an umbrella for twelve unions that include the recently installed University of Belize Faculty and Staff Union (UBFSU) and the National Students' Union of Belize (NSUB). In 1989, eighteen trade unions were contributing to the democratic development of Belize by improving the working conditions through legislative processes in later events (Fernandez 1989, 55-56). The vast amount of participation in unions, excluding other factors, can produce a populace with high regard for democratic opinions and are likely to be active in the political process affecting government effectiveness and legitimacy (Lipset 1959, 84-85). Thus, there have been several instances where mass mobilizations by unions achieved significant reforms that have directly affected the democratization of Belize as explained below.

There was massive civil unrest held at Belmopan City in January 2005. In the aftermath of a new national budget that increased taxes on businesses and commodities such as an 11% increase in the real estate sales tax, 5% increase in for financial institutions, 8% increase in tobacco and a 100% increase in rum, many interest groups such as the National Trade Union Congress of Belize and the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry (BCCI) demonstrated in front of the National Assembly Building. However, growing out of financial mismanagement, the protests also echoed years of frustration towards the corruption in the PUP administration. The run-up to the protest was the breakdown of a meeting held between members of the civil society and the government where several alternatives to sales tax and business tax were presented. The key issue for tax increases was to salvage a one hundred and ninety-eight-million-dollar deficit (Channel 5 2005, 1). However, on January 20th, the NTUCB, with its eight unions and the private sectors called for a two-day strike and many workers from large companies did not show up to work the next day.

The unions expressed strongly their opposition to tax increases as the protest ended in violence with the police force. Both the Maya Leaders Alliance of southern Belize and the Society for the Promotion of Education and Research gave support while some of the students from the University of Belize and Saint John's Junior College engaged in a street protest in Belmopan City. The BTNU staged another strike that left many schools without teachers while the NTUCB engaged in negotiations with the Government which included the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Channel 5 2005, 1). Moreover, several political and financial reforms were recommended for the business community which consisted of a review of the budget and possible permanent amendments to the Finance and Audit Bill. These meetings broke down while faulty communications between unions representative urged the government negotiators, the Minister of National Development, Assad Shoman and the Financial Secretary, Carla Barnett to draft an

agreement containing a review of the budget, salary increases for teachers and public officers, and several reform measures inclusive of national development corporations (Becker 2010, 1).

Despite that the teachers' demand had been met, many still engaged in protest as the NTUCB was still in denial and demanded more. The protest culminated in several agreement ranging from salary increases, tax implementations, financial reforms, a guarantee of position on the Central Bank's board, and a group to review the budget. The group was also responsible to review Belize's tax system. The protest was historic and reminiscent of the civil unrest caused by the proposed Head of Agreement in the early 1980s. So important was it that the Prime Minister, in a public address, said that it was a historic moment in Belize's history as the unions pressured the government to increase their salaries, open the budget and national financial process for public dialogue (Becker 2010, 1).

Another protest that was organized by the BNTU occurred in September of 2016 at Belmopan City along with its 3,000 members wearing their green t-shirts. The "Stand Up for Belize" solidarity campaign closed many government schools across Belize and the government deemed it "politically motivated" despite that what triggered it was the government's decision to defer a 3% salary increase until the following year. In a public notice, the Ministry of Education (MOE) mentioned that despite the ongoing dilemma and in compliance with the MOE rules, it will take the necessary measures to keep the schools open and fully functioning. The BTNU notified parents in advance that most teachers will not attend classes on Monday the 19th, however, the MOE granted their permission for classes to be canceled.

As industrial action loomed in the air, they also demanded the removal of Senator Godwin Hulse, for the government to sign unto the UN Convention Against Corruption (UNCAC), improved integrity in laws and a compliance with the consequences for illicit enrichment, legislative actions to improve the functionality and effectiveness of the public accounts committee, and immediate appointment of a Special Senate Select Committee to investigate the Auditor General's Audit Report into Immigration and National Departments, to enact the Occupational Safety and Health (OSH) Bill and to enact a fair minimum wage legislation and policy, the implementation of the BNTU Special Proposal 22, to secure the rights and employment status/tenure and service benefits of the staff of secondary and tertiary levels educational institutions, legislative measures to modify the Social Security Laws and Benefits concerning the coverage of the workers (The San Pedro Sun 2016, 1). The government then stated that the issue

had been raised in the Collective Bargaining Agreement¹¹ forum but the president of the BNTU mentioned that it was also demanding good governance and claiming that the circulating corruption scandals affected everybody. The BNTU did not join other unions, such as the PSU, in meetings with the Prime Minister and that the demonstration will persist despite the government's response to their seven demands in the hope of holding a meeting without conditions or any further demands with the Prime Minister (Jamaica Observer 2016, 1).

The government responded positively by stating that it will engage in dialogue with the business community concerning the OSH Bill and that along with the help of the Belize Chamber of Commerce and Industry, it will activate the integral committee. The government also implemented a 1% salary increase, to begin with, but it was not sufficient to quell the unrest. At a rally, the BNTU leader sympathized with the contending issues of the country and reminded the public of the failing leadership in the Ministry of Education and their support for the working class in the context of social justice, economic empowerment and territorial integrity (The San Pedro Sun 2016, 1). Moreover, the PSU and the Association of Public Service Senior Managers (APSSM) agreed to the deferring of the salary adjustments but not the BTNU because the government was financially assisting hurricane victims, it was not a valid excuse to defer salary increases and the government decided to further engage in dialogue.

Finally, in November of 2016, the Senator Select Committee was created and approved by the Ministry of Finance. It was tasked with inquiring the findings in the special audit conducted by the Auditor General into the Passport, Visa, Immigration and Nationality Departments for the period 2011-2013 (Committee 2020, 1) of which many were called out to testify. The Committee ended after 41 hearing sessions and a thorough investigation into the immigration department by the Auditor General's team to provide information to the committee. The long-awaited report was tabled at a special senate sitting on July 2020 where the report confirmed that corruption was rampant in the department. The illegal activities reported were the granting of visas and residency to unqualified personnel's, the disappearance of over 130 visas from the office at northern border, and fraudulent nationality certificates and frequent cases of UDP Ministers intervening in the granting of passports, especially former Minister of State for Immigration and Nationality, Elvin Penner (Committee 2020, 49-50; Leslie 2020, 1). Penner was stripped from his ministerial portfolios and deselected as the representative for the Cayo North East Constituency back in 2013.

¹¹ The Collective Bargaining Agreement forum was held in 2014 between the government and several unions which established a framework to increase salary for public officers and teachers every three years starting in 2014.

Meanwhile, the committee suggested in their report that the government should enact new legislation focusing on reformulating the penalties for personnel's violating the provisions of the Act and Regulations, simplifying the process for the issuance of visas, nationality certificates and passports to making more transparent and predictable, and a restructuring of the department to make it more accountable (Committee 2020, 152). Furthermore, the Integrity Commission of Belize was created in 2007 under the Prevention of Corruption Act but remained inactive until January of 2017. This was a result of the ongoing protests by the unions, especially the BNTU, in a demand for good governance. The Integrity Commission consisted of seven members and was charged with the task of investigating and complaints or declarations of non-compliance pertaining to the Act with rights to investigate matters of corruption. It was to examine the declared statements of assets and liabilities of government officials and to make frequent reports to the Prime Minister. It served a two-year term starting in 2017 (The San Pedro Sun 2017, 1). In 2018 it published a report in the Government Gazette of 42 names of persons who did not declare their assets. The Prevention of Corruption in Public Life Act law states that whenever a government official fails to declare their assets, the Commission is responsible to publicize it in the Gazette and send a report to the Director of Public Prosecutions for further action (Law Revision Commissioner 2011, 19). Moreover, one of the demands of the BNTU, along with the BCCI and the Belize Business Bureau (BBB), was the installment of a new Senator to represent civil society despite that it was a part of the government's manifesto during the general and municipal elections campaign of 2012. On January 10th, the president of the Belize Tourism Board (BTB) Osmani Salas, was chosen as the thirteenth senator. As I am writing this section, the BNTU is engaged in strikes against a recent proposal of a cut of 10% of their salary by the PUP government as part of its national economic relief plan caused by the Covid-19 pandemic. However, Osmani Salas became the senator during the administration of former Prime Minister Hon. Dean Barrow.

Hon. Dean Barrow was born on March 2nd, 1951, in Belize City. He attended the St. Michael's College before studying law at the University of the West Indies. He practiced law in 1975 and later with his uncle Dean Lindo. He also has a master's degree in international relations which he received from the University of Miami in the early 1980s. He entered politics in the early 1980s first as a councilor for the Belize City council and later as minister of foreign affairs and attorney general under the UDP until 1989. After this, he set up a law firm with Rodwell Williams and in 1990 he became the leader of the UDP. After a victory in 1993, Barrow obtained his previous positions and in 1998 he became the head of the party. He was able to secure seven seats

in the 2003 elections and in 2008 he became the Prime Minister of Belize and Minister of Finance (Turner 2013, 205) until the PUP won by a landslide in November of 2020.



Table 5 The Political Development in Belize

Events	Time	Description
Burnaby's Code	1765	Earliest legislation of Belize with elected magistrates.
Public Meeting	1784	This was dominated by a handful of the richest inhabitants who limited the elections of magistrates to only white groups possessing property, or a habitation, or a Negro slave, or a form of timber work.
Legislative Assembly	1854	This was made up of 18 members elected on a limited franchise until 1862.
Crown Colony	1862	Became an official Crown Colony and a part of the British Commonwealth.
Legislative Council	1871	The imperial government instituted a form of direct rule through a Crown colony system that appointed members to the Legislative.
1894 Riots	1894	The riot was the laborers' reaction to the empowerment of the growing Creole middle-class and the white merchant-landowner elite in the hope of becoming allies to participate in the political process of the colony and severe poverty.
Ex-Servicemen's Riot	1919	War veterans of the British Honduras Contingent, being exposed to recent activities in the Great War in Europe, rioted to demand an increase in wages and to improve the livings standards.
The Great Depression	1929-31	Triggered a global collapse in the demand for Mahogany and caused chronic poverty in Belize.
The 1931 Hurricane	1931	Was devastating but foundational for the establishment of Belize's first union that later promulgated the basis of its nationalist movements and its decolonization process.
Formation of the Laborers and Unemployed Association	1934	The LUA was far more political than any other in the colony as they utilized techniques such as petitions, demonstration pickets, strikes, and boycotts to bolster the working class' demands.
Extended Elective Representation	1936	Allowed for an "elective representation" comprising of five elected and two nominated unofficial members provided that the Governor maintained his reserved powers in special cases.

Formation of British Honduras Workers and Tradesmen Union (Later GWU)	1939	Organizations established and utilized by the working class of Belize to demand an increase in the standard of living and working conditions.
Legalization of Trade Union	1941	Trade unions were legalized in March of 1941 as a condition to receiving development and welfare funds.
Extended Unofficial Majority	1945	The unofficial members increased to ten, six were elected and four were nominated, and the official members decreased to three.
Creation of the People's Committee	1949	The PC was created as an organized reaction to the devaluation.
Creation of the People's United Party	1950	The PUP was formed out of the PC.
Legislative Assembly replaced Legislative Council	1954	Legislative council was replaced with the Legislative Assembly, which was first established a century before.
New Constitution	1954	The PUP achieved Universal Adult Suffrage in 1954 and elective majority in Legislative Council.
Independence (New Constitution)	1981	The 1981 constitution was created from the one in 1964.
Union Protests	2005	Salary increases, tax implementations, financial reforms, a guarantee of position on the Central Bank's board, and a group to review the budget.
Union Protests	2016	Salary Adjustments, establishment of the Senator Select Committee, Reactivation of the Integrity Commission, and the formation of a 13 th senator for CSOs.

Source: Author's Compilation

Table 6 The Socialization Process of the Postcolonial Political Elites of Belize

Name of Political Elite	Position	Years Active	Socialization Process	Regime Type	Level of Social Mobilization
Rt. Hon. George Cadle Price (1919 – 2011)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • British Honduras Legislative Assembly • Member of the House of Representatives • First Minister of British Honduras • Premier of British Honduras • Leader of the Opposition and 1st Prime Minister of Belize 	1954 - 2003	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • St. John's College High School in Belize (Jesuit - Catholic). • Saint Augustine's Minor Seminary in the U.S. • Mayor Seminario Conciliar in Guatemala City. • Member of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. 	Colonial Regime – Democratic Regime	Intermediate - High
Manuel Esquivel (1940)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Member of the House of Representatives • Leader of the Opposition • 2nd Prime Minister of Belize 	1979 - 1998	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • St. John's College High School in Belize (Jesuit - Catholic). • Loyola University New Orleans in the U.S. (Jesuit – Catholic). • Bristol University in England • Member of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. 	Colonial Regime – Democratic Regime	Intermediate - High

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Appointed Knight Commander of the Order of St Michael and St George (KCMG). 		
Said Wilbert Musa (1944)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member of the House of Representatives Leader of the Opposition Prime Minister of Belize 	1974 - 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> St. Michael's College High School in Belize (Anglican). St. Johns College Sixth Form in Belize (Jesuit – Catholic). University of Manchester in England. Circuit Magistrate (1967–68) and as Crown Counsel in the Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions (1968–69). 	Colonial Regime – Democratic Regime	Intermediate - High
Dean Oliver Barrow (1951)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Member of the House of Representatives Leader of the Opposition Prime Minister of Belize 	1984 - 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> St. Michael's College in Belize. The University of the West Indies at Cave Hill in Barbados. The Norman Manley Law School in Jamaica. 	Democratic Regime	Intermediate - High

			<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The University of Miami School of Law in the U.S. • Member of the Privy Council of the United Kingdom. 		
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Source: Author's Compilation



Chapter 6: Case Study (II): Guatemala

6.1 Spanish Colonial Legacies

The Spanish colonized regions in Latin America that had comparatively more developed societies such as the Aztecs in central Mexico, the Maya in Guatemala and the Inca in Peru. These regions were more appealing to the Spanish conquerors due to their complexity and prosperity that were comparable to the Moorish societies particularly the Granada during the “*Reconquista*”. In addition, these regions had large quantities of precious metals and were densely populated making them ideal for exploitable indigenous labor (Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006, 1423-1424). Spain had just expunged the last Moorish occupation on the peninsula the same year Columbus arrived in the New World in 1492. The successful move by the Crown strengthened its control and actuated a vast acquisition of lands by Christian nobles who were eager to expand the empire through conquest. The monarchy was convinced that overseas expansion would guarantee enough wealth to galvanize its power in Europe and to spread its fractured version of Christianity to the rest of the world (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 35). Within a few years, the conquistadores were able to topple and control the empires asserting a high social status in Spanish society and great wealth. The main reasons for their victory were due to the superior technology - gunpowder (for muskets, and canons) horses, crafty military strategies, the role of the non-Aztecs who were against the Aztec empire, and most importantly Old-World diseases.

To establish firm control and to prevent conflicts, several extensive institutions were created in the economic, political and sociocultural domains. For instance, the Council of Indies was established to control affairs of the New World in Spain while the viceroyalty through the viceroy, was for overseas control of general administration, legal procedures, public works, and defense by military *caudillos*. These institutions were highly bureaucratic meaning that each level would supervise the one below which led to conflict over matters of jurisdiction, however, they were autonomous, organized and flexible. Moreover, a major feature of this political structure was rooted in Catholic doctrines that legitimized the authority of the Crown and combined precolonial elements of labor coercion for exploiting mines and large agrarian estates (Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006, 1424; Skidmore and Smith 2005, 17-18). These large agrarian estates, *encomiendas*, were combined peninsular institutions and existing settlement patterns, in the form of land grants distributed by the conquistadors to the settlers to establish a system of tax collection and surplus labor in return for military protection and religious conversion (Andrien 1995, 15;

Bethell 1984, 83). The colonial settlement patterns of Guatemala were driven by its dense indigenous population used for surplus labor and wherever the populations were less complex, Spanish occupation was less effective. The first settlers inhabited mainly regions east of Lake Atitlan and in 1543 the capital of Santiago (present-day Antigua) was founded under the newly established Kingdom of Guatemala as part of the viceroyalty of New Spain. Guatemala along with Colombia and Ecuador became semi-peripheries under the Habsburg empire due to high-intermediate levels of settlement and institutionalization. (Mahoney 2010, 100; Skidmore and Smith 2005, 357). To ensure the efficiency of this system, two branches of government were created – the *cabildos* (town government) with *alcaldes* (magistrate) and the *regimiento* (council) with *regidores* (councilors) which were Castilian by nature and controlled by the Crown. These cabildos enjoyed autonomy, offices were often bought and became a source of creole authority and revenue (Andrien 1995, 24; Bethell 1984, 74; Skidmore and Smith 2005, 27). There were lucrative trade monopolies and large agricultural estates that were formative for a mercantilist colony despite lacking the economic and political prominence of the colonial centers. These institutions were organized and strong enough, though at times unstable, to keep Latin America colonized for three centuries until the rise of the Bourbon monarchy.

At the height of its reign from the 16th to the end of the 17th century, Spain was the most powerful mercantilist empire in the world. The evolutive changes in its policies and institutions during the three centuries it held sovereignty over Latin America were fundamentally mercantilist policies of the Habsburg Empire that relied on resources for the expansion of its territory. It created a stratification system that maintained order through a hierarchical system of caste groups at the bottom ruled by a king on the top. Production was regulated through guilds, trade restrictions, and precious metals were hoarded until the rise of the Bourbon monarchy in the 18th century (Mahoney 2010, 35). The rise of the Bourbon monarchy in the early 1700s transformed Spain's classical mercantilist system to a more liberal form but not entirely, instilling centralized authority, bureaucratized the state and empowered the landed elites. These reforms included a secular approach to transforming the existing power of the Catholic church, a reduction of corporate privileges, loosening commercial restrictions, free trade expansion and strengthening the elite stratification. The tipping of the scale of power behind a fully blown mercantilist system came to be known as the liberal reform period. The most important features of this system were increased state involvement in promoting economic development and the removal of state-imposed

constraints on private property and free trade between any Spanish ports and a weakening of the church (Mahoney 2001, 3; Skidmore and Smith 2005, 27).

Thus, the rise of the Bourbon monarchs in 1713 initiated these new reforms in order to ameliorate Spain's global decline by increasing revenues for the crown and strengthening political power. It established the new viceroyalties of New Granada and Buenos Aires and replaced the old administrative system (*corregidores*) with an intendancy system of local governors that were Spanish-born. In Guatemala, like elsewhere in colonial Latin America, the social structure consisted of Spanish-born bureaucrats (*peninsulares*) who controlled the *audencia*, the landed elites of landholders (*criollos*) whose power came from the town councils or *cabildos* then the bottom was comprised of the indigenous peoples and African slaves. The mixed-blood or *ladinos* consisted primarily of wage laborers and country-side farmers. The intendancy system, however, sparked the ire of the Creoles (*criollos*) whose power was now decreasing as a result and who had to rely on the *cabildos* as a power base since they could no longer buy positions of administration in local courts. In addition, colonial militias were established to tighten control and the Jesuits were expelled in 1767 (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 28). In effect, though commercial agriculture was advanced, and exports were increased, the form of "radical liberalism" that some of these states pursued, including Guatemala and El Salvador, deteriorated communal land-holding structures, and increased agrarian capitalist expansion that polarized the agrarian economy and militarized the state apparatus (Mahoney 2001, 3). The indigenous population was made as a subservient race living in poverty and isolated from the rest of the region. However, the mercantilist elites or the merchant landed elites, were impediments to the economic development of Guatemala as they entered the Bourbon era. Most of the largest states were agrarian and ruled by militaristic leaders who were dependent on surplus labor to expand their territory. They controlled the trade even before experiencing the new liberal reforms, collected large profits from legal export commodities in a system of monopoly and had already embedded their identity and roles in the institutions that followed. Commercial interest personals owned most of the seats in the town council of the capital making themselves richer and politically stronger than any other elites in the region. The capital was dependent on agricultural export mostly to Mexico, such as cacao, indigo, and eventually sugar, coffee and bananas mostly after independence (Mahoney 2010, 102-104).

However, despite that Latin American colonies experienced a period of liberalism, Lange et al., (2006) argues that those marginalized regions that experience more capitalistic institutions

often experienced more success in the postcolonial period (Lange, Mahoney, and Vom Hau 2006, 1422). On the other hand, Mahoney (2001) argues that radical liberal legacies deteriorated the democratization of some states in postcolonial periods (Mahoney 2001, 4). It must be noted that the goal here is not merely to elaborate on the variations of the ideal types of identities, as arguments from both perspectives have been made, but to analyze levels of post-colonial democracy with those mercantilist regions that were not marginalized during colonialism.

The Republic of Guatemala was perhaps the most politically important country in Central America for decades after its independence in September of 1821. After Spanish colonial rule and the ephemeral empire of Mexico in 1823, it acquired provincial control in the UPCA as it held the presidential seat of the federation. The UPCA linked all the former territories of the Captaincy General of Guatemala (a former administrative division of the Spanish Empire) under a sovereign state that was guided by a republican democracy. Nonetheless, due to its precarious structure, tension grew between the liberal and conservative parties which erupted into violent civil wars that liberated the provinces from central control culminating in the independent states in Central America. The federation was officially dissolved in 1838 and 1839 (Humphreys 1961, 45; Woodward 1976, 294). Since the territory of Belize was legally settled by the British but not yet an official colony, it wasn't a part of the UPCA. Thus, Guatemala's historical claim to Belize was a *de facto* ownership of all its territories during this time up until the 1859 Treaty. Surrounded by Mexico, Belize and far away from the capitals of the UPCA, central control was weakening as the civil war proliferated and divided political parties and provinces throughout Central America. The lack of proper communication and transportation became an impediment to the UPCA's survival as it could not mobilize armies and relay messages on time.

The capitulation of the UPCA encouraged many '*caudillos*' who were military personals and ordinary civilians with an appetency for political power. Anarchy was rising at the end of the 19th century in Central America, and the United States (US) acquired a vast amount of Latin American human and natural resources for its economic benefit. Most of Guatemala's presidents during this time accepted US intervention in the country's political economic affairs which ultimately perpetuated the oppression of the peasantry and brewed a form of neo-colonialism. As a consequence of the growing '*caudillismo*' personalities and the influence of the US. the 36 years civil war was set in motion and culminated in mass genocide in 1996. The state was ruled by a series of brutal military dictators that tried to consolidate their political and economic power but conflict is considered to be the darkest time in contemporary Guatemalan history and around

200,000 indigenous and ladino people of Guatemala met their demise as a result (Briggs 2007, 1). Many war victims immigrated to neighboring countries such as Belize, Mexico. However, the coverage of the civil war has attracted many journalists, anthropologists, political scientists etc. Scholars such as Stolen (2007) became some of the first researchers to document the experiences of victims. Despite this, analyzing the origins of authoritarianism in Guatemala, both from a domestic and international perspective, is foundational to understanding the role that social movements played in Guatemala's democratic process.

Guatemala's political development in the 19th and 20th centuries was tainted with prolonged authoritarianism. Dictatorial successions were often the consequence of a weak and unstable political environment and as previously mentioned, these dictators were strong military personals, otherwise known as *caudillos*, that often gained power through coups. The military has played a significant role in the development in Latin America and has always portrayed itself as the arbiter of class conflict, the defenders of the oligarchy and national interest as it gained its credibility from the independence wars (Livingstone 2009, 48). The period of dictatorial rule of Rafael Carrera, from 1844 - 48 and then from 1851 - 65, is a good example of the consolidated power of '*caudillismo*' in Guatemala. When Carrera was a young soldier in the early 1820s, he fought in the civil war of 1826- 29 and in 1838 he led a popular revolt comprising of indigenous peasants against the liberal government. He was a staunch supporter and defender of traditional judicial procedures, religious orders and ecclesiastical privilege while granting amnesty to those exiled in 1829 but demanded obedience. He became the dominant political figure in Guatemala as well as Central America when he defeated Morazan in 1840 and until his death in 1865. He dismantled the liberal programs in 1839 by re-establishing merchant guilds and empowering the church particularly in the education sector (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 360). The liberals gained control in the early 1870s after the successful revolution of Justo Rufino Barrios. He quickly repossessed lands to expand coffee production in the highlands of Guatemala from peasants that were granted by Carrera's Administration and encouraged both U.S. and German foreign investors into Guatemala to stimulate the country's economy by developing its infrastructure and modernizing its technology (Streeter 2000, 9).

Most of the presidents that preceded him were amiable to U.S. interest in Guatemala, so did succeeding presidents like Manuel Estrada Cabrera, Jose Maria Orellana, General Lazaro Chacon and Jorge Ubico of the early 20th century. As a consequence of a fraudulent election where US officials persuaded the provisional government to dissuade Manuel Orellana from a coup,

Jorge Ubico Castaneda became the country's authoritarian president from 1931 to July 1944. He came from a wealthy family and while embracing his aristocratic roots throughout his lifetime, he had always sided with Guatemala's aristocrats over the peasants especially in conflictual matters. He frequently tortured his enemies as exemplified in the executions of the members of the Partido Guatemalteco de Trabajo (PGT) which was ordered by him based on a bizarre anticommunist stance. Like many of the aristocrats, he despised the indigenous population and encouraged military training to subdue them. He enacted a vagrancy law to replace the debt peonage but to allow a labor supply through forced labor of the indigenous population. His police state opposed freedom of speech and tolerated the torture and execution of workers by their employers to discipline and punish them (Streeter 2000, 10-11). After he completed his studies at the Guatemalan military academy, in the U.S. where he received advanced training in the U.S. Army, and in Europe, he quickly rose to prominence in the officer corps to the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. He became the governor of the department of Retalhuleu under the dictator Manuel Estrada Cabrera. His harsh strategies to pacifying the state from terrors caused by local bandits earned him a reputation for being effective but brutal. U.S. officials adored him and considered him as qualified for the presidency (Grieb 1970, 12).

However, in his rise to power, Ubico was the only candidate running during the elections. Though he attracted the support of the US, he was labelled as a bigot by the majority of the population because of his lavish lifestyle and was therefore overthrown by many protests and demonstrations organized and led by professionals, teachers, students, and reformist military officers. The participants that marshaled the protests were urban middle-class professionals that craved a new era epitomized in the "October Revolution" of 1944 and the election of Jose Arevalo, a professor and political moderate, as president in 1945 followed by Jacobo Arbenz in 1951, his defense minister (Handy 2000, 22; Livingstone 2009, 26). These presidents were not communists but socialist reformers who created a progressive constitution and a moderate Labour Code that encouraged and legalized the organization of many trade unions, campesino and agrarian organizations (Handy 2000, 29; Livingstone 2009, 26; May 2001, 79).

The country elected Juan Jose Arevalo after the coup d'état in 1944 and resembled that of the New Deals Programs of Franklin Delano Roosevelt in the U.S. Both Arevalo and his successor, Arbenz, promoted an egalitarian participatory society by supporting an expansive policy of organizational inclusion such as rural trade unions which claimed more than 300,000 members (May 2001, 4). Under Arevalo's presidency the industrial wage went up by 80%, Guatemalans

enjoyed the freedom of the press and speech and experienced a near-adult suffrage - only literate women could vote (Livingstone 2009, 26; Skidmore and Smith 2005, 389). About 90% of Guatemala's labour force worked in the agricultural sector thus, 70% of the arable land was owned by the elites that accounted for a meager 2.2% of all landowners in Guatemala or 14% of the land was controlled by 88% of the farming units (Handy 2000, 89; Livingstone 2009, 26). The empowerment of the working class under the Labour Code of 1947 encouraged them to demand higher wages and angered the United Fruit Company (U.S. owned company) that was the largest land-owning company in Guatemala. The UFC owned about half a million hectares, and as the largest employer in the country, they threatened to shut down and leave. They warned the U.S. of a growing communist threat but though Arevalo was a reformist at heart, he experienced about 22 known military revolts during presidential term and an increasing U.S. intervention.

In 1950, Jacobo Arbenz became president and like Arevalo, he was also a reformist. Even though he was known to work with communists, he is widely considered as a nationalist rather than a communist. He improved the economy by empowering private sectors, expanding public works, by building ports to attract foreign capital and improving the standard of living (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 389-390). The summit of his term in office was the introduction of the 1952 Agrarian reform bill (Decree 900) which expropriated only plantations larger than 667 acres and that was uncultivated (Kirkland 2003, 65). As a result, approximately 100,000 peasants acquired land which was equivalent to 1.5 million acres. Naturally, the UFCO (United Fruit Company) was angered as it owned about 80% of untouched arable land. Many of the UFCO shareholders were linked with U.S. President Eisenhower's administration that sought the overthrow of Arbenz. Thus, the resignation of Arbenz in 1954 was a result of a coup d'état led by Carlos Castillo Armas who trained and armed by the CIA on the order of U.S. President Eisenhower who justified it as 'containing communism'. Castillo Armas was a part of the right-wing National Liberation Movement (MLN) and was associated with the success of the CIA's operation (PBSUCCESS). He was Guatemala's president from 1954 up to his assassination in 1957. The PBSUCCESS utilized an intensive paramilitary and psychological campaign to replace a democratically elected government and without antecedent, it promoted covert operations as safe, inexpensive substitute for the army in their anti-Communist agenda – an agenda pushed by the Eisenhower administration (Cullather 2006, 7). During Armas' term, the Eisenhower administration contained the communist threats in Guatemala term, and it undermined the country's democratic institutions. Even though the U.S. was successful in removing a government, it became desperate to find another U.S. puppet

to protect its capitalistic interest after the assassination of Armas. The CIA, as much as it helped to undermine the democratic institutions, it failed to install a moderate leader and by doing so, it became responsible for the start of the civil war.

After the death of Armas in 1957 and the increasing U.S. intervention, Guatemala experienced a series of dictators that vigorously encouraged the 36 year-long civil war in their bold attempts to gain power. The constitution of Guatemala holds that elections should be held 4 months after a president is dead and so three parties contended for the presidency of which the MDN won. After the MDN won, a military junta in 1957 annulled the elections and a re-election took place in January of 1958 in which Ydigoras became president through fraudulent support. Public demonstrations in the rural areas against corruption and severed labor contracts were common throughout Ydigoras' administration. Urban protests were also increasing as teachers and students protested in the streets of Guatemala City which consisted of a large population of students from the National University of San Carlos (USAC). Many students were killed and what started off as a protest against electoral fraud and corruption soon climaxed into a protest against the entire system (May 2001, 52-53).

After these events, sources noted that what triggered Colonel Peralta Azurdia organize a coup d'état was the fear of the return of former president Arevalo and that Azurdia was also convinced that Ydigoras mingled with communists and did not stood hard enough against it (Jonas and Torres Rivas 1991, 60; May 2001, 53). Azurdias established the Institutional Democratic Party (PID) with a strong anti-communist ideology and was a pro-military government party that was not of the traditional service of the wealthy landowners but of their own political and economic interests. His expenditure on military expansion grew rapidly and increased to 17% of Guatemala's national budget per annum which was faster than any other country in the region at this time (May 2001, 56). However, in 1966, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro of the Revolutionary Party (PR), which was the furthest left of the competing parties, was triumphant in a presidential election while the military remained in firm control during his term (Cullather 2006, xxv; May 2001, 57). Thus, he was considered a puppet president and was not allowed to act independently of the army. He tolerated the military to enact counter-insurgency strategies and government-sponsored terrorisms, such as the creation of the Mano Blanca Death Squad under U.S. Military Advisors. This was out of a complicity between the economic and military elites (Aguilera Peralta and Romero Imery 1981, 125; May 2001, 58). Hence, the US trained and equipped the military to 'properly combat' the guerrilla forces (FAR) in the mountains even if it meant state terrorism.

The next president, which was the start of the PID's long military rule, was Col. Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio. Similar to his predecessors, he was fraudulently elected. President Osorio continued the military policy preferences, values and norms that started under the military rule of ex-president Mendez Montenegro paving the way for military rule that followed into the '70s and '80s. From this moment onward the presidential terms are as follows; General Kjell Langerud García (1974–78), General Romeo Lucas Garcia (1978–82) and in 1982 by Efraín Ríos Montt who was a bodacious retired officer and evangelical Christian.

He was born in 1926 in Huehuetenango City in Guatemala to a shopkeeper father and a seamstress mother. As a product of the Jorge Ubico era, he joined the army as a teenager and later a student at a *La Escuela Politecnica*. Upon his graduation in 1950, he became a lecturer at the *Politecnica* and trained at the School of the Americas. He also received training from the U.S. and Italy and was leader of the Mariscal Zaval brigade. He briefly held the post of Army Chief of Staff in 1973 and after a demotion he was dispatched to the Inter-America School of Defense in Washington, DC. He returned to Guatemala in 1977 and joined the evangelical church *Iglesia Verbo*, which was the Guatemalan branch of the Gospel Outreach of the U.S. He visited the church's headquarters in California during this time and refused several offers from members of political parties and officers about contesting for the presidential seat. However, after a broad coalition of parties, including a cadre of young officers, overthrew the former president Lucas Garcia, Montt accepted to become the leader of the junta and became defacto president from March 1982 to August 1983 (Bateson 2021, 5-6). Montt's version of a new Guatemala entailed a "national moral reckoning" through which the country would transform itself into a fully functional society through religion and discipline. His ideology stemmed from a biblical patriarch which he used to define his political framework. Those who were against the state were seen as immoral and godless and needed to be corrected harshly. Essentially, his administration emphasized a vertical and horizontal moral accountability, commencing from the family's structure and behavior and ending at the government ability to convert divine power into "justice for its citizens". He was certain that he was chosen by God and that his evangelical discourse would permeate the discipline and obedience needed for Guatemala to prosper. For instance, in one of his sermons, he distinctly said that "God makes things as God commands, and what God commands is a direct relationship, and work is a direct relationship. Patron, do not exploit; worker, do not extort. . . . Change, change, all of you. Guatemala needs a change, to do the things that God has commanded" (Garrard-Burnett 2010, 66-68). Montt ruled with an unusual religious fervor that is reflective of the times when

Spanish conquistadores justified their atrocious acts as a divine conversion of power to justice. Moreover, in mid-1983 he was ousted by General Oscar Humberto Mejía Victores (Skidmore and Smith 2005, 393). In the mid-1980s, the military empowered Vinicio Cerezo, a civilian president who became another puppet of the military. Coming to the end of the civil war, a right-wing president, Jorge Serrano Elias, mounted an auto-coup in the early 1990s but quickly lost support. Nevertheless, Ramiro de Leon Carpio was democratically elected and it became a fresh start for legitimate peace that was non-existent in Guatemala from as far back as 1960.



6.2 Elite's Response to Social Mobilization and Democratic Development

This section will demonstrate the role of social movements' pressure towards the Guatemalan state in initiating a democratic process while analyzing the state's long and violent resistance towards democracy. In this context, the relationship between social movements and the state was severely deteriorated and suppressed by the military regimes after the Arbenz administration. The role of social movements in Guatemala's democratization is unlike any other country in Latin America because it was unable to organize under atrocious military rule that utilized genocidal counterinsurgency and constant violent responses to prohibit the rise of civil society. Therefore, it did not take part in the political transition in the 1980s until several years after democracy had been restored (Brett 2008, 34). Democratic development was a consequence of constant pressure by the guerilla factions and international influences against authoritarian rule and corruption, proving successful in initiating a democratic process after almost 4 decades. This period served as a critical juncture in Guatemala's road to democratic consolidation after a long history of authoritarianism since its independence in the early 19th century.

Social movements, particularly labor unions, were banned prior to the start of the civil war. President Ubico, during the 1930s, following a skewed narrative created by some of his predecessors, had disbanded all unions and banned the word *sindicato*, claiming it had communist implications (Batres 1995, 1). Even though workers, students, teachers and other professionals were instrumental in the ousting of President Ubico in what became known as the "October Revolution", the influence of the US-owned United Fruit Company (UFC) managed to promulgate an anti-communist rhetoric at the highest levels of Guatemalan society. After unionism enjoyed a brief period of legitimacy, US intervention became one of the primary reasons behind the dismantling of the UFC's workers' union and the rise of a 36-year civil war. This move propelled a string of US puppets (dictators) that mirrored Ubico and his predecessors' militant style of leadership. Since its independence, most of Guatemala's *caudillos* occupied powerful seats in government through coups often supported by the US. These military regimes were kept constantly under pressure by guerrilla factions.

The military institution was reflective of a long and brutal colonial past when it served mainly as the defenders of the mercantilist system in Guatemala and the repressors of any social mobilization that threatened the status quo. The military has always played a dominant role in Latin America's politics (Livingstone 2009, 48) and in the 20th century, high positions in the Guatemalan military became synonymous with an opportunity to gain political authority. The road

to modernity seemed to be hopeless as the army still represented the oligarchic *Criollo* even before the overthrow of ex-president and general, Jorge Ubico and especially during the civil war.

The country returned to an oligarchic and military rule that exploited landless campesinos who were predominantly indigenous Maya after the short-lived reformist government of Dr. Juan Jose Arevalo and Jacobo Arbenz in the early 1950s. The national interest was maintained as the interest of the oligarchic society and the military officers who benefited. In essence, the military controlled the state by constantly eliciting military coups, fraudulent elections and by successfully discouraging any social movements. During the 1970s, a military-civilian coalition to manage societal conflict was created by elements of the political and economic elites along with the guide of the military while unionism was strongly suppressed or limited. Meanwhile, the military ascertained its control of the executive, the civilians controlled the congress and managed the political parties which ultimately merged the economic elites and middle-class with factions of the military (Ebel 1996, 112). The conflict that followed saw the massacres of indigenous people that became the epitome of the Guatemalan civil which was done by its very own army. Even in 1996 after the peace accords were signed, wealth distribution remained highly unequal and the majority of the population remained poor, though it made foreign investment accessible (Archibald 2006, 1). Unequal wealth distribution, poverty, corruption, lack of transparency, checks and balances and the like, still necessitate strong movements to push against government oppression. The rise of the more radical guerrilla factions in Guatemala coincided with the end of Ubicos' presidential term and the ousting of President Arbenz.

The event that perpetuated the 36-year Guatemalan civil war was the ousting of president Arbenz in 1954 by a CIA-sponsored coup d'état led by Armas. The indigenous peasants carried the burden of Arbenz's agrarian reform (Decree 900) which led to the rumor by right-winged conservative military personnel that he was a communist. This rapidly got the attention of U.S. officials who were concerned with containing the spread of communism in the rest of Latin America. The specter of communism haunted US officials as Guatemala, joining Cuba, could have galvanized a Soviet bloc at the doorstep of the US. Behind this façade of containment was primarily the rhetoric of a foreign policy preference to eliminate any threats to its economic interests in the region. When the US assisted Armas' coup d'état, peasants relived the plight of Ubico's administration as unions were dismantled and unionists were condemned along with campesino leaders for suspicions of being communists.

Several national organizations such as unions and revolutionary parties were disbanded and marked as communist while members, especially in San Marcos, were detained and taken to Quetzaltenango for interrogation. The leaders of these movements had to burn or bury their copies of the Labor Code, the Constitution and leftist books to avoid prosecution. The army seized the tools and around 60,000 Quetzales from the organizations while soldiers pursued the union officers in the mountains. The new government reversed the Agrarian Reform Act and almost all the land that been redistributed were returned to their previous owners (Froster 2001, 201). Armas vigorously repealed 'Decree 900' and violently repossessed most of the properties that were previously taken away from the landed elites. The rural areas where the accessibility of land promoted agricultural farming between the peasants experienced the most violent acts of Armas' repossession. He was responsible for the massacres of many peasants that were suspected of being communists. Many labour activists, peasants and intellectuals were tortured and killed while others were forced to exile and forced to abandon political life. The military and the elites promoted a strong anti-communist principle banning the communist party and the Workers Party (PGT) Brockett (2005, 13). Though some victims were innocent, they often met their deaths usually because envious friends or foes reported them as communists (Froster 2001, 203). Armas received loyal support from the elites, but his assassination propelled the start of the Civil war in 1960 which also coincided with the creation of the *Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre* (MR-13) guerilla movement. The rebel group was able amass its strength in the eastern portion of the country (Brett 2008, 45). The Guatemalan constitution mandated for congress to elect the president if none of the candidates won by a majority. This created an opportunity for the CIA to bribe congress to elect Ydigoras who later worked in their favor. His administration immediately attracted the ire of the majority of the population and popular unrest for economic, social and political reform, grew into the MR-13 which was organized and led by a group of military officers, some of whom were trained in the United States. The MR-13 found solace and support from rural peasants and faced constant and vigorous pressure from the army. Guerrilla warfare, inspired by Sandino from Nicaragua and Fidel Castro from Cuba, became a viable channel for peasant resistance against the status-quo. Many officers who were trained in the US attempted a coup d'état against Ydigoras and formed the revolutionary movement and as a reaction, a counterinsurgency state (Brockett 2005, 13).

In 1961 students and other members of the communist party took the streets in protest against the government's training of Cuban exiles for the Bay of Pigs Invasion and the army

responded by killing three students. In 1962, students protested in the streets against fraudulent elections, and became largest demonstration since the ‘October Revolution’ in the ‘50s. Workers from the lower classes and middle classes participated and demanded that Ydigoras step down from the presidency. Many workers died during the protest including students during an open demonstration organized mainly by law students (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 17; Brockett 2005, 14). Furthermore, Azurdia became president in a coup d’état in 1963 and with the army now independent of the government, the state increased suppression of popular resistance. His installation enforced the military to become elitists and to strategize on ‘counter-terrorism’ by creating death squads. Many students and ex-army officers attempted to create a guerrilla uprising modeled like the one Cuba’s Sierra Maestra but met their end in protest when it confronted the army in Baja Verapaz. However, various guerrilla factions led by the outlawed PGT and army officers allied between the years 1962-1969 to create the Armed Rebel Forces (FAR) operating in the eastern countryside but never numbered more than three hundred at one time (Batz 2013, 60; Brockett 2005, 14-15; Uekert 1995, 114). Peralta promised the electorates democratic transition to gain popular support in 1966 and nominated a candidate but lost to Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro.

The MLN created the Mano Blanca in 1966 as a preventative measure for the presidential assumption of Mendez Montenegro but as later used as a counterinsurgency organ. These death squads were mainly organizations created to allow the armed forces to carry out illegal operations. According to the State Department, the most infamous death squads were covers “for clandestine army commando units” to carry out extrajudicial executions (Batz 2013, 64). The death squads and the Fourth Corps of the National Police raided villages against suspected leftists and guerrillas under the supervision of Manuel Francisco Sosa Avila who was favored by the CIA (Kuzmarov 2012, 219). Moreover, the death of unarmed civilians rose to 8,000 between 1966-70. Under the PID-MLN’s banner, Col. Arana Osorio became president. The PID-MLN joint strongly supported military dictatorship in Guatemala and were triumphant for over two decades at this time. During renovated counterinsurgency campaigns under Mendez Montenegro, Osorio was called the ‘Jackal of Zacapa’ due to his terror. Osorio’s administration enacted a ‘stage of emergency’ and with more military aid from the U.S., he expanded the counterinsurgency means throughout Guatemala and dramatically increased death rate both in the rural and urban areas.

EXMIBAL was a Canadian mining company that most Guatemalans regarded as a sell-out of Guatemalan minerals to U.S. companies. This triggered a massive public protest, and the center of the opposition was at the University of San Carlos. Arana soon ordered mass arrests and suspended the constitutional right to assembly in his attempt to quell the protest. The committee that was studying the contract was led by university intellectuals and as the protest ended the death squads killed law professor Julio Camey Herrera and law professor and congressional deputy Adolfo Mijangos Lopez who was shot in public (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 18). In an attempt to consolidate his power and weaken opposition, Arana was massacring 700 political officers a year. His redefined counterinsurgency campaign was successful in the wounding of MR-13 leader Yon Sosa and the death of FAR's second-in-command and weakened the possibility of another coup d'état. In an attempt to create a military elite and to gain loyalty, he created an Army Bank that would grant officers special loans to establish private enterprises. Additionally, the military frequently stole project loans from international banks (Batz 2013, 63, 67-68). During his reign, villages, such as '*el Truinfo*' in the department of San Marcos, were destroyed overnight. Sources estimated that Arana's administration masterminded the death and 'disappearances' of about 20,000 people during the '70s (Uekert 1995, 111). The massacres and 'disappearances' increased as a result of counterinsurgency strategies during the administrations of a string of military presidents following Arana Osorio. In 1968, the FAR assassinated Colonel John Weber who was in charge of the US military mission and aiding the death squads, as revenge for Rogelia Cruz who was a beauty queen in her 20s and a leftist sympathizer. Arana became more committed in the campaign to annihilate leftist insurgencies even if it meant "turning the country into a cemetery" and so the death squads continued to kill "terrorists" and raid private businesses, homes and schools (Kuzmarov 2012, 220).

Through a fraudulent election, the PID-MLN's backed General Kjell Eugenio Laugerud Garcia and became president in 1974. He was trained in the U.S. and was the minister of defense under Arana Osorio's administration. Hundreds of members of indigenous farming cooperatives demonstrated for the ownership of private property at the town center of *Panzos* and ended when the army wounded 47 people and massacred another 53 (Brockett 2005, 3-4). In 1975, after one of the first of the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres' (EGP) operations in *Ixcán Grande*, 30 members of the *Xalbal* peasant cooperative were taken away in helicopters and were murdered by the government. The surviving leaders of the FAR constituted the EGP after they were crushed in the 1960s when around 8,000 of its members were killed by the state. In 1978, relatives, members and

even suspected members of peasant organizations were murdered, including, 45 men, 15 women and 40 children at the hands of the Military Police.

Civil unrest increased at the turn of the '70s during Lucas Garcia's presidency when many organizations and 10,000 high school and university students participated in street protest. The army quelled the protest using tear gas that intoxicated and hospitalized many participants. In addition, in 1980, some peasants were massacred and wounded after hundreds, including guerrilla members, stormed the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala City to demand land ownership. The embassy exploded into flames caused by the National Army which triggered a pivotal terror that increased public support for the guerillas (Brockett 2005, 180, 198; Loveman 2002, 196; Uekert 1995, 115). The state increased the massacres which included any peasants who were suspected of being a part of the EGP or FAR in the 80s as evident at the villages of *Papa-Chala*, *Patzaj*, *Panimacac* and, *Cocob* when more than 300 peasants were killed. The CIA reported that an airborne troop entered the village of Cocob and attacked and murdered 65 civilians including children (CIA 1981, 1-2). Further military aid was given to Guatemala during the Reagan administration. The U.S. shifted to a hardline, anti-communist foreign policy during the Reagan administration in 1980 which supported the Guatemalan military. As previously mentioned, in 1982, junior officers carried out a coup d'état to end personalism, corruption from the Lucas Garcia administration and the guerilla challenges (Loveman 2002, 196).

The coup d'état was led by General Efraín Ríos Montt (1982 to 1983) who is known for his engagement in the most extreme violations of human rights in Guatemala. His atrocities included, rape, torture and increased widespread massacres of 15,000 indigenous people who had their houses burnt down. Through his operation known as 'guns and beans' in his regime's Plan Victoria 82 to pacify villagers, entire villages, crops and livestock were destroyed. The campaign was explained by Montt very succinctly "If you are with us, we'll feed you, if not, we'll kill you" (2005, 1). The army attacked and killed 96 indigenous villagers in *Llom* which later included the starvation to death of 60 children right on the day of Montt's presidential assumption. A few months after, 95 indigenous peasants from the village of *Chel* and 150 more from the village of *La Plazuela* were murdered. Sources say that Montt's regime killed around 3,000 peasants per month regime was responsible for the deaths of more than 15,000 peasants (Daniels 2006, 1). Montt's brutal style of dictatorship stemmed from a conservative ideology that manifested itself in the military and the church. Most of these high-ranking dignitaries were descendants of the colonial

landed elites that dominated Guatemala's political and economic domains. Even if Montt's family weren't from the aristocracy, he was emblematic of this group. Many of the military dictators that preceded him came from the far-right spectrum of conservatism who, as a fundamental aspect of this ideology, vehemently opposed democratic principles. Additionally, these military dictators often found solace in allying with religious, reactionary actors such as the Catholic Church and the Protestant Christian movements in their attempt to return society to its old status quo (Althoff 2019, 300).

However, countless administrations were unable to annihilate the guerilla factions in the hinterland. The new wave of guerilla fighters in the early 70s took more of a political approach to attack the government. Meanwhile, the deteriorating power of FAR's urban resistance brought about a new cadre of guerillas known as the Ejercito Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP). The political instability merely encouraged more resistance from the insurgents while external help via material assistance was also influential. Between 1981-1982 the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG) was formed consisting primarily of the left-wing guerrilla groups -- the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of Armed People (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR), and the Guatemalan Labor Party (PGT) (Fauriol and Loser 1988, 53-54; Uekert 1995, 114). At the peak of their height, peasant support was estimated to be around 270,000 while membership was around 7,500 trained militants despite having to operate in exile (Ball, Kobrak, and Spier 1999, 28; Brockett 2005, 124). The URNG continuously launched attacks against the government's security forces, killing and kidnapping government officials, and raiding army bases. As the human rights condition deteriorated in Guatemala, the Carter administration adopted a foreign policy that focused on human rights assistance of which Guatemala had been the perfect target. Washington's new policy demands towards Guatemala sparked a controversy that was influenced in part by its nationalist and xenophobia ideologies. Carter's administration was to improve the human rights condition in Guatemala by reassessing its counterinsurgency campaign but Guatemala refused to corporate and choose to stand on its own. The violence got worse attracting more international attention, especially after the army burnt down the Spanish embassy which deteriorated Spanish diplomatic relations with Guatemala (Fauriol and Loser 1988, 55).

Rios Montt's brutal presidency came to an end in 1983 after a coup led by his minister of defense, General Oscar Mejia Victores. At this time Guatemala's society was highly militarized and the army consolidated its power in all aspects of society because of the counter-terror policies

under Lucas Garcia and Rios Montt administrations. Throughout the 1982 to 1985 period, government policy was pressured to create a framework to establish democratic institutions. However, the rates of murders by death squads in the countryside were gradually decreasing but dramatically increasing in the urban areas. Regardless, Marxist insurgents remained a threat in rural areas. A CIA report noted that a month after Mejia Victores became president, the kidnapping rate in urban areas jumped to 56 and admitted the involvement of state security forces. Information can easily be twisted and innocent people would soon ‘disappear’ due to false information given to the army by personal enemies or business competitors (CIA 1983, 1). The world news became aware of the increased violence and the local media was under heavy surveillance due to the state’s attempt to quell civil unrest and to give the international media false information. Many journalists who reported on the increased violence faced their deaths during the Lucas administration when threats against the press contributed to self-censorship. The elites removed their ads from the papers that reported state terror and the Rios Montt administration completely banned the report of political violence in order to maintain “stability” (Ball, Kobrak and Spierer 1999, 45-46). Many journalists and leftists in the countryside or in the city center were targeted by death squads.

After Victores’ military regime, Guatemala’s lean towards democracy was evident in the 1985 elections but with an autonomous elitist military. The highlight of the political sphere in 1984 was the creation of a Constituent Assembly in July on the premise that it would dedicate itself to implementing a concrete plan for democratic transition. However, this was not an internal pressure but one that came from the US. Thus, the message was clear that the Reagan administration was firm in its stance towards a renewed orientation with Guatemala by refusing any help unless it can demonstrate democratic governance (Fauriol and Loser 1988, 62). In 1985 the spirit of democracy was revived when President Cerezo from the Christian Democratic Party committed to democracy by adhering to a military amnesty decree initiated by the previous military government which dismissed previous human rights violations. The decree ensured that military personnel that committed crimes between March 1982 and January 14th, 1986, were omitted from prosecution. Though the 1985 constitutions established various organizations to improve the human rights conditions, they were dysfunctional and failed to carry out thorough investigations (Uekert 1995, 112).

The first dialogue between the government and the guerrilla movements since 1960 occurred in 1987 and a year after, Cerezo signed a Social Pact with the labor unions promising social and land reforms. However, these conciliatory events came to a halt when the oligarchy,

that made up a portion of the military, supported a military attempt to overthrow the regime unless Cerezo met several conditions such as breaking down discussions with the guerilla movements, cancellation of social and land reforms, halt human rights growing concerns and unionization. He became a puppet of the military but was the first civilian to be elected as president since 1966 and the first to initiate a genuine dialogue via the National Commission for Reconciliation between the URNG and the Government. The failure of electoral politics in the 80s owes itself to the lack of an institutionalized party system that also plagued much of Central American politics. Since the beginning of the war, elections had been tainted with fraud and the 80s ushered in a real opportunity for the transfer of political power towards democratic representation (Fauriol and Loser 1988, 83). Nonetheless, the military was still active. In 1989, the state massacred 1600 and carried out 800 kidnappings in just half a year. The event worsened the heightened tensions between the URNG and a year later, agreements were signed in Spain between the government and the URNG initiating a peace process and initiated a democratic transition after years of domestic pressures and international condemnation (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 31). The military then, being the governing authority, expressed their docility to engage in a democratic transition through the electoral process in the hope of bringing legitimacy to governance.

The evolutive changes towards democratic development in Guatemala were influenced by state-society relations within the interplay of regional and international socio-political conditions. These domains were significant in guiding and shaping the political strategy and decisions of movement actors especially in the role of social movements' influences on the democratic process. Thus, the nexus between social movement and the military's turn towards democracy became more pronounced during and after Serrano Elias' presidential term. Serrano Elias became the president after Cerezo in 1991 which marked the first democratic transition of power since decades. Serrano dialogued with the URNG and respected Belize's sovereignty which turned out politically unpopular for him. During the peace talks there was still state terror that was carried out by the military elites in the hope of deteriorating talks so that they can maintain their benefits of status. As a result, ironically, many civilians lost support for the rebels (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 63). In the height of all these promising events, the tides suddenly changed when Serrano suspended Congress and the constitution in an auto-coup in 1993. Peaceful dialogues with the URNG were still ongoing despite the failure of Serrano's auto-coup. After a vote of no confidence in Congress in 1993, Ramiro de Leon Carpio was elected as the next president. Carpio supported the process to end the civil war. As previously observed, a gradual increase in tolerance by the

state to adhere to international human rights standards became a vital part of Guatemala's democratization and is tantamount to the influences of social movements and international organizations. Significant to this aspect is the presence of international rights regimes and transnational advocacy networks that assisted in realizing social movement's renewed demands such as socio-economic rights, cultural rights, and gender rights – an attribute usually alluded to the leftist politics in Latin America (Brett 2008, 15-16). Moreover, in 1994 the government and guerrillas negotiated and enacted the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA – the United Nations Mission for the Verification of Human Rights and Compliance with the Comprehensive Agreement on Human Rights in Guatemala). MINUGUA guaranteed compliance between both parties towards several agreements made on behalf of human rights and demilitarization process (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 32). MINUGUA served as a monitor and promoter of human rights that encouraged the rebels to safely put down their arms. Two years after the accords were signed, it took over the responsibility to verify compliance, consolidate democracy, improve human rights conditions, and reform institutions to promote peace and democracy until it was closed in 2004 (Stanley 2013, 1).

However, many Guatemalan governments failed to execute several reforms and as a result, the UN, by way of its verification mandate, pressured consecutive governments to comply, to hold their promises and to draft critical reports. Though several administrations refused to comply at times, they did not assert full sovereignty and ignore the UN's complaints but rather accepted, though at times not fully, the UN's involvement as a mediator to a peaceful settlement. Aware of improving the deteriorating conditions of the Guatemalan majority, to prevent future conflict and despite the lack of dedication from the Guatemalan government, the economic elites and the rebels, the UN continued to assist Guatemala. Public concern created an asymmetry of motivation since the UN was more committed to implementing accords than the Guatemalan government who had the power to do it (Stanley 2013, 1). MINUGUA also worked closely with local groups to assist with advocacy and with government agencies to improve skills and overall performance. In essence, it promoted peace and justice in Guatemala by way of fostering negotiations for peace accords with the rebels and the government, providing technical assistance to agencies and preventing democratic breakdown (Stanley 2013, 2).

As a part of the MINUGUA package, the URNG and the state signed the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous People in 1995 which served as a pretext for a final peace agreement. Thus, this agreement required an immediate implementation of aspects surrounding

human rights that resonates with the constitution of Guatemala, international treaties and conventions to which it is legally bound (MINGUA 2001, 5). In essence, the agreement stipulated that the government respects the indigenous, socio-political and economic rights of all indigenous peoples of Guatemala which are: the Maya, Garifuna and the Xinca people that constantly endure the plight of discrimination, injustice and exploitation by consecutive governments. Furthermore, it also emphasized the historical importance of these people to a Guatemalan identity which is key to national unity and development. The deploring conditions continued to affect the people profoundly as it hampered their civil and political rights while disfiguring its national unity and values (MINGUA 2001, 5). Thus, TNA's and international rights regimes were vital in the process of democratic transition in Guatemala by supporting social movements and urging the government to comply with domestic and international pressures. In addition, these also included Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch that assured the state and further developed and strengthen indigenous identity and identity politics. They provided an effective channel that was previously blocked by the state for social movements to dialogue with the military (Brett 2008, 17). A report from the International Center for Transitional Justice noted that the UN-brokered peace accords were finalized in 1996 bringing peace, stability reparations and reforms. There was an estimated 250,000 deaths and disappearances recorded by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) and in its groundbreaking 1999 report, it pointed out that the state's military operations against its indigenous peoples constituted genocide (International Court for Transitional Justice 2021, 1). Even after the signing of the long-lasting peace accord between the URNG rebels and the Guatemalan government under the administration of Alvaro Arzu, the creation of the National Reparations Program (NRP) was stalled. It took a decade after the peace accords for the NRP to meet the reparations demanded by war victims and even after the enactment, many victims felt cheated on and dissatisfied with small individual payments for the priceless lives of relatives lost. The program was designed to improve the standards of living of the victims and to commemorate the lives lost by way of symbolic recognition (International Court for Transitional Justice 2021, 1).

The Guatemalan Forensic Anthropology Team (GFAT) which was a part of the CEH, recently created a DNA bank to match the remains that were exhumed with the surviving relatives as a way of providing closure to the families, to rebuild social trust, to repair a broken justice system and to promote democratic governance in Guatemala. So far, hundreds of bodies have been revealed to the light of day after decades of dirt and darkness. In addition to exhuming remains,

the GFAT's cultural anthropologists collect oral and written histories from personal testaments, interviews and archival sources to elucidate the story of the civil war. The CEH concluded that 83% of the war victims were indigenous and attributed blame for 93% of the human rights violations to the Guatemalan army in its attempt to destroying the Maya culture. A major component of the state's genocidal strategy was to incorporate indigenous civilians into army-controlled civil patrols (Sandford, 2004). Millions of National Police files have been uncovered in 2005 leading to the creation of a national project to organize the documents and to make them available to the public. These documents are also being used in court cases by victims though only several of the cases have been prosecuted. The rest of the cases are frozen in institutional bureaucracy, judicial adjournment and stall tactics, neglect and loss of evidence of which the Inter-American Court of Human Rights proved the incompetence and corruption of a broken justice system after hearing several cases (International Court for Transitional Justice 2021, 1). The government admitted to having genocidal policies in its campaign against the indigenous people in a case known as Plan de Sanchez at the Inter-American Court in 2004 following meager payments of reparations that reflect a broken justice system and institutionalized discrimination of its indigenous people.

Racial discrimination has now been institutionalized in Guatemala by its elites. Racial discrimination during the civil war was more objective and direct embedding itself in the political and economic institutions. Guatemalan elites are expanding their capitalist tentacles by privatizing their public industries and services, creating an ever-increasing export-oriented economy to better compete in a globalized world. Its neoliberal policies have reaped significant benefits as it has modified its economic strategies to fit the globalization of capital and free-trade agreements such as Central American Free Trade Agreements (CAFTA) at the plight of discrimination and exploitation of its indigenous people (Little 2005, 3-11). As a consequence of resource extraction by local and foreign industries, many indigenous farmers have been displaced from their lands by forced evictions and no prior consultations. The UN noted that indigenous groups continue to struggle with structural discrimination, political and economic exclusion, a lack of inclusion concerning projects, forced displacement, unfulfilled reparations for genocide, and chronic poverty. Among widespread discrimination and other factors affecting the lives of indigenous people is an increasing forced evacuation of indigenous land as many large-scale extractive industries, agribusinesses plantations rush to grab land that is indigenous territories.

Around 2% of arable land in Guatemala is owned by local farmers (Gies 2018, 1). Excluding other factors, neoliberalism may stimulate an economy by lowering trade barriers, eliminating price controls and reducing state interference in economic affairs, but it is mainly the elites that reap the benefits through privatization and austerity at hands of indigenous people that bears the weight of poor standards of living, low wages, poor working conditions and forced labour. Many foreign-owned companies in Guatemala employ indigenous people for low wages to expand profit and for the little to no government protection/consideration given to indigenous rights and territories. A good example is the Marlin Mines operation that fits the criteria of a mere profit-driven foreign company that has no regard for human rights. The Marlin Mine is a gold mine in Guatemala owned by Montana Explorada, the subsidiary of Canadian company Goldcorp that never consulted the indigenous people before extraction and obtaining indigenous land. The UN confirmed the case in a report stating that regardless of the ratification of the Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention by the Guatemalan government, known as ILO 169, which delineates the right to consultation for development on indigenous land, it acted without consent and criminalized leaders who demand government recognition (Gies 2018, 1). Institutional racism and discrimination are lasting effects of the atrocities committed by high-ranking military officers in the civil war, the domestic policies and the restructuring of institutions to their benefit. Though some have been prosecuted for their roles in genocide, like the 2013 case against former dictator General Efraín Ríos Montt, many have gotten away, which is symbolic of the lack of effort and consideration to indigenous rights and justice by the government. In addition, the Agreement on Identity and Rights of Indigenous Peoples has seen a 19% implementation since the 1996 Peace Accords.

Since the Peace Accords in '96, many administrations have deliberately kept silent in the hope of forgetting the genocide while many top generals have chosen to disregard the past. Furthermore, top military generals that were involved in the scorching of indigenous people have also made their way to the presidency even after MINUGUA left in 2004. Since the end of the civil war, corruption has plagued several presidential administrations. For instance, in 2011 former president Alfonso Portillo (2000-2004) was accused of embezzlement and accepting bribes from Taiwan and was later extradited to the US to serve a prison sentence for money laundering in 2015. Successive presidents and government officials such as Oscar Berger (2004-2008) were imprisoned for money laundering, drug trafficking, and extrajudicial killings as were members of Álvaro Colón's (2008-2012) administrations who were dismissed on corruption allegations.

During his term, it was alleged that the first lady, Sandra Torres, used the *Mi Familia Progres* social welfare program to advance clientelist purposes (Pallister 2017, 473-474). Moreover, in 2012, a top military general, Otto Molina Perez, took office as president of Guatemala. He led a successful presidential campaign behind a defining message of ensuring peace in Guatemala by cracking down on gangs, narco-traffickers and other violent criminals with the help of the entire state apparatus. He served in the special military forces known as the *Kaibiles* and was also director of military intelligence and inspector-general of the army during the civil war (Bonacker & Safferling, 2013, 298). His presidency met arguments from all corners as some were in support claiming that he was involved with a part of the army that sought a resolution with the guerrillas in the 1996 peace accords and that he played a key role in the ousting of *de facto* president Rios Montt by supporting Defense Minister Oscar Mejia in 1983. Nonetheless, human rights activists linked him with the *Ixil* massacre and with the ‘disappearance’ of Efraim Bamaca Velasquez (Bonacker and Safferling 2013, 298-299).

However, it took international organizations like the United Nations International Commission against Impunity (CICIG), to pressure the Guatemalan Justice Department to mount an investigation against Molina’s administration. The investigation of a corrupt scheme known as “*La Linea*” accused the Guatemalan customs agency of offering massively reduced tariffs to importers in return for support. The investigation announced that it had produced strong evidence against it as they analyzed thousands of telephone calls, emails and documents proving that Perez and his Vice President Roxana Baldetti were the leaders of the scandal. Thus, Perez resigned after thousands of people protested which led to his subsequent impeachment and the stripping away of his immunity. He remained in pre-trial detention in 2015, even after he claimed health issues and was later charged. The UN’s CICIG was one of the most important resolutions to fighting corruption in Guatemala until its end in September of 2019 during President Morales’ term. Guatemala had one of the highest crime rates in Latin America in 2010 which is 41.2% per 100,000 residence and suffers single-digit rates of prosecution (3-4%) (Bonacker and Safferling 2013, 299). Political rights in Guatemala were rated at 4 (on a scale of 1-7, higher numbers indicating less freedom) by Freedom House due to organized crime, illicit campaign funding, and murders of political candidates during their campaign (Pallister 2017, 472). Through an amnesty, Guatemala took measure to not totally preclude prosecutions through amnesty and the Law of National Reconciliation exempted from prosecution only political crimes and established that the crimes of genocide, forced disappearance, torture and any other crime without a statute of limitations could

not qualify for an amnesty. By doing this, it promoted a principle that encouraged reparations for victims by affirming the importance of the prosecutions (Bonacker and Safferling 2013, 300-301).

In 2017, many organizations protested in the streets against corruption and demand President Jimmy Morales' resignation after he declared Ivan Velasquez, lead investigator of CICIG, a persona non-grata and proceeded to deport him. Jimmy Morales was born in Guatemala City to a circus family and is a devout Evangelical Christian. Before occupying the presidential seat, he was a comedian and a television entertainer. He holds a degree in Business Administration from the Univesidad de San Carlos in Guatemala, a Master's degree in strategic Studies from the Universidad Mariano Galvez in Guatemala and a Master's degree in Media Management from the University of Texas, Texas (World Bank 2017, 1). Morales' presidency is intimately associated with right-wing populism originating from his party's ties to the military. His party was created by military veterans, some who were charged for human rights violations during the civil war. This points to a historic continuity within the party as his campaign slogan "not corrupt nor a thief" was like Montt's campaign slogan, he engaged in a social-conservative and moralist discourse that was often used in Guatemalan society and politics to preserve the interest of the elites, and he emphasized hierarchy, order, security, and community similar to many former evangelical neo-Pentecostal military dictators in Guatemala (Althoff 2019, 319).

Furthermore, Morales and his son had been accused of illicit campaign financing prompting prosecutors to request Congress to strip the President's immunity so that he could be prosecuted for corruption (Brannum 2019, 273). Before this scandal, he was criticized for having no transparency in the selection process of his cabinet and for naming members of the elite. His oldest son and brother were all a part of an investigation in an alleged misuse of funds and illicit contracts at the Property Registry in what became known as the "Botin Registro de la Propiedad" case which also includes contracts a restaurant Morales and his brothers are involved in. His son and his brother were both arrested (Pallister 2017, 477). Furthermore, after making a public announcement, surrounded by military officials, that Velasquez is banned from entering the country, one of his ministers resigned and he sent military vehicles to the streets as a tactic to intimidate citizens, civil society organizations, and CICIG.

After ignoring a request from the constitutional court – Guatemala's highest court – to allow Velasquez back into the country, he received condemnation from domestic and international bodies and in 2017, the congress voted against the investigation of the president - 25 deputies voted against his immunity (Brannum 2019, 274; Taft-Morales 2019, 10-11). He later ordered CICIG

staff to leave the country within 24-72 hours, unilaterally tried to end CICIG's mandate in 2019 and withdrew their police protection. He also reverses an earlier pledge and refused to renew CICIG's term. Thousands protested against the decisions and demanded Morales' resignation, with support from the U.N., EU, and other human rights organizations. In 2019, a prosecutor mentioned that Morales' wife will be investigated for accusations of cashing illicit checks of over \$30,000. In a coalition of 34 organizations, some indigenous, condemned the president and protested outside the congress against the move to repeal the anti-corruption laws, particularly the impunity that stifles the political system triggered by the illicit financing of his campaign and corruption scandals. They demanded his resignation and a trial but to no avail (Abbott 2017, 1).

In retrospect, reports estimated that 140,000 to 200,000 people perished as a result of the civil war (Ball, Kobrak, and Spierer 1999, 87) and surviving victims are still traumatized. There was a string of *caudillos*, starting with Rafael Carrera, that rose with the support of U.S. intervention after the UPCA capitulated in 1839-40. They became some of the most violent dictators in the region, such as Ubico, Armas, and Montt and it is likely that they will continue to be known as such for generations to come. With the backing of foreign support, multiple administrations elevated the armed forces to elite status and encouraged them to own state enterprises (Uekert 1995, 113). They were heavily supported by the CIA to preserve U.S. capitalist interest in the guise of an anti-communist foreign policy that failed. Their ultimate failure is that they deliberately encouraged the decimation of thousands of innocent indigenous men, women and children who suffered the most just to maintain its global status as world superpower, even if it meant supporting right-winged dictators.

During the war there were many brave activists and social organizations who condemned state terror despite the possibility and threat of being kidnapped. However, despite high rates of kidnapping, social movements such as the MR-13, the ERG, the URNG along with other organizations continued to protest and stand against state atrocities (Fauriol and Loser 1988, 54). State violence was relaxed only after international human rights organizations intervened at the turn of the 20th century and encourage transitional justice and indigenous human rights activists like Rigoberta Menchu to take stand. Her campaign efforts were laudable as she achieved justice which many had hoped for decades. Due to her efforts, members of the military and state who were involved in the war were tried in a Spanish court particularly the commander of a death squad who killed her father. He was tried and sentenced in 2015 for crimes against humanity. Rios Montt was placed under house arrest for "health reasons" in 2016 during a trial where he faced charges

for the massacre of 1,071 *Ixil* indigenous people. Many brave and inspiring activists, journalists, and scholars are restless in their attempts to document the truth behind the secrets of the Guatemalan civil war. After the war, Guatemala domestic policy preferences became moderate and was forced by international organization such as the UN, to enact policies and projects that are in support of indigenous rights. The country has left an autocratic regime legacy and is more attentive towards promoting indigenous rights that were denied for centuries while trying to consolidate its democracy.

Colonial identity, political actor's policy and value preferences, international influences and organized movements are some of the most significant factors in analyzing the political development of Guatemala. Since its inception as a strong republic in Central America at the turn of the 19th century, it had only started to consolidate its democracy until after the end of the civil war in 1996. However, the breakdown of Guatemala's short-lived democracy in the mid-1900s by the coup d'état became the incipience of a string of military dictators that lasted more than three decades. The US support of these autocratic regimes were foreign policies driven by capitalistic self-interest coupled with the guise of anti-communist rhetoric. The events leading up to the peace accords created a self-producing sequence such as pivotal terror, increased state repression and consistent US-sponsored military dictatorships. Throughout the civil war, victims organized and rebel primarily in the form of military organizations and unions. The sequence of events demonstrates how political actor's actions and policy preferences shape the social and political environment that may ultimately trigger reactions from subordinate groups that find it necessary to organize and mobilize. However, these social movements' reactions were vital in starting the process of signing the peace accord in 1996 that set the stage for transitional justice in Guatemala. The event that precipitated the peace agreement was causally important in prompting transitional justice just as the civil war was causally important in prompting peace agreements between parties.

Table 7 The Political Development of Guatemala

Events	Time	Description
Colony	1524	Guatemala became a colony of Spain with its capital at Santiago (Antigua).
Independence	1821	The war of independence led Guatemala to become independent from Spanish rule.
UPCA	1823	After Spanish colonial rule and the ephemeral empire of Mexico in 1823, Guatemala acquired provincial control in the UPCA and held the presidential seat of the federation.
Independent Guatemala	1839	The federation was officially dissolved in 1838 - 1839 and a string of dictators followed.
Rafael Carrera	1844	The period of dictatorial rule of Rafael Carrera, from 1844 - 48 and then from 1851 - 65, is a good example of the consolidated power of 'caudillismo' in Guatemala.
Rufino Barrios	1873	President Rufino Barrios modernized the country by developing the army and coffee plantations.
Jorge Ubico	1931	Ubico was the only candidate running when he became the country's authoritarian president from 1931 to July 1944. He was labelled as a bigot and was overthrown by protests.
Juan Jose Arevalo	1944	Urban middle-class professionals craved a new era that was epitomized in the "October Revolution" of 1944 and the election of Jose Arevalo.
Jacobo Arbenz	1950	In 1950, Jacobo Arbenz became president and like Arevalo, he was also a reformist
Decree 900	1952	Arbenz introduced an agrarian reform bill (Decree 900) which expropriated only plantations larger than 667 acres and that was uncultivated.
Carlos Castillo Armas	1954	The resignation of Arbenz in 1954 was a result of a coup d'état led by Carlos Castillo Armas who also ended the Decree 900.
Civil War	1960	The assassination of Armas propelled the start of the Civil war in 1960 which also coincided with the creation of the <i>Movimiento Revolucionario 13 Noviembre</i> (MR-13) guerilla movement.

Short-Lived Civilian Rule	1966	Civilian Rule resorted when in 1966, Julio Cesar Mendez Montenegro of the Revolutionary Party (PR), which was the furthest left of the competing parties, was triumphant in a presidential election but the military remained in firm control during his term.
Spanish Embassy Destroyed	1980	Due to a protest, the army burnt down the Spanish embassy which deteriorated Spanish diplomatic relations with Guatemala.
Rios Montt	1982	A coup d'état was led by General Efraim Rios Montt (1982 to 1983) who was engaged in the most extreme violations of human rights ever seen.
A New Constitution	1985	Throughout the 1982 to 1985 period, government policy was pressured to create a framework to establish democratic institutions.
Civil War Pursued	1989	In 1989, the state massacred 1600 and carried out 800 kidnappings in just half a year despite negotiations.
Jorge Serrano Elias	1991	Serrano Elias became the president after Cerezo in 1991 which marked the first democratic transition of power since decades.
Serrano's Resignation	1993	Serrano suspended Congress and the constitution in an auto-coup and was forced to resign.
MINGUA	1994	The government and guerrillas negotiated and enacted the United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala (MINUGUA).
Peace Accords	1996	Civil war ended when the army sought a peaceful resolution with the guerrillas.
UN Reports Genocide	1999	There was an estimated 250,000 deaths and disappearances recorded by the Historical Clarification Commission (CEH) and in its groundbreaking 1999 report.
Rios Montt's Arrest Warrant	2006	Warrant issued for the arrest of Rios Montt by Spanish Judge.
CICIG	2006	The government and the UN decided to create CICIG to combat corruption.
Rios Montt's Trial	2013	Rios Montt was placed under house arrest for "health reasons" in 2016 during a trial where he faced charges for genocide.

Resignation of President Otto Perez Molina	2015	Perez resigned after thousands of people protested and he was impeached and stripped of his immunity.
Protest Under President Jimmy Morales	2017	Protests in the streets against corruption and demand President Jimmy Morales' resignation after he declared Ivan Velasquez, lead investigator of CICIG, a persona non-grata and proceeded to deport him. He refused.

Source: Author's Compilation



Table 8 The Socialization Process of Postcolonial Political Elites of Guatemala

Name of Political Elite	Position	Years Active	Socialization Process	Regime Type	Level of Social Mobilization
Jorge Ubico Castañeda (1878 –1946)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Service • Leader of the Liberal Progressive Party of Guatemala • 21st President of Guatemala 	1896-1944	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guatemalan Military Academy • Studied in Europe and in the U.S. 	Authoritarian Regime	High
Rios Montt (1926 – 2018)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Service • President of the Congress of Guatemala • 26th president of Guatemala 	1950 - 1983	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guatemalan Military Academy • School of the Americas in the U.S. • Fort Bragg in the U.S. • The Italian War College in Italy • Devout member of the Gospel Outreach Church via <i>Iglesia El Verbo</i> (Evangelist) 	Authoritarian Regime	High
Otto Perez Molina (1950)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Military Service • Deputy of the Congress of Guatemala • 46th President of Guatemala 	1966 - 2015	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guatemalan Military Academy • School of the Americas in the U.S. • Inter-American Defense College in the U.S. 	Democratic Regime	Intermediate - high
Jimmy Morales (1969)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • 2nd Secretary-General of the National Convergence Front • 50th President of Guatemala 	2013 – 2020	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • San Carlos University in Guatemala • Mariano Galvez University • Devout Evangelical Christian 	Democratic Regime	Intermediate - high

Source: Author's Compilation

Chapter 7: Conclusion

Previous research has examined how various factors affect post-colonial democratic development in LAC. However, few studies focus on the relationship between colonial legacies and democratization. Since these countries became independent, they have experienced several waves of democratic development with the most recent being the third wave of democratization that started in 1978. This analysis addresses one of the fundamental questions of postcolonial democratic development: What explains differences in levels of democracy in Latin America and the Caribbean? To address this issue, this study emphasizes the importance of colonial identities, shaped by their colonial institutions, in affecting the postcolonial democratic development in the region. Incorporating theories proposed by Lange et al. (2006) and Pérez-Liñán and Mainwaring (2013), this thesis explores how Spanish and British colonial legacies shape democratic development in LAC.

The colonial identities through which colonial institutions were affected and shaped subsequent events differed dramatically for Spanish and British colonialism. The empirical results concerning the 33 Latin American and Caribbean countries from 1982 to 2018 revealed that colonial identities matter for democratic development in the region. I find that British colonial identity fostered a higher level of post-colonial democratic development than Spanish colonial identity. This illustrates that former British colonies tend to provide more voices for their citizens in the political process as they are more likely to hold their government accountable, have a higher quality of rule of law, and are more tolerant towards CSOs activities relative to other former European colonies.

Additionally, the large-N analysis also supports the conclusions drawn from the case studies. British colonial legacy has a positive and significant relationship towards level of democracy revealing that countries that were former British colonies tend to have higher levels of democracy compared to countries with Spanish colonial legacies. This is exemplified in the cases of Belize of Guatemala. The former was a British colony and thus has a higher level of democracy than Guatemala. As observed, the mercantilist model in Guatemala established support for extra-market institutions that provided assistance in the form of rents to elite groups and denied privileges to others. Consequently, resources were concentrated in the hands of the political and economic elite (usually caudillos) in a rigidly hierarchical society creating a dependency from the majority of the population even after its independence. By contrast, a liberal model in Belize

organized productive activity toward maximizing profit through access and competition in free markets and international trade as observed when more than half of Guatemala's imports from European markets came via the British settlement in Belize in the mid-1800s. Though the liberal model in Belize was associated with a state that privileges status groups, it did not impose high levels of hierarchical relations of dependence after independence. The political authorities also use the state to protect private property, encourage commercial production and investment and enforce the rule of law. The state is not directly involved in economic production but is vital for the provision of the basic infrastructure necessary to sustain a market economy. These features are present in both the colonial and modern history of Belize indicative of the monopoly of the BEC and other companies and the road works that occurred in the 1930s which continue to influence economic development.

Moreover, the negative and significant relationship between the years under colonization and the levels of democracy suggests that longer periods of colonization are more detrimental to levels of democracy. Belize was part of the British empire for 119 years while Guatemala remain under Spanish control for 297 years. Hence, over a hundred years difference may have greatly impacted Guatemala by hindering its levels of democracy. Nevertheless, it is worth noting that both the coefficient and significance level of British colonialism are larger than those of the years under colonisation suggesting that whether a colony was British or Spanish may remain more important. Lastly, GDP per capita proves to be one of the most significant variables that has a high level of significance and a positive relationship with levels of democracy. While Belize and Guatemala have similar GDP per capita, Belize is still ahead of Guatemala which seems to influence the current levels of democracy. Even though GDP growth has no significance, it could also be considered that for the period between 1982 and 2018, Belize had a GDP growth of 4.38% while Guatemala's only accounted for 2.99%. In short, Belize has a better economy compared with Guatemala which illustrates the results of the large N analysis. In conclusion, the case studies illustrate the large-N analysis that reveals that British legacy is a determinant for explaining the current levels of democracy in the regions along with the years under colonialism and the economic conditions of the countries.

While the statistical results provide strong evidence to support my argument, the comparative case studies of Belize and Guatemala elaborate further support. The first argument that Lange's et al. (2006) theory suggests is that mercantilist and liberal powers pursued different levels of colonialism in territories that had the same levels of precolonial development.

Mercantilists are more likely to have a higher level of institutional establishment in comparatively more complex precolonial regions and are less likely to implement a high level of colonialism in comparatively less complex regions. Liberals, on the other hand, are likely to pursue low levels of institutional establishment in more complex precolonial regions, and they are likely to pursue high levels of colonialism in less complex precolonial regions (Mahoney 2003).

Belize was colonized by Britain and Guatemala by Spain. Guatemala experienced a high level of colonialism because it was a comparatively more complex region equating to a densely settled indigenous population. It exhibited state-like political organizations and hierarchical economies that relied on coercive labor systems that protected merchant guilds that lasted well after independence especially during the Ubico administration in the 1930s. The British occupied Belize because it was a comparatively less complex region marked by a simple agricultural society that was displaced and provided leeway for the introduction of a broad range of new market institutions and state organizations. The Maya of Belize inhabited the interior while the British settlement lied on the coast. This also allowed authorities and settlers to establish institutions like the Public Meeting and Legislative Assembly, without having to extensively modify preexisting arrangements. Moreover, an early consensus of Belize in the 19th century indicated a less dense indigenous population relative to Guatemala which posits that while mercantilist institutional development was extensive in Guatemala, liberal institutional development was intermediate-high in Belize.

The reason for the latter argument is that Lange et al. (2006) highlighted the diversity of the forms of British colonial rule that was either direct or indirect. This had different effects in institutionalizing states resulting in different levels of institutions that promoted development or despotism. Belize experienced both direct and indirect forms of colonialism, making it a hybrid form because it installed the Alcalde system in the 19th century to incorporate the Maya into British rule. These colonial intermediaries were given the authority to rule over the local population in exchange for their inclusion and support of British administration – a feature of indirect colonialism. The settlers created extensive and bureaucratic institutions in Belize, which is indicative of direct colonialism and a major feature of the plantation colonies. This was the derivative of the Spanish *corregidores* that were present in high levels of colonialism such as in Guatemala which transformed the aspect of British liberalism into a quasi-form of mercantilism.

In today's world economy, mercantilist institutions such as Guatemala's are more of an impediment because it establishes labor intuitions and socio-cultural conventions that exploits

indigenous population by deteriorating access to health care and education. Guatemala is known for its high levels of poverty, high levels of corruption and human rights abuses that sever political civil liberties, political representation, transparency and accountability. Conversely, former liberal colonies like Belize encourages competitiveness within a world economy and provides greater resources to state and societal actors to improve standards of living. Belize did not experience a brutal civil war like Guatemala and its socio-economic level is relatively high which supports the modernization theory of democratic development. Unlike Guatemala, Belize has coherent administrative, juridical, and police institutions that provide the basic infrastructure for functioning markets, an enforcement of the rule of law, a provision of public goods and education. As previously mentioned, it is worth noting that one weakness of Lange et al.'s (2006) theory is that it fails to specify the causal linkage in within-case sequences accounting for the differences of Spanish and British colonial legacies. To fill this gap, I analyzed the role of social actors that link colonial legacies and postcolonial developments.

As we have observed, mercantilism tends to produce patrimonial states whose leaders are unable and unwilling to stimulate competitive markets and fail to influence positive socio-economic and political developments. It has been especially difficult for Guatemala to escape this calamity. For this reason, the second theory in this study, borrowed from Mainwaring and Perez-Linan (2013), elaborates that an early history of democracy favored the building of formal institutions such as party systems, courts, and other agents of intrastate accountability that promote a higher level of democracy in the contemporary period; in earlier periods of democracy, elites may have learned that democracy was not harmful to their interests, hence making them more tolerant of a high level of democracy in the contemporary period; and a more democratic and tolerant mass political culture emerged in the early democratizing countries. In short, regime legacies last through the socialization of elites over time (Mainwaring and Perez-Linan 2013).

In this regard, the legacies of colonial institutions of Belize and Guatemala also affect elites' behavior through reproduction and socialization of the institutional norms from generation to generation. The different models of institutions, such as mercantilism in Guatemala and liberalism in Belize, are the main domestic conditions that triggered different levels of democratic development. The case study of Guatemala sheds light on the inherited authoritative legacies of the Spanish empire on Guatemala as it elaborates a hierarchical class and racial structure that produced caudillos after independence. As a result, the civil war bolstered an elite preference, guided by a sense of caudillismo, towards authoritarian regimes even more so when the military

became the elites and the numerous times when the elites supported the military. The military elites became interested in a range of policy considerations and grew strong independent normative preferences regarding an authoritative political regime. This drastically changed only with the exogenous causes such as the TNA's and the US (ironically) after the third wave. Belize on the other hand, experience an earlier period of democracy starting from when S. Turton got elected in the Legislative Council, self-government in the 1960s and culminating in democratic elections after independence. Colonial merchants of Belize experienced the benefits of democracy and became more tolerant towards a its process. This period was crucial in the democratic process of Belize as successive economic and political elites cultivated a democratic preference in the political domain.

Thus, throughout the decolonizing process, elites learned that democracy was not harmful to their interests, hence making them more supportive of democratic representation in the post-independence period. Additionally, a more democratic and supportive political culture emerged when the state legalized unions in Belize, unlike in Guatemala where the state violently suppressed unionism for decades after independence. The drive behind this, however, was made critical by the intervening of social actors. The organizations in the case studies, such as the guerrilla factions in Guatemala and the various organizations after the civil war, the unions in Belize and international organizations, created a sort of path dependence in their political systems. Additionally, it also created more radical normative preferences about the political regime in Belize. The effects of these radical organizations in Belize, as seen in the events that unfolded before and after independence, created a political environment that promotes democratization, while the political actors in Guatemala, during and after independence suppressed the more radical social movements, therefore, limiting their effects on creating a democratic environment.

For instance, in Belize, after the protests that were conducted by unions in 2005 and in 2016, the government increased salaries, expanded political representation and accountability. In this case, these outcomes ultimately increased tolerance for CSOs activities and expanded democracy and can be attested to elites' socialization process that was influenced by a British legacy. All the political actors mentioned during the protests in the case study of Belize were born during colonization while most received a higher education from England. As previously mentioned, compared to countries with a Spanish legacy, countries with a British legacy have consolidated a higher tolerance and responsiveness towards the actions and demands of social mobilization. While in Guatemala, social mobilizations were not as effective. A good example of

this is encapsulated in the elites' violent response towards social mobilization before and throughout the years of civil war. Repression towards social mobilization persisted even in the years after Guatemala enacted a democratic constitution in the mid-1980s. For instance, the corruption scandal unearthed by CICIG along with the repressive actions of former president Morales triggered a massive protest that demanded his resignation, but he refused. Like the military dictators during the civil war, Morales' actions during the scandal were tantamount to a *caudillo* in the making. His actions and that of his colleagues, proved that in times of political turmoil, Guatemala's political elites are likely to follow normative preferences that are the quintessence of a dictatorial regime. In retrospect, Belize has a higher level of democracy than Guatemala, a position that is reflective of its enduring liberal colonial institutions that, in the long run, fostered a better political environment for governments to respond more positively towards the demands of its civil society.

The theoretical analysis of this paper warrants a need for further explanation of the variation in levels of democracy in other regions of the world; hence, researchers who wish to explore this aspect must be mindful of the long-term political effects of other European powers that may produce varying results. For instance, more investigation can be done between the British colonial legacies of India, the French colonial legacies of Vietnam, the Dutch colonial legacies of Indonesia, the Spanish colonial legacies of the Philippines, and the British, French, and Italian colonial legacies of Africa. However, researchers must pay keen attention to the different economic modes of the colonizers and elites' response to social mobilization, both of which promulgate variations in democratic development, as contrasting mode of colonial legacies may produce different levels of democracy.

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