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台灣的回憶，歷史和身分：
以日本為例

Nostalgia, History, and Identity in Taiwan:
The Case of Japan

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
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Abstract

The issue of Taiwanese identity has become popular in recent decades. The island's unique historical and geopolitical background proves to be a fascinating object of study for scientists worldwide. The colonial period of Taiwanese history, when the Japanese controlled the island, had been a focal point of the formation of Taiwanese identity. Surprisingly, there is a discernable trend of colonial nostalgia toward Japan in Taiwan. Contrary to other formerly colonized nations, the Taiwanese seem to bear unprecedentedly positive feelings for their colonizer. This paper serves as an analysis and interpretation of the nostalgic trends and patterns within Taiwanese public discourse. The author concentrates on investigating the evolution of the depiction of Japanese colonialism in the cinema and how those transformations reflected the changes in the ongoing national debate regarding colonial memory. Apart from the analysis of Taiwanese cinematography, this paper scrutinizes the political instrumentalization of the alleged (post)colonial nostalgia for political uses. The main research goals of the paper revolve around unveiling the actual roots and genesis of the sentimentalization and idealization of the colonial times in Taiwan and examining tangible effects of (post)colonial nostalgia on the formation of distinctive Taiwanese identity.

Keywords: Nostalgia, Taiwan, Japan, Identity, Colonialism

摘要

臺灣人認同議題近幾十年來備受矚目，而臺灣獨特的歷史與地緣政治背景對世界各地的學者構成了迷人的研究對象。臺灣日治時期是臺灣人認同形成過程的焦點時刻；令人意外的是，在臺灣可以觀察到日治懷舊的趨勢。與其他曾被殖民過的民族相反，臺灣人似乎對過去的殖民者抱有空前的好感。本文針對臺灣輿論上的懷舊趨勢進行一番分析解讀，聚焦調查臺灣電影作品對日本殖民主義描繪的演變，以及這種演變又如何反映有關殖民記憶的全國辯論進程。除臺灣電影作品外，本文考察所謂的(後)殖民懷舊的政治工具化。本文目的在於揭示臺灣社會對日治時期的多愁善感和理想化的真正根源，以及探究(後)殖民懷舊對於臺灣人認同形成的實質影響。

關鍵詞：懷舊、臺灣、日本、認同、殖民主義

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Introduction

When examined in the context of the attitude towards Japan, the East Asia region reveals a somewhat consistent pattern. Most of the countries that have experienced Japanese imperialism (Korea) or suffered from the atrocities carried out by Japanese soldiers during World War II (China) hold a grudge against the Japanese. Contemporary relations between the most important actors in the East Asian region are primarily shaped by historical events (and the attempts to revise the memory of them).

The anti-Japanese sentiments in Korea have a long tradition. The very origins of the negative attitude towards Japan can be retraced to the pirate raids and Japanese invasions of Korea in 1592-98. The main reason, however, is the Japanese occupation of the Korean Peninsula in the years 1910-1945. After signing the Annexation Treaty in 1910, the Japanese started the wide-scale assimilation program, which had in view the suppression of Korean culture and language, and the eventual elimination of the Korean race. In order to achieve this goal, the Japanese had employed several policies; first of all, the Korean language was removed from the schools and then forbidden to use in the public space under the death penalty. Japanese had also imposed the Japanese names system and forced Koreans to attend Shinto shrines.

Moreover, to humiliate and subjugate the Koreans, the Japanese destroyed some of the Korean national landmarks, e.g., Gyeongbok Palace.¹ In addition, the Japanese had been brutally suppressing the Korean independence movement. On March 1st, 1919, the dissatisfaction with the Japanese rule led Koreans to nationwide protests. Approximately 2 million people went down to the streets to protest the oppression and demand

¹ Bruce Cumings, *North Korea: A Country Study* (Washington: Library of Congress 2008), pp. 32-36.

independence for Korea. Japan repressed the independence movement through military power. The official Japanese archives speak of 553 killed, 1409 injured, and 12522 arrested, whereas the Korean estimates are significantly higher: over 7500 killed, about 15000 injured, and 45000 arrested.²

The anti-Japanese sentiment in Chinese society has several explanations. It can be traced back to the late 19th century and the Treaty of Shimonoseki that ended the First Sino-Japanese war of 1894-95. It was considered humiliating as the Qing dynasty was forced, among other things, to cede Taiwan and Penghu Islands to Japan. However, most reasons for anti-Japanese sentiment in China can be explained by the events of the Second Sino-Japanese War, 1937-1945. As a result of the war, China suffered 7-16 million civilian deaths and 3 million military casualties. Furthermore, the war produced almost 400 billion USD in damage and created 95 million refugees.³ There are also particular events that have been contentious for the Japanese- Chinese relations.

The case of the Nanjing Massacre has been a bone of contention between the two governments for a long time. Starting from December 1937, Japanese soldiers had been systematically decimating the population of Nanking. Chinese and Japanese records of victims are conflicting; the death toll ranges from 40 000 to over 300 000 victims⁴. The memory of the Nanjing Massacre has been repeatedly denied and downplayed by different Japanese authorities and thus infuriating the Chinese. For instance, on February 24th, 2012, Tokyo governor Shintaro Ishihara said that he does not believe that the

² Bruce Cumings, *Korea's Place in the Sun: A Modern History*(New York: W.W. Norton & Company 1997), p. 231.

³ <https://www.secondworldwarhistory.com/world-war-2-statistics.asp> (retrieved 4.6.2018).

⁴ Charlmer Johnson, "The real 'China Threat'," <http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China/GC19Ad05.html> (retrieved: 4.6.2018).

Nanjing massacre ever happened. He claimed that killing so many people in such a short period would be virtually impossible⁵. The issue of Unit 731 is another topic that has been very sensitive to mutual relations. The said unit was located in Harbin and is responsible for numerous war crimes, including using Chinese civilians as test subjects for research of chemical and biological weapons. Prisoners of Unit 731 were facing various ‘experiments,’ such as vivisection, frostbite testing, or being infected with fatal diseases⁶. Those actions' scale and inhuman cruelty can only be compared to the Nazi medical research programs developed during World War II.

Other contemporary issues have been very emotional to both societies. For instance, the dispute over the Diaoyutai/Senkaku Islands, which has been a flashpoint for Japanese-Chinese relations for decades. Problems of ‘comfort women’ and the Yasukuni Shrine are the topics that unite China and Korea against Japan. Consequent historical revisionism cultivated by Japanese politicians and public figures has been fanning the anti-Japanese sentiments and reinforcing nationalist trends in both societies. According to a BBC World Service Poll conducted in 2014, mainland Chinese people hold the most substantial anti-Japanese attitude in the world, with 90% of Chinese people viewing Japan’s influence negatively, while 79% of South Koreans view Japan’s influence negatively, making South Korea the second country with the most negative attitude toward Japan in the world⁷.

⁵ https://web.archive.org/web/20120225015821/https://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/article/ALeqM5gqqzO2hCm4p_W9kawUJsV85RS1RA?docId=CNG.55872017a52d4f3c1e40d17a3ebe2909.561 (retrieved: 4.6.2018).

⁶ T. Keiichi, “Unit 731 and the Japanese Imperial Army’s Biological Warfare Program,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal*, 11/2005.

⁷ https://globescan.com/images/images/pressreleases/bbc2013_country_ratings/2013_country_rating_poll_bbc_globescan.pdf (retrieved: 4.6.2018).

Against this background, the issue of Taiwanese-Japanese relations stands out as an unusual phenomenon. Even though Taiwan remained under Japanese control in 1895-1945, there is no obvious or apparent animosity towards Japan that could be easily identified. Quite the contrary, there is a long and well-documented trend of Taiwan's pro-Japanese sentiment. Ching writes about a traditional post-colonial view that the Taiwanese are generally "pro-Japan" (shinnichi) and the Koreans are "anti-Japanese."⁸ It can be found in different media, including cinematography, photography, literature, comic books, or even news coverage.

It is quite beyond the discussion that the collective memory of colonial experience under the Japanese government has had a significant impact on creating the Taiwanese identity and, therefore, on the relations between Taiwan and China. That is because, in my understanding, the dispute in the Taiwan Strait has always been more of an identity conflict than a purely political dispute.

I firmly believe that the issue of nostalgia for colonial times in Taiwan is a complex phenomenon that can affect various spheres of the political and socio-cultural life of the Taiwanese. Nostalgia, often mocked due to its seemingly facetious and melancholic nature, is, in fact, a force to be reckoned with in shaping the public discourse of contemporary societies. I argue that colonial nostalgia in Taiwan exists and has a significant influence on the historical, as well as present-day, narrative in Taiwan. This paper aims to trace back the origins and evolution of that phenomenon and put forward the potential application of nostalgia. This paper will address the following research questions:

1. What are the origins and factors that fostered the creation of (post)colonial

⁸ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation* (Berkeley, Calif.: University of California Press 2001), loc. 133.

nostalgia in Taiwan?

2. How did the positive image of Japan influence the emergence of the distinctive Taiwanese identity?

The first chapter of the paper will concentrate on the literature review and research methodology. The literature review is an essential part of my work because it remains the basis of my modus operandi as the literature analysis remains the primary method of the research.

Then I will put forward the theoretical background of nostalgia as a psychological and social issue. In this chapter, I will offer a brief background of nostalgia, tracing the term's historical roots and analyzing its evolution over the years. This chapter functions as a backbone of the whole paper as it discusses a central concept of the entire thesis.

The following chapter revolves around possible historical factors that brought about the emergence of colonial nostalgia in Taiwan. Understandably, this part is mainly dedicated to the Japanese colonial era in Taiwan. I am going through the most evident potential issues during that period that might have caused a contemporary amicable approach of the Taiwanese to the Japanese and the time when they governed the island. 3.1. and 3.2. are devoted to the issues of the relative (often oversimplified) good treatment of the Taiwanese by the colonial government and the generally understood modernization that took place on the island under Japan's rule. In 3.3. I consider the possibility that the positive representation of Japan and Japanese colonialism in Taiwan originates from the disappointment the Taiwanese had experienced when the KMT took over the island.

Chapter 4, in a way, dismantles the mechanisms and logic of colonial nostalgia in Taiwan with the instruments provided by the preceding sections. It serves as a kind of

conclusion and interpretation of the very phenomenon of nostalgia in Taiwan. Subchapter 4.1. is dedicated to the representation of Japan and Japanese colonialism in Taiwanese cinema. It serves as a kind of conclusion and interpretation of the very phenomenon of nostalgia in Taiwan.

Here, I provide the outlined cross-section of the transformation of the Japanese presence in Taiwanese cinema. From the late nineteenth century and the beginning of cinema in Taiwan, I attempt to trace the earliest stages in the development of Taiwanese cinema and display how Japan influenced this field at that period. In 4.1.1. I dwell a bit on the New Taiwan Cinema movement, which proved groundbreaking in depicting the Japanese and colonialism on the screen. New Wave has initiated a more ambiguous approach to the collective social memory of colonialism, although not necessarily consistently favorable. Subchapters 4.1.2. and 4.1.3. are dedicated to the relatively recent film productions representing a revelatory approach of representing Japan in an overwhelmingly positive, even emphatic manner. Such an approach had been, in my opinion, theretofore absent in Taiwanese cinematography.

In subchapter 4.2. I put forward how various political forces have been instrumentalizing colonial nostalgia and using them for their particular agendas. I attempt to provide a timeline of political events that have been, in various ways, pertaining to the issue of nostalgia. The main point of the chapter is the Taiwan-China identity struggle and how different political camps play off each other using nostalgia.

1. Research method and literature review

As mentioned in the preface, the literature review has been essential to this paper. The sources on which I base my research can be generally divided into two types: textual materials and visual ones. Textual materials consist of scientific books, publications in scientific journals, memoirs, and news coverage. “Visuals” is a category that includes cinema.

There is a somewhat shortage of texts in English that directly touch upon the issue of supposed nostalgia for Japan and Japanese in Taiwan. There is a remarkable body of publications and articles about the different aspects of the colonial regime in Taiwan. Obviously, there are even more publications revolving around the Taiwanese identity since this topic has become popular for wide scientific circles. A publication that can be regarded as an attempt to reconcile both of the aforementioned is *Japanese Taiwan: Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, a compilation of works of various authors, edited by Andrew Morris and published by Bloomsberry Press in 2015. As the title suggests, throughout the book, different authors present the historical background of Japanese rule over Taiwan and then deconstruct the contemporary reception and imagery revolving around Japan in Taiwan. Among those texts, the most interesting and significant are those regarding the repatriation of Japanese citizens after World War II, indigenous modernity in Japanese Taiwan, Japanese photography in Taiwan (the issue of creating Taiwan’s image in the minds of the “mainland” Japanese), representation of the colonial era in Taiwanese cinema, Taiwan news coverage. However, since it is a compilation of different, often immensely

different, works, it lacks somewhat of a contentual integrity. Nevertheless, it sheds much light on inevident phenomena in Taiwanese history as well as contemporaneity.

Becoming “Japanese”: The Politics of Identity Formation in Colonial Taiwan by Duke University professor Leo Ching attempts to outline and deconstruct the emergence of Taiwanese identity. According to Ching, the Taiwanese identity emerged during colonial times due to the disappointment of Mainland China as a feasible political alternative.

One of the most interesting works I have had the pleasure to come into contact with during my work on this paper was *The Fig Tree: The Memoirs of Taiwanese Patriot* (無花果) by Wu Chuo-liu (吳濁流), a prolific Taiwanese writer, author of *The Orphan of Asia*. *The Fig Tree* is a non-fiction memoir of the author’s memory about his upbringing and adolescence in Taiwan under colonial rule. Not only serves it as an immense and profound source of direct information about everyday life and social moods of the period, but it also exhibits a very particular and profiled point of view since Wu was ethnically Hakka and always identified himself with this social group.

Apart from books, there is a considerable body of journal publications on Japanese colonial times and its subsequent influences on Taiwanese reality. However, a big chunk of them represents International Relations and political point of view. For instance, *Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan’s Relations with China and Japan, 1895–2012*, written by He Yinan, takes into consideration the intricate and complex interrelations between Taiwan, China, and Japan. Using the constructivist approach, she attempts to untangle the identity knot and sketch possible outcomes for the region’s political future.

As for the selection of my auxiliary sources, I have decided to focus on Taiwanese cinema for several reasons. More often than not, cinema, in general, has served as a

reflection of the current socio-cultural state of affairs within a specific community. Taiwanese cinematography, in particular, has been an immensely useful conveyor of the evolving attitudes and approaches toward the memory and heritage of the Japanese colonialism on the island. The evolution of depicting Japan and the Japanese somewhat reflects the actual state of Taiwan's identity and political discourse. Throughout the decades, the cinema has accurately displayed the socio-political stance of public discourse on the colonial period. In the 'cinema' section of my thesis, I write about various film productions, ranging from the early colonial attempts at movie-making (*Buddha's Pupils*) to the wartime cinema (*Sayon's Bell*) and the New Taiwan Cinema (e.g., *City of Sadness*) finishing with a comprehensive breakdown of two pictures: *Cape No.7* and *KANO*.

As for my research methods, on the most general plane, my research methodology stems from the theory of collective memory coined and developed by Maurice Halbwachs. Collective memory can be constructed, shared, and passed on by large and small social groups. Examples of these groups can include nations, generations, and communities, among others. Collective memory has been a topic of interest and research across many disciplines, including psychology, sociology, history, philosophy, and anthropology. My research methodology possesses both inductive and deductive characteristics.

I employ strictly deductive reasoning when I posit the central question of my research. According to California State University, deductive reasoning, or deduction, is initiated with a broad general statement, or hypothesis, and scrutinizes the possibilities to reach a precise, logical conclusion. The techniques of classical hermeneutics I have employed in my research are the very core practices of deductive logic. Intertextual scrutiny of cross-disciplinary texts of culture, including cinema, and scientific literature,

remains the backbone of my research. As inferred above, I am using principally qualitative research methods. Content analysis of visual and textual materials constitutes my primary qualitative method.

Of course, I do realize the limitations of my primary method. Above all, I aim at discovering the formative functions of imagining Japan among contemporary generations of Taiwanese – people who have experienced violent identity revisions and discontinuations. I do understand that, in order to grasp an actual matter of state regarding nostalgia in Taiwan, I would have to arrange a series of in-depth interviews, preferably with the elderly Taiwanese who remember the Japanese times or directly inherited memories of said period. Notwithstanding, I believe that examining the very symptoms and manifestations of colonial nostalgia in Taiwan might be valuable and informative in the context of mechanisms of nostalgia and its impact on identity formation.

I wanted to emphasize that what I am aiming to present on the following pages is not, by any means, an attempt to impute nostalgia to Japan to the whole Taiwanese population (be it modern or past). My goal here is not to prove that nostalgia to Japan is an obligatory part of every Taiwanese individual identity. In fact, there are multiple individual and collective “nostalgias”; colonial nostalgia is one of the many. Sometimes “nostalgias” coexist, other times they are fundamentally irreconcilable.

This is not the point of the paper. Nevertheless, this issue is worth emphasizing. Nostalgia, as a socio-psychological construct, is an extremely fluid and flexible phenomenon. In the course of this paper, I would like to display and prove that some kind of sentiment to Japan is still present in contemporary Taiwan. It is a fascinating subject, given the turbulent mutual history between both countries.

2. Nostalgia – history and theory

On the word of the New Oxford Dictionary of English, nostalgia is “a sentimental longing or wistful affection for the past.” The term ‘nostalgia’ is a compound of two Greek words: ‘nostos’ (which has various translations but in its most general means return to home or native land) and ‘algos’ (pain, suffering, grief)⁹. Formerly, nostalgia was ascribed to the soldiers carrying out their duties abroad. To be even more precise, it was first used to describe the physical state of Swiss soldiers serving in foreign countries in the 17th century. The author of the word ‘nostalgia’, Swiss physician Johannes Hoffer, coined the term in order to depict the (in)disposition noticed among his compatriot Swiss serving in the army outside of Switzerland. They had suffered from symptoms such as anxiety, apathy, dejection, and lethargy. English medics believed that nostalgia resulted from a sudden change of one’s environment, in particular, the transplantation into an environment that significantly differed from the environment in which said person had spent their upbringing¹⁰. In the early days, nostalgia was referred to as an essentially physical condition. Physicians and medics went on to prove that there existed a material, tangible cause of nostalgia.

However, in the early 19th century, due to a radical shift in the scholar perception, nostalgia began to be defined as a more intricate and complex psychological condition related to depression, rather than a neurological condition confined to a particular social group, as soldiers¹¹. Physiological understandings of nostalgia gradually waned, as the term,

⁹ N. Atia, J. Davies, *Nostalgia and the shapes of history*, Memory Studies 3/3 2010.

¹⁰ S. Garrido, J. W. Davidson, *Music, Nostalgia and Memory Historical and Psychological Perspectives*, (London: Palgrave Macmillan 2019), 30.

¹¹ C. Routledge, C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, J. Juhl, *Finding Meaning in One’s Past: Nostalgia as an Existential Resource*, In: *The Psychology of Meaning*, Edited by K. D. Markman, T. Proulx, and Matthew J. Lindberg, American Psychological Association 2013, 299.

under the influence of romanticism, came to describe a more general state of alienation¹². The then perception and discourse of nostalgia started to resemble a modern understanding of this phenomenon. Namely, nostalgia started to ‘take the metaphorical meaning of longing for a lost place and, especially, a vanished time.’¹³

In the 20th century, it was identified that previously described adverse physical conditions, such as mentioned before apathy or lethargy, were induced and maintained by homesickness, which by that time had been successfully discerned as a separate phenomenon¹⁴. According to Angé and Berliner, the West had seen the emergence of a whole ‘culture of nostalgia’ in the 1960s and 1970s due to the transformations and social upheaval. In essence, nostalgia had undergone commodification through popular culture.¹⁵

However, nostalgia is still often perceived as a peculiar distortion of memory. It has long been blamed for the sentimentalization and falsification of history. Some argue that nostalgia has been a medium for misusing history by preying on ‘comfortable and conveniently reassuring images of the past.’¹⁶ Nostalgia is sometimes compared to melancholia in Freudian understanding. It can work as a form of compensatory mechanism that produces soothing emotions that smooth over the complexity of contemporaneity.¹⁷

Nostalgia, in its original meaning, was regarding a phenomenon that could only affect individuals. The contemporary definition of nostalgia describes it as a sentimental

¹² W.C. Bissel, *Engaging Colonial Nostalgia*, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 20 Issue 2, 2005.

¹³ O. Angé, D. Berliner, *Introduction: Anthropology of Nostalgia – Anthropology as Nostalgia*, in: *Anthropology and Nostalgia*, ed. O. Angé, D. Berliner, (New York: Berghahn 2015), 2.

¹⁴ C. Routledge, C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, J. Juhl, *Finding Meaning in One’s Past*, 299.

¹⁵ O. Angé, D. Berliner, *Introduction: Anthropology of Nostalgia – Anthropology as Nostalgia*, 3.

¹⁶ O. Angé, D. Berliner, *Introduction: Anthropology of Nostalgia – Anthropology as Nostalgia*, 4.

¹⁷ P. Wright, *Just start digging: Memory and the framing of heritage*, Nottingham Trent University, UK Memory Studies 3(3) 2010, 196–203.

longing for one's past, commonly experienced¹⁸. The first person who used the term 'collective memory was Maurice Halbwachs, a French sociologist, a co-worker of Emile Durkheim. Halbwachs did not deny that those who actually remember are individuals. However, since these individuals are never set in the void, but are located within social frameworks and in a specific group context, they draw upon that context to recreate the past.¹⁹

Halbwachs developed a distinction between historical and autobiographical memory. The former can be retrieved through tangible objects, such as written records or photography. On the other hand, autobiographical memory refers to events one has personally experienced in the past. According to Halbwachs, in the case of historical memory, one does not remember events directly. Instead, the person can be stimulated either through the aforementioned tangible conduits of historical memory or through the participation in the collective social rituals and activities aimed at commemorating particular events from the past.²⁰

According to Halbwachs, the past should be perceived predominantly as a social construct affected by the present factors. In his view, a national or social should be understood as a reconstruction of the past. He aimed at showing how the present circumstances influence the selective perception of the past. That view has become mainstream – Paul Connerton in his seminal work, *How Societies Remember*, agrees that the experience of the present is highly dependent on the knowledge and the perception

¹⁸ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, J. Arndt, C. Routledge, *Nostalgia. Past, Present and Future*, "Current Directions in Psychological Science", 5/2008.

¹⁹ L. Coser, *Introduction*, in: M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London 1992, 22.

²⁰ L. Coser, *Introduction*, in: M. Halbwachs, *On Collective Memory*, 23-24.

of past events.²¹ In other words, the collective memory is technically a reconstruction of the past in the context and through the prism of the present shared memory is not merely a sum of individual memories. It requires interaction in order to sew up a mosaic of different stories and to turn into a coherent narrative²².

There is a distinction between memory and imagination. The former is, in a way, limited by the actuality of the past, whereas the latter is not. Margalit offers a twofold definition of imagination. Firstly, it is understood as a process of bringing up images that could have happened, that are logically embedded in reality. Secondly, a mechanism of fantasizing unreal things²³.

Halbwachs provides us with a set of highly useful tools to utilize. First of all, in light of previous statements, nostalgia can be recognized as one of the mechanisms that conduct the selection of memories. Through the lenses of nostalgia, individuals, as well as collective entities, pick elements convenient for their respective narratives. Romanticization and idealization of the past are some of the most effective ways of determining the required elements of the Self. It is also a helpful way of putting aside past events that are not to become a part of the memory. In this way, nostalgia precisely applies to the definition of the collective memory drew on by Halbwachs. It deconstructs and reconstructs the past, according to one's memories and experience, but most importantly, under the influence of contemporary demands and needs posed by the subject of nostalgia. The process of remembering is a process of questioning one's identity and answering it by identifying with a particular community. The past is being

²¹ P. Connerton, *How Societies Remember*, Cambridge University Press, New York 1989, 2.

²² A. Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Harvard University Press 2005, 111.

²³ W.C. Bissel, *Engaging Colonial Nostalgia*, Cultural Anthropology, Volume 20 Issue 2, 2005.

used to explain the present and vice versa²⁴. A distinct souvenirization of the memory is an effect of the institutionalization of nostalgia. Boym draws upon a correlation between the intensity of experienced emotions and the profoundness of sentimentalization of the past; the stronger the longing for the past, the more it is prone to idealization²⁵.

There are very different views on nostalgia among scholars. Some of them consider nostalgia inherently negative as they identify it with the feelings of separation, loss, and longing for the past that no longer exists. Others plainly accuse nostalgia of falsification of history, let alone the falsification of the memory of history. Others associate nostalgia with the good memories of one's past and believe that it is a generally positive phenomenon²⁶. Margalit considers nostalgia to be a possible expression of shared memory. For him, nostalgia is a distortion of memory by a thorough sentimentalization and idealization of the past. Margalit contemplates that there exists a unique affinity between nostalgia and infantilization of memory, or as he puts it – nostalgia tends towards kitsch representation²⁷.

The phenomenon of nostalgia usually occurs in periods of social turmoil, often caused by forced migration or resettlement. Such events disrupt the traditional environments and obstruct assimilation into a new setting²⁸. According to Anouk Smeekees, nostalgia often emerges in times of social change and disturbance. When the social environment undergoes transformations, members of a particular community might experience feelings of being separated or disconnected from their original Self.

²⁴ M. Napiórkowski, *Turbopatriotyzm*, Wydawnictwo Czarne, 2019.

²⁵ S. Boym, *Future of Nostalgia*, Basic Books 2002, 48.

²⁶ A. Smeekees, *National nostalgia: A group-based emotion that benefits the in-group but hampers intergroup relations*, "International Journal of Intercultural Relations", 59/2015.

²⁷ A. Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Harvard University Press 2005, 89.

²⁸ A.G. Nikelly, *op. cit.*

This feeling of identity discontinuity gives rise to anxiety and discomfort. Recalling pleasant times and places serves as a buffer from feelings of distress and uncertainty²⁹. Nostalgia, therefore, serves as a subliminal means to alleviate the pain caused by separation from one's homeland through "providing guidance into the future by recalling the ideals of the past"³⁰.

According to Sedikides, Wildschut, Routledge, and Arndt, Self-discontinuity is a notion of disjuncture between one's past and present self. They list several factors related to Self-discontinuity, amongst which they mention "anxiety, ineffective coping following life transitions such as job loss, and even suicide."³¹ According to the research conducted by Sedikides, individuals are able to experience a difference between their past and present Self. That difference, or contrast, is what can be described as a Self-discontinuity. In this regard, nostalgia can counter the negative symptoms of Self-discontinuity. Through selective remembering, nostalgia serves to form somewhat of an "appreciative stance" toward one's previous Self. By such developments, one can reestablish a positive perception of the Self.³²

According to the same authors, "nostalgia is a psychological resource that contributes to equilibrium in the self-system. Self-discontinuity, especially negative self-discontinuity, disrupts the equilibrium. Nostalgia would constitute a response to self-discontinuity and foster self-continuity, thus re-instating equilibrium".³³ Hence, I propose that alleviating attributes of nostalgia can be translated onto a broader plane,

²⁹ A. Smeekes, *op.cit.*

³⁰ A.G. Nikelly, *op.cit.*

³¹ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, C. Routledge, J. Arndt, *Nostalgia counteracts self-discontinuity and restores self-continuity*, European Journal of Social Psychology 2014.

³² C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, C. Routledge, J. Arndt, *op. cit.*

³³ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, C. Routledge, J. Arndt, *op. cit.*

namely, onto a plane of collective identity.

The individual self is defined based on personal traits that are supposed to distinguish an individual from other members of a particular group. The collective identity, however, describes an individual in the context of the group itself, differentiating that person from the other social group members.³⁴ In such a case, nostalgia would be able to reconnect dislocated collective memories through conjuring pleasant memories; only in that case would that require historical memory (or memories), according to the memory distinction proposed by Halbwachs. Such memories would involve events of national/collective glory or even whole periods perceived as times of well-being, peace, or development. Respectively, identity or Self-discontinuity would have to be able to shake the identity foundations on the collective level, on the level of collective trauma; it could be the experience of war, subjugation, political repressions, and alike. Nostalgia serves as an emotional reaction aimed at bridging the discontinuity in one's life. To be precise, nostalgia is produced when the difference or contrast between one's past and present (regardless of the subject of nostalgia, be it individual or collective) is visible and distinguishable.³⁵

Nostalgia has often been mistaken with homesickness; however, they are not the same. Homesickness refers simply to yearning to return to home or country, whereas nostalgia establishes a wider longing for an idealized and romanticized place and time. Moreover, homesickness refers to a place, while nostalgia may refer to various objects (e.g., people, places, events)³⁶. Studies on nostalgia as a phenomenon that can influence

³⁴ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, L. Gaertner, C. Routledge, J. Arndt, *Nostalgia as Enabler of Self Continuity*,

³⁵ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, L. Gaertner, C. Routledge, J. Arndt, *Nostalgia as Enabler of Self Continuity*,

³⁶ C. Sedikides, T. Wildschut, J. Arndt, C. Routledge, op. cit.

communities are a relatively new thing. National nostalgia refers to a mixed notion of loss and yearning for the home (country) of the past. It helps to fix the identity discontinuity. National nostalgia is supposed to cherish a reemerged perception of social identity that originated from the recognition of a shared past. According to Smeekes, group-based nostalgia is a process of social categorization; it depends on the distinction between the old ‘us’, who share the history, and new ‘them’, who had never participated in ‘our’ experience. Furthermore, some studies show that the original members of the community tend to claim to be of higher value than the outsiders³⁷. As defined by Smeekes, group-based nostalgia is “the nostalgic reverie that is contingent upon thinking of oneself in terms of a particular social identity or as a member of a particular group”³⁸. A shared memory that reaches beyond the memory of living people is a memory of a memory. It is, therefore, prone to distortion and not necessarily a memory that, through the division of diachronic labor, ends up at an actual event. This kind of memory reaches alleged memories of the past but not necessarily past events³⁹.

Svetlana Boym proposes a distinction of nostalgia into two theoretical dimensions. Restorative nostalgia is concentrated upon the reconstructions of the symbols of the past, whereas reflective nostalgia is supposed to be a conduit between the present and the imagined realm of another place and time. The two types of nostalgia dwell on different aspects of the phenomenon. Restorative nostalgia is predominantly tied with the domain of ‘nostos’ – returning home or recreating lost home, while reflective nostalgia acts in the


³⁷ A. Smeekes, op.cit.

³⁸ A. Smeekes, M. Verkuyten, B. Martinovic, *Longing for the country's good old days: National nostalgia, autochthony beliefs, and opposition to Muslim expressive rights*, “British Journal of Social

³⁹ A. Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Harvard University Press 2005, 111.

plane of ‘algia’, in the longing and loss. Restorative nostalgia ails the disjuncture and general Self-discontinuity through the intimate interaction with desired objects, memories, and places. Restorative nostalgia is a story of national past and future, collective memory and identity, while reflective nostalgia is more of an individual and personal notion⁴⁰. Boym argues that ‘one is nostalgic not for the past the way it was, but for the past, it could have been’. Or how I would rather put it, for the *present* that could have been.

That said, these two types of nostalgia are capable of intertwining. In fact, that is often the case. In the very instance of nostalgia in Taiwan, restorative nostalgia is the dominating force; however, the reflective subtype of nostalgia is undoubtedly present in the discourse of colonial phenomenon. Reflective nostalgia is mainly embodied by the memoirs of individuals that had directly experienced the colonial period.



⁴⁰ S. Boym, *Future of Nostalgia*, Basic Books 2002, p. 48.

3. History – rethinking & reflections

3.1. Treatment by the Japanese authority

So what may be the reasons for the predominantly positive portrayal of Japan in contemporary Taiwan? Does the favorable image of Japan correspond in any way with the historical facts? To some extent, this is undoubtedly the case; compared with other regions under the control of Japan in the first half of the 20th century, Taiwan was treated relatively well. Undoubtedly, the intensity of coercive actions in Taiwan was lower than in Korea or China. Why, then, did Taiwan enjoy such a privilege? One of the reasons could be the composition of the Japanese management staff in Taiwan. In 1945 27% of military personnel in Taiwan were owned by the imperial navy. In China and Korea, this ratio added up to 6% and 10%, respectively. That might have been crucial since the navy enjoyed the reputation of an institution of more liberal and open-minded people, compared to other branches of the Japanese Imperial Army⁴¹. However, the impact of the military staff's open-mindedness is practically unmeasurable, and as such, it is pure speculation. Besides, unlike China and Korea, at the time of establishing Japanese power in Taiwan, there was arguably no such thing as Taiwanese identity. For this reason, installing colonial administration did not encounter as much resistance as in Korea or China. The undeveloped national identity also resulted in less reluctance towards the aggressor. As an effect of the continuous political shifts and changes, there was no definite emergence of the Taiwanese identity, which would be linked to the islanders'

⁴¹ S. Denney, *Taiwan's Collective Memory of Japan: Around the Horn*, <http://www.shanghai1937.com/the-japanese-on-taiwan/> (retrieved 11.6.2018).

ethnicity⁴².

Japan intended to turn Taiwan into a “model colony”⁴³. It was supposed to help Japan to join the elite club of colonial powers. Goto Shimpei, the chief of the Civil Administration Bureau, openly confessed that Taiwan was supposed to be a colonization “university” for Japan’s first attempt at colonizing.⁴⁴

The right treatment may also have its origins in the original purpose of the colony. In contrast to Korea, which was only supposed to provide a corridor to Manchuria and deeper into China, Taiwan was planned to be the demonstration of Japan’s potential, and also, in a broader perspective, a bridgehead for the Japanese southbound expansion⁴⁵.

On the other hand, the Japanese administration often brutally used the apparatus of coercion to enforce power. There is a long list of malpractices, oppressive measures, and pure discrimination against Taiwanese carried out by the Japanese. The author of the essential *Fig Tree*, Wu Zhuoliu had been personally a witness to it. Throughout his life, Wu had been getting gradually more cognizant of the colonial discrimination that was taking place in Taiwan. He reminisces about the unfair treatment of Taiwanese students and limited career possibilities compared to his Japanese counterparts.^{46,47}

To avoid provoking the Japanese coercive apparatus, ‘Taiwaneseness’ was

⁴² Chang B.-Y., *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan*, Routledge 2015, 2.

⁴³ N. Heé, *Taiwan under Japanese Rule. Showpiece of a Model Colony? Historiographical Tendencies in Narrating Colonialism*, “History Compass”, 8/2014.

⁴⁴ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 214.

⁴⁵ Nish, *Japanese Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period*, Westport: Praeger Publishers, 1991, pp. 157-174.

⁴⁶ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 57.

⁴⁷ One of the most essential and relevant authors of the Taiwanese nativist literature (鄉土文學) was Wu Zhuoliu (1900-76) who had first-handedly experienced life under the Japanese colonial rule. In his seminal book, *The Fig Tree/無花果* (1970), Wu follows through the turbulent history of Taiwan in the first half of the 20th century up to the 228 Massacre.

treated by many Taiwanese people as a taboo for the sake of personal safety. These actions distort the image of lenient and cooperative Japanese. Even though considered to be relatively good, the Japanese treatment of the Taiwanese was by no means objectively proper. Wu writes about the hypocrisy of the Japanese colonial government regarding equal treatment. Despite the slogans like “Equal treatment for all,” “Japanese and Taiwanese – a single entity,” or “Japanese and Taiwanese in harmonious intermarriage!”, Japan actually kept harassing any attempt to implement these words into life.⁴⁸

Ching writes about the underlying hypocrisy that was embedded in the ideologies of assimilation (doka) and imperialization (kominka). As Ozaki Hotsuki states, the goal of that system was “not to live as Japanese, but to die as Japanese.”⁴⁹ The ideologies of doka and kominka distorted the image of the Taiwanese's actual social and political status. These movements implied, by definition, that the Taiwanese were supposed to become full-fledged citizens of the Japanese Empire. In reality, the political and economic rights of the Taiwanese were constantly denied.⁵⁰ In the end, any form of coercive assimilation is, in its core and by definition, discriminatory.

3.2. Modernization

Probably the most apparent and visible reason that could underlie the Taiwanese longing for Japan is the issue of modernization of the island that occurred during Japanese

⁴⁸ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 91.

⁴⁹ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 89.

⁵⁰ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 97.

rule. Until the Japanese, Taiwan had been peripheral to Qing's China and, as such, in large neglected and undeveloped. The Mainland generally did not consider the island to be of strategic or economic value. By contrast, the Japanese treated Taiwan as a chance to develop a showpiece colony and thereby ascend to the international first league.

Japanese Imperial rule introduced to Taiwan many of the newest achievements of civilization. One of the most significant and memorable decisions of the colonizer was surely developing the railway system in Taiwan. Due to the infrastructure modernization plans, the Japanese were able to implement the effective transportation system in Taiwan and, in a way, bring together regions that were geographically and logistically remote until then. Among other achievements in this field, the creation of Western Line stands out as exceptionally remarkable since it linked the major cities along the west coast of Taiwan and affected their growing prosperity⁵¹. Apart from that, the Japanese had also introduced "taisha" to Taiwan, a self-propelled rail trolley,

General modernization was not limited to the railroads; the construction of the Wushantou Dam and the Jianan irrigation system are among the most significant projects of its era. In its time, the latter was the biggest and the most advanced irrigation system in Asia¹²⁵². The modernization of infrastructure (often rather creation from scratch) is indisputable. However, the modernization of Taiwan by the Japanese was inextricably tied with immense exploitation. Taiwan served as a supply source for Japan; it provided its metropolis with resources such as rice, sugar, gold, salt, and coal⁵³.

⁵¹ R. Sławiński, *Historia Tajwanu*, Warsaw: Elipsa, 2001.

⁵² I. Numazaki, *Colonial and Imperial Landscapes in the Taiwanese Film "KANO": A Postimperial View*, access: https://www.academia.edu/19567744/Colonial_and_Imperial_Landscapes_in_the_Taiwanese_Film_KANO_A_Postimperial_View (retrieved: 12.06.2018).

⁵³ R. Sławiński, op. cit.

Japanese also take credit for the significant improvement of the general health level in Taiwan. Apart from the construction of numerous clinics and hospitals, the Japanese employed foreign engineers in order to expand sanitary structures. That is how sewage systems and storm drains were introduced to Taiwan. As a result, the rate of infectious diseases in the Taiwanese society dropped dramatically⁵⁴. On the other hand, there is a morally questionable case of monopolizing the opium business. After taking over Taiwan Japanese faced the severe problem of opium addiction among Taiwanese. Instead of imposing an absolute ban on opioids (even though it was the initial idea), the Japanese Colonial Government enacted the Taiwan Opium Edict, which technically compelled all opium dealers to cooperate with the Japanese government. In that way, the Japanese government took charge of opium distribution. Admittedly, by imposing certain restrictions on the opium market, the number of addicts had dropped dramatically by the end of Japanese rule⁵⁵. Nonetheless, the very fact of taking economic gains (and how significant contribution it was) from that business is nothing but a typical measure imposed by the colonizer upon the colonized. Wu Zhuoliu states that “it was colonial policy to develop agriculture in Taiwan and reserve industry for Japan proper (...)”.⁵⁶

Japanese are also responsible for the reform of education in Taiwan. They had decreed the closing of private schools, instead of which they established public schools with four years of compulsory primary education. Now not surprisingly, education was turned into one of the essential instruments of Japanese indoctrination and brainwashing.

⁵⁴ R. Sławiński, op. cit.

⁵⁵ H. Cheung, *Taiwan in Time: The 'war' on opium*, access: <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/feat/archives/2017/01/15/2003663122>, (retrieved 12.06.2018).

⁵⁶ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 88.

The colonial education system in Taiwan aimed to create an obedient and submissive society. In the first stage of Japanese colonization, Taiwanese were left without a chance of attending secondary education since it was conducted in Japanese. Ethnic discrimination was common; the Taiwanese were not allowed to become civil servants, judiciaries, or scientists. The only prestigious career paths available to them were medicine and teaching⁵⁷. Indubitably, the Japanese had significantly contributed to the remarkable improvement of the education level in Taiwan. However, the underlying motive of said reform overshadows the whole issue. The modern education model was not implemented on behalf of some positivist ideology; it was instead a tool to subdue Taiwanese.

As sketched out above, although modernization indeed improved many aspects of everyday life in Taiwan, it was not free from abuse and exploitation. Mark Harrison wrote that Japan's exploitation of Taiwanese "natural resources could be compared with keeping a hen for eggs, and in this way, the industries and all kinds of establishments had remarkable progress."⁵⁸ Therefore it is hard to indicate univocally that the process of modernization and related issues was the reason for Taiwan's sympathy for Japan.

3.3. KMT factor

The factors mentioned above are (to some extent) certainly a significant pretext for the idealization of Japan. However, the motivation for Taiwanese nostalgia for Japan

⁵⁷ R. Sławiński, op. cit.

⁵⁸ M. Harrison, *Legitimacy, Meaning, and Knowledge in the Making of Taiwanese Identity*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2006, p 99.

cited most frequently is the impact of the Kuomintang rule in times directly after World War II. Taiwan had been Japanese for fifty years, four months, and twenty-seven days when Japan signed the surrender in 1945, thereby ceding the island to the Republic of China. In the eyes of many Taiwanese, this was indeed a festive moment; despite fifty years of colonial indoctrination, cultural ties with China were still strong⁵⁹. Wu reports overpowering exhilaration and joy descending from being a part of China again. The emphatic atmosphere in Taipei after Japan's defeat was overwhelming: "The whole city seethed with excitement – long-hidden lanterns, garlands and silken banners were brought out, firecrackers exploded endlessly, and Taipei was transformed into a whirlpool of color and noise."⁶⁰

However, the brutal treatment and malpractices carried out by the KMT government after taking over Taiwan soon pushed the Taiwanese (especially the elites that prospered under the Japanese) to romanticize the colonial times. It did not take long before the Taiwanese realized that the new government does not necessarily mean the liberation and continuation of stable development. After the arrival of the Nationalist army, Wu could not hide his disappointment. Soldiers, who were imagined to be heroes that defeated the Japanese, turned out to look poor and exhausted. It was a shock for Taiwanese who still remember how well-organized and intimidating the Japanese Imperial army was.⁶¹

After taking over the island, Kuomintang filled all the significant posts with people

⁵⁹ A. D. Morris, *Introduction: Living as Left Behind on Postcolonial Taiwan*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015, p. 11.

⁶⁰ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 167.

⁶¹ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 183.

from the continent. Taiwanese were moved away from the administration because they were supposedly not Chinese enough⁶². At that time, one could notice the rapid takeover of official positions by the Mainlanders. Chinese filled the positions left by the Japanese, while the locals remained low-tier at the administrative hierarchy. The argumentation behind that was that the Taiwanese needed to be re-educated before they could be allowed to hold any critical post; Mainlanders claimed that the Taiwanese were indoctrinated to be and think like “Japanese slaves.”⁶³

That might have been the defining moment for the Chinese-Taiwanese relationship on the island, which began the tragic conflict between these two groups that eventually culminated with the 228 Massacre and 38 years of martial law. The friction between the newcomers from the continent and the local population culminated on February 28th, 1947. Riots that broke out that day went down in history under the name of the 228 Incident. It was a manifestation of discontent of Chinese policy towards Taiwan (KMT regime blamed, among the others, the “poisonous” effect of Japanization for causing the incident⁶⁴). The revolt was brutally suppressed by KMT forces and has been a powerful symbol of KMT’s violence up to this day. In the 1980s, Hill Gates heard from one Taiwanese that “(...) under the Japanese, we learned to trust the word of the authorities. The Nationalists betrayed that trust; they will never have it again.”⁶⁵

After losing the Civil War and escaping to Taiwan in 1949, KMT invoked martial

⁶² Y. He, *Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan’s Relations with China and Japan, 1895–2012*, “Political Science Quarterly”, 3/2014

⁶³ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 189.

⁶⁴ Ibid.

⁶⁵ A. D. Morris, *Introduction: Living as Left Behind on Postcolonial Taiwan*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015, p. 13.

law on the island. It was in the interest of the Nationalists to make sure that the Taiwanese identify with China; this was central to Chiang Kai-shek's overarching goal of regaining the Mainland. In order to do so, KMT introduced a new "Chinese" curriculum, prohibited speaking (during the lessons), and teaching in local languages, radio and television became available only in Mandarin. The authoritarian rule of KMT put much effort into sinicizing Taiwanese (in KMT rhetoric, it was a re-sinicization). Starting from 1945 until the mid-1960s, KMT was putting an exceptional effort on eradicating Japanese influences and shaping Chinese identity among Taiwanese. Nationalists introduced the term 'guangfu' (光復), which means recovery, in reference to Taiwan, to indicate that the island finally rejoined with the „Motherland.” In Taiwan, decolonization, contrasting with the Third World discourse, was not about liberation or independence, but about a “retrocession” (aforementioned guangfu) to the fatherland, China.⁶⁶

Apart from banning the Japanese cultural remainings from the cultural life of Taiwan, Kuomintang also adopted the policy of the idealization of Mainland China. Not only did Mandarin become an official language in both the public sphere and education; the new regime had also altered the school curricula in order to make sure that the new generations would possess a thorough knowledge of Chinese history and geography, a knowledge of place which they were supposed to treat as their as the ancestral home⁶⁷. It would, however, leave barely any room for education about Taiwan itself. It seemed, in some way, as if Taiwan was colonized again. Even for the Republic of China after 1949, Taiwan seemed to be of marginal importance, almost a liability. For the reasons mentioned

⁶⁶ Leo T.S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia*, Duke University Press Books 2019, loc.2015.

⁶⁷ Chang B.-Y., *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan*, Routledge 2015, 164.

above, the nominal de-colonization of Taiwan in the eyes of many of its inhabitants turned out to be de facto recolonization.

Apart from banning the Japanese remaining from the cultural life of Taiwan, Kuomintang also adopted the policy of the idealization of Mainland China. Not only did Mandarin become an official language in both the public sphere and education; the new regime had also changed the school curricula in order to make sure that the new generations would possess a thorough knowledge of Chinese history and geography, a knowledge of place which they were supposed to treat as their as the ancestral home⁶⁸. It would, however, leave barely any room for education about Taiwan itself. It seemed, in some way, as if Taiwan was colonized again. Even for the Republic of China after 1949, Taiwan seemed to be of marginal importance, almost a liability.

The already negative perception of the KMT government was further strengthened by a rampant economic crisis that took place after World War II in Taiwan (which was not wholly KMT's fault). KMT's rule was considered to be unfair, corrupted, and violent. The disappointment and disgust of the Nationalist actions on the island effectively pushed the Taiwanese toward reconstitution and reimagining their colonial memory and relationship with Japan.⁶⁹ Wu reports that he had become sentimental and more sympathetic to the Japanese and the times they were ruling the island after experiencing a similar kind of mistreatment and discrimination from the hands of the Chinese, with whom they were supposed to be sharing the bond of blood. He describes his disappointment and the disillusionment of the Taiwanese society that had painfully learned that the new regime

⁶⁸ Chang B.-Y., *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan*, Routledge 2015, 164.

⁶⁹ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 249.

was far from what they imagined.⁷⁰ There was a running joke in Taiwan during the 1950s: “The Japanese were lucky because the Americans only dropped atomic bombs on them; Americans dropped Chiang Kai-shek on us”⁷¹. This perception of the new ruling authorities (combined with the memories about the modernization of the Taiwanese infrastructure by the Japanese) very likely gave rise to the feeling of nostalgia for Japan within the Taiwanese society.

3.4. Historical Nostalgia issue in Poland

Clearly, the phenomenon of nostalgia is not distinctive to Taiwan. Apart from its original personal manifestation that occurs on the individual level, one can easily identify various nostalgia modes in almost every state. I would like to point out that the aforementioned individual nostalgia is not the case in this situation – it takes place across nations, ethnicities, or age groups. I want to present here that in many countries, similarly to Taiwan, nostalgia has been commercialized and further politicized. As a political tool, Nostalgia is a double-edged sword; it can catalyze patriotism and social consciousness. However, in the wrong hands, it may become a deadly weapon just right for inciting nationalism and revisionism.

In its very basic understanding, the genesis of nostalgia can be boiled down to the continuous shifts of power and subsequent periods of social anxiety and uncertainty. I believe that the example of Poland’s history can serve as a valid auxiliary argument to

⁷⁰ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 189.

⁷¹ A. D. Morris, *Introduction: Living as Left Behind on Postcolonial Taiwan*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015, p. 13.

support this claim.

The timeline of “the nostalgia-defining” events in both countries is strikingly convergent. Both Taiwan and Poland entered the XX century as subsidiary states. Poland had been technically non-existent since the Third Partition in 1795, which erased Poland from the political maps for over a century. Polish territory was divided between Russia, Prussia, and Austria. The partitioning powers had implemented aggressive and wide-scale campaigns that aimed at eradicating the Polish identity. Those policies ultimately failed and backfired, thus inducing the Polish consciousness and national identification, often through the mode of nostalgia. It is extensively documented in the Polish literature and art of the period, especially within the Romantic movement. Polish Romanticists had been idealizing the Polish state through the nostalgia lenses. It is evident in many literary works, including *Pan Tadeusz* by Adam Mickiewicz or *Moja Piosnka II* by Cyprian Kamil Norwid. Of course, nostalgia for the lost country (and freedom/liberties) is the primordial and primary form of nostalgia, as it was first observed in the XVII century. In this case, longing for a lost home was, in a sense, almost material and tangible. Not only was the previous way of life gone, the whole state and its institutions that hitherto had indicated the national identity disappeared. The issue of loss was not open for interpretation – the loss was objective. In such an environment, the emergence/hatching of nostalgia with all of its positive and negative attributes would be somewhat expected. The idealization of the lost country was thus justified, at least to some extent.

Poland regained sovereignty in 1918 as a result of the Central Powers’ defeat in World War I. The similarity between Poland and Taiwan lies on a different plane here and is far more abstract. Whereas Poland regained its independence, the sense of Taiwanese

identity was just starting to crawl. That was the period when the Taiwanese intellectual elites started to express their ideas of identity and affiliation. League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament and the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy in Taiwan are examples of such groups. The character of those movements was far from radical calls for the insurgency, and for the most part, limited itself to the debates of Taiwan's role within the Japanese Empire. Nonetheless, the Taiwanese started to comprehend themselves as separate from the Japanese. This sentiment had been further induced by the introduction of brutal assimilation policies (kominka) starting in 1937.

In Poland, the interwar period was marked by the alleged flourishing of culture and arts and infrastructural developments on the one hand, and coup d'état (1926), the rise of the authoritarian regime, and political repressions on the other. It was not a healthy, democratic, and efficient state. The shortcomings and continuous failures of the theretofore diplomacy of the regime became apparent in the wake of the outbreak of World War II. Poland, encircled by Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union, capitulated after one month of fighting.

World War II in Poland was concluded by the "brotherly help" of the Soviets and eventual "liberation" from the Nazi occupants. As a result, Poland ended up as a satellite state of the Soviet Union and continued to be one for the next 45 years. The ruling communist regime severely stunted the emergence of any nostalgia towards interwar Poland. Every single expression of praise towards the interwar state was a subject of censorship and could result in grave consequences for its author. The state control of the former's regime depicted in the Post-World War II reality was another common denominator between Poland and Taiwan. The rhetoric of the then regimes in Poland and

Taiwan, although ideologically opposite, both implemented somewhat similar tools in order to shape the public discourse and intimidate the opposition.

The first seeds of nostalgia for the interwar period could be planted around the time of installing the communist regime. However, due to the political repression, complex censorship system, and the enormous effort to rebuild the country, the exact and precise moment of the conception of nostalgia is impossible to pinpoint. Similarly to Taiwan, within the trend of idealization of the interwar Polish state, a set of particular aspects are being idealized, with a seeming omission of the negative phenomenon.

Infrastructural investments and developments are one of the most frequently used arguments of the apologia in the narrative of the Second Polish Republic. The development of the Central Industrial Region (Centralny Okręg Przemysłowy), which aimed at creating a hub of heavy industry of Poland, and building the port city of Gdynia, are the flagship examples of the success story rhetoric of (and on) that period.

Noticeably, the economic and infrastructural development did take place in interwar Poland; however, their extent and significance are vastly overestimated. It creates a distorted image of interwar Poland as an economically sound country, while, in fact, this view was far from reality.

One can also identify a movement toward the idealization of strict political rule, even if it held a stigma of an authoritarian regime. The sentiment for a strong centralized political authority locates itself as an opposition to the contemporary, pluralistic - and often viewed as volatile and ineffective – political reality.

Therefore, it is understandable that the current political rule in Poland, The United Right Wing (with Law and Justice party being the unequivocal leader of that coalition),

puts a significant effort to fuel the nostalgia towards the interwar Polish state. In the Polish public sphere, the Second Polish Republic is held in preposterously high esteem, saint-like almost. It functions as a symbol of the restoration of an independent Polish state, and as such is being thoughtlessly put on a pedestal.

It is worth noting is that in the political realm, nostalgization goes further than stressing only the positive sides of a particular regime while obscuring the negative ones. The very fact of nostalgic and idealized memory for that period allows and legitimates the repetition of some of these anti-democratic and authoritarian practices. For instance, the current ruling party is nostalgic for the anti-democratic solutions from the time of the Second Polish Republic regarding the judiciary. Moreover, it consistently strives, though, of course, with some modifications, to implement them. The very fact that they originate from the venerated Second Republic somehow automatically legitimizes their enactment.

To sum it up, nostalgia for the Second Polish Republic underscores the economic prosperity of the period and higher moral standard and the social order back then. At the same time, the apparently negative aspects, such as the gentrification of the society and creeping authoritarianism, are overlooked. Moreover, the nostalgic image of the Second Polish Republic keeps being instrumentalized and reproduced in order to legitimate the actions of the politicians. I believe that the above patterns can be easily identified within the colonial nostalgia in Taiwan as well.

4. Taiwan and colonial nostalgia

Patricia Lorcin claims that colonial nostalgia falls under the restorative dimension of nostalgia (as in the distinction offered by Boym), identifying ‘nostos’, or yearning for home, with the characteristic colonial lifestyle.⁷² Svetlana Boym argues that nostalgia is a highly complex social phenomenon. It is not merely a notion of displacement or disjuncture and loss of a cherished past, but also a form of sentimentalization of one’s past with the use of the present concerns. Colonial nostalgia can be ascribed to the restorative quality of the phenomenon. In this dimension of colonial nostalgia, ‘nostos,’ the yearning to go home, is represented directly by the longing for the past lifestyle. However, colonial nostalgia is not only a reflection of a gone lifestyle but also, and most importantly, a reflection of the romanticized idea of the actual state of affairs under the colonial regime within a specified period.

Colonial nostalgia requires certain factors to emerge. A sense of historical linearity is essential. Nostalgia would become obsolete if history lived a cyclical life. In the nostalgic scenario of time, the past has to be irretrievable, and the present has to be marked with a decline, be it social, political, or cultural. Moreover, nostalgia requires tangible objects of focus – a palpable remaining of the past time. Nostalgia preys on the specific fixations with the material and non-material tokens of the past. For nostalgia to happen, there has to be a significant presence of the past within the present, with which one can continuously compare the contemporaneity.⁷³

⁷² P. M. E. Lorcin, *Imperial Nostalgia; Colonial Nostalgia. Differences of Theory, Similarities of Practice?*, *Historical Reflections* Volume 39 Issue 3, 2013.

⁷³ W.C. Bissel, *Engaging Colonial Nostalgia*, *Lafayette College, Cultural Anthropology*, Volume 20 Issue 2, 2005.

National identity (in almost all cases) has always been determined relationally, through the relationship with the 'Other'. However, it does not inherently mean that the process is doomed to antagonize two communities. National 'Self' and 'Other' can be competitive, cooperative, or even harmonious. Instead of being an external 'other' against which national identity could be determined, colonial Japan served as a counterpoint to mainland China in the reformulation of the Taiwanese identity. It provided a somewhat paternal figure that could guide Taiwan in contemporary reality⁷⁴. This argument is further reinforced by Bi-Yu Chang, who claims that immigrant communities, such as that in Taiwan, exist in a seeming contradiction of the desire to return 'home'.⁷⁵

Following Benedict Anderson's distinction, Taiwan can be classified as a settler colony. That is a particular case where national identity is not defined by the relation with any random 'Other', but specifically through the relation with its metropolis. According to Anderson, colonial "mother" is the most essential reference – "other" against which settler colonies build their distinctive identities⁷⁶. He Yinan argues that the strongest and the most crucial factor for patriotism (and therefore national identity-building process) within settler communities is a "sense of dispossession and alienation from the discriminatory or even oppressive system imposed by the metropole on the colonies".⁷⁷ To define their own distinct identity, Taiwanese have been comparing Taiwan to two "others" - Japan and China. Leo Ching argues that any concept of a Taiwanese identity

⁷⁴ Y. He, *Identity Politics and Foreign Policy: Taiwan's Relations with China and Japan, 1895–2012*, "Political Science Quarterly", 3/2014.

⁷⁵ Chang B.-Y., *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan*, Routledge 2015, 3-4.

⁷⁶ B. Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origins and Spread of Nationalism*, London: Verso, 2006, Chapter 4.

⁷⁷ Y. He, op.cit.

can only be expressed between the undisputable Chineseness and Japaneseness.⁷⁸

The experience of decolonization and its nature affects the nature of nostalgia toward colonial times⁷⁹. Those two aforementioned “master countries” had been systematically taking attempts to construct a dominant Japanese or Chinese identity in Taiwanese society. They had been numerous juxtaposed against each other in Taiwan. This situation could be described by a specific example of identity–tug of war, a competition of nostalgias. The implementation of identity policy, either by Japan or China, was inextricably tied with the denial of the other. Thus, the “kominka” (皇民化) policy employed in 1937 was aimed not only at the Japanization of Taiwanese but also on the necessary eradication of Chinese identity among the Taiwanese (because it could endanger Japanese war plans in a longer perspective). Wu reports first-handedly that “their aim was to destroy our identity throughout the kominka movement – a deliberate attempt to turn us into faithful Japanese citizens of the Emperor.”⁸⁰ As Ching writes, kominka “aimed at the complete regimentation and Japanization of Japan’s colonial races, and justified these goals through endless moral platitudes couched in Confucian phraseology and centered on inculcation of a sense of obligation to the Japanese Emperor.”⁸¹ Kominka consisted of certain pillars, among which were the “national language movement” (kokugo undo), the “name changing program” (kaiseimei), and the “volunteers’ system” (shiganhei seido). From the imperialist standpoint, the process of kominka was a political and cultural

⁷⁸ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 2151.

⁷⁹ W.C. Bissel, *Engaging Colonial Nostalgia*, *Cultural Anthropology*, Volume 20 Issue 2, 2005.

⁸⁰ Wu Zhuoliu, *The Fig Tree: Memoirs of a Taiwanese Patriot*, translated by Duncan Hunter, Bloomington 2002, p. 97.

⁸¹ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 1009.

escalation prerequisite to transmute the colonized into loyal and dedicated imperial followers. At that time, the meaning of kominka was explained by the war preparations.⁸²

Sinicization initiated by KMT was aimed at both national integration and securing Taiwanese support to its conflict with the Communists on the Mainland; in the discourse of the time, Japan was depicted as negative “other”⁸³ (only for domestic purposes, in terms of international politics Chiang Kai-shek considered Japan as a potential ally against Communist China). Eventually, the contemporary Japanophilia (which kicked off rapidly after lifting the ban on Japanese culture products in 1992), in order to enforce a distinct Taiwanese identity, has been consequently downplaying the Chinese heritage of Taiwan, instead emphasizing the Japanese colonial era as a moment that represents the experience that differentiates Taiwan from China. After the democratization and subsequent rapid globalization in Taiwan, the cultural ties between Taiwan and Japan were reopened. Ching argues that Japanese colonialism played a crucial role in constructing a distinctive Taiwanese identity in terms of essential socio-economic development. It was Japanese colonialism that directed Taiwan to separate itself from the Chinese social circle.⁸⁴ The term itself – ‘Japanophilia’ (in Mandarin 哈日) – has been present in Taiwanese publications since 1997. Japanese nostalgia and identity in Taiwan have become synonymous with opposition to “China” in any possible form⁸⁵. More and more frequently, the Japanese colonization has been represented in the 1990s and 2000s, like politics that

⁸² Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 1020.

⁸³ Y. He, *op.cit.*

⁸⁴ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 808.

⁸⁵ A. D. Morris, *Introduction: Living as Left Behind on Postcolonial Taiwan*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015.

left a positive cultural heritage; this contributed to reinforcing the assumed originality of the Taiwanese identity as opposed to continental China. Until 1994 the perception of the national identity among the Taiwanese was somewhat significant. Hitherto, most of the Taiwanese population considered themselves either ‘only Chinese’ or ‘Chinese and Taiwanese.’ However, only a small portion of the society, clearly a minority, viewed themselves as ‘only Taiwanese’ (less than one-fifth).⁸⁶ Margalit claims that it is hard to remember a past humiliation without reliving it. That might have been the case in Taiwan, according to literary sources. However, young generations have not experienced that injustice directly; therefore, they can bring up that “memory” (or rather memory of memory) without reliving it⁸⁷.

According to Wakabayashi, the birth of modern Taiwanese nationalism took place under the Japanese, as Taiwanese were not aware of a distinct Self until they became discriminated members of the Japanese empire. During the colonial period, a portion of the Taiwanese society, especially among the elites, started to identify themselves as the Japanese, whereas the rest exhibited a notion of mixed identity split between the Japanese, Chinese, and Taiwanese. The first signs of the emergence of distinctively Taiwanese identity should be traced back to the colonial period, and more specifically, to the 1920s. It had been growing ever since, significantly gaining in strength in the 1940s as a reaction to the Japanese war mobilization effort. Taiwanese identity in that period, however, did not necessarily preclude the coexistence with the general ethnic Chinese identity, being as well an internal dimension of newly arisen Japanese Imperial identity.⁸⁸

⁸⁶ Chang B.-Y., *Place, Identity and National Imagination in Postwar Taiwan*, Routledge 2015, 5.

⁸⁷ A. Margalit, *The Ethics of Memory*, Harvard University Press 2005, 111.

⁸⁸ F. Muiyad, *The Formation of Taiwan's New National Identity Since the End of 1980s*,

Paradoxically, the cultural influence of the Japanese ‘Other,’ which had been the target of Taiwanese nationalist struggles before 1945, has become a symbol of resisting the China ‘Other’ personified in this case by the KMT regime⁸⁹. Nostalgia has extended its presence beyond literature and cinema, becoming a commonality in public spheres of social life.

On the centenary of the Treaty of Shimonoseki, several celebrations took place in Taiwan. For instance, Shih-lin elementary school celebrated its centennial. This facility, formerly known as Shizangangakudo(芝山巖学堂), was the place where the Japanese colonial education originated. It was founded by Izawa Shuji, the first director of the Colonial Education Bureau. In July, Lu Xiu-lian(Annette Lu, 呂秀蓮), the freshly designated vice president of the Democratic Progressive Party, set off to Shimonoseki as a leader of a pilgrimage to the place where the treaty was signed; upon the arrival, she led a one-hundred-member pilgrimage to Shimonoseki, where the treaty was signed and expressed gratitude to the Japanese for guiding the Taiwanese out of China.⁹⁰

In France, it was not merely the ancien regime that fostered the revolution, but the revolution created the ancien regime in the metaphorical, collective imagination.⁹¹ Respectively the times of upheaval after WWII gave rise to creating a coherent and specific memory of the Japanese. Leo Ching argues that Japanese colonialism has stimulated a historical breach that allowed the dis-identification from Mainland China and

⁸⁹ M. Wakabayashi, *Taiwanese Nationalism and the Unforgettable “Others”*, in: E. Friedman (ed.), *China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemma and International Peace*, London: Routledge, 2006.

⁹⁰ L. Ching, “Give Me Japan and Nothing Else!” *Poscoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism*, *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Volume 99 Issue 4, 2000.

⁹¹ S. Boym, *Future of Nostalgia*, Basic Books 2002, 48.

the creation of a distinctively Taiwanese subjectivity.⁹²

However, Ching recognizes a critical issue – not to confuse the omnipresence of Japanese-produced mass culture in Taiwan with an unreflective process of identification with the (ex) colonizer. In his view, the ubiquitousness of ‘Japaneseness’ has more to do with the mechanisms of capitalism rather than the influence of Japanese colonialism. According to him, it is simplistic and erroneous to link the sentiment for Japan in postcolonial Taiwan as an austere after-effect of colonialism.⁹³

There are voices that the post-war authoritarian regime of KMT and the tragedy of the 228 Massacre caused a historical and social split, as a result of which the Taiwanese got rid of the illusions about the new government, thus turning themselves toward Japan. However, this theory does not take into account the complexity of the problem. According to Ching, this view completely overlooks the convergence between postcolonial longing for Japan and the colonial rebellion in defense of separateness and identity⁹⁴. In my opinion, Ching is wrong here because he assumes the existence of an ideal system in which emotions such as nostalgia can be defined and described on the principles of rationalism. Yes, the revolt against KMT and the potential longing for Japan, and the protests against Japanese colonialism have much in common. However, the point here is not to argue about the legitimacy of this rebellion but to acknowledge its existence as a fact and examine its causes and consequences.

⁹² L. Ching, “Give Me Japan and Nothing Else!” *Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism*, South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 99 Issue 4, 2000.

⁹³ L. Ching, “Give Me Japan and Nothing Else!” *Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism*, South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 99 Issue 4, 2000.

⁹⁴ L. Ching, “Give Me Japan and Nothing Else!” *Postcoloniality, Identity, and the Traces of Colonialism*, South Atlantic Quarterly, Volume 99 Issue 4, 2000.

4.1. The portrayal of Japan in Taiwanese cinema

In 1895 under the Treaty of Shimonoseki, Taiwan was ceded to Japan by the Qing Empire. Almost simultaneously, the Lumiere brothers had presented their Cinematograph to the public in France. However, Taiwan had to wait until the year 1900 to be introduced to the device and, therefore, to the cinema. The cinematograph was publicly launched in Taiwan on June 21st 1900, in Taipei; it was the property of Oshima Putaichi, a Japanese businessman living in Taipei. Screenings were initially intended for the Japanese audience. Eventually, after ten days, shows were decided to be introduced to local Taiwanese, and they turned out to be an outstanding success. Notwithstanding, by 1915, there were only four permanent movie theaters in Taiwan, and most of the film exhibitions were conducted by businessmen and technicians from Japan. Overall, compared to the rest of the world, the development of the film industry was rather slow⁹⁵.

Cinema in Taiwan before 1945 remained under the strict supervision of the colonial government, which initially imported propaganda educational films from Japan to indoctrinate and assimilate the population. This situation changed partially when, in 1923, two Japanese film studios obtained the right to film in Taiwan. Nevertheless, the subject of these films still oscillated around Japanese aesthetics and could not interest the Taiwanese audience, which preferred films imported from America and mainland China, shown by the Touring Cinema Company (台灣巡迴電影公司).⁹⁶ Taiwanese involvement in the film industry under Japanese colonial rule was severely limited. Not only Taiwanese

⁹⁵ M. Wakabayashi, *Taiwanese Nationalism and the Unforgettable "Others"*, in: E. Friedman (ed.), *China's Rise, Taiwan's Dilemma and International Peace*, London: Routledge, 2006.

⁹⁶ M.-B. Yue, 'There Is No Place Like Home': *Diasporic Identifications and Taiwan Cinema of the 1960s and 1970s*, *Postcolonial Studies*, 6/2.

lacked the skills required to produce an appealing picture, but also Taiwanese audiences themselves preferred Chinese films from Shanghai or Hong Kong over the native productions⁹⁷. Against this background, Liao Huang stands out as the first and probably one of the few Taiwanese participating in the film business during the first decade of the 20th century. Liao learned his projection skills in Tokyo and then returned to his hometown – Miaoli, with a projector and 25 films; later, he successfully expanded his business to Taipei⁹⁸. The first film realized in Taiwan was *Butsuda no Hitomi (Buddha's Pupils)*, directed by Edward K. Tanaka in 1924. The scenography of the picture included several temples in Taipei and beaches on the northern coast. Moreover, although all of the main actors and crew were Japanese, some Taiwanese were cast to play supporting roles and therefore appear in the film for the first time in history⁹⁹. The other notable production created under Japanese rule was a picture directed by Liu Xiyang – *Whose Fault Is It?*, the first Taiwanese feature film shot exclusively in Taiwan. It received relatively good reviews; however, it turned out to be a commercial failure due to limited distribution¹⁰⁰.

Also, the cinema during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan served as an education and propaganda tool. Movies produced under this agenda were supposed “to educate the ignorant Taiwanese”¹⁰¹ about the benefits of being the imperial subjects. This movement was supported both by the local and central Japanese government. Interestingly, the films created in Taiwan were also aimed at educating people in Japan about the island's actual

⁹⁷ Lee Daw-Ming, *How Cinema Came and Stayed in Taiwan*, retrieved from: www.academia.edu/4377262/A_Brief_History_of_Taiwan_Cinema; 1.10.2019.

⁹⁸ Op. cit.

⁹⁹ M. Rawnsley, *Film History and Public Memory in Taiwan*, retrieved from: <http://blogs.nottingham.ac.uk/chinapolicyinstitute/2014/11/20/film-history-and-public-memory-in-taiwan/>.

¹⁰⁰ Lee Daw-Ming, op. cit.

¹⁰¹ Op. cit.

living conditions and reality. The main objective of the filmmakers was to present the outstanding outcome of the colonial government's policies and debunk the myths of Taiwanese savagery and other defunct stereotypes about Taiwan¹⁰². According to Wilson, in order to create a particular national or quasi-national self-image, it is necessary to put up a narrative that surrounds that image. Hence, the Japanese filmmakers idealized and romanticized the relationship between the metropole and the colony.¹⁰³

During World War II, the film industry in Taiwan had adopted rigid propaganda characteristics. Educating Taiwanese of the correctness of imperialization and Japanization, and above all, encouraging them to enlist as volunteers in the Japanese army was the primary goal of cinema. The control over cinema in colonial times had been inextricably linked to the progress of the war effort. Cinema served as an essential propaganda tool, and, as such, it was dependent on the war goals. That is why the war-time cinema is stripped off any productions that could not serve any tangible benefit to the course of the campaign.

Sayon's Bell/莎韻之鐘 by Hiroshi Shimizu is a film from 1943. It is one of the flagship examples of propaganda war-time productions. The film's plot is based on the true story of a young Atayal girl named Sayun Hayun, who had most likely drowned while seeing off her teacher who was being sent to war in China. The eponymous bell was a gift from the Japanese colonial governor to the people of Nan'ao, the protagonist's hometown. It was supposed to commemorate the patriotic dedication and commitment of Sayun. Like many others of that period, this film aimed at boosting the morale and devotion of colonial

¹⁰² Op. cit.

¹⁰³ F. Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg University Press 2014, pp.18-19.

subjects. Above all, however, the main goal of productions such as *Sayon's Bell* was encouraging people to volunteer and join the army.¹⁰⁴

In 1945, after World War II, Kuomintang took over the media to prepare the ground for taking over the island. In the meantime, the Propaganda Bureau had taken over film studios and announced new restrictions and censorship regulations. From then on, the distribution of Japanese films, as well as Japanese or characters, was strictly prohibited and punished. As Yue suggests, these activities had apparent legitimacy in the context of the decolonization of the island in the post-war period, but in the broader historical context, it marked the beginning of Taiwan's recolonization. De-Japanization turned into re-sinicization, without any regard for the Taiwanese, who at that time were developing a unique identity.¹⁰⁵ The new administration had quickly installed its institutions. The nationalist government led by Chiang Kai-shek initiated a wide-scale campaign of "re-sinicizing" the island. In order to do so, Nationalists banned Japanese films and replaced them by titles promoting the rhetoric of new rulers. This period was marked chiefly by anti-communist and pro-KMT productions. In 1949 KMT escaped Mainland China after losing the Civil War to the communists. Although stuck on a small island and virtually stripped off a chance to retake China, Nationalists refused to accept the new state of matters. They considered themselves the rightful rulers of China and treated Taiwan as a part of it. This view had been reflected in the post-war cinema in Taiwan. KMT government focused on promoting the Mandarin language. Sino-Japanese War, and especially World War II, created very complicated memories in Taiwan as Japan was the enemy of China between

¹⁰⁴ <https://www.japansociety.org/event/bell-of-sayon>

¹⁰⁵ M.-B. Yue, 'There Is No Place Like Home': *Diasporic Identifications and Taiwan Cinema of the 1960s And 1970s*, *Postcolonial Studies*, 6/2.

1938 and 1945, yet Taiwan was a Japanese colony during this war, therefore nominally making Taiwanese and Chinese enemies. The post-war Taiwanese cinema has a long record of the negative stereotypical depiction of the Japanese. A substantial number of titles realized in the 1960s and the 1970s presented Japan as a brutal oppressor¹⁰⁶. Starting from the 1950s, the import of Japanese films had been severely restricted, however, at the end of the 1960s the Bureau of Censorship introduced a quota of five Japanese productions per year). Moreover, Japanese music was banned from radio broadcasting. A minor breakthrough took place in 1982 when unauthorized Japanese programs became available due to the increasing availability of video-renting services and illegal cable TV. The censorship of media was a direct result of the vibrant popularity of Japanese cultural products. This popularity was an important symptom of tangible nostalgia for the colonial period among the Taiwanese. Censorship was supposed to be a safeguard of the emerging public discourse that emphasized the “Chineseness” of Taiwan.¹⁰⁷

4.1.1. New Taiwan Cinema

The 1980s brought a somewhat new approach to the issue of colonialism in Taiwan cinema. The internal pressures for democratization, combined with loosened ideological censorship and the commercial crisis of heretofore dominant trends in Taiwan cinema, gave birth new movement – “Taiwan New Cinema” (臺灣新電影). The new trend originated from the

¹⁰⁶ C. Nerri, *Haunted Island: Reflections on the Japanese Colonial Era in Taiwanese Cinema*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015, p. 11.

¹⁰⁷ David Y. H. Wu, *Cultural Nostalgia and Global Imagination: Japanese Cuisine in Taiwan*, in: *Re-Orienting Cuisine: Food, Nutrition, and Culture*, edited by Kim Kwang-Ok, Berghahn Books 2015, p.112.

transformation of Taiwan from a rural society into an industrialized and globalized one. Anxieties and political frictions between different ethnic groups that had unveiled during that process stimulated a new generation of filmmakers to reinterpret the national memory. Content-wise, the “New Taiwan Cinema” was not a simple shift from a pro-China/pro-KMT to pro-Taiwan/anti-KMT rhetoric. It addressed long-suppressed memories and emotions¹⁰⁸. Representatives of this trend tried to reevaluate the Japanese colonial period in Taiwan. The depiction of that period ceased to be unequivocally negative. The representatives of the New Wave aimed at distancing themselves from propaganda oriented genres of the hitherto decades. Liberated from continuous governmental interference, the new generation of filmmakers set sail to create an utterly new genre. The result of their creation was a distinctive combination of the Taiwanese nativist literature from the 1960s/1970s (in terms of the contents and themes) and the aesthetics heavily influenced by both the Italian neorealism and French New Wave. Wilson argues that the New Wave cinema represents "a deep-seated reaction against the silence surrounding Japanese colonialism and the subsequent KMT-ruled government".¹⁰⁹

The fact that Hou Hsiao-hsien's early movies, such as *The Sandwich Man*/兒子的
大玩偶) (1983), *Dust in the Wind*/戀戀風塵 (1986), and *A City of Sadness*/ 悲情城市
(1989), present the period of the Japanese occupation of Taiwan during World War II is a
significant and a telling example of the groundbreaking shift in the attitudes and mindsets
of the filmmakers. At the time of the release, the issue of the Japanese past of the island

¹⁰⁸ M. Rawnsley, *Taiwan New Cinema*, in Corrado Neri and Kirstie Gormley (eds), *Taiwan Cinema*.
Lyon: Asiexpo 2009, pp.78–96.

¹⁰⁹ F. Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg
University Press 2014, p. 21-40.

was still considered taboo.¹¹⁰

Hou Hsiao-hsien's career-defining and seminal work, *City of Sadness*/悲情城市 (1989), tells the story of a Taiwanese family that lived through the period when the political rule over Taiwan was transferred from the Japanese to the Republic of China ruled by the nationalist Kuomintang. The film depicts the brutality of the shift of power. Hou focuses on the 228 Massacre, the occurrence which was denied by the Nationalist government prior to the release of the movie – let alone open discussion of the brutality and an actual number of victims. The depiction of the corruption and horror of those times, as predicted, caused commotion and controversy upon the film's release.¹¹¹ Touching upon such topics was possible due to the gradual easing of the censorship apparatus. That way, it became possible to create films about, for example, the arrival of Chinese Nationalists in Taiwan, as well as the Japanese occupation of the island. *City of Sadness* became an impulse - the issue of the KMT takeover after World War II grew into the collective consciousness of the Taiwanese.¹¹²

There is a significant scene in the *City of Sadness* where the village chief orders a bunch of ROC flags for everyone. After the war, the Taiwanese had to replace the old Japanese imperial flags with the national flags of the Republic of China. This seemingly simple action faces an unexpected obstacle when people realize they are uncertain which way they should hang the flag. This scene, although funny, shows the confusion of the Taiwanese under the new rule. The *City of Sadness* proved that erasing Japanese

¹¹⁰ F. Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg University Press 2014, p. 8.

¹¹¹ F. Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg University Press 2014, p. 79.

¹¹² Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg University Press 2014, p. 83.

colonialism is a grueling mission.

Another clear nod from Hou Hsiao-hsien towards Japan is the movie *Cafe Lumiere/ 珈琲時光* (2002). Hou directed this film in Japan, with Japanese actors, despite himself not speaking Japanese. *Cafe Lumiere* was supposed to be a tribute to a legendary Japanese director, Yasujiro Ozu, as it was planned to debut on the 100th anniversary of Ozu's birthday. It debuted at a festival commemorating the centenary of Ozu's birth, and it was later nominated for a Golden Lion at the 2004 Venice Film Festival.

Not to dwell on the storyline too much, it revolves around an average Japanese girl, Yoko, a central character and protagonist of the film. She lives in Tokyo, and is occupied with researching the life of the Taiwanese-born composer Jiang Wenye, who was largely forgotten at the end of his life due to the political turmoil. However, after his death, his work returned to favor and began to gain new recognition in both East Asia and Western countries. There is a theme of a romantic relationship between a Japanese and Taiwanese. Yoko is pregnant with her Taiwanese boyfriend's child, but she does not want to marry him.

Apart from the explicitly expressed motivation to produce this film, Hou pays homage to Ozu by imitating his style. One can quickly identify the so-called 'pillow shot' camera angle and disjointed narrative, tools so characteristic of Ozu. Hou's plot-guiding method avoids giving the viewer all the necessary material within any one individual shot. According to Wilson, "Hou prefers the long take, a still camera, and a noticeable absence of wordy dialogue. The lack of speech in Hou's films contributes to an overall feeling of non-ironic 'sweetness' and the hidden emotions of his characters".¹¹³

¹¹³ F. Wilson, *New Taiwanese Cinema In Focus: Moving Within and Beyond the Frame*, Edinburg University Press 2014, pp. 80-81.

Another of Hou's films, *The Puppetmaster*/戲夢人生(1993), is based on the life of Li Tian-lu, the most renowned Taiwanese puppeteer. The plot was stretched between Li's birth in 1909 and Japan's fifty-year occupation of Taiwan in 1945. Throughout the story, Li Tian-lu becomes a master puppeteer but is demanded to use his talents to spread propaganda during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan in World War II, and, to be more precise, in order to recruit Taiwanese soldiers for the Japanese army.

The last chapter of the so-called history trilogy (which also includes the *City of Sadness* and *The Puppetmaster*) by Hou Hsiao-hsien was *Good Men, Good Women*/好男好女 (1995). Like previous films from this trilogy, *Good Men, Good Women* focuses on the complicated relationship between Taiwanese history and the national identity of the Taiwanese.

The film presents the authentic life story of Chiang Bi-yu. In the 1940s, she and her husband, Chung Hao-tung, set off to mainland China to join the anti-Japanese resistance. To some extent, one can notice that the story depicted in the film also coincides with the life story of Wu Zhuoliu, who, like the *Good Men, Good Women* protagonist, enrolls in an anti-Japanese guerilla in China. It only shows that this experience was shared by many Taiwanese. The fact that Taiwanese tended to leave their island and rush to the Mainland to fight against their nominal co-patriots also makes us aware that one cannot speak of unreflective approval for Japan in Taiwanese society during colonial times. Despite enormous educational and infrastructural efforts, the belief in ethnic and cultural belonging to China was still strong in Taiwan during World War II.

Another example of a shifting attitude to the colonial period among the representatives of the New Taiwan Cinema is *A Borrowed Life*/多桑 by Wu Nien-jen. The film had its premiere in 1994, and at the same time, it was the directorial debut of Wu.

The story of the film revolves around the relationship and generational conflict between Sega and his son Wen-Jian. Two main characters represent different approaches to Japanese colonial memory. Sega and his friends are openly enthusiastic to the Japanese, it is clear from the language they are using or from their notion of Japanese products (Japanese radio is supposed to be superior), whereas Wen-Jian, brought up during the postwar wave of anti-Japanese sentiment, did not share that view about the Japanese, to say the least. Ken Eisner states that the film has an autobiographical character, and the story represents the experiences of Wu's upbringing.¹¹⁴ In his productions, Wu uses slang language and the Japanese loan words. The original title of *A Borrowed Life* – 多桑 – pronounced as "dou-san" means 'papa' or 'daddy' in Japanese.¹¹⁵ According to Chen Kuan-hsing praises the use of languages and dialects in the film, stressing the difference to the cultural, social, and political transformations that had been taking place at that time, namely the fall of the Japanese empire and KMT taking over the island.¹¹⁶

The film provides a glimpse into the reality of the (post)colonial period in Taiwan; once again, Japan is associated with progress and development. In one of the film's opening scenes, Sega remarks that the Japanese radio would not have broken as fast as the Taiwan-made one. The eponymous dou-san, overshadows the film and other characters with his

¹¹⁴ Eisner, Ken (30 October 1994). "A Borrowed Life". *Variety*. Retrieved 27 August 2018.

¹¹⁵ E. Yueh-yu Yeh, D.W. Davis, *Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island*, Columbia Press University 2005, pp. 68-69.

¹¹⁶ Chen, Kuan-Hsing (2010). *Asia as Method: Toward Deimperialization*. Duke University Press. pp. 124–135. ISBN 9780822391692.

determined admiration of the Japanese colonial era. “Dōsan” describes the generation of men that were born and raised under Japanese colonial rule and experienced a trauma, shock, and a deep feeling of disjuncture and identity disruption after the defeat of Japan and subsequent takeover of Taiwan by Kuomintang. The term “dōsan” expresses a sense of sorrow, loneliness, alienation, and a painful longing for Japan.¹¹⁷

A movie theater in the mining village, where the protagonists live, plays films with the assistance of a narrator. The film played in that scene is Japanese, but the narrator uses the Taiwanese to explain the plot and role-play the dialogues between the characters. In a sense, one could argue that this scene is nostalgia-in-making as the audience internalizes the content of Japanese film wrapped with the Taiwanese language. As Yeh and Davis argue, the images mixed with the Japanese-language soundtrack and the Taiwanese-speaking narrator overlap in a mixture of sentimental nostalgia:

In this scene, we see several ingeniously intertwined elements: Japanese colonial residues, with which Dou-san is identified; the overlapping languages and diegetic worlds. (...)The soundtrack and diegesis are Japanese, yet the storyteller's art—including his interjections — enframes it for native purposes. No longer does a Japanese film work to propagate imperial values. Empire is extinguished yet its remnants are recycled.¹¹⁸

¹¹⁷ Leo T.S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia*, Duke University Press Books 2019, loc.1746.

¹¹⁸ E. Yueh-yu Yeh, D.W. Davis, *Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island*, Columbia Press University 2005, pp. 71-72.

Let us move to another example of the New Taiwan Cinema that referred to the issue of colonialism – *Strawman*/稻草人 made by Wang Tung and released in 1987. In terms of genre, *Strawman* is a black comedy situated in the last months of Japanese occupation. The story revolves around the village people during the concluding days of World War II. Japanese military officers seize the valuables, crops, and animals of the peasants. Desperate for food, they can only watch their fields being bombed by American B52s.¹¹⁹ Wang's movies attempt to reach the living, hybrid accounts of Taiwanese people instead of partaking in political arguments. Wang remarked on this issue in an interview:

I think Taiwan is different from China. Taiwan is very interesting. Taiwan is Chinese, but it's also like Japan in the 1950s. It too accepts American aid. Its culture is very fresh. Even today, this continues. It's very complicated, but also rich and full. Taiwan has all kinds of cultures. Therefore, it changes fast. There's a deep influence from Japan. I used to love to watch Japanese films; we used to live in a Japanese house. Some of my friends spoke Japanese, our teachers spoke Japanese too. It is like living in Japan. But Taiwan is not Japan. I am a mainlander. Living in Taiwan is like living in a foreign country.¹²⁰

Although the image of the Japanese in “Taiwan New Cinema” was by no means clear-cut positive, it was nevertheless a breakthrough in the history of Taiwanese cinema. Often the positive aspects of the colonial regime would be counterbalanced with the

¹¹⁹ E. Yueh-yu Yeh, D.W. Davis, *Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island*, Columbia Press University 2005, pp. 75-78.

¹²⁰ E. Yueh-yu Yeh, D.W. Davis, *Taiwan Film Directors: A Treasure Island*, Columbia Press University 2005, p.79.

downsides of the Japanese rule¹²¹. This deep ambiguity in the depiction and interpretation of the colonial period gave rise to a new, unprecedented way of presenting Japan and the Japanese, marked by Japanophilia and deep revisionism of Japanese-Taiwanese relations. This new phenomenon is characteristic of 21st century Taiwanese cinema. A number of productions foster nostalgia and Japanophilia through an extremely idealized and enthusiastic approach to the issue of Taiwan's colonial past. One of the movies that offer such vision is the documentary *Viva Tonal: The Dance Age* (跳舞時代) from 2004, which provides the review of Taiwanese popular music in the 1930s. The film revolves around the figure of Shojiro Kashiwano, chairman of Columbia Records at the time. He is depicted as an ultimately positive character, "decent in nature," who stood behind one of Taiwan's most outstanding cultural endeavors at the time.¹²²

4.1.2. *Cape No. 7*

The most notable author producing films within this aesthetics is, without doubt, Wei Te-sheng. He was born in 1968 and was heavily influenced by the "New Taiwan Cinema." He has no formal training in film-making; however, he worked with Edward Yang (one of the most significant directors of the "New Taiwan Cinema"¹²³) in the 1990s. Among other films of his creation, such as *Seediq Bale*, which tells the story of Wushe Incident of 1930 when indigenous tribes revolted against the colonial Japanese¹²⁴, one

¹²¹ C. Su, *Beyond South of the Border: A Textual Analysis of the Taiwanese Blockbuster Cape No. 7*, "Asian Cinema" 20/2009.

¹²² C. Su, op. cit.

¹²³ Visions - The Inaugural Sydney Asia Pacific Film Festival <http://sensesofcinema.com/2000/festival-reports/sapff/>

¹²⁴ M. Rawnsley, op. cit.

film stands out as particularly significant.

Cape No.7 was released in 2008 and is by far the most successful native movie in Taiwanese cinematography. It had caused massive excitement in Taiwan and turned out to be an enormous success, earning over 16 million dollars and becoming the highest-grossing film in the history of the Taiwanese box office (leaving behind films such as *Titanic* or *Jurassic Park*). The most obvious question that comes to one's mind is what had caused such a spectacular success? There is no simple answer to that; however, in its sense of humor and intertextuality, the film is actively corresponding to Taiwanese experience and taste. That might be a reason for *Cape No.7's* limited success outside of Taiwan (only \$ 1 million earned outside of Taiwan). Apart from the relatable content and form of the film, one can also point at an innovative advertising campaign preceding the film's premiere. Ming Yeh-Rawnsley describes *Cape No. 7* as a cultural phenomenon due to the innovative blog-marketing strategy, free screenings before the official release, and agreement from the Taiwanese branch of Disney to distribute the movie nation-wide¹²⁵. However, this is only one part, albeit an important one, of the picture. Rawnsley argues that the success of *Cape No. 7* originates predominantly from the broad appeal to the local viewers. She describes the film's popularity as a combination of “production values and a *feel-good factor*.”¹²⁶ Unquestionably, that was the nature of the story presented and a strong link to the reality of everyday life of many Taiwanese that attracted the masses to the theatres.

¹²⁵ Y. Lin, *Transnational Connections in Taiwan Cinema of the 21st Century*, submitted to the University of Exeter as a thesis for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Film, June 2013.

¹²⁶ M. Rawnsley, *Hai jiao qi hao* (海角七號)/*Cape No.7* (*Wei De-sheng 2008*), in: G. Bettinson (ed.), *Directory of World Cinema: China*, London 2012, pp.139–140.

The story of the film consists of two parallel plotlines; the first one is only vaguely sketched. It takes place in 1945, during the repatriation of the Japanese living in Taiwan. It shows a tragedy of disrupted romance between a Japanese teacher forced to leave the island and his Taiwanese student, Tomoko. The contemporary theme focuses on Ah-ga, a wannabe musician who, frustrated by his failures in Taipei, decides to return to his hometown in southern Taiwan. At one point, both plotlines intertwine with each other, as Ah-ga, then working as a postman, finds the letters of the Japanese teacher addressed to the now-defunct address: 海角七號 (Cape No. 7). In the meantime, a music festival in Hengchun, Ah-ga's hometown, is about to start, and the town administration decides to promote local Taiwanese bands. That creates an opportunity for Ah-ga to give a second kick-off to his music career. Along with other locals, he forms a band that is supposed to play as a support before the main star, a famous Japanese singer. The organization of the festival and the coordination of the progress of the newly formed team is supervised by a young Japanese manager, Tomoko (the namesake of the student from the WWII feature line), who also becomes one of the leading film protagonists.

Japan in this film represents (and is represented by) several motifs, the most obvious is undoubtedly the story set in 1945. The content of letters written by a Japanese teacher, although expressing love for her student (and to Taiwan, calling him her home), is characterized by a clear patronization. That, in a way, reflects the actual relationship between both societies during the Japanese colonial rule. Japan was the center of science, rationalism, progress, and Taiwan was considered a subject desperately in need of these things. The love between the Japanese and Taiwanese symbolizes the final character of relations between the two nations.

Contemporary Tomoko performs a managerial role in a modeling agency. Eventually, she becomes responsible for overseeing the newly created local band. The main obstacle is the containment of conflicting temperaments of the members within the multi-ethnic band. Unintentionally, she serves as a unifying force in the multiethnic team. Eventually, she manages to bring band members under control and channel their efforts towards a common goal. In Cape No. 7, conflicts between the band members materialize repeatedly, which emphasizes the ethnic origin of individual people. However, thanks to the Japanese manager, they are able to create an over-ethnic bond connecting the team members. The culmination of this process is the final scene in which the song performed on stage is simultaneously sung in Japanese and Chinese. It is an unpretentious celebration of intercultural unification. This scene also has a symbolic dimension because the Japanese singer-playing actor also plays the repatriated Japanese teacher in the parallel subplot of 1945. The unfinished romance of the 40s has its continuation in the persons of Ah-ga and contemporary Tomoko, closing the film with a buckle linking both fictional lines. According to Rawnsley, reconciliation between two societies comes from three elements:

(1) retelling the colonial past with an ambivalent tolerance; (2) creating a young Japanese character, Tomoko, with sweet and vulnerable qualities that render her 'a member of intra-Asian imagined community', and (3) placing the protagonist, Ah-ga, a young Taiwanese singer, on an equal footing with a major Japanese pop star

*on stage at the end of the film*¹²⁷.

4.1.3. *KANO*

The second film worth closer analysis in terms of pro-Japanese sentiments is *KANO* (2014). Similarly to *Cape No. 7*, *KANO* deals with the contested memory of the Japanese colonial past in Taiwan. It was directed by an Aboriginal director and writer, Umin Boya. It is worth mentioning that his non-Han ethnic roots serve as a kind of emphasis on identity for the film's narration. In addition to the number of corresponding motifs, for the sake of which I chose *Cape No. 7* and *KANO*, the common denominator of both productions is the person of Wei Te-Sheng, who in the case of *KANO* took up production. In a nutshell, *KANO* tells the story of a high school baseball team made up of Taiwanese (Hoklo and Hakka), Aborigines, and Japanese ("KANO" is an acronym derived from the Japanese school name: Kagi Norin Gakko - Jiayi School of Agriculture and Forestry). The team under the leadership of the Japanese coach qualifies in 1931 for the Koshien tournament in Japan. The competition itself serves as a kind of intra-Imperial academic games (teams from Taiwan, Korea, and Manchuria). This tournament, played on a stadium in the suburbs of Kobe, was a huge annual event broadcasted by radio and celebrated throughout Japan.

KANO can be understood as an effort to answer the question about the position and rank of colonial Taiwan in the hierarchy of imperial Japan. The events of the Koshien tournament in 1931, the one in which *KANO* takes part, reflect the process of changing the position of Taiwan in the hierarchy within imperial Japan. Initially, the *KANO* team

¹²⁷ Op. cit.

is treated by the Japanese with a high degree of protectionism. Ethnic diversity is the object of ridicule and prejudice; the Japanese wonder how the Japanese players communicate with their Taiwanese colleagues, suggesting the intellectual inferiority of the Taiwanese. The attitude of the Japanese coach of the Taiwanese team is significant here; he repeats several times that ethnicity has nothing to do with baseball. Eventually, the Japanese are convinced by the Taiwanese band, openly cheering KANO by the end of the film. Throughout most of the film, the language spoken by the characters is Japanese (the few moments when using the local language). Ichiro Numazaki declares that the movie looks like it was produced by the Japanese for the Japanese viewer¹²⁸.

Japanese power manifests itself through a thorough modernization of Taiwan. It is a subtle subplot of the film – juxtaposition of sports with agricultural modernization¹²⁹. Baseball games are broadcasted by radio, a powerful symbol of development. Bicycles dominate the streets of the city, while the winning parade is run by a car. A flagship example of modernization is the construction of the Wushantou Dam and Jianan irrigation channels (the most extensive irrigation system of that time in Asia). The builder of both investments was Hatta Yoichi, a legendary figure who died in the course of the war and was awarded an almost divine status by the island's inhabitants. After his death, his remains were taken to Taiwan and buried near his creation in Wushantou, according to his will. Currently, this place functions as a tourist destination for both the Japanese and the Taiwanese. These tangible manifestations of modernization represent a new quality of life for the people of Taiwan. According to Ichiro Numazaki, Taiwan presented in

¹²⁸ Numazaki, *Colonial and Imperial Landscapes in the Taiwanese Film "KANO"*, Tohoku University 2014.

¹²⁹ S. Tang, M. Fujimaki, *The unredeemed nations: the Taiwanese film KANO and its trans-border reception*, *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies*, 1/2018, pp. 21-39.

KANO is, in fact, more modern than a large part of Japan at that time¹³⁰.

KANO turned out to be a great success in Taiwan, especially in the context of tourism related to the film's plot. Jiayi University, the direct heir of Kaga Nori Gakko, placed on his campus monuments for coach Kondo and one of the players, Su Zhengsheng. Jiayi actively promotes his connections with the legendary team, the manifestation of such activity is even the monument to the star *KANO*, Wu Mingxie, located in the city center. The heroes of this film were also honored in Japan. Kondo Hyotaro has his statue in Matsuyama, where he played baseball before he came to Taiwan, while Hatta Yoichi was honored in Kanazawa. The history of *KANO* is a special kind of bridge connecting the contemporary societies in Japan and Taiwan. Moreover, some studies found out that actual 'colonial nostalgia' is, in fact, one of the major reasons for the elderly, who have any memory of that period, to visit a tourist attraction stylized as Japanese or consume products resembling those of Japanese origin. For instance, Japanese-style hot springs enjoy uninterrupted popularity. Seniors stress the difference between the character of traditional Japanese hot springs and nowadays Taiwanese hot springs, emphasizing the superiority of the former.¹³¹

4.2. Politics of nostalgia and international relations

The concept of Taiwanese identity has been a crucial issue in the relations

¹³⁰ I. Numazaki, op.cit.

¹³¹ R. Bandyopadhyay, C.-H. Lin, J.-L. Lin, "To Be A Japanese For A Day": *The Influence Of Colonial Nostalgia in Taiwanese Senior's Travel Decision-Making Behavior*, "Tourism, Culture & Communication, Volume 8, 2008.

between Taiwan and China ever since the democratization of Taiwan. Before that, despite the fundamental ideological conflict and obvious historical reasons, one thing was evident for both the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China in Taiwan. Namely, Taiwan was an integral part of China, and China was not to remain divided. That was, in a way, confirmed by the so-called "1992 consensus". This term refers to the result of a meeting in 1992 between the representatives of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of China. The content of the 'consensus' comes down to the general agreement that there is only one "China", and both Mainland and Taiwan belong to it. This unspoken accord allows for different interpretations of the "One China principle"¹³². "1992 consensus" has been the basis and, in a way, a prerequisite for Taiwan to maintain a relationship with China. However, the question of a different nature is whether the consensus exists in the first place. Supporters of KMT argue that it does exist and should be respected as the ground for talks with the PRC, while the supporters of the pan-green coalition with the DPP claim that there is no such thing¹³³.

In the 1990s, especially after the presidential elections won by Lee Teng-hui in 1996, Taiwan-centric discourse moved to the mainstream. That was the time when the issue of Taiwanese identity has become contentious for cross-strait relations. "One China principle", which is the core of the Chinese reunification model, is based on the assumption that the Chinese nation has been divided and, thus, the only possible outcome in a long perspective is the eventual reunification. In this context, the emergence of a distinct Taiwanese identity poses a critical problem for China as it undermines the

¹³² C.-H. Wei, *China Taiwan Relations and the 1992 consensus, 2000-2008*, "International Relations of the Asia- Pacific", 1/2016.

¹³³ <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/acs/201605040017.aspx> (retrieved: 11.6.2018).

fundamental logic of unification: if Taiwanese society and political elites do not consider themselves Chinese, then the concept of Chinese “reunification” becomes intrinsically conflicting.

As said in the sections before, Japanese heritage can be perceived as an element that diversifies the Taiwanese identity from the Chinese. As such, it is prone to instrumentalization by politicians and other authorities. The first symptoms of the direction change of the identity (and memory) politics of the Republic of China revealed in the 1990s – school textbooks and curricula were changed in order to emphasize the uniqueness of the Taiwanese. According to the new education program, a solely negative depiction of the Japanese was discarded. New textbooks condemned the atrocities carried out by the Japanese, but on the other hand, praised their contribution to the civilizational progress that took place in Taiwan under their rule¹³⁴.

In terms of cross-strait politics, the most urgent matter was to suppress the reunification trend cultivated through the decades of KMT’s rule. In order to curb those ideas and stop Taiwan from leaning towards China, a new point of reference was needed. Once again, the process of "othering" was initiated, this time with China as its object. Rhetoric supported and propagated by Lee Teng-hui (and later Chen Shui-bian) aimed at convincing public opinion that Taiwan was not part of China because it had more commonalities and a more intimate relationship with Japan. The goal was to distance Taiwan from China, culturally and politically, by provoking tension between two states and using it to approach Japan¹³⁵. In the interview with Japanese writer, Shiba Ryotaro in 1994, Lee said that the KMT government was a regime imposed on Taiwan by

¹³⁴ Y. He, *op. cit.*

¹³⁵ Y. He, *op. cit.*

outsiders. He also criticized the Beijing regime for treating the country “as a private asset and thereby acting against liberal democratic values”. At the same time, he spoke favorably of the Japanese colonial legacy in Taiwan and admitted that he himself was a Japanese citizen until he was 22 years old. In addition, he encouraged Japan to accept the leadership of resistance against China’s growth in Asia¹³⁶.

Four visits that Lee Teng-hui made to Japan after the end of his presidency in 2000 were particularly significant for using the nostalgic image of Japan. Due to the fact that the PRC treated (and still treats) the former president of Taiwan with high suspicion, in his rhetoric describing him as a separatist, Lee’s visits to Japan took place in an agitated political atmosphere. China interpreted a visa for Lee Teng-hui as an official Japanese endorsement of his sentimental longing for the Japanese rule of Taiwan¹³⁷. The first of the trips took place in 2001, after a long period of Chinese pressure that was supposed to hold Japan back from issuing Lee Teng-hui a visa. However, under a set of rules (no political statements), the permit was released, and the former president arrived in Japan, officially for medical purposes. Lee Teng-hui, who during his youth studied in Japan (Kyoto University), at every turn expressed admiration for the Japanese way of life and culture. Lee’s father used to be a worker of the Japanese colonial police. His brother served in the Japanese army during World War II and was killed in the Philippines. That is why he was enshrined in the Yasukuni Shrine, where all the people that died in the service for Emperor are worshipped. While comparing pre-war Japan with the modern state, Lee stressed the incredible progress that has taken place over six decades.

¹³⁶ J. Sejrurp, *Reliving the Past: The Narrative Themes of Repetition and Continuity in Japan-Taiwan News Coverage*, in: A.D. Morris (ed.), *Japanese Taiwan. Colonial Rule and Its Contested Legacy*, Bloomsbury Academic 2015.

¹³⁷ Ibid.

On the other hand, he emphasized that, despite this progress, Japan did not lose its "spirit". Lee's trip took place in the middle of diplomatic controversies between Japan and China over the Japanese government's introduction of a revisionist history textbook. To no one's surprise, Lee's visit highly dissatisfied Communist China, which as a reaction, rescheduled several bilateral exchanges, including the postponement of an official Japan visit by Li Peng, chairman of the Standing Committee of National People's Congress¹³⁸.

Taiwan's search for identity (and implicit pursue of independence) coincided with historical revisionism trends in Japan. The counterpart nostalgia in Japan, that is nostalgia to a formerly colonized nation, had been manifested among the conservative politicians in Japan, who maintain to emphasize Japanese contributions to Taiwan's modernization and development. Japanese political right-wing, embodied by Liberal Democratic Party, called to stop the historical "self-flagellation"¹³⁹, as (in their interpretation) Japan did not do anything to feel ashamed and to get humiliated continuously. In this political climate Lee Teng-hui and controversial manga artist – Kobayashi Yoshinori released a book titled "Lessons from Lee Teng-hui's School" (2001). The book took the form of a dialogue between the authors. Their conversation revolved around the issues of nationalism and memory politics. Lee criticized the Japanese education system for creating a highly negative view of Japanese historical heritage among the youngest generations by exaggerating the dark chapter of Japan's history.

Moreover, Lee uncovers the positive aspects of Japanese history, giving the examples straight from the horse's mouth, speaking of the profits Taiwan gained because

¹³⁸ Ibid.

¹³⁹ N. Ferguson, *Westerners don't understand how vulnerable freedom is*, <https://www.theguardian.com/books/2011/feb/20/niall-ferguson-interview-civilization> (retrieved: 11.6.2018).

of the Japanese rule. Kobayashi criticizes the younger generations of Japanese, for they are supposedly “directionless”. He juxtaposes Japan against Taiwan, in his opinion, managed to sustain its “spirit”. Furthermore, he claims that Japanese heritage is also responsible for democracy in Taiwan. Lee refers to Japanese colonial history to support the idea that, due to the success of the Japanese colonial rule, the Taiwanese are more Japanese than Chinese. Both men express the pity that the Japanese cultivate “masochistic history” and blame China for constantly humiliating and keeping Japan down¹⁴⁰. This book serves as an example of a possible understanding area which could be employed by both sides to oppose China.

Another highly contentious matter for the Taipei-Beijing-Tokyo triangle is the issue of the Yasukuni Shrine. This Shinto shrine is supposed to commemorate soldiers that died in the service of the emperor. However, besides the regular soldiers, 1068 persons honored in it were recognized as war criminals, including 14 “A class” criminals. Besides, the museum in the temple represents a revisionist version of history. Yasukuni is therefore considered a symbol of Japan’s past militarism by most of the Asian nations. Visits of the Japanese politicians in Yasukuni have been causing severe diplomatic tensions for Japan's foreign affairs, especially for the diplomatic relations with Korea and China, but also with Taiwan. The period of most significant controversies includes the period of 2001-2005, when the prime minister of Japan, Jun'ichirō Koizumi, was regularly paying visits to the shrine.

On 4 April 2005, a member of the Taiwanese parliament, Su Chin-Chiang, along with the members of his Taiwan Solidarity Union Party – a formation under the patronage

¹⁴⁰ B. Kushner, *Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan, and China since 1990*, “The International History Review”, 4/2007.

of Lee Teng-hui (TSUP was an active advocate of Taiwan's independence), made a pilgrimage to Tokyo to pay their respects at Yasukuni. The action of Su and his fellows was sharply criticized in both China and Taiwan. In Taiwan, James Soong, the chairman of the People First Party, condemned Su for demeaning Taiwan's national dignity¹⁴¹. In Beijing, the official Chinese news agency, Xinhua, followed the words of KMT spokesman Chang Rong-Kung's, that if Su Chin-Chiang is visiting the shrine as the leader of a Taiwanese political party, he is demonstrating how Taiwanese "independence party affiliates" worship Japanese militarism.' Not surprisingly, the Chinese internet was flooded with criticism towards Su Chin-Chiang, branding him a 'traitor'.

On June 7, 2007, Lee Teng-hui, who was then traveling to Japan for the third time since the end of his presidency, visited Yasukuni to pay respect to his older brother, who was killed as a Japanese soldier during the World War II. Unsurprisingly, PRC considered this visit an affront, expressing the dissatisfaction of Lee's action, and accused him of taking attempts of general "prettification of history"¹⁴². A significant effort was put to present Lee as a hypocrite. China Times reported that he had never visited his brother's memorial plaque located in Hsinchu County, and his visit to Yasukuni had no religious motivation since Lee is a Presbyterian Christian. Although these kinds of approval manifestations were sharply criticized by the pan-blue camp in Taiwan and the People's Republic of China, they were welcomed by the Japanese right-wing. Therefrom, Japanese historical revisionism and Taiwan - centric nationalism found an ally in each other against the common Chinese enemy. Barak Kushner wrote that "the contested memory

¹⁴¹ <http://www.carcav.com/bbs/dispbbs.asp?Boardid=43&ID=27528>, (retrieved: 12.06.2018).

¹⁴² J. Sejrurp, op.cit.

of the colonial era explains the relationship between otherwise unlikely bedfellows, the Japanese political right and the Taiwanese political left.”¹⁴³ The links between conservative Japanese and liberal Taiwanese are strengthened by their mutual fear of China's economic dominance and their wish to sustain Japan as a countervailing force in the region. Taiwan's stance in the struggle over memory influences Japan and China in three ways: by applauding Japanese historical memory, denying Chinese identity, and championing a new Taiwanese identity.

The presidency of Chen Shui-bian was, in many ways, a continuation of Lee's strategy regarding China; however, it had taken even more extreme form. Chen's position was marked by further antagonizing Taiwan and China. Out of uncertainty of his political situation (his victory was an effect of the split in the blue camp) and the reelection, Chen decided to employ identity politics to reinforce his position. In 2005, DPP released a document on "developing relations with Japan". It was the first document issued by the DPP, explicitly defining Taiwan's policy towards Japan and could serve as a kind guidepost for the development of the relations between Taipei and Tokyo. Chen's main goal was to "upgrade" relations with Japan to the level of a "quasi-alliance" modeled on its relationship with the US¹⁴⁴. In August 2002, he spoke of "one side (of the Strait), one country (一邊一國)," following Lee's two-state theory¹⁴⁵. His rhetoric moved "Taiwan" to the center of national representation. The curricula were further modified, for instance,

¹⁴³ B. Kushner, *Nationality and Nostalgia: The Manipulation of Memory in Japan, Taiwan, and China since 1990*, "The International History Review", 4/2007.

¹⁴⁴ B. Bridges, C.-P. Chan, *Looking North: Taiwan's Relations with Japan under Chen Shui-bian*, "Pacific Affairs", 4/2008.

¹⁴⁵ H.-C. Chang, R. Holt, *Taiwan and ROC: A Critical Analysis of President Chen Shui - bien's Construction of Taiwan Identity in National Speeches*, "National Identities" 11/2009.

by correcting the depiction of the character of Koxinga, who got demoted from the position of the national hero. It was reasoned by the words that have been used to describe his conquer of Taiwan, namely “restoration” (收复) that implied that Taiwan was part of China. Furthermore, for the first time, the issue of the 228 Incident appeared in the textbooks¹⁴⁶.

In 2008 KMT won the elections, and Ma Ying-jeou became president. Ma distanced himself from pro-independence Taiwanese activists in Japan, but on the other hand, he maintained the connections with Japan's right-wing. Contrary to the DPP's push for a Taiwan–Japan alliance or a Japanese version of the Taiwan Relations Act, the new government decided not to pursue a stable security relationship with Japan. Particular effort was put on the reorientation of the accents placed on Taiwan's two most important “Others”. After Ma Ying-jeou's presidential victory in 2008, in line with expectations, the new KMT government initiated the modification of the official identity politics. As a result, some of the de-sinicization trends undertaken by previous administrations were reversed. KMT brought back the history of anti - Japanese resistance as an essential reference point for defining Taiwanese identity. This new line recognized the “mistakes” committed by Japan; furthermore, Japan did not occupy any particular place in the modern discourse in the sense of positive sentimentalization. In the new rhetoric, Japan was not to be evaluated by any individual/unique measures, Japanese authorities were called to stop the visits to Yasukuni, the issue of Senkaku/Diaoyutai islands resurfaced etc.¹⁴⁷ When emphasizing the history of the anti - Japanese struggle, Ma wanted to

¹⁴⁶ Y. He, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁷ J. Sejrurp, *op.cit.*

undercut the historical and cultural legitimacy of the pro - independence camp, but on the other hand, did not want to encourage narrow-minded anti-Japanese nationalism in Taiwan. However, there was no going back to the explicitly negative depiction of Japan. Instead of it, the new administration proposed the twofold evaluation of the Japanese colonial legacy in Taiwan. Two features of current public opinion in Taiwan prevent leaders from endorsing a straightforward pro - China, anti - Japan identity discourse: (I) constantly growing public recognition of the Taiwanese identity, and (II) Taiwanese affection for Japan¹⁴⁸.

The issue of memory policy between Taipei, Beijing, and Tokyo stayed relevant up to this day. That is showed by President Tsai Ing-wen's decision to honor the memory of Taiwanese soldiers killed in the service of the Japanese army. On November 7, 2016, President Tsai attended an event in Kaohsiung to commemorate Taiwanese WWII soldiers, including those who fought for Japan. The move by Tsai was interpreted as a sign of disrespect by Beijing since the Yasukuni Shrine is considered to be a manifestation of Japan's militarism¹⁴⁹.

During the presidential campaign in October 2015, Tsai went on a “Japan-Taiwan friendship” tour during which she visited the Abe family's home prefecture of Yamaguchi and met secretly with Abe himself. Interestingly, Abe's family occupies an important place in the postwar relationship history between Taiwan and Japan. Abe's maternal grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, was the first Japanese prime minister to visit Taipei in 1957. Kishi's brother (Abe's great-uncle), Eisaku Sato, was the last prime

¹⁴⁸ Y. He, *op. cit.*

¹⁴⁹ <https://gbtimes.com/tsai-ing-wen-pays-respect-taiwanese-soldiers-who-fought-japan> (retrieved: 14.06.2018).

minister to visit Taipei in 1964.¹⁵⁰

In order to emphasize the importance of maintaining good relations with Japan, President Tsai Ing-wen appointed Frank Hsieh, former prime minister of Taiwan, as the representative of the Republic of China in Japan. Moreover, Taiwan and Japan renamed their mutual diplomatic representatives. The Interchange Association (Japanese representative in Taiwan) changed its name to the Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association, while its Taiwanese counterpart, the Association of East Asian Relations, was renamed the Taiwan-Japan Relations Association¹⁵¹. Putting the words “Taiwan” and “Japan” in the new names of de facto embassies indicates the improvement of Japanese-Taiwanese relations. The political thaw between Taiwan and Japan is also visible in the matter of the Trans-Pacific Partnership. Taiwan has been urging Japan to take leadership, especially after the US left the agreement. On the other hand, Japan openly encourages the countries of the region to support the Taiwanese candidacy for TPP.¹⁵²

¹⁵⁰ Hoppens, Robert. “Japan-Taiwan Relations under Abe and Tsai in Historical Context.” *Expert Voices on Japan: Security, Economic, Social and Foreign Policy Recommendations*, U.S.-Japan Network for the Future Cohort IV, 2018, 49–64

¹⁵¹ S.-L. Ko, *Beijing aside, Tsai presidency looks to draw Taipei closer to Tokyo* <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2016/06/08/national/politics-diplomacy/beijing-aside-tsai-presidency-looks-draw-taipei-closer-tokyo/#.WmSDv4CWTIX> (retrieved: 14.06.2018).

¹⁵² <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aip/201706260027.aspx> (retrieved: 14.06.2018).

Conclusion

Let me reiterate my research questions here:

1. What are the origins and factors that fostered the creation of (post)colonial nostalgia in Taiwan?
2. How did the positive image of Japan influence the emergence of the distinctive Taiwanese identity?

The research questions I aimed at answering in the course of this paper revolved around the roots and origins of nostalgia in Taiwan. Moreover, I have investigated how the Japanese colonial period affects contemporary Taiwanese society and how Japanese colonialism affected the formation of Taiwanese identity.

As for the origins of (post)colonial nostalgia or sentiment in Taiwan, the roots of this sentiment are complex and not self-evident. Times of the Japanese colonial rule have been partially idealized and romanticized as a result of the disappointment of KMT's new rule. On the other hand, according to the theory of nostalgia and collective memory from chapter 2, the underlying reason for yearning for Japan, whether idealized or not, was to alleviate the pain originating from the sense of loss in "both personal and historical terms".¹⁵³ The continuous turmoil and shifts of political power and authority have propelled the Taiwanese society to revision and reevaluate the memory of the colonial period. The subjugation imposed by the Nationalists in the post-war period, along with the

¹⁵³ Leo T.S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia*, Duke University Press Books 2019, loc.1717.

later liberalization and eventual democratization, stimulated the emergence of nostalgia for the idealized image of Japan.¹⁵⁴

Eventually, the Japanese heritage of Taiwan got employed in the process of building a distinct Taiwanese identity. It served and still serves as an element of Taiwanese history that differentiates it from the Chinese and therefore justifies the pursuit of a distinct identity. Ching argues that “the Japanese legacy presently continues to form and inform not only the definition of a strictly “Taiwanese” identity but also the historical role that Japanese colonialism has played in the constitution of that identity and its differentiation from mainland China.”¹⁵⁵

I agree with Leo T.S. Ching that the contemporary nostalgia of Japan in Taiwan is mainly due to the influence of capitalism and globalization, as well as an effect of undeniable geographical and cultural proximity. However, I do not agree that the phenomenon of (post)colonial nostalgia comes down to the mere after-effect of globalization. It would be simplistic and distortive. The emergence of nostalgia in Taiwan took place on a much deeper level; its roots can be traced down fifty years before the re-opening cultural market to Japan in Taiwan in the 1990s. Nostalgia can be a mechanism of explaining the hardships and solving the problems of the present. Using nostalgia as a reality-explaining tool, we equip a simplifying tool that reduces the complexity of reality. One has to be careful and vigilant not to take the image disturbed by nostalgia for a fact.

On the other hand, the elusive character of nostalgia does not determine the illegitimacy or inherent faultiness of that phenomenon. It is a subjective mode of

¹⁵⁴ Leo T.S. Ching, *Anti-Japan: The Politics of Sentiment in Postcolonial East Asia*, Duke University Press Books 2019, loc. 427.

¹⁵⁵ Leo T.S. Ching, *Becoming Japanese: Colonial Taiwan and the Politics of Identity Formation*, University of California Press 2001, loc. 583.

perception, defining the present by the past. Taiwan has experienced all the required events for the emergence of an actual colonial nostalgia. It is currently profoundly internalized and embedded in Taiwanese consciousness. Stating that the phenomenon is just an expression of facetious materialism would be inaccurate and detrimental.

According to Halbwachs and his concept of collective memory, nostalgia can be utilized to select memories constitutive to a certain notion of identity, be it individual or collective. In other words, through the mode of nostalgia, societies are able to deconstruct the memories of their past and then construct (or reconstruct) their identities anew. I believe that was the case in Taiwan. All of the mentioned factors have had their part in this process. The memories of the colonial period distorted by the oppression of the Nationalist regime and subsequently induced by democratization and globalization have resulted in the emergence of (post)colonial nostalgia in Taiwan.

Some may argue that the ubiquitous phenomenon of nostalgia might be interpreted as a manifestation of cultural neocolonialism – a self-imposed display of the imperialist cultural model of the former colonizer. Contrary to the apparent examples of neocolonialism self-colonialism, like India or Nepal, Taiwan's potential decolonization was replaced by de facto recolonization. It was not until the 1980s that any sentiment to Japan has started to manifest in the mainstream public discourse. I believe that there is a significant difference; when the expression of nostalgia or any other sympathetic feeling toward Japan became possible in Taiwan, the Taiwanese were self-conscious enough to commercialize, consume, or even instrumentalize and politically capitalize on the phenomenon of colonial nostalgia.

As I presented in chapters 4.1 and 4.2, the presence of Japan and the revisionism of the colonial period has broken through to the crucial fields of the public sphere, such as culture and politics. The cinema review provided in the previous chapters proves that the gradual evolution of the depiction of Japan has been meeting its climax in recent times. The obvious examples of *Cape No.7* and *KANO* display the contemporary position of the sympathetic approach to Japan in Taiwan nowadays. Following Margalit's claim that nostalgia is an expression of shared memory, the current approach to Japan can be interpreted not only as an attempt of reconciliation with difficult colonial heritage but also constituting said colonial memory as one of the cores essential to the distinctive Taiwanese identity.

In the political field, nostalgia for Japan has been expressed, commodified, and instrumentalized since the 1990s. I would like to stress that it is practically impossible to determine the genuineness of the majority of such sentimental declarations. That is the nature of politics – political actors select and employ particular elements that have the potential of bringing tangible political gains. They are not always honest or sincere; that is as clear as day. The important fact for my thesis, however, is that they identified (post)colonial nostalgia as a viable political means. From my point of view, this serves as a kind of legitimization and validation of the actual presence of such phenomenon in Taiwanese society. Had nostalgia to Japan been insignificant, the politicians would not have employed it as a tool to shape the political discourse within and outside the country. Whether the manifestations of sentiment by Taiwanese politicians and authorities are authentic, or they are just the reflection of political pragmatism, will remain unresolved. In the 1990s, many Taiwanese elite members had Japanese background as the Japanese

education system brought them up. However, today's declarations of true historical intimacy between Taiwan and Japan might be somewhat suspicious.

Nevertheless, in Taiwan's international situation, the sincerity of politicians is of second-tier importance when it comes to improving or maintaining Taiwan's awkward position. Nostalgia is a kind of a common ground for Taiwan and Japan, and as such, it can serve as a pretext for both states to come closer to each other and potentially try to oppose China. I believe that the reference to the Japanese colonial experience and heritage will remain present in the political narrative in Taiwan; it will continue to be utilized when the political situation is required, be it identity differentiation from Mainland China or means to rapprochement with Japan. Taiwanese nostalgia for Japan is not only Taiwan's domestic issue anymore. It has been instrumentalized and utilized in diplomacy. The question of Taiwan's nostalgia for Japan, and its relations with Japan, in general, is fundamental in the case of cross-strait relations. Taiwan's complex and challenging international position means that all contacts with other countries become a cross-strait issue. It is even more meaningful in the case of Japan because of the historical antagonism on the Tokyo-Beijing line.

I also believe that, at least to a certain extent, contemporary nostalgia for Japan has been deeply internalized in Taiwanese society. Some elements that seemingly might signalize the sentiment or longing for Japan happen to occur unconsciously to the Taiwanese. Let me explain, an excellent example of such subconscious internalization of nostalgia is Taiwanese cuisine. Within it, one may find a plethora of Japanese influences and remainders.


In the years that directly followed Japan's defeat in World War II, Taiwanese cuisine expressed a somewhat underground sentiment for Japan. According to the research made by David H. Wu, some of the Taiwanese do not recognize typical Japanese dishes like sushi or tempura as Japanese. On the one hand, "Japaneseness" is something highly desirable, for instance, Japanese fashion or Japanese cinema and dramas. On the other hand, however, such evident and apparent manifestations of the Japanese cultural residue might not be interpreted correctly. Probably the best example of such a cultural, gastronomic leftover (sic) is tianbula/甜不辣, originally a Japanese-style fishcake tempura stick boiled in oden-type soup. It appears that, although it has had strong Japanese roots in Taiwan, nowadays, it has lost all the connotations linking it with Japan.¹⁵⁶ I wonder if that might be the case with other parts and elements of contemporary Taiwanese culture. In other words, are other departments of the public sphere prone to such profound internalization. For example, is contemporary architecture unwittingly replicating the styles and patterns of classical Japanese architecture in Taiwan? Or are the Taiwanese comic books inadvertently reproducing the model put forward by the Japanese manga? The list goes on, and I find it fascinating. The studies on the awareness level of the supposed nostalgic replication of Japan in Taiwan could be a somewhat natural continuation of this paper.

As the last point, let me address that I am fully aware of the limitations of my research. I have concentrated on reviewing existing literature on nostalgia and the sentiment towards Japan, and then juxtaposing it with the visual material in the form of movies. The scope of my sources was limited; not only have I constricted my research to the particular aspects of the public sphere (cinema and politics), but I have also faced an

¹⁵⁶ David Y. H. Wu, *Cultural Nostalgia and Global Imagination: Japanese Cuisine in Taiwan*, in: *Re-Orienting Cuisine: Food, Nutrition, and Culture*, edited by Kim Kwang-Ok, Berghahn Books 2015, p.119.

obvious language barrier that prohibited me from accessing some of the sources. Another significant limitation of my study was the fact that the representations and general discourse of the colonial memory I presented in my thesis refer to the mainstream narrative. Regrettably, the limitations of my thesis constrained me from investigating the evolution and influence of colonial heritage on the discourse within minorities, such as Taiwanese Aborigines or the descendants of waishengren.

Nonetheless, I believe that my thesis is valuable as an introductory work to analyze the various impacts of colonial nostalgia in Taiwan. Despite the limitations as mentioned above, the image of nostalgia, its commodification, and its utilization presented in my thesis represents the proximate state of affairs.



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