

國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程
International Master's Program in Asian-Pacific Studies
College of Social Sciences
National Chengchi University

碩士論文
Master's Thesis

· 過去的梦想與現代的渴望 ·
林呈祿和泉哲筆下的現代性、傳統與國家

Dreams of the Past and Aspirations for Modernity
Modernity, Tradition, and the State in the Writings of Lin Chenglu and Izumi Tetsu

Student: 田舒立 Julian Tash

Advisor: 藍適齊 Lan Shi-Chi

中華民國 110 年 7 月

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Abstract

This thesis studies the contributions that Meiji University professor Izumi Tetsu and his Taiwanese student Lin Chenglu made to *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* and its successor publication *Taiwan* to examine how each figure constructed his desired Liberalist theories of colonial governance. This thesis finds that Izumi focuses on international liberal causes, engaging colonialism from a genericized perspective predicated on the assumption that the Taiwanese share Japanese global interests. Meanwhile, Lin uses his Han Chinese heritage to fend against Japanese assimilation while simultaneously appealing to modernity to highlight the shortcomings of Japan's insufficient modernization. Ultimately, Lin employs his lived experience to critique the Western theories to which he was exposed, creating a version of Liberalism that could accommodate Han Chinese cultural and the Taiwanese aspiration for modernity.

Keywords: Taiwan Youth, Taiwan, Lin Chenglu, Izumi Tetsu, Modernity, Liberalism, Taiwanese Political Movement

摘要

本論文以明治大學教授泉哲和他的臺灣學生林呈祿在《臺灣青年》及其後續刊物《臺灣》的投稿為研究對象，探討二者如何建構他們所期望的殖民統治下的自由主義理論。本論文研究發現，泉哲關注國際自由事業，傾向於以臺灣與日本共享全球利益的理念為基礎，從泛化的角度與殖民主義打交道。與此同時，林呈祿則利用自己的漢人傳統來抵禦日本人的同化，並藉助現代性來批判日本不充分的現代化。本論文研究發現，林呈祿運用自己的生活經驗，對他所接觸到的西方理論進行批判，提出了一個既能適應漢人傳統習俗，又能順應臺灣人對現代性追求的自由主義的細緻描述。

關鍵詞：臺灣青年，臺灣，林呈祿，泉哲，現代性，自由主義，臺灣政治運動



TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Introduction.....	1
1.1 Colonial Taiwan at the Turn of the Decade	2
1.2 Tai Oan Chheng Lian	3
1.3 Izumi Tetsu.....	4
1.4 Lin Chenglu.....	6
1.5 Subsequent Sections.....	7
2 Literature Review.....	9
2.1 Theories of Modernity.....	10
2.2 Japanese Liberalism	16
2.3 Liberalism and Taiwan.....	24
2.4 Literature Review Conclusion.....	33
3 Towards a Universalized Liberalism — The Internationalist Dialectic of Izumi Tetsu.....	35
3.1 The Ideals of Local Governance	35
3.2 Deciding the Fate of Ethnic Minorities.....	37
3.3 Framing Ethnic Independence—Izumi as an Interlocutor	40
3.4 Historical Development.....	42
3.5 Arms Management	43
3.6 Economics and National Sovereignty	46
3.7 The Meaning of International Conferences.....	47
3.8 Conclusion.....	49
4 “4,000 Years of History” Meets Modernity— Chinese Heritage, The Japanese State, and Western Values in the Writings of Lin Chenglu.....	51
4.1 The Role and Powers of the Governor General	51
4.2 The Case for Local Governance.....	55
4.3 Chinese Identity.....	60
4.4 The Tide of History	64
4.5 Conclusion.....	67
5 Conclusion — The Role of Modernity in Taiwanese Liberalism.....	69
6 References.....	73
6.1 Primary Sources	73
6.2 Secondary Sources	75

1 Introduction

The intellectual influences of the colonial Taiwanese elite during Japanese rule stands at a fascinating intersection between Western, Japanese, and Chinese thought. With the conclusion of the Sino-Japanese war in 1895, Taiwan entered the Japanese empire, where it remained until the conclusion of World War II. This 50-year period of colonial rule is unique because, Japan—the only imperial Asian power—experienced belated capitalist development, was culturally distinct from other colonizing powers, and concentrated its colonial expansion to its periphery. The regionality, temporality, and cultural distinctiveness of Japanese modernization meant that even as the Japanese sought to develop, the Japanese state remained marginalized in global politics as a non-Western (and non-White) latecomer. Japan sought to overcome these circumstances by marginalizing those in its periphery, leading Taiwan to experience what Rwei-ren Wu describes as “double marginalization,” since Taiwan was subjugated in an already marginalized empire.

This research examines how these circumstances, engendered by the unique properties of Japan as an Asian empire, influenced the manifestation of Taiwanese political movements; namely, it describes how the multipolarity of the Taiwanese case as a group of culturally and historically “Chinese” people colonized by an Asian Empire still in the process of “learning” modernity differed from western colonies that could be described through the Manichean ontology of metropole/subaltern, western/oriental, and developed/savage. This key difference profoundly influenced the epistemology and rhetorical expression of the Taiwanese political movement and simultaneously elucidates the nature of empire in Asia.

In order to deeply probe these intellectual trends, this thesis focuses on the expression of Liberalist ideology as expressed in articles written by Meiji University professor Izumi Tetsu¹ and his Taiwanese student Lin Chenglu in the magazine *Tai Oan Chheng Lian*² (*Taiwan Youth*), the first Taiwanese founded periodical under colonial rule. The following section introduces the

¹ Note on romanization: this article includes names and terms that derive from Japanese, Chinese, as well as those that are used in both languages. As a general rule, Japanese words are rendered phonetically with accompanying markings denoting elongated vowels except where usage is already widespread in English, in which case common usage shall be employed (i.e. Tokyo). Chinese shall be Romanized according to the principles of *Hanyu Pinyin* sans tones. There are some exceptions to this in the interest of respecting Taiwanese authors or historical accuracy (i.e. *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* instead of *Taiwan Qingnian*).

² This romanization was that chosen by the publishers of *Taiwan Youth* and reflected their Taiwanese pronunciation of 台湾青年 (Mandarin Chinese: *Taiwan Qingnian*/ Japanese: *Taiwan Seinen*).

circumstances in Taiwan at the time Lin and Izumi were writing, as well as basic information about *Taiwan Youth*, Izumi, and Lin.

1.1 Colonial Taiwan at the Turn of the Decade

The late 1910s and early 1920s were a tumultuous period for the Asian colonial world. In 1919, the March 1 Movement in Korea and the May 5 Movement in China brought hope for increased attention to the demands of colonized people.³ Meanwhile, the establishment of the Japan Worker's Party in the same year augured the rise of Taisho Democracy, which brought internationalism and liberalism to national prominence and eventually realized the long-held goal of universal male suffrage in 1925. During the same period, Wilsonianism brought keen international interest to the plight of oppressed ethnicities and created a rhetoric to legitimize self-determination for ethnic movements globally.

Just as these global events developed, a new social class arose in Taiwan. Since Taiwan entered the Japanese empire in 1895, the Taiwanese leadership reacted to Japanese rule with sporadic violence or detached ambivalence. However, as the end of the first decade of the twentieth century arrived, so did the “new intellectuals” (*shin chishiki zō*). Fluent in Japanese and often beneficiaries of study abroad in Japan proper, this group eschewed violence and non-involvement, instead preferring to work with Japanese institutions and people to pursue their interests. The new intellectuals were also active in political mobilizers. They founded the New People's Society (Xinminhui/Shinminkai) with the financial support of local Taiwan notable Lin Xiandang, and students such as Cai Huiru, Cai Shigu, and Huang Chengcong.⁴ This group also became responsible for the largest political mobilization in the history of Japanese colonized Taiwan: The Petition Movement to Form a Taiwanese Parliament.

³Shih Yun Lo 羅詩雲, “Táiwān jìndài zhīshì jiàngòu de kěnéng: Lùn 1920 niándài táiwān qīngnián de fānyì piānzhāng yǔ sīxiǎng zhuǎnyì 台灣近代知識建構的可能：論 1920 年代台灣青年的翻譯篇章與思想轉譯” [The possibility of Thought Construction in Modern Taiwan: Discussing the Translated Chapters and Translated Thought of *Taiwan Youth* in the 1920s], *Taiwan Xue Yanjiu* 台灣學研究 16 (2013): 152.

⁴Xiu Zheng Huang, “Táiwān qīngnián yǔ jìndài táiwān mínzú yùndòng” 台灣青年與近代民族運動 [Taiwan Seinen and Modern Taiwanese Ethnic Movements], *National Taiwan Normal University Bulletin of Research* 國立台灣師範大學歷史學報 30 (2002): 326.

In the same period, a series of political changes occurred within Japanese leadership in Taiwan. Immediately following the beginning of Japanese control of the island, the Office of the Governor General was established to oversee the administrative affairs of the area. Under the pretense of stabilizing the island in the face of violent Taiwanese resistance and due to the allegedly uncultivated nature of Taiwanese natives, the colonial administration was placed under military control and many civil liberties enjoyed by Japanese in the mainland were not extended to the Taiwanese. Moreover, Taiwanese were not given political representation in the Diet (the Japanese legislature) and the Governor General was imbued with the ability to issue edicts called *ritsurei* that were as binding as law, essentially granting the Governor General legislative powers due to legislation passed in 1896 called Law No. 63 (alternatively called Law 63 as a direct translation from the Japanese name *roku san hō*). During these early years, Japanese colonial policy was marked by anti-assimilationism and significant barriers between Japanese and Taiwanese were erected.

This situation experienced a degree of change with the appointment of pro-assimilationist Den Kenjiro, the first civilian Governor General. A sinologist who was fluent in Chinese with ancestry that traced back to early Chinese immigrants to Japan (as suggested by his unusual surname 田 ch: Tian), Den instituted a relatively liberal period of colonial administration.⁵ Under Den, prohibitions against mixed schooling and intermarriage were repealed, leading to greater connections between Japanese and Taiwanese as well as increased opportunities for Taiwanese elite. Although the fundamental inequality of undemocratic colonial rule was never fully resolved, the relatively liberal atmosphere of the 1920s allowed the circulation of publications such as *Taiwan Youth* that critiqued certain government policies.

1.2 *Tai Oan Chheng Lian*

Following its establishment in July 1920, *Taiwan Youth* became the first journal founded by Taiwanese under Japanese rule. Serving as the official publication of The New People's Society, *Taiwan Youth* included both Japanese and Taiwanese contributors and featured articles

⁵ Rwei-ren Wu, "The Formosan Ideology: Oriental Colonialism and the Rise of Taiwanese Nationalism," (PhD diss. University of Chicago, 2003), 93.

that were published in both Japanese and Chinese (sometimes in translation and sometimes directly authored). It also included articles and speeches by Western figures translated into either Japanese or Chinese. The tone and content of articles varied greatly. Some were didactic in nature, seeking to raise the degree of cultivation of the Taiwanese (*mindō*) while instructing their readership about international developments and Japanese law. Other articles sought to mobilize the Taiwanese around certain political goals. There were also articles that sought to gain sympathy from Japanese in the mainland or influence the policy of the Governor General. In one of the seminal pieces of literature on *Taiwan Youth*, Taiwanese historian Huang Xiuzheng divides the purposes of the publication into three categories: acting as a vanguard voice for islanders, cultivating enlightenment and spreading culture, and calling Taiwanese compatriots, thus capturing the various types of content *Taiwan Youth* included.

Over the years of colonial rule, *Taiwan Youth* was forced to reincorporate and change its name several times, switching to *Taiwan (Formosa)* in 1922, then merging with the Chinese language publication Taiwan People's Daily News (*Taiwan Minbao/Taiwan Minpō*) in 1923. In 1927, it gained permission to publish in Taiwan, before becoming the *New Taiwan People's Daily (Taiwan Xin Minbao/ Taiwan Shin Minpō)* in 1930. In 1932, it became a daily newspaper under that same title. Although *Taiwan Youth* was initially founded and printed in Japan, most of its readership and funding was based in Taiwan and included influential local Taiwanese figures such as Lin Xiandang. Editorially, it was managed by Cai Peihuo, Peng Huaying, and Lin Chenglu. As the only newspaper owned and operated by Taiwanese during the 50 years of Japanese rule in Taiwan, it became a critical space through which Taiwanese elite and intellectuals shared their political ideology.

1.3 *Izumi Tetsu*

Born in Hokkaido, Izumi Tetsu began his higher education at Sapporo university before transferring to University of California Los Angeles to study agricultural economics. What followed was approximately 16 years of studies around the United States, ultimately bringing him to Columbia University where he studied international law, which became his primary field

of research in Japan.⁶ After returning to Japan, he became a professor at Meiji University, an institution known for having many Taiwanese students. While at Meiji University, Izumi taught classes on colonial policy, publishing notable works including *Shokumichi Tōjiron* (Colonial Governance Theory—1921) and his article “Kokusai Keisatsuken no Settei” (The Establishment of the Right to International Policing—1922).

Following the May 1 movement, Izumi became actively engaged in journalism, through which he criticized colonial policy, advocated for local self-governance, and eventually supported the movement to establish a Taiwanese Parliament.⁷ Izumi criticized colonial policy on the grounds that it was *honkoku honi*—it placed Japanese interests over those of Taiwan.⁸ Moreover, he rejected assimilationist policy because of its inconsistency; according to Izumi, Japan selectively applied an assimilationist policy when it was advantageous to the Japanese, but otherwise employed a *tokubetsu no seido* (a special system) to exploit the Taiwanese and maintain social inequality. He therefore argued that *minzoku jiketsu* (ethnic self-determination) was a preferable mode of colonial governance.

Izumi was known for actively engaging with Taiwanese, even opening his house on a weekly basis to meet and talk with Taiwanese students. It was through this networking that Izumi became involved in the activities of Taiwanese students such as Cai Peihuo, Cai Shigu, Zheng Songyun, and Lin Chenglu. After this group founded *Taiwan Youth*, Izumi became one of the most prolific Japanese contributors to the publication and was hailed as “a prominent leader” by a reporter writing for *Taiwan Youth*'s successor publication *Taiwan*. Izumi's deep connections with Taiwanese activists makes him an ideal subject for a comparative study because he was well informed about Taiwanese concerns and thought, but still had a Japanese background and institutional affiliation.

⁶ Masahiro Wakabayashi 若林正文, *Taiwan Teinichi Undō Shi Kenkyū* 台灣抗日運動史 [Research on the Taiwanese Movements of Resistance Against Japan] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1983), 95.

⁷ *Ibid.*, 96.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 98.

1.4 Lin Chenglu

When he was only seven years old, Lin Chenglu experienced deep trauma at the hands of the Japanese state when his father and older brother were killed and his family house razed in the Japanese suppression of a military uprising.⁹ Nonetheless, Lin matriculated into a Japanese language high school from which he graduated in 1908. In 1910, he went on to obtain the highest score on the bureaucratic exam and subsequently became a judicial secretary for the Governor General's office.¹⁰ In 1914, Lin entered the Law department at Meiji University.¹¹ During his time in Tokyo, Lin was recorded as an active member of Taiwanese cultural and political movements, and maintained connections with other notables such as Tsai Peihuo, Tsai Shigu, Huang Chencong, and Chen Xin.¹² It was also during his studies at Meiji University that Lin developed a deep admiration for Japanese liberals such as Izumi Tetsu and Yamamoto Minō, whose research encouraged Lin's keen interest in the colonial policies of the Japanese state.¹³

Following graduation, Lin was eager to leave Japanese society. He departed for Hunan province in the Republic of China to work as a professor in 1917. However, the complicated political situation in China forced Lin to return to Taiwan the next year due and begin preparing for the judiciary examination.¹⁴ In 1919, Lin became a secretary in the Tokyo Enlightenment Society and in the following year became a founding member of the New People's Society, where he became involved in the publication of *Taiwan Youth*. Along with Cai Peihuo, Lin played a critical role in the publication activities of the New People's Society. In 1922 he became the chief editor of *Taiwan* and in 1923 was the director and chief editor of the newly incorporated Taiwan New People's publishing company. He retained key editorial and journalistic roles in progenitors of *Taiwan* as well.

⁹ Tsui-lien Chen 翠蓮陳, *Bǎinián Zhuīqiú: Táiwān Míngzhǔ Yùndòng de Gùshì, Juǎn Yī, Zhèngzhì de Mèngxiǎng* 百年追求: 台灣民主運動的故事, 卷一, 政治的夢想 [The 100 Pursuit: The Story of the Taiwanese Democratic Movement. Volume 1: Political Dreams] (New Taipei City: Acropolis (衛城)), 35.

¹⁰ Lin Chenglu 林呈祿, *Taiwan Dabaike Quanshu* 台灣大百科全書 [Encyclopedia of Taiwan] (Taipei: Taiwanese Ministry of Culture, 2009), <http://nrch.culture.tw/twpedia.aspx?id=5457>.

¹¹ Wakabayashi, 96.

¹² Hsu-feng Chi 紀旭峰, *Taishōki Taiwanjin no "Nihon Ryūgaku" Kenkyū* 大正期台湾人の「日本留学」研究 [Research Regarding Taisho era Taiwanese "Study Abroad in Japan"] (Tokyo: Ryūkei Shoten, 2012), 140.

¹³ Tsui-lien Chen, 35.

¹⁴ Ibid.

Throughout his involvement in *Taiwan Youth* and *Taiwan*, Lin was a prolific contributor, writing a total of 18 articles in both Chinese and Japanese— thus creating one of the largest bodies of work in the magazine attributed to a single author. Many of his contributions were of substantial length, sometimes spanning several issues and exceeding thirty pages in a publication in which submissions of two to four pages were common. In these articles, Lin turns a critical eye to Japanese colonial policy, bringing particular focus to the results of international and imperial developments on life in Taiwan. He directed his articles at various audiences spanning Japanese liberals, the office of the Taiwan Governor General, and the Taiwanese themselves.


For over twenty years, Lin was the most one of the most important figures in the nascent world of print media in colonial Taiwan. Moreover, he had an intimate understanding of Taiwan, mainland Japan, and the Republic of China. The coalescence of these multifarious influences in such an important figure as well as his close relationship with Izumi Tetsu makes Lin an ideal subject for this study. The relationship that Lin had with Izumi will permit a close comparison of Japanese and Taiwanese perspectives on Liberalism, Meanwhile, Lin's experience crossing multiple boundaries influenced him to articulate a nonbinary vision of modernity that accounted for the intersection of Chinese past with Japanese present that created a unique set of circumstances in Taiwan found neither in Japan nor China. Moreover, the print media to which Lin contributed was inextricably intertwined with the largest Taiwanese political mobilization during colonial rule. Lin's involvement with Taiwanese publications was critical to local history and also produced a body of work that can provide insight into colonial modernity.

1.5 Subsequent Sections

Izumi and Lin were two import figures, writing for a critical publication at a historical movement of great opportunity, excitement, and uncertainty. The following thesis will elaborate on these circumstances, examining in depth the publications of Lin and Izumi to discern how the relationship among Taiwan, China, Japan, and the West manifests in their discourse regarding liberalism. To do so, this thesis first begins with a literature review that details different theories regarding Japanese and global liberalism in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This literature review will also address how the movement of this ideology into the Japanese intellectual milieu spurred contradictions, conflicts, and innovation. Finally, the literature review will introduce to

the different manners in which scholars have approached the dynamic between Western and non-Western manifestations of modernity and how these relate to the Japanese empire.

The section following the literature review examines how Izumi constructed his theories of local self-governance and internationalism to demonstrate his prospects for the relationship between Taiwan, Japan, and the West. The penultimate chapter focuses on the articles Lin published in *Taiwan Youth* and *Taiwan*, investigating how Lin used his lived experience to negotiate conflicting Western ideologies to construct Taiwanese modernity as a foil to the nationalist Japanese state. Finally, the conclusion will compare Izumi's and Lin's approaches to liberalism to demonstrate how the temporality and regionality of the Japanese empire created a unique manifestation of the colonial political movement, even as Japanese and Taiwanese visions regarding the exact nature and goal of the movement diverged.



2 Literature Review

When Japan gained control of Taiwan and began its project of transforming the island into its colony, Japan itself was just starting its own experiment with modernity. Having viewed the dissection of China at the hands of Western countries, Meiji reformers realized that they would have to adopt Western practices or meet the same fate. The Japanese adoption of Western culture and technology was not limited to manufacturing or medical science. It also included a generation of thinkers who learned—and actively interpreted and challenged—Western philosophy. The process of adopting this thought involved probing what it meant to be Japanese, what thought could be kept, and what should be adapted.

After joining the Japanese empire in 1895, the Taiwanese were also faced by intellectual dilemmas about colonialism and modernity. The earliest Taiwanese movements resisted the Japanese through violence or ambivalence, but by the early twentieth century a new group of Japanese-educated intellectual elite emerged. While members of this group spoke Japanese as a native language and often studied abroad in Japan, their experience with modernity was distinctly shaped by their colonial identity—in particular, the juxtaposition between their life in the liberal metropole and the authoritarian rule of the Governor-General's Office in the colony.

The following chapter contains three main sections. First, it addresses literature regarding theories of modernity. This will establish some of the major difficulties in studying the concept of modernity and the respective approaches various scholars have employed to overcome these difficulties. Second, it turns to examine liberalism and the accompanying concepts of individualism and syncretism within Japanese thought to elucidate the tensions between Western and Japanese intellectual trends. The reason for specifically concentrating on individualism is because this concept highlights the tension between state control and the individual that concerned Taiwanese democratic activists. Syncretism is significant because Japanese interpretations of modernity—and their perceived shortcomings caused by allegedly improper internalization of Western norms—became a key focus for both Japanese and Taiwanese liberals.

Finally, this chapter will highlight scholarship regarding the intellectual developments and print culture related to Taiwan. This section begins by outlining the critiques of Japanese colonialism by prominent Japanese liberals while also addressing the limits and contradictions of

this movement. Then it will address the issues that Taiwanese activists raised with the colonial government before finally addressing literature about colonial Taiwanese publications.

2.1 Theories of Modernity

2.1.1 Defining Modernity

Despite the prevalence of the term modernity, its precise meaning changes depending on context and user. In its broadest definition, modernity is a period reaching from recent history to the present. Definitions of recent history, however, range from the eighteenth century to the fall of the Roman Empire.¹ The challenge of defining the “start” of modernity is also intertwined with issues of Western-centrism, raising questions about whether a date such as the Fall of Rome or the French Revolution can be chosen for an epoch of history that is allegedly global.

Beyond periodization, the issue of theoretically demarcating the contours of modernity has been repeatedly problematized, thus prompting multiple approaches.² One strand of analysis challenges whether the diverse recent histories of various peoples can be captured by “one modernity.” For example, Richard Wolin, in analyzing “the peregrinations of a contested historical concept,” criticizes modernization theory for its “one-size-fits-all approach,” while Zvi Ben-Dor Benite asserts that there can be multiple modernities.³

Meanwhile, Frederick Cooper rejects the concept of multiple modernities and instead asserts that attributing multiple meanings to modernity would undermine the cohesion of the concept.⁴ Carol Gluck seeks to reconcile the differences between various manifestations of modernity by positing that “paying heed to the perceived modernities available at different moments underlines the commonalities that run through the global variants of the modern even

¹ The American Historical Review, “Historians and the Question of “Modernity,” in *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 632

² Lynn M. Thomas, blames modernization theory for inhibiting the growth of African historiography, while Richard Wolin critiques modernization theory for its “one-size-fits-all approach.

Thomas, Lynn M. "Modernity's Failings, Political Claims, and Intermediate Concepts," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 727-40; Richard Wolin, ""Modernity": The Peregrinations of a Contested Historiographical Concept," in *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 741-51.

³ Zvi Ben-Dor Benite. "Modernity: The Sphinx and the Historian." *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 638-52.

⁴ Frederick Cooper, *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2005).

as path dependence highlights the historical differences.”⁵ In searching for a generalized framework that can be used to theorize modernity, Gluck suggests that modernity does not exclusively bring new phenomenon, but it does bring a new context.⁶ Gluck also emphasizes the common “grammar of modernity,” typified by urban migration, shared social institutions, and contradictions between individual identity and social values that can be termed the “oxymodern.”⁷

Other readings identify the tensions between the state and individual in modernity. In *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no Bunka Tōgō*, Takeshi Komagome quotes Maruyama Masao to emphasize how “imperialism is both the development and the repudiation of nationalism;” the nation develops because it desires to grow and control new markets, but the increasingly diverse composition of empire invariably undermines the ethnic basis of the nation.⁸ Meanwhile, Andrew Barshay notes how forming the nation creates an “other.” By analyzing the state-society-self triad, Barshay explains that modernity can create ground for the formation of fascism, which relies on an extreme manifestation of othering to drive citizens to the state for a sense of safety.⁹ The issues of society-self is also explored by Germaine Hoston, who writes that a frequent characteristic of modernity is the increasing effectiveness of the state at intruding into individual space while the individual increasingly resists state encroachment.¹⁰

Self-perception is also frequently identified among the characteristics of modernity. Dipesh Chakrabarty, for example, distinguishes between institutional changes, which he defines as modernization, with the self-perception that one is modern, which he defines as modernism.¹¹ Writing on Meiji Japan, Carol Gluck identifies modernity as a “mental temper distinguished by perpetual self-consciousness and critique”¹² Self-awareness, self-critique, and a distinct

⁵ Carol Gluck, "The End of Elsewhere: Writing Modernity Now," *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 682.

⁶ Ibid., 684

⁷ Ibid., 677

⁸ Takeshi Komagome 駒込武, *Shokuminchi Teikoku Nihon no Tunka Tōgō* 植民地帝国日本の文化統合 [The Cultural Integration of the Colonial Japanese Empire] (Tokyo: Iwanami Shoten, 1996), 6.

⁹ Andrew E. Barshay, "The Public Man and the Public World in Modern Japan: Nanbara Shigeru and Hasegawa Nyozeikan Revisited," in *Social Science Japan Journal* 7, no. 2 (2004): 263-275.

¹⁰ Germaine A. Hoston, "The State, Modernity, and the Fate of Liberalism in Prewar Japan," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 51, no. 2 (1992): 287-316.

¹¹ Dipesh Chakrabarty, "The Muddle of Modernity," in *The American Historical Review* 116, no. 3 (2011): 663-75.

¹² Gluck, 678.

perception of oneself as part of the global phenomenon that is modernity thus enters into the definition of modernity itself—to be modern is to think of oneself as such.

Modernity is also accompanied by a distinct sense of cultural and intellectual chauvinism. Taiwanese art historian Yangyung Yuan examines the plant taxonomy created by Captain Cook and Carl von Linné to find that early biological studies excluded part of the stamen and removed images of the surrounding ecology as well as the context of the plants, thus separating the plants from their local contexts.¹³ This example demonstrates how colonists believed that Western rationality and science could be used to break down and assimilate observable phenomena without relying on indigenous intellectual traditions. Elizabeth Mjelde similarly finds that Western depictions of the colonial environment erased the violent processes needed to gain and maintain control over indigenous territory, instead imparting an idyllic image of natural landscapes ready to be inhabited and enjoyed by the colonizer.¹⁴

Zvi Ben-Dor Benite also notes that modernity and the corresponding concept of development inherently implies that others are uncivilized. This concept is evident in the work of Tomiyama Ichiro, who discusses how the Japanese lifestyle reform movement placed Okinawans in a negative light according to polarized normative values such as “clean/unclean” and “prosperous people/poor people.”¹⁵ Notably, however, these perceptions could be embraced and self-enforced by indigenous populations, thus proving that the demeaning nature of colonial heuristics did not necessarily preclude their adoption by colonized people.

In conclusion, the range of time periods, definitions, and characteristics identified with modernity are so variegated that some scholars question the usefulness of the term. Additionally, critiques regarding the Western standards of development to which other countries are measured have called into question the theoretical precision and utility of the concept. In response, some scholars have called for the discontinuation of this term or, at least, the acceptance of “multiple modernities.” Nonetheless, modernity was critically important in the self-identification of both

¹³ Yungyuan Yang 楊永源, “Shíchuān qīnyīláng táiwān fēngjǐng huà zhōng `dìfāng sècǎi`gàiniàn de jiàngòu” 石川欽一郎台灣風景畫中「地方色彩」概念的建構 □ [The Formation of the Idea of ‘Local Color’ in Kin’ichirō Ishikawa’s Landscape Paintings of Taiwanese Scenery], *Yìshù xué yánjiū* [Journal of Art Studies] 3 (2008): 108.

¹⁴ Elizabeth Mjelde, “Colonial Violence and the Picturesque,” in *Violence, Colonialism, and Empire in the Modern World*, ed. Philip Dwyer and Amanda Nettelbeck (Ebook: Palgrave Macmillan, 2018), 61.

¹⁵ Iro Tomiyama, “On Becoming ‘a Japanese’: The Community of Oblivion and Memories of the Battlefield,” trans. Noah McCormack in *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 3, no. 10 (2005): digital copy (no page numbers).

colonizer and colonized. Moreover, the concept of modernity and its adoption became a vector through which the West theorized and legitimated its dominate global position.

2.1.2 *Modernity in Japan*

This section deals with how the Japanese approach to modernity addressed the tension between Western and Japanese ideas. Rather than mere acceptance or rejection, literature regarding the Japanese approach to modernity tends to focus on cases of synthesis and even teases at the potential for the confrontation of Western and Japanese ideals to create completely novel phenomena.

One thread of literature on the relationship between Japanese and Western ideas emphasizes how the adoption of modern techniques and thought could become a powerful tool for enforcing state legitimacy during the instability of the Meiji period. Alexis Dudden notes that the adoption of European learning and international relations allowed Japanese representatives to obtain a privileged diplomatic position over Korea in the international stage.¹⁶ Brett Walker describes how the Japanese mapping of Sakhalin Island sought to rival traditional Western “centers of calculation” and used “scientific” methods to authoritatively assess the barbarity of other peoples as Japan cemented the borders of its empire.¹⁷

Meanwhile, there exists another thread that focuses how the introduction of Western ideas led some thinkers to place Japan within global trends. For example, Susan Townsend notes the importance of world historical development for Tadao Yanaihara, the chair of colonial studies at Tokyo Imperial University. Although Townsend is primarily concerned with examining the strategies that Yanaihara adopted to function within an increasingly conservative Japanese society, she also notes that Yanaihara’s colonial theory was guided by a “mixture of Whig ideas of progress and Ranke’s ‘moving finger of God.’” In short, Yanaihara believed Taiwan would inevitably develop an ethnic consciousness because this was an imperative of history and seeking to repress this would merely result in poor relations when Taiwan inevitably broke away.

¹⁶ Alexis Dudden, *Japan’s Colonization of Korea: Discourse and Power* (Honolulu: University of Hawai’i Press, 2005), 137.

¹⁷ Brett L. Walker, “Mamiya Rinzo and the Japanese Exploration of Sakhalin Island: Cartography and Empire,” in *The Asia-Pacific Journal Japan Focus* 6, no. 2 (2008): digital copy (no page numbers).

Other authors that echo this theme include Hiroshi Tanaka, who writes about how Taguchi Ukichi created a history of Japan that diverged from previous accounts by neither copying Western narratives nor treating Japanese history unique and separate.¹⁸ Sharon Nolte presents similar findings, noting the work of Ishibashi Tanzan, who argued that the development of Chinese nationalism was inevitable, and the writings of Tanaka Ōdō, who rejected the concept of *kokutai* and stated that the nature of Japanese history was evolutionary and no different from the cultures of other people.¹⁹ These Japanese thinkers were part of a liberal (and often Christian) group of intellectuals who challenged the concept of Japanese exceptionalism and instead argued Japan was bound by the same rules of historical development as other countries.

In several cases, the reappropriation of Western thought for Japanese state auspices has drawn scholarly criticism. Germaine Hoston notes that modernization tends to engender a “dialectal relationship” between the individual and the state wherein individuals increasingly oppose state encroachment.²⁰ However, in Japan the state orthodoxy of *kokutai* (national polity) inhibited the adoption of liberalism not predicated on a strong central state.²¹ Hoston also notes that although Fukuzawa Yukichi initially denied the concept of *kokutai*, he later affirmed its importance, stating that the imperial throne was the center of Japanese civilization and enlightenment.²²

Similarly, Fang-quei Quo highlights how Meiji thinker Tokutomi Iichiro advocated for *heimin shugi* (populism) on the grounds that greater political participation would inspire broad patriotism and was only important insofar as it fostered nationalism.²³ As Peter Duus notes, *minponshugi* reconciled liberal individualism with the imperial system by asserting that Japanese politics were “people-centered” rather than “people ruled” democracy (*minshushugi*).²⁴ However, the rejection of Western thought could also be used to support nationalist interests;

¹⁸ Hiroshi Tanaka. “The Development of Liberalism in Modern Japan: Continuity of an Idea—From Taguchi and Kuga to Hasegawa.” *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 21, no. 1(1989): 264.

¹⁹ Sharon Nolte, *Liberalism in Modern Japan: Ishibashi Tanzan and His Teachers 1905-1960* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1987), 151, 167.

²⁰ Hoston, 290.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 291.

²² Hoston, 298.

²³ Fang-quei Quo, “Jiyushugi: Japanese Liberalism,” *The Review of Politics* 28, no.4 (1966): 480.

²⁴ Peter Duus and Irwin Scheiner, “Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-31,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, edited by Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 172.

Carol Gluck observes that in the 1930s “overcoming modernity” came into vogue as an anti-Western alternative to “world historical” thought.²⁵

Other readings emphasize different types of synthesis. Vivian Blaxell writes about how modern Hokkaido architecture would include almost direct copies of Western buildings, but architects would be sure to include certain distinguishing Japanese elements as well.²⁶ The need to emphasize difference while copying western architecture demonstrates how a large part of modernity could be generalizing and universal—to be developed and civilized was to largely acquiesce to a fixed style and modality of thought. Nonetheless, modernity also included nationalizing processes which required societies to find and emphasize certain symbols to distinguish themselves and coalesce national identity even as they simultaneously continued globalization and Western learning.

Carol Gluck provides another insight into how modernization invites hybridization in a novel way; Buddhist cremation had a long history in Japan but did not become the dominant method of funeral until the 1880s, when it ascended to prominence due to the modern emphasis hygiene. This process, which Gluck describes as an “emergent structure, the blending of historical practice with modernity produces new features not visible in either of the origin components,” can be termed “historical blending.”²⁷ Meanwhile, Robert Eskildsen describes how the Japanese government readily employed the advice of their Western advisors with regard to sharing “civilization,” but ignored it in other fields like international trade (which was less important to a Japan because it was still industrializing).²⁸ Eskildsen is thus careful to note that the construction of Japanese modernity was an active and intentional process.

Looking towards the colonies, research by Takeshi Komagome provides how colonialism created different approaches to modernity. Examining the intellectual collisions that arose from Japanese cultural unification policies, Komagome distinguishes between what he identifies as “logic of oppression” and “logic of resistance” (*shihai no ronri* vs. *teikō no ronri*) in Taiwan during the 1910s.²⁹ Komagome connects “logic of oppression” with “civilization as modernity”

²⁵ Gluck, 682.

²⁶ Vivian Blaxell, “Designs of Power: The ‘Japanization’ of Urban and Rural Space in Colonial Hokkaidō,” *The Asia-Pacific Journal* 7, no.35 (2009): digital copy (no page number).

²⁷ Gluck, 686.

²⁸ Robert Eskildsen, *Transforming Empire in Japan and East Asia* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

²⁹ Komagome, 187.

and the imperial system. His definition of “civilization as modernity” includes a broad swath of developmental signifiers like infrastructure construction and increased sanitation along with cultural ones such as short hair (as opposed to the Manchu que). Komagome also connects the “logic of resistance” with “thought as modernity” and the traditions of ethnic Chinese. “Thought as modernity” encapsulated the ideals of freedom and equality. Komagome uses this framework to develop six distinct relationships of domination-resistance through which he demonstrates how both the Japanese and Taiwanese marshaled different definitions of modernity for their respect interests.

Scholarly literature regarding Japan thus suggests a variety of methods and areas in which the Japanese hybridized or selectively embraced modernity. Modernity spurred new approaches in politics, science, and the arts. Moreover, modern ideas were appropriated to reinforce state power, a process that sometimes distorted ideas from their original meaning and provoked later criticism. Interestingly, there are multiple examples of how the universalizing and globalizing conditions of modernity engendered a locally specific approach. Gluck’s research demonstrates this trend by explaining how a common modern condition (higher hygiene standards) had a culturally specific manifestation (widespread Buddhist cremation). Komagome’s research suggests the same because both the colonizer and colonized drew from an existing and general “grammar of modernity” to create their respective intellectual constructs. These examples therefore suggest a how modernity can be common despite having societally distinct manifestations.

2.2 Japanese Liberalism

2.2.1 Meiji Liberalism: New Ground and Inconsistencies

Liberalism can generally be defined as a philosophy which takes the individual as the essential, fundamental building block of society. Liberalism also generally affirms the unalienable right to “negative freedom” (freedom from constraint) and posits that the state is created willingly by social contract. Although Western learning had existed in Japan since the medieval period, Meiji liberals imported Western ideas with unprecedented fervor. Liberalism held a broad appeal within this blossoming intellectual milieu and a multitude of local organizations such as *Sanshisha* (Society of Mihara District Teachers) as well as scholarly

groups such as the *Meiryokusha* (Meiji 6 Intellectuals) challenged the government and advocated for the expansion of free political speech. Among them, Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakae Chomin, Nishi Amane, and Katō Hiroyuki, advocated for a natural law theory conception of natural rights that found tremendous popular support. Furthermore, Fukuzawa's pivotal "*Gakumon no Susume*" laid a strong foundation for the popularization of liberalism.³⁰

Although the Meiji intellectuals provided a historically unprecedented effort to liberalize Japan, their motivation has drawn critique. For example, Fang-quei Quo argues that liberalism was first used by disaffected elites who had sided with the *bakufu* during the Meiji Restoration. Deprived of their positions, these elites sought to challenge the government due to self-interest rather than ideological conviction. Accordingly, the Meiji Popular Rights movement was more anti-governmental than truly liberal.³¹

The relationship of nationalism to liberalism during Meiji has also been repeatedly problematized. For example, Meiji thinker Tokutomi Iichiro advocated for *heimin shugi* (populism) on the grounds that greater political participation would inspire broad patriotism among the masses.³² Therefore, Tokutomi believed that liberalism was only important insofar as it fostered nationalism. Liberals also needed to reconcile their ideology with the ultimate status of the emperor in the Meiji state. Building on translations done by Fukuzawa Yukichi, Nakae Chomin advocated for "bestowed popular right." Using this formulation, Nakae was able to adapt the Western concept of "restored popular right" into the imperial system by arguing the Japanese had rights because they were bestowed by the emperor. These trends in Meiji liberal thought consequently undercut traditional liberal conceptions regarding the endemic nature of rights and the conception of government for the people.

Meanwhile, there were also nationalist opinions that diverged from the xenophobic connotations that the term now carries. Using his newspaper *Nihon* (Japan) as a platform, Katsunan Kuga described nationalism and liberalism as inherently intertwined and actively advocated for "*Kokumin no Tokuritu*" (special improvement of national life). However, Kuga

³⁰ Hoston, 296.

³¹ Quo, 480.

³² Ibid, 482.

defined *kokumin* as all the peoples of Asia.³³ Accordingly, he strongly opposed military expansion. Ueki Emori articulated another humanitarian interpretation of liberalism that used the scholarship of Kato Hiroyuki to argue that the diffusion of liberal ideas into economics could lessen the burden of the Japanese masses. The existence of such conceptions demonstrates the higher-minded, altruistic vein of thought held Meiji liberals.

Another major trend in Meiji intellectual discourse was the struggle between Western universalism and Japanese uniqueness. For example, Fukuzawa initially denied the concept of a sacred and unique *kokutai* (national polity). However, he later affirmed its importance, stating that the imperial throne was the center of Japanese civilization and enlightenment.³⁴ In another case, Prince Saionji withdrew from the *jiyū minken undō* because of his noble connections, thus affirming the importance of the imperial household over his liberal convictions. Emphasis on *kokutai* and the enshrined divinity of the imperial household both strained liberal claims of individualism and equality.

Other Meiji intellectuals put more emphasis on universalist principles. Using a historical perspective, Taguchi Ukichi wrote *The Nature of Japanese Civilization* in 1885. In it, Taguchi finds that enlightenment and progress are inevitable trends in history and state institutions unable to adapt will be replaced. By placing Japanese development within global trends, Taguchi diverged from previous historical Japanese research, which either copied western histories or treated Japanese history as unique and separate.³⁵ Taguchi also employed his argument to reach humanitarian conclusions, ultimately emphasizing openness, social equality, and an end to military build-up.

The legacy of Meiji intellectuals is thus mixed; they argued for individual rights, but also obfuscated the relationship between individual and nation through the concept of *kokutai*; they argued for equality and yet revered a divine emperor; they engaged in internationalism yet were inconsistent in their critiques of imperialism and militarism. The mixed record of Meiji liberals is no doubt greatly influenced by the changing international world faced by Japan at the beginning of its development. Spurred by the desperate need to resist Western encroachment, Meiji liberals

³³ Hiroshi Tanaka. "The Development of Liberalism in Modern Japan: Continuity of an Idea—From Taguchi and Kuga to Hasegawa." *Hitotsubashi Journal of Social Studies* 21, no. 1(1989): 264.

³⁴ Hoston, 298.

³⁵ Tanaka, 263.

embraced nationalism and a powerful state as the means to achieve the necessary level of development. As Fukuzawa and Nakae demonstrate, the need to articulate liberal ideas within the Japanese state framework—including the emperor—was ever present. Accordingly, Meiji intellectuals left their Taishō predecessors with a foundation that simultaneously opened new areas of inquiry and imposed serious constraints.

2.2.2 *Limits of Taishō Liberals: Syncretism and Incrementalism*

Taishō liberals were a diverse group of thinkers. Some belonged to conservative state universities like Yoshino Sakuzō and Yanaihara Tadao. Others like Ishibashi Tanzan, Tanaka Ōdō, and Shigemura Hōgetsu found an intellectual home in private universities, middlebrow magazines, and the business journal *Tōyō Keizai Shinpō*.³⁶ Some like Yanaihara had influence among powerful state bureaucrats while others like Nagai Ryūtarō and Nanbara Shigeru came from samurai families hurt by the *bakumatsu* and were equipped with a critical outsider's perspective on Japanese society. However, an examination of Taishō thought reveals that despite this diversity, some common trends arise. Taishō reformers were generally critical of the Meiji state, but they preferred a reformist approach to revolution. Moreover, they often looked to the state for solutions, whether it was for addressing violence, expanding political participation, or providing a minimum level of social security.³⁷ Most had strong opposition to non-state violence and were generally opposed participation in strikes and other organized resistance.³⁸ Until the 1930s, these traits generally saved liberals from the purges that affected their more radical peers. However, they would also impose serious restraints on their activism.

Taishō liberals endeavored to articulate a concept of individualism that was agreeable to Japanese sensibilities. Minobe Tatsukichi proposed the emperor-organ theory. Rather than providing a radical new concept, Minobe essentially posited a reinterpretation of the Meiji constitution in which the highest organism is the state and the emperor is an organ imbued with the power to represent the state.³⁹ The fact that there are restraints on the imperial powers

³⁶ Nolte, 11.

³⁷ Eiko Maruko Siniawer, "Liberalism Undone: Discourses on Political Violence in Interwar Japan," *Modern Asian Studies* 45, no. 4 (2011): 999.

³⁸ Hoston, 308.

³⁹ Quo, 483.

represents the fact that the emperor is not, in fact, the state itself. Minobe's approach allowed him to call for a more constrained role for government without challenging the existence of the emperor. However, since he was working within the context of the Meiji constitution, this theory remained incompatible with universal suffrage.

Taishō liberals often shared a Christian background, although many were comfortable combining their Christian faith with eclectic Japanese influences. This trend is strongly evident in the *mukyōkai* (Churchless Christianity) movement in which Uchimura Kanzō participated. Like many Japanese during the early modern period, Uchimura was drawn to Christian concepts but disenchanted with sectarian politics. His skepticism was strengthened when he was mugged and racially harassed during a trip to the United States, which Uchimura previously upheld as an exemplar among Christian nations. The contradictions in Western practice thus attracted him to the *mukyōkai* movement. Other Christians included Yanaihara, who combined his Christian background with Confucian education that taught him about welfare for the whole society. This ethos would go on to form part of the basis with which Yanaihara critiqued colonial practices.

Like their Meiji predecessors, many Taishō liberals maintained an attraction towards militarist and statist ideas. For example, Yoshino and Nagai Ryūtarō supported the exploitative Twenty-One Demands that Japan made of China. Similarly, Hasegawa Nyozeikan advocated for Japan's colonial role in the Pacific.⁴⁰ Many Taishō liberals actively supported the Russo-Japanese war. Such nationalistic attitudes remain one of the more controversial elements of the Taishō intellectual legacy.

Another strong trend in Taishō liberalism was a strongly critical attitude towards violence. Abe Isō took a staunch stance against violence with two exceptions: self-defense and state violence. Abe was so opposed to violence that despite his socialist convictions he decided to leave the labor movement because he disagreed with its tactics. Mizuno and Kikuchi also echoed the notion that regardless of whether the purpose is just, violence is not-justified.⁴¹ Sugimori Kōjirō even labeled violence as “anti-culturalism” (*bunka hitei shugi*).⁴² Yanaihara expressed disdain at the unlawfulness of the Triple Alliance Strike that he experienced during his

⁴⁰ Hoston, 307.

⁴¹ Siniawer, 984.

⁴² *Ibid.*, 985.

sojourn in the United Kingdom.⁴³ These attitudes tended to drive a wedge between Taishō liberals and their more radical Marxist peers.

2.2.3 *Taishō Individualism*

The growth of Taishō liberalism thus presents somewhat of an anomaly among global liberal movements. Modernization tends to engender what Germaine Hoston calls a “dialectical relationship” between the individual and state, wherein the state increasingly assumes a greater role in daily life while individuals increasingly value their private lives and oppose state encroachment.⁴⁴ However, in Japan the conception of the *kokutai* preempted any forms of liberalism that were not predicated on a strong central state. The state thus became valorized as an agent of change. This orientation also spurred the Taishō liberals to shift the Meiji era focus on natural rights doctrine and instead emphasize community and national belonging. A tendency towards aloofness and detachment from social movements, however, ultimately impaired their ability to steer the development of Japanese social movements.

Another major basis for Taishō liberalism comes from Imperial Tokyo University Professor Yoshino Sakuzō. Yoshino did not advocate for democratization on the basis of natural law, which he argued has not historically suited Japan. Juxtaposing his theory against *minshu shugi* (rule by the people), Yoshino advocated for *minpon shugi* (rule for the people). This formulation accepts that government may not have popular rule and the emperor can maintain a privileged position. However, it simultaneously asserts that governance should be for the welfare of the people.⁴⁵ Like Minobe, Yoshino articulated theories that supported incremental reform. Moreover, his theory notably endorses a form of positive freedom rather than negative freedom; the proper role of the state was to foster conditions in which every individual could best realize oneself. In this regard, Yoshino reveals the appeal of a strong state sought by many Taishō liberals.

Yoshino was also among liberal figures such as Yamakawa Hitoshi, Ōsugi Sakae, and Sakai Toshihiko who advocated for greater democratization. In his essay on constitutional

⁴³ Townsend, 56.

⁴⁴ Hoston, 290.

⁴⁵ Hoston, 301.

government (*kansei no hongii wo toite sono yūshū no bi wo nasu michi wo ronzu*), Yoshino asserted that the basis of a democratic constitutional structure was the protection of individual rights, separation of powers, role of a representative assembly, and responsible cabinets.⁴⁶ His theory was in part linked to the concept that yearning for freedom and the creation of constitutions were universal global trends. Moreover, he believed that democratization would lead to better governance by solving issues of bribery and encouraging men of character (*jinkakusha*) to increase their involvement in public office.⁴⁷

Taishō intellectuals also continued a strong tradition of conflating the individual and the state. Abe Isō argued that the 1925 Peace Preservation Law was good because it would eliminate violence. This assertion was premised on the concept that the people were part of a national body and the state would hold the best interests of the *kokumin*.⁴⁸ Mizuno Hironori conceived of the state and *kokumin* as inherently cooperative because the *kokumin* shared a moral and spiritual union with the state. According to Mizuno, state violence was objectional, not because of individual rights and liberties, but rather because it decreased the faith of the *kokumin* in the state.

Some scholars took arguments conflating the state and individual to the extreme. Nanbara Shigeru was a scholar of Western philosophy who was heavily influenced by Kant and argued that a spiritual connection to the nation state could foster “freedom-in-community.”⁴⁹ His definition, however, drew no clear comparison between nation and state. Iwano Hōmei wrote that the nationalist polity is the state, and therefore the state is the individual. Since the *kokutai* is merged with the self, the Japanese actually experience an absolute freedom greater than the “comparative” freedom of Western countries, where the freedom of others must be compromised with the freedom of self.⁵⁰

Ōyama Ikō also wrote positively about popular mobilization for the state. Based on studies he conducted in the United States, Ōyama argued that the state rested on an individual’s sense of common interest (*kyōdō rikai kannen*). If people’s consciousness of shared values was

⁴⁶ Peter Duus and Irwin Scheiner, “Socialism, Liberalism, and Marxism, 1901-31,” in *Modern Japanese Thought*, edited by Bob Tadashi Wakabayashi (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 167.

⁴⁷ Duus, 167.

⁴⁸ Siniawer, 986.

⁴⁹ Hoston, 305.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, 306.

intensified, then they would be driven to contribute to society. Ōyama also highlighted how “imperialism was expressive of the national spirit.” This embrace of nationalism made it easier for democratic liberals to be accepted into mainstream, organized political discourse.⁵¹

Nationalist liberal discourse was also accompanied by familiar themes of Japanese uniqueness. For example, Takahashi Kamekichi argued through *yukizumari-ron* (gridlock theory) that the Japanese economy had stagnated and its only recourse was to pursue colonial expansion. One precept of this theory was that Japan was a special case of imperialism to which Marxist theories did not apply.⁵² The controversiality of this theory invited heavy criticism from the left and also earned Takahashi a reputation as an apologist for imperialism.

However, Japanese liberal voices were not completely uncritical when it came to the state and the *kokutai*. For example, Hasegawa Nyozeikan voiced reservations that the police were influenced by the state and thus could not be consistently expected to strive towards the realization of “societal life” (*shakai seikatsu*). Nonetheless, he did not entirely dismiss the notion that the police could control violence either. He had little faith in the Diet or political parties to resolve issues of violence because they were often seen as perpetrators.⁵³ Therefore, his view can be described as ambivalent.

Some liberals also sought to provide more specific, less nationalistic interpretations for race. Yanaihara denied that Japan was a mono-racial society. Instead, he separated the concepts of race and nationality and asserted that the Japanese were part of “the yellow race,” which included Han-Chinese and Koreans. He also claimed that the Japanese nation was comprised of the Ainu and that the Yamato people had mixed Malay and Mongolian origins. Anthropologist Tsuboi Shōgorō also distinguished between *kokumin* and *minzoku* and Tanaka Ōdō rejected the concept of a Japanese polity (*kokutai*) and instead advocated for *kokuminsei*—the concept that the nature of the Japanese was evolutionary and relativistic just like other cultures.⁵⁴

⁵¹ Duus, 175.

⁵² Susan C. Townsend. *Yanaihara Tadao and Japanese Colonial Policy* (New York: Routledge Curzon, 2002), 263.

⁵³ Siniawer, 999.

⁵⁴ Nolte, 167.

2.2.4 The Collapse of Taishō Liberalism

In the late Taishō era, the limited influence of liberalism in Japan came under heavy suppression. Breakdowns of communication divorced minds like Yanaihara from state policy.⁵⁵ The situation was exacerbated by a lack of leftist organizations, which were effectively all dismantled by the 1930s. Yanaihara was forced to resign from his post, while other liberals were jailed, censored, or faced with debilitating lawsuits. Under heavy pressure, the liberal movement splintered. Yanaihara stuck to his liberal morals and was dismissed from his academic post. Meanwhile, his teacher Nitobe Inazō joined the ranks of Abe Isō and Hasegawa Nyozeikan and collaborated with the regime.⁵⁶

The end of Japanese liberalism raises a question that has divided scholarly literature on the Taishō era: was the Taishō state liberal? On one hand, there seems to be an uncertain philosophical foundation for this argument. Theories articulated by Yoshino Sakuzō (minponshugi) and Minobe Tatsukichi (emperor organ theory) never separated the individual from the *kokutai*. Additionally, the reformist approach of Japanese liberals meant that they would never attack the illiberal foundations of the Japanese state: including the emperor and the existence of colonies. There also remains the issue of separation from the bureaucracy. Insiders like Yanaihara were too few and their influence too limited. Ultimately, the increasing pressure on Japanese liberalism pushed the remaining liberals underground until the war, leaving space for militarism that dominated the 30s.

2.3 Liberalism and Taiwan

2.3.1 Japanese Liberals and Colonial Policy

Numerous liberals critiqued colonial policy. Strains of criticism can generally be divided into two camps. The first, and largest group, asserted that there were serious inequalities in the colonies that needed to be redressed through “mainland expansionism” (*naichi enchō shugi*.) Others, prompted by scientific and universalist views of history, believed that the “rules” of development naturally would lead to the formation of national identities and protests against

⁵⁵ Townsend, 263.

⁵⁶ Andrew E Barshay, “The Public Man and the Public World in Modern Japan: Nanbara Shigeru and Hasegawa Nyozeikan Revisited,” *Social Science Japan Journal* 7, no. 2 (2004): 269.

alien rule. As prescient as this prediction may seem, Taisho liberals remained fundamentally constrained by several factors. First, very few actually rejected the logic of colonialism. Although certain Japanese colonial policies could be bad, colonialism was viewed as necessary and even a beneficial way to solve important problems within Japan and develop allegedly uncivilized peoples. Moreover, the constraints on liberal influence over government policy coupled with the general disposition against direct action further limited the influence of liberals within colonial management.

Perhaps the most vocal liberal voice on colonial policy was Yanaihara Tadao. Serving as the chair of Colonial Policy at Tokyo Imperial University, Yanaihara had a relatively rare “insider” position in the government. Using his position, Yanaihara developed sharp criticism of colonial policy, particularly when it came to disparities suffered in economic, educational, and political fields. For example, Yanaihara drew attention to the failings of the Japanese economic system. Based on Hilferding’s *Das Finanzkapital*, Yanaihara argued that the separation between financial capital and industrial capital that encouraged healthy competition was disappearing, forcing banks to invest directly into production rather than commerce. This process was demonstrated by the drastic concentration of wealth in a few banks during the 1920s as well as the growth of *zaibutsu*, Japanese megacompanies with huge influence over colonial development.

Many liberals felt alarm about how Japanese exploitation would sour the relations between them and their future neighbors. This belief was predicated on ideas about the development of national conscience in colonies. Ishibashi Tanzan, for example, saw the development of Chinese nationalism as inevitable. Drawing a comparison to the Meiji Restoration, Ishibashi argued that China was on its own course of national coalescence since the revolution of 1911. Moreover, where other Japanese intellectuals criticized China for being late to develop a national identity, Ishibashi argued that its relatively slow pace was only natural given its size and diversity.

Ishibashi similarly argued that the Koreans were a group with a distinct language, culture, and history.⁵⁷ As national conscience and education rose, an anti-imperial movement would

⁵⁷ Nolte, 151.

naturally emerge. Yanaihara similarly viewed the development of ethnic nationalism as an inevitable “rule of history.” Drawing upon what Susan Townsend characterizes as a “mixture of Whig ideas of progress and Ranke’s ‘moving finger of God,’” Yanaihara believed that colonies would eventually transition towards autonomy as their financial structures matured.⁵⁸ Accordingly, Japan should prepare for the eventuality of colonial independence.

Ishibashi and Yanaihara warned of grave consequences should the government not reform its colonial approach. Ishibashi argued that Japanese aggression in continental Asia only served to stoke anti-Japanese sentiments.⁵⁹ As opposed to those who sought to justify Japanese militarism by highlighting anti-Japanese resistance, Ishibashi saw Japanese involvement as the cause of resistance. His feelings were further cemented by the Russian Revolution, which Ishibashi argued fit into the global trend of people rising against bureaucratic despotism. Turning his criticism towards the Terauchi Masatake Cabinet, Ishibashi argued Japan might meet a similar fate if its systems went unreformed.⁶⁰

Facing these dire predictions, liberals began postulating more mutually constructive models of colonial engagement. For example, Rōyama Masamichi, a professor from the Tokyo Imperial University Faculty of Law, wrote that ethnic nationalism and anti-imperialism were coalescing into a New World Order. Ryōyama argued that it was becoming impossible to ignore the desire of ethnic nations for autonomy. Japan needed to find a way to conduct a regional East Asian Community that could incorporate the need of its colonies for autonomy. If it could do so, Japan could assume a leading role in shaping the development of the global order.⁶¹ Ryōyama’s insistence that Japan’s regional policy could have global effects inextricably links Japanese developments with that of the world.

Also adopting an emphasis on coexistence, Yanaihara argued that Japan must reduce its military oppression and forced assimilation and instead adopt “responsible government policies.” Looking at cases such as Canada and Australia, Yanaihara argued that the gradual transfer of autonomy to colonial localities could facilitate harmonious relations between locality and

⁵⁸ Townsend, 80.

⁵⁹ Nolte, 148.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 152.

⁶¹ Hiroharu Kobayashi, “Ryōyama Masamichi’s perception of international order from the 1920s to 1930s and the concept of the East Asian Community,” in *Nationalism and Internationalism in Imperial Japan*, edited by Dick Stegewerns (New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2006), 160.

metropole.⁶² Moreover, Yanaihara gave his full support behind the movements to establish a Taiwanese parliament and end compulsory Japanese education in Taiwanese schools.⁶³ Yanaihara worked closely with the League for the Establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament, where he became close with Cai Peihuo. Yanaihara argued that giving localities greater independence would be a precursor to the healthy development of their full autonomy. If the Japanese government accepted a gradualist approach to colonial autonomy, then it would be sure to enjoy the benefits of congeniality and close relations when the colonies inevitably left the empire.

The alternative to modifying its policies would have detrimental effects on the future foreign relations of the Japanese state. Yanaihara argued that *dōka* (assimilation) policies were tantamount to *jūminzoku shugi* (racial subjugation). Since assimilation would invariably provoke resistance, assimilation was inevitably accompanied by coercive policies and violence. Using the research of Joseph A. Schumpeter, Yanaihara also added that imperialism was grounded in atavistic attitudes of domination and militarism.⁶⁴ However, the long-term effects of such policies were not limited to their uncivilized nature. Rather, they would be unable to prevent the eventual separation of colony from metropole since the development of a national consciousness was, according to Yanaihara, a rule of history. When they did separate, Japan would find itself caught in a web of acrimonious relations.

Ishibashi advocated for colonial autonomy to the extent that he called for Japanese withdrawal from Korea, Taiwan, Karafuto, Siberia, and China. Arguing that the colonies were imperiling the relationship between Japan and the West, Ishibashi asserted that Japan should surrender its colonies to protect its trade interests. The basis for this argument was his economic research that demonstrated that trade within the empire did not equal trade between Japan and the West. Moreover, he echoed Ryōyama and Yanaihara by arguing that granting colonies their independence would help foster better relations and even spur independence movements in Western-held colonies. Since Japan would have started this trend, it would naturally become a leader with great international popularity among the numerous, newly freed countries.⁶⁵

⁶² Townsend, 82.

⁶³ *Ibid.*, 99.

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 77.

⁶⁵ Nolte, 160.

While the views above represent piercing criticisms of Japanese colonialism, they do not encompass the totality of liberal opinions about colonialism. The views of Yanaihara and Ishibashi went against the grain of other liberal commentators such as Okuma Shigenobo and Nagai Ryūtarō. Even Yoshino broke with Ishibashi over the Twenty-One Demands, stating that they did not qualify as onerous.⁶⁶ Moreover, while they might criticize certain policies, virtually none of the liberals disputed the fact that the colonies were necessary. Between 1905 and 1920 scholars, publicists, and journalists including the likes of Tōgou Minoru, Takekoshi Yosaburō, and Mochiji Rokusaburō anticipated the colonies could act as a pressure valve to alleviate overpopulation on the main Japanese island. The works of this group also saw Japan as vital to guiding colonial development.⁶⁷

Yanaihara himself did not see colonization as an evil, but rather as a process that could benefit mankind by opening new resources. He writes in *Shokumin oyobi Shokumin Seisaku* that colonization enriches the life of humanity because it increased the resources available to mankind and helps labor and capital reach their full potential.⁶⁸ Naturally, Takahashi's *yukizumari-ron* also joins this body of work. Yanaihara's approval of colonialism did elicit criticism from some of his contemporaries. Hosokawa Karuko asserted that Yanaihara ignored the role of class interests. Yagii Katsumi believed that Yanaihara inadequately addressed problems of racial oppression.⁶⁹ Meanwhile, Ōuchi Hyōmei claimed that Yanaihara's emphasis on the cultural and economic is to the detriment of the political. In recent years as well, Yanaihara has drawn criticism for his rigid adherence to state institutions. Asada Kyōji highlights that Yanaihara characterizes the *dōka* policy as assimilation despite the intentional development of distinctly unequal economic and political circumstances in Taiwan.

On one level, these critiques of Yanaihara and of other liberals highlight the core limitations of Taishō intellectuals. As Hiroshi Tanaka observes, university professors at national institutions were “pragmatic technocrats,” who were expected to provide training to government

⁶⁶ Ibid., 150.

⁶⁷ Townsend, 75.

⁶⁸ Tadao Yanaihara 矢内原忠雄, Tadao. *Shokumin oyobi Shokuminseisaku* 帝国主義下の台湾 [Colonization and Colonial Policy] (Tokyo: Yuhikaku, 1926), 197, accessed from the National Diet Library: https://dl.ndl.go.jp/info:ndljp/pid/982912?itemId=info%3Andljp%2Fpid%2F982912&__lang=en.

⁶⁹ Townsend, 89.

officials and provide their expertise.⁷⁰ As a government insider, Yanaihara was charged with creating functional policy recommendations for the government. As such, the most radical stance he could take is the gradual transfer of autonomy. This stance connects to a fundamental critique of Taishō liberalism: it was too comprising with state interests and too removed to actually engender change.

2.3.2 Equality Through Assimilation

Despite the limitations addressed above, Japanese liberals often represented the best opportunity for local Taiwanese elite to find a voice. The primary drivers of collaboration with the Japanese were the so-called new Taiwanese elite. This group had a large number of doctors and lawyers, who were relatively well educated and were not susceptible to government intimidation like those who worked state-owned lands or Japanese businesses.⁷¹ Unlike some Western colonies, the Japanese were able to govern in Taiwan without incorporating the elite into the bureaucracy in large numbers. Accordingly, the Taiwanese elite were politically disenfranchised and could only be described as “local elite.”⁷²

One of the earlier paths to winning equal treatment was the active pursuit of “mainland expansionism” (*naichi enchō shugi*) and “assimilation” (*douka*). However, even though local Taiwanese at times served as the catalyst for assimilationist activity, the Japanese approach to assimilation was never dialectic and instead assumed the unilateral adopted of Japanese traits by the Taiwanese.⁷³ Accordingly, it is also accurate to refer to these assimilation as “Japanization” (*nihonjinka*). The movement was also tarred by divisions among the Japanese. While those on mainland Japan believed assimilation movements could bring the Taiwanese closer to Japan, such efforts were opposed by local Japanese authorities and residents in Taiwan, who resented the notion that assimilation would confer equal rights to the Taiwanese and eliminate their

⁷⁰ Tanaka, 261.

⁷¹ Masahiro Wakabayashi 若林正文, *Taiwan Teinichi Undou Shi Kenkyuu* 台灣抗日運動史 [Research on the Taiwanese Movements of Resistance Against Japan] (Tokyo: Kenbun Shuppan, 1983), 33-34.

⁷² Chen, 1988.

⁷³ Wakabayashi, 56.

privileged status.⁷⁴ Accordingly, Taiwanese who wanted to employ assimilation had to acquiesce to a demeaning framework and faced powerful and immediate opposition.

Nonetheless, a coalition of “new intellectuals” (*shin chishiki zō*), local businesspeople, and “ambitious collaborators,” looked towards assimilation as a means to overcome the inequalities of colonial life. An opportunity to begin realizing this vision came with the entry of retired politician Itagaki Taisuke. Encouraged by the two minor bureaucrats Nakanishi Ushirō and Satō Genpei, Itagaki came to Taiwan in 1914 and established the Assimilation Society (*douka kai*). Itagaki’s efforts were able to attract the funding from Lin Hsiung-cheng, a member of influential Banqiao-based Lin family.⁷⁵ Although the movement initially lacked popularity among the Taiwanese, it eventually grew influential enough to gain Itagaki an invitation from the Lin Xiandang of the Taichung (Taizhong) Lin family.

The League, however, met a very different reaction among the local Japanese. At first ambivalent about the involvement of an outsider in Taiwanese politics, local authorities and Japanese residents grew increasingly hostile to Itagaki. They continued to afford him—and the League—with the respect due to a retired politician during his time in Taiwan. Once he left, however, the authorities struck: the league was banned and forcibly dissolved. Lin Lieh-tang and Lin Xiandang became primary targets for abuse in Japanese media like the *nichi nichi shinpō*. Moreover, local Japanese began an aggressive lobbying campaign on mainland Japanese while simultaneously banning the Taiwanese from travelling to Japan to express their side of the story.

The Assimilation society thus represents a chapter of Taiwanese history in which there was intense involvement between liberals in Japan and Taiwanese local elite. However, it failed because there was too much control exerted by Itagaki, who created the movement without considering the power dynamics within Taiwanese politics. This disparity demonstrates how the different political systems found in colonial Taiwan—where the assimilation society met complete failure— and mainland Japan—where they resulted in different outcomes from liberalizing movements

Following the dissolution of the assimilation society, frustration with incrementalism and inequality spurred a movement that emphasized self-rule. These efforts were furthered by a

⁷⁴ Lamely, 500.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.*, 507.

serious of sometimes contemporaneous organizations that included the New People's Society, League for the Formation of a Taiwanese Parliament, the Taiwan Cultural Association, and the League for the Attainment of Local Autonomy.⁷⁶ These organization were caught between government censure and the need to attract attention from local Taiwanese. Accordingly, these organizations had to balance wish to increase nationalistic sentiment and need for self-preservation.

2.3.3 Scholarship on Taiwanese Publications and Culture

Compared to the wealth of scholarship on Japanese modernity, research on the Taiwanese understanding of modernity is relatively limited. Particularly in the case of English language literature, there is sparse information regarding Taiwanese intellectuals and the publications which they produced. The research that does exist focuses on either political or identity issues. Meanwhile, there is a comparably robust treatment of Taiwanese publishing in Chinese language scholarship, but this too seems to be more oriented towards political subjects or specifics about the publishing process and related noteworthy figures.⁷⁷

“*Taiwan Seinen*’ and the Modern Taiwanese Ethnic Movement” by Huangxiu Zheng is perhaps that most well-known article documenting *Taiwan Seinen*.⁷⁸ Huang begins by addressing the oppressive systems of Japanese colonialism that drove the founders of *Taiwan Youth* to seek an outlet to air their grievances and organize. The article then proceeds to cover three themes that describe the core mission and content of the publication: acting as a vanguard for islander voices; enlightening Taiwanese society; and calling Taiwanese compatriots to arms. While the article excellently captures the broad contours of *Taiwan Youth*, there is inadequate space to provide

⁷⁶ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," in *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1972): 477-97.

⁷⁷ For information on important figures see: Minzheng Chen 陳玟錚, “Càipéihuǒ yǔ rì zhì shídài dàzhòng méitǐ zhī guānxì-- yǐ <táiwān qīngnián >, <táiwān >, <táiwān mín bào > yǔ <táiwān xīnmín bào > wéi lì lì 蔡培火與日治時代大眾媒體之關係-- 《台灣》, 《台灣民報》與《台灣新民報》為例 [The Relationship Between Cai Peihuo and Mass Media during Japanese Rule—taking Taiwan Seinen, Taiwan, Taiwan Minpō and Taiwan Xin Minpō as examples],” in *Táiwān Fēngwù* [Taiwan Folkways] 57, no. 3 (2007): 103-132.

⁷⁸ See citation 1.

detailed coverage of individual articles. It therefore raises interesting general topics, such as the international orientation of certain articles, without providing specifics.

Shih Yun Lo likewise provides insightful analysis into translated articles by arguing that translation is an active process that gave the Taiwanese a means to articulate alternative intellectual frameworks that undermine the “hegemonic modernity” promulgated by the Japanese.⁷⁹ Like Huang, Lo’s article describes several broad trends in article content, but with a specific focus on translated pieces. Lo stresses that many of these pieces had an emphasis on “the development of culture” and a distinct global mindset. However, Lo’s analysis of these globally minded pieces tends to be general, leaving room for further detail regarding why specific pieces were chosen and what they specifically demonstrate about the forms of modernity in which the Taiwanese were interested.

In one of the few English language pieces of research addressing *Taiwan Seinen*, Shin Kawashima notes that the Taiwanese showed minimal interest in the Japanese racial equality proposal submitted to the League of Nations.⁸⁰ Instead, he finds that the authors of the *Taiwan Seinen* seldom mentioned the topic. In the few cases where it was addressed, Taiwanese editors highlighted the hypocrisy of the Japanese in raising the issue of international racial inequality before addressing inequality within the Empire.⁸¹ Ultimately, Kawashima demonstrates that the Taiwanese had difficulty finding common cause with the Japanese and were more interested in domestic concerns rather than furthering the international ambitions of Japan.

Extensive research exists documenting political movements in Taiwan. For example, in *Taiwan Teinichi Undō Shi Kenkyū*, Masahiro Wakabayashi documents how a generation of new intellectual elite and study abroad students eschewed prior methods of resistance—violence and apathy—in favor of working within state institutions to pursue greater autonomy.⁸² Wakabayashi details the legal inequalities that spurred Taiwanese movements for greater independence and

⁷⁹ Shih Yun Lo 羅詩雲, *Táiwān jìndài zhīshì jiàngòu de kěnéng: Lùn 1920 niándài táiwān qīngnián de fānyì piānzhāng yǔ sīxiǎng zhuǎnyì* 台灣近代知識建構的可能：論 1920 年代台灣青年的翻譯篇章與思想轉譯 [The possibility of Thought Construction in Modern Taiwan: Discussing the Translated Chapters and Translated Thought of *Taiwan Seinen* in the 1920s], *Táiwānxué Yánjiū* [Taiwan Studies] 16 (2013): 171.

⁸⁰ Shin Kawashima, “Chinese and Taiwanese Perspectives on Japan’s Racial Equality Proposal,” in *Japan Review* 3, no. 3-4, (2020): 28-37.

⁸¹ Kawashima, 36.

⁸² See Wakabayashi (1983).

also includes extensive analysis behind each petition for the establishment of a Taiwanese parliament, including the occupation and ages of the signatories. Wakabayashi also provides insight into assimilation policies, suggesting that because Taiwan and Korea did not have the same potential to invite inter-ethnic conflict like that which Britain engendered in India, the Japanese instead relied on cultural assimilation to fragment Taiwanese resistance.⁸³

Other readings on the political circumstances of colonial Taiwan abound and tend to dominate English language literature. Ching-Chih Chen describes the influence of Japanese colonial rule on Taiwanese elite and how elites were generally excluded from the colonial hierarchy.⁸⁴ Harry Lamely describes the failure of the assimilation society, paying particular attention to the unfamiliarity of mainland advocates for Taiwanese rights with the actual politics of the colony.⁸⁵ Edward I-te Chen provides a general overview of Taiwanese political movements in which he asserts that the Taiwanese had to pursue their agenda in the Japanese system due to a lack of strong Chinese support.⁸⁶

Literature on Taiwanese publishing under Japanese rule thus raises several interesting questions: Taiwanese publications included Western, Chinese, and Japanese influences, but what points were emphasized from each area of thought and why? Moreover, will the amalgamation of three intellectual constructs—arguably four if Chinese nationalism and traditional Chinese thought are to be separated—produce different patterns of hybridization than what is seen in the Japanese example? Addressing these questions has the potential to shed new light on discourse about modernity while bringing coverage about Taiwanese print into English language scholarship.

2.4 Literature Review Conclusion

In the variegated and modernizing intellectual milieu of Taisho Japan, Taiwanese fighting for greater autonomy faced numerous obstacles. Japanese liberals, who were one of the most

⁸³ Ibid., 62.

⁸⁴ Ching-Chih Chen, "Impact of Japanese Colonial Rule on Taiwanese Elites," in *The Journal of Asian History* 22, no. 1 (1988): 25-51.

⁸⁵ Lamely, 1907.

⁸⁶ Edward I-te Chen, "Formosan Political Movements Under Japanese Colonial Rule, 1914-1937," *The Journal of Asian Studies* 31, no. 3 (1972): 477-97.

natural groups of collaborators for Taiwanese elite, were fundamentally incrementalist and opposed revolution. Consequently, while they critiqued certain policies, influential liberal thinkers were hesitant to challenge the fundamentally illiberal underpinnings of the imperial system, nationalism, and the existence of colonies. This limit was compounded with the illiberality of the international system in which the existence of colonies was taken for granted, the limited degree of influence that liberals had in state institutions such as the bureaucracy, and the disdain of liberals to engage in “on-the-ground” activism.

The politics of introducing liberalism to the colonies was even more fraught. As the Yanaihara case demonstrates, the liberals who became the most influential were only able to do so because they accepted certain fundamental hierarchies of the Japanese state structure. Moreover, figures such as Itagaki Taisuke reveal that while the colonial plight of Taiwan was able to elicit attention within mainland Japan, the tactics successful in the mainland had limited application in colonial Taiwan due to the expansive powers given to the Governor General. The Japanese living in Taiwan were vested in an unequal society and thus posed an additional challenge to the Taiwanese.

In addition to highlighting the successes and limitations of liberalism within the Japanese empire, this literature review has engaged with some of the critical questions that the following chapters seek to address, particularly regarding the nature of modernity, syncretism, and Taiwanese publications. For example, is it possible to construct a model of modernity that is generalizable but not Western centric and able to account for the modern experiences of multiple non-Western cultures? How do Taiwanese publications demonstrate different approaches to liberalism and how do they balance the Chinese, Japanese, and Western intellectual trends that influenced Taiwan? By holding these and the other questions posed by the literature review in mind, the subsequent chapters will seek to contribute to the histories of Taiwan and modernity more generally.

3 Towards a Universalized Liberalism — The Internationalist

Dialectic of Izumi Tetsu

Compared to the writings of Lin Chenglu, which demonstrate a keen interest in the particulars of the lived colonial experience, the contributions Meiji University professor Izumi Tetsu made to *Taiwan Youth* appear considerably more abstract. With the exception of a short article he wrote commemorating the inauguration of the publication—“Jinggao Taiwan Daomin” (Notifying Taiwanese Islanders)—Izumi wrote a total of eight articles in *Taiwan Youth* and its successor publication *Taiwan*. Of these eight articles, three relate directly to Taiwanese issues (“Taiwan no Shourai,” “Shokuminchi ni okeru Rippoukikan ni tsuite.” and “Taiwan Jichi ni Hyousu”), two relate to issues of self-governance (Shousuminzoku no Hogo to Minzoku Jiketsu” and “Minzoku Jiketsu no Shini”), while the remainder concern themselves with international conferences that addressed topics that had little direct relation to Taiwanese colonial affairs such as the Bolshevik revolution and naval armament limits.

By this calculation, fewer than half of the articles that Izumi contributed to *Taiwan Youth* are directly related to Taiwan. This therefore raises the question of why Izumi spent so much attention on other topics in a publication founded by Taiwanese exchange students. Starting by analyzing issues relating to local governance and Taiwan before moving on to Izumi’s writings on international conferences, this chapter builds on the concept of Japan as a marginalized great power addressed in the previous chapter. The following analysis of Izumi’s writing analyzes whether the diversity of topics that Izumi addresses can elucidate how he perceived the triangular relationship between Taiwan, Japan, and the West. Additionally, this chapter aims to use these topics to understand how Izumi construed his relationship as a Japanese teacher with his Taiwanese students and how his perspective was shaped by his experience in Japan.

3.1 The Ideals of Local Governance

Izumi portrays local governance as a practice that is broadly applicable and inherently valuable. As he expresses in the beginning of his article “Shokuminchi ni okeru Rippō Kikan ni tsuite” (Regarding Colonial Legislative Bodies): “Civilized countries are a simple nation state, a union of states [such as Mexico or the USA], or a federation, and all use some degree of local

governance.”¹ The reason for this is that “as long as the locals do not infringe upon the interests of the whole country, it is natural to give primary consideration to the prosperity, safety, and flourishing of the locality.”² Izumi thus demonstrates that he sees the issue of self-determination as a question of justice generally—an issue tied less to a specific locality than a universal human condition. Izumi proceeds to argue that people living in localities should have the ability to establish legislatures that have financial and administrative mechanisms beholden to the will of the local people.

Izumi criticizes Japan for failing to erect such a system because Taiwan under Japanese rule “is merely a small military colony, without the mechanism to incorporate the will of the people found in the civilized countries of today.”³ Moreover, at the time Izumi wrote his article, the primary means of incorporating the will of the Taiwanese people was the “consultation council” (*Shimon Kikan*) that Lu mentioned. Izumi argues that since the council “is a body made up of those controlled by the Governor General, knowing the will of the people through this body is impossible.”⁴ In short, the *shimon kikkān* falls short of true legislative autonomy and yet cannot even realize its limited purpose because it is not representative. Without the ability to make binding decisions, the Japanese configuration of colonial governance will be unable to reach the standard set by other “civilized countries.”

The benefit of establishing such a representative system was not purely related to issues of interest, but rather issues of good governance. As Izumi argues in “Minzoku Jiketsu no Shini” (The True Meaning of Ethnic Self-Determination), the colonized “hold the greatest hope regarding the future of the colony and therefore exert the greatest effort in education, in society, in production, and in politics. Regardless of whether they have orders from local administration, they must put forth a great effort regarding these various issues.”⁵

¹ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Shokuminchi ni okeru Rippō Kikan ni tsuite” 植民地に於ける立法機関について [On Legislative Bodies in Colonies], Toyko: *Formosa* 台湾 4, no. 4 (1923): 2.

² Ibid.

³ Ibid., 3.

⁴ Ibid.

⁵ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Minzoku Jiketsu no Shini” 民族自決の真意 [The True Meaning of Ethnic Self-Determination]. Toyko: *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 2, no. 4 (1921): 2.

Therefore, Izumi conceives the colonized people as fundamentally independent and driven by their own interests. As residents of the colony, the local people are its largest stakeholder and will naturally pursue its betterment if given the chance. Therefore, as a general rule, the political enfranchisement of colonized people is a mutually beneficial endeavor.

According to Izumi, such a degree of autonomy, however, cannot be universally applied to every colony. Izumi divides cultures into two varieties: civilized and uncivilized. Uncivilized cultures should have political participation via an advisory capacity whereas the civilized ones, such as Taiwan, deserve legislative autonomy.⁶ Izumi therefore does not dispute a hierarchical and exclusive framework for dividing colonial people. He furthermore accepts the idea that certain peoples, deemed civilized by their own internal standards, have the authority to judge when other peoples count as civilized and earn the right to political autonomy.

Therefore, even as the issue of local governance was of great interest to the Taiwanese, it is evident that Izumi was interested in defining the principles behind self-government in general terms. Furthermore, while he viewed the eventual realization of self-government as an important affirmation of colonized people, it was not a right that should be instantly granted, or even necessarily realized in the immediate future. Instead, colonizing countries, based on the standards created by themselves, are self-imbued with the right to judge the worthiness of other societies. In this sense, the universalist theories of Izumi demonstrate an internalized parochialism and ultimately affirms hierarchical colonial relationships.

3.2 Deciding the Fate of Ethnic Minorities

A tendency to universalize colonial principles is also evident in Izumi's description regarding the treatment of ethnic minorities. Izumi asserts that the international order of his day was underpinned by two growing ideologies that emerged from the destruction wrought by the First World War: internationalism (*kokusai shugi*) and ethnicism (*minzoku shugi*). In his article "Shōsū Minzoku no Hogo to Minzoku Jiketsu" (The Protection of Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Self-Determination), Izumi writes that internationalism means that each country needs to curtail

⁶ Izumi, "Shokuminchi ni okeru Rippō Kikan ni tsuite," 3.

its rights in the interest of world peace and that “in the highly developed current day, there is no room for excessive nationalism.”⁷

The phrase “highly developed current day” appeals to self-identification seen in other constructions of modernity—those engaging with these practices are more “developed” and therefore more modern than others. The association between modernity and internationalism thus reveals itself to be both a self-consciously cultivated construction and a reflection of international developments. The appeal to disperse with rigid dedication to nationalism reflects a certain high-mindedness in Izumi’s conception of liberalism that focuses on the realization of the common good through grand systems.

Meanwhile, Izumi presents ethnicism (*minzoku shugi*) as a more complicated case, caught between international, national, and local levels:

Ethnicism is nationalism that takes a single ethnicity as its base or alternatively it includes so-called ‘nationalism’ [*kokka shugi*], and the opposite of nationalism. For example, in countries like Japan, France, and Italy (excepting the latter’s colonies), ethnicism is nationalism since the country is made from a single ethnicity. However, in states like the Austro-Hungarian Empire which include many ethnicities, ethnicism is anti-nationalism. Finland, Poland, Estonia.... are all countries founded based on a single ethnicity. The birth of these small nations is the embodiment of Wilsonian Self-Determinism. The nationalism of the old international system has changed and become ethnic self-determination. **In other words, the international society of old gave primacy to the nation, however today that has changed to ethnicity.**⁸

Izumi thus outlines his understanding of world history, which, under the influence of US president Woodrow Wilson, is moving to emphasize the rights of individual ethnicities rather than states. Izumi also expresses skepticism regarding the uniformity of ethnic states, highlighting that even “pure” countries such as “Estonia,

⁷ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Shōsū Minzoku no Hogo to Minzoku Jiketsu” 少数民族の保護と民族自決 [The Protection of Ethnic Minorities and Ethnic Self-Determination], *Formosa* 台湾 3, no. 9 (1922): 3.

⁸ Izumi, “Shōsū Minzoku no Hogo to Minzoku Jiketsu,” 3. Emphasis added by author.

Lithuania, and the Baltic States,” have minorities of Russian, Jewish, and Polish decent.⁹

The solution that Izumi presents for this issue is a combination of local rights and international cooperation. To illustrate his perspective, Izumi uses the example of a group of Finnish islands that were ethnically and historically majority Swedish. Izumi writes that Finland treated the matter as an issue of ethnic minority rights and, with the support of League of Nations member countries including Japan, established a special legislative region which gave the residents virtual autonomy in governance while they remained formally part of Finland.¹⁰ The description of this solution is highly favorable, in part, because it upheld the ideals recently established in a Prague conference, including the principles that no laws unfair to minorities should be established and that ethnic minorities will be given the freedom to practice their own religion and speak their own language.¹¹

Izumi thus demonstrates that when dealing with issues of ethnic self-determination, he believed European examples and the principles set by international conferences are important and relevant information for his Taiwanese readership. Although he does not explicitly draw comparisons between the above examples and Taiwan, there remains an implicit comparison and a clear endorsement of cases of self-determination based on international and humanistic principles. By drawing these principles into comparison with the Taiwanese case and through his inclusion of European examples in a Taiwanese publication, Izumi thus demonstrates that he views the case of Taiwan to be inextricably intertwined with ethnic self-determination internationally.

⁹ Ibid., 4.

¹⁰ Izumi, “Shōsū Minzoku no Hogo to Minzoku Jiketsu,” 4.

¹¹ Ibid., 5.

3.3 Framing Ethnic Independence—Izumi as an Interlocutor

As he wrote about ethnic independence movements, Izumi displayed a keen attention to both his Japanese and Taiwanese readerships, often making appeals to one of the groups specifically. For example, in “Minzoku Jiketsu no Shini,” Izumi writes that the territory of Saar Basin (today Saarland), was governed by France with the mandate of the United Nations following the First World War, but was subsequently allowed to determine its eventual return to Germany via referendum.¹² Rather than a rare exception, Izumi portrays this as a common occurrence, describing four other similar cases where the fate of a colony or occupied territory was determined by referendum.

With regard to these referendums, however, Izumi makes an interesting distinction. Since these votes were to decide the country to which these localities belonged, Izumi asserts that “ethnic self-determinism is certainly not the freedom of revolution or a colonial independence movement.”¹³ This framing parallels his initial introduction to the article, in which he writes that national self-determination represents the ability of the colonized to govern their own affairs. However, this could entail the ability to resist the colonial metropole:

“Looking from the view of the colonizer [means] ethnic self-determination is an extremely dangerous concept, and there is concern that this ideology will lead the colonized to rebel. [Therefore] the colonizer fervently defends the entry of this ideology into the colony.”¹⁴

Izumi thus seeks to address Japanese misgivings by demonstrating through successful European cases that self-governance does not necessarily lead to entail “revolution or colonial independence.” Izumi thereby exhibits his sensitivity for the Japanese readership of *Taiwan Youth* as well as his understanding of the objections and perceived misconceptions of the Japanese public.

¹² Izumi “Minzoku Jiketsu no Shini,” 3.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 4.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, 2.

Izumi also takes aim at his Taiwanese audience through his article “Taiwan no Shourai” (The Future of Taiwan). Describing the Taiwanese movement for greater autonomy, Izumi “examines the issue from the standpoint of scholarly principles,” to conclude that he “believes the desire of the Taiwanese is just and the method [of the Taiwanese] is exceedingly moderate. There will certainly come a period where just goals pursued via just means shall be accomplished.”¹⁵ This narrative echoes the convictions of Lin Chenglu and Yanaihara Tadao, both of whom also believed that the inertia behind colonial movements meant that the question of attaining self-determination was “an issue of when, not if.”

However, Izumi is careful to add a word of caution, emphasizing that “reform is not something that can be achieved through violence. Violence will rather hinder the realization of your goals.”¹⁶ In this explicit address to the Taiwanese readership of *Taiwan Youth* through the second person “your” (*shokun*), Izumi demonstrates an approach emblematic of Taisho liberals; by eschewing violence, Izumi expresses faith that the realization of Taiwanese goals can be achieved through the mechanisms of the Japanese state and that the most compelling manner to realize these goals is through peaceful means.

Through this combination of international examples and appeals to Japanese and Taiwanese readership, Izumi thus acts as an interlocutor among the West, Japan, and Taiwan. Between the West and Japan, Izumi uses his international and academic acumen to assuage the misgivings of the Japanese public and highlight the shortcomings of Japanese practices. The prestige afforded to the West within the colonial and global hierarchy thus became a means for Izumi to critique Japan and provide a model for good behavior. Simultaneously, Izumi also urges the Taiwanese to avoid aberrations from his definition of ideal behavior for colonized people, thus demonstrating that Western ideas also served to critique the colonized, even as Izumi sought greater colonial rights.

¹⁵ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Taiwan no Shōrai” 台湾の将来 [The Future of Taiwan], *Formosa* 台湾 5, no. 1 (1923): 2.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, 3.

3.4 Historical Development

Izumi's concept of universalism is connected with his view of history and world trends. In the article "Taiwan Jichisei wo Hyōsu," he writes that if Japan "wishes to maintain the position of a civilized colonizer, the welfare of the colonized must become the principle goal of governance."¹⁷ However, while certain welcome changes occurred on the societal level since the beginning of Den Kenjiro's term as the first civilian Governor General, reform, on balance, has been tantamount to small matters that have failed to result in substantive political involvement for the Taiwanese. According to Izumi, this is a grave mistake because "this considers not the trends of world culture and the future of the country, but rather is poison to the colonized people and the country's future for the pursuit of ephemeral selfish interest."¹⁸

Significantly, this change is not limited to Taiwan. Rather, "this is the request of developing colonies all over the world" and local legislative bodies were already established in Western colonies such as Canada.¹⁹ This framing uses colonial development and administration—important markers of modernization—to imply that Japan is behind the progress of other developed countries. By establishing this comparison, Izumi accepts Western countries as a standard par excellence and aligns himself with Western liberal values over Japanese governmental practices. Izumi thus demonstrates a sensitivity to the "tide of history" in the sense that he feels current policy is incongruent with world trends. The failure to realize and conform to such trends will inevitably leave the Japan with an anachronous political system unsuited to "civilized" modernity.

As he develops his argument, two main justifications for this reading emerge: one relating to Taiwan's internal situation and the other relating to the standards of Western countries. Regarding the latter, Izumi draws examples from India, where a degree of self-

¹⁷ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, "Taiwan Jichisei wo Hyōsu" 台湾自治制を評す [Evaluating the System of Taiwanese Self-Governance], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 1, no. 3 (1920): 11.

¹⁸ Izumi, "Taiwan Jichisei wo Hyōsu," 11.

¹⁹ Izumi, Tetsu, "Shokuminchi ni okeru Rippō Kikan ni tsuite," 4

government “was extremely effective at cultivating the political training of locals.”²⁰ He also writes that in the Dutch colonies in the East Indies and in French Indochina, various self-governance schemes were implemented with positive effects.²¹ With regard to the internal situation of Taiwan, Izumi expresses that “one cannot say that the degree of culture of the Taiwanese is not lower than that of the Indochinese.”²²

Therefore, for reasons from within and without, a move to local governance is suited for Taiwan. The reasons without, namely the state of colonial governance in the colonies of Western countries, creates a comparison between the West and Japan wherein the West is an idealized goal of modernity. Japan, meanwhile, is in a liminal state. While Japan is a “civilized” culture with the authority to colonize other countries, it simultaneously remains divergent from Western trends. Izumi does not mean to demean Japan, but rather expresses his ideas as the frank description of world development that Japan must head to secure its own future. This narrative thus imposes a pseudo-scientific, rules-based narrative of history, in which the vanguard of development is defined by the trends of great Western powers and the failure to understand and conform to such “rules of history” will leave the ignorant underdeveloped and insufficiently modern.

3.5 Arms Management

The above passages account for Izumi’s writings that are either directly related to Taiwan or have a very strong connection to Taiwan via a focus on local governance issues. However, what of the approximately half of Izumi’s articles that do not fit this description? The following sections will explain the content of these other articles and seek to explain how they can be used to understand Izumi’s relationship to Taiwan and his thoughts about the colonial world. To begin, the following section addresses his pacifist aspirations, which he hoped could be realized through international arms control.

²⁰ Izumi, “Taiwan Jichisei wo Hyōsu,” 14.

²¹ Ibid., 14-15.

²² Izumi, “Taiwan Jichisei wo Hyōsu,” 16.

In “Taiheiyō Kaigi toha Nanzoya” (What is the Pacific Conference?), Izumi expresses his ideas about his desired future for international relations, mainly focusing on arms agreements. After first expressing his frustration that the United States did not join the League of Nations despite having a hand in its founding, Izumi proceeds to identify the focus of the Pacific Conference: “the United States is outside of the Anglo-Japanese alliance [*Nichi-Ei Dōmei*], and expressed its annoyance with the two alliance countries, particularly Japan.”²³ The US was further frustrated because while England and Japan had agreement in the treaty to limit the production of armaments, both failed to keep their obligations. On this note, Izumi expresses his agreement with the United States:

“To expand military armaments today is to forget the point of the Great War, to ignore the spirit of the alliance, and to regress again into the armed peace seen before the war. Regarding this point, alliance countries completely understand. Like the United States, intellectuals, humanists, and true nationalists disparage armament expansion.”²⁴

In drawing the distinction between “true nationalists” and the unstated warmongers, Izumi juxtaposes narrow self-interests with global ones. It is only through learning from the legacy of the First World War and changing practices regarding military armaments that the Japanese can avoid creating the same competition—and inevitable conflict—that led to disastrous war in Europe.

Izumi is so dedicated to stopping military expansion that he takes the second half of the article to disagree with the American stance regarding the conference’s conclusions that were unrelated to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance. For example, the United States sought to outline several principles regarding continental Asia, including the acceptance of the Open Door Policy, the cessation of foreign involvement in Chinese domestic political affairs, the separation between foreign government controlled companies and Chinese railways, and the cessation of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance.²⁵ However, Izumi found this arrangement to be wholly insufficient, stating:

²³ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Taiheiyō Kaigi toha Nanzoya” 太平洋會議とは何ぞや [What is the Pacific Conference?], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 3, no. 2 (1921): 7.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, 7.

²⁵ Izumi, “Taiheiyō Kaigi toha Nanzoya,” 9.

“While naval dominance, superior fleets, and impregnable fortresses dominate the thoughts of politicians on both Pacific coasts, the resolution of Pacific issues is impossible. The American approach is merely ignoring the root while treating the illness.”²⁶

The issue, as perceived by Izumi, is therefore primarily the issue of military violence and accumulation. It is the threat of war, ever escalated by the increasing armaments and competition among the Pacific great powers, that is driving unpopular defensive posturing and causing the Japanese to seek control within the Chinese mainland. On one level, this demonstrates that Izumi’s style of liberalism is highly concerned with macro, systematic issues and underlying patterns of thought that drive coercive state behavior. Through this lens of analysis, the prospect of military disarmament naturally presents itself because of its potential to change the calculations of great powers and allow them to act less defensively.

Izumi also turns strong attention to the issue of military expansion in the article “Gunbi Shukushō ni tsuite” (Regarding the Reduction of Military Arms), which is a reprint of a speech that Izumi delivered to a group of Taiwanese study exchange students. In this speech, Izumi outlines two main areas in which he objects to military expansion: the material and the spiritual. The former relates to the opportunity cost of war: “the cost of war must be principally born by the citizens of the country, moreover, the funds for education and industry become lacking and must be spent on military armaments.”²⁷

The later issue pertains to the topic of democracy and constitutionalism. Izumi writes that “not only are soldiers unable to criticize the military administration, they must follow the orders of their commanding officer absolutely. This spirit is absolutely incompatible with constitutional politics.”²⁸ Therefore, governments must exercise caution in the extent to which military affairs gain national importance, since militaries operate in a manner inconsistent with the ideals of constitutionality and accountability. Izumi thus outlines how his concern with military armaments relates to the principles of good governance and the welfare of the nation.

²⁶ Ibid., 10.

²⁷ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Gunbi Shukushō ni tsuite” 軍備縮小について [On Reducing Military Armaments], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 3, no. 5 (1922): 18.

²⁸ Ibid., 18.

3.6 Economics and National Sovereignty

Aside from arms management, Izumi addresses various other topics that arose in international conferences. For example, Izumi ends an article on the Washington Conference with a description of the “Far East Problem” (*Kyokutō Mondai*), which “in fact is mainly the China Issue,” which resulted in the establishment of the following principles:

“The respect for the political protection of China’s independence and territoriality; with regard to China, in order to strengthen the country and maintain a stable government, ample opportunities for freedom shall be furnished; signatories shall endeavor for the establishment of equal opportunity in industry across China for people of various countries; in response to the current situation of China, the entreaty for special privileges that infringe upon the rights of various Chinese nationals or actions that violate the safety of various countries shall be avoided.”²⁹

Izumi thus demonstrates an internationalist orientation in his description of the Washington Conference. To start, over three fourths of the article is concerned with arms limitation as a reaction to the First World War, which was primarily a European affair. Moreover, concerns regarding China are not articulated as they regard Taiwan, but rather as they concern the international community and China itself. Most of the four principles established at the conference, about which Tetsu writes approvingly, relate to the Great Powers providing China ample room to grow and maintain its stability. On one hand, this concept parallels Izumi’s determination to help find self-determination and dignity for all countries. Notably, however, Izumi pays significant attention to the relationship between great powers, and how they should limit their competition to avoid infringing upon China’s rights. In this sense, Izumi is concerned with politics, international relations, and power at highest level.

In his article “Zenoa Kaigi no Kōseki,” Izumi recounts the results of a conference held in the Italian town of Genoa. He begins the article noting Japan’s special place among the great powers by highlighting that among the 28 conference attendants, “besides Japan, all of the

²⁹ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Washinton Kaigi no Kōseki” 華盛頓會議の功績 [The Achievements of the Washington Conference], *Formosa* 台湾青年 3, no. 2 (1922): 6.

countries were European.”³⁰ He then goes on to explain how the conference was, in part, a continuation of the *Taiheyō Kaigi*, but would inevitably fail to reduce in any way the expansion of continental armies, since, unlike navies, the competition between European powers to accumulate armaments on land was too intense to persuade any of the actors to desist. The article pays detailed attention to the particulars of the conference: its date; represented countries; and the subsequent conferences that it spurred. It also addresses the array of topics covered by the conference, ranging from whether Germany could defer paying its war indemnities to compensation to foreign nationals by the Soviet government.

Izumi identifies three main successes of the conference: “1) the decision regarding finance; 2) the decision regarding economics; and 3) the decision regarding trade”³¹ Specifically, these points relate to stipulations given by the international community to the Soviet Government. In general, the conference resulted in the agreement that the government would be responsible for the material losses incurred by foreigners during the revolution, the Soviet government is responsible for creating a committee to investigate these cases and deal with them, and that the Soviet government was responsible for the bonds and loans of the imperial Russian government.³² The conference also dealt with a series of agreements drawn between the German and Soviet governments, regarding matters that even extended to issues related to the businesses of Germans living in Russia.³³ Overall, these articles demonstrate a keen interest in the economic repercussions of European political developments.

3.7 *The Meaning of International Conferences*

It is clear that Izumi spent a significant portion of his contribution to *Taiwan Youth* focusing on high-level international issues with little direct relation to Taiwan such as military armaments, European politics, and international trade. While at first this may appear unrelated to Taiwan, Izumi’s emphasis on these international questions and desire to explain them in a detailed manner actually indicates his vision for the future of Taiwan and demonstrates his

³⁰ Tetsu Izumi 泉哲, “Zenoa Kaigi no Kōseki” ゼノア会議の功績 [The Achievements of the Genova Conference], *Formosa* 台湾 3, no. 4 (1922): 2.

³¹ Izumi, “Zenoa Kaigi no Kōseki,” 8.

³² *Ibid.*, 4

³³ *Ibid.*, 7.

perceived relationship to Taiwanese students. This becomes particularly evident in his article “Gunbi Shukushō ni tsuite.”

In the beginning of his speech, Izumi questions what topic would be the most desirable to present at the conference, asking whether he should chose a topic that “directly relates to you [Taiwanese students] who have honored me with your presence today, or otherwise something abstractly related to the world that when you go can guide Taiwanese culture.”³⁴ Izumi thus establishes key themes guiding his choice of topic by placing key importance on an international perspective in developing culture. Rather than a case directly related to Japan or Taiwan, Izumi felt that lessons in global politics were of greater didactic value and that he, as a professor guiding the members of a still-developing colonial culture, could act as an important vector through which this guidance could be transmitted.

Izumi’s choice of language also demonstrates his thinking regarding the relationship between the Taiwanese and Japanese. This is evident when Izumi writes, “the youth, who are you [Taiwanese students], but also us, Japanese citizens, must think about one matter regarding this issue... [because] you are the progenitors of Japan, and the successors of the people of the earth.”³⁵ Therefore, Izumi views that Taiwanese as fundamentally ingrained in the Japanese empire to the extent that they too could be considered its inheritors. This becomes even clearer when Izumi explicitly addresses the future of the island:

“I believe the majority of you [Taiwanese students] think that Taiwan will not leave Japan, and will live in an area of self-governance— one part of the Japanese empire, that is more agreeable to your residency... You, the Taiwanese youth, should join hands with the Japanese and plan the future development of the empire together.”³⁶

By ending a speech about arms management with an appeal to Taiwanese-Japanese unity, Izumi demonstrates that he educated the Taiwanese youth about these distant European conferences and treaties because he conceptualized the Taiwanese as the future of Japan, who would consequently require knowledge about great power relations employed by the Japanese. In order to prepare the Taiwanese for this perceived need, Izumi acts as an interlocuter between

³⁴ Izumi, “Gunbi Shukushō ni tsuite,” 17.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 22.

³⁶ *Ibid.*, 23.

Western knowledge, the Japanese, and the Taiwanese. As a liberal, he viewed international affairs with a somewhat altruistic and globally minded attitude. However, the ability to bring so much focus on global issues is in part due to his position as a Japanese person, who did not need to reckon with the daily experience of colonial inequality. Therefore, even as Izumi presents a distinctly international topic to an audience of Taiwanese exchange students, his position as a Japanese remains ever-present, shaping both the information he presents and the narrative he uses to construct his argument.

3.8 Conclusion

The fact that the majority of Izumi's articles do not directly relate to Taiwan, reveals how Izumi perceived the future of Taiwanese governance as well as how he construed his relationship with the Taiwanese. On one hand, Izumi's preference for broad and systematic change seems to reflect his positionality as a fully enfranchised resident of the colonial metropole. Izumi's preference to first resolve the issue of arms reduction among greater powers means he is fine with prioritizing difficult, sweeping change over comparatively quickly attainable goals. As a scholar for whom the lived injustices of colonial life is abstract, Izumi can focus on these "high-level" issues with few repercussions in his daily life.

On the other hand, while Izumi's choice to focus on great power relations may seem disconnected from the Taiwanese political movement, Izumi construed the Taiwanese as perpetually intertwined with Japan through empire regardless of whether self-governance is established. As the progenitors of the Japanese nation, the Taiwanese thus have an equal stake in great power politics with the Japanese. Within this framework, Izumi places himself in the role of an interlocutor between the West, Japan, and Taiwan, as he leverages his positionality as a Japanese professor to gain Western knowledge, which he then transmits to Taiwanese students through *Taiwan Youth* and his lectures.

This relationship, however, is not a linear one whereby knowledge trickles down from the West, to Japan, before finally reaching Taiwan. Due to Japan's marginal

position in the global hierarchy, Izumi is quick to highlight the ways in which the Japanese empire fails to achieve its modern mandate as a “civilized” colonial country. In these cases, Izumi calls upon Japan to respond to the Taiwanese requests for self-governance, since the Taiwanese had also achieved the level of development deserving of autonomous government. As a result, there are cases where Taiwan better realizes modern aspirations and liberal ideals than Japan despite the colonial power disparity. Therefore, within Izumi’s internationalist framework, the connection between Japan and Taiwan becomes dialectic, with the colonized, not the colonizer, advocating for the adequately modern political practices.



4 “4,000 Years of History” Meets Modernity — Chinese Heritage, The Japanese State, and Western Values in the Writings of Lin Chenglu

As a leader in Taiwanese student political movement, Lin Chenglu was one of the most prolific contributors to *Taiwan Youth*. An examination of his articles reveals a complex and nuanced perspective, through which Lin blends his lived experience as a Taiwanese with concepts from China, Japan, and the West to conceptualize his preferred political relationship with Japan. This section begins with Lin’s writings on the role and powers of the Governor General, which together embodied many of the issues that he identified with the Japanese colonial hierarchy, before proceeding to investigate the ideas he used to weigh the desirability of his two proposed solutions to Japanese discrimination: total integration into Japanese electoral politics and the establishment of a local legislative body for Taiwan. Throughout these writings, appeals to Western modernity and Chinese heritage in Taiwan both arise, creating a hybrid and paradoxical dialectic.

4.1 *The Role and Powers of the Governor General*

Much of the attitude Lin adopted regarding Japanese colonialism can be captured in his criticism of the Governor General. This institution became an object of Lin’s focus because Law No. 63, a piece of legislation that starting in 1896 imbued the Office of Governor-General with the ability to issue ordinances called *ritsurei*, which held the same power as Japanese law, thus concentrating the power of two branches of government into one executive body. Although the law was initially only temporary and conditional upon Diet renewal every three years, the shrewd political maneuverings of Goto Shinpei, the Civil Administrator of Taiwan between 1898 and 1906, and the failure of the Governor General to establish order within its first three years resulted in the ongoing extension of Law No. 63 every three years for over 20 years.³⁷ As a result, Taiwan was put into a perpetual system of constitutional dictatorship that chafed Taiwanese elite. Examining Lin’s critique of this legislation will demonstrate his ideas about the proper relationship between government and citizens as well as what constitutes appropriate constraints on state power.

³⁷ Wu, 87.

Lin's criticism of Law No. 63 is often couched in constitutionalist language. As he writes in his article "*Sogan ni tsuite*" ("Regarding Appeals"): "under the form of 'legislative trusteeship,' the Taiwan Governor General, which is an organ of the administrative branch, issues laws. As a result, Taiwan has not reached true constitutionalism, namely despite lacking legal basis, the people's freedom is limited through administrative powers."³⁸ Lin thus draws upon the liberal ideas of freedom and rules-based governance that were circulating globally in the early twentieth century. Lin's choice of phrasing also evokes comparisons between both Taiwan and Japan as well as between Japan and other countries, since he is insinuating that there exists a basis for *true* constitutionalism in *other* colonies.

In his investigation of constitutionalism, Lin inevitably encounters arguments regarding whether the Japanese constitution can support the unequal arrangement of power under the Governor General. For example, in his article "*Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten*" (Conclusions Regarding Law 63), Lin raises two main issues: whether Law No. 63 is appropriate given the conditions of Taiwan and whether its basis is constitutional. Regarding the suitability of the law, he addresses concerns about instability by quoting Mizuno, who writes that:

"Since Taiwan entered the empire.... there has been a concern that discord will occur. Moreover, the customs of the Islanders are completely different [from those of the Japanese], therefore the thorough implementation of laws exactly the same as those is in Japan is impossible. Temporarily, in response to the time and place, the issuance of orders with the same effectiveness as law is required."³⁹

Mizuno thus argues that the possibility for violence in a new territory as well as the cultural differences between Taiwan and Japan makes the implementation of Japanese law in Taiwan inappropriate. Lin also addresses the constitutional dimension of Japanese justification for Law No. 63 by citing Shimura, who adopts a conservative "passive interpretation" (*shōkyoku ron*) of the constitution, asserting that:

"The eight *shū* referred to in the constitutional clause "promoting the people's welfare of the eight *shū*" refers traditionally to Japan... All laws of a country are

³⁸ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, "Sogan ni tsuite" 訴願について [Regarding Appeals]. *Formosa* 台湾 3, no. 3 (1922): 25.

³⁹ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, "Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten" 六三問題の歸着点 [Conclusions Regarding the Law no. 63 Issue], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 1, no. 5 (1920): 27.

predicated on given societal circumstances and therefore obviously should not be enacted in new territory. The practices, customs, manners, and thoughts held by people of new territory are clearly different from those of the mother country, and therefore the enactment of laws and ordinances for the domination of the motherland is natural.”⁴⁰

In addition to the already established cultural argument against equal treatment, Shimura raises a rather technical issue regarding the constitution, asserting that the language of the Japanese constitution does not require its application outside of the main Japanese islands. Yet, Lin demonstrates that the points raised by Shimura and Mizuno are not hegemonic. For example, Lin quotes Kiyomizu who asserts that the constitution is the foundation of the country and should thus be applied to new territories.⁴¹ Moreover, Kiyomizu finds that because the constitution is supposed to change with society, it can adapt to new cultural norms. This mode of constitutional interpretation can be referred to as “active interpretation” (*sekkyoku ron*) which is juxtaposed by Shimura’s *shōkyoku ron*.

Ultimately, the presentation of these conflicting arguments leads Lin to conclude there exists little agreement within Japanese political or academic discourse regarding whether the implementation of the Japanese constitution in Taiwan is possible, legally mandated, or advantageous.⁴² Lacking consensus, Lin proceeds to develop his own case against the status quo, relying upon arguments for constitutionalism. Lin states that “in a constitutional country, the three powers— legislative, judiciary, and executive—are divided into separate bodies. Moreover, that each [branch] respectively allows for a degree of popular participation is a requisite for constitutionalism.”⁴³ Lin thus echoes his argument in “Sogan ni tsuite” by advocating for the implementation of a Western liberal ideal—constitutionalism—and using the Japanese failure to fully recognize this ideal as the point of his criticism.

⁴⁰ Ibid., 30.

⁴¹ Ibid., 31.

⁴² Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 33.

⁴³ Ibid., 37.

Lin's embrace of constitutionalism is also evident in his article "Kaisei Taiwan Tōji Kihon Hō to Shokuminchi Tōji Hōshin" (Reforming the Fundamental Law of Taiwanese Governance and the Direction of Colonial Governance), which discusses the development of legislation regarding the powers of the Governor General. Since its implementation in 1896, Law No. 63 did not remain stagnant, but rather went through two major changes, first becoming Law No. 31 in 1906, and then finally Law No. 3 in 1921. While certain details in each iteration differed slightly, "all three generations possessed the same legislative spirit in that they attributed legislative trusteeship to the Taiwan Governor General on the basis of the special conditions in Taiwan."⁴⁴ In fact, Law 3 was less desirable because, unlike Law No. 63 which had to be extended in the Diet regularly, Law 3 had no time limit.⁴⁵ This is, ultimately, bad for constitutionalism and rule of law since "there is no statute limiting the situations in which something is necessary due to the special conditions of Taiwan."⁴⁶ In short, establishing legislation that was effective in perpetuity undermined the proposition that the special powers afforded to the Governor General were based on a temporary need to reconcile an unstable environment and cultural differences, thus creating a constitutional dilemma. Therefore, Lin's commentary on this legislative reform once again brings him back to his embrace of Western ideals.

Interestingly, Lin also seems to accept certain colonial ideas that facilitate the oppression of colonized people. For example, Lin does not contradict the culturally chauvinistic concept that people of "less developed cultures" do not deserve the right to self-governance. Rather, he seeks to portray the Taiwanese as having realized these ideals and are therefore deserving of fitting treatment. For example, Lin states that rights should be withheld from newly acquired areas of the empire on the basis of instability and "undeveloped intellects" (*mindō*) of local people.⁴⁷ However, having experienced 25 years of Japanese rule, and following "the stabilization and improvement in the people, the basis [for withholding constitutional rights] was

⁴⁴ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, "Kaisei Taiwan Tōji Kihon Hō to Shokuminchi Tōji Hōshin" 改正台湾統治基本法と植民地統治方針 [Reforming the Fundamental Law of Taiwanese Governance and the Direction of Colonial Governance], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 2, no. 5 (1921): 7.

⁴⁵ Lin, "Kaisei Taiwan Tōji Kihon Hō to Shokuminchi Tōji Hōshin," 7.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 10.

⁴⁷ Lin, "Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten," 38.

gradually lost [in Taiwan].”⁴⁸ By constructing the Taiwanese as a group that has “improved” and is self-consciously modern, Lin eschews criticism of stratified colonial heuristics to instead cultivate an image of the Taiwanese as perfect adopters of liberal modernity.

4.2 *The Case for Local Governance*

Throughout his case against the Governor General, Lin argues that the unequal treatment of Taiwan and Japan, as well as the Japanese government’s perpetual unwillingness to resolve this difference has created a constitutional issue. However, while the argument that inconsistencies in the application of law are unconstitutional may at first glance appear to be an argument for assimilation (i.e. the absorption of the Taiwanese and Japanese into a shared legal and societal sphere), Lin weighs difference practices of colonialism before deciding that simple assimilation is not an ideal outcome.

In the article “Kinsei Shokuminchi Tōji ni Kansuru Taijin Seisaku” (Human Policies regarding Modern Colonial Governance), Lin outlines three types of colonial governance: despotism; local governance; and assimilation.⁴⁹ Under despotism, an authoritarian government controls all branches. In colonies that practice local governance, such as Canada, the colonized people have their own legislature, political participation, and the ability to govern local affairs provided their decisions do not infringe upon the critical interests of the colonial metropole. Lastly, assimilation policy, such as that practiced in French colonies, seeks to extend the laws and practices of the colonial metropole into the colony. The practice of assimilation was not based on mere domination, but rather “the concept of freedom and equality, and the spirit of compatriotism with all people.”⁵⁰ In short, since all people deserve treatment commensurate with that of the metropole, colonial residents were, in the French view, given the opportunity to adopt French culture and therefore eventually gain the benefit of living as equals under French law.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿. “Kinsei Shokuminchi Tōji ni Kansuru Taijin Seisaku” 近代植民地に関する対人政策 [Human Policies regarding Modern Colonial Governance], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 2, no. 1 (1921): 23.

⁵⁰ Lin, “Kinsei Shokuminchi Tōji ni Kansuru Taijin Seisaku,” 25.

However, such an altruistic narrative of assimilation struck Lin as disingenuous; quoting French sociologists, Lin emphasized that assimilationist policy was crafted by political bodies in which few politicians had a deep knowledge of the colony. As a result, the French “looked down upon the system of that indigenous society and tried to reform that society’s system in a manner advantageous to the colonial country.”⁵¹ The ability to discern the ethical motivation behind some proponents of assimilationism while highlighting the gap between theory and practice thus underscores Lin’s perspective.

The discontinuity between theory and practice is not only evident in the colonies of European powers. Lin writes that while those arguing for continued legislative restrictions on Taiwan claim that they currently plan to make Taiwan legally equal once it “reaches the extent that it does not differ from Japan... in fact the situation has not proceeded according to this simple theory.”⁵² This is typified by the implementation of Law No. 3, which seems to have essentially “abandoned Mainland Expansionism” (*naichi enchō shugi*), and instead moved towards the perpetual implementation of fundamentally unequal conditions in Taiwan. Moreover, even supposing the proponents of Law No. 3 truly planned to repeal the law following the attainment of full assimilation, Taiwan has developed its own language and culture so distinct from Japan that to reach full assimilation could take “half an eternity,” thus making assimilation more a theoretical possibility than an imminent reality.⁵³

Even if total integration into the Japanese political system was eventually achieved, as residents of a remote colony, the Taiwanese have unique interests. In a system where each representative is primarily concerned with his own constituency, Taiwan could still face considerable discrimination.⁵⁴ Lin, therefore, takes his experience as a colonized subject and uses it to describe the actual results of colonial policy.

As opposed to assimilationist ideals, Lin uses his article “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue)” (Describing Local Self Government and Granting it to Taiwan) to explain the practical ideals of colonial self-governance. As opposed to assimilationist ideals, which are imposed from the central government and have limited efficacy among the people, incorporating

⁵¹ Ibid., 25.

⁵² Ibid., 13.

⁵³ Lin, “Kinsei Shokuminchi Tōji ni Kansuru Taijin Seisaku,” 14.

⁵⁴ Ibid., 19.

the colonized into the political process has the potential to make decisions reflect the actual conditions of the colony. As Lin writes, “in constitutional politics, politics are done by the people and eliminate an authoritarian mentality ... Since the bond between the governing and the governed is effective, the people will contribute to public affairs.”⁵⁵ As in Lin’s criticism of the Governor General, this suggestion is rooted in Western liberal ideals; in addition to his appeal of constitutionalism, self-government is appealing because it reflects the “will of the people,” which in turn improves the quality of governance.

Lin writes that this form of government is both European in origin and modern in form. Describing the basis for local government, Lin explains how self-government came from the decline of central authorities within France and Germany during the middle ages which led individual townships and villages to gain *de facto* autonomy.⁵⁶ Although central governments subsequently experienced a resurgence, a strengthening of constitutionalism and liberal thought rebounded in the late eighteenth century as countries around Europe witnessed The French Revolution. As part of the changes that occurred due to this liberalism, local governments, particularly at the town and village level, gained considerably more autonomy.

Since the Japanese constitution is based on European models founded on this “narrowly defined self-government,” Lin believed the Japanese government should also allow self-government that includes 1) a legislative body comprised of elected officials—if the officials are not democratically elected or the state controls the nomination process, then it cannot be said to truly reflect the will of the people—and 2) a body for local governance that has its own finances, thus proving its status as a *hōjin* (legal person).⁵⁷

Lin thus actively embraces criticism of the Japanese government through an embrace of Western ideals. According to Lin, the Japanese government began a process of learning from the West that resulted in partial modernization. However, Japan has failed to sufficiently complete this process of learning, as demonstrated by the refusal to implement local self-governance in

⁵⁵ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue)” 地方自治を述べて台湾自治を及ぶ (上) [Describing Local Self Government and Applying Taiwanese Self Government (first chapter)], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 1, no. 2 (1920): 32.

⁵⁶ Lin, “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue),” 21.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, 23.

Taiwan. By comparison, the course of action recommended by the Taiwanese represents the fulfillment of modernist ideals:

“In constitutional governments of the modern world, laws and ordinances separate the power of the state and the rights of the people. Moreover, [modern states] do not allow executive bodies of government to infringe upon the rights of the people without legal basis and if the executive body violates the law and harms the peoples’ rights, or in the event it inappropriately infringes upon the peoples’ interests, the people must hold some manner of recourse that they can seek against the state.”⁵⁸

In failing to grant its colonial subjects sufficient recourse and protections, and also in failing to appropriately maintain the separation of powers in the Office of the Governor General, the Japanese government has not fulfilled the mandate of “constitutional governments of the modern world.” By comparison, the Taiwanese proposition for local self-government would facilitate the realization of these goals, making the Taiwanese better champions of liberalism.

Lin’s concept of ideal self-government is intimately connected to his ideas regarding constitutionalism and separation of powers: “on a complete case of self-governance, the extent of oversight is legally determined, with a basis in law, and the observatory body cannot create executive orders to change this.”⁵⁹ However, because the Governor General has the ability to create orders with legally binding power, ultimately law on the island “is merely a method of the Governor General originating in the executive branch.”⁶⁰ Therefore, the establishment of local governance would resolve this constitutional dilemma.

Lin is also careful to note that methods of local governance need to be meaningful. In his article “Minpō no Shinzoku Kitei wo Taiwanjin ni Tekiyō suru Hōan no Gigi” (Skepticism About Applying the Civilian Family Regulations to Taiwanese), Lin writes that the application of family law to Taiwan, which has significantly different customs and practices from Japan, is self-evidently poor policy. However, the Governor General pursued this unwise course of action

⁵⁸ Lin, “Sogan ni tsuite,” 24.

⁵⁹ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (naka)” 地方自治を述べて台湾自治を及ぶ (中) [Explaining Local Self Government and Applying Taiwanese Self Government (middle chapter)], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 1, no. 3 (1920): 33.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, 34.

due to inadequate input from the Taiwanese themselves, largely because the “Consultation Council” (*Sōtokufu Hyōgikai*) established in 1922 for the express purpose of including the Taiwanese into the political process was wholly unsatisfactory.

To start, Lin levels criticism at the composition of the council, which had eighteen Japanese and just nine Taiwanese members at the time he wrote the article.⁶¹ Such an unrepresentative body would have great difficulty reaching a majority consensus that reflects the views of the Taiwanese. Moreover, Lin continues, the Taiwanese who were chosen were selected by the Office of the Governor General and therefore unrepresentative of actual Taiwanese views. As evidence of their bias, Lin emphasizes how the council approved of the Governor General’s decision to ban large public rituals, despite their popularity among the Taiwanese. Adding insult to injury, on occasions when the council reached a decision that contradicted the will of the Governor General, it could be ignored because it was “merely an institution for consultation” with no binding mechanism to influence the behavior of the Governor General.⁶²

By critiquing these elements of the colonial status quo, Lin thus establishes a groundwork based on liberal Western ideals of limited government, popular representation, and constitutionalism to highlight the shortcomings of assimilation policy and strengthen the case for local self-governance. Lin therefore demonstrates that while some Western ideals are adapted, including concepts used to oppress other colonized peoples such as the idea that “civilized” people should enjoy rights not granted to others, Lin also has experience as a colonial subject that empowers him to clearly highlight the manner in which certain colonial concepts do not realize their altruistic ideals. In doing so, he demonstrates an active and selective approach to the adoption of Western thought even as he prepares to argue that the Taiwanese rather than the Japanese were true adopters of Western liberalism.

⁶¹ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿. “Minpō no Shinzoku Kitei wo Taiwanjin ni Tekiyō suru Hōan no Gigi” 民法の親屬規定を台湾人に適用する法案の疑義 [Doubt regarding the Proposal to Apply the Familial Regulations of the Civil Code to Taiwanese], *Formosa* 台湾 3, no. 6 (1922): 22.

⁶² *Ibid.*, 22-23.

4.3 Chinese Identity

While universalist appeals to liberalism comprise an important part of Lin's rhetoric, these are mingled with a pseudo-nationalist logic that emphasizes the inherent value of Han Chinese culture. As Lin begins his article "Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo" (The Resolution of Taiwanese Youth in the New Age), which was published in the inaugural edition of *Taiwan Youth*: "The 3,500,000 *hontoujin* [islanders] are one part of the Han Chinese people, who have around four thousand years of ancient history."⁶³ This narrative is critical for Lin and appears in his other articles including "Shindai ni Shousuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo," in which he writes "The [Han] residents of Taiwan have an ancient history and are a people with cultural character."⁶⁴

Lin goes on to reason that "humans possess high level knowledge and reasoning. This point differentiates man from beast, and moreover seeking fulfilled cultural life and spiritual freedom separates men of culture from savages."⁶⁵ The implication here is clear; the Taiwanese are a highly developed people who seek cultural and spiritual life and additionally possess a long and distinguished history. As such, they deserve to be treated with commensurate respect for their customs. On one level, the universalist nature of this appeal to fundamental human nature evokes Western liberalism, however the claim to dignity based on the long history held by the ethnic Chinese is particular to the Taiwanese.

However, the Chinese customs about which Lin wrote were not merely an abstract call for identity, but were instead deeply intertwined with the actual circumstances in Taiwan. For example, in the aforementioned article about the Japanese family law, Lin unambiguously asserts that the legislation is "incompatible with the customs of the Taiwanese" on the grounds that "The Taiwanese—aboriginals aside—are *Hanzoku* who migrated from Fujian and Guandong

⁶³ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, "Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo" 新時代に処する台湾青年の覚悟 [The Resolution of Taiwan Youth in the New Age], *Tai Oan Chheng Lian* 台湾青年 1, no. 1 (1920): 29. Lin uses the term *hanzoku* which at the time of writing did not have the nationalist connotation held by the term "Chinese" today since the Chinese nationalist movement had yet to fully develop. Numerous academic studies have demonstrated that the meaning and membership of *hanzoku* depends on place and time. As Lin used the term, *hanzoku* likely denoted those ethnically Chinese with certain shared religious practices such as funerary customs. More information about the permutations of this term can be found in: Agnieszka Joniak-Lüthi, *The Han: China's Diverse Majority* (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2015).

⁶⁴ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁶⁵ Lin, "Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo," 30.

provinces in China and practice burial history and practices of familiar recording that originate from rituals practiced in the Tang Dynasty.”⁶⁶ Although the exact practices changed through the middle ages, the Taiwanese practice agnatic primogeniture, calculate four generations back patrilineally when recording direct descendants, and include women in their husband’s families.⁶⁷

Lin compares this with Western (and modern Japanese) law, in which the husband and wife are treated as relatives (in the sense that the wife’s family becomes the husband’s ‘in-laws’) and contrasts this with the Chinese practice of treating the wife and husband as “one bone one flesh” (*yi shen dong ti*). In the Chinese custom, the wife completely joins her husband’s house and she is expected to pray to his ancestors.⁶⁸ Moreover, the new Japanese law would only record three generations back and would include both matrilineal and patrilineal lines. Lin argues that regardless of whether or not Japan implements the law, the customs will not change, thus opening the protentional for the ill-intentioned to abuse the legal system by disingenuously invoking the law.⁶⁹ Lin thus makes it clear that the issues of legally imposing foreign customs are not just onerous and humiliating, they create practical issues because the law will inevitably fail to fully transform a society’s given social practices, thus leading to legislation that does not reflect the actual societal conditions.

“Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten” also includes a section in which Lin questions whether “the 3,400,000 Han Chinese residents of Taiwan, who have an ancient history, special ethnic customs and practices, and a special intellectual culture, can ultimately be governed under a fully assimilated system with the Japanese.”⁷⁰ Although Lin insists that Taiwan was developed enough to have constitutional rights, this did not preclude the preservation of certain Chinese cultural elements. As Lin explains:

⁶⁶ Chenglu Lin 林呈祿, “Minpō no Shinzoku Kitei wo Taiwanjin ni Tekiyō suru Hōan no Gigi” 民法の親屬規定を台湾人に適用する法案の疑義 [Doubt regarding the Proposal to Apply the Familial Regulations of the Civil Code to Taiwanese], *Formosa* 台湾 3, no. 6 (1922): 26.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, 27-28.

⁶⁸ Lin, “Minpō no Shinzoku Kitei wo Taiwanjin ni Tekiyō suru Hōan no Gigi,” 28.

⁶⁹ *Ibid.*, 35.

⁷⁰ Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 38.

“Within the Imperial Diet, it is natural for legislation to be created together [with the Taiwanese integrated into the Japanese system], however, looking at reality, I believe that creating a Taiwanese special representative body with special legislative powers is necessary.”⁷¹

This rhetoric cleverly appeals to the intuition of the Japanese reader by accepting that full integration is self-evidently “natural” while also framing the special situation of Taiwan that warrants an aberration from the typical standard of democratic participation. However, rather than a drawback, an area of special governance can provide political advantages because “the laws which enact special areas [facilitate] the participation of the will of residents, who have stakes in that area.”⁷² The people of any given locality “understand local interests and therefore have the benefit of making appropriate administrative decisions.”⁷³ In short, Lin emphasizes that by incorporating the Taiwanese into local decision making benefits the political process because it fulfills the democratic mandate to reflect the will of the people while also providing a better level of governance because, as those actively practicing Han culture, the Taiwanese were more familiar with local conditions.

However, this is not just a matter of practicality. Lin is sure to mention, albeit briefly, that it is a matter of respect: “Putting uncultured peoples aside, peoples that have reached relatively high levels of cultural development should be able to decide how to divide the family on their own respective terms, based on their historical development and traditional beliefs.”⁷⁴ The return to historical argument recalls Lin’s initial allusion to the Tang dynasty, chronicling the reason why a belief is long standing and cannot be changed by a single piece of legislation while also conferring respectability. His mention of “uncultured peoples” is likely both a general principle and an allusion to aboriginals, who are explicitly mentioned and juxtaposed against the Taiwanese earlier in the article. Therefore, the respectability that Lin seeks to cultivate is not just based on Chinese history, but also a favorable comparison with other, allegedly less developed people.

⁷¹ Ibid., 40.

⁷² Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 40.

⁷³ Lin, “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue),” 32.

⁷⁴ Lin, “Minpō no Shinzoku Kitei wo Taiwanjin ni Tekiyō suru Hōan no Gigi,” 34.

Lin's appeal to Taiwanese identity has roots in the past, but is also connected to a self-consciences cultivation of a modern identity. In the first edition of *Taiwan Youth*, Lin appeals to his peers, stating:

“We will lose our qualifications as youth of the new age if we are small people restricted by thoughts of revenge because the Japanese often call us ‘chan.’ Both Japanese and Taiwanese have different history. According to the law, of course we belong to the same nation, and as we are both members of the same human race, it is unacceptable to have ourselves bound by hate.”⁷⁵

Lin thus powerfully calls upon his fellow Taiwanese to strive for a standard of behavior higher than that of the Japanese, by refusing to use pejorative language like the Japanese did. Like the other appeals to Chinese heritage outlined above, Lin is combining Western liberal rhetoric—namely the universalist claim that all are members of the “same human race”—while also suggesting a contradiction between the fact that the Taiwanese and Japanese have distinct histories but are legally the same nation. While at face value this is a call for comradery, it can also be seen as a subtle criticism since the Japanese engage in the racist behavior of “small people” while Lin is calling for the Taiwanese to overcome such parochial thinking.

Lin thus demonstrates a multifaceted approach to thinking about his Chinese heritage. As a group that is historically Chinese, the Taiwanese have a cultural distinct from the Japanese. Yet within the Japanese empire the Taiwanese were colonial subjects without the rights enjoyed by the Japanese. The Taiwanese were thus both Japanese and Chinese, while simultaneously neither. Lin clearly describes the issue of cultural practices as not merely identity-based, but rather important because the failure to respect Taiwanese identity will lead to the creation of laws that do not reflect society. Lin opts to resolve this contradiction through local governance, which would allow the Taiwanese to reconcile their legal status with their historical customs.

⁷⁵ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 39.

4.4 *The Tide of History*

While certain customs of the Taiwanese were particular to the region, their situation as a colonized people was not. Lin argues that the tragedy of the First World War resulted in the rise of a “new cultural movement.”⁷⁶ In his article “Shindai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” Lin describes the regimes of old, positing:

“That people who are less developed are directly ruled or rather are dominated by the political influence of developed peoples is a general rule throughout ancient and modern times, and in some sense is a universal condition of humanity.”⁷⁷

However, Lin finds that following the First World War, conditions were poised to change:

“The present has transitioned into an age dominated by a great spirit founded in humanistic justice, freedom, and peace. Economically, feudalism has been destroyed, and capitalistic societal organization has finally pitched forth... the strong will soon plan the development and welfare of the weak.”⁷⁸

In this historical perspective, the world finds itself in a state where women sought suffrage, the proletariat applied for their betterment, and movements for ethnic self-determination were able to reach the international stage. It was “none other than the voices of the weak” that were able to rise in this new atmosphere. Therefore, the progression of history and trends of thought signaled that conservative groups and antiquated systems would need to reform; global systems would proceed to “justice rather than coercion,” “equality rather than stratification,” and “freedom rather than confinement.”⁷⁹

Lin actively sought to integrate the Taiwanese into this trend. He called to his compatriots, asserting that “as the Taiwanese Youth, we naturally must have a great awakening; we should develop new culture to adjust to the times.”⁸⁰ Due to the development of the Taiwanese, the thrust of history clearly favored the colonial people. For example, in quoting a professor just identified as Egi *Hakushi* (Professor Egi), Lin says that “from this professor’s

⁷⁶ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 30.

⁷⁷ Lin, “Kinsei Shokuminchi Tōji ni Kansuru Taijin Seisaku,” 19.

⁷⁸ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 30-31.

⁷⁹ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 32.

⁸⁰ *Ibid.*, 37.

disciplinary scientific viewpoint, in the future a time will come when the establishment of a Taiwanese Parliament.”⁸¹ Lin reiterates this concept at the end of the article, when he comments that regarding the cessation of the “special system” of governance in Taiwan “the only question is the time frame.”⁸²

Although the Japanese might seek to stop this development, Taiwan was already indelibly entrenched in world trends. Lin writes in “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue)” that “reflecting upon the spirit of the age and regarding the actual state of society, one discerns it is not a matter of until when Taiwan will be separated for world civilization, but rather the inevitable establishment of constitutional governance or spread of local autonomy” that will define the development of Taiwan.⁸³ In short, Taiwan has already become enmeshed in the trends of global development. Taiwan will therefore parallel the trajectory of other colonies and inevitably demand political representation. This principle, it seems, is less an opinion and more a rule of history. Lin thus creates a narrative in which the Taiwanese, as self-consciously modernizing people, have gained the qualifications to participate in their own governance.

By comparison, the Japanese government seems tepid in its embrace of these global trends. Turning attention to the issue of education, Lin writes that In Taisho 7 (1918), “the number of students enrolled in school was a mere 15.71%. Comparing this to Meiji 42 [1909], when the percent was 5.54%, in the last nine years there has only roughly been 1% annual increase, which can only be described as a laggard, anachronistic stagnation.”⁸⁴ Pointing to this low rate, Lin asks “in an everchanging world, can this be called true progress?”⁸⁵ Lin therefore identifies education as a clear marker of modern progress, and impugns the Japanese for failing to develop it on the island.

The Japanese failure is not just educational, but also political. With regard to the expansive powers of the Governor General, for instance, Lin writes that “the old form of politics in which the three powers [legislative, executive, and judicial] are combined and the people have absolutely no participation in politics obviously has no basis for continuation in the current day,

⁸¹ Lin, “Kaisei Taiwan Tōji Kihon Hō to Shokuminchi Tōji Hōshin,” 17.

⁸² Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 38.

⁸³ Lin, “Chihō Jichi wo nobete Taiwan Jichi wo Oyobu (ue),” 17.

⁸⁴ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 36.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.*, 36.

when democratic thought has been developed, with the exception of savage hinterlands.”⁸⁶ The description of Japanese political practices when compared with the Taiwanese proposals of self-government (or even incorporation into the Diet) is thus anachronistic and “savage,” a term that Lin directly opposes to “civilization” (*bunmei*). Culturally as well, Lin criticizes Japanese racist practices, such as calling the Taiwanese “*chan*” and encourages the Taiwanese to adopt a higher standard of behavior for themselves on the grounds that “to be constricted by hateful conceptions due to racial discrimination is to already have lost one’s qualifications as a person of culture in the new age.”⁸⁷

Lin simultaneously adopts a skeptical attitude towards the achievements for which the Japanese were responsible. For example, Lin states that although the Japanese improved the material life of the Taiwanese, it was not for altruistic reasons: “The material development of Taiwan was the Japanese’ own development; it is economic policy for Japanese on the basis of Japan .”⁸⁸ By employing the term “for Japanese on the basis of Japan” (*honkoku honi*), Lin juxtaposes the ideals of colonialism—that certain societies have the right to rule others because of their high development and due to the mandate to share their civilization—with the lived reality that Japanese policy was self-serving. On one hand, this implicitly undermines a precept of assimilationist theory: that Japan provided a superior and civilized model for the Taiwanese. Simultaneously, this portrayal constructs a foil for the Taiwanese case, portraying the Japanese colonial project as a failure to embody the modern ideals that the Taiwanese political movement sought to realize.

Just as the phenomenon of historical development was global, so too was colonial legacy. Lin portrays good developmental policies for Taiwan as mutually beneficial since “developing Taiwan’s culture ... is a duty to national society.”⁸⁹ If the Taiwanese are able to meaningfully contribute to Japanese politics and society then “with the cooperation of us [Taiwanese], we will be able to add a definitive success to the history of Japanese governance.”⁹⁰ Alternatively, if the Japanese government continues to stunt Taiwanese cultural development, the perpetual isolation of the island will “not only [cause] the unhappiness of islanders, but furthermore will create a

⁸⁶ Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 37.

⁸⁷ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 39.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.*, 29.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, 39.

⁹⁰ *Ibid.*

deficiency in the history of Japanese governance and a blot in global cultural history.”⁹¹ The issue of legacy also arises in “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten” in which Lin asserts that should Japan adopt a beneficial policy for Taiwan, it “will be recorded in the history of world civilization as the first and only Eastern colonial power with truly successful governance of a new area.”⁹²

Therefore, in constructing his view of Japanese colonial practices, Lin recounts the Japanese failure in realizing the mandate of modernity while simultaneously highlighting how these failures will reflect upon Japan in global historic memory, thereby unit the past and future in the present: in essence Lin is both remembering and anticipating remembrance. The creation of this image for Japan—a country that has failed to uphold its responsibilities as a colonizer—becomes juxtaposed with Taiwanese political activists. Where Japan pursues self-interested policies, failing to develop the educational system or realize constitutional governance, the Taiwanese articulate proposals to resolve these inconsistencies. It is therefore the Taiwanese, in embodying “the voices of the weak,” who embrace the mandate of modernity and are in accordance with the tide of history.

4.5 Conclusion

Due to the marginalized status of Japan, Lin actively strengthened the image of the Taiwanese as the champions of Western liberal values. By portraying the Taiwanese, rather than the Japanese, as the harbingers of Asian modernity, he appropriates the social capital of the West to undermine exploitative Japanese colonial practices. Nonetheless, an eagerness to critique the Japanese extent of modernization and ally himself with Western thought is insufficient to describe why Lin chose to advocate specifically for local governance as the ideal mode of colonial administration. To explain this decision, it is necessary to also to consider Lin’s lived experience under colonialism in addition to a burgeoning sense of Chinese/Taiwanese nationalism among Taiwanese elite.

⁹¹ Lin, “Shinjidai ni Shosuru Taiwan Seinen no Kakugo,” 35.

⁹² Lin, “Roku San Mondai no Kichaku Ten,” 41.

Lin was faced with two primary options to overcome the unequal hierarchal structure imposed by the sweeping legislative powers held by the Governor General: assimilation and local governance. While assimilation promised equal treatment with the Japanese, Lin's lived experience led him to be skeptical about its practicability and desirability. Not only would assimilation policy exclusively crafted by a colonial power likely be unfavorable to the colonized people, but moreover the long history and distinct social practices held by the Taiwanese would make a strict policy of assimilation a virtual impossibility. Moreover, Lin further argues that seeking to thoroughly replace Taiwanese identity violates the fundamental human dignity that "men of civilization" deserve. By invoking the inherent value of local Chinese culture while simultaneously emphasizing universal rights, Lin thus underscores the paradox of modern identity that relies upon the simultaneous invocation of globalized thought and local distinction.

This fusion was attractive to Taiwanese activists like Lin because the usage of Western liberal concepts allowed them to capitalize upon Japan's marginalized position globally while the affirmation of local Chinese values reflected their practices and offered a means to distinguish themselves from the Japanese. Significantly, this distinction contained both an ideological component, but also prominently featured the real, lived, and daily experiences based in Taiwanese customs that preclude the neat transfer of Japanese law to Taiwan. Given the inherent tension between the Chinese heritage and Japanese legal status of the Taiwanese, the pursuit of local government presented itself as a logical means to protect the lifestyle and interests of the Taiwanese while maintaining the contours of the Japanese formal empire.

5 Conclusion — The Role of Modernity in Taiwanese Liberalism

Lin Chenglu and Izumi Tetsu—student and teacher, Taiwanese and Japanese— each brought a distinct approach to his ideal application of Liberalism in colonial governance. Their contributions to *Taiwan Youth* express the spirit of the colonial political movement and highlight how the regional and temporal peculiarity of the Japanese Empire colored the relationship among Chinese cultural, Western thought, and Japanese political rule. By using liberalism to construct their respective narratives of historical development, both Lin and Izumi offered piercing critique of the colonial situation in which they lived. Despite their importance, however, the contributions (and even existence) of these two figures and the publication for which they wrote has gone virtually unacknowledged in the world of English letters. This thesis hopes to make a modest contribution in this regard by providing insight into their political theory and demonstrating its utility in describing the unique characteristics of Taiwanese political thought as a modernist movement within an Asian empire.

Lin and Izumi share common ground in their embrace of Western liberalism to critique Japan. Both highlighted how the consolidation of power within the Office of the Governor General under the auspices of Law No. 63 ran contrary to the standards of constitutional government seen in Western countries; both sought to implement local government in Taiwan to express the will of the people; and both subscribed to a developmental view of history in which rising liberalism and colonial conciseness inevitably led to demands for greater political representation and freedom for colonized people. In the sense that Lin and Izumi shared a consensus regarding the overall development of world affairs and self-government as the proper manifestation of colonial political will, these two shared deep commonalities that demonstrate their intimate relationship as liberal activists and teacher and student.

Yet, a close reading of their respective reasoning for their ideal modes of political governance begins to reveal the differences in their thinking. Izumi's worldview was based in his conviction that Taiwan was a fundamental part of Japan and that the Taiwanese were the next generation of the empire. Therefore, while they might have certain niche issues specific to the colony such as ethnic self-governance, the Taiwanese were also deeply vested in the application of liberalism on the international stage. Questions about military armament reduction, the policies of the great powers towards China, and the results of various European conferences

accordingly all receive considerable coverage. Where ethnic issues are concerned, Izumi continues to err towards international cases, citing Finnish islands and Baltic ethno-states as examples.

Izumi thus persistently returns to an internationalist perspective, demonstrating the role he sought to fulfill in *Taiwan Youth*. As an internationally educated professor at a university with many Taiwanese students, Izumi acted as an interlocutor. Even as he treated the Taiwanese future as inherently connected to Japan and conceived the Taiwanese among the progenitors of the Japanese nation, he understood that the Taiwanese did not have equal access to international knowledge. Izumi thus sought to bridge this gap, introducing Western thought and developments to the Taiwanese so that they too could approach international affairs as Japanese. In this sense, Izumi acknowledges a Taiwanese *present* in anticipation of a Japanese *future*. This does not mean that he predicted full assimilation, but rather that he foresaw a future where, as citizens of the Japanese empire, the Taiwanese would reach a point where their interests on an international stage would coincide with those of the Japanese.

When it comes to great schemes of international power or the future of Taiwan in the Japanese empire, Lin occasionally paid lip service to the ideal that the Taiwanese should be loyal Japanese subjects, but in general remained rather ambivalent. Instead, Lin's primary focus was directed towards the lived colonial experience. Like Izumi, Lin takes his didactic capacity as a writer very seriously, spending considerable time to elucidate various theories of colonial government as well as their historical origins. Yet, as Lin begins to expound upon his own opinions, he introduces a critical perspective: his lived experience in the colony.

It is from his firsthand experience that Lin understands the French ideal of comradeship for all *via* assimilation would not be realized when the power differential and decision-making ability overwhelmingly lay with the distant colonial metropole and authoritarian local government. It was also his lived experience that drove him to delve into the Chinese past. Lin recounts how burial customs dating to the seventh century intersect with a Confucian tradition that deeply affected familial relations in Taiwan. Moreover, he invoked the "4,000 years of tradition" shared by the ethnically Han residents of the island in multiple articles. While this recounting of history and culture in part seems to evoke a pseudo-nationalist call for dignity, it is

also deeply practical; how, Lin asks, can assimilation work when Japanese laws will be applied to a territory with deep cultural differences?

Even as Lin invokes the Chinese peculiarities of the island, he actively aligns himself with Western modernity. It is the Taiwanese proposal for limited government, not the authoritarian administration of the Governor General, that would separate the branches of government in a manner appropriate for a modern constitutional polity. It is the Taiwanese activists who organized to improve the state of schooling in Taiwan while the Japanese neglected their colonial mandate. However, it is the Japanese who, despite their alleged high degree of civilization, cling to racist epithets unbecoming of a modern power. Lin therefore constructs a self-consciously modern identity that intermingles with the Chinese heritage of the island.

This paradoxical fusion is essential to understanding the form of liberalism that Lin presents. At the outset, this thesis focuses on the peculiarity of the Japanese empire as a non-White, colonial latecomer whose expansion was largely limited to its periphery. It was these specific circumstances, in particular the tension between Japan's own Asian identity and the Western nature of modernity, that allowed Taiwanese like Lin to cultivate their self-image as the true adopters of Western modernity. Yet, Western modernity was hardly monolithic and the wish to juxtapose the Taiwanese with the Japanese cannot alone account for its particular manifestation within Lin's writing. To explain this element, the introduction of *lived experience* becomes critical. Lin's experience under colonial rule gave him the lens through which he interpreted different iterations of Western modernity to find the one that could give him the political capital to undermine Japanese despotism while creating desirable circumstances for daily life in Taiwan.

The confluence of the peculiarities of the Japanese Empire and the respective experiences and positions of Lin and Izumi thus resulted in two distinct manifestations regarding their liberal ideals of Taiwan. Izumi took a generalized and internationalist approach because he emphasized the Japanese-ness of the Taiwanese, whereas Lin based his philosophy on his *lived experience*, critiquing certain Western theories while crafting an ontological framework that incorporated both the Chinese characteristics of Taiwan and the Taiwanese aspiration for modernity.

This study is modest in scope, only focusing on a set of articles in two publications by two authors and specifically analyzing their writing through the lens of liberalism. However, it

has nonetheless highlighted the unique potential of Taiwanese history as a hub for cultural and intellectual intersections in which the tensions, permutations, and innovations engendered by the relationship among the West, Japan, China, and Taiwan led to the genesis of a fascinating modern political movement. It is therefore my hope that in positing a narrative of modernity that is neither dichotomous nor Western, this thesis has demonstrated the rich contributions that Taiwanese history can offer to the study of intellectual, political, and colonial histories.



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