

airiti

COVID-19 and Taiwan's Bid to Re-enter the WHA: Contexts and Implications

Was ist Dharma? Dharma ist das Gesetz, das die Welt regiert. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt zusammenhält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Ordnung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Frieden hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Glückseligkeit hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Weisheit hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Erleuchtung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Befreiung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Erlösung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Frieden hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Glückseligkeit hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Weisheit hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Erleuchtung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Befreiung hält. Das Gesetz ist das, was die Welt in Erlösung hält.

Nun wird diese Welt aus zehn Bereichen bestehend beschreiben. Welche Bereiche sind das? Da sind zunächst die zwei Bereiche von Buddhas und Bodhisattvas. Ein Buddha ist ein vollkommener Mensch, jemand, der die Welt der Formen und Erscheinungen ganz durchschaut und losgelassen hat. Ein Bodhisattva ist ein Wesen voller Weisheit und Barmherzigkeit, dessen Praxis darin besteht, allen Wesen zur Befreiung von Krankheit und Leiden zu verhelfen. Ein Pratyeka-Buddha ist ein Heiliger, der ohne Lehrer von selbst zur Erleuchtung erwacht. Ein Arhat ist ein Heiliger, der alle Illusionen abgeworfen hat. Sein Praxis im Unterschied zu der des Bodhisattva besteht darin, andere zur Erlösung zu bringen. In vier Bereichen kommen die sechs Bereiche der Wiedergeburt vor: Menschen, Titanen, Tiere, Pflanzen, die Bereiche der Dämonen, die Bereiche der Götter.

Prashant Kumar Singh
(Associate Fellow, the East Asia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses)

COVID-19 and Taiwan's Bid to Re-enter the WHA: Contexts and Implications

Prashant Kumar Singh*

(Associate Fellow, the East Asia Centre at Manohar Parrikar Institute for
Defence Studies and Analyses)

Abstract

This article covers the period from when China first reported the outbreak of COVID-19—source unknown—in Wuhan, Hubei on December 31, 2019 to the commencement of the 73rd session of the World Health Assembly (WHA) of the World Health Organization (WHO) in Geneva on May 18 and 19, 2020. It highlights how Taiwan's success in tackling the COVID-19 outbreak reinforced the Tsai Ing-wen government's quest for observer status in the WHA and defined its spirited campaign to be invited to the 73rd session of the WHA. The article analyzes the impact of the world approbation Taiwan received for containing the outbreak in cross-Strait relations, Taiwan-US ties and Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy with reference to its campaign to secure the invitation. Analyzing the developments in these three thematic areas pertaining to Taiwan's WHA-WHO cause, it reiterates that universalist values and objectives in the present international order prove ineffectual in the face of power politics. Weaker political entities like Taiwan continue to be squeezed between favorable and unfavorable geopolitical situations. They rely heavily on a favorable geopolitical environment to be heard in the world without any guarantee of success. The Tsai government has succeeded in its bid for the WHA invitation insofar as its objective was to attract international attention towards its predicament vis-à-vis China and sensitize global opinion on the issue of Taiwan's entry into the WHA. However, Chinese power has prevailed and has not allowed any substantial diplomatic gains for Taiwan. As the ramifications of COVID-19-induced geopolitical developments for the world are yet to be fully revealed, Taiwan should prioritize the consolidation of the gains its pragmatic diplomacy has made in its relations with the US and beyond.

Keywords: COVID-19, coronavirus, cross-Strait relations, WHA, WHO, mask diplomacy

* The views expressed do not purport to reflect the views of the Institute or the Government of India. The author thanks the referees for their perceptive comments on the draft article.

I. Introduction

Tsai Ing-wen of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP)—a party that Mainland China (hereafter China) has shunned as being pro-independence given its non-adherence to the 1992 Consensus or the One-China principle¹—secured a second straight term as president on January 11, 2020 (Bruyas 2020) in spite of rising political tensions in the Taiwan Strait. Soon after the re-election, Tsai was faced with the outbreak of COVID-19 in Wuhan—a health menace that would soon engulf almost the entire globe.² Ironically, even during this unprecedented global health crisis there has been no let-up in the squabbling, maneuvering and posturing that has typified the cross-Strait problem over the last 70 years. The pandemic provided yet another opportunity to the DPP government and China to reiterate their respective positions. This is one more reason to believe that international politics will have to learn to live with pandemics and that it will have to be business as usual.

-
1. Former National Security Council head Su Chi is credited with coining the “1992 Consensus” in 2000, a term which encompassed the differences between China and the KMT’s interpretations of the meaning of “One-China.” The lowest common denominator that there is one China helped them to ignore each other’s claims to legitimacy and the exercise of sovereignty over the whole of China in order to facilitate a cross-Strait dialogue in the early 1990s. This ingenious term helped China and the KMT’s Ma Ying-jeou government (2008-16) resume their dialogue in 2008 for the first time after 1999. There was great progress in cross-Strait cooperation from 2008 to 2016, leading to the establishment of political-level contacts between Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) and China’s Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) in 2014 and the historic Ma-Xi summit in Singapore in 2015. However, since the ruling DPP is a product of democratic movement of the 1970s and 1980s and nativist sentiment in Taiwan, it does not believe in eventual reunification and rejects every interpretation of the “one China principle,” including the 1992 Consensus. It does not preclude *de jure* independence for Taiwan if the Taiwanese people so decide. Therefore, China shuns it as a separatist force. It also did not recognize its first government (the Chen Shui-bian government, 2000-2008) or the present Tsai Ing-wen government as a legitimate dialogue partner. Political contacts and a diplomatic truce in the international arena collapsed, and progress in people-to-people exchanges halted in June 2016 when China suspended cross-Strait dialogue in response to what it described as the DPP government’s failure to unequivocally uphold the 1992 Consensus. Only trade, investment and other people-to-people exchanges have continued through pre-existing working-level mechanisms.
 2. The World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID-19 as a pandemic on March 11, 2020. As of December 22, 2020, there were 76,250,431 (more than 76 million) confirmed cases of COVID-19 infections and 1,699,230 deaths in more than 200 countries and territories across the globe.

This article begins by providing an overview of Taiwan's impressive record in its handling of the coronavirus outbreak. Furthermore, it establishes that the Tsai government capitalized on the approbation it received for containing it. Taiwan leveraged the issue to acquire moral appeal for its fierce diplomatic and media campaign to re-enter the World Health Assembly (WHA), the governing body of the World Health Organization (WHO).³ Additionally, the article underscores how the fresh impetus to the campaign pitted the DPP government against China and the WHO. The ensuing clash naturally deepened the cross-Strait chasm. More importantly, it exposed the weak moral foundations and universalist claims of the WHO in particular and the present international order in general. On the geopolitical side, this article argues that Taiwan-US coordination on the WHO issue was in keeping with the fresh investment that President Donald Trump has made in US relations with Taiwan. However, an analysis of this crucial period suggests that while the strategic situation in terms of continuing US support is quite reassuring for Taiwan, the gains for Taiwan's larger external engagement under the rubric of its pragmatic diplomacy are still limited at best, even though its "mask diplomacy" was fairly successful in sensitizing international opinion to its WHO cause. The article ends by envisaging a way forward on the WHO issue and drawing some inferences for the future from its investigation. At the outset, it should be noted that Taiwan's demand for an invitation to the annual WHA meeting as an associate member or an observer is part of its larger quest for membership in the WHO. This article is only concerned with Taiwan's bid for an invitation to the 73rd session of the WHA (May 18-19, 2020) in Geneva in the backdrop of the COVID-19 outbreak.

3. The World Health Organization (WHO) "is the specialized global health agency of the United Nations." "Made up of 194 member states, the WHO works worldwide to promote the highest standard of health for all people, regardless of race, religion, gender, political belief, economic or social condition." As for the World Health Assembly (WHA), "every year, delegates from all 194 Member States that make up the WHO gather to agree on the Organization's priorities, leadership, and budgets...Delegations consider and provide guidance on policies and courses of action which are then coordinated and overseen by the [WHO] secretariat...The WHO secretariat does not have the power to enforce any action from individual Member States." See WHO. "WHO and the WHA – An explainer". <https://www.who.int/about/governance/world-health-assembly/seventy-third-world-health-assembly/the-who-and-the-wha-an-explainer>.

II. Taiwan's Alertness and Sensitivity to Pandemics Pays Off

Given Taiwan's exposure to Mainland China with the high number of its people living there, its geographical proximity, the absence of a political-level dialogue between them and its absence from the World Health Organization (WHO), Taiwan's success against the COVID-19 outbreak has rightly earned it huge international approbation (Table 1). Taiwan also achieved this success without lockdowns or a blanket ban on international travel and large gatherings.

Taiwan's success can be attributed to the following factors: An in-place pandemic control infrastructure that was alert to pandemics, pandemic surveillance, strict on-board quarantines,⁴ sophisticated tracing of patients and patient contacts, and resource integration to enhance the supply of necessary equipment.

The way Taiwan speedily swung into action speaks volumes about the readiness of its anti-pandemic protocols.⁵ As China informed the WHO of a pneumonia outbreak for unknown reasons in Wuhan on December 31, 2019, Taiwan enforced the "on-board quarantine of all direct flights arriving from Wuhan" on the very same day (TCDC 2020a). Incidentally, protocols for the routine "screening for fever on all inbound international transportation at ports of entry and conducting quarantine assessments on the travel history of fever individuals" have been in place since the SARS outbreak (TCDC 2020b). On January 2, 2020, "experts from the infectious disease control and prevention advisory committee" discussed the pneumonia issue with the Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW), and a response team was formed. The experts recommended adherence to "the existing measures of on-board quarantine

4. The phrase "on-board quarantine" is routinely used in Taiwanese press releases. It essentially means medical safety protocols during flights.

5. The Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) was established in 1999 by a parliamentary statute under Ministry of Health and Welfare (MOHW). A National Health Command Center (NHCC) within the CDC was created in 2004 to ensure an effective response to pandemic outbreaks by incorporating lessons learned from the SARS outbreak in 2003. The NHCC is a unified command that includes a Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) for "international epidemic surveillance as well as border control measures" along with the Biological Pathogen Disaster Command Center, the Counter-Bioterrorism Command Center and the Central Medical Emergency Operations Center. NHCC. See, TCDC. <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/MPage/gL7-bARtHyNdrDq882pJ9Q>.

inspection,” “reporting clinically severe cases of pneumonia among people” arriving from Wuhan, and “standard precautions for nosocomial infection... such as wearing N95 respirators” (TCDC 2020c).

On January 9, the Taiwan Centers for Disease Control (TCDC) assured that since “the available information” had been “anticipated and obtained,” there was “relevant preparedness and response efforts concerning quarantine, diagnostic and testing, as well as medical supplies” (TCDC 2020a). It also confirmed that it was in communication with its Chinese counterpart and had obtained the genome sequence of the virus (TCDC 2020a). On January 15, Chuang Yin-ching, Commander of the Communicable Disease Control Medical Network, and Hung Min-nan, the medical officer from the TCDC, visited Wuhan “to obtain more comprehensive information of the outbreak.” During this visit, they learned about “the latest development of the outbreak and the prevention and control measures implemented” and “also visited the local hospital and the negative pressure ward in order to better understand the treatment process of the cases and the nosocomial infection control measures implemented” (TCDC 2020d).

On January 6, the TCDC relayed the information provided by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention that “as of January 5, 2020, no evidence of human-to-human transmission had been found, and no illnesses had been reported among healthcare workers” (TCDC 2020e). However, as the first confirmed imported cases of infection in Japan and Thailand that were unrelated to the Huanan Seafood Market in Wuhan were reported on January 16, Taiwan concluded that “limited human-to-human spread in Wuhan cannot be ruled out” but “the source of infection [was] still under investigation” (TCDC 2020d). The assessment of the Taiwanese medical experts who had visited Wuhan on the previous day also played a role in arriving at this conclusion (TCDC 2020f).

This revised assessment was followed by raising “the travel notice level for Wuhan City to Level 2,” advising travelers planning to “visit Wuhan and other neighboring areas in China to take personal precautions to ward off infection” (TCDC 2020d). The Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) was activated on January 20 (TCDC 2020g) and raised to Level 1 agency (“facility”) on February 27 (Executive Yuan 2020a). The CECC raised the

alert level to Level 3 on January 21 and advised against “all non-essential travels to Wuhan,” following the lead from the WHO that COVID-19 “might have sustained human-to-human transmission”: this happened two days before the lockdown in Wuhan (TCDC 2020h). Once the community transmission stage was ascertained, the CECC stepped up resource integration for effective quarantine measures at airports and ports and began communication to increase awareness about the pandemic, ensure pharmaceutical and medical supplies, curb fake news—mainly relating to mask shortages—and to prevent profiteering and reduce panic (TCDC 2020h).

Thus, one can discern a remarkable rapidity and prescience in Taiwan's response to a fast-evolving situation during the critical weeks from December 31, 2019 to January 23, 2020. Other notable aspects of the response have been the gradual increasing to Alertness Level 2 and Level 3, advising against non-essential travel to various countries as the situation evolved, extending area-specific restrictions on inbound and outbound travel, restricting travel to and from China, and banning the entry of Chinese nationals (including from Hong Kong and Macau) on February 6 (Focus Taiwan 2020a; MAC 2020a; MAC 2020b; MOFA 2020a; TCDC 2020i; TCDC 2020j). Taiwan also created a centralized electronic quarantine record that stores travel histories and health declarations linked with local cell phone numbers which are in turn linked with National Health Insurance (NHI), engaged in the GPS tracking of people under home quarantine or in isolation, and conducted the safe evacuation of suspected serious cases directly from airports and seaports to the hospital (Chen 2020). These efforts were supplemented by the setting up of “50 designated hospitals and medical centers and 167 community hospitals and clinics to create a tiered system for testing” (Chen 2020) across Taiwan and the ramping up of the production of masks, protective equipment and testing kits with a focus on rationed availability of masks (TCDC 2020k; TCDC 2020l). Taiwan ramped up its medical mask production to an “estimated 8.2 million face masks per day on average” in the first week of March (TCDC 2020m).

Basically, early projections based on prior experience and knowledge leading to the prompt responses of authorized institutions helped Taiwan to minimize the severity of the pandemic. As mentioned above, Taiwan has not closed its international airspace, and some degree of inbound and outbound

international traffic has continued throughout the period. Therefore, Taiwan's efforts were focused on stopping the disease at the entry points and an intelligently designed on-board quarantine, tracking, treating and ramping up of medical supplies.

III. Taiwan's Fight against Exclusion from the WHO and "Non-Cooperation" by China

Taiwan's successful fight against the coronavirus has created new political tides in cross-Strait relations. Both Beijing and Taipei have utilized this context to reiterate their respective positions in their own ways.

Taiwan's energy has been directed against its exclusion from the WHO under Chinese pressure despite its remarkable success in dealing with the virus. Taiwan not only argued that its exclusion was unjust to its people, but that its warnings about possible human-to-human transmission of pneumonia in Wuhan were ignored to the detriment of global health (an issue that will be discussed separately). Also, voices from Taiwan have accused China of being uncooperative and insensitive towards Taiwanese people stuck in China. This was followed by the highlighting of the superiority of Taiwan's democracy over the communist regime in China in view of its successful handling of the COVID-19 outbreak and the widely shared belief regarding the initial suppression of information by China.

A. Contextualizing Tsai Ing-wen's Bid for Taiwan's Membership in the WHO

Here, the DPP government's ire against the WHO and its chief needs to be contextualized. As per Article 4 of the WHO constitution, all UN member states can join the WHO. Under Article 6 non-members can be allowed to join it "by a simple majority vote of the [World] Health Assembly." Article 8 also provides the space for "territories or groups of territories" which the WHO perceives as "not responsible for the conduct of their international relations" to "be admitted as Associate Members by the Health Assembly upon an application made on behalf of such a territory or group of territories by a Member or other authority having responsibility for their international relations" (WHO Basic Documents). The KMT's Ma Ying-jeou government's adherence to the 1992 Consensus was able to secure observer or associate status for Taiwan in the WHA from 2009 and 2016 as the "Department of

Health, Chinese Taipei.” China’s not objecting to its observer status was in keeping with the so-called diplomatic truce across the Taiwan Strait during that period (MAC 2009; Xinhua 2020). Since the Tsai government does not subscribe to the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan had to exit from the WHA. It has not participated in WHA meetings since 2017 (RTI 2016; Li 2016; VOA 2016).⁶

As membership in international organizations has been an important goal of Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy to enhance its international profile and extend its international space, the Tsai government has been striving to regain entry into this world organization.⁷ The COVID-19 crisis gave Taiwan the opportunity to launch a fierce diplomatic and media campaign for observer status in the 73rd session of the WHA, held on May 18 and 19, 2020. However, the Tsai government intends to join the WHO or re-enter the WHA without subscribing to the 1992 Consensus. It bases Taiwan’s claim on the WHO’s founding and universalist values enshrined in the preamble to its constitution, according to which “the enjoyment of the highest attainable standard of health is one of the fundamental rights of every human being without distinction of race, religion, political belief, economic or social condition” and the objective stated in Article 1 of the WHO constitution that “the objective of the [WHO] shall be the attainment by all peoples of the highest possible level of health” (WHO Basic Documents; Executive Yuan 2020b; Office of the President 2020).

Riding high on its success in containing the COVID-19 infection and its “mask diplomacy” (to be discussed separately), Taiwan’s campaign gained much traction because of rising anti-China sentiment in many major Western

6. Taiwan attended only one WHA meeting under the Tsai government from May 23 to 28, 2016. Tsai won the presidential election in January 2016, but as per the Taiwanese system, she was sworn in on May 20, 2016. Taiwan’s health ministry received the invitation during the transition under the pre-existing arrangement. The Tsai government accepted the invitation and sent a MOHWH delegation that participated as representatives of Chinese Taipei. Politically, however, it rejected the “one China principle.” Taiwanese civil-society groups protested outside the meeting venue in Geneva.

7. Under the existing international order, Taiwan cannot become a member of any international organization in which the criteria is sovereignty due to a Chinese veto or objections. It may join organizations such as APEC or the WTO in which sovereignty is not an issue without an objection from China.

countries, especially the US, and the prevailing view that the world was paying the price for China's suppression of information about the outbreak. Taipei began to vociferously highlight the "immorality and illogicality" of its exclusion from the WHO to shape international opinion to support its cause. It complained about how amid this unprecedented global health crisis, Taiwan's 24 million people had to rely on "second-hand" and "delayed" information from the WHO (Winkler 2012).

B. Taiwan Shares US Allegations against the WHO

Taiwan has made the same allegations against China and the WHO that the US and some of its allies have made. They essentially accused China of mishandling the outbreak and suppressing information, particularly about human-to-human transmission, in the initial stages. Moreover, Taiwan not only endorsed the US view that the WHO under Chinese pressure helped "cover up" the severity of the outbreak, but also added to it by providing "email evidence" proving that Taiwan's warnings about possible human-to-human transmission were ignored. This email controversy will be discussed separately.

Taiwanese Premier Su Tseng-chang accused "China of covering up the crisis in its early stages and not giving the world early enough warning." President of the ruling DPP Cho Jung-tai made an even more scathing remark that "China had hoodwinked the WHO ... Since the outbreak of the epidemic at the end of last year, China has covered it up and manipulated the WHO to pretend that everything is going well" (Blanchard 2020). Minister of Health and Welfare Chen Shih-chung said:

China has reported the world's most confirmed cases and knows the most about how the disease arose, but its statements are not trusted by most people... The WHO can also make a judgement, yet it remains muted on the issue, despite having many health experts and a lot of documentation (Lin 2020a).

Foreign Ministry spokesperson Joanne Ou's reaction was equally sharp:

China is to blame for the rapid spread of the disease, and instead of focusing on how to contain the outbreak, it has allowed

politics to override human health and has employed the fictional “one China” principle to pressure and downgrade Taiwan’s sovereignty and dignity (Lin 2020b).

Vice President Chen Chien-jen, himself an epidemiologist, specifically “criticized WHO Director-General Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus” saying that the WHO’s declaration of COVID-19 as a pandemic was “too late” (Lin 2020a). In widely reported statements, Vice President Chen even maintained that, “While the Huanan seafood market is believed to be the source of the Covid-19 infection, there are serious doubts that hint it may not be the case” (*India Today* 2020) ... “The origin of the virus has to be examined scientifically and so far we can see that the virus originated from Wuhan. Whether it is from a laboratory or from the natural infection sources needs further confirmation... the laboratory theory was ‘one of the possibilities’” (Perelman 2020).

One can empathize with Taiwan’s irritation and anguish. To be fair, the WHO has variously referred to Taiwan as “Taiwan, China,” “Taipei,” or “Taipei & Environs,” grouping it with China on its website. Some of the statistics it has provided have also relied on Chinese information. This has greatly inconvenienced the Taiwanese trapped overseas, as some countries have banned Taiwanese airlines or suspended their own flights to Taiwan on this basis. This has revealed the vulnerability of Taiwanese abroad and fueled Taiwan’s anger against the WHO (Lim 2020a; Lin 2020c).

C. The Taiwan-Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus Faceoff

Taiwan began an aggressive diplomatic and media campaign amidst rising negative publicity that the WHO under “China’s influence” had downplayed the gravity of the outbreak in its initial phase, creating an awkward situation for the WHO leadership (Davidson 2020). This issue has indeed given Taiwan the moral high ground given the current emotionally charged atmosphere. The intensity of the campaign in the Taiwanese blogosphere has been such that WHO chief Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus complained that he was being subjected to racist attacks. He however stuck to his guns saying, “I don’t give a damn” (Feuer 2020).

Nevertheless, the WHO has repeatedly stated that Taiwan cannot become a member as this is open only for UN member states, while observer status can only be granted by a majority vote of the members. On the question of cooperation with Taiwan, WHO spokesperson Tarik Jasarevic stated, “Taiwanese authorities, including health experts, are being informed through cross-strait channels as well as channels connected with the International Health Regulations.” Thus, in practical terms under the existing system, there has been no exclusion of Taiwan during the ongoing crisis. Even though Taiwan is not a member of the WHO, its health experts and professionals participate in the WHO under the 2005 mechanism of the International Health Regulations (IHR).

D. The Email Controversy between Taiwan and the WHO

Taiwan’s claim that it had emailed about possible human-to-human transmission in Wuhan as early as December 31, 2019 and was ignored due to the WHO’s dismissive attitude created a “sensation.” This led to a spat between the Taiwanese authorities and the WHO. Taiwan’s Health Minister Chen Shih-chung revealed its contents at a press conference on April 11, saying: “If the Chinese did not notify the WHO, what else would be called a cover up? ... If (the Chinese) did [actually] report it, what else would be deemed a dereliction of duty (on the part of the WHO)?” (Focus Taiwan 2020b). The WHO acknowledged that it did receive the email but stated that the message did not mention “human-to-human transmission.” Tedros Adhanom Ghebreyesus stated, “One thing that has to be clear is the first email was not from Taiwan. Many other countries were already asking for clarification. The first report came from Wuhan” (Chen, Tang and Kao 2020). MOFA spokeswoman Joanne Ou responded by saying, “The key point was not which country first informed the WHO of the epidemic but the global health body’s evaluation and handling of the matter” (Chen, Tang and Evelyn 2020). WHO Emergencies Director Michael Ryan maintained, “Taiwan did not tell the WHO anything it did not already know” (Chen, Tang and Kao 2020). A perusal of the email shows that it was indeed very carefully worded. While it did not contain the phrase “human-to-human transmission” or even the word “transmission,” it did contain medical terminology which could be interpreted as hinting at it.

State Council Taiwan Affairs Office (TAO) spokesperson Zhu refuted the Taiwanese claim, saying that:

...the email merely cited the Wuhan Health Commission in Hubei province ... and it didn't mention "human to human transmission" at all ... The health authority of Wuhan for the first time on December 31 uploaded the news of some 27 infection cases on its website. The WHO received information on the same day. Also on December 31, the island's health authority inquired about the situation in Wuhan from the National Health Commission on the Mainland (Zhang Yi 2020a).

Zhu alleged that Taiwan relayed the information as its own when the Mainland had already released it publicly, even though the Taiwanese assert that they had learned of possible human-to-human transmission through their own thorough internet tracking (TCDC 2020f). Incidentally, as mentioned previously, the Taiwan CDC in its press-notes released in the first week of January noted, "There is no obvious person-to-person transmission or infection among medical staff," something which Zhu also highlighted. Besides, as has been previously mentioned, Taiwanese medical experts in the TCDC had only warned about the possibility of limited human transmission on January 16. Again, as has been previously mentioned, an advisory against "all non-essential travels to Wuhan" was issued on January 21 only after the WHO advised that COVID-19 "might have sustained human-to-human transmission."

E. A Fair View of the Email Controversy

However, this author does not endorse Zhu's allegation that Taiwan had fabricated evidence. One should recall that Taiwan had enforced an on-board quarantine for flights from Wuhan as early as December 31. It would be reasonable to argue that although Taiwanese experts did not have professionally and scientifically ascertained information on December 31, they probably had some reason to believe that human-to-human transmission of the virus in Wuhan was possible. This was on the basis of either their knowledge and experience or through some early warning from their social

channels and sources. They did their duty by relaying the information to the WHO, although with some ambiguity. This is more or less the Taiwanese CDC's response to the WHO's counter on the issue (TCDC 2020f). Thus, to be fair to the WHO, it could not have acted upon such information which was neither exclusive nor specific nor scientifically proven. While the email sent on December 31 was not of much medical relevance, it was later used as a diplomatic weapon against the WHO on April 11.

F. China Accuses Taiwan of Taking Advantage of the Situation

Responding to the Taiwanese campaign for membership in the WHO, China argued that the DPP campaign against the WHO was designed to undermine the 1992 Consensus. China's official and semi-official media has been focused on highlighting the political motives for the DPP government's charges of non-cooperation and insensitivity towards Taiwan and Taiwanese citizens and the international power politics behind its bid for observer status in the WHA. China was convinced that the DPP was trying to take the advantage of the situation. It accused the DPP of pushing its separatist agenda by exploiting the health crisis to press its demand for entry into the WHO. The TAO has categorically stated that "the attempt by Taiwan's DPP authorities to use the novel coronavirus outbreak as an excuse to seek "Taiwan independence" will never succeed." It accused the DPP and "separatist elements advocating 'Taiwan independence'" of "taking advantage of the epidemic" and of fishing "in troubled waters" to pursue Taiwan's "so-called 'international space,' "while all Chinese people are engaged in the fight against the virus outbreak." It said that "in face of [the] facts, the DPP authority fools nobody and only exposes its evil intentions to fool the public and take advantage of the situation to seek selfish political agendas" (China Daily 2020a). The essence of the TAO's countercharge was that the international community engages with Taiwan on the basis of the one China principle. As WHO membership is open only for UN member sovereign states, the DPP government cannot be allowed to use the pandemic to "challenge and trample" on this internationally recognized template for Taiwan's engagement with the international community. On the issue of the denial of access by the WHO to Taiwan under China's influence, the

TAO released partial data that “Taiwan experts at least [11 times] attended technical meetings held by the WHO on 10 different occasions in 2019,” claiming that it has never obstructed the practical arrangements which enable Taiwan to access information from the WHO (China Daily 2020a). Chinese data from the year 2019 about Taiwanese participation in WHO activities seemed to refer to Taiwan’s participation under the IHR mechanism. The TAO, Chinese media and bloggers have fiercely defended the WHO against Taiwan’s government, media and netizens.

G. Merit in Taiwan’s Claim for WHO membership

China has invoked UN General Assembly (UNGA) Resolution 2758 and WHA Resolution 25.1 to deny membership to Taiwan in the WHO and an invitation to the WHA. These resolutions replaced the Republic of China (ROC, Taiwan) with the People’s Republic of China in the UN in 1971 and the WHO in 1972 (EPKD 2020). It is also widely held that the WHO Secretariat and China signed a secret Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) in 2005 under which the WHO requires China’s approval for interaction with Taiwan. The full contents of this MoU are unavailable, however (Chang 2010). Moreover, under a different secret WHO memorandum dated September 14, 2010, the WHO is believed to have “an ‘arrangement with China’ to implement the IHR for ‘Taiwan, Province of China’” (Kan 2011, pp.15-16).

Taiwan rejects the applicability of the two resolutions, stating that these only decided the issue of whether the ROC or the PRC was the rightful government of China without stating in any way that Taiwan was a part of China (TECO 2020; Taipei Times 2016). As such, China’s consent is not needed. Taiwan also condemns the secret MoUs. Nevertheless, as things stand, this contention makes the question of Taiwan’s entry into WHA one that can only be decided by “a two-thirds majority of the members present and voting” under Article 60(a) of the WHO constitution. Furthermore, whether the invitation to Taiwan can only be decided by “a two-thirds majority of the Members present and voting” will also be determined by “a majority of the Members present and voting” under the Article 60(b) (WHO Basic Documents). Thus, Taiwan’s claim may not be on a sound legal footing. To be fair, however, Taiwan has a strong moral and logical case if not a legal

one. The 24 million people of Taiwan are an important link in the global health chain. The international community can wish away their existence at its own peril, particularly when there are fears that humanity is going back to the age of pandemics (Mosk 2020; Wakefield 2015). Therefore, the Taiwanese diplomatic, media and internet campaign against the exclusion has earned great empathy and sympathy internationally, and the wide coverage of the issue available on the internet confirms this.

IV. Taiwanese Allegations of Non-Cooperation and Insensitivity against China

China was also accused of being insensitive towards Taiwanese people stuck in Hubei and other places in China. China reportedly did not allow charter flights (Aspinwall 2020a), delayed their evacuation, and “deliberately made [the evacuation] inconvenient” for them in many instances because they were to be flown back by Taiwan’s “national” carrier (China Airlines), which would have amounted to an unintended conferment of sovereignty on Taiwan (Taipei Times 2020a). It would have been bad optics for China had the Taiwanese been evacuated like “foreign nationals” in charter flights by China Airlines (Taipei Times 2020a). Therefore, the Taiwanese were asked to travel to Shanghai from Hubei by train and then leave for Taiwan by “normal,” “routine” or “quasi-charter” flights (Focus Taiwan 2020c; Lai and Ko Lin 2020; Taipei Times 2020a).⁸ The media termed flights by China Airlines as “quasi-charter flights” due to Chinese sensitivities regarding the representational status of Taiwan (Taipei Times 2020a). There were also complaints that proper screening of the passengers was not carried out before the first flight in early February and that “one passenger confirmed to be infected with the virus and three others who had fevers” returned in the flight “[creating] a tear in virus prevention” (Hamacher 2020). Taiwan objected to China Eastern Airlines not providing protective clothing to the Taiwanese it was evacuating (Everington 2020a). Tsai Ing-wen complained that “China

8. The government of Taiwan suspended transportation links with China after the pandemic hit China. However, direct flights from Taiwan to Beijing, Shanghai, Chengdu and Xiamen within China continued. Shanghai continued to be the “usual point of departure for regular CAL flights” for Taiwanese in China.

had not prioritized more vulnerable groups—which Taiwan says includes the elderly, children and others—on the first flight back despite an agreement with China that they would” (Hamacher 2020). However, there are conflicting versions about this whole issue to be discussed in the subsequent section.

Furthermore, Taiwan alleged that Chinese netizens were subverting Taiwan's efforts to control the pandemic situation (Pan 2020) and that most of the virus disinformation was originating from China as the Chinese netizens were “displeased by Taiwanese criticism of how China has managed its outbreak” (Taipei Times 2020b). This was in line with Taiwan's standing grievance of being the target of China's cyber-warfare.

A. China Refutes the Taiwanese Allegations

China dismissed the charges of non-cooperation with Taiwan on the issue of the return of Taiwanese people from the pandemic-hit areas to their homes in Taiwan. Its narrative has been that the Chinese government was responsible for the entire motherland, including Hong Kong and Taiwan.

The TAO has been putting out China's response to Taiwan's charge of non-cooperation. It maintains that while China will not allow a “separatist agenda,” it has a commitment to its Taiwanese compatriots in Taiwan as well as on the mainland. TAO spokesperson Zhu Fenglian said that the mainland had “sent Taiwan 101 notifications as of [March 24, 2020]” (China Daily 2020b). Ma Xiaoguang, another spokesperson for the TAO, said that in early February Taiwan too had shared outbreak-related information with the mainland 15 times before February 5, 2020 (Zhang Yi 2020b). He intimated that the mainland had “specifically notified Taiwan of the information related to sharing the virus' genome sequence with the World Health Organization and of the means to obtain it.” Ma told the media that four experts from Taiwan's CDC had been permitted to travel to Wuhan, “the epicenter of the outbreak,” to understand the situation there (China Daily 2020c). He reiterated that Taiwan was “timely updated with the information on Taiwan compatriots who have been diagnosed with the infection on the mainland” (Zhang Yi 2020c). The TAO emphasized that “Taiwan affairs offices across the mainland have established working groups for epidemic prevention and control and maintained close communication with Taiwan compatriots, businesses and associations... have worked to keep these groups informed of

the epidemic and prevention tips as well as help solve practical difficulties”... and that the mainland would “keep communicating and coordinating with Taiwan on epidemic prevention, which includes information sharing, and manage personnel who travel between the two sides” (China Daily 2020d).

As a matter of political positioning, Ma Xiaoguang maintained that “Taiwanese in Hubei Province have been well cared for... China has a high regard for the wellbeing of Taiwanese in China and that it had been in touch with officials since the beginning of the outbreak” (Liao 2020a). Chinese foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying offered “strong support” should Taiwanese people “encounter difficulties overseas” (Aspinwall 2020a). China also strongly refuted the charge of animosity towards Taiwanese people stuck on the mainland. By March 28, 2020, Chinese authorities had facilitated the return of 608 Taiwanese people from Hubei to Taiwan. They argued that the difficulties had actually been created by “entry restrictions imposed by Taiwan’s DPP authority” (China Daily 2020e). “The first batch of 247 Taiwan residents” had returned to Taiwan from Wuhan as early as February 3, 2020 (Zhang Yi 2020d).

Furthermore, the TAO raised the issue of the “more than 8,300 students from the Chinese mainland who are enrolled in Taiwan universities [and] are unable to go back due to restrictions by island authorities.” It demanded that their rights be protected by “island authorities and universities,” (Zhang Yi 2020e) though the Taiwanese reports sought to highlight that China had restricted the Chinese students from going to Taiwan for the entire year (Liao 2020b). China also announced “a series of measures to help Taiwan-invested enterprises resume work and production.” As per the TAO, “over 90 percent of Taiwan-invested large-scale industrial enterprises” had “resumed work in regions with concentrated investment from Taiwan” by March 10, 2020 (China Daily 2020f).

B. Determining the Degree of Truth in the Allegations against China

The fact remains that the Taiwanese began returning as early as the beginning of February and kept returning throughout the period. To be fair, Taiwanese complaints on this issue highlighted in the preceding section appear to be a mix of many issues. There may have been political

airiti

posturing as well as logistical and procedural issues on both sides which are understandable in the situation. The sensitivities around what are perceived as “evacuations” and attendant interpretations are understandable in the context of cross-Strait relations. Besides, the lockdown had imposed travel restrictions in Hubei which did cause inconveniences for the Taiwanese people there. Similarly, the Taiwanese government also exercised extra caution in receiving Taiwanese from pandemic-hit China (MAC 2020c; Shen and Kao 2020).⁹ Taiwan did not approve of China’s “lax quarantine measures” (Wang, Wen and Lai 2020) and perhaps did not trust Chinese medical procedures behind the fitness certificates issued to the Taiwanese for travel (Ke-lun, Chang and Mazzetta 2020). Moreover, Taiwan had constraints on its capacity to accommodate passengers from China in isolation wards (Wang, Lai and Lim 2020). It was insinuated that Taiwan had its own “travel black list” for the Taiwanese returning from Hubei. Thus, the impression from international media headlines that China bears sole responsibility for the inconveniences and harassment that Taiwanese people underwent in returning from China is incorrect. Taiwan’s strict protocols in this matter were equally responsible.

Overall, there is sufficient verifiable information that the Chinese had put in place systems for cooperation and information sharing regarding the COVID-19 crisis. This is corroborated by a reading of the information emanating from the Taiwanese side. The governments in Taipei and Beijing are not talking to each other for reasons that are well known, but the relevant official bodies seem to be in constant communication with each other and are cooperating. The Chinese cooperation that was previously highlighted is not surprising. It is very much in line with its longstanding policy of supporting and promoting people-to-people exchanges across the Strait—even unilateral ones if needed—to deepen bonding at the societal level and make Taiwanese

9. The media noted that “the handling of people returning from Hubei” was “somewhat controversial because they [were] being treated more strictly than Taiwanese coming home from Western countries.” Unlike travelers from the United States and Europe who could “take regularly scheduled passenger flights to Taiwan”, “certain passengers from China, however, [were] still required to take government-arranged “charter-like flights” home and then be quarantined in official quarantine facilities, despite lower COVID-19 case numbers in China than in the West in recent weeks.”

society amenable for eventual reunification. Whether this policy has yielded or will yield desirable results is a different issue.

V. Taiwan-US Coordination on the WHO Issue

The invitation for Taiwan to the WHA was also an issue in the US-China standoff on the WHO and its role in tackling the COVID-19 outbreak. Trump announced his decision to withdraw from the WHO on May 29, 2020, a week after the 73rd meeting of the WHA. On one level, the Trump administration's support for Taiwan can be viewed as a pressure tactic against China. At a more substantial level, however, the support was a natural fit in US policy moves under Trump to help Taiwan strengthen its de facto independence.

The current global health crisis has further energized Taiwan-US relations that were already on the upswing under Tsai and Trump. The latest developments during COVID-19 as it rages on, many of which are related to Taiwan-US allegations that the WHO was under Chinese influence and Taiwan's endeavors to secure an invitation to the 73rd WHA, have further reinforced a relationship which helps Taiwan retain its de facto independence. This reinforcement needs to be understood in the context of fresh investment in relations made by Trump. Under Trump, Taiwan has once again started to feature as an important partner in US strategic documents such as the National Security Strategy Document, 2017 and the Department of Defense (DOD) and Department of State reports on Indo-Pacific Strategy of June 2019 and November 2019. It has also begun finding mention in the speeches and statements of top US leaders like Vice President Mike Pence and Secretary of State Mike Pompeo. They have praised Taiwan's democracy and expressed support for it. It appears to have made a "comeback" in the US-China dialogue. The newly initiated Taiwan-US cooperation with Taiwan's remaining diplomatic allies and important US legislation such as the Taiwan Travel Act (2016) and the Taipei Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI Act) (2019) point to a recalibrated diplomatic focus on Taiwan by the United States. Widely publicized sailings of US naval warships in the Taiwan Strait and the clearing of the long-pending decision to sell a total of 66 F-16V jets to Taiwan over Chinese objections are all evidence of a renewed strategic focus on Taiwan. At a more fundamental level, this upswing and fresh investment can be attributed

to US disillusionment with the Nixon-Kissinger view that a constructive engagement with China and its integration with the world would lead to an open and democratic China. Instead, China has emerged as a “strategic competitor.” Like a “second Cold War,” rivalry between the US and China has renewed Taiwan’s relevance for the US, and their relations seem to be moving beyond the post-Taiwan Relations Act (1979) phase. The COVID-19 outbreak has become the perfect occasion to recalibrate its relevance.

Such an overt, spirited and coordinated posturing by Taiwan and the US on a single issue (the WHO issue) vis-à-vis China has not been seen since the Taiwan Strait Missile Crisis of 1995-96. The US has used the Taiwanese email to substantiate its charge that the WHO initially downplayed the gravity of the outbreak under China’s influence. President Trump tweeted, “Why did the W.H.O. ignore an email from Taiwanese health officials in late December alerting them to the possibility that the Coronavirus could be transmitted between humans?” (Nelson 2020). US State Department spokesperson Morgan Ortagus tweeted, “Dec. 31—that’s the same day Taiwan first tried to warn the WHO of human-to-human transmission” (Chen, Tang and Kao 2020). Secretary of State Mike Pompeo (Aspinwall 2020b) and the US ambassador to the UN (Bloomberg 2020) supported Taiwan’s demand for a place in the WHA and participation in the 73rd session of the WHA on May 18 and 19, 2020. Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations James Risch and Chairman of the House Committee on Foreign Affairs Eliot Engel joined Robert Menendez and Michael McCaul in their two respective committees, writing to 55 countries and territories that included US allies and friends to seek their support for Taiwan’s participation in the 73rd session of the WHA (Taiwan Today 2020). In the meantime, the Senate unanimously passed a bill on May 11 that had been introduced on January 29, 2019, asking “Secretary of State Mike Pompeo to come up with a strategy to help Taiwan regain observer status at the World Health Assembly (WHA)” (Hsu and Yeh 2020). On the whole, this year saw a highly spirited campaign for Taiwan’s participation in the WHA supported by not only a handful of its diplomatic allies, but also by the US and its allies such as Australia, Canada, France, Germany, Japan, New Zealand and the UK who “issued a joint demarche to the WHO pushing for Taiwan's inclusion in the WHA” (Horton 2020; Focus Taiwan 2020d).

A. Taiwan-US Joint Efforts to Fight COVID-19

On March 18, Taiwan's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA) and the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), the *de facto* US embassy in Taiwan, issued a "Taiwan-US Joint Statement on a Partnership against Coronavirus" to facilitate cooperation on "research, development and production of rapid tests kits, vaccines and medicines..." (MOFA 2020b). This joint statement was a recognition of Taiwan's capabilities. In addition, instead of being signed by the Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in the United States (TECRO) and AIT—which has been the more regular way for signing the joint statements, MOUs and agreements between them—this particular joint statement was signed by the MOFA from Taiwan's side. The subtle message inherent in this cannot be ruled out (Focus Taiwan 2020e). In another important development, President Trump signed the TAIPEI Act into law after it was passed with bipartisan support in both houses of Congress, though it had been introduced in May 2019 by Senator Cory Gardner (Congress.Gov). Since the period under review, US Secretary of Health and Human Services Alex Azar visited Taiwan in August 2020, the first high-level visit enabled by the Taiwan Travel Act of 2016 and the first "highest level visit...in more than four decades" (Zhang Hui 2020), further enhancing US-Taiwan health cooperation. This also reflected an intensification of relations under Trump.

The US State Department coordinated its assistance with Taiwan along with "other like-minded partners" to help Pacific island nations "respond to the COVID-19 pandemic." While the US "provided more than US\$32 million" to these nations, Taiwan "donated 80,000 masks ... along with forehead thermometers and thermal imaging cameras" to them (Lin 2020d). This furthered Taiwan-US cooperation among Taiwan's allies, particularly in the Pacific (MOFA 2019; Lin 2020e; Chiang and Chiang 2019). Additionally, the State Department "held a virtual forum" ... "on the topic of expanding Taiwan's participation on the global stage," lauding the "Taiwan model [of] fighting COVID-19, with countries around the world" (Department of State 2020). Thus, the pandemic has helped to enlarge Taiwan-US cooperation beyond the bilateral, a trend that has emerged under Tsai and Trump.

B. Taiwan's Mask Donations to the US

Under the Taiwan-US Joint Statement on a Partnership against Coronavirus signed on March 18, Taiwan was to supply “100,000 masks to the US per week, while the US [was to] send raw material for 300,000 medical protective suits” to be manufactured in Taiwan.” By April 16, the two sides had delivered the “first batch of personal protective equipment (PPE)” to each other. Taiwan received 150,000 medical protective suits of “the total volume pledged” and the US received 500,000 surgical face masks “for the last week of March and the month of April.” The media reported that “3,600 masks (were) donated by Taiwan for use by White House staff and officials” (Lim 2020b). This was in addition to a separate donation of a million surgical face masks to the US federal government and another million “to American states in dire need of personal protective equipment” (Lim 2020c).

C. US Military-Diplomatic Signaling in the Taiwan Strait amid the Pandemic

There has also been some notable military activity in and around the Taiwan Strait, with Chinese and US warships sailing through the Taiwan Strait during the period under review. Taiwan's Ministry of Defense (MND) reported that US naval ships—in the latest instance, the Arleigh Burke-class destroyer *McCampbell*—have transited through the Taiwan Strait six times thus far, whereas they transited nine times in 2019 (Focus Taiwan 2020f). Chinese war planes such as J-11 jet fighters, KJ-500 early warning aircraft and H-6 bombers¹⁰ undertook threatening maneuvers in close proximity to Taiwan during this period. While these activities did not start during the COVID-19 period, their frequency and the fact that they have continued undeterred through the pandemic does indeed convey a message. Thus, the sighting of American air assets such as the RC-135U Combat and RC-135W Rivet Joint near Taiwan—a total of 12 times between March 25 and April 16—can be seen as a new development. The media “learned” that these American planes deliberately put on their lights in order to convey a message to China (Taipei Times 2020c; Taipei Times 2020d; Chen and Lim 2020).

10. The Bashi Channel is between the Philippines and Taiwan, or more precisely, between their Y'Ami Island and Orchid Island, respectively. It connects the South China Sea and the Western Pacific.

These maneuvers appeared to be in response to China's increased military activities in the South China Sea and in the airspace near Taiwan. One may infer that these maneuvers stemmed from mutual suspicion and the desire of each side to prevent the other from exploiting the situation. China also seems to be conveying a message to its domestic audience that it is undeterred by the negative international situation, that it is grappling with following the pandemic, and that its forces are capable of defending their national interests. Similarly, the US might also be sending a signal about its commitment to Taiwan. Perhaps the reading that the PLA's threatening maneuvers were not merely political posturing but displayed a distinct preparation for military struggle in terms of reconnaissance, surveillance and "grey zone warfare" made this signaling necessary.

VI. Pragmatic Diplomacy: Mask Donations and Sensitizing Global Opinion for the WHO Cause

Taiwan's impressive handling of COVID-19 has attracted international attention and created a proper context for its mask diplomacy, which it has used to raise its international profile and sensitize international opinion for its WHA/WHO cause. It also seemed to have made some inroads into Europe and other western countries that had thus far been silent on issues relating to Taiwan. These countries are all leading opinion shapers in the international community. Taiwan succeeded in gaining Japan's support for its WHA observer status, an unprecedented achievement as it has always been seen as a country with tacit and undeclared strategic interests in the Taiwan Strait but has hitherto remained silent on Taiwan.

A. Mask Donations

Taiwan has undertaken a vigorous campaign of mask diplomacy which it has described as "international humanitarian assistance in response to the continued spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID-19) outbreak." It initiated its mask diplomacy on April 1 by donating 10 million medical face masks and other medical equipment to the US, Europe, and 15 of its other diplomatic allies. Some of the countries that received help in the

“first wave” of mask diplomacy were the Netherlands, Belgium, the Czech Republic, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, Poland, Spain, the Holy See, Switzerland, and the UK. These supplies were for “frontline medical personnel... clergy who are in frequent contact with their flock.” The donations were delivered in around 10 days. In the “second wave” on April 9, Taiwan donated six million medical masks to European Union (EU) member states in Northern, Central, and Eastern Europe, “more severely affected states” in the US, Latin American and Caribbean countries, New Southbound Policy (NSP)-partner countries and “other friendly nations” (MOFA 2020c). Health cooperation is an integral part of Tsai’s NSP. Building on the two waves, the MOFA donated 7.07 million face masks to the US (2.28 million), the EU and its member states (1.3 million), Taiwan’s diplomatic allies (1.09 million), NSP-target countries (1.8 million), and for African and West Asian countries and the “medics working with Syrian refugees” (600,000) on May 5. The MOFA had received 3.93 million masks from individual Taiwanese citizens as part of the “third wave” under the “Health for all, Taiwan can help” program (MOFA 2020d).

Additionally, Taiwan’s diplomatic allies and “friendly nations” received “35,000 forehead thermometers and 250 sets of automatic temperature measurement systems” (Lin 2020f). Incidentally, the Holy See, Taiwan’s only diplomatic ally in Europe, received “100,000 surgical face masks” from Taiwan that would be further donated “to certain African countries” (Huang and Lim 2020). The teaming up with the Holy See may be seen as a reassurance for Taiwan, as there have been murmurs that the state was holding parleys with China with the intention to switch its diplomatic recognition (Pullella and Lee 2018).

Among the other major countries, Japan received two million surgical masks on April 21 (The Japan Times 2020); the Indian Red Cross Society received a donation of a million face masks on May 8 (Hindustan Times 2020); and Canada received 500,000 (400,000 for the Canadian Red Cross Society and 100,000 for the provinces of Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia) on April 27 (Boynton 2020). The quantity of donations has brought Taiwan’s capabilities to the fore in the international community’s estimation.

B. Increased Voices of Support and Goodwill for Taiwan and Its WHO Cause

67 members of the European Parliament (EP) wrote to Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, while 60 German parliamentarians wrote to the WHO chief demanding Taiwan's inclusion in the WHO (Taiwan News 2020a). Also, 102 EP members "urged EU health ministers to help facilitate the participation of Taiwan's health minister Chen Shih-chung at the upcoming WHA [its 73rd session from May 18-19, 2020] as an observer" (Tang and Lim 2020). The Japan-Taiwan Exchange Association (JTEA), Japan's representative in Taiwan, posted support for Taiwan's participation in the WHA on Facebook (Focus Taiwan 2020g).

The Times of India carried an editorial supporting Taiwan's entry in the WHA (Times of India 2020a). On May 6, Taiwan News stated that India was the "top country tweeting for Taiwan membership in WHA" with 49 percent of total tweets at "a hashtag meant to rally support for the proposal by the U.S. State Department" (Everington 2020b). The leader of the Congress Party in the Lok Sabha of the Indian Parliament, Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury castigated China and urged the government to recognize Taiwan, though the tweet was later deleted and disowned by the party (Times of India 2020b). Meenakshi Lekhi and Rahul Kaswan, members of Parliament from the ruling Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP), "virtually attended" Tsai's swearing-in ceremony on May 20, 2020 (Times of India 2020c). This was in contrast to the Modi government's decision not to participate in the swearing-in ceremony in 2016 (Patranobis 2016).

Canadian Prime Minister Justin Trudeau publicly thanked Taiwan for mask donations (Connolly 2020). So did the Singapore's first lady Ho Ching (Yu and Yeh 2020). These examples illustrate the goodwill that Taiwan earned during this crisis which will help it push the diplomatic envelope. A fuller picture of praise and empathy for Taiwan can be gleaned from the favorable press it has received internationally, the examples of which are too many to detail here.

C. Tangible Gains Made by Pragmatic Diplomacy during the Pandemic

Health diplomacy and humanitarian assistance have been long-standing elements of Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy which it conducts officially,

wherever possible, and through civil-society groups. The following examples may be considered as factors in the gains of Taiwan's mask diplomacy during the period under review. Taiwan and the Czech Republic issued a joint statement relating to an epidemic prevention cooperation agreement, signed on April 1, 2020 (ROC-Taiwan Uploads 2020). Later and beyond the timeframe under review in September 2020, president of the Czech Senate Milos Vystreil led a delegation which evoked a strong response from China and an equal rebuff from European countries (Ridgwell 2020). The *de facto* embassy of the Netherlands officially changed its name from the "Netherlands Trade and Investment Office" (NTIO) to the "Netherlands Office, Taipei" on April 27, 2020 (Yeh 2020). It was suggested that the name change was actually in line with a trend visible from 2012 of countries such as Australia, Japan, Poland and the UK changing the names of their offices to reflect the reality of their relationships with Taiwan moving beyond trade and investment. It also might have had some connection with Taiwan's mask diplomacy and the prevailing world sentiment—the NTIO described Taiwan's masks as "600,000 pieces of love" on April 9 (Lim 2020c).

VII. The Taiwan Model versus the Chinese Communist Model

Concluding the discussion thus far, the author would underscore that the pandemic has also given Taiwan an opportunity to play up its view of the shortcomings of communist rule, citing China's perceived failure to transparently report the outbreak and thereby further delegitimizing the PRC's "one country, two systems" formula for reunification. DPP president Cho was reported as saying, "The Chinese Communist Party regime's approach of maintaining stability and neglecting people's lives and health has caused the spread of the epidemic and seriously damaged China's carefully crafted image as a great power" (Blanchard 2020). Mainland Affairs Council (MAC) minister Chen Ming-tong remarked, "The whole world has seen that Taiwan has done a better job than Beijing in containing COVID-19." Premier Su Tseng-chang claimed, "The world [is] hailing the 'Taiwan model' for containing COVID-19" (Lin 2020). Taiwan undertook various activities such as large-scale international webinars to share its experience and promote its image and brand in the international community (Taipei Times 2020e; Asian Community News 2020). Speaking at a virtual forum

hosted by the Washington D.C. based Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Taiwan's Vice Premier Chen Chi-mai stated that "the "Taiwan model" for fighting COVID-19 can be successfully adopted by democracies around the world." US Deputy Health Secretary Eric Hargan also spoke at the forum (Hsu and Mazzetta 2020). Truth be told, these have been unilateral proclamations which have resonated with some sympathetic and like-minded constituencies in the international community. Having been busy with its own medical diplomacy, China appears to have overlooked such proclamations. However, the Chinese blogosphere has indeed cast doubt on Taiwan's success in handling the COVID-19 outbreak. Besides, not everyone seems to be convinced by Taiwan's mask diplomacy. One commentator has termed Taiwan's mask diplomacy as giving it "delusions about its international status" (Chin 2020).

VIII. Taiwan's Re-entry in the WHA: The Way Forward

The discussion thus far has suggested that Taiwan's successful handling of the COVID-19 outbreak and the international media coverage of China's alleged non-cooperation and insensitivity towards Taiwan amid the raging pandemic and its mask diplomacy has generated widespread empathy for its campaign for an invitation to the 73rd WHA. Taiwan has occupied the moral high ground on this issue. However, despite the moral sanctity of Taiwan's WHO/WHA cause, there is no escape from realpolitik. One cannot ignore that the UN and its agencies have been an arena of international power politics. To an extent, the tussle over Taiwan's entry into the WHO/WHA is reminiscent of the international one over China's entry into the UN in the 1950s and 60s. Taiwan's entry into the WHO has all along been a political issue linked with the fundamentals of the cross-strait problem. Despite Taiwan's spirited campaign with a strong US backing, the number of countries supporting Taiwan's participation in the 73rd session of the WHA was miniscule among a total of 194 members. Moreover, prevailing upon China and side-stepping the 1992 Consensus through US help and other diplomatic maneuverings appears impossible. The current anti-China sentiment in the Western quarters of the world is temporary. Most members of the international community

are likely to lose interest in this issue after a point and would not like to be dragged into the US diplomatic push against China for Taiwan's entry into the WHO. This dilemma has also been discerned in Southeast Asian countries, as they do not want to choose between the US and China (Jaipragas 2020). After having taken over as chairman of the WHO Executive Board at its 147th session in May 2020, India could be facing a difficult situation because of its complex and dynamic relationship with China, in view of which it has traditionally exercised caution and reticence on issues relating to Taiwan (The Indian Express 2020a; Haidar 2020; The Indian Express 2020b).

At present, the prospects of Taiwan's re-entry in the WHA appear bleak. However, this is not an impossibility. Taiwan gained admittance as an observer to the WHA under the 1992 consensus from 2009 to 2016. In a normal situation and when the KMT is in power, Taiwan may be admitted once again. It is also possible that China may give a small concession by agreeing to Taiwan's admittance to the WHA during a process of reconciliation and a thaw in relations with the US. However, a blanket rejection of the 1992 Consensus by the DPP would still be a hurdle.

The ruling DPP needs to show some flexibility on this issue. Its non-adherence to the 1992 Consensus or the "one China principle" and its simple rejection of it pertains to a particular type of politics that promotes "nativist" sentiment as opposed to the KMT's "pan-China" stance which seeks Taiwan's eventual reunification with China. The fact is that the KMT won two consecutive elections while pledging support for the 1992 Consensus. For the international community, supporting Taiwan's re-entry into the WHA and bypassing China's objections or the 1992 Consensus as expected by the DPP will amount to taking sides in Taiwan's domestic politics. Therefore, the DPP government should offer a reasonable, not maximalist option to the larger international community and China in its campaigns for observer status in the WHA. It should make a WHO-specific exception to the 1992 Consensus and agree to re-enter the WHA under a new innovative mechanism. Such a move will further enhance the moral appeal of its cause, and many countries may find a reason to ignore China's remonstrations. One can also hope that China may also be reasoned into not seeking a universal adherence to the 1992 Consensus.

At this point, it is difficult to prescribe a formula with regard to what China and the DPP government can do to overcome the hurdle of the 1992 Consensus. However, they may very well realize the need to climb down from their extreme positions. Despite the current feel-good impact of the ruling DPP, it may later come under public pressure, particularly from the business sector, to withdraw from its precarious stand-off with China. For businesses, the NSP is nowhere close to replacing China. A prolonged DPP government which is theoretically very possible will only widen the distance between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. At some point in time, China may actually feel the need to keep the DPP government close enough to keep its sovereignty claims on Taiwan relevant. It may also strive to wean the DPP away from US influence. These imperatives may eventually end up motivating them to “reinvent the wheel” of cross-Strait rapprochement. In the given context of COVID-19, a civil society which prioritizes peace and stability can push for effective anti-pandemic cooperation at the level of local governments and health departments and between prominent hospitals and other medical facilities on both sides, even though prospects appear bleak for serious cross-Strait anti-COVID-19 cooperation at the formal, official level. Such a small, non-political step may initiate a new beginning.

IX. Conclusion: Some Indications about the Future

The cross-Strait narrative in response to the ongoing COVID-19 crisis is a manifestation of current cross-Strait politics and the deterioration of bilateral ties since May 2016. The peace and cooperation in cross-Strait ties during the Ma presidency (2008-16) gives reason to argue that had the KMT been in power now, the present narrative would have been one of cooperation against the pandemic. The Tsai government’s success against COVID-19, the modest success of its mask diplomacy, and international empathy in the face of China’s obstruction to its participation in the WHA may only help to consolidate and entrench the DPP’s cross-Strait relations position in Taiwan’s society and politics (Chung and Chung 2020). As per the latest survey released on May 7, the approval rating of the KMT—the DPP’s rival who seeks Taiwan’s eventual reunification with the Mainland—dropped in a

historic low to 9.2 percent following the presidential election in January 2020 (Taiwan News 2020b).

The crisis has proved to be an opportunity for the DPP government to push the envelope in the diplomatic arena. Taiwan's pragmatic diplomacy in official as well as public diplomacy formats has been seen at its best during the crisis. A good many members of the international community have been sensitized to Taiwan's WHO cause, its demand has been viewed with empathy, and its mask diplomacy has increased its visibility internationally. Health diplomacy may be employed to sell Taiwan's story more vigorously in the coming period with some success. Medical and health sector cooperation in the NSP may receive more attention in addition to trade and investment. Taiwan's voice may also resonate with social constituencies across the globe and particularly in the Western world given the prevailing resentment against China. Pro-Taiwan initiatives by individuals, civil-society groups, parliamentarians, and possibly Christian religious groups may gain traction.¹¹ A nudge by the US to its allies and friends in this direction might be expected. Their anti-COVID-19 cooperation and coordinated efforts for Taiwan's entry in the WHO have deepened their bonding even more. This may ensure the further recalibration of Taiwan-US diplomatic and defense ties.

However, a reading of these developments alongside long-standing macro-level trends suggests that it would be premature to expect that any diplomatic windfall would accrue from this. Its entry into the WHO by overruling the Chinese veto seems an unmerited proposition. Mask donations

11. Taiwan received support from these social constituencies vis-à-vis the PRC during the Cold War. It also received support from these constituencies in its fight for democracy against the authoritarianism of the KMT from the late 1970s to the early 1990s. However, as the PRC chose to be integrated with the world and achieved miraculous economic growth and Taiwan transformed into a democracy, this support outlived its utility and the interest of these constituencies in Taiwan diminished. There have been indications of a renewal of this interest in recent months and years (Jensen 2019; Deutsche Welle 2019). Among Christian religious groups, the Presbyterian Church has played a notable role in Taiwan's struggle for democracy and rights and has a significant presence in the country (Tyson 1987). Given China's increasingly tough attitude towards Christianity under President Xi Jinping, it is quite possible that Christian groups in the West could play a role in the international mobilization of private initiatives to support Taiwan.

to the Indian Red Cross Society and Canadian Red Cross Society are well within pre-defined “unofficial” relations with Taiwan in those countries. The Netherlands took down the information about renaming its *de facto* embassy from Facebook following Chinese protests. Trudeau thanked Taiwan for its mask donations only after being nudged as his foreign minister had “dodged” this expectation (Connolly 2020). Similarly, a fundamental altering of US China policy to favor Taiwan is a near impossibility. Whether Trump’s current bullish attitude towards China will survive the presidential election later this year remains to be seen. Also, a diminished US profile relative to China in international organizations such as the WHO does not augur well for Taiwan. While the US may continue to underwrite Taiwan’s security, this scenario will frustrate Taiwan’s aspirations and schemes that mainly rely on US support for its entry into international organizations. Although the prevailing international atmosphere is conducive for Taiwan’s pragmatic diplomacy, its true dimension and extent will be clear only once the COVID-19 dust has settled. The relatively diminished US influence may have implications for Taiwan’s larger pragmatic diplomacy as well. Thus, one must await the emergence of a power differential in a post-COVID-19 world.

Table 1: Tracking COVID-19 on a Monthly Interval (Cumulative Figures in Persons)

| Reported on | Cases Reported | Ruled Out Cases | Laboratory Confirmed Cases | Imported Cases | Indigenous Cases | Naval Crew Cases | Released from Isolation (Recovered) Cases | Deaths |
|-------------|----------------|-----------------|----------------------------|----------------|------------------|------------------|---|--------|
| 21/01/2020 | 1 | 0 | 1 | 1 | 0 | 0 | 0 | 0 |
| 19/02/2020 | -- | -- | 24 | -- | -- | -- | -- | -- |
| 19/03/2020 | 20,014 | 18,579 | 108 | 71 | 29 | 0 | 26 | 1 |
| 19/04/2020 | 53,005 | 50,619 | 420 | 341 | 55 | 24 | 189 | 6 |
| 19/05/2020 | 69,657 | 68,588 | 440 | 349 | 55 | 36 | 401 | 7 |
| 15/06/2020 | 74,409 | 73,507 | 445 | 354 | 55 | 36 | 433 | 7 |
| 19/07/2020 | 79,506 | 78,568 | 455 | 364 | 55 | 36 | 440 | 7 |
| 19/08/2020 | 85,128 | 84,068 | 486 | 394 | 55 | 36 | 457 | 7 |
| 20/09/2020 | 91,555 | 90,461 | 507 | 415 | 55 | 36 | 479 | 7 |
| 20/10/2020 | 99,367 | 98,102 | 543 | 451 | 55 | 36 | 495 | 7 |
| 19/11/2020 | 106,576 | 105,091 | 609 | 517 | 55 | 36 | 545 | 7 |
| 19/12/2020 | 119,164 | 116,802 | 763 | 671 | 55 | 36 | 625 | 7 |

Note: This table tracks the outbreak of COVID-19 in Taiwan on a monthly interval with nearest date that completes the monthly cycle.

Source: Compiled from press releases issued by the TCDC, Taipei. This table was first published in Prashant Kumar Singh, “What Does Success Against COVID-19 Mean for Taiwan?” MP-IDSA Website, July 20, 2020.

Appendix 1: Chronology of Key Events and Initiatives regarding Taiwan’s Fight against COVID-19 and Push for Observer Status in the WHA

| S.No. | Description | Date-Month-Year |
|-------|---|-----------------|
| 1 | China informs the WHO of a pneumonia outbreak for unknown reasons in Wuhan | 31-12- 2019 |
| 2 | Taiwan enforces “On-board quarantine” on all direct flights from Wuhan | 31-12-2019 |
| | Taiwan emails the WHO about the possible human-to-human transmission nature of the pneumonia in Wuhan | 31-12-2019 |
| 3 | The MOHW forms a response team | 2-1-2020 |

| | | |
|----|---|-----------|
| 4 | The TCDC relays information provided by the Chinese Center for Disease Control and Prevention that “as of January 5, 2020, no evidence of human-to-human transmission had been found.” | 6-1-2020 |
| 5 | Wuhan is visited by Chuang Yin-ching, Commander of the Communicable Disease Control Medical Network and Hung Min-nan, the medical officer from the TCDC | 15-1-2020 |
| 6 | The TCDC concludes that “limited human-to-human spread in Wuhan cannot be ruled out” but “the source of infection [is] still under investigation.” | 16-1-2020 |
| 7 | The TCDC raises “the travel notice level for Wuhan City to Level 2” | 20-1-2020 |
| 8 | The CECC is activated | 20-1-2020 |
| 9 | The first case of COVID-19 is reported in Taiwan | 21-1-2020 |
| 10 | The CECC raises the alert level to Level 3 against “all non-essential travels to Wuhan” | 21-1-2020 |
| 12 | The first group of Taiwanese return from Wuhan, comprising 247 people | 3-2-2020 |
| 13 | The CECC is raised to Level 1 | 27-2-2020 |
| 14 | China announces “a series of measures to help Taiwan-invested enterprises resume work and production.” | 13-3-2020 |
| 15 | Taiwan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the American Institute in Taiwan issue a “Taiwan-US Joint Statement on a Partnership against Coronavirus” | 18-3-2020 |
| 16 | Taiwan and the Czech Republic sign the epidemic prevention cooperation agreement | 1-4-2020 |
| 17 | Taiwan launches the “first wave” of mask diplomacy | 1-4-2020 |
| 18 | 60 German parliamentarians write to the WHO chief demanding Taiwan’s inclusion in the WHO | 2-4-2020 |
| 19 | 67 members of the European Parliament (EP) sign a petition to Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the issue of Taiwan’s inclusion in the WHO | 8-4-2020 |
| 20 | The “second wave” of mask diplomacy begins | 9-4-2020 |
| 21 | Health Minister Chen Shih-chung reveals the contents of the email sent to the WHO | 11-4-2020 |
| 22 | The name of the “Netherlands Trade and Investment Office” is changed to the “Netherlands Office, Taipei” | 27-4-2020 |

| | | |
|----|---|------------------|
| 23 | The “third wave” of mask diplomacy is announced | 5-5-2020 |
| 24 | Eight countries issue a joint demarche to the WHO for Taiwan's inclusion in the WHA | 7-5-2020 |
| 25 | Taiwan withdraws/postpones its request for observer status in WHA | 18-5-2020 |
| 25 | The 73rd session of the WHA begins | 18 and 19-5-2020 |

Source: Author's Own Compilation from Information Available in the Open Domain

References

- Asian Community News. 2020. "Taiwan Shares COVID-19 Handling Experience with Indian Health Experts." <https://www.asiancommunitynews.com/taiwan-shares-covid-19-handling-experience-with-indian-health-experts/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Aspinwall, Nick. 2020a. "Taiwan's Coronavirus Response Hits Obstacles Set by Chinese Government." <https://thediplomat.com/2020/02/taiwans-coronavirus-response-hits-obstacles-set-by-chinese-government/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Aspinwall, Nick. 2020b. "Pompeo Urges Tedros to Invite Taiwan to WHA as More Countries Join Campaign." <https://thediplomat.com/2020/05/pompeo-urges-tedros-to-invite-taiwan-to-wha-as-more-countries-join-campaign/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Blanchard, Ben. 2020. "Taiwan Doubles Down on Virus Criticism as China Denounces 'Disgusting' Behavior." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-coronavirus-taiwan-china/taiwan-doubles-down-on-virus-criticism-as-china-denounces-disgusting-behavior-idUSKBN21C16U>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Bloomberg. 2020. "China Opposes Taiwan Participation in U.N. after U.S. Tweet." <https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2020-05-02/china-opposes-taiwan-participation-in-u-n-after-u-s-tweet>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Boynton, Sean. 2020. "Coronavirus: 500,000 Surgical Masks Donated to Canada from Taiwan." <https://globalnews.ca/news/6909700/coronavirus-canada-taiwan-masks/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Bryas, Dimitri. 2020. "President Tsai Ing-wen Wins Reelection in a Landslide." <https://chinapost.nownews.com/20200111-930105>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Chang, Jaw-ling Joanne. 2010. "Taiwan's Participation in the World Health Organization: The U.S. 'Facilitator' Role." *American Foreign Policy Interests* 32 (3): 141.
- Chen, Shih-Chung. 2020. "Taiwan's Coronavirus Protocol Shows How It is Done." <https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/taiwans-coronavirus-protocol-shows-how-it-is-done/article31484681.ece>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Chen, Yun-yu and Emerson Lim. 2020. "U.S. Military Assets Seen Near Taiwan Friday, Saturday." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004110006>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Chen, Yun-yu, Tang Pei-chun and Evelyn Kao. 2020. "Taiwan, WHO again Spar over Controversial Email to WHO." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004210020>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Chiang, Chinye and Chiang Yi-ching 2019. "Taiwan, US Discuss Possible Collaboration

in Taiwan's Allies," <http://focustaiwan.tw/news/aip/201910220008.aspx>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Chin, Hsueh. 2020. "Mask Diplomacy Gives Taiwan Delusions about Its International Status." <https://www.scmp.com/comment/letters/article/3093143/mask-diplomacy-gives-taiwan-delusions-about-its-international>. (Accessed on July 20, 2020).

China Daily. 2020a. "Taiwan Authority's Attempt to Use Epidemic to Seek 'Independence' will Never Succeed: Mainland." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/06/WS5e3bdcd7a3101282172758a9.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

China Daily. 2020b. "Mainland has been Sharing COVID-19 Info with Taiwan All Along: Spokesperson." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/25/WS5e7abe74a310128217281d0f.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

China Daily. 2020c. "No Barriers for Taiwan to Access Epidemic Information: Mainland Spokesperson." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/04/WS5e3919bba310128217274c8b.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

China Daily. 2020d. "Mainland Steps Up Services for Taiwan Compatriots Amid Virus Outbreak: Spokesperson." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/05/WS5e3a6865a31012821727524c.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

China Daily. 2020e. "Mainland Actively Facilitates Taiwan Compatriots' Return: Official." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/28/WS5e7f4988a310128217282bac.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

China Daily. 2020f. "Mainland Helps Taiwan-invested Enterprises Resume Work Amid Epidemic: Spokesperson." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/13/WS5e6b3bf9a31012821727ef6b.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Chung, Li-hua and Jake Chung. 2020. "Most Taiwanese Feel that China is Unfriendly: Poll." <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/03/28/2003733531>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Congress.Gov. "S.1678 - Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative (TAIPEI) Act of 2019." <https://www.congress.gov/bill/116th-congress/senate-bill/1678/text>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Connolly, Amanda. 2020. "Coronavirus: Trudeau Thanks Taiwan Directly for 'Generous' Mask Donation." <https://globalnews.ca/news/6921046/justin-trudeau-taiwan-mask-donation/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Davidson, Helen. 2020. "Senior WHO Adviser Appears to Dodge Question on Taiwan's Covid-19 Response." <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2020/mar/30/senior-who->

adviser-appears-to-dodge-question-on-taiwans-covid-19-response. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Department of State. 2020. "Virtual Forum on Expanding Taiwan's Participation on the Global Stage." <https://www.state.gov/virtual-forum-on-expanding-taiwans-participation-on-the-global-stage/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Deutsche Welle. 2019. "German Petition on Taiwan Forces Government to Justify 'one China' Policy." <https://www.dw.com/en/german-petition-on-taiwan-forces-government-to-justify-one-china-policy/a-51558486>. (Accessed on January 12, 2021).

EPKD. 2020. "Remarks of Spokesperson of Chinese Embassy in Denmark on the Article by Head of the Taiwan Authorities' Foreign Relations Department." <https://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/cedk/eng/zdgt/t1809986.htm>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Everington, Keoni. 2020a. "Chinese Refuse Protective Clothing for Taiwanese Evacuees, 30 Rejected." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3895018>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Everington, Keoni. 2020b. "India Top Country Tweeting for Taiwan membership in WHA." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3929033>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Executive Yuan. 2020a. "Central Epidemic Command Center Raised to Level-1 Facility." <https://english.ey.gov.tw/Page/61BF20C3E89B856/de8adc4f-d276-42cd-a7c9-cd4d551d6a7d>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Executive Yuan. 2020b. "Taiwan Deserves a Place at the World Health Assembly." <https://english.ey.gov.tw/News3/9E5540D592A5FECD/b85459d3-098e-40f7-9d0b-1475656fcfc9>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Feuer, William. 2020. "WHO Chief Addresses Death Threats, Racist Insults: 'I don't Give a Damn'." <https://www.cnbc.com/2020/04/08/who-chief-addresses-death-threats-racist-insults-i-dont-give-a-damn.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020a. "Taiwan Bans Entry of Chinese Nationals from Guangdong Province." <https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202002010017>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020b. "Taiwan Reveals Email, Blasts WHO for Possible 'Dereliction of Duty'." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004110004>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020c. "CORONAVIRUS/About 440 Taiwanese in Hubei Seeking to Get Home on Special Flights." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202003260011>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020d. "Taiwan's Diplomatic Allies Call for Review of Its Exclusion from

WHA.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005130021>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020e. “Taiwan, U.S. Announce Joint Efforts to Fight Coronavirus.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/society/202003180010>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020f. “U.S. Warship Transits Taiwan Strait; Sixth This Year” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005140006>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Focus Taiwan. 2020g. “Japan Voices Support for Taiwan’s Attendance as WHA Observer.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005110014>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Haidar, Suhasini. 2020. “India Caught in U.S.-China Spat over Taiwan’s Status at WHO.” <https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-caught-in-us-china-spat-over-taiwan-status-at-who/article31569621.ece>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Hamacher, Fabian. 2020. “Taiwan, China argue over flights for stranded Taiwanese in Wuhan.” <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-health-taiwan/taiwan-china-argue-over-flights-for-stranded-taiwanese-in-wuhan-idUSKBN201067>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Hindustan Times. 2020. “Taiwan Donates 1 Million Face Masks to Protect Indian Medical Personnel.” <https://www.hindustantimes.com/india-news/taiwan-donates-1-million-face-masks-to-protect-indian-medical-personnel/story-E3cQ9bNJ75jjeGZ6W5e6sM.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Horton, Chris. 2020. “China Seeks to Deny Taiwan Seat at key WHO Meeting.” <https://asia.nikkei.com/Politics/International-relations/China-seeks-to-deny-Taiwan-seat-at-key-WHO-meeting>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Hsu, Stacy and Joseph Yeh. 2020. “US Senate Passes Bill to Help Taiwan Regain WHA Observer Status.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005120006>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Hsu, Stacy and Matthew Mazzetta. 2020. “Vice Premier Shares ‘Taiwan ‘Model’ with Senior US Health Official.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005090003>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Huang, Ya-shih and Emerson Lim. 2020. “CORONAVIRUS/Taiwan, Vatican Team Up to Provide Facial Masks to Africa.” <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005010004>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

India Today. 2020. “Wuhan Wet Markets may not be Coronavirus Origin, Identifying Patient Zero Difficult: Taiwan’s VP.” <https://www.indiatoday.in/world/story/wuhan-wet-markets-may-not-be-coronavirus-origin-identifying-patient-zero-difficult-taiwan-vp-1668835-2020-04-20>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

- Jaipragas, Bhavan. 2020. "US Push for Taiwan WHO Observer Status Seen Falling Flat in Southeast Asia." <https://www.scmp.com/week-asia/politics/article/3083378/us-push-taiwan-who-observer-status-seen-falling-flat-southeast>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Jensen, Sally. 2019. "Australian Petition to Recognize Taiwan Garners Thousands of Signatures." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3804792>. (Accessed on January 12, 2021).
- Kan, Shirley A. 2011. *China/Taiwan: Evolution of the "One China" Policy: Key Statements from Washington, Beijing and Taipei*. Washington. Congressional Research Service.
- Ke-lun, Chang Ming-hsuan and Matthew Mazzetta. 2020. "CORONAVIRUS/No Longer A Political Football, Stranded Taiwanese in Hubei Return Home." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202003120007>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lai, Yen-hsi and Ko Lin. 2020. "CORONAVIRUS/Taiwanese in Hubei can Fly Back on 2 CAL Flights from Shanghai: SEF." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202003260005>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Li, Ruohan. 2016. "Taiwan at 1st World Health Meet since Tsai Takes Office." <http://www.globaltimes.cn/content/984746.shtml>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Liao, George. 2020a. "China Refuses Taiwan's Request to Evacuate Citizens from Wuhan." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3865894>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Liao, George. 2020b. "China Bans Students from Studying in Taiwan for Rest of 2020." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3913343>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lim, Emerson. 2020a. "Taiwan's Foreign Minister Blasts WHO for Shifting Designations." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202002060016>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lim, Emerson. 2020b. "PPE Supplies Reach Taiwan, U.S. under Bilateral Arrangement." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004160017>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lim, Emerson. 2020c. "Taiwan Gives 400,000 Masks to US under Cooperation Arrangement." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004090023>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin, Chia-nan. 2020a. "Virus Outbreak: Minister Points Finger at China." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/03/14/2003732671>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin, Chia-nan. 2020b. "Virus Outbreak: China's Permission not Needed for WHO forum: MOFA." <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/02/13/2003730902>.

(Accessed on July 15, 2020).

- Lin, Chia-nan. 2020c. "Virus Outbreak: MOFA Slams Beijing's 'Misleading' Lies." <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/02/05/2003730398>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin, Chia-nan. 2020d. "Virus Outbreak: US Says Working with Taiwan in Pacific Relief Efforts." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/23/2003735150>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin, Chia-nan. 2020e. "Talks Held with US in Guatemala." <http://www.taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/01/18/2003729457>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin Chia-nan. 2020f. "Virus Outbreak: Nation Donates Thermometers to Aid Allies." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/25/2003735277>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Lin, Sean. 2020. "Cross-strait Exchanges Questioned." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/03/25/2003733332>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MAC. 2009. "President Ma Benefits of Diplomatic Truce during His Meeting with CSIS." www.mac.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=67800&ctNode=6607&mp=3. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MAC. 2020a. "Entry into Taiwan to be Suspended for Hong Kong and Macao Residents starting from Midnight on February 11, 2020 as Disease Control Takes Priority." https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=0F2D2B8E7DA6EC5B. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MAC. 2020b. "Taiwan to Suspend Direct Cross-Strait Sea Passenger Transportation from February 10, 2020 in Response to Coronavirus Outbreak in Mainland China." https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=0B3159E39F236F0C. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MAC. 2020c. "Humanitarianism and Disease Prevention Must Both be Taken into Account: Cross-Strait Cooperation Required in Evacuation." https://www.mac.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=2BA0753CBE348412&sms=E828F60C4AFBAF90&s=CC E0BA7763F3ADC2. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MOFA. 2019. "Taiwan and United States Set to Hold inaugural Pacific Islands Dialogue in Taipei." https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=539A9A50A5F8AF9E&s=ACE8FB42E66EE14A. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- MOFA. 2020a. "Taiwan to Bar Foreign Nationals from Entering the Country Starting March 19 in response to the Continued Spread of COVID-19." <https://www.mofa.gov>.

tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=539A9A50A5F8AF9E&sms=37B41539382B84BA&s=1816E365AF525FDD. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

MOFA. 2020b. "Taiwan-U.S. Joint Statement on a Partnership against Coronavirus." <https://www.mofa.gov.tw/Upload/RelFile/662/171361/1f9b22e4-365c-4791-8427-58db5ecb5ad6.pdf>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

MOFA. 2020c. "MOFA Announces Second Wave of International Humanitarian Assistance in wake of COVID-19." https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=75913673E6864346. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

MOFA. 2020d. "MOFA Announces Third Wave of International Humanitarian Assistance in wake of COVID-19." https://www.mofa.gov.tw/en/News_Content.aspx?n=1EADDCFD4C6EC567&sms=5B9044CF1188EE23&s=A6A5262977208EE8. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Mosk, Matthew. 2020. "George W. Bush in 2005: 'If We Wait for a Pandemic to Appear, It will be too Late to Prepare'." <https://abcnews.go.com/Politics/george-bush-2005-wait-pandemic-late-prepare/story?id=69979013>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Nelson, Steve. 2020. "Trump Says WHO Ignored Taiwanese Email Citing Coronavirus Transmission." <https://nypost.com/2020/04/17/trump-cites-taiwan-email-to-who-about-covid-19-transmission/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Office of the President. 2020. "Office of the President's Response to Taiwan's Lack of Invitation to This Year's WHA." <https://english.president.gov.tw/NEWS/5134>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Pan, Jason. 2020. "Virus Outbreak: Authorities Find 45 Cases of Chinese Misinformation." <http://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/03/05/2003732117>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Patranobis, Sutirtho. 2016. "India Backtracks on Sending MPs to Inaugural of New Taiwan Prez." <http://www.hindustantimes.com/world/india-backtracks-on-sending-mps-toinaugural->. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Perelman, Marc. 2020. "Taiwan's Vice President Says 'Possibility' that Covid-19 Came from Chinese Laboratory." <https://www.france24.com/en/asia-pacific/20200508-taiwan-s-vice-president-says-possibility-that-covid-19-came-from-chinese-laboratory>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Pullella, Philip and Yimou Lee. 2018. "As Vatican and China talk, Taiwan Looks on Nervously." <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-pope-china-taiwan/as-vatican-and-china-talk-taiwan-looks-on-nervously-idUSKBN1H107U>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

- RTI. 2016. "Taiwan to Attend WHA as an Observer." <https://en.rti.org.tw/news/view/id/46997>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Ridgwell, Henry. 2020. "European Attitudes Harden as Czech Visit to Taiwan Triggers Chinese Fury." <https://www.voanews.com/europe/european-attitudes-harden-czech-visit-taiwan-triggers-chinese-fury>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- ROC-Taiwan Uploads. 2020. "Joint Statement of the Taipei Economic and Cultural Office, Prague and of the Czech Economic and Cultural Office in Taipei on a Partnership against Coronavirus." https://www.roc-taiwan.org/uploads/sites/121/2020/04/0401Joint_Statement-TW__CR_Partnership.pdf. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Shen, Peng-ta and Evelyn Kao. 2020. "214 Taiwanese Back in Taiwan after Long Ordeal in Hubei Province." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202003300029>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2016. "EDITORIAL: UN's 1971 Resolution Irrelevant." <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2016/05/10/2003645899>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2020a. "EDITORIAL: Evacuations Reveal China's Insecurity." <https://www.taipeitimes.com/News/editorials/archives/2020/03/31/2003733693>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2020b. "Virus Outbreak: Most Virus Disinformation Originating from China." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/09/2003734287>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2020c. "US Military Plane Flies near Taiwan." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/18/2003734843>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2020d. "US Reconnaissance Aircraft Spotted near Taiwan" <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/16/2003734716>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taipei Times. 2020e. "Virus Outbreak: Experts Share with US, Canada Doctors." <https://taipeitimes.com/News/taiwan/archives/2020/04/02/2003733849>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taiwan News. 2020a. "MOFA Thanks EP and German Lawmakers for Backing Taiwan's WHO Bid." <https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=175296>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).
- Taiwan News. 2020b. "Support for Taiwan's KMT Drops to Historic Low." <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/3929724>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Taiwan Today. (2020). "MOFA Thanks US Lawmakers for Backing Taiwan's WHO Bid." <https://taiwantoday.tw/news.php?unit=2,6,10,15,18&post=177122>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Tang, Pei-chun and Emerson Lim. 2020. "EU Health Ministers Urged to Support Taiwan's Participation in WHA." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202005140012>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020a. "In Response to Pneumonia Outbreak in Wuhan, China and Related Test Results, Taiwan CDC Remains in Touch with China and World Health Organization and Taiwan Maintains Existing Disease Control and Prevention Efforts." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/4N96uF-2yK-d7dEFFcwa0Q?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020b. "What Steps have been Taken by Taiwan CDC to Prevent Imported Cases." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Category/QAPage/LnqBFJsulw6fW3nswc04Yw>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020c. "In Response to Pneumonia Outbreak in Wuhan, China, Taiwan CDC Advises Travelers Visiting Outbreak Area to Take Relevant Precautions throughout Trip and after Returning to Taiwan." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/Dbg1J9leIDoxseqTHMiaxQ?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020d. "Two Experts from Taiwan Visit Wuhan to Understand and Obtain Information on Severe Special Infectious Pneumonia Outbreak; Taiwan CDC Raises Travel Notice Level for Wuhan to Level 2." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/jFGUVrLkluHmzZeyAihHQ?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020e. "In Response to Severe Pneumonia Outbreak in Wuhan, China, Executive Yuan Instructs Taiwan CDC to Reinforce Quarantine Practices and Plan Site Visit to Investigate ongoing Outbreak." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/p6Rh9tOURU-S2K9vd5Avmg?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020f. "The Facts regarding Taiwan's Email to Alert WHO to Possible Danger of COVID-19." https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/PAD-lbwDHeN_bLaviBOuw?typeid=158. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020g. "Taiwan CDC Announces Activation of Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) for Severe Special Infectious Pneumonia to Comprehensively Prevent Novel Coronavirus Pneumonia Outbreak in China and Ensure Health of Taiwanese Public." <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/vmv22PiH7-k3K-yh6FkmKw?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020h. "Taiwan Timely Identifies First Imported Case of 2019 Novel Coronavirus

Infection Returning from Wuhan, China through On Board Quarantine; Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) Raises Travel Notice Level for Wuhan, China to Level 3: Warning.” https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/pVg_JRVvtHhp94C6GShRkQ?typeid=158. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020i. “In Light of Pneumonia Outbreak in Wuhan, Central Epidemic Command Center (CECC) Broadens and Raises travel notice level for Hubei Province to Level 3, Urges Public to Avoid Non-Essential Travels and Raises Travel Notice Level for other Chinese Provinces and Cities to Level 2: Alert; Travelers Advised to Reinforce Prevention Measures.” https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/_zX7MFw1Wxr78AWgyfgROg?typeid=158. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020j. “In Light of Outbreak of 2019-nCoV in China, Central Epidemic Control Center (CECC) Stipulates Restrictions on entry of Chinese Citizens.” <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/AbXx37glDFCRtGihlDGOmA?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020k. “Name-based Rationing System for Purchases of Masks to be Launched on February 6; Public to Buy Masks with their (NHI) Cards.” <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/ZlJrlunqRjM49LIBn8p6eA?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020l. “Starting February 16 (Sunday), Face Masks to be Purchased at Local Health Centers in addition to Pharmacies.” https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/_M21mzJg9g35g4d0hlqAWA?typeid=158. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TCDC. 2020m. “Starting March 5, Everyone to be Allowed for One Additional Face Mask Every Week due to Increased Production.” <https://www.cdc.gov.tw/En/Bulletin/Detail/1CC5Xgb9UdxXES6-RcS1uQ?typeid=158>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

TECO. 2020. “MOFA Urges WHO Secretariat to Maintain Neutral and Professional Stance, Live Up to Its Status as World Public Health Leader.” https://www.roc-taiwan.org/usnyc_en/post/4970.html. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

The Indian Express. 2020a. “What Dr Harsh Vardhan as WHO Executive Board chairman Means for India.” <https://indianexpress.com/article/explained/dr-harsh-varadhan-who-executive-board-chairman-6420280/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

The Indian Express. 2020b. “India in Talks with Nations Pushing for Taiwan at WHO Meet, China Sends Reminder.” <https://indianexpress.com/article/india/india-in-talks-with-nations-pushing-for-taiwan-at-who-meet-china-sends-reminder-6410406/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

The Japan Times. 2020. “Japan Receives 2 Million Face Masks Donated by Taiwan to Combat COVID-19.” <https://www.japantimes.co.jp/news/2020/04/21/national/japan->

face-masks-donated-taiwan-coronavirus/#.Xrzqy0BuL4g. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Times of India. 2020a. "Taiwan can Help: New Delhi must Support Taipei's Participation at Upcoming World Health Assembly." <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/blogs/toi-editorials/taiwan-can-help-new-delhi-must-support-taipeis-participation-at-upcoming-world-health-assembly/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Times of India. 2020b. "Congress Forces Adhir Ranjan Chowdhury to Delete China Tweet." <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/congress-forces-adhir-ranjan-chowdhury-to-delete-china-tweet/articleshow/75728280.cms>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Times of India. 2020c. "BJP MPs 'Attend' Taiwan Event, Irk China." <https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/bjp-mps-attend-taiwan-event-irk-china/articleshow/75986912.cms>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Tyson, James. 1987. "Christians and the Taiwanese Independence Movement: A Commentary." *Asian Affairs* 14 (3): 163-170.

VOA. 2016. "Taiwan Accepts WHO Invitation despite Political Caveat from China." <https://www.voanews.com/east-asia-pacific/taiwan-accepts-who-invitation-despite-political-caveat-china>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Wakefield, Jane. 2015. "TED 2015: Bill Gates Warns on Future Disease Epidemic." <https://www.bbc.com/news/technology-31956344>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Wang, Flor, Wen Kuei-hsiang and Lai Yen-shi. 2020. "Taiwan Prioritizing Vulnerable People, Quarantine for Wuhan Evacuations." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202002070010>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Wang, Yang-yu, Lai Yen-hsi and Emerson Lim. 2020. "No Further Evacuation of Taiwanese in Next Two Days: MAC." <https://focustaiwan.tw/cross-strait/202002050010>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

WHO Basic Documents. "Constitution of the World Health Organization." <https://apps.who.int/gb/bd/PDF/bd47/EN/constitution-en.pdf?ua=1>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Winkler, Sigrid. 2012. "Taiwan's UN Dilemma: To Be or Not To Be." <https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/taiwans-un-dilemma-to-be-or-not-to-be/>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Xinhua. 2020. "Taiwan's Participation in WHA must be Based on One-China principle: Spokesperson." http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-05/06/c_138038502.htm. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Yeh, Joseph. 2020. "Netherlands Rep Office Changes Name to 'Netherlands Office

Taipei?." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004270015>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Yu, Matt and Joseph Yeh. 2020. "CORONAVIRUS/Singaporean First Lady Thanks Taiwan for Mask Donation in Updated Post." <https://focustaiwan.tw/politics/202004130014>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Hui. 2020. "Azar's Taiwan Visit Intensifies Provocation." <https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1196849.shtml>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Yi. 2020a. "Taiwan's Plots of Playing Political Tricks Slammed." <http://global.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202004/18/WS5e996ae9a3105d50a3d170a9.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Yi. 2020b. "Mainland, Taiwan Work together to Guarantee Safety." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/05/WS5e3a783fa3101282172752c7.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Yi. 2020c. "Mainland Updating Taiwan on Outbreak Info." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202002/04/WS5e39053ca310128217274c2c.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Yi. 2020d. "Nearly 400 Taiwan People in Hubei to Go Home on Charter Flights." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/11/WS5e683eeaa31012821727e0d9.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Zhang, Yi. 2020e. "Mainland Students can't Return to Taiwan." <http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/a/202003/20/WS5e74171ca3101282172809fc.html>. (Accessed on July 15, 2020).

Abbreviations in References

EPKD: Embassy of the PRC in the Kingdom of Denmark

MAC: Mainland Affairs Council

MOFA: Ministry of Foreign Affairs (of ROC, Taiwan)

RTI: Radio Taiwan International

TCDC: Taiwan Centers for Disease Control

TECO: Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in New York

VOA: Voice of America

WHO: World Health Organization

Author: Prashant Kumar Singh

Address: 1 Development Enclave (Near U.S.I.)

Rao Tula Ram Marg, Delhi Cantt

New Delhi-110010

India

Email: prashant.idsa@gmail.com

Date of receipt: 2020/05/31

Approved by: 2020/12/14

Assistant Editors: Gao, Shih-yuan, Kuo, Chin-yuan