

ONLINE METAPRAGMATIC DISCOURSE ON “ENGLISH AS TAIWAN’S SECOND OFFICIAL LANGUAGE”: MULTILINGUALISM AND IDEOLOGICAL CONTESTATION*

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ABSTRACT

This study analyzes online discussion regarding the proposal of the officialization of English as Taiwan’s second official language in October 2017 to investigate how Taiwan responds to a conceptualization of a global market in which English is generally perceived to be dominant. As Taiwan does not practice a de jure official language, the public’s feverish metapragmatic online discussion allows for the examination of the ideologizing process of English and ‘official languages.’ The news viewers evaluate not the proposal text itself, but the inferred interpretations. The study distinguishes two levels of language ideologies—shared language ideologies which contribute to the meaning-making and emergent language ideologies which are discursively introduced through the evaluation of shared language ideologies. Specifically, the study discusses (1) how online news viewers talk about English and the idea of official languages, (2) how multilingualism in the Taiwanese context is conceptualized in the public’s discussion regarding the officialization of English, and (3) how different layers of the dynamic ideological processes are evidenced by discursive elements.

Keywords: language ideology; metapragmatics; Taiwan; official language; multilingualism; English

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1. INTRODUCTION

Discourse is characterized by both old information, which speakers rely on for meaning interpretation, and emergent, newly introduced information, which speakers use to evaluate older information. Information flow and discourse representation are constitutive of each other (Chafe 1987; Chui 1994; Du Bois 1987). As language users possess the capacity to reflect on discourse (Caffi 2006), this multiplicity of information in discourse can be extended to enable our understanding of linguistic practice in a socially contextualized sense, namely, linguistic norms and language ideologies (Silverstein 1979; Woolard 1998). Discourse is loaded with both established decorum, which shapes the discourse to serve its sociopragmatic functions in communication, and emergent norms which reinforce or contest these norms in such current discourse. Through the analysis of online metapragmatic discussion regarding recognizing English as Taiwan's second official language in October 2017, the study discusses how online discussion manifests the ideologizing processes of English and the concept of an official language and how the dynamics can be captured by distinguishing between 'older' language ideologies which are established and crucial to meaning-making, and 'newer' language ideologies which are introduced through evaluating readily available language ideologies.

A common ideological link associates globalization and English as a package (Crystal 2003; Park and Wee 2012). Such an association is embodied in the pursuit of English competence by numerous non-Anglophone parts of the world, including South Korea (Park 2007; Piller and Cho 2013; Song 2011; Yoo 2005), Japan (Kubota 1998; Seargeant 2008, 2011), and Taiwan (Chang 2008; C. W. Chen 2006; Lin 2007; Price 2014; Wu 2011). In October 2017, 林之晨 Jamie Lin, recognized as one of the Ten Outstanding Young Persons in Taiwan of Year 2017, attributed low competitiveness to a lack of English ability and suggested to the then Executive Yuan Premier, Lai Ching-te, at the award ceremony that more emphasis be placed on English education. In the same month, a Legislative Member, Wu Szu-Yao, called for the legitimization of English as Taiwan's second official language. Because English remains a foreign language in Taiwan, Lin's and Wu's pleas drew public attention to the related news.

News viewers' comments on the reports and the proposals elicited their rationalizations of both English and 'official languages,' namely, their language ideologies (Woolard 1998). Based on empirical grounds, this study will discuss how English and official languages are conceptualized in the Taiwanese context.

A few notes need to be provided about current language use in Taiwan. As a multilingual society, Taiwan does not designate a *de jure* official language. Mandarin Chinese serves as "a default national language" of Taiwan (Tsao 2008: 297) and the *lingua franca* (Dupré 2013; Tsai 2010). The younger generations are less inclined to relate the use of Mandarin Chinese to earlier political oppression (see Sandel (2003) and Wei (2008) for the discussion on the National Language Movement) or to an alignment with Mainland China (Scott and Tiun 2007). The Mandarin Chinese spoken in Taiwan has become gradually indigenized and is recognized as Taiwan Mandarin (Cheng 1985; Her 2009; Su 2018; Tan 2012; Tsao 1999). Taiwan Mandarin is also commonly referred to as 國語 *Guoyu* 'the national language' and 中文 *Zhongwen* 'Mandarin Chinese.' The label *Guoyu* itself conveys how prevalently used Mandarin Chinese is in Taiwan. Nonetheless, to some, the label could carry the ideological implication of the downgrading of other local languages. In addition to Mandarin Chinese, local languages include Taiwanese (also known as 'Southern Min,' 'Tai-gi,' or 'Tai-yu'), Hakka, and Aboriginal languages. Taiwan is generalized to be composed of four major ethnic groups (Dupré 2016; Scott and Tiun 2007; Wu 2011). Further, in recent years, the number of new immigrants to Taiwan from places such as China and Southeast Asia has been rising (Chen 2020). The sociolinguistic landscape of Taiwan has been further vivified with a call for a new definition of multilingualism (Chen 2020). English, fundamentally a foreign language in Taiwan, is characterized by the smaller number of its native-speaking population and low attachments to local identities (Chen 2010; Dupré 2013), whereas it is considered critical for competitiveness, social mobility and international perspectives (Lin 2014; Tsai 2010). Though English does not serve as a daily language, fixed English expressions are common in daily communication and the use of English is socially indicative. A newly-coined expression, 摺英文 *lao yingwen*, labels the use of English lexical insertion in the non-English-dominant context as ostentatious (Su 2020).

The linguistic diversity in Taiwan reveals that Taiwan simultaneously practices multiple identities. Yearning for a recognized position in commerce in the Asia-Pacific region, Taiwan emphasizes the importance of English (Tsao 1999). Taiwan is also hoping to gain international acknowledgment of its autonomy. Furthermore, a multicultural society like Taiwan takes pride in the vitality of its multilingualism. Taiwan performs three distinct ‘spatial identities’ (Vandenbroucke 2015) from local, then national, to international—a place where local diversity thrives, where nationality can be recognized, and where international visibility can be secured.

Empirically, the discussion on recognizing English as Taiwan’s second official language provides insights into Taiwan’s sociolinguistic profile of English and official languages. Since contemporary Taiwan has not formally selected a *de jure* official language, the question of how an ‘official language’ is conceptualized forms an empirical niche. This investigation includes an effort to address the interaction between language ideologies concerning official languages and those concerning English, complementing known sociolinguistic studies on English in Taiwan (e.g., Chang 2008; S.-C. Chen 2006; Lin 2007). The study concerns how Taiwan, an Expanding Circle country where English is learned as a foreign language (see the discussion of Concentric circles in Kachru (1985)), responds to the rationalizing forces of a global market perceived to be English-dominant through analyzing lay perspectives on the language policy proposal that English be officialized. Moreover, the study will also contribute to a better understanding of the impact that English exerts on Expanding Circle countries. The neighboring Expanding Circle countries such as Japan and South Korea are fundamentally monolingual and English is learned as a foreign language in both countries. Their attempts to officialize English brought forth conflicts related to nationalism, ethnocentrism and internationalization (Seargeant 2008; Yoo 2005). The discussion in this study will further complement these findings regarding whether a multilingual society like Taiwan perceives English officialization similarly or distinctively from monolingual societies.

The significance of the study lies in the attempt to theoretically account for the dynamics of ideologization with discursive evidence. Language ideologies address “what people think, or take for granted,

about language and communication” (Woolard and Schieffelin, 1994: 56) where norms require no explicit mentioning except for when they are challenged (Kroskrity 2004). Eagleton (1991) states that ideology defines uniqueness, but manifests itself as “a kind of anonymous universal truth” (20). Eagleton’s definition (1991) also suggests that language ideologies reside in the social actors of shared cultural practices. Simply put, ideologies “are social constructs” (Cameron 2003: 448). These definitions point to a regulating, evaluative function which (language) ideologies serve. Manifested in discourse, language ideologies can be further evaluated in ongoing interaction. Therefore, language ideologies can reside in a stretch of discourse with various levels of discursive explicitness (Dyers and Abongdia 2010). Some language ideologies are held more in general and the interpretations of meanings are less contested. They are commonsensical, shared and reduced in form. Some language ideologies are more transient and evaluative in this immediate context. They are new and elaborated. Viewing the proposal text “English as Taiwan’s second official language” as discourse (Barakos and Unger 2016), this study shows that metadiscourse on discourse manifests language ideologies concerning language ideologies.

Specifically, the study discusses the following questions. 1. How do online viewers talk about English and the idea of official languages? 2. How is multilingualism in Taiwan conceptualized in the public’s discussion regarding English officialization? 3. How are different layers of the dynamic ideological processes evidenced by discursive elements?

2. THEORETICAL FRAMEWORKS

This study draws on how speakers talk about a language proposal and investigates how the ideologizing process is unveiled in an online colloquy. When “English as Taiwan’s second official language” was put forward as a proposal, news viewers examined its purposes, practicality and implications. The study adopts a discursive approach to analyzing the online discourse elicited as comments on news coverage on officializing English. Discursive approaches to language policy center on the discussion of language reflexivity (Barakos 2016) and exploit

metapragmatic discourse to account for shared assumptions about language (Mortimer 2016). Savski (2016) notes that “policy meaning is discursively constructed and that ‘discourse about policy’ can thus be considered constitutive of policy meaning and constituted by it” (55). Through talking about language policy, social actors interpret language policy by utilizing their beliefs about languages. Discourse thus serves as a site where language ideologies are manifested, evaluated, and contested (Lawton 2016; van Splunder 2016; Weber 2016). The study approaches the online metapragmatic discussion from a discursive, dialogic perspective to yield a better understanding of both the ideologizing process and the sociolinguistic profile of the languages discussed.

The connection between language policy and language ideologies is summarized in Spolsky (2004), who notes that “language ideology is language policy with the manager left out” (14). Language ideologies (Irvine 1989; Rumsey 1990; Silverstein 1979; Woolard 1998), which refer to the beliefs about language that speakers accumulate along with their social experiences, could be both a reason for and a result of language management (Shohamy 2006). Rumsey (1990) defines language ideologies as “shared bodies of commonsense notions about the nature of language in the world” (346). Rumsey’s definition focuses on the homogeneity of language ideologies and pays less attention to the interaction among distinct language ideologies (Kroskrity 2004). A pivotal site to investigate language ideologies is through the study of metapragmatic discourse (Woolard 1998). Nonetheless, Woolard (1998) also mentions that the term ‘ideologies’ seems to place greater emphasis on ideologization as a product rather than as an ongoing process though this interpretation of language ideology as fixed was never intended. This study takes this a step further and suggests that metapragmatic discourse about a language policy proposal presents a combination of layered ideological processes which can be evidenced with discourse structure. There are existing language ideologies which serve as shared knowledge for communication, and language ideologies which are brought up to reinforce or contest shared conceptualizations of language. The multilayered nature of the ideologizing process urges the present study to address language ideologies in the plural form.

The present study adopts Blommaert's sociolinguistic scales (2007, 2010) and Vandenbroucke's (2015) analytical scheme of place identity to account for the contesting nature of language ideologies in the Taiwanese context with reference to the multiple spatial identities within Taiwan. Sociolinguistic scales (Blommaert 2007, 2010) metaphorically see language practice and norms as vertically layered. The multiplicity of norms at different layers, namely, 'scale-levels' (Blommaert 2007, 2010), of a locale shows the existence of numerous evaluation schemes which speakers make reference to so as to communicate in socially appropriate ways, a phenomenon Blommaert (2010) terms 'polycentricity.' A 'locale' (Giddens 1991) or a 'regime' (Blommaert, Collins and Slembrouck 2005) determines the socially appropriate language among numerous norms according to when and where linguistic practice occurs, or in a 'TimeSpace,' a term coined by Wallerstein (1998) and Fals Borda (2000) to chain the time and space of speech events together. With various linguistic norms among which language users rationally choose to comply with (Blommaert 2007, 2010; Blommaert, Collins and Slembrouck 2005), a locale may function with multiple spatial identities (Vandenbroucke 2015). Linguistic practice can relate to multiple references ranging from the homogenous and global to the situated and local, depending on the associations between the spatial identities and linguistic norms (Blommaert 2010). Vandenbroucke (2015) discusses how Brussels projects distinctive identities as a locale, a capital, a de facto EU capital and a neoliberal global city with shop signs featuring Dutch monolingualism, French/Dutch bilingualism, and English. The preferred language choices and specific identities serve to constitute each other. The connections formed in the space in-between these choices and identities are strengthened through discursive practice (Blommaert 2010). As Taiwan positions itself as a place with multiple identities, to officialize English potentially invokes discussion about the linguistic norms at different scale-levels and leads to ideological contestation.

3. METHOD

This study is part of a larger research on social representations of English in public discourses in the Taiwanese context. The study focuses on lay beliefs about English and official languages by analyzing how speakers talk about officializing English. The study collects YouTube news comments, online news comments from various news media, and comments on an online survey conducted by Yahoo Taiwan in October 2017¹. A total number of 2349 comments are collected and examined. The survey comments are presented as the primary data, while the news comments are drawn upon to support the discussion in this study.

The study adopts a dialogic approach to analyzing the ideologizing process revealed in the online comments. A dialogic perspective sees linguistic practice, including monologue, as inevitably evaluative and responsive (Martin and White 2005). The comments are first examined based on viewers' evaluative stances on the officialization of English. They are found to center not merely on English and official languages, but also on various languages in Taiwan in relation to one another. The study identifies thirteen prevailing stances. These prevailing stances are further found to manifest more general, less explicitly verbalized ideological themes. This finding suggests that layers of language ideologies with different degrees of explicitness (Dyers and Abongdia 2010) are in a state of interaction in the viewers' comments, as shown in (1a) and (1b).

- (1) a. 國際觀、加強國際競爭力並不是指把英文列為第二官方語言就會變好。英文列為重點學習語言就可以了(Making English our second official language doesn't make us more globally competitive. We can simply focus more on English education.)
 b. 不然要用閩南語跟世界接軌嗎？(Otherwise can we connect with the world in Southern Min?)

Comment (1a) explicitly disfavors English officialization. It is the officialization of English, not the learning of English, that Viewer (1a) disapproves of. Simply put, despite a negative stance towards the

¹ The online comments are retrieved July 8, 2019, from <https://tw.news.yahoo.com/pk/290f58c0-54a8-11e7-8358-dd5e7b17ef6e>.

officialization of English, Viewer (1a) affirms that English brings international perspectives and boosts international competitiveness. By negating the assumed correlation between the officialization of English and a boost to competitiveness, the comment can be seen, from a dialogic perspective, as the viewer's anticipatory refutation of the comments of those who bear such a belief (Martin and White 2005). The use of negation suggests the existence of two contradictory propositions. Comment (1a) shows that the viewer is not evaluating the propositional content of the proposal text, but ascribing a meaning to the proposal grounded in his/her learned social knowledge about English. A rhetorical question in (1b) challenges Southern Min's usefulness in the global market and draws on the knowledge that English is considered useful in the global market, a piece of information which is implicitly stated. The fact that specific assumptions are backgrounded, as in (1a), or implicitly mentioned, as in (1b), explains that they are treated as commonsensical, and, thus, it is unnecessary to elaborate on the point being made. This observation has several implications. A comment can manifest multiple language ideologies. Some are provided verbally, in an obvious way, whereas some remain implicit. Their varying degrees of discursive explicitness can indicate how deeply rooted a language ideology can be. Language users seldom dwell upon what has been treated as a norm unless when the norm is breached (Anton 1998; Kroskrity 2004). The officialization of English is not to be comprehended in its denotational sense (Kremer and Horner 2016), but interpreted via the ideologizing process. The ideological processes can lead to disparate, even opposing, evaluations within and across comments. The thirteen prevailing stances are further found to reflect four broader, less explicit language ideologies. This study is aware that online anonymity and the length of the comments may prohibit the study from relating stancetaking to the viewers' demographic information. Nonetheless, online anonymity and the length of the comments further accentuate how the ideologizing process contributes to meaning-making because of the ways in which speakers interact with one another when a significant amount of information is not overt.

Speakers' discussion on proposal texts has been referred to as "discourse about discourse" (Mortimer 2016: 79). In this vein, "discourse about discourse" is also language ideology about language ideology.

Emergent, situated language ideologies are termed *ideological stances*, following Jaffe's terminology (2016), because they evaluate existing language ideologies. Ideological stances tend to share the same discursive structure for new information. They are the focus of a complex sentence, they follow a transition, and they contain explicit evaluative terms. They appear later in a sentence (Chui 1994). This study refers to the backgrounded, but prevalent language ideologies as *established language ideologies*. Established language ideologies, as old information, occupy a sentence-initial position and occur in subordinate clauses as a topic, or as a precondition. They precede new information (Chui 1994). Established beliefs can be left-dislocated, or be the preferred answers contained within rhetorical interrogatives because they are the expected information. The study adopts Martin and White's (2005) view that all linguistic performances reveal the speakers' attitudes toward prior discourse. The use of conjunctions and connectives, for instance, introduces two opposite propositions and one is preferred to the other by the backgrounding of the dispreferred proposition. This phenomenon justifies how utterances can be seen as evaluative in regard to anticipated counter-assertions, which may not necessarily be linguistically overt. The connections among the text of the policy proposal, established language ideologies and ideological stances are shown in Figure 1.




Figure 1. The connections among the policy proposal, established language ideologies, and ideological stances

At the linguistic level, the proposal text to recognize English as Taiwan’s second official language leads to the ideologically-charged comments from the viewers. The relationship between the two is presented in the concrete lines and frames because the (proposal) text and the comments are verbally explicit. This study proposes that the meaning-making process mediates between the proposal text and viewers’ stances and that the process is built up by the viewers’ learned social knowledge about English and official languages. The dotted lines that connect the proposal text, established language ideologies, and ideological stances show that they are ideologically pertinent, but not necessarily verbally presented.

4. ESTABLISHED LANGUAGE IDEOLOGIES AND IDEOLOGICAL STANCES

The study identifies thirteen ideological stances. These instantly observable stances reflect ideological understandings about officializing English which these viewers already treat as part of social knowledge. The social knowledge, termed established language ideologies in this study, is not the objective truth (Schieffelin, Woolard and Kroskrity 1998; Silverstein 1979). Instead, it embodies how English and official languages are situated in the Taiwanese context. Four established language ideologies are found to serve as frameworks for interpreting the proposal text. The thirteen ideological stances do not neatly fall into these four categories. Neither are these four established language ideologies mutually exclusive. The four subsections below illustrate how each established language ideology leads to the varied and dynamic ideologizing process in which thirteen prevailing stances are involved in this current debate.

4.1 “English Represents Global Competitiveness”

Among the thirteen ideological stances, four evaluate the connection between English and global competitiveness. These four divergent stances also explicate that one established language ideology can be evaluated differently by the viewers.

The most prominent ideological stance “English is a globally competitive language” reinforces the perceived instrumental association between English and global competitiveness through viewers’ explicit assertions and rhetorical strategies, as shown in (2).

- (2) 看看英文水平高的國家比台灣競爭力強多少吧！(Just look at countries that have better English proficiency! How far more competitive they are than Taiwan!)

Comment (2) connects 英文水平高 *yingwen shuiping gao* ‘better English proficiency’ with being 競爭力強 *jingzhengli qiang* ‘more competitive.’ The verb 看看 *kankan* ‘take a look’ denotes its complement as an object

which can be understood as immediately observable and unproblematic by simply looking at it. The reduplication of the verb indicates casualness (Li and Thompson 1981) and further phrases the act of spotting the relation as effortless. The use of the imperative also positions the viewer as more authoritative and knowledgeable. The reduplication in the imperative mood strengthens the rationalization between 英文水平高 *yingwen shuiping gao* ‘better English proficiency’ and 競爭力強 *jingzhengli qiang* ‘more competitive’ by phrasing the rationalization as something evident and transparent. The proposal to officialize English is popularly understood as an attempt to enhance competitiveness. This ideological stance corresponds to the long-held belief that English plays a critical role in competitiveness and social mobility (Chang 2008; Chen 2010; Oladejo 2006; Tsai 2010).

A contesting ideological stance “English being important doesn’t make it an official language” is observed in the viewers’ doubts regarding the legitimacy of the officialization of English. Despite its disapproval of the officialization of English, the ideological stance reflects positively on the established belief that English represents competitiveness. Comments containing this ideological stance first affirm the facilitative role that English serves, and proceed to elaborate on the concerns regarding the officialization of English, as revealed in a survey comment in (3) and in a news comment in (4).

- (3) 國際語言有學習必要，沒有列為官方第二語必要 (It’s necessary to acquire the international language. There is no such a necessity to list it as a second official language.)
- (4) 推廣第二語言是不錯。 但把英語列為第二「官方」語言就怪了？ 英語不是台灣的外語嗎？ (It’s great to promote a second language. But English as a second “official” language is weird? Isn’t English a foreign language in Taiwan?)

Viewer (3) explains that the need to acquire a 國際語言 *guoji yuyan* ‘international language’ does not equate to the need to officialize it. While the belief that learning an international language is necessary is backgrounded, the refuting stance suggests the viewer distinguishes

between an international language and a legitimized official language. Comment (4) also acknowledges the advantage of promoting a second language. The transition 但 *dan* ‘but’ shows that the focus of the comment lies in the following negative rhetorical question, which invites an affirmative answer (Shao 2013) that English is a foreign language. The comment explicitly presents the juxtaposition of a 外語 *waiyu* ‘foreign language’ and 官方語言 *guanfang yuyan* ‘official language.’ This ideological stance acknowledges that, however important it may be, English does not meet certain criteria which an official language is conceptualized to possess, as will be discussed further.

The ideological stance “English threatens Taiwan’s national identity” addresses the undesired impact of English on local languages and identities (Phillipson 1992), attesting to its dominant role. Although whether English negatively influences local languages and identities still remains debated (Byram 2008; House 2003; Jenkins 2009; Smolicz and Secombe 2003), the lay perspective shows that the reflexivity disfavors the officialization of English. Despite disapproval, the ideological stance responds to the question of the officialization of English by recognizing English as powerful and that it is necessary to acquire it. An example is shown in (5).

- (5) 鼓勵語言學習有必要列為官方語言？自貶國格還是民族自賤？
(Do [we] need to list an official language to promote language learning? Is that national deprecation or the denigration of ethnicity?)

Viewer (5) uses the generic noun 語言學習 *yuyan xuexi* ‘language learning’ to refer to the learning of English. The question 鼓勵語言學習有必要列為官方語言 at the propositional level seems to apply to language learning. The viewer is expressing the lack of a necessity to officialize English. In this case, the ‘upscaling’ (Blommaert 2007; Uitermark 2002) of a specific case of the learning of English to a generalization about all language learning implicates how established and dominant the belief about treating the learning of English as required and normative. By questioning the necessity to officialize English as a means to encourage language learning, Comment (5) sees the officialization of English as 自貶國格 *zi bian guoge* ‘national deprecation’ and 民族自

賤 *minzu zi jian* ‘the denigration of ethnicity,’ thus as an act of submission to the dominance of English. This ideological stance associates the conceptualization of an official language with national identity and indicates that English could not serve as an identity marker in the way that an official language should (cf. Jenkins 2009). It explicates that language ideologies concerning English and those concerning official languages are interacting, but competing. Such contestation is the focus of this study and will be further discussed.

The ideological stance “English has nothing to do with global competitiveness” explicitly dissociates the two, a survey comment and a news comment, respectively, presented in (6) and (7).

- (6) 國家競爭力不是靠英文來提升的。真的有產力與能力才是真的。
([We] can’t boost our competitiveness with English. Only productivity and capability count.)
- (7) 怎麼這世界只需要靠會英文 就能夠把科技弄好了嗎！！ [...]
國家的競爭力在科技能力 不是在於英文！！ (Is it only English that leads to the advancement of technology in this world!! [...] A country’s competitiveness lies in technology, not in English!!)

Both comments (6) and (7) refute the idea that ability in English boosts national competitiveness. From the dialogic perspective, explicitly denying the link between English and boosting competitiveness suggests that the viewers are disapprovingly aware of such a positive connection (Martin and White 2005). The rhetorical question in (7) compares 會英文 *hui yingwen* ‘knowing English’ and 把科技弄好 *ba keji nong hao* ‘advancing technological knowledge’ and implies that the former does not lead to the latter. The viewer also deliberately negates the connection between English and advancement. The comment reveals that specific rationalizations are assumed and anticipated. These rationalizations, i.e., established language ideologies, are not necessarily popularly supported. They serve the function of *being out there* for language users to pick up for use in meaning-making and to re-evaluate in a current context (Gal and Irvine 2019).

The four distinctive ideological stances make explicit viewers' evaluations of the aims of English officialization. They do not respond directly to the proposal text alone, but to the prevalent conceptualization that English officialization is an attempt to boost Taiwan's competitiveness through speaking English at a higher proficiency. The online colloquy explicates that the ideologizing process naturalizes language management, as discussed by Woolard (1998) and Shohamy (2006).

4.2 “Taiwanese are Bad English Speakers”

Viewers also speculate as to how this policy proposal could influence individuals, leading to two ideological stances. Some affirm that the officialization of English will potentially boost the level of proficiency in English. Noteworthy, the conflicting stance does not contest the established language ideology by claiming that “Taiwanese speak good English.” Instead, the opposing stance argues that the officialization of English may not contribute much to improving the current situation. The two opposing ideological stances both reflect on an established language ideology that Taiwanese are not proficient in speaking English.

The ideological stance “We could/should improve our English” celebrates the potential boost in English proficiency as an anticipated result of the officialization of English. The appropriation of English is also connected to the established language ideology that the knowledge of English represents global competitiveness, as shown in (8).

- (8) 台灣人語文程度太差，難以與國際接軌，有個國際通用的語言當第二語言是好事 (Taiwanese suffer from low language proficiency. This makes it difficult to connect internationally. Things might change were an international language to be Taiwan's second [official] language.)

Comment (8) attributes Taiwan's low global visibility to self-reported low proficiency in English. The viewer uses two negative evaluations 差 *cha* ‘bad’ and 難 *nan* ‘difficult’ to accentuate the established link between language proficiency in English and international connectedness. The

statement serves as a piece of background knowledge, i.e., an established language ideology, before the viewer proceeds to approve of the officialization of English in the current debate. This ideological stance concerns the idea that the officialization of English is expected to ameliorate the problem of speaking English only to a low level of proficiency.

In contrast, the ideological stance “We won’t speak better English by officializing English” casts doubt on whether the officialization of English can substantially alter the situation, as revealed in (9).

- (9) 台灣人部會因為這個白癡政策英文變好² (Taiwanese won’t become better English speakers with this stupid policy.)

Comment (9) denies the possibility of improving proficiency in English by the use of the implementation of this 白癡政策 *baichi zhengce* ‘stupid policy.’ The verb 變 *bian* ‘become’ denotes a transition from a current state to a different one, presupposing that Taiwanese currently speak English at a low level of proficiency. While affirming Taiwanese’ low command of English, the ideological stance questions the validity of legitimizing English.

Self-deprecation of proficiency in English implies the anxiety of non-native English speakers when met with the conceptualization that English competence is a must (Park 2009). Individuals may self-identify as bad speakers of English, but take a stance opposing the officialization of English. This illustrates how ideological sharedness and distinction can reside simultaneously in discourse. The phenomena suggest the need to account for the dynamics of ideological work (Kroskrity 2004) with both academic and social concerns.

4.3 “The Number of Official Languages Should be Kept to a Minimum”

An economic perspective regards language learning as an investment (De Swaan 2001). Investing in one language is commonly thought to occur

² 部會 is a typological error by the viewer. It should be 不會 *buhui* “not.”

at the expense of other languages. Multilingualism is therefore conceptualized as a battlefield among languages (Wiley 2000). When the viewers argue for the most appropriate official language, the efforts to allocate the official status to one language reflect the viewers' ideation to keep the number of official languages to a minimum. Moreover, to favor one specific language over the others, the symbolic values that each language indexes (Eckert 2008, Silverstein 2003) are also made obvious in the discourse.

The ideological stance "English is more important" prioritizes the perceived instrumental values of the use of English in Taiwan (Chang 2008; Chen 2020; Oladejo 2006; Tsai 2010) and backgrounds the established language ideology "English represents global competitiveness." To phrase the learning of English to be more desired than the acquisition of other languages, the values attached to English and those attached to local languages are discursively deployed as contrastive. A survey comment and a news comment are respectively presented in (10) and (11).

- (10) 可以跟國際接軌總比把時間花在學啥台語,客家語當個井底之蛙來的強 (Learning English to go international is more useful than learning Taiwanese and Hakka which will only allow people to become narrow-minded.)
- (11) 英文早該實施了 不懂在台語/客語什麼的,不是歧視或不尊重族群文化,而是語言本來就是溝通的工具,但台語跟客語很難走出國際,但台灣所實施的教育政策卻比任何國家還要封閉 (English [officialization] should have been put into practice. [I] don't see what the fuss with Taiwanese and Hakka is all about. This is not discrimination against or disrespect for ethnic cultures. Language is essentially a communication tool, but it's hard to go anywhere with Taiwanese and Hakka. But our current language education policies are way more conservative than other countries'.)

Viewers (10) and (11) describe the learning of English as being more practical than learning Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese or Hakka. Both of the two viewers make a contrast between English and local languages by

placing the languages on the two ends of a continuum of mobility. English is envisioned to be associated with internationalization and mobility, while learning local languages will result in one being geographically confined and near-sighted. The knowledge that mobility may be brought by knowing English is treated as given. The established language ideology acts as an argument to criticize an excessive emphasis on local languages. Viewer (11) justifies his/her ground for favoring English over local languages. The construction 不是...而是 *bu shi er shi* ‘not...but’ shows the viewer’s acknowledgement that favoring English can be easily related to discrimination against local languages and cultures. The viewer is disaligning from this representation of linking language preference to discrimination (see Martin and White (2005) for a discussion about countering and (dis)aligning). The comments reveal the willingness to limit resources for the learning of other languages to enhance English competence. They express a conflict-oriented understanding of language learning. Limited time and resources should be invested in learning a more useful language.

The ideological stance “Chinese is more important” emphasizes learning Mandarin Chinese, as shown in (12).

- (12) 當大家都在說現在人的中文造詣越來越差時,應該先把中文學好再來學英文!! (When everyone acknowledges that Mandarin Chinese proficiency is receding, [we] should put Mandarin Chinese before English!!)

In response to declining proficiency in Mandarin Chinese, learning Mandarin Chinese is prioritized over improving English in Comment (12). The roles of Mandarin Chinese diverge in the comments that manifest this ideological stance. Some consider Mandarin Chinese to be a local language in Taiwan, while others disagree. To better accommodate the data, Mandarin Chinese and local languages are labeled differently in this study. A further discussion regarding labels and ideological distinctions requires a larger amount of data and is set aside in this study.

The ideological stance “Local languages are more important” is seen in concerns that local languages should get recognized first and that Taiwanese should master local languages. Such comments value the

preservation of languages over English. A survey comment and a news comment are shown in (13) and (14) below.

(13) 自己國家的母語都搞不好了還要將外來語言當成官方語言！？
([We] can't even settle on the issues of our native languages and [we're] making a foreign language serve as our official language!?)

(14) 現在小孩台語都不會說了，還搞英語？(Kids nowadays can't even speak Taiwanese well, and now [we are] talking about officializing English?)

Comment (14) also suggests that learning Taiwanese should be prioritized. Viewer (13) finds it unsatisfactory to give a 外來語 *wailaiyu* 'foreign language' the official status when the native languages still struggle for recognition. The use of 都...不...還... *duo...bu...hai...* 'can't even...and' in the two comments reveal the viewers' conceptualizations that language learning is ordered and that a knowledge of local languages should be considered to be a prerequisite to learning English. This stance therefore contests the ideological stance that "English is more important."

The debate on a most appropriate official language as seen in the three respective stances shows how official languages are conceptualized in different ways. Values attached to different languages are also weighed differently. Some value local identities, as revealed in "English threatens Taiwan's national identity", whereas some prioritize the usefulness of English. The act of weighing to determine the most legitimizable language also indicates that the practice of multiple official languages is a much less prominent belief. The three ideological stances under this established language ideology illustrate that English and languages in Taiwan are conceived of as functioning in conceptually different ways.

4.4 "An Official Language is a Language for All"

An official language is generally understood as a language that everyone in a social group speaks, or should learn to speak. Officializing English is therefore associated with an obligation to speak English. Four ideological stances reflect on this mandated mastery of English.

The ideological stance “English is for everyone” celebrates the fact that language learning can become equally available to all. This ideological stance backgrounds the established language ideology “English represents global competitiveness.” It also presupposes that access to English learning is not equally available to begin with, as a survey comment illustrates in (15).

- (15) 語言學習不應該分貧富, 如果列為第二官語就能讓全民更具國際化, 給弱勢家庭更多的機會 (Language learning shouldn't distinguish between the rich and the poor. If [English is] listed as a second official language, [this] makes everyone more international and gives underprivileged families more opportunities.)

Comment (15) links learning English to the 機會 *jihui* ‘opportunity’ of underprivileged families, implying the instrumental function of English in social mobility. The notion that language learning 不應該分貧富 *bu yinggai fen pinfu* ‘shouldn't distinguish between the rich and the poor’ suggests that access to learning English is thought to correlate with financial abilities, as also discussed in Tsai (2010) and Price (2014). Although English has already long been a required school subject, the mastery of English and the access to language learning are far from equally affordable to all. Price (2014) discusses how social division is entrenched in mandatory English-in-education in Taiwan, making the learning of English available only to an exclusive group of people. The past findings and the viewers’ comments both call for academic and pedagogical attention to be given to social differentiation within Taiwanese society in response to the ideologization of English and that of English-in-education.

Mandated societal acquisition is viewed as facilitative in developing an English-speaking environment. The ideological stance “Officializing English creates an English-friendly environment” hopes to bring about an environment of English immersion. The ideological stance backgrounds the established language ideologies that Taiwanese do not have a high level of proficiency in English and that competency in English represents competitiveness, as a survey comment and a news comment reveal in (16) and (17).

- (16) 若英文成為第二官方語言，本人認為可以營造英語的使用環境，並增加國人的外語能力 (If English is made Taiwan's second official language, I think this will build an environment where English is used and it will boost English proficiency.)
- (17) 把英文設置第二官方語言，為什麼一定要用殖民語言來解釋？視為製造英語環境不是很好嗎？語言只是單純的工具，台灣人已經有中文的優勢了，干嘛還要用一堆莫名奇妙的理由阻止自己獲得另一個強力的競爭武器？ (Why [must we] relate English officialization to colonization in the proposal to recognize English as the second official language? Wouldn't it be great to view this as an effort in building an English-friendly environment? Language is essentially a tool. Taiwanese are already privileged with Chinese. Why [do we] come up with nonsensical reasons to stop ourselves from obtaining another competitive weapon?)

Comments (16) and (17) describe how the officialization of English will help to develop an English-speaking environment and lead to an improvement in English skills. Comment (16) specifies that Taiwanese' proficiency in English will 增加 *zeng jia* 'improve,' implying that there is still room for Taiwanese to speak better English, i.e., the established language ideology that "Taiwanese speak bad English." Comment (17) specifically argues against the colonization-oriented perspective of English domination (Phillipson 1992) and asserts that Taiwanese would benefit from officializing English. The question 為什麼一定要 *weisheme yiding yao* 'Why must we' indicates that the association between English and colonization is an existent but questionable concern. The ideological stance of hoping for an English-friendly environment also reveals that present-day Taiwan does not use English in the daily sectors and that the lack of an English-speaking environment is considered to be a disadvantage in mastering English.

The ideological stance "We should have the right to choose" challenges the concept of mandated language learning. The contestation reflects on the interpretation that an official language is one that is spoken by all, as shown in (18).

- (18) 身為台灣人民，至少應該有不學英文的自由吧！(As Taiwanese citizens, [we] should at least enjoy the freedom of not being forced to learn English!)

Comment (18) notes the freedom to choose to acquire English or not, a right that Viewer (18) believes will be removed along with the officialization of English. The ideological stance reflects disapprovingly on the compulsory language learning which would accompany language officialization. “A language for all” simultaneously prohibits citizens from choosing.

The ideological stance “Nationwide English proficiency is difficult to achieve” verbalizes the gap between nationwide competence, which an official language is believed to advocate, and the current sociolinguistic situation of English, where English is used in a relatively limited way (Chen 2010), shown in (19).

- (19) 官方語言要全面化，但現在民間英文有這麼普及嗎？(An official language has to be pervasive, but is English this prevalent in non-official sectors?)

Comment (19) questions how practical officializing English would be because English is not prevalent enough. The statement that an official language 要全面化 *yao quanmianhua* ‘has to be pervasive’ acts as a precondition for the viewer to proceed with his/her doubt with a transition 但 *dan* ‘but’. Though the understanding that an official language demands competence in that language is established, and that this is seen in the comments of both proponents and opponents of the officialization of English, the viewers who take this ideological stance are reserved about the officialization of English.

These four ideological stances individually specify how nationwide proficiency, a widely acknowledged property of official languages, conflicts with the current state of the use of English in Taiwan. An interesting discrepancy lies in how nationwide proficiency of English is treated. For proponents, nationwide proficiency is the ideal goal of the officialization of English, as seen in Comments (15), (16) and (17). Nonetheless, the opponents’ comments suggest that nationwide

proficiency is a precondition for language officialization, as seen in Comment (19). The opposing voices rationalize the connection between an official language and national proficiency in the language. The ideological stances again suggest that established rationalizations about language may be evaluated differently even when the rationalizations are shared.

The debate regarding the officialization of English foregrounds norm contestation at the discourse level. The thirteen diverse ideological stances are based on four established language ideologies, two concerning English, the other two concerning official languages. Moreover, language ideologies concerning English and those concerning official languages are interacting and competing in the current debate, as will be discussed in the next section.

5. THE IDEOLOGIZING PROCESS IN ONLINE INTERACTION

This section presents how discourse is interpreted with established language ideologies and built up by evaluating these established language ideologies in different ways. Furthermore, these ideological differences are discursively constructed as contrastive social distinctions, a semiotic process that Gal and Irvine (2019) call an ‘axis of differentiation.’ Linguistic practice indexes social attributes (Eckert 2008). In the current metapragmatic discussion, speakers who take different stances are thought to possess opposite traits or to disown certain characteristics linked to particular practice. Discourse in favor of legitimizing English and discourse against it are used to identify speakers as being on two ends of a continuum between globalization and indigenization, where acknowledging one as more important is thought to ‘betray’ the position of the other.

The interaction in (20), initiated by a proponent, illustrates how interaction proceeds beyond the propositional content of the proposal text “English as Taiwan’s second official language.”

(20)

- 1 Viewer A 想要跟國際競爭難道不需要學嗎？
(Could it be possible that we don't need to learn [English] if [we] want to connect with the world?)
- 2 Viewer B 學跟列為官方語言是兩回事
(Learning English is one thing and officializing it is another.)
...(63 words, 9 lines omitted)...
- 12 Viewer F 所以如果不是英國人跟美國人
(So people other than Americans and British)
- 13 學英語都自我矮化？
(are belittling themselves when learning English?)
- 14 矮化的結果如何？
(What is the result of belittling?)
- 15 你鎖在台灣
(You are stranded in Taiwan.)
- 16 全球自我矮化的人遨遊暢通無阻
(Those around the world who belittle themselves can go anywhere.)
- 17 Viewer G 沒看到台南市官方就是用在公文上啊，³
(Haven't you seen that offices in Tainan issue English documents.)
- 18 你不懂喪失權益就你家的事，
(If your rights are infringed upon because you don't [read English], that's your own business.)
- 19 像是支付命令你阿公阿罵看不懂就 GG 了。⁴
(For example, elders may have difficulty understanding the systems for making payments and get into trouble for that.)

³ 台南 Tainan, a city in Southern Taiwan, has attempted to list English as its second official language citywide. In the current debate about legitimizing English as Taiwan's second official language, the instance of Tainan is brought up occasionally.

⁴ 阿公阿罵 is a transliteration of the spoken Taiwanese *a-kong a-má* in Chinese characters. The term refers to grandparents and elders generally. The term GG is an acronym for "Good Game," a phrase used in online games to show good sportsmanship. It has been used to refer to getting into trouble.

- 20 別以為那麼簡單。
(Don't oversimplify the issue)
- 21 Viewer G⁵ 還有一些公文名詞都要英文再去官方定義，
(Some official terms need to be redefined in English.)
- 22 你沒再去學，
(If you don't deliberately learn about them,)
- 23 會英文也沒用，
(your English doesn't help much.)
- 24 官方這個詞就是有法律效益，
(The term 'official' comes with a legal aspect.)
- 25 中文公文你都看無了，
(You can't even read official documents in Mandarin Chinese,)
- 26 換成英文你就慢慢去體會吧，
(what makes you think you can read English documents?)
...(31 words, 3 lines omitted)...
- 30 Viewer H 全台灣人工作跟英文掛的上關係的有多少，
(How many people in Taiwan need English at work?)
- 31 你這輩子用不太到英文卻為了要和鄰居聊天而學英文.....
(You haven't used English extensively in your lifetime and now you're learning it to chat with your neighbors.....)

Viewer A starts with a rhetorically negative question. The use of 難道 *nandao* 'Could it be possible' accentuates the perceived unlikeliness of being able to join in international competition without using English. The rhetorical question, intended as an affirmative answer to the association between the learning of English and competing internationally, explicates how the connection between the two is normalized. Viewer A affirms the necessity of English officialization and takes a positive view of the

⁵ Based on the identical username, Viewer G left two comments consecutively.

established language ideology “English represents competitiveness.” Viewer B refutes Viewer A’s stance by distinguishing between language learning and language officialization, though s/he probably still recognizes the learning of English to be required. Viewer B’s refutation makes apparent the discrepancy of views concerning how an official language is conceptualized. Viewers A and B share the established language ideology “English represents competitiveness;” yet remarkably, they conceptualize official languages differently. Several turns of verbal abuse among different viewers are omitted. Viewer F then derides the attitudes that the learning of English is an act of menace to one’s identity (lines 12-16). Based on the dialogic perspective proposed by Martin and White (2005), and also according to the ideological stance “English threatens Taiwan’s national identity,” Viewer F disaligns from the anticipatorily existent conceptualization that English as an official language could result in a waning of local awareness. S/he also pronounces that English provides a ticket to 暢行無阻 *changxingwuzu* ‘go anywhere’ and that without English one is geographically confined. English competence is depicted as a criterion for mobility by Viewer F, and the global status of English is thus inferred. Viewer G criticizes an excessively cheerful view of the officialization of English (lines 17-20) and describes competence in English as socially indicative. Elders are depicted as being less likely to acquire English and thus at disadvantage (line 19). This view opposing the officialization of English manifests the established language ideology “An official language is a language for all” by reflecting on undesired scenarios which obligatory mastery in English could bring. Viewer G’s two comments on how official languages work at first sight do not cohesively respond to the previous comments about English and mobility. The seeming lack of cohesion explicates that the ideologizing process serves to sustain a conversation string. The previous viewers favor the officialization of English while Viewer G takes a reserved stance. Viewer G’s responses to the previous comments reveal that disparate stances are discursively generalized into two opposite categories based on approval or disapproval (Gal and Irvine 2019). Viewer G is not responding to a different ideological stance (“English is a globally competitive language”), but to the polarized opposite stancetaking (“proponents of the officialization of English”). Viewer H aligns with

Viewer G. The comment 你這輩子用不太到英文 *ni zhebeizi yong bu tai dao yingwen* ‘you haven’t used English extensively in your lifetime’ explicates that English does not serve as a daily language and that the efforts to acquire English will not be well justified. The excerpt shows that viewers rely on a limited number of established language ideologies to interpret English officialization. As online communication heavily relies on textual hints, the lack of apparent textual cohesion in this conversation string, aside from the words immediately from the proposal, such as 官方 *guanfang* ‘official’ and 英文 *yingwen* ‘English,’ justifies how critical the ideologizing process is to sustain the interaction.

Several observations are noteworthy. First, as English is already a mandated subject in education, English officialization is probably taken to promise more intensive, even successful, language learning. Ideological differences are a consequence of different critiques based on shared established language ideologies. The semiotic process of differentiation makes ideological distinction socially meaningful by both interpreting differences as being in opposition and by extending the opposition to social attributes (Gal and Irvine 2019; Irvine and Gal 2000). Gal and Irvine (2019) state that an abstract quality is defined by projecting an opposite image. Several contrastive pairs are observed. Speakers who oppose the officialization of English are phrased as showing no interest in international competition (line 1). On this ground, incompetence is discouraged and the argument is *for* the officialization of English. However, in lines 17 to 20, the issue of the proficiency in English is mapped onto age to question the suitability of the officialization of English. Elders are described as less likely to possess an ability in English. An implied message lies in that the younger generations are expected to have fewer problems with English learning. On this ground, lack of competence is presented to argue *against* the officialization of English. This excerpt shows how differences, such as linguistic facts or stances, are discursively built up as oppositions. The dichotomy is made concrete in a string of comments that do not display obvious textual cohesion. On the one hand, the study shows that the discussion develops beyond polarized stancetaking as the ideologizing process is multilayered. On the other, the study also presents that the comprehension of different stances as being polarized prevails in online interaction.

6. DISCUSSION

The discussion about legitimizing English as Taiwan's second official language lays out multilayered ideologizing processes. Using discourse evidence, this study has provided a sketch of the dynamics of the ideologizing processes. Ideological stances are the viewers' explicit and descriptive comments on the purposes of the language policy proposal. These opinions tend to be the focus of a sentence, the main clause of a complex sentence, and are the most information-loaded elements. As new information, ideological stances also occur later in a sentence (Chui 1994). These ideological stances respond to four established language ideologies. Established language ideologies are backgrounded, given, and commonsensical. They anchor the discourse topic, occur earlier in a sentence structure and offer the unsaid, but preferred, assumptions of rhetorical questions. These four established language ideologies act to mediate between the proposal to officialize English and the viewers' evaluations of the officialization of English. They contribute significantly to the interpretations of the officialization of English though they may not be necessarily explicitly verbalized. The interaction between the ideologies of English and those of official languages reveals the diverse and dynamic ideological processes (Kroskrity 2004; Spitulnik 1998; Verschueren 2012).

The discussion of the position of English in the planning of language policy engages the viewers to attend to the concept of official languages when, significantly, Taiwan does not have a *de jure* official language. An official language denotes a series of practices concerning not one, but all of the languages in Taiwan. At issue is not merely which language should be legitimized, but also why other languages are not officialized. The ordinal number 第二 *di er* 'second' presupposes the existence of a first official language. A second official language also suggests that its status is higher than languages without official status. The viewers' justification as to which language is to be given more prominence manifests the belief that "The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum." The established language ideology that "An official language is a language for all" is understood by some as an opportunity to improve competence in English. Others view the promotion of English as a deprivation of freedom

because speaking English is perceived to be an obligation. Though the two established language ideologies shape how an ‘official language’ is broadly conceptualized, the diversified ideological stances also suggest that clearer definitions of official languages, particularly in respect to their impact on and interaction with other non-officialized languages, are still required. Figure 2 summarizes the interaction among the proposal text, established language ideologies and ideological stances.




Figure 2. The interaction among the proposal text, established language ideologies and ideological stances concerning English and official languages.

Though Taiwan is multilingual, official multilingualism is perceived differently from societal multilingualism (cf. Sridhar 1993), as Dupré (2016) states in his study on the drafting of the language equality law. Societal multilingualism which is reckoned as a fact in the Taiwanese context defines societal vitality at the local scale-level. Official multilingualism at the national scale-level defines obligation and autonomy. The conceptual gap between the two definitions makes the discussion of the officialization of English contestation-oriented.

The association between English and globalization is hardly new (Crystal 2003; Seargeant 2011), as seen in the prevalent established language ideology “English represents global competitiveness.” The perceived importance of English is considered by some to conflict with how an official language is conceptualized, as seen in the ideological stances “English threatens Taiwan’s national identity” and “English being important doesn’t make it an official language.” The metapragmatic discourse on the officialization of English is thus a site of norm agglomeration between those of English and those concerning languages in Taiwan, as evidently shown in the established language ideology “The number of official languages should be kept to a minimum” and its three contesting ideological stances, namely, “English is more important,” “Chinese is more important,” and “Local languages are more important.” The contestation could be accounted for with the use of Blommaert’s framework on sociolinguistic scales (2007, 2010). A locale (Giddens 1991) can commit to multiple spatial identities. Vandenbroucke (2015) theorizes that a multiplicity of place identities can be conceptualized as structured, ranging from global and local. He further elaborates that the different layers of spatial identities can be associated with the multilingualism of a locale as linguistic norms also range from the global to the local (Blommaert 2007, 2010). Taiwan displays multiple spatial identities, due to the yearnings to preserve the vitality of local languages and cultures, to gain recognition of national-level autonomy, and to secure an important position in international trade in the Asia-Pacific region. These layers of Taiwanese identities, situated at the local, national and international scale-levels, respectively, are linked to different preferred language choices. At the international level, concepts such as “globalness,” “internationalization,” and “competitiveness” are highly valued and

thought to be regulated via English. Languages other than English, including Mandarin Chinese, Taiwanese, Hakka, and Aboriginal languages, are considered inadequate and peripheral (Blommaert 2010). Nevertheless, norms at the local scale-level center on local languages. Taiwanese, Hakka and Aboriginal languages rule. It is also seen that Mandarin Chinese has a debatable identity as a local language or a foreign language. Situated between the local and international levels is a national level, where Mandarin Chinese has long served as the practical norm (Chen 2010; Dupré 2013; Tsao 1999, 2008) and where English is currently proposed to be another. Table 1 summarizes the three scale-levels, spatial identities and the perceived norms.

Table 1. The three scale-levels and their corresponding spatial identities and norms in Taiwan

scale-level	perceived norm	spatial identity
local	(Taiwan Mandarin), Taiwanese, Hakka, Aboriginal languages	multilingual and multicultural vitality
national	Taiwan Mandarin	National autonomy
international	English	global recognition as an Asia-Pacific operations center

At the national level, if English is made the center, i.e., the authorized language which speakers regard as legitimized and appropriate (Blommaert 2010), this is seen as an attempt to assimilate norms at the national scale-level into those at the international scale-level. Languages except for English (and Mandarin Chinese) are made peripheral. This illustrates why the viewers value English over other languages, as seen in Comments (10), (11) and (17). Citizens without English competence are silenced and considered incompetent (Blommaert, Collins and Slembrouck 2005). Conversely, the viewers who propose to the officialization of local languages attempt to correspond local norms to national norms. This is believed to place English at a peripheral position at a national scale-level and to reject prosperity and competitiveness in a

global market the access to which is thought to be regulated by English (Crystal 2003; Kachru 1985; Park and Wee 2012). Viewing the debate on language officialization with sociolinguistic scales (Blommaert 2007, 2010), the study presents the debate as a result of favoring one particular norm and spatial identity over others.

Divergent understandings of the officialization of English are found to map onto social distinctions in a contrastive dichotomy (Gal and Irvine 2019; Irvine and Gal 2000). Gal and Irvine's (2019) axis of differentiation addresses the point that differences tend to be perceived as oppositions. The understanding of the languages under discussion in this study undergoes semiotic processes where each links to different social images. Local languages and Taiwan Mandarin represent Taiwanese identity and autonomy (Dupré 2013). English is associated with advancement (Lin 2014; Price 2014; Tsai 2010). Between English and local languages, preferring one tends to be discursively constructed as a denial of the others. As far as proponents are concerned, opponents' disapproval of the officialization of English represents their culpable disinterest in pursuing competitiveness in the global market. For opponents, proponents' approval of the officialization of English means the abandonment of local identity and national autonomy. The study has presented the finding that the proposal to officialize English as Taiwan's second official language evokes four established language ideologies and leads to thirteen disparate stances. As shown in the previous section, these ideological focuses are not necessarily entirely opposing or downright contradictory. Nonetheless, they tend to be generalized at the discourse level as binary choices, to be available to the proponents and opponents for use in their contest with each other. Conflict-oriented interpretations about the officialization of English overgeneralize the debate, but the polarized categorization of these stances prevails in the metapragmatic discourse. This explicates that in the Taiwanese sociocultural context, English and official languages are conceptually contesting, in terms of their functions and social significances.

7. CONCLUSION AND IMPLICATIONS

The study has adopted a discursive approach to analyze how the ideologizing process is laid out in the metapragmatic discourse (Barakos and Unger 2016) regarding the legitimization of English as Taiwan's second official language. Theoretically, the study has suggested that the metapragmatic discussion centers on ideological understandings of the officialization of English, instead of on the text of the policy proposal (Kremer and Horner 2016). Two levels of language ideologies are thus proposed to identify the ideological processes as dynamic and heterogeneous (Kroskrity 2004). *Ideological stances* show transient, situated evaluations of established language beliefs in the current discussion. *Established language ideologies* are relatively stable rationalizations about languages mostly phrased as background knowledge. The news viewers rely on a limited number of established language ideologies to interpret the legitimization of English and further comment on it. Empirically, the study has presented how English and official languages are conceptualized in the Taiwanese context. The use of English is commonly described as being connected to global competitiveness. Furthermore, English is recognized as a language that Taiwanese are not fluent in. An official language is understood to be everyone's language. Moreover, it is preferred that the number of official languages be kept to a minimum. The four established language ideologies explicate that English and official languages are conceptually disparate and even incompatible to some. Though these four shared established language ideologies dominate how the proposal is comprehended, they lead to thirteen distinctive ideological stances. The discussion on legitimizing English as Taiwan's second official language presents as a site of norm contestation. Opponents and proponents can in fact share identical language ideologies, i.e., established language ideologies. The discussion is *discursively constructed* as dichotomous and opposing when it is in fact multilayered. The distinctive ideological stances and linguistic competence are found to be discursively constructed as contrastive social distinctions (Gal and Irvine 2019; Irvine and Gal 2000). Adopting Blommaert's sociolinguistic scales (2007, 2010) and Vandenbroucke's (2015) analytical scheme of relating scales to identities, the study

discusses how the debate on legitimizing English is conceptualized as a norm agglomeration in accord with the various spatial identities that Taiwan yearns to project. The viewers make choices about the most suitable official languages because they prioritize one particular identity over the others. The study argues that distinctive sets of language ideologies define a language and its speakers in relation to other languages and speakers.

Though a yearning to boost societal English competence is hardly news-worthy in the Taiwanese context, much awaits further exploration, especially concerning both intra-societal and international heterogeneity. Compared to Taiwan, South Korea and Japan are, respectively, monolingual and they both faced the shared anxiety to give English more prominence. The attempts under societal monolingualism led to ideological competition between nationalism and internationalism (Seargeant 2008; Yoo 2005). Taiwan's societal multilingualism makes Taiwan's case particularly worthy of both academic and societal attention. The competition among languages extends the debate beyond that between multilingualism and nationalism. The discussion and debate reside at local, national, and international levels. These findings in these Expanding Circle countries suggest that to recognize English requires much more consideration concerning the effects of the implementation on all languages. Furthermore, the recurrent ideological themes discussed in the study are data-driven and hardly exhaustive. What deserves further investigation is not merely the languages popularly mentioned, but also languages less mentioned or absent, such as the once widespread Japanese and other increasingly acknowledged languages used in the networks of Taiwanese new immigrants. Their roles in this multilingual context should be attended to. At the time this study was sketched, the national development blueprint for English officialization was announced. Future investigation on the issue with various types of data, particularly interviews, will record this valuable opportunity of witnessing the public's participation in language policy making and bring more insights into discursive approaches to understanding language management.

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「英語為臺灣第二官方語言」的網路言談：
多語現象的語言意識形態之論爭

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藉由分析「英文為臺灣第二官方語言」的網路言談，本文探究「英語」和「官方語言」在臺灣社會語境下的語言意識形態之論爭。在 2017 年 10 月，將英語為台灣第二官方語言的提案受到了公眾的熱烈討論。本文收集當時相關新聞報導的網路評論及網路票選，以探討意識形態的動態、論爭、和多樣性。依意識形態在言談內的不同角色及呈現，本文進一步認為語言意識形態可區分為：被作為常識以理解和推論他人言談的常規型語言意識形態，以及用以評估和推翻這些常規的後設語言意識形態。本文探究以下三個問題。(1) 英文及官方語言的概念如何在言談中體現？(2) 這些討論中如何體現臺灣看待多語現象和多語制？(3) 話語元素如何與語言意識形態的動態及其互動連結？

關鍵字：語言意識形態、後設語用、臺灣、官方語言、多語現象、英語