CHAPTER 5

Political Institutions, Democratization, and Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico

Yen-Pin Su and Fabricio A. Fonseca

Introduction

Executive-legislative relations in Mexico have changed dramatically over the past decades. The Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) and its predecessors, the National Revolution Party (PNR, 1929–1938) and the Mexican Revolutionary Party (PRM, 1938–1946), have dominated Mexican politics for 71 years. Because the PRI controlled the presidency and held majorities of both chambers of the Congress from 1929 to 1997, executive-legislative relations during the PRI regime had been extremely stable. After the 1997 legislative election, the PRI failed to secure the

Y.-P. Su (✉)
Department of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, Taiwan

F. A. Fonseca
Graduate Institute of Latin American Studies, Tamkang University, New Taipei City, Taiwan

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021

J.-H. Tsai (ed.), *Presidents, Unified Government and Legislative Control*, Palgrave Studies in Presidential Politics,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-67525-7_5

majority in the chamber of deputies for the first time since 1929. PRI's long time "loyal opposition," the National Action Party (PAN), won the 2000 presidential election, which was the first party turnover in Mexico since 1929. After the Vicente Fox administration, Felipe Calderón of the PAN defeated the candidate for the Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD), Andrés Manuel López Obrador, with a narrow margin of 0.58% in the 2006 presidential election. Under the Fox and Calderón administrations, executive-legislative conflicts increased remarkably because the PAN failed to control the majorities of both chambers of the Congress.

In 2012, Enrique Peña-Nieto of the PRI won the presidential election and managed to maintain a narrow majority (251 seats out of 500) in the Chamber of Deputies by allying with the Green Party (PVEM) and the New Alliance Party (PANAL). In the 2015 midterm election, the PRI-PVEM-PANAL coalition won 260 seats, securing the majority in the Chamber of Deputies. Executive-legislative relations under the Peña-Nieto administration (2012–2018) were less confrontational than the previous two PAN administrations. However, compared to the PRI regime before 1997, the PRI's legislative behavior under the Peña-Nieto administration presented some characteristics that allow us to think about a changing nature in executive-legislative relations (López Leyva 2015: 78–80). In 2018, Andrés Manuel López Obrador (AMLO hereafter) and his National Regeneration Movement Party (MORENA) swept the general elections and formed the first unified government since 1997.

The brief political history mentioned above indicates that Mexico has experienced different unified governments before and after the 2000 party turnover. Did the incumbent party[1] under the unified government exhibit different levels of party cohesion in the legislature before and after 2000? If so, what explains the variation in incumbent party cohesion? This chapter aims to examine incumbent party cohesion in the Chamber of Deputies under the Zedillo administration (1994–2000), the Peña-Nieto administration (2012–2018), and the first year of the AMLO administration (2018–2019). We select these cases for comparison for three reasons. First, unlike the PRI administrations before 1994, the Zedillo and Peña-Nieto administrations are not typical unified governments. The first half of the Zedillo government was a unified government, while the second

[1] In this paper, an incumbent party refers to the party that holds the presidency.

half was a "partial unified government,"[2] where the PRI controlled only one chamber of the Congress (the Senate). In contrast, the Peña-Nieto administration was a partial unified government throughout the six-year term, which controlled only the Chamber of Deputies. Second, the Zedillo administration was the last PRI government before democratization in 2000, while the Peña-Nieto administration was the first PRI government after 2000. It is interesting to examine what drives different levels of party cohesion before and after democratization. Third, the AMLO administration is a unified government, but our data show that the level of the MORENA's cohesion (2018–2019) is lower than that of the PRI's cohesion under Peña-Nieto's partial unified government. Therefore, it is interesting to address the puzzle that a unified government has a lower party cohesion than a partial unified government.[3]

Because the PRI has dominated both the executive and legislative branches for a long time, many previous studies of executive-legislative relations in Mexico focus on the relationship between the president and the PRI legislators under the unified government setting. Some studies argue that the authoritarian orientation within Mexican political culture shaped the unbalanced relationship between the executive and legislative branches (González Casanova 1982: 32–35; Meyer Cosío 1996: 21). Other scholars focus on the impact of political institutions, arguing that centralized constitutional power for the presidency and the ban on reelection for political posts contribute to the dominant role of the executive in its relations with the legislature (Casar 2002; Weldon 1997, 2002). The similarity of these studies is that they show that the PRI had been a highly cohesive party.

We follow previous studies that emphasize the importance of institutional factors for understanding Mexico's executive-legislative relations. However, we contend that the factors of centralized constitutional power for the presidency and the ban on reelection better explain executive-legislative relations before 1997, the last year that the PRI secured unified

[2] The term "partial unified government" is borrowed from Bolton (2015) and is used to describe the situation in which the incumbent party controls only one chamber of legislature in a government consisting of an executive branch and a bicameral legislature.

[3] We do not examine unified PRI governments before 1994 because they were considered authoritarian regimes with no free or competitive elections by important databases of classification of political regimes such as Polity IV Project (Marshall et al. 2017) and the Varieties of Democracy Project (Coppedge et al. 2019).

government after 1929. However, because these two institutional factors have been time-invariant institutional features in the Mexican political system from 1929 to 2018, it is not proper to use these two institutional factors to explain variation in recent executive-legislative relations in Mexico. In other words, these two institutional factors can be seen only as a background, and further scrutiny is required for understanding the changing patterns of incumbent party cohesion.

Based on the insights of new institutionalism, we argue that the level of centralization of the candidate nomination procedure and the strength of the party leadership are two key factors for explaining incumbent party cohesion.[4] Based on historical evidence about how incumbent party legislators vote for executive-sponsored bills, we find that the PRI's legislative behavior under the Zedillo and Peña-Nieto administrations was highly cohesive because the candidate nomination procedure was highly centralized. In contrast, the MORENA party's cohesion is lower in the first year of the AMLO administration because this party has a less centralized candidate nomination procedure.[5] Moreover, we find that the rate of PRI legislator abstention in the legislative vote varied from time to time under the Peña-Nieto administration. Specifically, the abstention rate of the incumbent party's legislators was higher under the second half of the Peña-Nieto administration than that under the first half of the Peña-Nieto administration. We argue that it is because the party leadership was weaker and was frequently challenged by copartisans in the second half of the Peña-Nieto administration.

This chapter will proceed as follows. The second section briefly discusses how new institutionalism provides a useful analytical perspective for understanding executive-legislative relations in Mexico. In the third section, we discuss how centralized constitutional power for the presidency and the ban on reelection provide a basic institutional environment for legislative behavior. The fourth section provides analyses about the impact of the candidate nomination procedure and party leadership

[4] While the constitutional rule for a vote of confidence is an important institutional factor that needs to be considered when studying incumbent party cohesion, in the Mexican Constitution, there is no stipulation for votes of censure or votes of no confidence.

[5] In spite of being lower than previous PRI unified or partial unified governments in Mexico, MORENA party cohesion is still remarkably high compared to many unified governments in other countries, including some of the cases presented in this edited book.

on the level of incumbent party cohesion in the Chamber of Deputies. We also discuss how democratization and a renewed emphasis on federalism amplify the effects of a less centralized nomination procedure on reducing party support for certain executive-sponsored bills. The fifth section concludes.

Perspectives of New Institutionalism for Studying Legislative Behavior

To understand legislative behavior of the president's party in Mexico, we adopt analytical perspectives from two theories of new institutionalism: historical institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism. First, historical institutionalism underscores the importance of institutions in understanding political actors' behavior. Historical institutionalism suggests that, once an institution is established, its historical legacies shape the long-term behavioral patterns of the political actors (Steinmo et al. 1992). Most importantly, as time passes, an institution is likely to follow certain "path dependence" and produce a "reproduction mechanism" to sustain its survival (Pierson 2004). According to historical institutionalism, institutions tend to not change unless an exogenous shock causes serious conflicts between different political forces and produces a "critical juncture" for institutional change (Collier and Collier 1991; Peters et al. 2005).

Second, rational-choice institutionalism assumes that actors are rational and tend to maximize their interests. For this institutional theory, institutions are a political arena with a series of rules and incentives for actors to interact with each other (Peters 2012: 48). In other words, institutions provide opportunities and constraints that shape the rational behavior of the actors (Shepsle 1989, 2006). Moreover, political actors might struggle to pursue their interests by keeping or changing the institutions (North 1990). As we will discuss in the following sections, centralized constitutional powers for the presidency, a party-centered electoral system, and a centralized candidate nomination procedure are three key institutional factors that shape executive-legislative relations in Mexico. Before 1997, these institutions followed a path dependency, as suggested by historical institutionalism, to shape long-term executive-legislative elections in Mexico.

Rational choice institutionalism also helps explain legislative behavior. Centralized constitutional powers for the presidency, a party-centered

electoral system, and a centralized candidate nomination procedure provide incentives to shape the behavior of the president and the legislators of the incumbent party. Mexican presidents have used these institutions as a strategic tool to influence legislative behavior by controlling the career path of the legislators. In order to secure their political survival, the incumbent party's legislative voting on the floor under unified governments had shown an extremely high level of cohesion, mainly because these legislators' strategic choices were largely constrained by these institutions.

However, while the factors of centralized constitutional powers for the presidency and a party-centered electoral system remain intact in Mexico, different parties have changed their candidate nomination procedure over time. The PRI's defeat in the 1997 legislative election constitutes a "critical juncture" for the change of centralized candidate nomination. Since 1997, the trend of making the candidate nomination procedure less centralized has become a norm for many major parties in Mexico. It is expected that a less centralized candidate nomination procedure provides incumbent party legislators with more opportunities to strategically deviate from the party's direction when necessary. Therefore, a less centralized candidate nomination procedure might reduce the level of party cohesion.

In addition to the level of centralization of the candidate nomination procedure, we argue that the strength of party leadership is also a crucial factor for understanding incumbent party cohesion in Mexico. A strong party leader is more able to use the "carrot and stick" approach to influence legislators. Therefore, under strong party leadership, incumbent party legislators are more likely to follow the direction of the party, or otherwise they might risk losing opportunities to advance their political career. In contrast, a weaker party leadership exerts less influence on legislator behavior. Weaker party leadership might be more likely to be challenged by copartisans with different interests and opinions, and thus it could undermine party cohesion. Under weak party leadership, some legislators of the incumbent party might not directly vote against the party's direction on the floor, but they might use other ways to express their discontent, such as taking abstention in the vote.

Accordingly, we generate two testable hypotheses for our analysis. Our first hypothesis suggests that, when the incumbent party's candidate nomination procedure becomes less centralized, the party's legislators

tend to be less cohesive. Second, we hypothesize that, when the incumbent party's leader is not strong, the party's legislators tend to be less cohesive. We test our two hypotheses using evidence about the interactions between the president and his copartisans in the Chamber of Deputies under the Zedillo administration (1994–2000), the Peña-Nieto administration (2012–2018), and the first year of the AMLO administration (2018–2019).

Institutional Settings for Executive-Legislative Relations in Mexico

Centralized Constitutional Power of the Presidency

The Constitution of Mexico grants the president legislative power, including the power to make legislative proposals, to veto proposals made by the Congress, and to issue presidential decrees. More importantly, Article 89 of the Constitution stipulates a wide-range of constitutional powers, including appointing, and removing important government officials and military officers. Among the various political posts, the power to appoint the Secretary of the Interior (*Secretario/a de Gobernación*) is considered the most important because, under the PRI authoritarian regime from 1929 to the late 1980s, the Secretariat of the Interior managed the intelligence agencies and took charge of the administration of parties and elections.[6]

Interestingly, although Mexican presidents' constitutional power seems highly centralized, it is not particularly strong compared to other Latin American countries (Shugart and Haggard 2001). According to Doyle and Elgie's (2016) measure of constitutional presidential power across the globe, Mexican presidential power is ranked 14th among the 18 Latin American countries.[7] Although the Mexican president's power might not be strong based on the constitutional parchment, the Mexican presidency

[6] Among the thirteen presidential elections from 1928 to 2000, eight presidential candidates from the PRI had been Secretary of the Interior.

[7] The country order from the highest constitutional presidential power score to the lowest in Latin America is: Chile (0.570), Ecuador (0.560), Brazil (0.486), Panama (0.452), Peru (0.420), Argentina (0.407), Nicaragua (0.403), Dominican Republic (0.400), Venezuela (0.391), Colombia (0.381), Uruguay (0.377), El Salvador (0.373), Honduras (0.343), Mexico (0.343), Bolivia (0.319), Costa Rica (0.284), Guatemala (0.283), and Paraguay (0.272). See http://presidential-power.com/?page_id=2151.

in practice is by no means a weak institutional actor (Carpizo 1978). In our view, what makes the Mexican president a powerful institutional actor is the combination of centralized presidential power, the ban on reelection for all elected officials, and a highly centralized system of candidate nomination.

Party-Centered Electoral System and the Ban on Reelection

Mexico has a bicameral Congress, and the country has adopted seven different electoral systems for electing Congress members since 1929 (Weldon 2001: 447). One similarity of these different electoral systems is that they are all highly party-centered. There are two crucial factors that make the Mexican electoral system for Congress members so party-centered. First, before 2015, all candidates for senator or deputy required official nomination from a party. In other words, the electoral laws have long prohibited the participation of independent candidates in congressional elections. Second, the Constitution stipulates a ban on immediate reelection of senators and deputies (Nacif 2002: 258–261).

Before 1964, Mexico adopted a single-member district system (SMD) for electing members of the Chamber of Deputies. From 1964 to 1976, Mexico adopted a "party deputy" electoral system, introducing the idea of proportional representation (PR) to grant seats for smaller parties who failed to gain any seats in the SMD system. From 1979 to 1985, senators and deputies were elected through mixed-member electoral systems, in which voters cast one vote for the SMD system and the other vote for the PR system.

In 1998, Mexico adopted another reformed electoral system. For the Chamber of Deputies, 300 deputies are elected based on the SMD system, and 200 deputies are elected based on a closed-list PR system in five multi-member districts (with 40 seats for each district). To elect federal deputies, a Mexican voter casts only one vote for an SMD candidate in his or her electoral district. The SMD votes for a party are summed at the national level, and the total votes will determine: (1) whether this party passed the eligibility threshold (2% of vote since 1997) for gaining seats from the PR tier; and (2) the number of seats gained from the PR tier with other requirements being considered. In short, under the current Mexican mixed-member electoral system, a voter makes a voting decision for SMD candidates only and has no say over the party list.

In general, an SMD system tends to provide stronger incentives for candidates to cultivate a personal vote compared to candidates under a PR system (Preece 2014: 156). However, this is not the case for the Mexican electoral system. The Mexican electoral system is highly party-centered because the Constitution used to ban reelection for all elected officials. The origin of the ban on reelection can be traced to 1910, when the important political figure Francisco Madero used the slogan "Effective suffrage—no reelection!" and successfully mobilized different political forces to oust the dictator Porfirio Díaz and start the Mexican Revolution. Later, the principle of no reelection became an important principle enshrined in the 1917 Constitution, but it was only applied to the presidency. Before 2018, mayors and legislators (at both the federal and the local levels) were not allowed to run for immediate reelections; in other words, they can only run for reelection after sitting out one term.

In 1927, former president Plutarco Elías Calles allied with a number of Congress members to amend the Constitution to permit non-immediate presidential reelection. However, the Congress again passed a constitutional amendment in 1933 to forbid presidential reelection (Colomer 2001: 155). Also in 1933, consecutive reelection for Congress members and state legislators was prohibited. As Weldon argues (Weldon 2004b: 574–575), the purpose behind the reform is that the prohibition on reelection would undermine the connections between local political bosses and their supported federal legislators, so that the legislators' loyalties could be redirected to the party leader (see also Weldon 2003).

Unlike the presidency and the governorship, in which a person can serve only one term in his or her life, the Constitution allows non-immediate reelection for legislators. Although all federal legislators are term-limited to a single term, they are eligible to run for the same office again after sitting out one term.[8] Still, the constitutional ban on reelection for all elected officials has become an inseparable part of Mexican political culture since then. Although Mexico has experienced six electoral reforms from 1978 to 1996, the no-reelection rule had been implemented for decades (Casar 2002: 142). Cosío Vellegas (1978; cited from

[8] Lujambio's (1996; cited from Álvarez 2013: 299) study shows that only 9% of 4227 PRI federal legislators (1933–1995) have been reelected, and 11% of 455 PAN federal legislators have been reelected. This definition of "been reelected" suggests one of two situations: 1) moving from one chamber to the other; and 2) being reelected for the same office after the one-term sit-out period.

Weldon 1997: 248) argues that this rule largely explains why the Mexican Congress had been so subordinate to the president.

Centralized System of Candidate Nomination

In addition to the ban on reelection, the other important factor that makes the Mexican presidency a powerful institutional actor is the highly centralized system of candidate nomination. The PNR adopted relatively open (but often rigged) primaries for selecting candidates in its early years, but later in 1937 the PRM introduced the method of closed conventions (Weldon 2004a: 134–135). Between 1946 and 1951, the PRI held closed primaries, but beginning from 1951, the federal electoral laws abolished primaries as a way for parties to select candidates (Medina 1978: 20–25; cited from Weldon 2004a, 135).

There are two formal organization mechanisms for candidate selection within the PRI, including the political council and closed national convention. However, the National Executive Committee (CEN) has the authority for determining the candidate selection method. More importantly, it is the president who had the power to designate the head of the CEN (Casar 2002: 140–141).[9] From 1937 to 2000, the Mexican presidents were the *de facto* leader of the PRI (Weldon 2004b, 575), and they were able to dominate the candidate selection procedure for most elective posts for the PRI, including senators, deputies, and state governors.

The PRI presidents did not personally select all the candidates for elective offices. In many occasions, the president "acted as an arbiter among various interests within the party when nominations were decided for federal deputies" (Langston 2001: 490; see also Bailey 1988). Historically, many political actors within the PRI have a certain influence on the candidate selection procedure. For instance, the traditional sectors within the PRI's corporatist structure used to be offered a quota of candidates for elective offices at national and local levels (Bailey and Gómez 1990: 299).

[9] During the *maximato* period (1928–1935), Mexican presidents were not fully able to control the party. The PNR (the predecessor of PRI during 1929–1938) was informally led by former president Calles, who overpowered the three presidents during the *maximato* period (Weldon 1997: 232).

Mexican governors have great control power over nomination for the SMD candidates for the Chamber of Deputies, and, at times, the governors will negotiate with the national-level party leader to place allies for the candidates on the PR list (Langston 2010: 241). In contrast, the governors do not have a strong influence on the candidate selection for senators. Many of the PRI senatorial candidates "were chosen directly and imposed on the party by the executive and the national party leadership, taking into account information and preferences 'sent up' to the CEN and the PRI's three presidential candidates from the state-level PRI organizations and sectors" (Langston 2006: 400).

Explaining the Dynamics of Incumbent Party Cohesion Under Unified and Partial Unified Governments in Mexico

Party Cohesion of the PRI Before 1994

What are the consequences of the ban on reelection for federal deputies and senators? When the legislators face strong cross pressures from their constituencies and their party, they tend to cultivate a personal vote. Therefore, when the electoral system allows for reelection, many candidates tend to pursue a personal vote (Carey and Shugart 1995). However, when the constitution bans reelection, like in the case of Mexico, the incentive structure for the legislators could be fundamentally different.

As Álvarez (2013: 299) points out, when politicians have no incentives for reelection, they break the linkages with the constituencies right after they are elected. The main reason is about political accountability. Facing no chance to be reelected, politicians are almost not accountable to the voters. In Mexico, an important indicator that reflects the impacts of the ban on reelection is the number of pork-barrel bills passed in the Congress. Weldon's (2002: 405) study demonstrates that the number of pork-barrel bills that targeted the interests of local constituencies dropped dramatically after reelection was constitutionally forbidden in 1933.

Furthermore, the combination of the ban on reelection and a centralized candidate nomination system has large impacts on incumbent party

legislative behavior in Mexico.[10] Because PRI party leaders used to designate jobs in non-elective offices for legislators after their terms end, PRI legislators were more likely to be office-seekers (Álvarez 2013: 299). After the legislators' terms end, the CEN or the president might appoint them to bureaucratic posts at different tiers of the party, namely, party's national organization, local branches, party organization in the legislature, and party organization in the administration (Casar 2002: 137). For other politicians, they might be nominated to run for other kinds of elective office after the end of their term. Therefore, many PRI legislators tended to maintain good relations with powerful party officials for enhancing the chances of political survival (Caballero-Sosa 2013: 179–181). Some other legislators would try to attract the attention of the party leaders by proposing numerous legislative proposals (Béjar Algazi 2012: 622).

Therefore, the ban on reelection combined with a centralized nomination system makes it easier for party leaders to maintain party discipline (Langston 2008: 148). Weldon (2004a, 135) argues that the practice of *dedazo*, an informal practice of power to determine the next candidate for presidential successor, also contributes to greater party cohesion. Most PRI deputies that served in the first three-year term of a six-year presidential term tended to have greater incentives to follow the party line on the floor because they anticipated that such compliant behavior would be rewarded by the CEN. In contrast, many PRI deputies that served in the second three-year term of a presidential term had a different incentive structure because the president "could not credibly pledge to reward legislative loyalty because he would be out of office (in retirement or exile) just three months after the legislative term ended" (Weldon 2004a, 135). In order to maintain high party discipline, the outgoing president used *dedazo* to ask the successor to keep the outgoing president's promises to advance the loyal PRI legislators' careers (ibid.).

Most PRI legislators had to be highly disciplined in their votes on the floor, or otherwise they would risk their political career after their terms end. Throughout the unified government experience from 1937 to 1994, the PRI had been highly cohesive in the Congress due to the president's strong influence over the Congress. For instance, during the Cárdenas administration (1934–1940), over 97% of executive-sponsored bills were

[10] Langston (2008: 146) adds that the national party organization's control over public campaign financing also matters for the high levels of party discipline in votes in the Chamber of Deputies.

passed by the Chamber of Deputies. From 1940 to 1964, the passage rates of executive-sponsored bills in the Chamber of Deputies ranged from 95 to 100% (Weldon 2004a, 137; see also Weldon and Molinar Horcasitas 2009). Weldon (2002: 400) shows that, between 1947 and 1977, presidential budgets received committee amendments only 4 times of 30; moreover, these budgets were amended only twice of 31 occasions on the floor of the Chamber of Deputies (Weldon 2002: 403).

During the de la Madrid administration (1982–1988), 337 of the 343 proposals initiated by the executive branch were passed by the Chamber of Deputies (Casar 2002: 126). The high passage rate of executive-sponsored legislative initiatives remained during the Salinas administration (1988–1994), when 164 out of the 169 executive-sponsored proposals were approved by the Chamber of Deputies (Casar 2002: 128).

Because roll-call vote data for the Mexican Congress are not available for years before 1998, we cannot accurately gauge the exact level of party cohesion of the PRI. Still, the historical evidence about the initiation and passage of presidential bills suggests that the PRI's legislative behavior had been highly cohesive and that executive-legislative relations had been extremely stable before 1994.

Democratization and the Changing Trend of the Candidate Nomination Procedure

In 1993, Mexico, the United States, and Canada ratified the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). On January 1, 1994, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) seized towns and cities in Chiapas, protesting the signing of NAFTA and calling for greater democratization and inclusion of indigenous rights. The Zapatistas movement inspired pro-democracy forces and pressured the Zedillo government to implement deeper political reforms (Gilbreth and Otero 2001). In 1996, the Federal Electoral Institute (IFE) was transformed to be an independent body for the administration of electoral matters, which aims to ensure that future elections are clean and fair.

In 1997, the PRI lost the majority in the Chamber of Deputies for the first time since 1929. It was also the first time that the PRI government changed from a unified government to a partial unified government.[11]

[11] The PRI still held the majority in the Senate from 1997 to 2000.

Table 5.1 The distribution of seats by political parties in the Chamber of Deputies in Mexico (1991–2018)

	1991	*1994*	*1997*	*2000*	*2003*	*2006*	*2009*	*2012*	*2015*	*2018*
PAN	89	119	120	206	152	206	143	114	109	78
PRI	321	300	239	211	225	104	237	213	203	47
PRD	41	71	126	50	96	126	71	103	61	11
PT		10	7	8	5	16	13	15		28
PVEM			8	17	17	19	21	28	47	11
PPS	11									
PARM	15									
PFCRN	23									
Convergencia/MC				3	5	16	6	17	25	28
PANAL						9	9	10	11	
ASDC						4				
MORENA									35	259
PES									8	29
PSN				3						
PAS				2						
Independents									1	8

Source Data from the 1991 election to the 2015 election are from Instituto Nacional Electoral (2019); data for the 2018 election are from Cámara de Diputados (2019)

Table 5.1 shows the distribution of seats for each party from 1991 to 2018. It shows a clear pattern that the PRI has not been able to secure a majority in the Chamber of Deputies by itself since 1997.[12] In 2006, the PRI became a second largest party for the first time since 1929, but it returned to be the largest party in the Congress from 2009 to 2018.

In 2018, the sudden rise of the MORENA shook the Mexican party system. The total seats of the three traditional parties (PRI, PAN, and PRD) were reduced by 64%, while the MORENA increased 224 seats, about 6.4 times more than the seats that it had in 2015. The MORENA swept the 2018 general elections and led the first unified government since 1997. Figure 5.1 shows the evolution of the effective number of legislative parties (ENLP) based on seat data for the Chamber of Deputies

[12] From 2012 to 2018, the PRI secured a majority in the Chamber of Deputies not by itself, but in a coalition with other parties.



Fig. 5.1 Evolution of the effective number of legislative parties in the Chamber of Deputies in Mexico (1991–2018) (*Source* Calculated by the authors)

in Mexico from 1991 to 2018.[13] As can be seen, the Mexican party system has become increasingly fragmented over time. The ENLP in the Chamber of Deputies in the 2015 election is 4.09, the highest since 1991. However, because of the strong rise of the MORENA, the ENLP dropped to 3.2 in the 2018 election.

Although the PRI nomination procedures were largely controlled by its national leaders, there was a noticeable transformation for the procedures beginning in the late 1990s. Specifically, as the elections became increasingly competitive, the PRI governors, who used to be crucial vote mobilizers for the presidential candidates, had more informal political

[13] We used the formula for effective number of parties developed by Laakso and Taagepera (1979), which is the inverse of the sum of squares of each party's seat share in an election.

weight to ask the president to nominate congressional candidates that were their favored allies with local political experiences (Langston 2008: 149–150; 2010).

Starting from 1994, former president Zedillo repeatedly asserted that he would distance himself from involvement in party matters; in particular, he participated less in the candidate nomination procedure for gubernatorial elections (Weldon 2002: 382). After the 1997 electoral defeat, Zedillo decided to give up exercising *dedazo*. Moreover, Zedillo introduced primary elections for selecting gubernatorial candidates in 13 of 17 gubernatorial elections held between 1998 and 1999 (Casar 2002: 139).

The arrival of a new generation of high-ranking officials commonly known as *tecnócratas*, most of them trained in universities in the United States and Western Europe, caused numerous frictions with those party leaders who thought of themselves as more traditional and true career politicians, but who were negatively depicted by public opinion as "dinosaurs" (Zeledón Flores 1999: 40–44). Presidential candidates Carlos Salinas de Gortari and Ernesto Zedillo came from this group of *tecnócratas*, and their visions about the future of the PRI were not always met with enthusiasm by the different sectors and corporations that were historically considered the backbone of the party.

Given that the PRI controlled most state governorships in the country, its party leadership also supported moves toward a deeper federalism. Specifically, in the hope of increasing its electoral competitiveness, the PRI supported the Vicente Fox administration's policy of grating more autonomy for state governments. These changes led to the involvement of more actors in the party's candidate selection procedure, giving more power of the selection to state governors and other key leaders (Olmeda 2009: 106).

The existence of an autonomous and strong IFE also moved all the parties to find more open ways to select their candidates. Nonetheless, Wuhs (2006) argues that no major parties in Mexico implemented internal organization reform that could undermine the strong party discipline. For instance, the CEN of the PRI is still the main authority for selecting PRI deputy candidates for the PR and SMD systems. After 2001, the PRI adopted the methods of district-level primaries and district-level party conventions to select its candidates (Cady 2012: 38–41). However, the CEN of the PRI relied on an instrument known as *convocatoria* for determining the election of the convention delegates and the voting

procedures for the local primaries and conventions (Wuhs 2006: 43–45). As a result, different *convocatorias* were used to adapt different local conditions for selecting a "candidate of unity" (Langston 2001: 494–495), who would run unopposed during the primaries. In short, the highly centralized of candidate nomination procedure within the PRI had not changed much.

Incumbent Party Cohesion Under the Unified Governments After 1994

As mentioned in the previous section, after Zedillo assumed power, he intentionally tried to distance himself from the affairs of the PRI. This informal change had some influence on the relationship between the president and his copartisans in the legislature. From 1994 to 1997, two important executive-sponsored bills were not fully supported by PRI legislators. Specifically, Zedillo's social security reform proposal had been largely modified by the Congress, and the proposal about privatization of the state-owned petroleum company's petrochemical plants were cancelled (Casar 2002: 128–129; Weldon 2002: 382).

Still, the overall rate of passage for executive-sponsored bills from 1994 to 1997 is close to 100%: 55 of 56 bills were passed by the Chamber (Casar 2002: 128). In spring 1995, while all opposition Congress members voted against a legislative bill of a 50% increase in the value-added tax, only one PRI deputy and one PRI senator voted against this bill (Weldon 1997: 246).

During the 57th Congress (1997–2000), the first time the PRI lost its majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the executive sponsored 43 bills. Due to the availability of legislative data, starting from 1998, from the 31 proposals that Zedillo sent to the Chamber of Deputies for its consideration and passage during that time, only two were never discussed or approved within the committees that they were referred to and did not make it to the floor. One of them was the controversial reform of the energy sector, allowing private participation in the traditional state monopolies PEMEX and CFE. This conflict was also framed under the intraparty fight between the *tecnócratas* and the traditional politicians, with the latter receiving strong support from the PEMEX labor union representatives affiliated to the PRI (SinEmbargo 2013). The other proposal was not a controversial one, dealing with the mint of a commemorative coin. Nonetheless, because it was sent a few months before the

2000 legislative elections, it is possible to infer that legislators lost interest, given that many of them were already thinking about their next jobs.

Overall, during the Zedillo administration, the rate of passage for executive-sponsored bills dropped from 98% (1994–1997) to 86% (1997–2000) (Casar 2002: 128). This evidence shows how partial unified government made a difference in impacting Mexico's executive-legislative relations. However, this evidence does not reveal information about party cohesion. Had the PRI become less cohesive under partial unified government? Below we use available roll-call vote data to examine the changing patterns of incumbent party cohesion of the two PRI partial unified governments (1997–2000 and 2012–2018) and the first year of the incumbent party cohesion under the MORENA government.

To measure the level of party cohesion, we use two indicators. First, we calculate party cohesion scores based on official roll-call vote data in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, which were made available from 1998. We follow Weldon's (2004a, 151) formula to calculate incumbent party cohesion scores for the last two years of the Zedillo administration, the six-year term of Peña-Nieto administration, and the first year of the AMLO administration. The cohesion score measures the largest percentage of party-members voting in the same direction in a vote on a legislative proposal, and in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies, there are three possible directions—for, against, or abstaining.[14] A higher cohesion score indicates a higher level of party cohesion. Theoretically, in a vote for a legislative proposal, the lowest cohesion score for a party is 33.33%, suggesting that 33% of party-members voted for, 33% of party-members voted against, and 33% of party-members abstained. The highest cohesion score for a party is 100%, suggesting that all party-members voted in the same direction, which could be for, against, or abstaining.

The second indicator that we use is the abstention rate of incumbent party legislators in the vote for executive-sponsored bills. While it is difficult to figure out the exact or true reasons for a deputy to abstain during a roll-call vote (Cantú et al. 2014: 36), we believe that the abstention rate captures "low-cost signals deputies use to express dissent" (González 2010: 127). Specifically, a highly cohesive party is expected to be able to mobilize as many legislators of the party as possible to vote along the party direction on the floor. Therefore, an abstention might be seen as a

[14] In Mexico, an abstention during roll-call votes indicates that a legislator abstains from the vote when his/her party had a clear position of preference on a legislative proposal.

way of defection from the party (Kerevel and Knott 2018: 207). In this sense, we expect that a higher abstention rate indicates a lower level of party cohesion.

In Table 5.2, we compared the average incumbent party cohesion scores and average abstention rates in four periods of three different administrations under partial unified government and unified government. As can be seen, the average party cohesion score exceeds 99% for the second half of the Zedillo administration and the six years of the Peña-Nieto administration. During the 62nd Congress (2012–2015), with the comeback of the PRI to the presidential office and the attainment of the majority in the Chamber of Deputies together with its allies, PVEM and PANAL, the executive sponsored a total of 50 proposals. From those, one of them was voted on the floor in the following Congress, and two proposals did not pass the committee stage. The proposals that did not make it to the floor were related to controversial issues that had also been rejected in the past, one in the energy sector creating the Mexican Petroleum Fund for Stabilization and Development, and the other related to a change in the public debt legislation (SIL 2019). The remaining 47 executive-sponsored bills were approved with high levels of party cohesion from the PRI legislators.

It is somewhat surprising to see that the level of party cohesion was high during the years of the Peña-Nieto administration for most of the executive-sponsored bills. If our theory is correct, the less centralized candidate nomination procedure of the PRI after 2000 should have produced a lower level of party cohesion. Although this evidence is surprising, it does not directly contradict our hypothesis. As we have mentioned in the previous section, the change in the candidate nomination procedure of the PRI was not substantive. In other words, the PRI still maintained a centralized form of candidate nomination procedure despite the introduction of democratic mechanisms. In short, while the candidate nomination procedure of the PRI had become seemingly less centralized, the procedure was still controlled by high-ranking party elites. Therefore, under the Peña-Nieto administration, incumbent party legislators still exhibit a high level of cohesion in legislative votes.

Another possible explanation is that the PRI had learned its lesson from the 2006 elections, when internal divisions led the party and its candidate (Roberto Madrazo) to third place, after the PAN (Felipe Calderón) and the PRD (AMLO). Therefore, almost all PRI legislators were committed to party unity and stood behind the Peña-Nieto administration (Béjar

Table 5.2 Incumbent party cohesion in a vote for executive-sponsored bills in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies (1998–2019)

Administration	*Zedillo administration—PRI (October 1998–April 2000)*	*Peña-Nieto administration—PRI (I) (December 2012–August 2015)*	*Peña-Nieto administration—PRI (II) (September 2015–August 2018)*	*AMLO administration—MORENA (December 2018–August 2019)*
Government form	Partial Unified Government (PRI controlled the majority in the Senate)	Partial Unified Government (PRI controlled the majority in the Chamber of Deputies)	Partial Unified Government (PRI controlled the majority in the Chamber of Deputies)	Unified Government
Average Incumbent Party Cohesion Score in a Vote for Executive-Sponsored Bills	99.38% (27 bills)[a]	99.80% (47 bills)	99.98% (35 bills)[b]	97.52% (5 bills)
Average Abstention Rate of Incumbent Party Legislators in a Vote for Executive-Sponsored Bills	9.14%	8.27%	15.53%	8.42%

Notes

[a]President Zedillo sent 31 proposals starting from 1998. Two of them never made it to the floor; one of them was first sent to the floor, but, because the bill was modified by the opposition parties, the PRI voted to reject it. Another bill was sent to the floor in 2005, when Zedillo was no longer president

[b]During the second half of the Peña-Nieto administration, 35 bills were voted on and passed in total. 34 bills came from the 38 proposals sent by the executive during the 63rd Congress, and another bill had been sent before the end of the 62nd Congress

Source Calculated by the authors with data from SIL (2019)

Algazi 2013: 35). Nonetheless, we still need to consider other elements to illustrate the changing nature of executive-legislative relations.

Table 5.2 shows that the abstention rates of incumbent party legislators in the Zedillo (1998–2000) and Peña-Nieto (2012–2015) periods are about 8–9%. In contrast, it is noticeable that the abstention of PRI deputies during roll-call votes on executive-sponsored bills increased notably during the 63rd Congress, reaching an average of 15.53%. In spite of the high levels of party unity during roll-call votes, it is interesting to note such an unusual rate of abstention that is an indicator of a changing relationship between the president and his PRI copartisans. We argue that the strength of the party leadership matters for explaining the variation in the abstention rates.

During the first half of the Peña-Nieto administration, under the leadership of César Camacho and after the PRI's comeback to the presidency, cooperation between factions of the party was cordial and smooth, since most of them recognized the political skills and long political career of Camacho and the need for party unity. However, starting in 2015, using his position as president of Mexico, Peña-Nieto attempted to influence the election of the new chairperson of the PRI, supporting his close ally Enrique Ochoa, who finally ran unopposed. Because he was not considered a true "priísta" by more traditionalist party members, the arrival of Ochoa to the PRI chairmanship was highly criticized, at a time when the Peña's approval rating was very low. The weak party leadership made the legislators more likely to express their discontent about the party. Instead of voting against the party direction on the floor, many PRI deputies chose to abstain in the vote. The selection of José Antonio Meade (not a member of the party) as the presidential candidate in 2018 and the inability of Ochoa to gather enough support within the PRI for Meade's campaign led to the replacement of Ochoa by René Juárez as president of the PRI (Murillo 2018). Juárez was considered a conciliatory figure, but that was not enough to avoid a further rupture in the party and its decline during the 2018 elections. In the presidential elections of July 2018, the PRI was relegated to third place, after the MORENA and the PAN, having its worst performance in history.

In short, the discussion above suggests that the high abstention rate of incumbent legislators was largely due to the fact that the party leader in the second half of the Peña-Nieto administration was not strong, and the leadership was frequently challenged by copartisans. The legislators did not necessarily vote against the party direction during the roll-call vote,

but they might abstain from the vote to protest. This evidence shows a different aspect of party cohesion, and it provides some evidence to support our hypothesis that a weaker party leadership might reduce the level of party cohesion.

In addition, there are some interesting features regarding the passage of president's proposed bills for the second half of the Peña-Nieto administration. During the 63rd Congress, the executive sponsored 38 bills, and four of them were not approved or discussed in the committees that they were referred to. In spite of an increased party cohesion in roll-call votes between 2015 and 2018, when compared to the other periods of partial unified government under the PRI, this time the rate of unpassed executive-sponsored legislation exceeded 10%. Among the four proposals that were not approved, three were related to legalization of same-sex marriage and gay rights (e.g., adoption). Facing the pressure from church-related and conservative groups (AFP 2016), PRI congressional leaders claimed that these issues were not priority for national legislature, and that the legalization of these issues should be under the state government authority (AnimalPolítico 2016). Some civil society organizations had criticized Peña-Nieto for not making efforts influencing Congress to advance the bills (Álvarez Campero 2016; Martínez Carmona 2017). In short, this evidence shows the changing nature in executive-legislative relations under partial unified governments in Mexico.

Candidate Nomination Procedure and Party Cohesion of the MORENA

The 2018 presidential and legislative elections gave control of the presidency and both chambers of Congress to a coalition led by the MORENA, a party from the center-left formed only six years earlier under the leadership of Andrés Manuel López Obrador. For the first time in more than twenty years, Mexico has a unified government, and most importantly, it is the first Mexican unified government not controlled by the PRI.

One important feature for MORENA legislators in the 64th Congress is their diverse political background. Many politicians affiliated with other parties defected from their parties to join the MORENA for various reasons, and one possible reason might be related to the lifting of the ban on reelection. After the 2018 general elections, mayors and legislators (both federal and state) will be allowed to run for immediate reelection

Table 5.3 Former members of different parties who were elected deputy under the MORENA in the 2018 legislative elections

Former affiliation	*Deputies*
PRD	68
PRI	20
MC	8
PVEM	6
PAN	5
PT	4
PES	3
PNS	1
Total	115

Source Calculated by the authors from SIL (2019)

for those who represent the same party.[15] In other words, the mayors and legislators who switch to a different party after 2018 are ineligible for running immediate reelections (Político 2017). This rule might provide certain incentives for many politicians to switch their party affiliation to the MORENA, therefore seeing higher chances of being reelected in the coming future. From the 259 deputies from the MORENA, 115 were members of a different party in the past. From those, 59% used to be PRD members, and 17% were former PRI members (Table 5.3). Some current MORENA members even had political background from center-right parties, like the PAN and PES.

Paradoxically, Table 5.2 shows that the levels of party cohesion during AMLO's first year in office were lower than those seen under the PRI's partial unified governments. Why are the incumbent party legislators under the MORENA unified government less cohesive than those under the PRI partial unified government? In the first place, the diverse ideological backgrounds of the MORENA legislators might be one reason for the lack of cohesion in the legislative vote. However, we argue that what really matters is the party's less centralized candidate selection rules.

After losing the presidential elections in 2006 and 2012, AMLO criticized the PRD decision to join the "*Pacto por México*" and moved to create a new party that presented as a "real alternative" for those people dissatisfied with the government. However, sensing the need to have a presence in all the national territory, the newly established MORENA

[15] The ban on reelection continues to apply to presidential elections and gubernatorial elections.

tried to attract as many people as possible to be party members, and thus numerous politicians of other parties with few chances to secure a nomination defected from their parties and joined the MORENA (Espinoza and Navarrete 2016: 100–102).

The candidate selection procedure of the MORENA presented traditional and new features. For the SMD candidates, the party organized district-level party conventions, with party-members voting for pre-candidates who were previously screened and approved by the party's CEN and its National Elections Commission (CNE) (MORENA 2017). Regarding the candidates for the closed-list PR deputies, the party innovated its methods, introducing a draw system with candidates being chosen randomly from a large list of three thousand party members, ten per district, approved by district-level conventions, together with the CEN and CNE (Zavala 2017). In short, the MORENA's candidate selection procedure is generally less centralized than the PRI's candidate selection procedure, and such an institutional feature might be an important factor that leads to the MORENA's low level of party cohesion.

Conclusion

The theories of historical institutionalism and rational-choice institutionalism offer valuable analytical tools to approach the evolution of executive-legislative relations in Mexico. The ban on reelection and the centralized candidate nomination procedure have been perceived as key elements in Mexican legislator behavior, showing very high levels of party cohesion during roll-call votes. The economic difficulties that produced important ruptures within the dominant party during the late 1980s and 1990s were seen as the start of a process of political liberalization in the country. The inauguration of a partial unified government in 1997 was followed by the arrival of an opposition party to the presidency in 2000, for the first time since 1929.

The introduction of district-level primaries and district-level party conventions within the PRI, combined with a move toward a stronger federalism, opened the door for new actors to influence the selection of candidates. Many deputies and senators had to reconcile their multiple loyalties, finding ways to maintain party discipline while securing future positions for the consolidation of their own careers. In spite of the introduction of more democratic mechanisms, the central party leadership was able to maintain a high degree of influence in the candidate

nomination procedures through the instrument known as *convocatoria*. For this reason, when the PRI returned to power in 2012, the party still had high levels of cohesion. Nonetheless, there were other signs that executive-legislative relations had changed after the PRI's comeback under President Enrique Peña-Nieto.

High rates of abstention during roll-call votes of executive-sponsored bills considered strategic or the refusal to discuss or approve executive-sponsored proposals within committees can be seen as evidence of the difficulties that Peña-Nieto had in his relations with the Chamber of Deputies. This was particularly the case during the 63rd Congress (2015–2018), when, among other episodes, the PRI leadership in Congress refused to endorse the proposal sent by the executive related to same-sex marriage and extension of rights for the LGBT community, arguing that it was not in the party's priorities. The high abstention rate for those years could also lead us to think about the relationship between the president and the party chairman as an important variable when studying executive-legislative relations under unified governments.

Candidate selection procedure can also be identified as a key variable to explain the lower party cohesion during the first year of the MORENA government. Having introduced more open rules for the selection of candidates with a draw system, and having welcomed defectors from other parties into its ranks, the new party has had difficulties securing levels of discipline. At the country level, the lift of ban on reelection beginning from 2018 is also an important feature for legislators to occasionally move away from toeing the party line, and has encouraged legislative individualism. Nonetheless, Mexico's unique historical trajectories also lead us to think about the possible continuation of high levels of party unity in the future, which could provide interesting implications for the political development in presidential democracies.

References

AFP. 2016. Cruzada vs. Peña Nieto por Propuesta de Matrimonio Igualitario. *El Economista*, June 9. Available at: https://www.eleconomista.com.mx/politica/Cruzada-vs.-Pena-Nieto-por-propuesta-de-matrimonio-igualitario-20160609-0146.html.

Álvarez, Jorge Arturo. 2013. Why Has the Transition to Democracy Led the Mexican Presidential System to Political Instability? A Proposal to Enhance Institutional Arrangements. *Mexican Law Review* 5 (2): 277–304.

Álvarez Campero, Santiago. 2016. Matrimonio Igualitario: los Motivos del Presidente. *Nexos*, May 24. Available at: https://redaccion.nexos.com.mx/?p=7699.

AnimalPolítico. 2016. Diputados del PAN, PRI y Verde Rechazan la Iniciativa de Peña Nieto sobre Matrimonio Igualitario. *Animal Político*, November 9. Available at: https://www.animalpolitico.com/2016/11/diputados-matrimonio-igualitario/.

Bailey, John. 1988. *Governing Mexico: The Statecraft of Crisis Management*. New York: St. Martin's Press.

Bailey, John, and Leopoldo Gómez. 1990. The PRI and Political Liberalization. *Journal of International Affairs* 43 (2): 291–312.

Béjar Algazi, Luisa. 2012. ¿Quién legisla en México? Descentralización y proceso legislativo. *Revista Mexicana de Sociología* 74 (4): 619–647.

Béjar Algazi, Luisa. 2013. Los Comicios Federales del 2012. Qué Esperar de la LXII Legislatura. *Estudios Políticos* 28: 33–49.

Bolton, Alexander. 2015. Collegial Leadership Structures, Ideological Diversity, and Policymaking in the United States. Working Paper. Available at: http://www.alexanderbolton.com/s/bolton_irc-yaus.pdf.

Caballero-Sosa, Lila. 2013. Party Dynamics in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: Power Networks and Committee Appointments. Ph.D. dissertation, The London School of Economics.

Cady, Frederic Kenneth. 2012. Political Party Transformation in Mexico: The Case of Candidate Selection Reform in the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) in Mexico (2000–2006). M.A. thesis, The University of Texas at Austin.

Cámara de Diputados. 2019. Álbum de Diputadas y Diputados Federales 2018–2021. Available at: http://sitl.diputados.gob.mx/LXIV_leg/album_foto_tc.pdf.

Cantú, Francisco, Scott Desposato, and Eric Magar. 2014. Consideraciones Metodológicas para Estudiantes de Política Legislativa Mexicana: Sesgo por Selección en Votaciones Nominales. *Política Y Gobierno* 21 (1): 25–53.

Carpizo, Jorge. 1978. *El Presidencialismo Mexicano*. México, DF: Siglo Veintiuno Editores.

Carey, John M., and Matthew Soberg Shugart. 1995. Incentives to Cultivate a Personal Vote: A Rank Ordering of Electoral Formulas. *Electoral Studies* 14: 417–439.

Casar, Ma Amparo. 2002. Executive-Legislative Relations: The Case of Mexico (1946–1997). In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. J. Scott, 114–145. Morgenstern and Benito Nacif. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Collier, Ruth B., and David Collier. 1991. *Shaping the Political Arena: Critical Junctures, the Labor Movement, and Regime Dynamics in Latin America*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Colomer, Josep M. 2001. *Political Institutions: Democracy and Social Choice*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Coppedge, Michael, John Gerring, Carl Henrik Knutsen, Staffan I. Lindberg, Jan Teorell, David Altman, Michael Bernhard, M. Steven Fish, Adam Glynn, Allen Hicken, Anna Lührmann, Kyle L. Marquardt, Kelly McMann, Pamela Paxton, Daniel Pemstein, Brigitte Seim, Rachel Sigman, Svend-Erik Skaaning, Jeffrey Staton, Steven Wilson, Agnes Cornell, Lisa Gastaldi, Haakon Gjerløw, Nina Ilchenko, Joshua Krusell, Laura Maxwell, Valeriya Mechkova, Juraj Medzihorsky, Josefine Pernes, Johannes von Römer, Natalia Stepanova, Aksel Sundström, Eitan Tzelgov, Yi-ting Wang, Tore Wig, and Daniel Ziblatt. 2019. V-Dem [Country-Year/Country-Date] Dataset v9. Varieties of Democracy (V-Dem) Project.

Cosío Vellegas, Daniel. 1978. *El Sistema Político Mexicano*. Mexico City: Cuadernos de Joaquín Mortiz.

Doyle, David, and Robert Elgie. 2016. Maximizing the Reliability of Cross-National Measures of Presidential Power. *British Journal of Political Science* 46 (4): 731–741.

Espinoza, Ricardo, and Juan Pablo Navarrete. 2016. MORENA en la Reconfiguración del Sistema de Partidos en México. *Estudios Políticos* 37: 81–109.

Gilbreth, Chris, and Gerardo Otero. 2001. Democratization in Mexico: The Zapatista Uprising and Civil Society. *Latin American Perspectives* 28 (4): 7–29.

González, Raul Cipriano. 2010. The Legislative Politics of Party Competition: An Analysis of Internal Organization in Eight Mexican State Congresses 2001–2008. Ph.D. dissertation, Rice University.

González Casanova, Pablo. 1982. *El Estado y los Partidos Políticos en México*. Mexico City: Era.

Instituto Nacional Electoral. 2019. Atlas de Resultados de las Elecciones Federales 1991–2015. Available at: http://siceef.ine.mx/camdiputados.html?p%C3%A1gina=1.

Kerevel, Yann P., and Cassie M. Knott. 2018. "La Disciplina Partidista en el Congreso Local del Estado de México, 2012–2015." In *Los Congresos en México: la Representación Política en el Contexto de las Reformas Electorales*, ed. Sergio A. Bárcena Juárez, Gustavo A. López Montiel, and Rosa María Mirón Lince, 197–219. Ciudad de México: ITESM, UNAM, Senado de la República y Instituto Belisario Domínguez.

Laakso, Markku, and Rein Taagepera. 1979. Effective Number of Parties: A Measure with Application to West Europe. *Comparative Political Studies* 12 (1): 3–27.

Langston, Joy. 2001. Why Rules Matter: Changes in Candidate Selection in Mexico's PRI, 1988–2000. *Journal of Latin American Studies* 33 (3): 485–511.

Langston, Joy. 2006. The Changing Party of the Institutional Revolution: Electoral Competition and Decentralized Candidate Selection. *Party Politics* 12 (3): 395–413.

Langston, Joy. 2008. Legislative Recruitment in Mexico. In *Pathways to Power: Political Recruitment and Candidate Selection in Latin America*, ed. Peter Siavelis and Scott Morgenstern, 143–163. University Park, PA: The Pennsylvania State University Press.

Langston, Joy. 2010. Governors and 'Their' Deputies: New Legislative Principals in Mexico. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 35 (2): 235–258.

López Leyva, Miguel Armando. 2015. El Episodio Reformista en México (2012-2014): Explorando las Razones del Cambio en la Segunda Alternancia. *Estudios Políticos* 35: 61–85.

Lujambio, Alonso. 1996. *Federalismo y Congreso en el Cambio Político de México.* Mexico, DF: Instituto de Investigaciones Jurídicas, Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México.

Marshall, Monty G., Ted R. Gurr, and Keith Jaggers. 2017. Polity IV Project: Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800–2016. Available at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscrdata.html.

Martínez Carmona, Carlos. 2017. A un Año del Fracaso de la Iniciativa Presidencial en Favor del Matrimonio Gay. *Movimientos e Instituciones*, June 19. Available at: http://movin.laoms.org/2017/06/19/fracaso-iniciativa-matrimonio-gay/.

Medina, Luis. 1978. *Evolución Electoral en el México Contemporáneo.* Mexico City: Comisión Federal Electoral.

Meyer Cosío, Lorenzo. 1996. La Crisis del Presidencialismo Mexicano. Recuperación Espectacular y Recaída Estructural, 1982-1996. *Foro Internacional* 36 (1–2): 11–30.

MORENA. 2017. Convocatoria a los Procesos de Selección Interna de Candidatos/as a Cargos de Elección Popular a Nivel Federal y Locales 2017–2018. Available at: https://morena.si/proceso-2017-2018.

Murillo, Estéfana. 2018. El PRI de Ochoa: Lo Recibió Mal, lo Deja Peor. *La Silla Rota*, May 3rd. Available at: https://lasillarota.com/pri-ochoa-recibio-mal-peor-meade-elecciones/220312.

Nacif, Benito. 2002. Understanding Party Discipline in the Mexican Chamber of Deputies: The Centralized Party Model. In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern and Benito Nacif, 254–284. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

North, Douglass C. 1990. *Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Olmeda, Juan C. 2009. Federalismo revitalizado, Pluralismo Político y Acción Legislativa. Las Relaciones entre los Gobernadores Mexicanos y el Congreso

de la Unión durante la Última Década. *Revista Legislativa de Estudios Sociales y Opinión Pública* 2 (3): 103–132.

Peters, B.Guy. 2012. *Institutional Theory in Political Science*. New York: Continuum.

Peters, B.Guy, Jon Pierre, and Desmond S. King. 2005. The Politics of Path Dependency: Political Conflict in Historical Institutionalism. *Journal of Politics* 67 (4): 1275–1300.

Pierson, Paul. 2004. *Politics in Time: History, Institutions, and Social Analysis*. Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Político. 2017. Reelección Inicia en 2018, ¿Cómo Funcionará? *Político MX*, June 15. Available at: https://politico.mx/central-electoral/elecciones-2018/reelección-inicia-en-2018-cómo-funcionará/.

Preece, Jessica Robinson. 2014. How the Party Can Win in Personal Vote Systems: The 'Selectoral Connection' and Legislative Voting in Lithuania. *Legislative Studies Quarterly* 39 (2): 147–167.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 1989. Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach. *Journal of Theoretical Politics* 1 (2): 131–147.

Shepsle, Kenneth A. 2006. Rational Choice Institutionalism. In *The Oxford Handbook of Political Institutions*, ed. R.A.W. Rhodes, 23–38. Sarah A. Binder and Bert A. Rockman. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Shugart, Matthew S., and Stephan Haggard. 2001. Institutions and Public Policy in Presidential Systems. In *Presidents, Parliaments and Policy*, ed. Stephan Haggard and Mathew D. McCubbins, 64–104. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

SinEmbargo. 2013. En 14 años, Tres Presidentes Fracasaron al Intentar una Reforma Energética; el Congreso las Frena. *Sin Embargo*, June 8. Available at: https://www.sinembargo.mx/20-06-2013/660436.

SIL. 2019. "Sistema de Información Legislativa" Cámara de Diputados del Congreso de la Unión. Available at: http://gaceta.diputados.gob.mx/gp_inis.html.

Steinmo, Sven, Kathleen A. Thelen, and Frank Longstreth (eds.). 1992. *Structuring Politics: Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Analysis*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 1997. Political Sources of Presidencialismo in Mexico. In *Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America*, ed. Scott Mainwaring and Matthew S. Shugart, 225–258. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 2001. The Consequences of Mexico's Mixed-Member Electoral System, 1988–1997. In *Mixed-Member Electoral Systems: The Best of Both Worlds?*, ed. S. Matthew, 447–476. Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 2002. The Legal and Partisan Framework of the Legislative Delegation of the Budget in Mexico. In *Legislative Politics in Latin America*, ed. Scott Morgenstern, 377–410. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 2003. El Congreso, las maquinarias políticas y el 'Maximato': las Reformas Antireleccionistas de 1933. In *El Legislador a Examen: el Debate sobre la Reelección Legislativa en México*, ed. Fernando F. Dworak, 33–53. México, DF: Cámara de Diputados/Fondo de Cultura Económica.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 2004a. Changing Patterns of Executive-Legislative Relations in Mexico. In *Dilemmas of Political Change in Mexico*, ed. J. Kevin, 133–167. Institute of Latin American Studies: Middlebrook. London.

Weldon, Jeffrey A. 2004b. The Prohibition on Consecutive Reelection in the Mexican Congress. *Election Law Journal* 3 (3): 574–579.

Weldon, Jeffrey A., and Juan Molinar Horcasitas. 2009. *Los Procedimientos Legislativos en la Cámara de Diputados, 1917–1964*. Mexico City: Cámara de Diputados, LX Legislatura/Porrúa.

Wuhs, Steven. 2006. Democratization and the Dynamics of Candidate Selection Rule Change in Mexico, 1991–2003. *Mexican Studies* 22 (1): 33–56.

Zavala, Misael. 2017. Así Funciona la Tómbola para las Candidaturas de Morena. *El Universal*, July 27. Available at: https://www.eluniversal.com.mx/articulo/nacion/politica/2017/07/27/asi-funciona-la-tombola-para-las-candidaturas-de-morena.

Zeledón Flores, Pablo. 1999. El Partido de la Revolución: Etapas y Transición Democrática (1929–2000). *Temas De Nuestra América. Revista de Estudios Latinoamericanos* 15 (33): 31–50.