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## Schools, Temples, and Tombs across the Sea: The Re-Civilization of Post-Zheng Taiwan, 1683–1722

**Abstract** This article examines the strategies employed by the Qing empire to induce the Han population in Taiwan to accept its rule following the island's conquest in 1683. Late-seventeenth-century Taiwan had a sparse population and a huge hinterland, and this made it difficult for the Qing government to enforce its rule by military means alone. I will argue that the Qing officials in Taiwan also used a number of cultural tactics to legitimize their government in the eyes of the Han Taiwanese. First, they built culture temples and schools in the hopes of both demonstrating their moral authority and convincing the Taiwanese to participate in the dynasty's examination system. Second, they involved themselves in local religion by founding or refurbishing temples to popular deities, demonstrating sympathy for local concerns and solidarity between religious groups on the mainland and in Taiwan. Finally, rather than denigrate the memory of the island's former rulers, the Ming-loyalist Zheng family who had resisted the Qing government's conquest of southern China, they portrayed them as honorable servants of the former dynasty whose legacy could be proudly remembered, but whose time had ultimately passed.

**Keywords** Early Qing, Taiwan, Colonialism, Chinese religion, Zheng family

On October 3, 1683, the Qing dynasty's "Sea Pacifying General" (Jing Hai Jiangjun) Shi Lang, sailed grandly into the bay of Taiwan near modern-day Tainan with a fleet of about two hundred warships filled with soldiers.<sup>1</sup> A small launch met them at the mouth of the bay, and then reversed course, guiding them

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<sup>1</sup> Consultation by Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse at Taiwan, September 25, 1683; in Chang Hsiu-jung et al., *The English Factory in Taiwan 1670–1685*, 514–15.

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into Taiwan's main harbor. Disembarking on the marshy coast, Shi was greeted by the current head of the Zheng clan, the family who had ruled Taiwan for twenty years. His name was Zheng Keshuang, and he was the son of Zheng Jing, the recently deceased architect of the family's statelet on the island, the grandson of the infamous warlord Zheng Chenggong who had conquered Taiwan in 1662, and the great-grandson of the tycoon Zheng Zhilong who had established the family's mercantile empire. But despite this intimidating lineage, Keshuang was only a fourteen-year-old boy controlled by his most powerful generals and officials. These men were gathered around their child-lord along with the rest of his court, and Shi was likely pleased to note that all of their heads were freshly shaven as a sign of their submission to his dynasty.

According to Shi's report to his master, the Kangxi Emperor (r. 1661–1722), his treatment of the surrendered Taiwanese was nothing less than magnanimous. The Zheng clan had been at war with the Qing from 1646 until only a few months before, when Shi had finally managed to defeat Keshuang's admiral, Liu Guoxuan, in a naval battle offshore of the Penghu Islands, but his troops did not exact revenge on their former foes as many other victorious Qing armies had. Instead, Shi's report states that he handed out fine clothing to all the Zheng officials, and when the common Han Taiwanese came to welcome him he gave them clothing, bolts of cloth, tobacco, and silver plaques as well. Shi describes the day the Qing occupation of Taiwan began as a joyous occasion for soldiers and civilians alike.<sup>2</sup> This may be an exaggeration, but Shi's basic claim that he treated the Taiwanese leniently is corroborated by representatives of the English East India Company, who were on hand to witness the transition. They reported to their superiors that Shi had confiscated weapons and ships from the Zheng family's former followers, had extorted sums of money from some of them, and that he and some of his officers had occupied the houses of former Zheng family officials. However, the English company's servants' account, which was intended to make Shi seem as rapacious as possible in order to explain why they had given him bribes, makes no mention of looting, slaving, or massacring.<sup>3</sup>

Why did the Qing government treat its former enemies in Taiwan so gently compared to other episodes in the consolidation of its empire? This article will argue that the Qing government believed that it needed to convince the Zheng family's followers in Taiwan to willingly accept its rule. Taiwan was unique in the Qing's domain; because it was an island, the Qing military's ability to exert force in times of crisis was impeded, and as a recently colonized frontier it also possessed a vast undeveloped hinterland beyond the effective reach of state

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<sup>2</sup> Shi Lang, *Jing hai jishi*, 51.

<sup>3</sup> Thomas Angeir and Thomas Woolhouse at Taiwan to the Agent and Council in Siam, December 20, 1683, in Chang, *The English Factory in Taiwan*, 556–57.

control. The Qing military was capable of suppressing rebellions in the short-term, but strategies of violence and oppression were impractical in Taiwan's frontier society over a longer period. Therefore, during the Kangxi Emperor's reign the central government in Beijing and the local officials it charged with governing Taiwan pursued a strategy aimed at transforming the Han Taiwanese into a dependable part of the new empire.

Part of this strategy was to prevent the abuse of the local population by the Qing troops stationed in Taiwan and to provide economic stability through initiatives such as limiting rice exports and allowing tax holidays. These types of policies have been described in detail by John Shepherd,<sup>4</sup> but there was another side to the Qing's stratagem that has received far less attention in modern studies of early post-Zheng Taiwan. This was the collection of initiatives aimed at legitimizing the Qing state at the cultural level in an effort to reconcile the Han Taiwanese to their new rulers. Emma Jinhua Teng has argued that the terms "imperialism" and "colonialism" are appropriate to describe the Qing empire's gradual development and settlement of Taiwan, especially in regards to its treatment of Taiwan's aborigines.<sup>5</sup> I will argue here that during the Kangxi era, the former Han Taiwanese followers of the Zheng family were subjected to a colonial project of a different sort as well.

Steven Sangren has provided a model to explain how imperial Chinese states positioned themselves relative to sources of local authority; that model is useful for understanding how the Qing officials implemented the colonial project in Taiwan. His model describes a process of reciprocal legitimization between imperial state authority and local religious and social structures, despite the contradictory origins of the imagined power each possessed. These he describes as a downward diffusion of virtue (*de*) from the imperial center and an upwardly directed mediating spiritual power (*ling*) from local religion. For these opposing perspectives on the origin of power to coexist, historical authentications that obfuscated the circular logic of the relationships. In the case of justifying the spiritual power of local deities, a deity might be granted a position of power from the state so that it used the power to perform some meritorious deed on behalf of its community.<sup>6</sup> My contention here is that the early Qing officials who landed in Taiwan found the central nodes of these systems of reciprocal legitimization already in place in the forms of a culture temple (*wenmiao*), temples to popular deities, and tombs, all of which had been part of the Zheng family's system for

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<sup>4</sup> See John Robert Shepherd, *Statecraft and Political Economy on the Taiwan Frontier, 1600–1800*, 105–6, 143.

<sup>5</sup> Emma Jinhua Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography: Chinese Colonial Travel Writing and Pictures, 1683–1895*, 10–15.

<sup>6</sup> P. Steven Sangren, *History and Magical Power in a Chinese Community*, 215–16.

sustaining its own authority through the same basic manipulation of meaning that Sangren describes. The Qing officials implicitly recognized the potential power these institutions possessed and the likely counterproductive results of direct assaults on them. They consequently sought to connect their own state system to them and replicate the processes of legitimization that had benefited the Zheng government.

In the case of the culture temple and school system, which were perceived as diffusing Confucian virtue into society through ritual performances and education, the Qing strategy was simply to assume the former Zheng rulers' role as managers of the system and to outdo them by expanding it. In the case of temples to local deities and the tombs of members of the Zheng government, the procedures were more complicated. The Qing officials either became the patrons of existing temples to popular deities or founded new ones in attempts to create new sets of historical authentications for the local cults that would replace the Zheng government with the Qing, thereby making use of the processes of reciprocal legitimization that Sangren describes. In the case of the tombs and the legacy of the Zheng family's rule of Taiwan, the officials had to perform a balancing act, on one hand claiming the inferiority of the Zheng government while on the other representing their own state as the mediating authority with the power to legitimize and manage the historical legacy of the Zhengs. This was done to position themselves as the perceived source and real benefactor of the considerable symbolic power that that legacy still held within Han Taiwanese society. This required a different kind of obfuscation of history, but produced a process of mutual reinforcement not dissimilar to the relationship between state and local religion. These tactics together are what I see as a strategy of "re-civilization," because rather than establish new institutions, the Qing officials in Taiwan sought to insert their government into the existing infrastructure of symbolic authority that the Zheng family had abandoned with its surrender.

Before continuing with the specifics of the Qing state's strategies, a brief note on the administration of the island may be useful. After the Qing conquest in 1683, it became a prefecture of Fujian province. The seat of the prefecture was within the area of present day Tainan city, and was simply called "Taiwan Prefecture City" (Taiwan fu cheng). For simplicity, I will refer to it as "Taiwan City" throughout. Taiwan Prefecture was further divided into three counties: Taiwan County in the general area of present-day Tainan City (formerly Tainan County), Fengshan County to the south of it, and Zhuluo County to the north. The highest ranked civil official present on the islands was the Fujian circuit intendant of Taiwan and Xiamen (Fujian fengxun Taiwan Xiamen dao), which I will refer to as the "circuit intendant" here. Below him were the Taiwan prefectural magistrate (*zhifu*) and the three county magistrates (*zhixian*). There

were military officials as well, but the men most commonly involved in the social dimension of the pacification of Taiwan were civil officials, so I will omit discussion of the military ones here.<sup>7</sup>

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## Problems and Justifications

Justifying the re-civilizing project required Qing officials to make the claim that it was necessary for the social health of the Taiwanese. In the case of Taiwanese aborigines and non-Han peoples in other southern frontier zones, the Qing government could portray the societies as inferior and in need of guidance because they had previously been beyond the pale of Confucian civilization.<sup>8</sup> For the Han Taiwanese, the problem was more complicated because the Zheng family had already brought the basic trappings of Confucian civilization with them to the island, and the Han Taiwanese could not therefore be described as being in the same state of pre-civilizational savagery as their aboriginal neighbors. The solution was the claim that there was a pervasive moral degeneracy within Han Taiwanese society. There is no real corroborating evidence that the seventeenth-century Taiwanese were any more partial to gambling, street theater, or other un-Confucian activities than people elsewhere in the empire, but the idea that the Taiwanese were particularly immoral became a shared theme in Taiwan's local gazetteers (*difang zhi*).

This trend is most evident in the earliest of these gazetteers. Jiang Yuying, the first Taiwan prefectural magistrate and editor of Taiwan's first prefectural gazetteer (compiled in 1685), complains bitterly that the former Zheng followers were poor, unruly, and generally of base character. He claims that gambling, drinking, and fighting were endemic in the settlements, and that proper family order was non-existent. Sons did not respect fathers while younger brothers did not respect older brothers, widows remarried, and families were only concerned with money when seeking sons-in-law for their daughters. Even more disturbing for Jiang, popular religion on the island had become degenerate and bizarre.<sup>9</sup> Gao Gongqian, the circuit intendant from 1691 to 1695, was willing to be slightly more generous in the 1696 prefectural gazetteer. Gao's gazetteer claims that since the time of Dutch East India Company rule (1624 to 1662), the Han

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<sup>7</sup> See Shepherd, *Statecraft*, 108.

<sup>8</sup> See Stevan Harrell, "Introduction: Civilizing Projects and the Reaction to Them," 18–20; and Teng, *Taiwan's Imagined Geography*, 76.

<sup>9</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 54–56. The gazetteers were usually compiled by teams of scribes whose work typically went uncredited. Except in cases where the authors of essays within the gazetteers are specifically acknowledged, I have treated the primary editor as the author for convenience.

Taiwanese residents had developed a sense of righteousness (*liyi*), and some had become sincerely interested in book learning (*shishu*). However, he also criticizes their wastefulness, predilection for gambling, love of theatre, and naïve devotion to gods, ghosts, and buddhas. In the gazetteer's section on the local customs of the Han population, he concludes by saying that despite their apparent improvement, he worried that the Taiwanese were mercurial and could not be relied upon to maintain the little progress they had made.<sup>10</sup>

This rhetoric of degeneracy masked the very real obstacles to Qing rule in Taiwan that neither Jiang, Gao, nor any of the other early officials were willing to acknowledge directly. This was the fact that the backgrounds of most of the Han Taiwanese on the island made them even less predisposed to trusting or accepting their new government than their counterparts on the mainland. Many of them were relatively recent refugees who had fled to Taiwan when the Qing government forcibly evacuated the Chinese coastline during the 1660s in an attempt to prevent the Zheng family from trading there.<sup>11</sup> These people had had their homes and communities burnt to the ground by Qing soldiers, and so had obvious reasons to be hostile to Qing rule. Most of the remainder would have come to Taiwan with Zheng Chenggong or Zheng Jing in the early 1660s, or would have immigrated during the Dutch East India Company's rule of the island long before the Qing had managed to consolidate its control over Fujian province where most of their ancestral homes were. These early migrants and their descendants had little or no direct experience with Qing rule, and most had lived for at least twenty years under a regime whose stated purpose for existing was the destruction of the Qing empire and restoration of the Ming dynasty. Of course these reasons to doubt the possibility of a smooth transition to Qing rule could not be openly discussed in the gazetteers, so insisting on moral degeneracy was a useful means to justify the urgency with which the officials began to seek ways to demonstrate the legitimacy of their rule to Taiwanese society.

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## Culture Temples and Schools

As with other parts of the empire, the early Qing officials sent to govern Taiwan were particularly concerned with establishing culture temples in prefectural and county seats. These temples served both as the sites of the annual state rituals the officials needed to perform and as the site of their dynasty's civil service examinations. Thomas Wilson offers one of the clearest explanations of the role of the temples in governance during the Qing and the dynasties that preceded it.

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<sup>10</sup> Gao Gongqian, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 185–87.

<sup>11</sup> See Cheng K'o-ch'eng, "Cheng Ch'eng-kung's Maritime Expansion and Early Ch'ing Coastal Prohibition," 240–41.

“The throne’s regulation of the ritual nexus,” he explains, “was based on the conviction that if each local cult and temple, as well as more orthodox rites such as those performed at the Confucian temple [culture temple], were not clearly fixed in a hierarchy of rites and cults that encompassed the empire, then society itself would begin to unravel.”<sup>12</sup> This connection between the temple rites and the maintenance of proper social relations is reflected in the constant attention Qing officials paid to the temples throughout their empire. Because of the Qing officials’ insistence that early post-Zheng Taiwan was suffering from acute moral degeneracy, the logic of their civilizing project demanded that the first and most important steps were the establishment of culture temples and the provision of orthodox education.

What the officials left unaddressed was the pressing need to displace the Zheng regime’s educational legacy on Taiwan, and to surpass it with a newly established and expanded Qing one. Chen Yonghua, Zheng Jing’s talented first minister, had established a culture temple on Taiwan to lend his regime legitimacy in the mid-1660s, and after the Qing conquest the old temple remained standing as a visible reminder of the Zheng family’s pretensions to being the dispensers of Confucian virtue.<sup>13</sup> Jiang Risheng, the son of a Zheng family follower who had defected to the Qing, wrote a historical novel about the famous family in which he describes Chen’s convincing Zheng Jing to found a culture temple and to begin conducting civil service examinations as well.<sup>14</sup> It is not certain whether Zheng Jing actually went so far as to conduct the examinations, but it is clear that his family had made its own play for Confucian moral and ritual legitimacy with the establishment of a culture temple, and it was therefore necessary for the early Qing officials to demonstrate that they were just as committed to this aspect of governance as the Zhengs had been.

The officials began work on renovating or constructing new culture temples as soon as Taiwan’s prefectural government was founded. In Taiwan’s 1685 prefectural gazetteer, Jiang Yuying claims that when he arrived, he found the Zheng temple and its attached school in Taiwan City to be a shabby and dilapidated affair.<sup>15</sup> He and Zhou Chang, the circuit intendant from 1684 to 1686,

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<sup>12</sup> Thomas A. Wilson, *Genealogy of the Way: The Construction and Uses of the Confucian Tradition in Late Imperial China*, 28. For an explanation slightly different in its details but the same in its essential argument, see Stephan Feuchtwang, “School-Temple and City God,” 592–93.

<sup>13</sup> For a discussion of the Zheng family’s pursuit of different forms of legitimacy generally, and reference to the culture temple specifically, see Xing Hang, “Between Trade and Legitimacy, Maritime and Continent: The Zheng Organization in Seventeenth-Century East Asia,” 209; and Hung, “Cheng Family,” 230–32.

<sup>14</sup> Jiang Risheng, *Taiwan wai ji*, 235–36. A reference to Chen’s founding of a temple-school is also made in Xia Lin, *Hai ji jiyao*, 56.

<sup>15</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 63.

donated their own money to renovate the temple and school, though they did not have it completely rebuilt. In the newly designated county seats, no earlier culture temples had been built, and apparently there were insufficient resources to begin construction of completely new ones, but the officials were innovative. Former residences of Zheng followers in the Taiwan County and Fengshan County seats were converted into culture temples, and Ji Qiguang, who served briefly as the county magistrate of Zhuluo from 1684 to 1685, built a makeshift one with a thatched roof for his county.<sup>16</sup> Finding funds to build or rebuild the temples seems to have been a problem even decades after the Qing conquest, so renovation and expansion was a gradual process, but the Qing officials, whether out of a sense of real responsibility or a desire for individual merit in the eyes of their colleagues, remained committed to the project. The Taiwan City temple was expanded in 1700 by the Circuit Intendant Wang Zhilin and again in 1712 by the Circuit Intendant Chen Bin. Chen was also responsible for renovating and expanding the Taiwan County temple in 1703 and 1715. In 1704 the Fengshan temple was refounded by Song Yongqing, the county magistrate for both Zhuluo and Fengshan at different times, and it was renovated again by another official in 1719. The Zhuluo temple was renovated and expanded by two different officials in 1708 and 1715, respectively.<sup>17</sup>

The founding of culture temples was the most prominent aspect of a larger project supposedly intended to correct the cultural failings of the Han Taiwanese that included the establishment of various types of schools. The culture temples served as symbols of moral authority and the sites of both state rituals and civil service examinations, but the schools were at least as important because they were designed to disseminate moral instruction and to make participation in the government's civil service examinations possible. Ji Qiguang, the Zhuluo county magistrate, sums up the official argument as to why founding schools was an urgent task in a list of policies he wanted implemented in Taiwan. According to him, the island was full of "mean people" (*jianmin*), who were just as hard to govern as the aborigines, so it needed schools to cultivate scholarly households because "scholars have always been first among the people, and are the first source of learning and courtesy."<sup>18</sup> The essence of the argument that Ji makes is that in order to instill what the Qing government defined as moral and political orthodoxy among the Han Taiwanese, a sufficient number of young Taiwanese men needed to be educated as scholars so that they would be able to guide their fellows away from their former meanness.

But this call to establish schools and cultivate a new class of scholars should

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<sup>16</sup> *Ibid.*, 63.

<sup>17</sup> Liu Liangbi, *Chongxiu Fujian Taiwan fuzhi*, 329–31.

<sup>18</sup> Chen Wenda, *Taiwan xianzhi*, 231.



not be taken to mean that there had been no education among Taiwanese before the arrival of the Qing. In the 1685 gazetteer, Jiang Yuying, who was probably the early Qing official most critical of Taiwanese local customs, contributed his view of the state of education in Taiwan immediately after the end of the Zheng period.

People [in Taiwan] really know how to study. Boys of five or six are taught and they learn. After they grow a little older, they promptly give up the work. Although they have an intelligent and distinguished character, their speech does not amount to any righteous meaning, as they just like being little know-it-alls. This is deeply unfortunate, and also worrying. If we do not quickly establish schools, and begin conducting examinations to recruit officials and motivate them to study for merit, I am afraid there will be no means of correcting their evil hearts.<sup>19</sup>

The implication of this passage is that Jiang did not think that the Taiwanese lacked education in a broader sense, just that they were not educated in the proper way for the proper reasons. Chen Yonghua and the other Zheng officials had apparently done an adequate job instilling the importance of book learning into the Han Taiwanese population during their rule, but this education was not the sort that Jiang and his colleagues thought necessary. As with the culture temple, despite the rhetoric about the baseness and incivility of the Taiwanese, what the Qing officials really aimed to do was subvert a tradition that already existed. They hoped to establish the Qing empire's legitimacy in the eyes of the Taiwanese, and to redirect the energies of the most ambitious men among them towards the pursuit of success within the new regime's system for creating an obedient class of local elites.

To this end, the establishment of new schools was among the first projects undertaken by the Qing officials in Taiwan. Shi Lang himself founded an academy (*shuyuan*) in 1683, and his example was followed by the first civil officials who were sent to govern the island.<sup>20</sup> By 1722 (the last year of the Kangxi era), at least eight academies had been established, along with thirty-two community schools (*shexue*) for Han Chinese children, and eight for aborigines.<sup>21</sup> Qing officials also established four "charity schools" (*yixue*) in the three counties (two in Taiwan County, and one in each of the other two). Like the regular community schools, the charity schools seem to have been constructed

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<sup>19</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 55.

<sup>20</sup> Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 33.

<sup>21</sup> Ye Xianjun, "Qingdai Taiwan de shexue yu yixue," 49; and Zhou Yuanwen, *Chongxiu Taiwan fuzhi*, 35–36.

mostly with funds donated by officials, but they possessed a steady source of income of their own through school fields (*xuetian*). In the case of the Fengshan County charity school, the land was rented to farmers and the income from the rent was split between salary payments for teachers and stipends for students. Song Yongqing, the county magistrate for Zhuluo and Fengshan, explains in the 1712 *Gazetteer of Taiwan Prefecture* that he was concerned about maintaining education in Taiwan because of its poverty. The charity schools were his solution to this because they allowed for the maintenance of an education system even while the economy remained weak.<sup>22</sup>

Besides disseminating moral education and demonstrating that the Qing government possessed as much moral authority as the Zheng family had, the construction of schools and culture temples also facilitated the establishment of the civil service examination system that Jiang refers to. This was a particularly useful tool for drawing the ambitious men into the state's system. To help induce the Taiwanese to accept the Qing education and examination system, generous quotas were set for the numbers of local degrees (*shengyuan*) awarded in Taiwan, and a special quota in the Fujian provincial examination guaranteed at least one Taiwanese examinee would be awarded the provincial degree (*juren*) each time the examination was held.<sup>23</sup> Although in practice only a very small number of Taiwanese students advanced beyond the local degree level during the Kangxi period, for centuries the possibility of social mobility through success in the examination system had been a powerful inducement for young men on the Chinese mainland to devote their energies to studying curriculums that states had defined as orthodox. As Jiang makes clear, he and his colleagues were hopeful that this complex of culture temples, schools, and examinations would work to help encourage the most capable Taiwanese men to subjugate themselves to Qing rule as well. This was the first and most straightforward step in the Qing government's attempt to ensure that it could replace the Zheng family as the source of legitimate, and legitimating, authority within Taiwan.

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## Popular Religion

The second part of the re-civilization strategy pursued by the Qing was the re-establishment of reciprocal relationships between state authority and local religion. Steven Sangren's model of the relationship provides insight into why the imperial officials were willing to accept the existence of alternative sources

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<sup>22</sup> Zhou, *Chongxiu Taiwan fuzhi*, 368.

<sup>23</sup> Lin Qiangang, *Taiwan jilüe*, 59. John Shepherd deals with this issue in great detail. See Shepherd, *Statecraft*, 210–14.

of authority alongside their culture temples and other symbols of state power within the local societies they sought to rule. In the simplest terms, the worshippers of popular deities had an incentive to accept bureaucratic support for the objects of their devotion because it conveyed validation on those objects, and to accept that validation also meant accepting the authority of the state to grant it. The case of early post-Zheng Taiwan provides a number of specific examples of how the Qing state managed to establish this reciprocity with local religion. The process was not always as straightforward as the bestowal of titles to the deity by the state or the conferral of “official” status on a temple that Sangren describes.<sup>24</sup> At least some of the time a more intimate approach that created direct patronage relationships between specific officials and particular temples was employed. Romeyn Taylor has pointed out that what was meant by “official” temples was not always clear outside the imperial center. There were what he calls “quasi-official” temples. These were either dedicated to deities recognized by the imperial center but not administered with any oversight by the state, or were dedicated to deities not recognized by the imperial center but sponsored or administered by local officials as though they were.<sup>25</sup>

During the early Qing occupation of Taiwan, this ambiguity is obvious. Explicitly, the officials claimed that their intentions were corrective. Jiang Yuying and Gao Gongqian both accused the Taiwanese of heterodox rites and unfounded superstitions, and expressed the hope that Qing rule would bring some sense of what they believed was propriety to the island’s religious practices. But in reality, the Qing officials on the island were far less concerned with establishing a proper hierarchy of deities or ensuring that the correct rites were performed than they were with finding ways to secure acceptance within local society of reciprocal relationships between its gods and their government. Whenever possible, they also sought to create historical re-authentications for the efficacy of the deities that involved the Qing state and excluded the Zheng regime in their new iterations. To this end, some individual officials built or renovated old temples to recognized deities and designated them “official” (referred to as “*tanmiao*” in the gazetteers’ lists), while at the same time others took it upon themselves to become the sponsors of nonofficial temples,

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<sup>24</sup> Sangren, *History and Magical Power*, 220; and P. Steven Sangren, “History and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy: The Ma Tsu Cult of Taiwan,” 683.

<sup>25</sup> Romeyn Taylor, “Official Altars, Temples and Shrines Mandated for All Counties in Ming and Qing,” 96–97. For slightly differing perspectives on the relationship, see Arthur P. Wolf, “Gods, Ghosts, and Ancestors,” 140–14; Robert Hymes, *Way and By Way: Taoism, Local Religion, and Models of Divinity in Sung and Modern China*, 4; and James L. Watson, “Standardizing the Gods: The Promotion of T’ien Hou (“Empress of Heaven”) along the South China Coast, 960–1960,” 323.

conferring upon them Taylor's "quasi-official" status.<sup>26</sup>

Shi Lang, who was the first Qing official to found a school in Taiwan, also led the way in demonstrating the Qing government's support for popular religious movements. The one he singled out to honor was the cult of Mazu, a trans-regional female deity associated with the sea and sailors.<sup>27</sup> Before he even arrived in Taiwan, Shi had the opportunity to express his devotion to her in the Penghu Islands. According to a memorial he wrote, after winning the battle against Liu Guoxuan, he landed on the Penghu island now called Magong and discovered there was no source of water for his thousands of troops except an old and mostly dried up well in front of the Mazu temple. Exhausted and without other alternatives at hand, he began to pray for help. Water gushed forth from the well, and his large army was able to slake its thirst and replenish its water supply. Knowing this was divine intervention, he had a stone carved and placed by the well to express his gratitude.<sup>28</sup> After taking control of Taiwan, Shi honored Mazu again by founding a new temple for her, listed as a *tanmiao* by Gao Gongqian, within the former residence of Zhu Shugui, a member of the Ming dynasty's imperial family discussed below.<sup>29</sup> This is perhaps the clearest example of the type of historical re-authentication that the Qing sought; Shi's account created a legend that described Mazu's use of miraculous powers for the benefit of the Qing and against the Zheng. Her supernatural intervention was then recognized and validated by the Qing state with a bestowal of honors and the conferral of official recognition on two of her temples within the empire's freshly conquered overseas territories.<sup>30</sup>

The effectiveness of this strategy depended not only on Mazu's promotion within the Qing's hierarchy of deities, but also on her popularity within the local societies that the state was attempting to subjugate. As a goddess associated with the sea and sailors, Mazu was an appropriate deity to receive the devotion of a sea-pacifying admiral such as Shi. She was also an excellent choice as a symbol for the Qing dynasty to associate itself with in Taiwan. Like Shi, the former Zheng subjects were mostly people belonging to families who had fled from the coast of Fujian, where Mazu's cult had originated and remained strong. Many of the men had also been sailors when the Zheng family still ruled Taiwan and

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<sup>26</sup> For official and unofficial temples in the gazetteers, see Feuchtwang, "School Temple," 582–84.

<sup>27</sup> See Vivian-Lee Nyitray, "Becoming the Empress of Heaven: The Life and Bureaucratic Career of Mazu," 167–68; and Watson, "Standardizing the Gods," 295.

<sup>28</sup> Shi, *Jing hai*, 20–21. This story was later added to a collection of legends about Mazu that stressed her connection to Shi, including one in which she actually intervened in the battle for the Penghu Islands on the side of the Qing navy. *Tian fei xian sheng lu*, 45–46.

<sup>29</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 64–65; and Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 33.

<sup>30</sup> See Xu Xiaowang, *Mazu xinyang shi yanjiu*, 181.

managed an extensive maritime trading network, so Mazu's cult was one of the most important on the island. Shi and his men would have seen more evidence of this even before they landed in Taiwan; when they entered Taiwan's main harbor at Luermen they sailed within sight of another large, stately Mazu temple near the harbor's entrance that may have predated the Zheng family's rule.<sup>31</sup> Supporting Mazu's cult was therefore a well-considered way for Shi and the Qing government to begin finding common ground with its freshly conquered Taiwanese subjects.

The civil officials who followed Shi found other deities to devote themselves to as well. In many cases, they did not necessarily attempt to validate the deity's wider cult, often because the deities had already been recognized and honored across the empire. In these cases the validation occurred at the local level with officials representing both themselves and their government by becoming patrons of specific temples. For example, in 1684 or 1685 Jiang Yuying donated money from his own salary to renovate the Dongyue Temple in Taiwan City that had been built during the Zheng period,<sup>32</sup> and then Gao Gongqian renovated the same temple again in 1693. The temple was apparently given official status as well, because Gao lists it as a *tanmiao* in Taiwan's 1696 prefectural gazetteer.<sup>33</sup> Dongyue ("Eastern Peak") was an important trans-regional deity in mainland China, but he had a fixed geographic association with Taishan, southeast of Beijing.<sup>34</sup> Like Mazu, Dongyue had a strong following in coastal Fujian, but another reason Jiang and Gao may have chosen to use their own money to renovate his temple in particular was the connection to mainland China and its imperial center. Another example of officials supporting a trans-regional deity can be found in the Taiwanese temples dedicated to Guan Gong (also called Guan Di), a martial god who had emerged from the real mortal hero Guan Yu. In 1690, the second Circuit Intendant Wang Xiaozong renovated a nonofficial Da Guan Di Temple in western Taiwan County, and in 1716, Chen Bin, the circuit intendant who was also responsible for expanding the culture temples in Taiwan City and Taiwan County, renovated the same temple again.<sup>35</sup> Chen, who was apparently devoted to Guan Gong as well as Confucianism, donated an inscribed plaque (*bian*) to another nonofficial Guan Gong temple in the south part of the county.<sup>36</sup>

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<sup>31</sup> Sangren, "History and the Rhetoric of Legitimacy," 679. Both this temple and the one Shi founded in Zhu Shugui's former residence can still be visited in Tainan City today.

<sup>32</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 64.

<sup>33</sup> Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 40.

<sup>34</sup> See Erin M. Cline and Ronnie L. Littlejohn, "Taishan's Tradition: The Quantification and Prioritization of Moral Wrongs in a Contemporary Daoist Religion," 124.

<sup>35</sup> Chen, *Taiwan xianzhi*, 209.

<sup>36</sup> *Ibid.*, 212.

Renovating temples was cheaper than founding new ones, and this is probably one reason why so many officials chose to express their sympathy for popular religion by sponsoring existing temples, but as the economy in Taiwan grew over the course of the Kangxi period some officials did begin founding new temples as well. Liang Wenke, the circuit attendant from 1715 to 1717, provides a good example. He founded two temples dedicated to Long Wang (“Dragon King”) and Tian Zu (“Field Ancestor”) in Taiwan County in 1716, and then wrote brief essays included in the county’s 1720 gazetteer explaining his intentions. Long Wang, Liang explains, was a god of the four oceans and responsible for maintaining peace in “ocean countries” (*haiguo*). He was also responsible for rainfall, so when a drought or flood occurred he was an obvious deity to pray to, but Taiwan had lacked a Long Wang Temple before Liang was appointed circuit attendant. Liang therefore helped found the temple ostensibly to calm the ocean’s waves and improve the weather for the benefit of the Taiwanese.<sup>37</sup> He claimed his intentions were similar when he founded the Tian Zu temple. Tian Zu, often called Shen Nong, was a deity associated primarily with agriculture whose cult had existed in mainland China since antiquity. Liang noticed that despite thirty years of rule by the Qing dynasty, the people of Taiwan still lacked any established worship of Tian Zu. Because floods, droughts, and disease were common in Taiwan, Liang explains, he established the Tian Zu temple in Taiwan County so that the people could pray for their welfare there. In the case of both gods, Liang writes that he was initially shocked that their temples had never been founded in the past, and states that his contribution to Taiwanese religious life was long overdue.<sup>38</sup>

Liang’s establishment of these two temples was also useful for the Qing officials’ strategy of supplanting and surpassing the Zheng family’s legacy in Taiwan. Liang’s motivation for founding the temples was clearly partly the same as those of his predecessors who had sponsored the renovation of temples dedicated to Mazu, Guan Gong, Dongyue, and others. He hoped to represent himself, and by extension his government, as benevolent and sympathetic to the welfare of the Han Taiwanese people, and hopefully to induce the Taiwanese already devoted to these deities to acknowledge the Qing state’s authority to validate them. But where his predecessors had sought to sponsor cults that had been established on the island during the Zheng period or before, Liang chose to found two completely new temples to deities that had had no previous history in Taiwan. This was a way of taking the re-civilizing project beyond the Confucian moral education of the culture temples and schools. As Liang’s feigned surprise at the lack of any prior Long Wang or Tian Zu temples suggests, the founding of

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<sup>37</sup> *Ibid.*, 256–57.

<sup>38</sup> *Ibid.*, 257–58.

these new temples was a not-so-subtle means of demonstrating to the Taiwanese that their pre-Qing popular religion had been lacking, and of implying that the Qing government had surpassed the Zheng family regime in this respect as well. Documenting the construction of the temples in the gazetteer also helped to create and preserve the historical authentication of the state's connection to the new cults. This documentation anticipated the miraculous powers of the deities (presumably the prevention of floods, droughts, and disease), which Liang and the Qing government would receive credit for, thus completing the loop of mutual reinforcement between state and religion.

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## Rehabilitating Rebels, Pirates, and Princes

The final site of the Qing government's struggle to demonstrate the legitimacy of its rule over the Han Taiwanese that I will discuss in this article is the history of the Zheng family itself. In Taiwan, the Qing court aimed to transform the legacies of their former enemies from symbols of resistance against Manchu rule into symbols of generalized dynastic loyalism that could be honored by the Taiwanese without compromising their loyalty to the new regime. The logic behind this process was very similar to the process of reciprocal legitimization that Sangren describes occurring between popular religion and the imperial state. Essentially, the Qing government recognized that the memory of the Zheng family and the Ming loyalist cause it had championed still retained a significant amount of symbolic power in the imaginations of its former followers. It was precisely because the Qing officials distrusted this legacy so much that they sought to connect themselves to it by granting it very visible validation. This validation acted in the same basic way as the legitimization the state granted local cults; those who acknowledged the honorable trappings that the Zhengs and their cause were granted were also forced to acknowledge the Qing state as the source of those trappings and its right to grant them.

The first step in this process was accepting the surrender of Zheng Keshuang, and rehabilitating him as a noble within the Qing dynasty's Eight Banners system. This use of clemency was by no means a certainty before Zheng's surrender. The Qing government's use of clemency and rehabilitation was not unprecedented, but the extent to which the Qing government applied it in Taiwan was, especially when the Zheng family's long, stubborn campaign against the new dynasty is considered. Other anti-Qing warlords who defied the Qing government's rule tended to experience considerably more brutality after their defeat. For example, when the Qing armies finally suppressed the Sanfan Rebellion (Sanfan zhi luan, 1673 to 1681) in southern China, they acted with very little forgiveness toward the rebellion's leaders. When the rebel capital of Yunnan fell in 1681, the

advisors and officers of Wu Sangui, the rebel leader who had initiated the rebellion, were executed, their wives and daughters were enslaved, and their city was plundered. Wu had mercifully died before the end of the war, but the Qing officers still had his body exhumed and publically mutilated.<sup>39</sup> The leaders of the other two rebel provinces received similarly unforgiving, if less theatrical treatment; Shang Zhixin of Guangdong was ordered to take his own life, while Geng Jingzhong of Fujian was executed by quartering.<sup>40</sup>

The Zheng leaders who surrendered to the Qing military escaped the bloody fate of the Sanfan rebels mainly because Shi Lang and his fellow officials recognized that among the Han Taiwanese there was still a certain amount of respect for the memory of Zheng Chenggong, and to a lesser extent Zheng Jing.<sup>41</sup> The deaths of both Zheng Jing and the Ming prince Zhu Shugui prior to the arrival of Shi's fleet also made the use of clemency in Taiwan much easier for the Qing government. Zheng Jing had led an invasion of the mainland during the Sanfan Rebellion, so it would have been more difficult to justify granting him honors had he been alive to receive them. Zheng Keshuang was still a child though, and under the control of his late father's most important generals, Liu Guoxuan and Feng Xifan, as Shi noted. This made it relatively easy to judge him unaccountable for his family's history of anti-Qing resistance.<sup>42</sup> The Qing court was able to accept his surrender and incorporate him into its own system without appearing too weak or forgiving. Keshuang, Liu, and Feng were all taken to Beijing, where the former child-lord received a non-hereditary position in the Chinese Eight Banners and the title of Haicheng Gong ("Duke of Haicheng"), while Liu and Feng received lesser honors. The teenaged Keshuang apparently lived out his life in comfortable captivity under the watchful eyes of Qing officials in Beijing without performing any direct service for his new dynasty, but this was all that the government required of him.<sup>43</sup> By being the living head of the Zheng clan and not only surrendering, but actually becoming a Qing duke and bannerman, he converted his family into loyal subjects of the Qing dynasty.

This recruitment lessened the danger that Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing could be used as symbols to rally Ming loyalism. Because Keshuang was his

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<sup>39</sup> Zhao Erxun, *Qing shi gao*, vol. 42, 12 851. For a first-hand account, see Dzengšeo, *The Diary of a Manchu Soldier in Seventeenth-Century China "My Service in the army,"* by Dzengšeo, 71–72.

<sup>40</sup> Kai-fu Tsao, "The Rebellion of the Three Feudatories Against the Manchu Throne in China, 1673–1681: Its Setting and Significance," 168–69; and Hosoya Yoshio, "Chinese Bannermen in the Late Qing: The Shang Family," 53.

<sup>41</sup> The Qing officials themselves were unwilling to admit this directly in their official writing, but some, such as Yu Yonghe, alluded to it in unofficial works. Yu, *Pi hai jiyou*, 50.

<sup>42</sup> Shi, *Jing hai*, 41.

<sup>43</sup> Mao Yibo, "Qingting dui Zheng Chenggong de cizang jianci he zhuishi," 33.



family's patriarch, he was the heir to his father's and grandfather's legacies, so his decision to surrender demanded respect from those who would honor the memories of Chenggong and Jing. This meant that the Qing government could leave intact the various symbols of the two men that remained in Taiwan, and take an active hand in legitimizing and managing them. The Kaishan Wang ("The Mountain Opening King") Temple in Taiwan County is a good example of this. The temple had been built during the reign of Zheng Jing, and had enshrined his father as a local deity. Not only did the Qing officials not remove it, but Gao Gongqian also saw fit to list it in the 1696 prefectural gazetteer, thereby granting it implicit sanction.<sup>44</sup> Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing's tombs were both also left intact, and Chenggong's was even mentioned in the 1696 gazetteer as a "historic relic" (*guji*).<sup>45</sup> In 1700, Kangxi Emperor declared that Zheng Chenggong was a loyal minister of the Ming dynasty, and ordered him and his son exhumed so they could be reburied with honors in Nan'an, the family's ancestral home in southern Fujian.<sup>46</sup>

The Qing officials charged with writing and compiling the gazetteers were able to represent themselves as caretakers of the Zheng family's legacy in another way by granting two of the family's female members a place in the gazetteers' biographies of virtuous women. These biographies were originally included in Jiang Yuying's 1685 prefectural gazetteer, and all the subsequent editions reproduce them. The first tells the story of the life of Zheng Jing's daughter, Zheng Bin. According to it, while campaigning on the mainland during the Sanfan Rebellion, Jing recruited a general who later returned to Taiwan with him. The general was unmarried, so Jing gave him Bin as a wife, but soon after the general was implicated in a murder plot and imprisoned. Bin was returned to her father's home, but after her husband was strangled for his supposed crime, she insisted on following him in death and hanged herself. The second biography tells the story of the daughter of Zheng Jing's adviser, Chen Yonghua. Chen's daughter married Jing's eldest son and Keshuang's half-brother, Zheng Kezang. Shortly after Zheng Jing's death, Kezang's assassination was arranged by his grandmother and other powerful members of the family's ruling circle. Chen's grief-stricken daughter refused food for weeks and eventually hanged herself as well. The early Qing government, though nominally opposed to most widow suicides like these, actively sought to establish itself as the arbiter of family morality, and used grants for commemorative arches and sections of gazetteers to canonize those chaste widows whose cases it judged to be truly righteous or at

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<sup>44</sup> Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 220. See also Mao, "Qing yan," 33.

<sup>45</sup> *Ibid.*, 224.

<sup>46</sup> Huang Zongyi, *Ci xing shimo*, 47; and Li Yuanqun, *Taiwan zhilüe*, 44.

least politically useful.<sup>47</sup> These two biographies are a good example of the political utility of the Qing's cult of chastity. Both make the point that the Zheng family had virtuous members who deserved respect and sympathy, despite becoming ensnared in the petty infighting of the misguided regime. At the same time, Jiang's inclusion of the stories of these two virtuous Zheng family women makes the implicit point that it is he, and by extension his government, who were recognizing and honoring the women's virtue while their own family had done nothing but bring them grief.<sup>48</sup>

In addition to the Qing government's management of the Zheng family's legacy, it also needed to deal with that of Zhu Shugui, the last Ming prince to formally remain loyal to his family's fallen dynasty. Zhu never declared himself emperor, but he held the title Ningjing Wang (Prince of Ningjing), and after following the Zheng family to Taiwan he helped them maintain the ritual fiction of their fealty to the Ming dynasty by ceremonially presenting memorials to an empty throne on their behalf.<sup>49</sup> Shi Lang was aware of this role, and intended to find and probably take Zhu as a political prisoner after his arrival in Taiwan,<sup>50</sup> but how Shi and the Qing government would have ultimately dealt with this Ming prince had they successfully captured him alive is uncertain. His ceremonial role in the Zheng family's government maintained an element of "political theology" (in Ernst Kantorowicz's sense of the phrase) that had helped to legitimize the family's rule in the eyes of their followers and allies, and he was the last surviving important Ming imperial family member who had continued to defy the establishment of the new Qing dynasty. Left alive, even if he had formally surrendered with Zheng Keshuang, he would still have represented the best possibility of a Ming restoration, but on the other hand, executing him would have undermined the policies of reconciliation Shi and the officials who followed him sought to implement in Taiwan.

Fortunately for Shi and the Qing court, after Zhu learned of Liu Guoxuan's defeat in the Penghu Islands, he simplified matters by hanging himself. This allowed the Qing officials to treat Zhu in much the same way as they did Zheng Chenggong and Zheng Jing. Similar to their posthumous treatment of the Zheng rulers, the Qing officials appointed themselves caretakers of Zhu's legacy and made him into a sort of historical relic of the island as well. They gave at least tacit approval to the respectful burial of the dead prince in a tomb in Fengshan

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<sup>47</sup> For probably the best recent work on the cult of chastity during the Qing period, see Janet M. Theiss, *Disgraceful Matters: The Politics of Chastity in Eighteenth-Century China*.

<sup>48</sup> Jiang, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 108–10.

<sup>49</sup> Hung, "Cheng Family," 145.

<sup>50</sup> Shi, *Jing hai*, 51.

County, and then had his remains re-entombed on the mainland in 1689.<sup>51</sup> The Fengshan tomb was left intact even after his removal; Gao Gongqian lists it in his 1696 gazetteer as the “Former Ming Ningjing Wang Tomb” (Gu Ming Ningjing Wang mu), and notes that a “crescent-moon brow pool” (*yue mei chi*) had been installed, presumably intended to beautify it.<sup>52</sup> Besides, Zhu’s own tomb, Gao’s gazetteer also mentions the “Five Virtuous Ones Tomb” (Wu lie mu) where five of Zhu’s concubines were buried together after loyally opting to follow him in suicide.<sup>53</sup> Finally, Gao’s gazetteer also includes a respectful biographical essay on Zhu’s life. The essay quotes a poem he supposedly wrote just before hanging himself that gives a good sense of how the Qing officials wanted his legacy to be understood. “I fled from hardship across the sea,” he laments, “all for the sake of a few hairs, but today the affair is finished, my ancestors shall accept me.”<sup>54</sup> The mention of the few hairs is a clear reference to his unwillingness to submit to the Qing dynasty, which required all men under its rule to shave the front of their head and to adopt the Manchu queue. It is quite possible that Zhu did not actually write this poem, but it nonetheless serves as a clever historical authentication of the point the author of the essay wished to make. Zhu’s loyalty to the fallen Ming dynasty was admirable, but ultimately futile. The Ming-Zheng era in Taiwan had ended, and it was time to accept the change of dynasties. The symbolic power that resided in the memory of the Ming-Zheng regime was left intact and was even enhanced, but that memory was now in the care and therefore the service of the Qing imperial state.

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## Conclusions

Systematically evaluating the success of each of these attempts to supplant or subvert the Zheng family’s legacy through a strategy of cooption and reinterpretation is beyond the scope of this article, but it is interesting to note a few of the instances when it apparently failed. Yu Yonghe, an adventurer working for the Qing government who explored Taiwan in the late 1690s, records in his travelogue that many former Zheng followers in Taiwan County rebelled each year. According to Yu, this was not because they expected to throw the Qing military out of Taiwan, but because they had witnessed Zheng Keshuang and his important councilors receiving honors after surrendering. This public show of

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<sup>51</sup> Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 211.

<sup>52</sup> *Ibid.*, 223.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*, 256; and Chen, *Taiwan xianzhi*, 217. The tomb eventually became the Five Concubines Temple (Wu Fei Miao), which still stands in Tainan city to this day.

<sup>54</sup> Gao, *Taiwan fuzhi*, 256.

clemency aimed at reconciling former Zheng followers to Qing rule apparently backfired in some cases, because the rebels stated that their reasoning was that if they rebelled and then surrendered, they might receive honors as well.<sup>55</sup> The Zhu Yigui rebellion of 1721 also proved that the memory of the Ming dynasty had not been rendered completely harmless. Zhu Yigui, the eponymous leader of the rebellion, reportedly gained support by pointing out to his followers that he was surnamed “Zhu,” the same as the Ming imperial family.<sup>56</sup>

Despite the mixed success of the Qing re-civilization project in Taiwan, it is hard to imagine that any other course of action would have produced better results. Zhu Yigui proved what Shi Lang had understood from the beginning; even relatively small-scale uprisings on the island were extremely expensive to suppress and impossible to prevent by military means alone. Once the Qing court made the decision to maintain control of the Zheng family’s old domain in southwestern Taiwan, securing the acquiescence of the Han Taiwanese was necessary. The Qing government could have had Zheng Keshuang and his most important officials executed and the most obvious physical sites of their legacy, their tombs and the Kaishan Wang Temple, destroyed, while making the argument that they were nothing more than usurpers and pirates. But the Qing officials could not so easily have erased the memory of that period among the Taiwanese, who still lived within the structures, both social and physical, that had been built during the Zheng family’s twenty-year rule of Taiwan. Besides this, thanks in part to writers such as Jiang Risheng, and many other now-forgotten storytellers, Zheng Chenggong had already become a legendary figure imbued with cultural power on both sides of the Taiwan Strait.<sup>57</sup> In the cases of both the Zheng family’s culture temple and the popular temples constructed during their reign, the Qing officials could not safely destroy them either, lest they make themselves appear to be iconoclasts attacking the very values that they claimed to represent. But the temples could not be ignored or abandoned either because there were insufficient funds available to replace them until the end of the Kangxi period. In the case of the popular religion, it is also doubtful that the Qing officials could have convinced the Taiwanese to abandon their old temples even if they had been able to offer new ones.

The potential power of local cults and the Zheng family’s legacy could not be ignored, and maintaining culture temples and schools was understood to be absolutely necessary for the governance of the new territory. So the only feasible solution was to co-opt these symbols and the powers that resided within them in an attempt to re-establish the mechanisms that would connect those powers to the

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<sup>55</sup> Yu, *Pi hai jiyou*, 32.

<sup>56</sup> Lan Dingyuan, *Ping Tai jilüe*, 1–2.

<sup>57</sup> Ralph C. Croizier, *Koxinga and Chinese Nationalism: History, Myth, and the Hero*, 35–43.

Qing state and contribute to its legitimization. In my view, the Qing government was more successful than not at this in Taiwan as in other parts of the empire, but it could never achieve a perfect assumption of all the mechanisms of civilization because the historical memory of the Zheng family's original introduction of those mechanisms could not be expunged, especially during the first decades after the establishment of Qing rule. The Qing government therefore had to rely on an insistence on moral degeneracy among the Taiwanese, and an attempt to create the appearance that their re-civilizational project had outdone the original Zheng civilizational project, whether by building more schools, pouring more money into popular temples, or even by heaping more honors onto members of the very family whose legacy they were trying to outcompete. These bolstered the Qing state's ability to claim authority over the symbols of civilization the Zheng family had left, but as the Zhu Yigui rebellion and other smaller-scale disturbances continually demonstrated, the state never achieved anything close to universal acceptance of this claim in Taiwan.

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