

國立政治大學亞太研究英語碩士學位學程
International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies
College of Social Sciences
National Chengchi University

碩士論文

Master's Thesis

抗衡中國：2016 年後日本與台灣中國政策的比較研究

Balancing China: A Comparative Study of China Policy

between Japan and Taiwan since 2016

Student: Kayako Takahashi 高橋嘉也子

Advisor: Ching-Hsin Yu 游清鑫

中華民國 111 年 6 月

June, 2022

抗衡中國：2016 年後日本與台灣中國政策的比較研究

Balancing China: A Comparative Study of China Policy


between Japan and Taiwan since 2016

研究生：高橋嘉也子

Student: Kayako Takahashi

指導教授：游清鑫

Advisor: Ching-Hsin Yu



Submitted to International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

National Chengchi University

In partial fulfillment of the Requirement

For the degree of Master of Arts

中華民國 111 年 6 月

June 2022

Acknowledgements

Writing this thesis was the most challenging part of these two years. I was able to accomplish this with many individuals' kindness and support. I could not have gotten through these two years without them.

I especially would like to express my sincere gratitude to my advisor, Professor Ching-Hsin Yu, for his attentive support. He always cared about me, not only giving me useful advice for my writing. Without his support, it was almost impossible to complete this thesis.

I also would like to thank my committee members, Professor Lu Yeh-Chung and Professor Tsai Hsi-Hsun, for their considerate suggestions. Because of them, my thesis has been polished.

I also would like to express my gratitude to my friend, Yu-Ying Hsu, for providing me with tremendous help in finding materials in Chinese and translating them. His advice as someone who has experienced writing master's thesis helped me a lot.

Lastly, I must thank my parents who accepted and supported my choice to go to Taiwan to pursue my curiosity. Without their mental and financial support, I would have never been able to be here and finish my study.

My deep thanks and appreciation go to everyone who were involved with my two years here. Thank you very much to all.

Abstract

This paper compares Japan's and Taiwan's China policies since 2016 by applying Walt's balance of threat theory. In recent years, China's actions to change the status quo (e.g., military expansion, territorial disputes) in the East Asian region have become more intense day by day. The U.S. and other democratic nations have been increasingly critical of China's assertiveness. In particular, Japan and Taiwan, two neighboring countries, have seen their security threatened by China's behavior. Japan has territorial disputes with China, including the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue, and Taiwan has a serious issue with China regarding its sovereignty. Under these circumstances, it is often argued that after the LDP's Abe administration in Japan and the DPP's Tsai administration in Taiwan, the balancing tone has been strengthened, unlike their predecessors who maintained a moderate and engaged China policy.

This paper finds that both Japan after Abe and Taiwan after Tsai chose to take a balancing strategy toward China. Both Japan and Taiwan are opposing China by strengthening their national defense capabilities and deepening relations with the U.S. However, due to differences in diplomatic positions and domestic opinions on China, Japan is strengthening relations with countries other than the U.S. and calling for cooperation to counter China, while Taiwan is deepening relations mainly with the U.S. and only calling for dialogue with China. Either way, the U.S.'s increasingly hardline attitude toward China has had a significant impact on that Japan and Taiwan have strengthened balancing tone on their China policies.

Keywords: Balance of Threat, Balancing, Hedging, Japan's China Policy, Taiwan's China Policy

摘要

本研究為藉由應用 Walt 的威脅抗衡(balance of threat)理論比較日本和台灣對中國的政策。近年來，中國對於改變東亞地區現狀的行動(例如軍事擴大、領土議題)愈加強烈，美國和其他民主國家對於中國獨斷行為的批判也是日益漸增，尤其是日本和台灣，這兩個相鄰的國家更是直接面臨了中國的脅迫。日本一直以來和中國有領土爭議，其中包括釣魚臺列嶼（尖閣諸島）主權問題，而台灣和中國之間更有嚴重的主權爭議。這些情況也使得不少人評論認為，日本的自民黨安倍政府及台灣的民進黨蔡政府出現之後，對中國政策採取抗衡策略的聲音已逐漸崛起，不像是之前的政府嘗試與中國保持溫和交往的態度。

本研究發現在日本安倍政府及台灣蔡政府上台之後都是採取對中國抗衡的策略，但執行方式互有異同。日本和台灣都藉由加強各自的國防能力以及和美國深入友好關係來對抗中國，然而，由於台日兩國的外交地位及國內對中國的觀點不同，日本目前以提升和美國以外的國家的友好關係，並且呼籲他們共同對抗中國為主要作法；而台灣則主要是與美國深化關係同時呼籲和中國以溝通的方式進行。不論哪種方式，這樣的發展也受到一個重要因素的影響，即美國對中國日益強硬的態度對於日本和台灣增強抗衡中國政策的採行有重要的鼓舞作用。

關鍵字：威脅抗衡，抗衡，避險，日本對中國的政策，台灣對中國的政策

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. INTRODUCTION.....	1
2. PURPOSE OF RESEARCH AND RESEARCH QUESTIONS.....	3
3. CASE SELECTION AND RESEARCH METHODS	5
3.1 CASE SELECTION	5
3.2 RESEARCH METHODS	10
4. LITERATURE REVIEW	11
4.1 A BALANCE OF THREAT: BALANCING, BANDWAGONING, AND HEDGING	11
4.2 CASES OF JAPAN	15
4.3 CASES OF TAIWAN.....	17
5. JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY SINCE 2016.....	21
5.1 BEFORE THE COMING OF ABE: NOT THAT BALANCING AGAINST CHINA	21
5.2 ABE'S CHINA POLICY BEFORE 2016 (2012~2015): MAKE JAPAN STRONGER	26
5.3 ABE'S CHINA POLICY SINCE 2016 (2016~2020): ON THE WAY TO BALANCING	32
5.4 JAPAN'S CHINA POLICY AFTER ABE'S RETIREMENT (2020~): INHERITANCE OF ABE	38
5.5 SUMMARY: SIDING WITH THE U.S.....	41
6. TAIWAN'S CHINA POLICY SINCE 2016.....	46
6.1 POLITICS BEFORE 2016 AND THE COMING OF TSAI: THE END OF RAPPROCHEMENT	46
6.2 TSAI'S CHINA POLICY (2016~2019): CALLING FOR A DIALOGUE	49
6.3 THE SECOND TERM OF TSAI (2020~): TIME TO BALANCE AGAINST CHINA.....	59
6.4 SUMMARY: STEERING THE CHINA POLICY IN THE DISUNITED SOCIETY	65
7. CONCLUSION	68
7.1 RESPONSES TO THE RESEARCH QUESTIONS	68
7.2 RESEARCH LIMITATIONS.....	71
7.3 RESEARCH PROSPECTS	72
8. REFERENCES	74

List of Figures

FIGURE 5.1 JAPAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET AND DEFENSE SPENDING BY % OF GDP.....30

FIGURE 6.1 TAIWAN'S DEFENSE BUDGET AND DEFENSE SPENDING BY % OF GDP.....62



1. Introduction

China has always been an inseparable part of their lives for Japan and Taiwan¹ due to its geographical proximity. However, as China's national power has grown, it has become not only an indispensable economic partner for both countries but also a threat to their national securities at the same time.

In 2016, Tsai Ing-wen from the DPP won the presidential election in Taiwan. In contrast to her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou from the KMT, she has adopted a more hardline policy toward China. Shinzo Abe, who served as prime minister of Japan simultaneously, has also adopted a stricter policy toward China in the face of the ever-increasing Chinese threat.

Then, what is behind this change in Japan's and Taiwan's attitude toward China? The basic stance of their policies toward China will probably change depending on whether it prioritizes the economy or security. However, what I would like to consider here is that although Japan and Taiwan are dealing with an economic partner but security threatening China, both countries have managed their relations with China differently. In the case of Taiwan, the country has been dealing with the issue of reunification with China since 1949. In addition to the national identity issues that arise from this issue, major political parties in Taiwan also maintained different and even competing views on the cross-strait relations. On the other hand, Japan does not have the national identity problem as Taiwan, and the Japanese major political parties basically agree that China is a threat to Japan. How do these similarities and differences between Japan and Taiwan affect their respective policies toward China, and will they make a significant difference in the policies of Japan and Taiwan toward China?

In this paper, I would like to apply the balance of threat, one of the theories of international relations, to the policies of Japan and Taiwan toward China and compare their policies to find their differences. According to Walt (1985), when a small country is

¹ It should be noted that although the term "Taiwan" is used in this paper for convenience, it has the same meaning as 'Republic of China (ROC)' and does not include any political agenda.

confronted with a large country, it will either balance or bandwagon against it (p. 4). In other words, “states will ally with or against the most threatening power” (p. 8-9). He lists four causes of threats: aggregate power, proximate power, offensive power, and offensive intentions. In his paper, he takes up the examples of some European countries and says that small countries tend to take balancing actions.

Walt’s argument is important for the application of the balance of threat in this paper. However, his paper only deals with balancing and bandwagoning and does not mention the term “hedging.” Also, he focused only on the cases of Europe during the Cold War. In this paper, I will discuss not only balancing and bandwagoning but also hedging, which does not appear in Walt’s paper. In addition, this paper deals with the cases of contemporary East Asia (Japan and Taiwan), which is not a very common example in the area of the balance of threat. In this respect, this paper may provide a new perspective for research on it.

In addition to presenting a theoretical contribution aforesaid, this study also highlights the changing “real politics” in the East Asian region. There has been complex wrestling of geopolitics among the two global hegemony, China and the U.S., a middle power Japan and a small power Taiwan in recent decades. In particular, the escalation of rivalry between China and the U.S. has brought in a new shape of the cross-national relations that significantly differ from earlier periods in this region. Hence both Japan and Taiwan need to develop a new type of engagement with China accordingly. This study examines the responses of these two countries and will thus provide timely reference to predict the future course of the Japan-China relations, the cross-strait relations, and the East Asian region in this turbulent time.

2. Purpose of Research and Research Questions

To Japanese citizens, the Japan-China relations have always been a source of concern. There are memories of rivalries between the two countries since last century. As well, there are close interactions between the two sides in every respect since the end of WWII. It has been a mixture of competition and friendship that majority of Japanese citizens conceive the Japan-China relation as crucial but difficult issue. In particular, the “nationalization” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands by the Japanese government in 2012 is still vividly remembered and has reminded Japanese that the Japan-China relations have been steadily deteriorating. For the people in Taiwan, China is a place having undividable historical and cultural connections but continues to have political tension and security competition. It goes without saying that the cross-strait issue has been the most salient issue constraining Taiwan’s post war development. However, it is also witnessed that increasing tensions between the two sides are higher than ever. In particular, military threats from China has drawn global attention and Taiwan has been warned as “The most dangerous place on Earth” (Taiwan News, 2021).

Recently, Japan’s Abe and Taiwan’s Tsai both served as political heads of the state when both Japan and Taiwan confront a threat of rising China, and they have one thing in common: both have adopted more hardline policies toward China than their predecessors. Both Japan and Taiwan are classified as mid-size and small countries in the international order. Mid-size and small countries always have to face the threat of major powers. In this case, the major power means China. In order to see how Japan and Taiwan are steering the course to deal with the threats that are close at hand, I will apply one of the theories of international relations, the balance of threat. I will analyze whether the two leaders are adopting balancing, bandwagoning, or hedging strategies toward China. Walt’s theory deals with the Cold War. That is why Asian countries are not treated as a case in his argument. In addition, the theory focuses on the case where a small country takes a balancing policy against a large country.

There was insufficient consideration of the case of bandwagoning and hedging (as will be elaborated in the literature review).

It should come as no surprise that there are similarities between Japan's and Taiwan's China policy. This is because Abe's and Tsai's basic stance toward China is the same. However, when I took into account that Japan and Taiwan are in different situations, there must be some differences there. And if there are differences, what causes those differences should be found out. Therefore, four research questions are raised in this paper.

- (1) In what way do Japan and Taiwan engage with China in the wake of China's hegemonic rising in East Asia? This will address the issue of how to apply or revise the theory of balance of threat in this region which has been relatively less attentive in the academic community.
- (2) What are the similarities and differences between the Abe administration's and the Tsai administration's policies toward China? At first glance, both countries are balancing China. In detail, there are differences behind the balancing strategies employed by the two countries. It is necessary to detect the fine line difference between the two cases.
- (3) What creates these differences? State behavior is inherently complex that results from various internal and external factors. Hence, both countries' balancing against China is also a product of mixed factors. In particular, externally, the role played by the U.S. might deliver different impacts on Japan and Taiwan, while internally, the different shapes of public opinion and party politics on China policy in the two countries are of special importance.
- (4) How does the role of the U.S. affect Japan's China policy and Taiwan's China policy? It is worth discussing the impacts of the U.S.-China competition since the competition may have an influence on Japan and Taiwan to some extent. Also, while the U.S. commit to Taiwan's security, Taiwan doesn't have the formal security alliance like the U.S.-Japan security alliance. This also might affect Japan and Taiwan's decision regarding China.

3. Case Selection and Research Methods

3.1 Case Selection

Japan and Taiwan are two distinct countries close to China. Thus, the common impacts of “China factor” are the starting point for comparative research. Simply put, it is because there are several similarities between the Japan-China relations and the cross-strait relations. Case selection methods are assisted by the principle of Most Similar Systems Design (MSSD) that selects similar cases and finds differences among them (Caramani, 2020, p.15). Since the purpose of this thesis is to find out the distinct factors distinguish Japan’s China policy and Taiwan’s China policy under a similar China impact, the MSSD method is used as a case selection method in this thesis.

The first similarity is that both countries are strongly influenced by Chinese culture. Although official/political exchanges between the two countries began relatively recently (after the “normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China” in 1972 for Japan, and after Lee Teng-hui became president of Taiwan in 1988 for Taiwan), the reality is that exchanges began long before that, and Japan and Taiwan have been heavily influenced by China both historically and culturally, due in part to their geographical proximity. For example, like China, both Japan and Taiwan use Chinese characters and have developed cultures based on religions and philosophies from China such as Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism. In the past, Japan also adopted the lunar calendar and, like China and Taiwan, celebrated the Chinese New Year, and in some areas, this culture still exists.

The second similarity is socio-economic development after the WWII. Japan’s post-war recovery was aided by special procurement following the Korean War, which began in 1950. Also, the phrase “it is no longer post-war” written in the Economic White Paper of 1956 is famous as a symbol word of Japan’s economic revival (Economic Planning Agency). Taiwan, on the other hand, went through a suffered period after the war. It suffered from prolonged inflation due to the end of Japanese rule and the arrival of the Kuomintang (KMT),

and a large number of refugees from the mainland. However, under the influence of the start of the Korean War, Taiwan was able to receive economic and military aid from the U.S. As a result, Taiwan's economy regained stability and gradually became integrated into the international economy as multinational corporations began to invest in Taiwan in the 1960s (Cheng, 2014, p. 5-6).

The third similarity is the economic and political impact of China on Japan and Taiwan. After the Cold War, especially in the 21st century, China's development has been remarkable. Indeed, Lim (2017) argues that the "rising China" has brought about profound changes in world politics in the 21st century (p. 48). The economic impact can be clearly seen in the data on trade. The report from JETRO (Hou and Mori, 2021) says that although the total amount of trade decreased slightly, the ratio of Japan's trade with China in 2020 was the highest ever. This shows the depth of the economic relationship between Japan and China. The report also tells us that China has been the top trading partner among major countries in Japan's total trade for the past 10 years. In addition, the Chinese economic impact on Taiwan is high. According to the Bureau of Foreign Trade, over the past 11 years, China has been the largest trading partner, accounting for about 18 percent of total trade.² As for political influence, it is clear that China's political decisions will have a major impact on the foreign policies of Japan and Taiwan.

The fourth similarity is the both Japan and Taiwan have security concerns with rising China. As China rises in power, it poses a growing threat in the region. The most serious issue between Japan and China is probably the territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, which began in 2010 with a ship collision off the coast of the islands that led to a deterioration in the Japan-China relations, and was further aggravated by the Japanese government's

² At <https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=91>, choose no.4, "trade statistics." Then, set the time frame from September 2010 to September 2021, select "country comparison," and "globe_country."

“nationalization” of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in 2012. Since then, China has continued to threaten Japan’s security by repeatedly intruding into Japanese territorial waters. On the other hand, Taiwan has also constantly exposed to security threats from China. In particular, China has been repeatedly invading Taiwan’s air space and territorial sea in recent years, and there have been several predictions of a possible invasion by China, sometimes called as the “Taiwan Scenario.” According to an article by Reuters titled “Focus: Taiwan Crisis T-DAY, Six Contingency Scenarios” (Lague, 2021), the following could happen: the Matsu blockade, the invasion of Kinmen Island, the disruption of logistics and traffic, a complete blockade of Taiwan, a large-scale air raid operation, and a full-scale invasion of Taiwan. In this way, both Japan and Taiwan are facing serious security problems with China, with no solution in sight.

While the two countries have many things in common, they also have differences. Here, I would like to point out the differences between the two countries in terms of domestic political parties and national identity.

The first difference is the domestic political parties’ attitudes towards China. While Japan’s domestic political parties are united in their stance toward China, they are not united in Taiwan. In Japan, the two major political parties, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP, which was called the Democratic Party of Japan, DPJ in the past) do not maintain a clear-cut different stand on China policy. An convenient example can be referring to the “Reiwa 3nen Ji Min Tou Seisaku BANK [The Liberal Democratic Party’s Policy BANK of 2021],” it is written that “We will respond calmly and resolutely to issues that concern the sovereignty and honor of Japan and the lives, safety, and property of Japanese citizens, including China’s military buildup and unilateral attempts to change the status quo; issues concerning human rights, Hong Kong, and the economy; and South Korea’s violation of international law and unjustified accusations over its historical awareness party” (p. 10). This statement also echoed in the “Rikken Minshu Tou ‘Seisakushuu 2021’ [The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan’s Policy Proposal 2021].”

It is mentioned that “China’s unilateral provocations against Japan in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands and its attempts to change the status quo in the South China Sea are in violation of international law, and we join the international community in resolutely demanding compliance with international law” (p. 67), and “With the solid Japan-U.S. alliance as the foundation of our diplomacy and security, we will face up to the security environment around Japan and steadily improve our defense capability, focusing on self-defense, to protect the lives and property of our citizens, as well as our territory, territorial waters, and airspace. We will resolutely deal with China’s use of force to change the status quo in the South China Sea and its provocations against Japan in the vicinity of the Senkaku Islands” (p. 67). From these sentences of their policy proposals, it is clear that they share a common perception that China is a threat. More importantly, their announcements have simultaneously expressed Japan’s concern on China’s hegemonic rise in neighbor area and potential threats to Japanese interests. Both parties share no disagreements with China’s impact on Japan and adopt a similar stand on China policy.

On the other hand, Taiwanese two major political party, the KMT and the DPP, have a different perception on China. The KMT, which originally came from mainland China, is often explained as pro-China party and does not support Taiwan’s independence. In fact, Ma Ying-jeou, a member of the KMT, stated in his presidential inaugural speech in 2008 that “No unification, no independence, and no use of force,” which he called the “three no’s” are the basic principles for the cross-strait relations (Ma, 2008). On the contrary, the DPP does not only maintain an anti-China stance but also tends to emphasize Taiwan’s independence and Taiwanese identity more. In fact, Tsai Ing-wen, the current president of Taiwan, continues to take a strong stance toward China, stating that she wants dialogue with China but will never accept the “one country, two systems.” Differences in the stance of domestic political parties toward China will directly affect the country’s policy toward China.

The second difference is related to the national identity which is unique for Taiwan. While Japan is a homogeneous nation, Taiwan is home to a variety of ethnic groups. The difference mainly comes from historical development after the WWII. Japan did not experience the “divided-nation” as Taiwan did after the WWII. The divided-nation was solidified by the-then ruling KMT to emphasize the close connection between Taiwan and China. Taiwanese was educated by the KMT regime into a Chinese. Nonetheless, the democratization process has gradually engraved a different identity between the ethnic (or sub-ethnic) groups. In particular, the feelings toward China may differ greatly between the Islanders (本省人) who have lived in Taiwan since before 1949 and the Mainlanders (外省人) who came to Taiwan from mainland China with the KMT. The former group has shifted their identity away from Chinese identity and adopted a more Taiwan-based identity. By contrast, the latter group has maintained a continuous attachment toward China and tends to identify themselves as Chinese.

This identity difference also delivers profound political impacts in Taiwan’s domestic politics as well as the cross-strait issues. On the one hand, the different identity has intertwined with party competition on the island. The DPP has consistently advocated itself as a party representing Taiwanese as a contrast to the KMT’s representing the interest of Chinese. Identity issue later turns into a crucial source of partisan mobilization in elections. On the other hand, the identity difference also profoundly framed the evolution of China policy. China factor, delicate or obvious, has been alive in Taiwan’s daily lives. The increasingly social, commercial and cultural interactions between Taiwan and China have created a no-returned path that binding both sides together. It was witnessed that the relations between the two sides were unstable and even hostile, such as the period between 2000 and 2008 when DPP was in power. Yet, the KMT returning to power between 2008 and 2016 did show a different picture of stable and friendly interactions between the two sides. Now, since the DPP regains the power in 2016 also brings tense relations again. Relatively speaking, as

compared with the sovereignty-related issues, the none-sovereignty issues have revealed some flexibilities and allowed more space for interactions. These ups and downs in the cross-strait relations seem to be a routine character in Taiwan's politics.

3.2 Research Methods

Qualitative research is going to be conducted in this paper. To answer the research question addressed above, this paper mainly uses second-hand sources. Specifically, it includes a literature review on papers applying the balance of threat theory, using Asia as a case study. In order to collect specific data and information, I will also use official government documents such as diplomatic bluebooks and white papers of Japan and Taiwan. In addition, other data sources, such as newspapers, books, academic journals, and websites, will be of great help in conducting such qualitative research to gather information from various angles.

Fundamentally, the methodological orientation of this study will be a combination of disciplines in international relations and comparative politics. According to Caramani (2020), the major difference between comparative politics and international relations is the former deals with interactions, such as party politics, social groups interaction, and issue politics within political systems, while the latter deals with interactions, such as the balance of power, war, and trade between different political systems (p. 2). The beginning theory used in this study is the perspective of a balance of threat. Walt's arguments and following supplements and revisions proposed by other scholars will be discussed. In addition, although this research will use a balance of threat, one of the theories of international relations, as its main theory, it would also refer to some of the methods of comparative politics. The reason is that this paper aims not only to discuss the similarities and differences of China policy between Japan and Taiwan but also to explore the reasons explaining the similarities and differences. It is natural to take domestic politics into account, especially the format of party politics in Japan and Taiwan, respectively.

4. Literature Review

4.1 A Balance of Threat: Balancing, Bandwagoning, and Hedging

The theoretical connection of this research comes from the classic balance of threat discussed by Walt (1985). Walt's ideas of balance of threat can be traced back to the theory of balance of power proposed by Waltz (1979). Walt shares the view proposed by Waltz that a country's alliance option reflects a response to threats. Yet, unlike Waltz, Walt continues to emphasize the key elements of alliance politics lie on the different responses for different countries, particularly, the weaker ones. According to Walt, a weaker state's calculation of alliance choice is contingent on four conditions proposed by the stronger state: aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions. When a strong state maintains more advantageous in the four conditions, the more likely it will claim the weaker state's subordination. Under the background of the Cold War era, Walt focuses on security issue in the cases of the U.S., the Soviet Union, and European countries and concerns how a state chooses its allies under threatened situation. When a state is faced with a threat, it will either choose a balancing strategy, which allies with the opposite side of the threat, or a bandwagoning strategy, which allies with the threatened state. According to him, "if balancing is more common than bandwagoning, then states are more secure because aggressors will face combined opposition" (p. 5). On the other hand, "if bandwagoning is the dominant tendency, then security is scarce because aggression is rewarded" (p. 5).

Walt says that states tend to choose balancing over bandwagoning for two reasons. The first reason is that "states risk their own survival if they fail to curb a potential hegemon before it becomes too strong" (p. 5). The second reason is that "joining the more vulnerable side increases the new member's influence because the weaker side has a greater need for assistance" (p. 6). Both balancing and bandwagoning are reactions in the face of threats, and he cites four factors related to this level of threat: the aggressiveness, proximity, offensive

capability, and offensive intension of the threatened country (p. 9-12). It means that these four factors are compounded and affect the threat level and how the state acts to the threat.

Walt has well-addressed the concept of balancing and bandwagoning in the explanation of coalitional politics under the Cold War era. Nonetheless, the utilities of the two concepts have subject to closer examined in other cases. For example, Kuik (2008)'s paper discusses the term called "hedging," which was not addressed in Walt's discussion. Kuik's paper focuses on the behavior of ASEAN members, especially Malaysia and Singapore, towards China from 1990 to 2005. According to him, it is difficult to find states which apply a pure balancing or pure bandwagoning stance, and the alternative to pure balancing or pure bandwagoning they choose a middle position is hedging (p. 160-161). In this paper, Kuik defines hedging as "a behaviour in which a country seeks to offset risks by pursuing multiple policy options that are intended to produce mutually counteracting effects, under the situation of high-uncertainties and high-stakes" (p. 163). Moreover, when the following three are absent, the state is said to act in a hedging manner: an immediate threat, ideological fault-lines, an all-out great power rivalry (p. 166). The main point of his argument is that the state chooses hedging, which is a combined strategy, rather than pure balancing or pure bandwagoning.

Though the cases in Kuik's discussion are not Japan and Taiwan, it is still very helpful in defining "hedging" in detail in this thesis. However, we have to keep in mind that this paper was written in 2008. China's assertiveness has increased dramatically since then, and we cannot deny the possibility that the state will adopt pure balancing or pure bandwagoning policies.

The discussion focuses on hedging and East Asia can be found in the arguments by Zhao and Qi (2016). According to them, many East Asian countries are adopting a hedging strategy in order to gain the maximum benefit from China without being at the mercy of it. By contrast, countries that have territorial disputes with China, such as Japan, the Philippines,

and Vietnam, are not adopting a hedging strategy, but are trying to pursue a geostrategic balancing strategy, although they are facing limitations (p. 485-486). China has been gradually increasing its power since the end of the Cold War, and many of its neighbors initially adopted a bandwagoning strategy with China. However, “China’s new pattern of assertiveness” (p. 486) has raised doubts among them about choosing the bandwagoning strategy. As a result, the authors argue that between the economic benefits from China and the security threats posed by China, many countries have opted for a middle ground position, which is hedging. Regarding the geostrategic balancing, they point out that strengthening the U.S. presence in Asia and enhancing security ties among Asian countries will be key to the success of geostrategic balancing (p. 491, 495). In a situation where a supranational presence is at stake, many countries have chosen a hedging strategy in order to survive without being preyed upon by a rising China. Some countries, such as Japan, the Philippines, and Vietnam have chosen to engage in geostrategic balancing, but few Asian countries have followed this trend (p. 498). Therefore, their main statement can be concluded as follows; the mainstream policy toward China in East Asia at present is a hedging strategy.

On the other hand, according to Lim and Cooper (2015), most of the recent security literature discuss that many states are applying hedging strategy, and East Asian states are also no exception. These literature states that “East Asian states are hedging by engaging with China on both economic and political levels while strengthening security links with the United States” (p. 697). This explanation is not wrong, but Lim and Cooper continue to emphasize, in East Asia, balancing is the mainstream strategy against rising China, and the word “hedging” may not be used correctly in many cases. They believe that “hedging behavior should not include costless activities that do not require states to face trade-offs in their security choices” (p. 696). Therefore, they redefine the term “hedging” in the paper. Their redefinition of hedging is “secondary states hedge by sending signals which generate ambiguity over the extent of their shared security interests with great powers, in effect eschewing clear-cut

alignment with any great power, and in turn creating greater uncertainty regarding which side the secondary state would take in the event of a great power conflict” (p. 709) and “In the context of East Asia, hedging occurs when a status quo-preferring secondary state refuses the security benefits of aligning with the United States and China” (p. 709). When reconsidered in accordance with this new definition, it seems that many countries that are considered to be hedging in the recent literature are in fact applying a balancing strategy. They reclassify hedging as used in the current literature into four categories: resolute allies, emerging partners, reserved allies, and hedging. According to them, Singapore, Indonesia, Myanmar, and Brunei are the only countries in Asia that belong to the new hedging category (p. 711-712). To summarize their argument, they “redefine hedging behavior as a costly security strategy involving a trade-off between alignment and autonomy. States hedge by sending signals that generate ambiguity over the extent of their shared security interests with great powers” (p. 724). Compared to the existing hedging, the paper greatly narrows down the meaning of hedging and concludes that balancing strategy is more prevalent in East Asia. This paper is significant in that it redefines the overly general term “hedging,” but it is regrettable that it fails to focus on individual countries in East Asia, despite the inclusion of the word “East Asia” in the title.

Wu (2019) uses the quantitative measurements, based on Lim and Cooper’s (2015) definition of hedging which is mentioned above, to try to clarify the question “Under what conditions do states in East Asia adopt a hedging strategy?” (p. 558). The author cites the power gap and U.S. military presence as two factors that could lead secondary states in East Asia to adopt a hedging behavior (p. 564-565). The author’s hypotheses are as follows: “States in the region with a larger power gap with China will be more likely to hedge” (p. 565), and “Countries with increasing members of US military personnel will be less likely to hedge” (p. 566). According to the analyses conducted by the author, among countries that are not allies of China, “the fewer security similarities they share with the United States, the more hedging

they implement” (p. 568). U.S. allies such as Japan, Australia and the Philippines “seek more US security assistance and protection in return for less policy autonomy and flexibility” (p. 569). In contrast, Southeast Asia has more obvious hedging behavior than U.S. allies (p. 569). At last, the author points out that national capability may be an important factor in examining hedging (p. 569). Unfortunately, this paper does not specifically focus on Taiwan.

Aforementioned perspectives of balancing, bandwagoning and hedging raised by scholars are useful providing a general guideline for this comparative study. As China’s recent rising has carried a comprehensive assertiveness of economic and security hegemony, Japan is forced to readjust her relations with this new hegemon. In addition to economic connections and competition, there are endured political, territorial and security concerns between Japan and China. In particular, as Japan continues to maintain the close Japan-U.S. security alliance, disputes on the sovereignty of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands as well as regional military competition seems inevitable. Taiwan is even more deeply affected by China’s rising than Japan. As China is getting stronger militarily, Taiwan has encountered with more serious threats of invasion by China for the purpose of re-unification of the nation. Likewise, Taiwan also suffers significantly as China has double-spaced its claim of sovereignty over Taiwan in the international community. These developments have effectively triggered both Japan and Taiwan a new thinking of their respective relation with China.

4.2 Cases of Japan

In this section, we will look at how Japan is discussed using the theory of balance of threat. A discussion focusing on Japan’s policies toward China after the Cold War until these days can be found in Koga (2016). The word “hedging” is used to describe Japan’s China policy quite often, but Koga’s main argument is that Japan has been adopting a balancing strategy since the end of the Cold War, and that it has become more explicit after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issues in 2010 and 2012. According to Koga, around 2009 was a

major turning point for Japanese diplomacy in particular. The first reason is the change from the LDP to the DPJ in 2009; the second reason is that the U.S. was hit hard economically by the global financial crisis in 2008; and the third reason is that China successfully completed the Beijing Olympics in 2008 and was not so much affected by the global financial crisis. (p. 778-779). In response to these changes, there are three possible actions that Japan can take: “keep balancing against China, change the strategy to bandwagon with China, or engage in hedging” (p. 779). This paper considers “Japan has maintained balancing behavior vis-à-vis China since the end of the Cold War; however, the incremental shift to explicit balancing began after the 2010 Senkaku Boat Collision Incident” (p. 779) and proceeds with the discussion. Around 1990, China was not a threat to Japan at all, but in the 2000s, China increased its national power and began to become a potential threat to Japan, including repeated arbitrary behavior around the South China Sea. However, at that time, “the Japanese government was hesitant to state explicitly that China was a potential threat” (p. 785). What changed the situation drastically was the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands Incident in 2010. Since then, Japan’s balancing tendency toward China has become more explicit, and the 2012 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands purchase further accelerated this trend. In conclusion, though there are some counter arguments, “Japan has constantly engaged in balancing behavior since the end of the Cold War rather than hedging, albeit its intensity has varied” (p. 790).

A discussion focusing on Abe’s security policy can be found in Maslow (2015). The purpose of this paper is “to outline the recent shift in Japan’s security policy, in rhetorical and practical terms, as it has unfolded with the return of Abe” (p. 740). This paper does not specifically discuss the theory of balance of threat, but it gives us an idea of how Abe has been trying to reform Japan’s security policy. According to him, Abe’s re-election as prime minister in 2012 brought about further changes in Japan’s security posture. Since he became prime minister in 2006, Abe has undertaken various security reforms, including deepening military ties with Australia, India and NATO. This can be considered “as a hedging strategy

toward a ‘rising’ China” (p. 741). During his term, Abe has actively proposed constitutional amendments and legal reforms regarding the right of collective self-defense, which aim at enhancing “Japanese role in East Asia, balancing China through further strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance” (p. 742). According to the author, Abe has a very hawkish attitude toward foreign policy and security policy (p. 745). In 2013, the new “National Security Strategy (NSS)” was released, which emphasizes “the shifting power balance in East Asia, marked by a rising China and declining US influence” (p. 758). As such, the author pointed out that “Abe’s return has dramatically accelerated Tokyo’s departure from its reluctant role in international security affairs” (p. 763). His article discusses in detail the context in which Abe has been strengthening Japan’s military role, but he uses both the terms “hedging” and “balancing” to describe Japan’s attitude toward China, and it is ambiguous that which of the two he considers the Abe administration’s attitude toward China.

Scholars may have their own arguments as to whether Japan’s China policy is balancing or hedging, but one thing they have in common is that Japan’s China policy has been changing to a more hardline one in recent years, especially since the Abe administration came to power.

4.3 Cases of Taiwan

Here, we will look at the recent discussions on Taiwan’s attitude towards China based on the theory of the balance of threat.

One recent study that discusses Taiwan’s China policy is Wang and Tan (2021). This paper examines how Taiwan’s cross-strait policy reflects the views of the Taiwanese citizens. According to the authors, there are times when Taiwan’s cross-strait policy tends to be more balancing and times when it tends to be more hedging. During the Chen Shui-bian era, there was a strong tendency toward balancing, and during the Ma Ying-jeou era, there was a strong tendency toward hedging (p. 4-5). However, it was basically “Taiwan citizens risk-averse

attitude supports a hedging strategy” (p. 4). Nevertheless, due to China’s recent more assertive attitude toward Hong Kong and the Trump administration’s policy, Tsai’s government has adopted a policy with a strong tendency toward balancing (p. 4). The authors also point out that the difference in basic stance toward China between the KMT and the DPP also should have an influence in some extent (p. 4). Looking at the data collected over the past two decades, the Taiwanese people have basically favored a hedging policy, but after seeing China’s assertive attitude toward Tsai Ing-wen and its suppression of Hong Kong, they have become more inclined to favor a balancing policy. The author points out that the reason for this tendency may be related to the confidence that the U.S. will come to the rescue in the event of an emergency (p. 14). In conclusion, with the U.S.’s support for Taiwan and China’s continuing assertive attitude, it is likely that the DPP government will keep opting for a balancing policy in the future. The authors also note that the cross-strait relations, which have cooled since Tsai Ing-wen’s 2016 inauguration, may continue even if the DPP government is no longer in power (p. 16).

As Wang and Tan (2021) point out above, the Ma Ying-jeou era did engage in hedging policies toward China, and Wu (2016) is a detailed discussion of this. According to the author, both pure balancing and pure bandwagoning are too risky for Taiwan’s policy toward China. He also states that the dichotomy of balancing and bandwagoning is too simple to be applied to East Asia in the first place (p. 471). As a result, the Ma administration “adopted not merely bandwagoning against China but combined with soft balancing and engagement [= hedging]” (p. 467). The purpose of this paper is to show that during the Ma administration, the combination of national capability, economic interdependence, and lack of external alliance resulted in Taiwan’s hedging against China (p. 468, 486). The author’s critical indication is that although Ma’s political ideology and pressure from the KMT were factors in his decision to adopt a hedging policy, he chose the hedging policy as a way to

stabilize the cross-strait relations in order to maintain peaceful relations and long-term economic tie with China (p. 468).

Then, how has Taiwan's China policy changed since Tsai Ing-wen came to power? Here, I will refer to Chen (2017), which focuses on how the Tsai administration is trying to handle the cross-strait relationship and suggests what she should. According to him, Tsai's China policy "has become more pragmatic and centrist" (p. 173) compared to her predecessor, and this stance is supported by Taiwanese citizens as well as the U.S. (p. 173, 176) The author states, if we apply the theory of balance of threat to the region, the more powerful China becomes and the more actively it tries to involve itself in the region's affairs, the deeper the conflict between the U.S. and China becomes. In other words, a less pro-China administration (= DPP) is more in line with the U.S. national interests (p. 183).

What China wants from Taiwan is for Taiwan to accept one China. However, when the Ma administration attempted to revive "China-centric nationalism" (p. 186), it was met with great opposition from Taiwanese citizens, resulting in a widening political divide and public distrust. "This would not be beneficial to Taiwan's unity and security interests when facing a stronger and more assertive China" (p. 186), the author points out. That is why Tsai has been trying to be moderate in her politics. However, the author also notes that there are many pro-independent party members in her DPP, which may encourage her to take a more radical stance toward China in the future (p. 187). In light of this, the author proposes the Taiwan should take the "combination of binding engagement and soft balancing" (p. 190) for the policy toward China. Taiwan's engagement with China may soften China's attitude toward Taiwan. At the same time, the author argues that it is necessary to take a soft balancing approach that makes full use of diplomacy, economics, etc. to try to curb the rising China (p. 190). The article does not specify whether Tsai's policy toward China is actually balancing or hedging, and the author uses words such as "centric" and "moderate" to describe her China

policy. However, it clearly shows that she has moved away from China compared to Ma's administration.

What the above discussions have in common is that Tsai has become more distant from China in her policies compared to Ma. Whether her policies should be called balancing, hedging, or some other suitable name will be clarified in the following chapters.



5. Japan's China Policy since 2016

5.1 Before the Coming of Abe: Not That Balancing against China

In this chapter, Japan's China policy after 2016, namely Abe's China policy will be mainly discussed, but before that, I would like to discuss the Japan-China relations and Japan's China policy before the coming of Abe and his political background.

Before Abe's second tenure as prime minister, the DPJ cabinet was in power for three years from 2009 to 2012. It was a landslide electoral victory for the DPJ which vowed to engaged comprehensive reforms in 2009. It was also anticipated that, as the DPJ replaced the LDP would bring in different foreign policy agenda. To some extent, the anticipation was correct, but the final result did not.

The three prime ministers at this time were Yukio Hatoyama, Naoto Kan, and Yoshihiko Noda. How was the Japan-China relations and policies toward China during this period? First, Hatoyama became prime minister in 2009, and the keywords of his foreign policy were "breaking away from dependence on the U.S." and "building the East Asian community" (Yoshida, 2020, p. 232). Hatoyama proposed "close and equal alliance" policy stance and reassessed the presence of the U.S. forces in Japan on the one hand. He also advocated an Asian version of "EU" called East Asia Community (EAC) which highlighted Japan's autonomous status on the other hand (Brooks, 2012). In other words, Hatoyama was attempting to deepen relations with China and other East Asian countries, aiming for a more autonomous status from the U.S. (Yoshida, 2020, p. 246). It resembled to the thinking of breaking away from the Japan-U.S. alliance that had been the main framework of Japanese diplomacy in the postwar period. Reasonably, searching for furthering Japan-China relations was included in Hatoyama's policy agenda. In fact, Hatoyama made his diplomatic debut on September 21, 2009, when he traveled to New York to attend the UN General Assembly, the first person he met was Hu Jintao (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, September 29, 2009).

As a new leader replacing the LDP's long-ruled status, the Hatoyama administration tried to readjust, but certainly not to dramatically reshape, the existing Japan-U.S. relations. This intention was clear in Hatoyama's campaign appeals of reviewing the existing Japan-U.S. relations which, in his view, Japan had too overwhelmingly depended on the U.S. So, the new government then cancelled the eight-year mission of refueling in Afghanistan, reconsidered the U.S.'s military bases in Okinawa. Meanwhile, China's rise since the early 2000s and its assertive behavior had deeply impacted Japan's regional status. The new development at the door step had forced the new leadership in Japan to seriously reflect its diplomatic status unlike before. Reconciliatory engagements with China, such as the visit of China's president Xi Jinping to Japan, was one of the attempts to improve the relations between the two countries. However, Hatoyama was forced to step down due to the poor performance on the issues the incident of the sinking South Korea navy ship, the U.S.'s military base, and financial scandal from the DPJ. The short-lived Hatoyama administration did not generate substantial changes in the Japan-U.S. or the Japan-China relations.

As Kan succeeded Hatoyama, two crucial tests appeared in 2011. This first came soon after Kan's assuming the premiership in September 2010 when Chinese trawler collided with Japanese coast guard patrol boats near the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. Chinese crew members were kept in detention by the Japanese government for their intrusion of Japanese territorial sea. The 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands incident caused the Japan-China relations to cool down for a while, but later, through the efforts of the Kan administration, the Japan-China relations gradually became friendly again (Yin, 2015, p. 7-8). On the Japan-China relations, Kan is known as a politician with a friendly attitude toward China. When he became prime minister, he inherited Hatoyama's friendly attitude toward China and expressed his intention to develop a strategic mutually beneficial relationship with China (Yin, 2015, p. 4).

The second challenge to the Kan administration was the unexpected Fukushima Incident occurred on March 11, 2011. Kan was anticipated by his supporters to address the

pressing issues of social and political reforms when he took the position of premiership. Unfortunately, the Fukushima Incident caught him by surprise. The catastrophic disaster critically unveiled the poor post-incident management of the Kan administration. Kan's popularity soon evaporated which eventually led to the DPJ's electoral defeat in the election for Upper House members in July. Kan's was forced to step down from the premiership in late August of 2011. His leaving also signaled a temporary stop of a China-friendly policy in Japan.

Noda, who became prime minister after Kan, was the former Financial Minister of the Kan administration. So, he also inherited the difficulties of the Kan administration. Domestically, he encountered with a divided government which the-then opposition LDP had dominated the Upper House. The post-Fukushima Incident management and relevant energy issues continued to be pressing challenges for the Noda administration. Meanwhile, Noda's flagship policy of the reforms on consumption tax and social security had led to internal frictions within the DPJ which clouded the future of Noda's leadership (Smith 2012).

Noda administration's foreign challenges was obliged to avoid the perceived difficulties created by his two predecessors, namely, Hatoyama's over-strained U.S.-Japan ties and Kan's dramatic territorial disputes with China which Japan had increased economic dependence (Sieg 2011). On the U.S.-Japan relations, Noda reaffirmed the Japan-U.S. alliance was the vital for Japan's diplomacy during his summit meeting with the U.S. president Obama on April 13, 2012. Based on the shared values of both sides, Japan was willing to work with the U.S. on the issues of the regional security, the cross-national economic partnerships and cooperation on comprehensive issues (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan 2012). Half year after, Noda paid a second visit to the U.S. in November 2012 and the leaders of both countries reemphasized the willingness to deepen economic and security cooperation. Noda's strategy of retuning the Japan-U.S. relations was straightforward. Including the debated issue of the

Futenma Air Station, the Noda administration also pledged to work to reduce the burden on Okinawa and ensure its relocation.

Nonetheless, Noda is said to have a tougher stance toward China than his two predecessors (People's Daily Online, 2012). Mainstream media in China had warned Noda's hawkish stance toward China after he paid a controversial visit to the Tokyo shrine (Foster, 2011). A pressing issue came as the Tokyo Governor Shintaro Ishihara announced the intention to purchase the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands in order to prevent being annexation by China. Truly, Ishihara's announcement of securing Japan's sovereignty over the Islands was in fact nationalistic. The decision was also echoed by the opposition party, the LDP. Nonetheless, the announcement irritated some Chinese nationalist activists who landed on one of the disputed islands and led to diplomatic quarrels between Japan and China. In response, the Noda administration decided that the Japanese government will purchase and nationalize the Senkaku/Diaoyu Island. The purpose for the Islands' nationalization was to maintain them in a stable and peaceful manner and will not deploy defense forces to secure Japan's sovereignty.

Obviously, Noda's decision on the nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was expedient. According to Zakowski (2014, p. 129), there are three reasons for this. (1) The government believed that there would be less opposition from China if Japan owned the islands rather than Governor Ishihara buying them. (2) The government thought that abandoning nationalization could give the impression that Japan was abandoning effective control of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. (3) The owner of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands was having economic difficulties and might sell them to China. For these three reasons, the Noda administration decided to nationalize the islands. However, China's opposition was more tremendous than Japan anticipated. In the end, Japan's announcement of nationalization of the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands led to an unprecedented deterioration in the Japan-China relations.

Then, what is the background of Shinzo Abe, who became the prime minister of Japan once again in 2012 after three years of the DPJ rule? Shinzo Abe was the Prime Minister of Japan from 2006-2007 and 2012-2020. This is the longest tenure in office in postwar Japan. He is a so-called political thoroughbred. His grandfather and father were both politicians. His grandfather, Nobusuke Kishi, served as the 56th and 57th prime ministers of Japan, and his father, Shintaro Abe, although not prime minister, played an important role in Japanese politics, for instance, serving as chief cabinet secretary. His political career began in 1982 when he served as secretary to his father, Shintaro Abe. Coming from such a family, it was a natural path for him to move into politics.

To describe what kind of person he is as a politician, in an article of the BBC News, for example, wrote that Abe is nationalist when it comes to domestic politics, but pragmatist in foreign policy regardless of security or economic issues. In foreign policy, he worked very hard to strengthen Japan's alliances, mainly with the U.S., and visited various countries, including the visits to Southeast Asia to build new partnerships. About the relationship with China, although he was keenly aware of China's threat to Japan, the article notes, he did not forego practical cooperative opportunities, such as holding talks with Xi Jinping (Nilsson-Wright, 2020). In particular, Abe's image of a nationalistic Japanese politician is also highlighted by scholars. As Samuels (2007) says, Abe is a "normal nationalist," which seeks "prestige through military strength" (p. 128). According to him, the "normal nation" here means "a nation that can go to war" (p. 128). Politician in this group want Japan to be a great power again and Abe is included in this group (p. 129). Likewise, Hemmings and Kuroki (2013) describe Abe is a "hawkish" politician and has "anti-Chinese views" in their discussion (p. 11-13).

Abe's outspoken of as anti-Chinese or a hawkish image in Japan's China policy has also closely related to his factional connection within the LDP. Abe is a member of the Hosoda faction of the LDP. This faction is a so-called right-wing faction with a relatively conservative

ideology. However, not all the LDP members are anti-Chinese. There are other factions within the LDP possessing a more China-friendly stance, such as the Nikai faction. Leaders of the Nikai faction also influential within the LDP, such as the Secretary-General Toshihiro Nikai and Takaya Imai who served as prime minister Abe's senior advisor. Therefore, it is sometimes said that they may have influenced Abe's policy toward China. As indicated by the Center for Strategic International Studies (CSIS) report, despite Abe has basically taken a hardline stance (= closer to balancing) toward China, the Nikai faction (sometimes referred to as "Nikai-Imai faction") gave advice to Abe to "take a softer approach toward China" (Stewart, 2020, p. 16), particularly with regard to Chinese infrastructure projects (i.e., BRI). So, did these pro-China factions within the LDP actually have a really strong influence on Abe's China policy? and if they do, in what aspects? This point will be discussed later.

5.2 Abe's China Policy before 2016 (2012~2015): Make Japan Stronger

In this section, Abe's policy toward China is specifically discussed. When making comparisons with Taiwan, the period after 2016 will be mainly focused, but Abe actually served as prime minister from 2012 to 2020 (as his second term). Therefore, I will discuss his China policy from 2012 here.

The year 2012, when Abe became prime minister for the second time, was the worst time for the Japan-China relations, not better-off than 2006 when he became prime minister for the first time. According to Zakowski (2016), there are pending controversial issues troubling the Japan-China relations such as the historical issues over the Yasukuni Shrine visits in 2006. In 2012, worse still, the main issue was a territorial dispute over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands (p. 24-25). Meanwhile, China's GDP surpassed Japan's in 2010, ranking the second in the world (Nikkei Shimbun, 2011) as contrast the Japan's stagnant economy. Since then, China has been aggressively asserting its own national interests in the

East China Sea and South China Sea. Japan's status in this region, in a relative sense, has declined as encountered with severe challenges from the China rise.

It is true that Abe had a serious awareness of potential threats from China's increasing assertiveness. Hence, since becoming prime minister on December 26, 2012, Abe has been seeking to strengthen Japan's defense capabilities both externally and internally though has been noted that this has sometimes led to domestic and international criticism (Szanto, 2017, p. 40). To begin with, on December 27, 2012, only one day after he became prime minister, he contributed an article called "Asia's Democratic Security Diamond" to the Project Syndicate. The "Democratic Security Diamond (DSD)" aims to make a diamond-shaped encirclement by connecting Japan, Australia, India, and the U.S. (Hawaii) "to safeguard the maritime commons stretching from the Indian Ocean region to the western" Pacific (Abe, 2012). This idea clearly targets to restrain the rising China as Abe (2012) states that "Japan must not yield to the Chinese government's daily exercises in coercion around the Senkaku Islands in the East China Sea," "The ongoing disputes in the East China Sea and the South China Sea mean that Japan's top foreign-policy priority must be to expand the country's strategic horizons."

As mentioned above, 2012 was marked by the dispute with an increasingly powerful China over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands. However, Abe did not take a firm attitude toward China at that time, nor did he emphasize his nationalistic stance. Rather, "Abe chose to represent his country as democratic and law-biding, just like its Western allies, making it easier for the U.S. and Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) members to align themselves with Japan" (Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, 2015, p. 9). In a speech titled "The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five New Principles for Japanese Diplomacy," which was to be announced on January 18, 2013 in Jakarta³, the final stop on his Southeast Asian tour, the five

³ For some reasons, Abe canceled this speech because he had to leave for Japan earlier, but the full text is available on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs' website.

principles (commonly known as the “Abe Doctrine”) were introduced: “(1) protecting freedom of thought, expression, and speech in this region where two oceans meet; (2) ensuring that the seas, which are the most vital commons to us all, are governed by laws and rules, not by might; (3) pursuing free, open, interconnected economies as part of Japan’s diplomacy; (4) bringing about ever more fruitful intercultural ties among the peoples of Japan and this region; and (5) promoting exchange among the younger generations who will carry our nations into the future” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2013, January 18). As it was also stated in the DSD, the five principles emphasize the importance of democracy and observance of law and order. Abe attaches great importance to Southeast Asia in his foreign policy. Because Abe believes that “ASEAN provides critical political support and legitimacy to Japan’s efforts to balance against China’s rise” (Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara, 2015, p. 10).

However, Abe’s approach which focuses on the democratic value, as opposed to a general approach focused on military strategy, arms races, etc., to confront China, may be outdated in these changing and unstable times. According to Nilsson-Wright and Fujiwara (2015), the approach that emphasizes order and law can only work if there is an assumption that that order will always be maintained. This assumption has been challenged by various crises, including “China’s increasing economic and political influence” (p. 9).

In other words, rely on international principles and democratic norms were proved insufficient to confront China. It further needs Abe’s more focus on security efforts, in particular, the formulation of the “National Security Strategy (NSS)” and the revision of Article 9 of the Constitution, to effectively respond China’s increasing hegemony. The NSS was a significant internal and external policy announcement for the Abe administration. According to the Japan’s MOFA website, “The NSS sets out Japan’s fundamental policies pertaining to national security, centering on diplomatic policy and defense policy” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, December 17, 2013). The basic principle of the NSS is proactive contribution to peace (積極的平和主義) as stated “in close cooperation with the United

States and other countries concerned, the NSS will contribute more actively than ever before to ensuring peace, stability, and prosperity in the international community, while realizing Japan's security and peace and stability in the Asia-Pacific region" (Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2021, p. 169). Simply put, "The crux of the NSS is that Japan needs to become a proactive member of the international community when it wants to influence the regional security architecture" (Szanto, 2017, p. 43). Miyake (2014) also describes the formulation of the NSS as historic and, in light of the "geopolitical tectonic shifts" taking place in East Asia, it is a minimal expansion of defense capabilities, with the exception of China.

However, the formulation of the NSS and the proposal to revise Article 9 of the Constitution were met with criticisms. Domestically, there were oppositions and mass demonstrations due to the fear that Japan would start another war, and internationally, especially from neighboring countries such as China and South Korea had expressed deep worries for Japan's possible remilitarization. Nonetheless, other countries, led by the U.S., was to welcome Japan's decision (Miyake, 2014).

Nonetheless, on July 1, 2014, the Abe's cabinet approved a change in the interpretation of the Constitution, allowing the exercise of the right of collective self-defense (Nikkei Shimbun, 2014). Article 9 of the Constitution, which places provisions on "renunciation of war, no maintenance of war potential, and denial of the right of belligerency" (Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet, 1946) is one of the most distinctive provisions in the Japanese Constitution. Article 9 of the Constitution is a controversial provision, and for many years there has been debate over whether the Self-Defense Forces (SDF) are constitutional or unconstitutional in terms of the "no maintenance of war potential." With this cabinet decision, after the enactment of the "Legislation for Peace and Security" (平和安全法制, passed on September 19, 2015), the SDF's overseas activities, which had been based on the "exclusively defense-oriented policy (専守防衛)" are no longer restricted, and the SDF

can fight back with other countries when there is a clear danger to the Japanese people, even if Japan is not under attack (Nikkei Shimbun, 2014).

In a press conference by prime minister Abe on July 1, Abe stated that this change in the interpretation of the Constitution is because “The global situation surrounding Japan is becoming increasingly severe, and it is necessary to prepare security laws for all possible situations” (Public Relations Office, 2014). In addition, the cabinet decision also stipulated a law to deal with so-called gray zone violations that do not lead to armed attacks, such as China’s repeated provocations off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, by expediting the procedures for mobilization of the SDF (Cabinet Secretariat, 2014). Looking at Abe’s actions up to this point, it appears that preparations are being made domestically to deal with a rising China that is causing a stronger sense of crisis in Japan.




Figure 5.1 Japan’s Defense Budget and Defense Spending by % of GDP

Source: Reiwa 2nen Bouei Hakusyo (2020) [Defense White Paper 2020], and The World Bank Data (2020).

At first glance, Abe’s actions seem to indicate that he is preparing for future battles in the face of steadily increasing threats such as China, but let’s take a look at the actual defense budget. The Figure 1 above shows Japan’s defense budget and the percentage of

Japan's defense budget to GDP, based on the data from the Ministry of Defense of Japan (2020) and the World Bank (2020). This shows that the defense budget has indeed been steadily increasing since 2012, when Abe took office as prime minister. However, the percentage to GDP shows that it has always remained below 1%. Even though the numerical value has increased, the overall ratio has not changed, so it cannot be said that military capability has actually increased in a full speed. This is even true, when compared with the China's counterpart whose increase of defense budget is more significant than the increase in Japan's defense budget (Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, 2021). Under these circumstances, it can be said that "while Japan's increasing defense spending is a significant factor, it does not seem to meaningfully alter Japan's traditional pattern of defense spending" (Szanto, 2017, p. 51).

To some extent, Abe's efforts had signaled a clear message to Japanese people that Japan needed to play a more active role in the region where rapid changes of geopolitics had occurred. The revisions/reinterpretation of Japan's constitution was a crucial step preparing for this new challenge. In fact, it is also possible to see Abe's attempts to compromise with China at this time. For example, the Japan-China summit meeting took place in Beijing on November 10, 2014 which was the first in three years since December 2011. The resumption of dialogue between the leaders of the two countries, which had been interrupted by the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue and the Yasukuni Shrine visit, was seen as a step toward rebuilding the Japan-China relations (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2014). The weekly Keidanren Times also commented that "relations had been cool for a long time, but since mid-2014, momentum for improvement has increased on both sides of Japan and China" (Keidanren, 2015). Likewise, another Japan-China summit meeting was held in Jakarta, Indonesia, on April 23, 2015, also indicates that both sides were willing to make progress at this moment. In the Jakarta summit, Abe expressed on the security issue in East China sea

and was looking forward to a friendly cooperation with China (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2015).

It has been clear, even though there were some signs of cooperative/friendly moments between Japan and China, the potential tension had been there, and increasingly approaching. For the Abe administration, Japan needed to prepare to respond to this tension as soon as possible. Unlike the previous DPJ governments whose China policy had swung between enhancement of Japan's economic interests in China and fending off China's security threat to Japan, the Abe administration had obviously leaned to the end of fending off China's threat. Even though both sides had re-voiced out some friendly appeals in the summit and visits between the two sides had continued, the fundamental issue on national security and territorial disputes had departed the two countries even farther from each other.

5.3 Abe's China Policy since 2016 (2016~2020): On the Way to Balancing

When Abe returned to power, his premiership was not peaceful at all as challenges from within and outside Japan. Domestically, the "Legislation for Peace and Security" enacted in September 2015 went into effect on March 29, 2016. This had offered Japan a gateway to exercise the right of collective self-defense and further expanded the missions of the Self-Defense Forces, which until then had not been allowed by Japan's constitution, (Mainichi Shimbun, 2016). Although the Japanese government has repeatedly explained that the collective self-defense is only to contribute to peace and stability, the explanation is not sufficient, and even as of 2022, there are still strong voices of opposition. In fact, several petitions were filed against the right to collective self-defense (集團的自衛權). Opponents of this Legislation expressed their concerns that it will abdicate the core principles of Japan's non-militarized constitution and lead to engagement with external warfare. There were results of opinion polls by media that, during the period of legislation, up to 50% and 60% of Japanese expressed their disapproval, and even higher to 70% and 80% were not satisfied

with the explanations provided by the government (Mori, 2015). Also expectably, the opposition parties, the DPJ, the Social Democratic Party (the SDP) and the Japan Communist Party (the JCP) had utilized parliamentary tactics to obstruct the passage of the Legislation, and publicly denounced the Legislation as “war legislation” (Japan Press Weekly, 2015).

Noticeably, although the Legislation for Peace and Security was passed in 2016, the “armed attack against foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival (存立危機事態)⁴,” which is required for the limited exercise of the right of collective self-defense has yet to be issued. Fumio Kishida, then Foreign Minister, stated that this is a very strict requirement even by international standards (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2015, June 19). Although it has never been exercised, there are indications that the right of collective self-defense has served as a deterrent against China and North Korea, and has also contributed to the stability of the Japan-U.S. relations. The Sankei Shimbun (2021) reported that there are voices in the Japanese government that believe that Abe and Trump were able to build a close relationship because of the enactment of the Legislation for Peace and Security in Japan. Although there is still much opposition to the law, it can be seen that it had a certain effect in terms of diplomacy and security.

In addition to the challenges of the constitutional revisions, the Abe administration also unexpectedly fettered by the Moritomo Gakuen and Kake Gakuen scandals since 2017. The Moritomo Gakuen is a private school operator which received a huge discount of public funds in the process of initiating a primary school. Critics argued the unreasonable discount from the government was mainly due to the Moritomo’s close ties with Akie Abe, the wife of Shinzo Abe. Not long after the Moritomo Gakuen issue, another strike to Abe, the Kake

⁴ The “armed attack against foreign country resulting in threatening Japan’s survival (存立危機事態) is one of the requirements for Japan to exercise the right of collective self-defense. It means a ‘situation in which an armed attack occurs against another country that has a close relationship with Japan, which threatens the existence of Japan and poses a clear danger that the rights of the people to life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness will be fundamentally overturned.’ It is regulated for in the Legislation for Peace and Security enacted in 2015.

Gakuen issue was revealed. Abe was accused of exerting improper influence on the governmental bureaucrats to assist his long-term family friend, the Kake Gakuen, to acquire the construction permit in a national special zone in Ehime Prefecture. Both scandals had revealed cronyism and the cover-ups followed by the Abe Cabinet. Even though Abe and his associates had resolutely explained the issues questioned by the opposition and the public, their efforts were not effective. Hence, Abe and his cabinet members were suffered a low public opinion approval during the period.

Externally, old issues remained and new challenges kept coming up. North Korea had launched a series of missile test since early 2016. It had turned into a constant military threat to Japan regardless of Japan's strong protests. Meanwhile, China's increasingly military moves around Japans offshore islands and territorial seas were even more pressing than ever. Chinese incursions into the waters off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and airspace flights, which have occurred repeatedly since Abe took office, continued as of 2016. The number of vessels and other vessels belonging to the China Coast Guard Bureau entering the territorial waters around the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands totaled 873 in 2016 (Japan Coast Guard). These developments had reminded the Japanese government and its people of a threatening neighbor to be worried about. They also drove the Abe administration to place the security issue as the top priority. As reflected on the Part 1 of Japan's Defense White Paper 2016, "The Security Environment Surrounding Japan," more concerns were devoted to North Korea and China, which were an overwhelming volume compared to other countries and regions, such as the descriptions on the U.S. and Southeast Asia (The Ministry of Defense of Japan, 2016).

The territorial disputes between Japan and China and the possible solutions had caught the most attention of the Abe administration. Nonetheless, the Abe administration was not shy to express Japan's stance. In the Defense White paper, the Abe administration had tackled the China's "growing assertiveness and military buildup of the People's Republic of China in the Asia-Pacific region" (Gady 2016). Also, in August 2016, the idea of "Free and

Open Indo-Pacific (FOIP)” was announced in Abe’s speech at the TICAD VI in Nairobi (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017, April, p. 15). Although the FOIP was not officially launched until 2016, it is actually based on the ideas came from the first (unofficial) quadrilateral meeting in 2007 (Satake, 2018, p. 1), the speech he gave in India in the same year titled “Confluence of the Two Seas” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2007). In other words, it is something that Abe has thought long and hard about. This alone shows no signs of improvement in the Japan-China relations.

2017 was a crucial year for the Abe administration. A new U.S. president, Donald Trump came to power and brought in the new and harsh U.S.-China competitive relations. Japan’s status between the two hegemony was thus deeply impacted. Enhancing a closer relationship with the U.S. was important for the Abe administration. The U.S.-Japan summit was held on February 10, 2017, soon after Trump’s inauguration the U.S. presidency. In a joint statement after the summit, both leaders expressed their concerns about the intensified instability in the Asia-Pacific region, particularly the tensions in the Korean Peninsula North Korea, East China Sea and the South China Sea. Both leaders also confirmed “a strong determination to further strengthen the U.S.-Japan alliance and economic relationship” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017, February 10). According to Togo (2018), the Abe administration’s foreign policy in 2017 was an immediate response to the Trump administration’s two policy principles: strong U.S. military power and economic diplomacy in pursuit of U.S. interests through bilateralism (p. 9, 15). There was an increasing alliance relationship between the two countries.

Yet, in the meantime, the Abe administration also tried to play a more active role in the Asia-Pacific region. Before the Trump administration, Abe has tried to make Japan sit back in the Asia Pacific in line with the Obama administration’s pivot to the Asia Pacific. However, as Trump has backed away from cooperation with those countries (no longer in a pivot to the Asia Pacific style), Abe has become more flexible in his response to the “Belt and

Road Initiative (BRI)” promoted by China, as a partner for regional cooperation after the “Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP)” plan collapsed from an economic perspective. This flexible response can be seen, for example, in his speech on June 5, when he said, “The One Belt, One Road (BRI) is a concept that has the potential to link the East and the West and the various regions in between,” “I have high expectations,” and “Japan is also willing to cooperate when fairness is maintained” (Government Internet TV, 2017).

It can be said that Abe’s actions related to China was partly due to the unilateralist, and unpredictable, stance of Trump. This was described by Woodall (2019) who notes that “An unintended consequence of the Trump shocks was to push Japan and China closer” (p. 73) and Ramirez (2020) also says that “The disruptive and unreliable nature of Trump’s diplomacy with both countries are driving the two [= Japan and China] together” (p. 4). Other researchers also attributed to Abe’s strategic thinking of regional security. As Togo (2018) suggested that the reason behind such a flexible attitude may be that Trump and Abe have high hopes for China in resolving the North Korean nuclear issue (p. 26). Still some attributed Abe’s policy toward China as a reflection of internal factional politics of the LDP. For example, Calder (2018) noted that there were signs of improvement in the Japan-China relations during the year, which he attributes to Abe’s cabinet shuffle on August 3. This is because Taro Kono, who was selected as Minister of Foreign Affairs at that time, “has long been regarded elsewhere in Asia outside Japan as a leading dove on historical issues, which have high symbolic importance in China” (p. 50).

With the advent of the Trump administration, Abe’s China policy had become more moderate than before (Ramirez, 2020). When China’s Li Keqiang visited Japan in May 2018, despite there was no agreements on the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue, Li had offered a dovish remark, “Over the past few years, our two countries experienced a detour with wind and rain, but the wind and clouds have passed away and the sky has cleared up when I participated in today’s welcome ceremony” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2018, May 9). There

seemed an amiable relation between Japan and China at that time. Saito (2019) also argues that the Japan-China relations improved dramatically with Premier Li's visit to Japan in May and Abe's visit to China in October (p. 109).

The improvement of the Japan-China relations could also come from the thought of the Beijing government. As proposed by Saito (2019), it was mainly due to Xi Jinping's intention to improve relations with Japan in the wake of deteriorating the U.S.-China relations (p. 109-110). On June 28, 2018, Xi Jinping visited Japan as China's head for the first time in nine years for the G20 summit in Osaka. At that time, Japan and China reaffirmed their importance to each other, and Abe announced plans to receive Xi as a state guest in the spring of 2020, which was agreed by Xi (Oikawa and Funakoshi, 2019). In 2019, as same as the previous years, Chinese incursions into Japan's territorial waters and airspace were still confirmed, but diplomatic relations appeared to be generally good between the two sides.

Relatively, the Trump administration and the Abe administration were on the different side of the economic spectrum, but they were on the same side of the security spectrum. While there have been some improvements in the Japan-China relations, nevertheless, the threat of China has not disappeared. In response to the looming China's threat, Japan's Maritime Self-Defense Force conducted operational security cooperation with the U.S. and Indian navies in May, July, and November 2017. In addition, on November 3, the "Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting" resulted in the formulation of the three pillars of the FOIP (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2017, November 6). These moves could be seen as a sign that the U.S. and Japan are taking steps together in terms of foreign policy. According to Reuters, Japan buys military supplies from the U.S. to counter China and Russia (Kelly, 2018). The Trump administration also showed strong interest in the FOIP that Abe announced in 2016, and he first mentioned the concept of FOIP at the APEC-CEO Summit in November 2017 (Ito, 2017, p. 77).

Likewise, Japan and the U.S. have conducted joint military exercises in the South China Sea for three consecutive years from 2017 to 2019. Okada (2019) points out that these military exercises may be seen as a way to strengthen the Japan-U.S. security integration based on the FOIP, the common foreign policy of the two countries, with a rising China in mind, and in conjunction with Japan's Legislation for Peace and Security. Furthermore, in 2018, Japan conducted air combat drills with U.S. allies, India and Australia (Woodall, 2019, p. 71). What ties the above the QUAD countries together is also considered to be their views on rising China.

In a closer examination, what the Japanese FOIP and the U.S. FOIP refer to are not completely identical. Differences can be seen, especially in attitudes toward China. While the U.S. is clearly hostile to China, Japan does not openly criticize China (Okada, 2019). Abe has been steadily strengthening his military and other forces in the face of a rising China and the changing global balance of power, he has also continued to improve diplomatic relations between Japan and China. Nonetheless, Abe's efforts to improve the Japan-China relations remained eclipsed by the rapidly changes of geopolitics in East Asian region. As Liff (2021, p. 53) comments, although Abe had made some achievements such as FOIP, "Abe's tenure came to an end without fundamentally resetting Japan's often tense relations with its geographically closest neighbors, South Korea, Russia, and China." In addition, the invitation of Xi Jinping as a state guest promised for the G20 summit in 2019 was postponed due to the COVID-19 outbreak. Moreover, the "Hong Kong National Security Law" was approved in Hong Kong in June 30, 2020. As a result, Abe resigned amid worsening Japanese sentiment toward China and a cloud over the Japan-China relations have grown darker.

5.4 Japan's China Policy after Abe's Retirement (2020~): Inheritance of Abe

Abe announced his decision to resign the premiership in September 2020 due to his health issues. Japan's prime minister was succeeded by Yoshihide Suga, who had served as

the chief cabinet secretary under the Abe administration for a long time. Suga's cabinet was formed on September 16, 2020. Suga took over Abe's baton at a time when the U.S.-China confrontation was intensifying and sentiment toward China was worsening in Japan. Suga seems to have basically inherited Abe's foreign policy, including strengthening the Japan-U.S. alliance and promoting the FOIP and its principles (Liff, 2021, p. 54, 57).

The year 2020 was to be an important year for Japanese diplomacy. It was supposed to symbolize an improvement in the Japan-China relations, which had been deteriorating since 2012, as the Chinese head of state, Xi Jinping was scheduled to pay a state visit, which has been done about once every 10 years. However, due to the spread of the coronavirus, Xi's state visit was postponed and has yet to take place. In addition, China's adoption of the "Hong Kong National Security Law," which could threaten Hong Kong's high degree of autonomy amidst the active presence of Chinese public vessels off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands, has aroused Japanese caution toward China, and some have suggested that "the sense of crisis toward China has in a sense reached its peak" (Reynolds and Nobuhiro, 2020). The Japanese government had explained the postponement of Xi's visit to Japan as being due to the spread of the coronavirus, but the active activities of Chinese public vessels off the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands and the sudden tightening of the gaze on China as a result of the clampdown on Hong Kong are also reasons for the delay.

In fact, Xi's state visit to Japan was seen an important occasion to improve the tense relations between the two sides. According to a report by Kajiwara (2020), Xi's visit to Japan was expected to mitigate the tensions resulted from the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issue and the Hong Kong issue. Unfortunately, Xi's visit was obstructed by the break out of the pandemic. Moreover, regardless of the final result of the U.S. presidential election (held in November 2021), the U.S. was likely to take a strong stance toward China no matter who was elected. It was hence necessary to first solidify the Japan-U.S. relationship and watch U.S. policy toward China. As the conflict between the U.S. and China intensifies, the Suga administration was

placed in a difficult position as to whether to emphasize economic ties with China, its neighbor and largest trading partner, or to confront China's hegemonic behavior to follow the U.S.

In the end, the Suga administration seemed to have chosen to side with the U.S. diplomatically: in January 2021, Trump left and the new Biden administration was established. This change has had a significant impact on Japan's foreign policy, especially its attitude toward China. The first foreign country Biden visited after taking office was Japan in March 2021, and his first personal summit was with prime minister Suga in April. On April 16, the historic "U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders' Statement: U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era" was released. In this joint statement, they advanced "a shared vision for a free and open Indo-Pacific based on our commitment to universal values and common principles" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021, April 16). What were new and historic were how they referred to China, for example, "President Biden and prime minister Suga exchanged views on the impact of China's actions on peace and prosperity in the Indo-Pacific region and the world, and shared their concerns over Chinese activities that are inconsistent with the international rule-based order, including the use of economic and other forms of coercion." and "We underscore the importance of peace and stability across the Taiwan Strait and encourage the peaceful resolution of cross-strait issues" (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2021, April 16). The joint statement indicates that both Japan and the U.S. will take a strong stance against China. In addition to deepening the alliance with the U.S., Suga also focused on deepening relations with like-minded countries, holding a QUAD summit on September 24, confirming the four countries' collaboration with China in mind (NHK, 2021).

However, the daunting challenges due to the pandemic had severely undermined the credibility of the Suga administration. Strong criticism rapidly surged against Suga's poor management of the spread of coronavirus. The pandemic further led to a postponement of the 2020 Tokyo Olympic Game. Suga's popular approval had suffered a free fall to the lowest and forced Suga to step down from premiership. In early September 2021, Suga announced

that he would not seek re-election as the head of its governing party and the former minister Fumio Kishida succeeded Suga as the new prime minister in November 2021.

So far, the new Kishida administration seems to be taking a stance toward China that is not significantly different from that of Abe and Suga. Actually, Sanae Takaichi, who belongs to the Abe faction is serving as the Chairperson of the Policy Research Council of the LDP. The Chairperson of the Policy Research Council is a key position that leads policy discussions within the party and summarizes government policy. Although she is not a member of the Kishida's cabinet, she holds such an important position that she is likely to have some influence on the Kishida cabinet. In other words, it is a quite possible scenario that Abe's intentions permeate the Kishida cabinet through her. Kishida also revealed that in June 2022, as part of the LDP's pledge for the Upper House election to be held in this summer, the LDP plans to increase Japan's defense spending to the equivalent of 2% of GDP within the next five years. This, he said, will be done with the awareness of the invasion of Ukraine and the military expansion of China and North Korea in mind (Nikkei Shimbun, 2022). Furthermore, 2022 will mark the 50th anniversary of the normalization of diplomatic relations between Japan and China, it remains to be seen how the Kishida administration will build Japan's relations with China and how he will work with the U.S. as Togo (2018) puts, "it is difficult to completely separate Japan-China relations from Japan-U.S. relations" (p. 111). The future course of both relationships will need to be carefully monitored.

5.5 Summary: Siding with the U.S.

In summary, in accordance with Walt's balance of threat theory, China is definitely a "threat" to Japan that meets all four of his conditions (aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive intentions). As Koga (2016) points out, the balancing tone toward China has intensified since the Noda administration after the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands collision in 2010, and Abe, who became prime minister after the nationalization incident in

2012, has been fully engaged in balancing policies. Specifically, although the ratio of defense budget to GDP has remained the same, Abe has increased the budget, established the NSS, and reinterpreted Article 9 of the Constitution to make Japan stronger. Since the Trump administration, he has also strengthened relations with the U.S. based on the Japan-U.S. security alliance with an eye to a rising China. In addition, Abe has deepened relations with other countries by announcing frameworks such as DSD, QUAD, and FOIP, conducting joint military training with other countries besides the U.S., and sharing democratic values. Thus, one could say that he was attempting to change China by deepening cooperation and sharing democratic values with like-minded countries and encircling China with them.

So why has Abe pursued the balancing policy? There are four possible reasons. The first one could be Abe's origins and political ideology. Abe is a member of conservative faction in the LDP, and as his slogan "Take back Japan (Nippon wo Torimodosu)" suggests, he is a politician with a very strong will to make Japan a strong country. Based on his political ideology, it is only natural that he would take a strong stance against China, which threatens Japan's international position.

Secondly, sovereignty issue related to the territorial disputes between Japan and China has play a decisive role in the Japan-China relations for the Abe administration. The disputes over the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands between Japan and China have lingering for decades. There is no sign of improvement, and China's aggression is gaining day by day. In fact, as Abe states in his book that "there is no room for diplomatic negotiations on the Senkaku issue" and that "what is sought in the Senkaku waters is not negotiations, but to put it bluntly, physical force" (Abe, 2013, p. 248). This means that Japan's defense capability will be enhanced, which is part of the balancing policy.

Thirdly, the U.S.-Japan security alliance is of paramount importance in Japanese diplomacy during the Abe era. Since the establishment of the Trump administration in 2017, there have been times when Japan has made compromises with China, especially with regard

to the BRI. In fact, the Japan-China relations have improved somewhat. This has partly been attributed to Trump's diplomatic stance. However, due to the fact that Abe was initially trying to isolate China from the international community by pushing democratic values, his positive comments about the BRI were more an attempt to influence China from within by showing cooperation. It was expected to instill democratic ideas in China instead of showing a full cooperation with China. Abe's positive opinion of China's BRI may also be partly because, as Stewart (2020) notes, the Nikai-Imai faction of the LDP, which is known as pro-China, intrigued Abe to take a softer approach toward China (p. 16). Nonetheless, internal factional pressure would be effective only when Abe was trying to get into China's good graces by taking a positive stance toward China's BRI, and to get China's BRI to adopt the universal values and democratic attitudes that Japan is trying to promote with the U.S. and other like-minded countries.

Fourthly, because Japanese public sentiment toward China deteriorated, this boosted Abe administration's anti-China stance. The Japanese people's impression of China has never been positive, especially since around 2020, sentiment toward China has further deteriorated (Mikoda, 2020). This is probably due to the events in Hong Kong and the coronavirus epidemic. The survey from the Cabinet Office (2021) reveals that how Japanese people see China these days. To the question "Do you have friendly feeling toward China," 79.0% answered "No." To the question "Do you think Japan-China relations are in the good mood," 85.2% answered "No" although 78.7% answered "Yes" to the question "Do you think the development of Japan and China is important for Japan, China, and the Asia Pacific region." Everyone knows that China is a very important partner in terms of economy and we can actually see it from the result of the third question of the survey, but even leaving that aside, Japanese public sentiment toward China has deteriorated beyond repair. In the light of this situation, Abe did not dare to choose a policy of bandwagoning, or hedging to compromise China.

Actually, not only citizens but also the opposition parties or party factions are reluctant to adopt a China-friendly policy, particularly on security dimension. It can be seen that Japanese political parties' views on China is comparatively unified now. The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, the largest opposition party, has clearly stated in its policy book that it will be tough on China (The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan, 2021). Likewise, in the LDP, there was not explicit examples that the pro-China Nikai faction or other factions have notably expressed opposition to Abe's China policies. This relatively unified attitude toward China policy maybe due to the fact that the issue surrounding the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands has not resolved since Abe assumed the prime minister's office.

Abe's attitude was carried over to the Suga administration. In terms of foreign policy, the Suga administration follows the same line as Abe in emphasizing the Japan-U.S. alliance, expanding democratic values with the U.S., and promoting on Indo-Pacific policy. With regard to China policy, it can be said he chooses balancing strategy as well as Abe, and seems to have taken on a stronger balancing tone than under Abe. "The U.S.-Japan Joint Statement," which aforementioned not only indicates Chinese assertiveness but also concerns the Taiwan issue clearly, is in line with the international community's concerns about China. There would be two reasons why he took over Abe's China policy. One is that the impression of China was worsening both internationally and domestically due to its continued territorial aggression against Japan, the spread of the coronavirus, and its repression of Hong Kong. Another reason for the continuing the Abe style is the emergence of the Biden administration. Biden, like Trump, had a very tough attitude toward China. However, unlike Trump's unilateralist approach, Biden has taken a stronger stance toward China by emphasizing democratic values among allies, and the Japan-U.S. alliance has also become more solid than under the Trump administration.

As for the Kishida administration, it has been in office for only a short period of time and still needs to be observed. At the moment, like Abe and Suga, he is maintaining his basic

stance of emphasizing the Japan-U.S. alliance. Also, he revealed the plan to increase the defense budget with rising China in mind. However, Kishida himself is a member of the liberal faction of the LDP, which is the opposite of Abe. So, it remains to be seen how this will affect his policy toward China and other foreign policies. Moreover, even though there are no signs of improvement in the Japan-China relations these days, China remains a very important economic partner for Japan, and it is impossible to completely cut ties with China. This point makes it even more difficult to predict how Kishida will steer his China policy in the future.



6. Taiwan's China Policy since 2016

6.1 Politics before 2016 and the Coming of Tsai: The End of Rapprochement

This chapter will discuss Taiwan's China policy in the Tsai administration. Before that, in this section, I would like to summarize the policy toward China before the Tsai administration, which is mainly the Ma administration, and Tsai's background information before she came to power.

Tsai Ing-wen is a DPP-affiliated politician, while Ma Ying-jeou, who served as president before her, was a KMT-affiliated politician. Ma has embraced the KMT's ideology in the cross-strait relations, namely, China and Taiwan both are belonging to an "One China" and according to the constitution, the "one China" is the ROC unification with China is certainly an option for the KMT. Therefore, Ma had behaved differently from his predecessor, the DPP's Chen Shui-bian who attached an anti-China policy. As expressed by Wang and Tan (2021), "Taipei's strategy toward an increasing powerful China has been largely alternating between balancing and hedging between 2000 and 2016, depending on which political party is in power" (p. 3). Ma served as president from 2008 to 2016. During the Ma administration, scholars had shared relative agreement that he adopted the hedging strategy toward China (Wang and Tan, 2021, p. 4, Wu, 2016, p. 485). For example, in his inaugural speech on May 20, 2008, he stated that

"I sincerely hope that the two sides of the Taiwan Strait can seize this historic opportunity to achieve peace and co-prosperity. Under the principle of 'no unification, no independence and no use of force,' as Taiwan's mainstream public opinion holds it, and under the framework of the ROC Constitution, we will maintain the status quo in the Taiwan Strait. In 1992, the two sides reached a consensus on 'one China, respective interpretations.' Many rounds of negotiation were then completed, spurring the development of the cross-strait relations. I want to reiterate that, based on the '1992

Consensus,’ negotiations should resume at the earliest time possible” (Ma, 2008).

In this speech, he announced “three no’s” and the embracement of the 1992 Consensus⁵ to his China policy. The “three no’s” principle and the stance of maintaining the status quo were both defensive as well as offensive for the Ma administration. Defensively, Ma articulated his determination to maintain the status quo across the Taiwan Strait. It was an echo to the mainstream public opinion at that time. By way of securing this status quo stance, Ma was able to persuade the Beijing government that, under his term of presidency, Taiwan will not adopt a policy toward Taiwan independence even though there will be no policy for unification neither. Offensively, the stance of maintaining the status quo also empowered Ma with ample space to actively engage with China. Based on the framework of the 1992 Consensus, Ma had effectively frozen the disputes of the meaning of “one China” and more interactions between the two sides were able to expand in large scale. The rapprochement stance was welcomed by Beijing, and the cross-strait relations improved significantly, especially on the economic front, for example, the signing of the ECFA in 2010.

Takeuchi (2017) points out that Ma Ying-jeou belongs to the conservative faction within the KMT. According to him, conservatives are those who maintain the ROC system and the “one China” principle (p. 16), and he notes that Ma wants to maintain the status quo with regard to the cross-strait relations in the short term, but in the future, he might want the cross-strait unification (p. 20). However, Ma was not bandwagoning to China even though he had maintained an eventual unification between Taiwan and China. On the contrary, Ma

⁵ On October 13, 1992, the Association for Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (China) and the Straits Exchange Foundation (Taiwan), the respective channels of communication between China and Taiwan, met in Hong Kong and, the ‘1992 Consensus’ was formed. This consensus is said to have been formed based on the agreement between the two sides on the issue of one China, but the interpretations of each side’s claims are different. While the Taiwanese side claims “one China, each expresses itself (一個中國，各自表述),” the Chinese side claims “one China means us,” and does not recognize the “each expresses itself (各自表述)” of the Taiwanese side’s claim. (Takeuchi, 2017, p. 16)

was pursuing a hedging policy in the cross-strait relations. Wu (2016) notes that the reason why Ma chose the hedging strategy is affected by the “critical factors created by the regional structure” (p. 485). Wu (2016) stated that hedging was better suited than balancing to maintain the peaceful cross-strait relations in terms of security interests, and stable and long-term economic cooperation with China (p. 485).

However, such pro-China but not bandwagoning policies of Ma Ying-jeou did not seem to gain support from the public. According to Ogasawara (2016), this was due to his inability to close the distance between the KMT and the Taiwanese people, whose “Taiwanese identity” was growing (p. 10). The economic benefits received from the cross-strait interactions were certainly contributive to Taiwan’s economy. Unfortunately, increasingly number of Taiwanese were fear of the favorable economic bonus from China would become the “Trojan Horse” alluring Taiwan to China’s scheme of unification. The Sunflower Movement in 2014 is a prime example of this. The protesters and sympathizers of the Movement had expressively worried about Taiwan’s economy would deeply depend on the one hand, and the danger of black-box decision process of China policy by the Ma administration. The Movement had delivered a heavy blow to the Ma administration’s China policy as well as the KMT’s electoral fortune in presidential election in 2016. The DPP won a majority in the presidential election in 2016 and Tsai became the new president. Tsai is the first female president in Taiwan’s history. Then, what kind of background does she have? Unlike Ma’s resume which had closely related to the KMT, Tsai pursued her career in academia at first. Her first foray into public service was as “legal advisor for Taiwan’s GATT and WTO accession negotiations” (Office of the President, Republic of China, n.d.). She also served as national security advisor under the Lee Teng-hui administration. As a disciple of Lee, Tsai was actually involved in the formulation of the “two-state theory” that caused a stir in many places. Nonetheless, Tsai was an independent who did not join the KMT. She did not join the DPP until taking the position of the head of the Executive Yuan’s Mainland Affairs

Council in the Chen Shui-bian administration in 2004. It was true that Tsai, before she firstly served as the DPP's Chairlady in 2008, she had been more a technocrat in the cross-strait relations than a career partisan figure. As the BBC News wrote that she is a party president who is not "dark green." Her position on Taiwan independence or anti-Chinese was actually not clear before she took the DPP's leadership at that time (Sui, 2016). In the next section, we will discuss her policy toward China in details after the presidential election in 2016.

6.2 Tsai's China Policy (2016~2019): Calling for a Dialogue

In this section, Tsai Ing-wen's China policy will be specifically discussed. Tsai won the presidential election of 2016, creating the first DPP government in eight years and became the first female president in Taiwan. It was an overwhelming victory, with 56% of the total votes, which is equivalent to about 6.89 million votes. This was the largest number of popular votes in Taiwan's electoral history at that time (Zheng, 2016). During her campaign, she carefully catered a safe China policy by promising she will maintain status quo in the cross-strait relations (Ogasawara, 2017). This stance, according to Komami (2019), was in line with the majority opinion of the Taiwanese public though not necessarily in line with the DPP's pro-independence ideology (p. 43).

Also, this election was the first time that the DPP was in complete control of the government. In addition to winning the presidential election, the DPP also won a majority seats in the Legislative Yuan for the first time (Watanabe, 2016, p. 17). Regarding the reason of this victory, Bush (2021) says it could be multiple courses such as "voters in any democracy eventually become dissatisfied with a party that has long held power" (p. 22), "the KMT suffered a significant split going into the election" (p. 23), and "the process for picking the KMT's presidential candidate was messy" (p. 23). In the cross-strait relations, Hickey and Niou (2017) explains it was because "former President Ma Ying-jeou's policies promoting a rapprochement with the People's Republic of China (PRC) made some [Taiwanese people]

nervous about Beijing's growing influence over the island" (p. 112). Regardless of what factors contributed to Tsai's electoral victory, it was no disagreements that the coming of the Tsai administration, as compared with the previous Ma administration, would signal a crucial juncture of Taiwan's political development, and the cross-strait relations would be particularly important.

On May 20, 2016, Tsai had the inaugural speech which declared a relatively steady stance on China policy. According to her speech, her approach to the cross-strait issues is based on following three pillars: "1) the Republic of China (ROC) Constitution; 2) the Act Governing Relations between People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (governing the conduct of legal relations between the two sides); and 3) the historical fact of the 1992 meeting and understandings reached in subsequent negotiations" (Hsiao and Hsiao, 2021, p. 130-131). These announcements emphasizing the importance of the ROC's constitutional framework and existing legislations governing cross-strait relations were safe and no sharp departure from her predecessor Ma. However, regarding the "1992 Consensus" mentioned in the third pillar, Tsai was circuitous not to explicitly admit the consensus and the implied "one China principle." In the speech, Tsai stated,

"In 1992, the two institutions representing each side across the Strait (SEF & ARATS), through communication and negotiations, arrived at various joint acknowledgements and understandings. It was done in a spirit of mutual understanding and a political attitude of seeking common ground while setting aside differences. I respect this historical fact. Since 1992, over twenty years of interactions and negotiations across the Strait have enabled and accumulated outcomes which both sides must collectively cherish and sustain" (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2016).

Beijing was very unhappy that Tsai did not explicitly acknowledge the “1992 Consensus.” As a result, China began applying various pressures on Taiwan, including stopping the cross-strait exchanges, having countries that had diplomatic relations with Taiwan cut their relations with Taiwan, and denying Taiwan participation in official forums such as ICAO and WHO, which were able to participate in during the Ma administration (Komami, 2019, p. 37). In fact, the emerging tension between the new DPP government and the Beijing government was also evident among the Taiwanese. In the survey conducted in November 2016 by the Taiwan National Security Survey (TNSS), many Taiwanese said they felt that cross-strait relations had deteriorated compared to eight years of the Ma administration and that they believed this deterioration would have a negative impact on Taiwan’s economy (Hickey and Niou, 2017, p. 114). Tsai’s stance and interpretation of the 1992 Consensus, and the harsh responses from the Beijing government had thus become the landmine in the cross-strait relations.

In this inaugural speech, the “New Southbound Policy” was also mentioned. This policy aims to “broaden exchanges and cooperation with regional neighbors in areas such as technology, culture and commerce, and expand in particular our dynamic relationships with ASEAN and India” (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2016). This policy is said to be part of an economic strategy aimed at moving away from excessive dependence on mainland China by deepening relations with Southeast and South Asia (Sugino, 2017). The New Southbound Policy was discussed in the regional development section of the inaugural address. In fact, the cross-strait relations were also discussed in this regional development section. In this regard, Hsiao and Hsiao (2021) argue that “This may be seen as an effort by the new administration to embed its China policy within a broader regional strategy, in contrast to the previous Ma Ying-jeou administration’s China-centric approach” (p. 131).

In addition to the deterioration of cross-strait relations, at this time, Taiwan’s relationship with the U.S., which is “Taiwan’s only potential security partner” (Hickey and

Niou, 2017, p. 115) and is very important for Taiwan's security, has also been affected by Trump. The future of U.S.-Taiwan relations had become uncertain with the advent of him. The election of Donald Trump as the president of the U.S. in November 2016 was widely reported with surprise in Taiwan. According to Sahashi (2019, June 12), when it was first decided that the unconventional Trump would be inaugurated as president of the U.S., there were some thoughts that the relationship between the U.S. and China, which has been maintained for the past 40 years would be broken, and that this would affect Taiwan as well. Despite Trump made a telephone conversation with Xi Jinping in February 2017 after he took office and confirmed that he would continue to respect the "one China principle" as before (Reuters, 2017, February 10). In late 2017 and into 2018, U.S.-China relations were under a cloud (Sahashi, 2019, June 12) while the relations between the U.S. and Taiwan also changed. I will discuss this point again later.

The cross-strait relations remained deteriorating in 2017, and support for Tsai Ing-wen continued to decline. The reasons for this decline of Tsai's popular approval includes the lack of significant achievements in improving the cross-strait relations, the failure to garner public support for domestic policies (e.g., revision of the Basic Labor Law, reform of the pension system), and the slow pace of policy implementation (e.g., discussions on legalizing same-sex marriage) (Sankei Shimbun, May 17, 2017).

Perhaps in an effort to defuse the situation in the face of ever-increasing Chinese pressure on Taiwan and deteriorating the cross-strait relations, Tsai Ing-wen "proposed a 'three-new' (new situation, new questionnaire, new pattern) thesis on the cross-strait relations in a media interview" (Tsai, 2018, p. 77) in May. Regarding new situation, Tsai said that China should reconsider the cross-strait relations in light of the current new situation, update our minds and thoughts, and adopt a goodwill attitude toward Taiwan. About new questionnaire, she said that if China continues to talk about unanswered questions [= 1992 Consensus], it will be seen as lacking goodwill. She also said that the cross-strait relations are

now facing a new questionnaire and both sides should look for answers together. Lastly, as for new pattern, she stated that a certain degree of goodwill and flexibility must be maintained in the cross-strait exchanges to stabilize it and it will be beneficial for people (Zhong and Shi, 2017). While Tsai said the 1992 Consensus should not be mentioned, Wu Den-yih, the newly appointed KMT chairman in May, has stated the same argument as Ma that the cross-strait relations should be based on the “1992 Consensus” (Lin, 2017). From this, it can be seen that different political parties within the same Taiwan have very different stances on the cross-strait relations. So, what did Tsai Ing-wen have to say about the cross-strait relations, which have shown no progress at all?

On October 10, 2017, Tsai continued to express her willingness to create workable communication channels with the Beijing government in her National Day speech. In this speech, she only stated that “Our goodwill will not change, our commitments will not change, we will not revert to the old path of confrontation, and we will not bow to pressure. This has been my consistent position on cross-strait relations,” “As we face new circumstances in cross-strait and regional relations, leaders from both sides should together work to display the political wisdom that has carried us through over the years.” “We should search for new modes of cross-strait interactions with determination and patience” (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2017). Though these messages look like passing an olive branch from the Tsai administration to the Beijing government, Tsai did not step back on the issue of the 1992 Consensus. Namely, Tsai has been resolute to remove the bondage of “one China principle” enforced by China if there were more interactions between the two sides.

Tsai’s announcement did not receive friendly reaction from the Beijing government. In response, China’s leader, Xi Jinping stated at the 19th Party Congress in November that “We must uphold the one-China principle and the 1992 Consensus” (Xi, 2017). The importance of the 1992 Consensus in relations is strongly emphasized by Xi which run directly against the basic stance of the Tsai administration. Hence, this apparent deterioration

in the cross-strait relations has further intensified Chinese pressure on Taiwan, with Panama newly establishing diplomatic relations with China (Sankei Shimbun, 2017, June 14). China has continued to narrow the scope of Taiwan's international activities like this.

Looking at the cross-strait relations in 2018, it remained as bad as ever, and both Taiwan's attitude toward China and China's attitude toward Taiwan remained hardline. In her National Day speech on October 10, Tsai Ing-wen said that as before, "The people of Taiwan will never accept any attempt by external forces to unilaterally change the status quo in the Taiwan Strait." (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2018). And China has also stated its opposition, as it has in the past (Tsai, 2019, p. 80).

The local elections were then held on November 24, 2018. This election was the first major election under the Tsai Ing-wen administration, which took office in May 2016, and was something of a midterm test for her. However, the results showed that the ruling DPP suffered a disastrous defeat, and Tsai Ing-wen resigned as DPP's Chairlady. The defeat in the mayoral election in Kaohsiung was a particularly hard blow to the DPP. This is because Kaohsiung had been a city where the DPP had served as mayor since 1998 (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2019, p. 176). Although the election resulted in a KMT majority at the local level, the outcome of this election did not appear to significantly change the DPP's policy toward China. Nonetheless, the electoral defeat had delivered a weighty blow to Tsai's popularity.

For the Tsai administration, the setbacks in the domestic politics were offset by newly emerged external relations. To some degree, 2018 was a year of great strides in U.S.-Taiwan relations due to the worsening U.S.-China relations. Both the U.S. Congress and the Senate jointly strengthened their support for Taiwan by various legislations and announcements. For example, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the "Taiwan Travel Act" in January and the Senate in February, which facilitates the travel of key U.S. and Taiwanese officials (Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan, 2018). Meanwhile, the Trump administration further promoted Taiwan-friendly politicians in the

cabinet. In April, John Bolton was appointed assistant to the president for security affairs. He is said to be an advocate for the stationing of U.S. troops in Taiwan and the restoration of U.S.-Taiwan diplomatic relations (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2019, p. 184). In addition, U.S. Navy vessels have passed through the Taiwan Strait three times since late October 2018 to counter Chinese military pressure (Kitamura, 2019). Additionally, in December, the Asian Reassurance Initiative Act (ARIA), which calls for increased security cooperation in the Indo-Pacific region and regular arms transfers to Taiwan, was passed by the Senate on December 4 and the House on December 12.

The increasingly close relations between Taiwan and the U.S. did not only benefit Taiwan but certainly serves to the interests of the U.S. as well. Some see these moves as aforementioned by the U.S. do not simply to strengthen ties with Taiwan, but to counter China's military threaten and prepare for a "cold war" with China in the East Asian region (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2019, p. 185). Wang and deLisle (2021) also state that "U.S. support for a more robust international presence for Taiwan can serve U.S. interests, including: advancing values agendas in the U.S. foreign policy; having a like-minded fellow participant at the table; and discouraging moves by Beijing to bully Taiwan that could draw the U.S. into a crisis or conflict" (p. 191). It can be said that the U.S. is strengthening relations with Taiwan within the scope of U.S. national interests.

2019 is likely to be a year of major changes in both the cross-strait and the U.S.-Taiwan relations. First, Tsai who until now has assumed that the status quo would be maintained in the cross-strait relations and has avoided provoking China, made a more explicit policy stance in the cross-strait relation in her New Year's speech on January 1. In that speech, she called "Four must" on China that "it must face the reality of the existence of the Republic of China (Taiwan), it must respect the existence of the 23 million people of Taiwan to freedom and democracy," "it must handle cross-strait differences peacefully, on a basis of equality," "it must be governments or government-authorized agencies that engage in negotiations." In

addition, to protect Taiwan's security in the cross-strait exchanges, Tsai also called for strengthening "three security networks," which are security on people's livelihood, information security, and security protecting democracy in the cross-strait interactions (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2019, January 1). Considering Tsai Ing-wen's stance on the cross-strait relations until 2019, it can be said that she has become quite persistent on a Taiwan-centered perspective on the cross-strait relations.

Yet, on the other side of the Taiwan Strait, the Beijing government seemed continue to maintain a hawkish stance on Taiwan issue. On January 2, Xi Jinping delivered a speech commemorating the 40th anniversary of "Messages to Compatriots in Taiwan," which was published in 1979. Here, he emphasized his call for "one country, two systems" for Taiwan and that the Taiwan issue is China's internal affairs (Mo, 2019). Xi's arguments did not differ significantly from the arguments proposed earlier by Deng Xiaoping. The "one China principle" continues to be the core and untouchable guideline for the cross-strait relations. Taiwan is destined to return the Chinese motherland under the formula of "one country, two systems." However, the impact of Xi's speech on Taiwan was not only a repeat of the already-known Chinese unification scheme which does not welcome in Taiwan, but also strengthened a Taiwanese sentiment of anti-China which also utilized by the Tsai administration.

In response to Xi's speech, Tsai expressed her opposition immediately on the same day. She had a press conference in the afternoon to express Taiwan's position. Here, she said

"First of all, we must emphasize that we have never yet accepted the '92 Consensus.' The fundamental reason for this is that the '92 Consensus' as defined by the Beijing authority is' in other words, 'one China' and 'one country, two systems.' Today's talk by Xi Jinping proves that our understanding was correct. I would like to reiterate my point here. Taiwan will not accept the 'one country, two systems' policy. The overwhelming majority of Taiwanese people are vehemently opposed

to the ‘one country, two systems,’ and this is the ‘Taiwan consensus.’” (Taipei Economic and Culture Center in Osaka, 2019)

Tsai’s stance was more than clear, the DPP government would not continue the previous KMT government’s China policy. On March 11, Tsai convened a meeting of National Security Council which gave birth to the strategy and mechanisms for responding to PRC's “one country, two systems model for Taiwan” were finalized (Office of President, Republic of China, 2019, March 11). Later on, five legislative amendments were submitted from May to July and passed by the Legislative Yuan (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2020, p. 158-159). These five legislative amendments include the amendments of the Classified National Security Information Protection Act (國家機密保護法), Act Governing Relations between the People of Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area (台灣地區與大陸地區人民關係條例), National Security Act (國家安全法), Criminal Code of the Republic of China (中華民國刑法). Due to these amendments, negotiating with the Chinese side without being commissioned by the government, or having contact with their agents, as the KMT did during the Chen administration and the Ma administration, are now a new punishable offense (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2019, p. 159). Furthermore, on December 31, the Legislative Yuan passed the Anti-Infiltration Act (反滲透法), a bill to crack down on infiltration operations in Taiwan by China and other countries (Aspinwall, 2020).

It was obvious that, even though the DPP suffered from a dramatic electoral defeat in the 2018 local election, the Tsai administration still had its power to determine preserving Taiwan’s autonomy, or sovereignty, in the cross-strait relations. This, of course, was a directly defiant gesture to the Beijing government. It was thus expected an escalating hostility between the two sides. Needless to say, the severe competition between the U.S. and China had drawn Taiwan closer to the U.S. The U.S. had not only played a more active role in the East

Asian region, but also become an external boost for the Tsai administration in the cross-strait relations. This development had continued and strengthened in 2019.

The year 2019, which marked the 40th anniversary of the enactment of the “Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)” and was also strongly influenced by the U.S.-China trade war, was a year witnessed an even stronger relations between Taiwan and the U.S. The U.S. increased its military involvement by selling more weapons both in number and quality to Taiwan to protect it from the growing Chinese threat. The Trump administration also ordered more presence of the U.S. warships near Taiwan. It is recorded that the U.S. naval vessels had passed through the Taiwan Strait nine times in 2019. In the same 2019, it was observed the highest level of contact between U.S. and Taiwanese government officials since the 1979 diplomatic crossing (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2020, p. 165-166). This may be due to the coincidence of the goals of the U.S. and Taiwan, both of which were worried about China’s hegemonic behavior. For the Taiwan side, defending the possible China’s invasion has been the first priority. The direct clash between the DPP government’s pro-independence stance has offended the Beijing government’s “sacred mission” of unifying Taiwan. The presence of the U.S.-China trade war and its concomitant impacts have boosted the Tsai administration’s persistent balancing stance against China. For the U.S. side, the increasing assertive China’s rise has been a strong challenge towards the U.S.’s global leadership, including its hegemonic status in the East Asian region. As the DPP came to power in 2016, Taiwan was swinging from a rapprochement stance to a balancing stance. This had offered the Trump administration an opportunity to bring Taiwan closer than ever in the U.S.-China-Taiwan relations.

In addition to the enhancement of the Taiwan-U.S. relations, the breakout of mass protests in Hong Kong had further agitated the tense cross-strait relations. The Hong Kong government intended to pass the “Fugitive Offenders and Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters Legislation (Amendment) Bill” in 2019 had introduced a lengthy popular opposition. Volunteer social groups, members of academia, and legal professionals feared

about the legislation would undermine Hong Kong's judicial autonomy prescribed by the "one country, two systems" principle in practice since the 1997 handover. This popular perception also reflected a deep distrust of Beijing's intrusion of human rights in Hong Kong. In fact, the image of the outcomes of the Umbrella Movement in 2014 was still very much alive in the minds of many people in Hong Kong. It was thus reasonable that this legislation would arouse the public concerns which demanded for the withdrawal of the Bill. Unfortunately, the Hong Kong government did not respond positively to the public concerns. Instead, leading oppositionists were either put in jail or silenced and eventually escalated the direct confrontations between the two sides until 2020.

The Tsai administration had kept a watchful eye on the event occurred in Hong Kong. On the one hand, the Tsai administration had expressed its support to the protesters who safeguarded Hong Kong's judiciary independence and political autonomy. On the other hand, the Tsai administration also denounced the political ambition of the Beijing government meddling in the Hong Kong without respecting the principle of "one country, two systems." More importantly, these developments in Hong Kong had provided the Tsai administration an expedient example showing the majority of Taiwanese that the Beijing government was ambitious and not worthy of trust. The political promises delivered by the Beijing government would be never ever sincere. Taiwan should be very careful not to follow the step of Hong Kong, otherwise, it would lead to a realization of "Hong Kong today, Taiwan tomorrow."

The recent developments in Hong Kong were a positive cue for the Tsai administration to justify its anti-China stance. The response of the major opposition, the KMT seemed unheard regarding to the events happened in Hong Kong. In the end, the Hong Kong issue had re-enforced the Tsai administration to take an overt anti-China stance in the wake of approaching presidential election in 2020.

6.3 The Second Term of Tsai (2020~): Time to Balance against China

As aforementioned, the cross-strait relations continued to deteriorate since 2016 and Tsai had experienced a tough interaction with China. Nonetheless, the negative interactions between Taiwan and China did not jeopardize Tsai's electorate fortune. In the presidential election held on January 11, 2020, Tsai won an overwhelming victory with approximately 8.2 million votes, which is equivalent to 57% of the vote (BBC News, 2020, January 13). Scholars and analysts have presented various perspectives explaining Tsai's electoral victory. For example, Bush (2021) cites five other reasons, which indicate not simply that Tsai Ing-wen's hardline attitude toward China won her public support. According to him, these five might be one of reasons of her and DPP's victory: (1) "voters in any democracy eventually become dissatisfied with a party that has long held power," (2) "the KMT suffered a significant split going into election," (3) "during Ma's second term the KMT had not coped with the emergence of young activists who skillfully used social media to mount protests in support of various causes," (4) "the process of picking the KMT's presidential candidate was messy," (5) "the KMT lost control of the policy agenda" (p. 22-23). Bush was correct in the interpretations of the DPP's winning of the 2020 election, or more precisely, the KMT's losing the 2020 election. Since the DPP's disastrous defeat in the 2018 local elections, it had been said that Tsai Ing-wen was unlikely to win the 2020 presidential election.

However, in addition to the combination these factors aforesaid, Tsai's victory can be attributed to her tough stance against China which is increasing its pressure on Hong Kong and Taiwan recently. For example, the Xi's speech in 2019 had effectively disarmed the KMT's long-term electoral strength against the DPP. When Xi interpreted the so call "1992 Consensus" equated to "one China principle." It was a direct deny of the KMT's interpretation of "1992 Consensus" which emphasized "respective interpretations." Namely, Xi's interpretation of "1992 Consensus" under Beijing version of "one China principle" without recognizing the KMT's version of "respective interpretations" had driven the KMT into an abyss of accusation by the DPP that the KMT had been echoing the Beijing's stance on

unification. In the presidential campaign, China issue was a crucial issue, and under the DPP's electoral engineering, vote for the KMT candidate equates to vote for a representative of Beijing government.

Another issue related to the cross-strait relations also jeopardized the KMT's electoral fortune in the 2020 presidential election was the KMT's presidential candidate, Han Kuo-yu's visit to Hong Kong and Macau not long after Xi's speech. In the trip, Han's visit and his meeting with local officials were soon interpreted as an act of chiming in with Beijing's "one country, two systems" formula. It was certainly not a positive credit for the KMT but only offered an easy leverage for the DPP to criticize the KMT's China-friendly stance. Thus, the developments in Hong Kong, the announcement of China's leadership, and the KMT's inability to justify its relation with the CCP, had jointly undercut the KMT's credibility in the presidential election in 2020. And the electoral result also carried a strong message that majority of Taiwanese were not in favor of the China-friendly KMT. Instead, they preferred the anti-China DPP to continue in power.

Knowing the importance of the cross-strait relations and the anticipation of the majority of Taiwanese, in her inaugural speech on May 20, Tsai clearly rejected the "one country two systems" policy that China is forcing on Taiwan. Not much difference from the case of 2016, Tsai said that Taiwan would maintain the status quo in the cross-strait relations in accordance with the "Constitution of the Republic of China" and the "Act Governing Relations between the People of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area," and that Taiwan will not provoke China, so China should stop provoking Taiwan (Office of the President, Republic of China, May 20, 2020). Noticeably, even though Tsai won the presidential election could be explained, at least partially, by her anti-China manifesto, Tsai continued to maintain a low but steady position which follows the ROC Constitution (equates to does not pursue a *de jure* Taiwan independence) and not to unify with China.

Facing the second term of the Tsai administration, the Beijing government’s patience was soon eradicated. Chinese incursions into Taiwan have not only not ceased, but the frequency of incursions has actually increased significantly. In 2020, Chinese military aircraft entered Taiwan’s ADIZ (Air Defense Identification Zone) 380 times, the biggest number in the past 30 years, and they became especially active after the end of the presidential election. (Takeuchi and Ikegami, 2021, p. 163-164). In addition, according to Taiwan’s Ministry of National Defense, the number of the emergency launches of jets by the ROC Armed Forces to deal with “Chinese People’s Liberation Army Air Force (PLAAF)” aircraft since the beginning of 2020 is more than double the number in 2019 (Indo-Pacific Defense Forum, 2020). Here, as Figure 2 indicates, the defense spending has been increasing year by year, but as a percentage of GDP, it has always remained around 2%, and in this respect, as in Japan, it does not appear to have increased significantly.




Figure 6.1 Taiwan’s Defense Budget and Defense Spending by % of GDP

Source: Legislative Yuan, Republic of China (2020).

This military pressure from China and the U.S.-China trade war have intensified the relations between Taiwan and the U.S., and the relations between Taiwan and some European countries. According to Yu (2021), the deterioration of the U.S.-China relations and the improvement of the U.S.-Taiwan relations “led to a discussion of revising the US’s long-term

policy of strategic ambiguity” (p. 84). The U.S. welcomed Tsai’s reelection, with Secretary of State Pompeo sending a congratulatory message on January 11 (Pompeo, 2020). In addition, the U.S. Congress passed Taiwan Allies International Protection and Enhancement Initiative Act (commonly known as the TAIPEI Act), which was enacted on March 26, 2021 to maintain diplomatic relations between Taiwan and other countries and to encourage Taiwan’s participation in international organizations. Meanwhile, Taiwan also deepened its ties with European countries. On January 13, when Prague and Taipei signed a sister city agreement, Shanghai broke its sister city agreement with Prague and increased pressure on the Czech Republic (Reuters, 2020, January 14). This unilateral Chinese attitude toward the Czech Republic led to increased criticism of China among European countries that distrusted it. Thus, it can be said that the year 2020 was a time when Taiwan’s presence in the multilateral international community increased further.

2021 was a challenging year for the Tsai administration. Domestically, the outbreak of coronavirus pandemic in the late 2019 had turned into a pressing issue for Taiwan. The DPP government adopted a strict border control policy in 2020 which had successfully kept Taiwan from being contagious like neighboring countries. However, the performance of procurement of the coronavirus vaccine did not go smoothly and cause Tsai’s approval ratings to decline (Wu, 2021). The procurement of the coronavirus vaccine did not go smoothly was in part due to the Chinese side-stepping in purchasing the vaccine. China called on Taiwan to purchase vaccines made in China, but Tsai refused (NHK, 2021). Yet, despite these disruptions, Taiwan had generally managed the pandemic better than other countries.

Taiwan’s response to the pandemic was praised around the world, and hopes were high that it might be able to join the WHO as an observer. In the end, unfortunately, strong opposition from China prevented Taiwan’s participation. It can be said that the cross-strait relations have reached a complete stalemate, and in her National Day speech on October 10, Tsai emphasized the acceleration of pressure from China by stating, “the more we achieve,

the greater the pressure we face from China.” In addition, Tsai insisted that Taiwan wants to maintain the status quo and that China needs to step up to the plate in order to do so, and strongly criticized any action by China that would lead to a unilateral change in the status quo. (Office of the President, Republic of China, 2021).

Externally, the establishment of the Biden administration in the U.S. in January 2021 has further strengthened Taiwan’s presence in the international community. Initially, there were some concerns that the Biden administration might downplay relations with Taiwan in favor of relations with China. However, even after the Trump administration was replaced by the Biden administration, the U.S. government has continued to make tough criticism against Chinese actions in Xinjiang, Hong Kong, and Taiwan, cyber-attack against the U.S., and economic pressure on U.S. allies (Mizumura, 2021, p. 15). The Biden administration also places great importance on cooperation with Japan and other allies and friends. The fact that Taiwan widely shares a sense of caution toward China and an awareness of the need for a peaceful resolution of the cross-strait relations with such countries through the announcement of the “U.S.-Japan Joint Declaration” and other means, has greatly helped to improve Taiwan’s standing in the international community, where its role in the international community is becoming increasingly limited due to increased pressure from China.

Looking at the current global situation, criticism of China has been growing, especially in Western countries, and it is difficult to imagine that the cross-strait relations will improve dramatically in the near future. On the other hand, despite the stalemate in the cross-strait relations with no improvement in sight, China remains Taiwan’s number one trading partner in terms of both exports and imports (Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan, 2022). In 2016, Taiwan announced the New Southbound Policy to reduce its dependence on China, but it does not seem to have been well utilized yet. While economic ties are key to improving the cross-strait relations, given the current situation, it is possible that Taiwan will make more use of the New Southbound Policy to reduce its dependence on China.

6.4 Summary: Steering the China Policy in the Disunited Society

Taken all of them together, it can be said that compared to her predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, Tsai Ing-wen's China policy has been more balancing than hedging as Wang and Tan (2021) indicated. Chen (2017) pointed out that Tsai Ing-wen has a "moderate" policy toward China. Indeed, her early attitude toward China could be called moderate. But after Xi Jinping's 40th anniversary speech in 2019, the balancing tone has certainly strengthened. China is an entity that fits into Walt's four threats, combining aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability, and offensive. China's threats have approached at the door step for the Tsai administration. This is a sufficient reason for Taiwan to take balancing measures.

Specifically, Tsai is working to strengthen Taiwan's defense capabilities by amending domestic laws and regulations to counter China and by increasing defense spending, even though it remains the same as a percentage of GDP. More importantly, Tsai has also established closer ties with the U.S. and further estranged Taiwan from China. Unlike Ma, she has never accepted "1992 Consensus." Although Tsai has not attempted to confront China head-on through concrete actions such as the creation of the FOIP and other frameworks to enclose China, as Japan has done, Tsai has patiently and persistently called for a dialogue between the cross-strait. Namely, Tsai in fact does not exclude further interactions between Taiwan and China. What Tsai intends is Taiwan should not subsume to China's sovereignty claim over Taiwan which framed by the Beijing government.

From a moderate and play-it-safe China policy to a balancing China policy, several developments are of special importance. Firstly, Tsai is a DPP politician, and unlike KMT, the DPP does not aim for the cross-strait unification. Therefore, it can be said that Tsai will not adopt a policy that is more accommodating to China than necessary, as Ma Ying-jeou did. Moreover, as a result of the U.S.-China trade war, the U.S. support for Taiwan has become timely and more generous. The strong backing of the U.S. can be considered one of the reasons for the strengthening of the balancing tone. Furthermore, China has not responded to


any of Taiwan's calls for dialogue. Tsai Ing-wen has at every turn insisted on maintaining the status quo and called on China to recognize the reality, but China has never responded to this call and has instead only increased pressure on Taiwan.

Meanwhile, the reasons why the Tsai administration does not embrace a complete confrontation approach to China, or even declare Taiwan's independence have made her government different from the Abe administration. It is true that, regardless of how intense of vocal quarrels across the Taiwan Strait, and how threatening China's military vessels and aircrafts to Taiwan, the Tsai has never addressed to the issue of pursuing Taiwan independence. Instead, the Tsai administration has persistently advocated to maintain the status quo across the strait. One of the reasons comes from very few countries have diplomatic relations with Taiwan. Therefore, it would be difficult to establish an international framework or call on other countries to participate in it, as is the case with Japan. Also, Taiwan, unlike Japan, does not have a unified national identity, and the KMT and the DPP have very different ideologies toward China. In order not to cause greater controversy than necessary within the country, Taiwan will probably only advocate maintaining the status quo and call for dialogue.

Equally important, Taiwan's relationship with the U.S. is close but without formal security alliance. Unlike Japan, Taiwan is not an ally of the U.S. At present, the U.S.-China trade war and China's attempts to unilaterally change the status quo have worsened the U.S.-China relations, and as a result, the U.S.-Taiwan relationship has strengthened, but there is no telling how long this will continue. Therefore, it is thought that Taiwan may be hesitant to take bold steps in cooperation with the U.S., as Japan has done. Last, but not the least, public sentiment in Taiwan toward China has dramatically worsened. Although it is pointed out that Taiwan is not unified in terms of national identity, it is believed that the barriers between the two countries are not as strong today as they used to be. China's repression of Hong Kong and other regions has significantly worsened the Taiwanese people's views on China, and there would have been no way for Tsai Ing-wen not to tap into this public sentiment. There is

a survey about security of the cross-strait relations conducted by Yu and Huang (2021). We can see how Taiwanese people perceive China. To the question “which country [China or the U.S.] should Taiwan choose as an ally? (p. 10)”, 69% of the respondents chose the U.S. Also, 65.7% of the respondents answered that “China’s security threat to Taiwan has got stronger than before. (p. 11)”

For these reasons, Tsai Ing-wen is likely to base her balancing policy toward China on a call for dialogue to maintain the status quo. However, while the cross-strait relations have deteriorated and balancing measures are being taken against China, economic ties have not been severed, as in the case of Japan, and China is an extremely important economic presence for Taiwan, and Taiwanese people are also aware of it. According to the survey (Yu and Huang, 2021), the average score the answer of how important China’s economy to Taiwan given by the respondents is 6.21 out of 10 (p. 12). So, it is not realistic to completely sever ties. This point may be said to make the cross-strait relations more difficult.



7. Conclusion

In this chapter, the four research questions presented in Chapter 2 will be answered. Also, after the discussions of previous chapters, the limitation of this research and the future prospects of the Japan-China relations and the cross-strait relations will be discussed.

7.1 Responses to the Research Questions

The answer to the first research question, “In what way do Japan and Taiwan engage with China in the wake of China’s hegemonic rising in East Asia?” is that both of Japan and Taiwan have adopted a balancing strategy to deal with the rising China. When the balance of threat theory by Walt is applied, China clearly belongs to all of four threats. In addition, both Japan and Taiwan strengthened their relations with the U.S. to balance China. As for Japan, under the former of DPJ administrations, it had a more friendly tone to China. However, after the 2010 Senkaku/Diaoyu boat collision incident happened, Japan’s China policy eventually switched to a balancing strategy. Specifically, Abe tried to strengthened the national defense capability by increasing the defense budget, establishing the NSS, and amendment of Article 9. Furthermore, he intensified not only the Japan-U.S. alliance but also the relations with other like-minded countries which share the democratic values through the framework like FOIP and QUAD. The reasons why he chose to balance China are following: due to his political ideology; the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands issues showing no signs of resolution; the importance of the Japan-U.S. alliance; and deterioration of Japanese citizens sentiment toward China. After Abe retired, the same attitude is carried over to his successors.

As for Taiwan, Tsai intensified the national defense capability by amendment of legislations, strengthening the relations with the U.S., and increasing the defense budget. She has never accepted the “1992 Consensus” unlike Ma. To maintain the status quo, she keeps calling for China to have a dialogue. The reasons why she chose a balancing strategy unlike her predecessor could be following: because she is from the DPP; China never responded to

her call for the dialogue; the relations with the U.S. were strengthened; and the Taiwanese public sentiment toward China deteriorated.

As for the second question, “What are the similarities and differences between the Abe administration and the Tsai administration’s China policy?” I would raise two similarities and two differences. The first similarity is strengthening national defense capability. Even though the defense budget has been increased, this may not be enough to say that they have increased their defense capability, since the ratio to GDP remains the same. However, Japan has been ready to encounter China by enlarging the scope of SDF’s activities and joint military exercises with the U.S. and QUAD countries. Taiwan also has been preparing to confront with China by letting the U.S. Navy vessels pass through the Taiwan Strait and buying more weapons in number and quality from the U.S.

The second similarity is both of them intensified the relations with the U.S., especially in terms of security. Japan declared the historical “U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement” in 2021 to share the democratic value and spread it. In the case of Taiwan, as a result of the U.S.-China trade war, the backup from the U.S. increased and the U.S. established many laws to support Taiwan.

On the contrary, as for the first difference, it can be raised that while Japan intensified its relationship with not only the U.S. but also other like-minded countries through the frameworks like FOIP and QUAD to encounter the rising China, there are not many examples that Taiwan is doing so. The second difference is how to deal with China which is changing the status quo in the East Asian region. In the case of Japan, it cooperates with other countries and fully embraces democratic values. By doing so, Japan is trying to encircle China and make it isolated. On the other hand, Taiwan is not taking any specific actions to encircle or make China isolated like Japan. What Taiwan is doing is calling for a dialogue to maintain the status quo. Then why were these differences created? It will be discussed next.

The third question is “What creates these differences?” The possible reason why the first difference is created can be attributed to the difference of diplomatic status. Unlike Japan, Taiwan’s diplomatic status is very unstable. In addition, countries which have diplomatic ties with Taiwan are usually small powers. Taiwan is also leading the framework called the New Southbound Policy, but this emphasizes economic aspect, and has not achieved a lot yet. When we take Taiwan’s unstable diplomatic status into account, it can be said that it should be difficult for Taiwan to take lead in presenting a new framework for security or involve other countries in it like Japan.

The reason for the second difference is also related to Taiwan’s unstable diplomatic status. Taiwan’s relations with the U.S. are not a formal alliance, and nobody knows when the generous support from the U.S. will cease. It is too risky for Taiwan to take bold actions in such a situation. Furthermore, the influence of China’s warning cannot be ignored either. Tsai does not want to provoke China more than necessary. This attitude makes her avoid being too proactive to China. In addition, in Taiwan, the two major parties, the KMT and the DPP, have very different attitudes toward China, and the national identity is complex too. This may have led Tsai Ing-wen to believe that calling for a dialogue aimed at maintaining the status quo, as her former administration had continued to do, would be the least disruptive way to domestic harmony. Equally important, China has been the most important market for Taiwan’s business exports. There is no doubt that Taiwan’s economy has been highly depended on China. If the Tsai administration were to take bold measures against China, as Japan has done, it would surely face fierce domestic criticism from the KMT and some citizens, and if that were to happen, a domestic split would be inevitable. That is why it is best to maintain the status quo in the cross-strait relations, and to do so, although Taiwan has strengthened its balancing tone in its policy toward China, its actions may be limited to calling for dialogue. In the case of Japan, the diplomatic position is stable, and the domestic political parties’ attitude toward China and national identity are relatively unified. Perhaps the possible collateral damages for

Japan's balancing strategy would be the decrease of economic benefits from China. Nonetheless, these economic benefits were sidelined for the sake of security concerns.

The answer to the fourth question, "How does the role of the U.S. affect Japan's China policy and Taiwan's China policy?" is that the U.S. affected both countries' China policies a lot. As it is mentioned above, by intensifying the relations with the U.S., both countries have moved to the balancing strategy. This is even more clear when both the Trump and the Biden administration take a hardline attitude toward China due to the trade war and China's assertiveness to change the international order. As compared to Trump's unilateralist style of leadership, Biden strongly emphasizes democratic values and sharing it with allies and friendly nations. Since the foundation of Japan's foreign policy has always been the Japan-U.S. alliance, it is natural for Japan to follow the U.S. and adopt a balancing strategy toward China. Also, although Taiwan is not allied with the U.S., its current relationship with the U.S. is very good, and it has generous support from the U.S. Under these circumstances, it is also natural for Taiwan to follow the U.S. in adopting a balancing policy toward China. Those are the answers for the research questions.

7.2 Research Limitations

Next, I would like to discuss the limitations of this paper. It is that because the viewpoint from China lacks in this paper, there is a possibility that I have led prejudiced answers. Due to the limitations of materials and time, in this paper, when I see the Japan-China relations, the materials from Japanese viewpoint are mainly used. When I see the cross-strait relations, the materials from Taiwanese viewpoint are mostly used. Therefore, it can be said that there is a lack of discussion on how the Japan-China and the cross-strait relations are actually being discussed in China and how China's policies toward Japan and Taiwan are being implemented. It should be kept in mind that including these in this paper could have led to a more neutral conclusion.

Likewise, this paper does not address the issue of benefits generated by a hedging policy implemented by both Japan and Taiwan. This paper has paid more attention to the idea of a balancing strategy against China. Yet, it should not exclude the reality that both Japan and Taiwan have close economic interactions with China respectively. The economic benefits generated from China should also play a crucial role in the shaping of a strategy embedded with hedging or “soft balancing” even the main theme will still be a balancing. Relatively, this will be more important for Taiwan than Japan as the former has continued to have a divided national identity among the major political parties. Whenever there is a power alternation in Taiwan, there would be possible a new China policy comes into being.

7.3 Research Prospects

Finally, I would like to conclude this paper by discussing the future prospects for the Japan-China relations and the cross-strait relations. Given the current situation in which China’s unilateral assertiveness has not abated, both Japan and Taiwan are expected to continue to pursue balancing policies toward China in cooperation with the U.S. However, even with the current deterioration in relations with China, China’s economic importance to both Japan and Taiwan is still very great. Even with the various problems that both countries face, it is almost impossible to completely cut ties with China. This makes it difficult for both Japan and Taiwan to steer their policies toward China.

For Japan, the new Kishida administration was established in 2021. Given that the Kishida administration has only been in power for a short period of time and that Kishida is sometimes said as a pro-China politician, it is unclear how he will pursue his policy toward China. In Taiwan, the tension in the cross-strait relations is growing day by day, and it remains to be seen what kind of stance Taiwan will take toward China in the future. It is necessary to carefully monitor the future relationship between the two countries and China.

In addition to Japan and Taiwan, it should be kept in mind that the relations between the U.S. and China had played a crucial role affecting the Japan-China relations and the cross-strait relations. Obviously, the contentious U.S.-China relations in recent decade is a new scenario between the two global powers. Both did enjoy a pretty comfortable relationship during and post the Cold War period. It was really anticipated by the U.S. that China would be a constructive partner sharing common values in global affairs at that time. As China has morphed from a partner to a challenger, the U.S. is obliged to pay extra-ordinary efforts to secure its status of a dominant global leadership. Formally alliance with Japan would certainly reduce the burden of the U.S. in the East Asian region. The presence of like-minded Japanese leadership would also become a reliable team member for the U.S. However, Taiwan is not completely the same as Japan. Taiwan's international status and its function have deeply relied on the U.S. Moreover, due to the long and complicated relations between Taiwan and China, the U.S. would be more difficult to project the development of the cross-strait relations. The strategic ambiguity adopted by the U.S. is the perfect illustration. Therefore, it will take more patience to carefully examine the different trajectories between the Japan-U.S. relations and the Taiwan-U.S. relations.

8. References

[Sources in English]

- Abe, S. (2012, December 27). *Asia's Democratic Security Diamond*. Project Syndicate. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from <https://www.project-syndicate.org/onpoint/a-strategic-alliance-for-japan-and-india-by-shinzo-abe>
- Aspinwall, N. (2020, January 3). *Taiwan Passes Anti-Infiltration Act Ahead of Election Amid Opposition Protests*. The Diplomat. Retrieved April 15, 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2020/01/taiwan-passes-anti-infiltration-act-ahead-of-election-amid-opposition-protests/>
- Brooks, W. L. (2012). Stress Test for the U.S.-Japan Alliance under the Democratic Party of Japan. *The SAIS Review of International Affairs*, 32(2): 121-135.
- Bush, R. C. (2021). Elections and the Challenges of the Governing in Taiwan under Tsai. In J. T. Dreyer & J. deLisle (Eds.), *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges* (pp. 19–38). essay, Routledge.
- Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA. (n.d.). *Information & Statistics*. Bureau of Foreign Trade, MOEA. Retrieved November 7, 2021, from <https://www.trade.gov.tw/english/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=91>
- Calder, K. E. (2018). Japan in 2017: Political Consolidation amid Global Volatility. *Asian Survey*, 58(1), 43–54. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.1.43>
- Caramani, D. (2020). *Comparative politics*. Oxford University Press.
- Foster, M. (2011, August 30). *Japan's New Leader Noda Sparks Wariness in China*. Taiwan News. Retrieved March 27, 2022, from <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/1694399>
- Gady, F.-S. (2016, August 15). *Japan's Defense White Paper Highlights Growing Threat from China*. The Diplomat. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2016/08/japans-defense-white-paper-highlights-growing-threat-from-china/>
- Hemmings, J., & Kuroki, M. (2013). Shinzo Abe: Foreign Policy 2.0. *Harvard Asia Quarterly*, 15(1), 8–14.

- Hickey, D. V., & Niou, E. M. (2017). Taiwan in 2016: A New Era? *Asian Survey*, 57(1), 111–118. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2017.57.1.111>
- Hsiao, L. C. R., & Hsiao, H. H. M. (2021). Cross-Strait Relations under the Tsai Administration. In J. T. Dreyer & J. deLisle (Eds.), *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges* (pp. 129–160). essay, Routledge.
- Japan Press Weekly. (2015, May 27). *Shii Upsets PM Abe Asking Questions About Japan's Use of Collective Self-Defense Right in Possible US Wars Of Aggression*, Retrieved May 15, 2022, from https://www.japan-press.co.jp/s/news/index_google.php?id=8235
- Kelly, T. (2018, December 18). *Japan to buy more U.S.-made stealth jets, radar to counter China, Russia*. Reuters. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-defence-idUSKBN1OH05Z>
- Koga, K. (2016). The Rise of China and Japan's Balancing Strategy: Critical Junctures and Policy Shifts in the 2010s. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25(101), 777–791. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2016.1160520>
- Kuik, C.-C. (2008). The Essence of Hedging: Malaysia and Singapore's Response to a Rising China. *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, 30(2), 159–185. <https://doi.org/10.1355/cs30-2a>
- Liff, A. P. (2021). Japan in 2020: COVID-19 and the End of the Abe Era. *Asian Survey*, 61(1), 49–64. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.61.1.49>
- Lim, D. J., & Cooper, Z. (2015). Reassessing Hedging: The Logic of Alignment in East Asia. *Security Studies*, 24(4), 696–727. <https://doi.org/10.1080/09636412.2015.1103130>
- Ma, Y.-jeou. (2008, May 20). *Ma Ying-jeou, "Inaugural Address," May 20, 2008*. USC US-China Institute. Retrieved November 29, 2021, from <https://china.usc.edu/ma-ying-jeou-%E2%80%9Cinaugural-address%E2%80%9D-may-20-2008>
- Maslow, S. (2015). A Blueprint for a Strong Japan? Abe Shinzō and Japan's Evolving Security System. *Asian Survey*, 55(4), 739–765. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2015.55.4.739>
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2007, August 22). *Confluence of the Two Seas*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2.html>

- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan (2012, May 1). *Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting (Summary)*. Retrieved May 13, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/n-america/us/pmv1204/meeting1205_pm.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2013, December 17). *Statement by Minister for Foreign Affairs of Japan on Adoption of the “National Security Strategy (NSS)”*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 6, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/release/press4e_000141.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2013, January 18). *The Bounty of the Open Seas: Five new principles for Japanese diplomacy*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/announce/pm/abe/abe_0118e.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2014, November 10). *Japan-China Summit Meeting*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 9, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4e_000151.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2015, June 19). *Press Conference by Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved May 6, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/press/kaiken/kaiken4e_000177.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, November 6). *Japan-U.S. Working Lunch and Japan-U.S. Summit Meeting*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/na/na1/us/page4e_000699.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2018, May 9). *Premier of the State Council of China Li Keqiang visits Japan Japan-china summit meeting and banquet*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/a_o/c_m1/cn/page3e_000857.html
- Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2021, April 16). U.S.-Japan Joint Leaders’ Statement: “U.S.-Japan Global Partnership for a New Era”. Tokyo; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.
- Mo, H.-E. (2019, January 2). *China Holds Gathering Marking 40th Anniversary of Message to Compatriots in Taiwan*. China News Service Website. Retrieved April 15, 2022, from <http://www.ecns.cn/news/politics/2019-01-02/detail-ifzcitha9949227.shtml>

- Mori, Satoru (2015, December 5). The New Security Legislation and Japanese Public Reaction. The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. Retrieved May 15, 2022, from <https://www.tkfd.or.jp/en/research/detail.php?id=542>
- Nilsson-Wright, D. J. (2020, August 28). *Shinzo Abe: Revisionist Nationalist or Pragmatic Realist?* BBC News. Retrieved March 3, 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-53950704>
- Nilsson-Wright, J., & Fujiwara, K. (2015). *Japan's Abe Administration: Steering a Course between Pragmatism and Extremism*. The Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House.
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (n.d.). *President Tsai*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 1, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/Page/40>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2016, May 20). *Inaugural Address of ROC 14th-term President Tsai Ing-wen*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 3, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/4893>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2017, October 10). *President Tsai Delivers 2017 National Day Address*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5231>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2018, October 10). *President Tsai delivers 2018 National Day Address*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 11, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5548>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2019, January 1). *President Tsai's New Year's Talk for 2019*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 15, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/5618>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2020, May 20). *Inaugural Address of ROC 15th-term President Tsai Ing-wen*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6004>
- Office of the President, Republic of China. (2021, October 10). *President Tsai Delivers 2021 National Day Address*. Office of the President, Republic of China. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://english.president.gov.tw/News/6175#:~:text=Taiwan%20today%20is%20no%>

20longer,can%20face%20challenges%20with%20courage.&text=But%20the%20more%20we%20achieve,of%20letting%20down%20our%20guard.

Pempel, T. J. (2017). Japan in 2016: Smooth Sailing despite Occasional Crosswinds. *Asian Survey*, 57(1), 79–92. <https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2022.62.1.03>

Pompeo, M. R. (2020, January 11). *Statement by secretary of State Michael R. Pompeo on Taiwan's election*. American Institute in Taiwan. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from <https://www.ait.org.tw/statement-by-secretary-of-state-michael-r-pompeo-on-taiwans-election/>

Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. (1946). *The Constitution of Japan*. Prime Minister of Japan and His Cabinet. Retrieved May 12, 2022, from https://japan.kantei.go.jp/constitution_and_government_of_japan/constitution_e.html#:~:text=Article%209.,means%20of%20settling%20international%20disputes.

Ramirez, C. (2020, September 21). *The Incremental Revolutionary: Japan after 8 Years of Shinzo Abe*. E-International Relations. Retrieved March 21, 2022, from <https://www.e-ir.info/2020/09/21/the-incremental-revolutionary-japan-after-8-years-of-shinzo-abe/>

Samuels, R. J. (2007). Securing Japan: The Current Discourse. *The Journal of Japanese Studies*, 33(1), 125–152. <https://doi.org/10.1353/jjs.2007.0034>

Satake, T. (2018). Will Japan-U.S.-Australia-India Security Cooperation be Realized? Different Perceptions for Order and Implications for Japan. *Briefing Memo*, 1–6.

Sieg, L. (2011). *Analysis: Japan's PM Noda: warm to Washington, wary of China*. Reuters, September 16, 2011. Retrieved May 13, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/us-japan-diplomacy/analysis-japans-pm-noda-warm-to-washington-wary-of-china-idUSTRE78F0EF20110916>

Smith, S. A. (2012). *Noda's Bold Tax Plan Play*. THE DIPLOMAT, June 29, 2012. Retrieved May 13, 2022, from <https://thediplomat.com/2012/06/nodas-bold-tax-plan-play/>

Stewart, D. (2020). *China's Influence in Japan*. Center for Strategic & International Studies (CSIS).

Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. (2021). Military Expenditure by Country, in Constant (2019) US\$ m., 1988-2020. Sweden; Stockholm International Peace Research Institute.

- Sudworth, J. (2020, January 11). *Taiwan Election: Tsai Ing-wen Wins Second Presidential Term*. BBC News. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-51077553>
- Szanto, B. (2017). Shinzo Abe's Security Policy: A Departure from Defensive Posture? *AEI Insights: An International Journal of Asia Europe Relations*, 3(1), 39–63.
- Taiwan News. (2021, April 30). *Taiwan the Most Dangerous Place on Earth: The Economist*. Taiwan News. Retrieved February 6, 2022, from <https://www.taiwannews.com.tw/en/news/4191181>
- Tsai, C.-M. (2018). Taiwan in 2017: The End of Honeymoon? *Asian Survey*, 58(1), 73–79. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2018.58.1.73>
- Tsai, C.-M. (2019). Taiwan in 2018: A Bitter Campaign and an Uncertain Future. *Asian Survey*, 59(1), 77–84. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.1.77>
- Wang, T. Y., & Tan, A. C. (2021). Balancing, bandwagoning or hedging: Taiwan's strategic choices in the era of a rising China. *Political Science*, 73(1), 66–84. <https://doi.org/10.1080/00323187.2021.1967765>
- Wang, V. W.-C. (2021). U.S.-Taiwan Relations: Do Past Patterns Persist in the Tsai Era? In J. deLisle, J. T. Dreyer, & J. deLisle (Eds.), *Taiwan in the Era of Tsai Ing-wen: Changes and Challenges* (pp. 161–207). essay, Routledge.
- Walt, S. M. (1985). Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power. *International Security*, 9(4), 3. <https://doi.org/10.2307/2538540>
- Waltz, K. (1979). *Theories of International Politics*. Reading, Mass: Addison-Wesley.
- Woodall, B. (2019). Japan in 2018: Abe Rule, Trump Shocks, and Mother Nature's Wrath. *Asian Survey*, 59(1), 63–76. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2019.59.1.63>
- World Bank. (2020). *GDP (current LCU) - Japan*. The World Bank Data. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from <https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CN?locations=JP>
- Wu, C. C.-H. (2016). Taiwan's Hedging against China. *Asian Survey*, 56(3), 466–487. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2016.56.3.466>
- Wu, C. C.-H. (2019). Why Do States Hedge in East Asia? An Empirical Study on Hedging. *Asian Perspective*, 43(3), 557–584. <https://doi.org/10.1353/apr.2019.0017>

Xi, J. (2017, November 4). *Full Text of Xi Jinping's Report at 19th CPC National Congress*. China Daily. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/19thcpcnationalcongress/2017-11/04/content_34115212.htm

Yu, C.-hsin, & Huang, C. (2021). Pulling Tiger's Tail: Why Taiwanese Are Balancing China? (draft).

Yu, C.-hsin. (2021). Taiwan in 2020: Beyond the Pandemic. *Asian Survey*, 61(1), 83–89. <https://doi.org/10.1525/as.2021.61.1.83>

Zhao, S., & Qi, X. (2016). Hedging and Geostrategic Balance of East Asian Countries toward China. *Journal of Contemporary China*, 25(100), 485–499. <https://doi.org/10.1080/10670564.2015.1132684>

[Sources in Japanese]

Abe, S. (2013). *Atarashii Kuni E: Utsukushii Kuni E Kanzenban* [To the New Nation: The Complete version of “to the Beautiful Nation”]. Bungei Shunshu.

Asahi Shimbun. (2012, July 7). *Senkaku Shotou Kokuyuuka no Houshin, Shushou Hyoumei Tochiji “Shutokugo ni Tojou”* [Prime Minister Announces Policy of Nationalizing the Senkakus, Tokyo Governor “Transfers them after Acquisition”]. Asahi Shimbun. Retrieved May 5, 2022, from <http://www.asahi.com/special/senkaku/TKY201207070149.html>

BBC News. (2017, July 25). *Nihon no Abe Shushou, Shijiritsu Kyuuraku no Haikei* [Japan's PM Abe, the reason why support rating dropped sharply]. BBC News. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/japanese/features-and-analysis-40715556>

Cabinet Office. (2021, September). *Gaikou ni Kansuru Yoron Chousa* [Public Opinion Poll on Diplomacy]. Cabinet Office. Retrieved June 27, 2022, from <https://survey.gov-online.go.jp/r03/r03-gaiko/2-1.html>

Cabinet Secretariat. (2014, July 1). *Kuni no Sonzai wo Mattou shi, Kokumin wo Mamorutame no Kiremenonai Anzenhosyouhousei no Seibi nitsuite* [The Development of an Unbroken Security System to Ensure the Country's Full Existence and Protect its People]. Tokyo; Cabinet Office, Government of Japan.

Cheng, S.-S. (2014). Hyakunenrai no Taiwan Keizai Hatten no Kiseki [100 Years of Taiwan's Economic Development]. *Koryu*, 884, 1–8.

Economic Planning Agency. (n.d.). *Ketsugo [Conclusion]*. Showa 31nen Nenji Keizai Houkokusho [Annual Economic Report of 1956]. Retrieved November 8, 2021, from <https://www5.cao.go.jp/keizai3/keizaiwp/wp-je56/wp-je56-010501.html>.

Focus Taiwan. (2018, January 23). *Taiwan, 2017nen no Shitsugyouritsu 3.76% ni Kaizen 2001nen Irai no Teisuijun [Taiwan Improves Unemployment Rate to 3.76% in 2017, Lowest Since 2001]*. Focus Taiwan. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://japan.focustaiwan.tw/economy/201801230001>

Hou, E., & Mori, S. (2021, June 15). *2020nen no Nicchu Boueki, Nihon no Boueki ni Shimeru Taichuhiritsu ha Kakosaikou ni [Japan-China Trade in 2020, the Ratio of Japan's Trade with China Reaches a Record High]*. JETRO. Retrieved November 7, 2021, from <https://www.jetro.go.jp/biz/areareports/2021/114272012ce2ba22.html>.

Indo-Pacific Defense Forum. (2020, October 18). *Chuugoku Jinmin Kaihougun no Shinnyuu Hindo ga Takamarunaka, Guntai no Kyouka to Kindaika wo Hakaru Taiwan [Taiwan to Strengthen and Modernize its Military as the Chinese People's Liberation Army Air Force Invades with Increasing Frequency]*. Indo-Pacific Defense Forum. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from <https://ipdefenseforum.com/ja/2020/10/%E4%B8%AD%E5%9B%BD%E4%BA%BA%E6%B0%91%E8%A7%A3%E6%94%BE%E8%BB%8D%E7%A9%BA%E8%BB%8D%E3%81%AE%E4%BE%B5%E5%85%A5%E9%A0%BB%E5%BA%A6%E3%81%8C%E9%AB%98%E3%81%BE%E3%82%8B%E4%B8%AD%E3%80%81%E8%BB%8D%E9%9A%8A/>

Ito, Y. (2021). Toranpu Seiken no Ajia Gaikou [The Trump Administration's Foreign Policy toward Asia]. *Rikkyo American Studies*, 43, 75–96.

Japan Coast Guard. (n.d.). *Senkaku Shotou Shuuhen Kaiiki niokeru Chuugoku Kaikeikyoku ni Shozokusuru Senpakutou no Doukou to Wagakuni no Taicho [Movements of Vessels Belonging to the Chinese Maritime Police Bureau in the Waters Surrounding the Senkaku Islands and Japan's Response]*. Japan Coast Guard. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from <https://www.kaiho.mlit.go.jp/mission/senkaku/senkaku.html>

Kajiwara, T. (2020, September 4). *Shuu Kinpei Shuseki Hounichi Enchou kara Hantoshi, Kongo no Nichuu Kankei wa [Six Months after the Postponement of President Xi Jinping's Visit to Japan, Future Japan-China Relations]*. Kaisetsu Iinkai [News

- Commentators Bureau]. Retrieved March 23, 2022, from <https://www.nhk.or.jp/kaisetsu-blog/100/435398.html>
- Keidanren. (2015, June 18). *Shuukan Keidanren Taimusu "Chuugoku Jousei to Nicchuu Kankei" [Weekly Keidanren Times "The Chinese Situation and the Japan-China Relations"]*. Keidanren. Retrieved March 9, 2022, from https://www.keidanren.or.jp/journal/times/2015/0618_05.html
- Kihara, T., & Kiyomiya, R. (2018, October 23). Chuugoku heno ODA Shuuryou he 40nen de 3chou Yen, Kindaika Sasaeru [ODA to China Ended: 3 Trillions Yen Over 40 Years to Support Modernization]. *Asahi Shimbun*. Retrieved November 28, 2021, from <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASLBR33GYLBRUTFK004.html>.
- Kitamura, J. (2019, January 31). *Taiwan Kaikyou wo Beikaigun ga Tsuukoushite mo Chuugoku ga Doujinai Riyuu [Why China Is Not Upset When U.S. Warships Pass Through the Taiwan Strait]*. JBpress. Retrieved April 11, 2022, from <https://jbpress.ismedia.jp/articles/-/55343>
- Komami, K. (2019). Sai Eibun Siken ni okeru Chuutai Kankei no Jirennma [The Dilemma of the Cross-Strait Relations under the Tsai Ing-wen Administration]. *Ritsumeikan Journal of International and Area Studies*, 49, 33–50.
- Lague, D. (2021, November 30). *Shouten: Taiwan Kiki "T-DAY", 6tsu no Yuji Shinario [Focus: Taiwan Crisis "T-DAY" and Six Contingency Scenarios]*. Reuters. Retrieved January 8, 2022, from <https://jp.reuters.com/article/taiwan-crisis-scenario-idJPKBN2IF04M>
- Lim, C.-T. (2017). Chugoku Taito Shokogun: Hong Kong, Taiwan kara Mita "Chinese System" no Kadai [The Rise of China Syndrome: The Challenges of the "Chinese System" from the Perspectives of Hong Kong and Taiwan]. *Asian Studies*, 63(1), 48–67. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.11479/asianstudies.63.1_48
- Mainichi Shimbun. (2016, March 28). *Anpo Hou: 29nichi Shikou, Shuudanteki Jieiken Koushi ga Kanou ni [Legislation for Peace and Security: Enacted on 29th Enables the Exercise of the Right to Collective Self-defense]*. Mainichi Shimbun. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from <https://mainichi.jp/articles/20160329/k00/00m/010/039000c>
- Mikoda, A. (2020, December 10). *Taichuu Kanjou Akka Nicchu no Surechigai [Sentiment toward China Has Detariorated, Japan and China Grew Apart]*. News Commentators

Bureau. Retrieved March 28, 2022, from <https://www.nhk.or.jp/kaisetsu-blog/700/440718.html>

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (n.d.). *Kenpou to Jieiken [Constitution and Self-defense]*. Ministry of Defense of Japan. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from <https://www.mod.go.jp/j/approach/agenda/kihon02.html>

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2016). Heisei 28nen Bouei Hakusho [Defense White Paper 2016]. Tokyo; Ministry of Defense of Japan.

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2020). Reiwa 2nen Bouei Hakusyo [Defense White Paper 2020]. Tokyo; Ministry of Defense of Japan.

Ministry of Defense of Japan. (2021). Reiwa 3nen Bouei Hakusyo [Defense White Paper 2021]. Tokyo; Ministry of Defense of Japan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2009, September 29). *Hatoyama Souri no dai 64 kai Kokuren Soukai Shusseki (Gaiyou) [Prime Minister Hatoyama's Attendance at the 64th United Nations General Assembly (Summary)]*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 27, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/gaiko/unsokai/64_s_gai.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2015, April 23). *Nicchuu Shunou Kaidan [The Japan-China Meeting Summit]*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 9, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/c_m1/cn/page4_001136.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2016, September 5). *Nichuu Shunou Kaida [Japan-China Summit]*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved March 18, 2022, from https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/a_o/c_m1/cn/page1_000246.html

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, April). *Gaikou Seisho 2017 [Diplomatic Bluebook 2017]*. Tokyo; Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2017, February 10). *Kyoudou Seimei [Joint Statement]*. Tokyo; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan.

Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. (2022, April 12). *Taiwan Kiso Data [Basic Data of Taiwan]*. Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://www.mofa.go.jp/mofaj/area/taiwan/data.html>

- Miyake, K. (2014, January 21). *Rekishiteki na Kokka Anzen Hosyou Senryaku [The Historic National Security Strategy]*. The Canon Institute of Global Studies. Retrieved March 7, 2022, from https://cigs.canon/article/20140121_2314.html
- Mizumura, T. (2021). Dai 2ji Sai Eibun Seikenka no Chuutai Kankei, Beitai Kankei wo Furikaeru [A Review of China-Taiwan and U.S.-Taiwan Relations under the Second Tsai Ing-wen Administration]. *Kouryuu*, 964, 9–15.
- NHK. (2020, August 28). *Abe Shushou Seisiki ni Jii Hyoumei “Futaku ni Jishin wo Motte Kotaerarenai” [Prime Minister Abe Formally Announces His Resignation: “I Cannot Confidently Respond to the Trust Entrusted to Me”]*. NHK News. Retrieved March 22, 2022, from <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20200828/k10012588961000.html>
- NHK. (2021, May 27). *Taiwan Sai Eibun Soutou “Wakuchin Choutatsu Chuugoku no Bougai de Muzukashiku” [Taiwan President Tsai: “Vaccine Procurement Difficult Due to Chinese Interference”]*. NHK News. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210527/k10013053661000.html>
- NHK. (2021, September 27). *Suga Shushou Kuaddo Shunou Kaigou he Chuugoku Nentouni 4 kakoku no Renkei Kakunin [Prime Minister Suga to hold Quad Summit, confirming cooperation among 4 countries with China in mind]*. NHK News. Retrieved March 24, 2022, from <https://www3.nhk.or.jp/news/html/20210924/k10013275441000.html>
- Nikkei Shimbun. (2011, February 14). *Chuugoku GDP, Nihon Nuki Sekai 2i ga Kakuetei 10nen Meimoku [China’s GDP Overtook Japan to Become the World’s Second Largest in 10 years]*. Nikkei Shimbun. Retrieved March 3, 2022, from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS1400K_U1A210C1MM0001/
- Nikkei Shimbun. (2014, July 1). *Kenpou Kaishaku Henkou wo Kakugikettei Shyuudanteki Jieiken no Koushi Younin [Cabinet Decides to Change the Interpretation of the Constitution, Allowing the Exercise of the Right of Collective Self-defense]*. Nikkei Shimbun. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXNASFS0103O_R00C14A7MM8000/
- Nikkei Shimbun. (2022, June 9). *Jimin Kouyaku, Boueihi “GDP hi 2% Nentou” Genpatsu wa Saidai katsuyou [LDP pledge, defense spending “2% of GDP in mind,” maximum use of nuclear power plants]*. Nikkei Shimbun. Retrieved June 30, 2022, from <https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGXZQOUA092XH0Z00C22A6000000/>

- Oikawa, A., & Funakoshi, T. (2019, June 27). *Chuugoku no Shuu Shuseki, Kokuhin toshite Raishyun Hounichi de Icchi [China's Xi Agreed to Visit Japan as a National Guest in the Next Spring]*. Asahi Shimbun Digital. Retrieved March 22, 2022, from <https://www.asahi.com/articles/ASM6W52W5M6WUTFK012.html>
- Ogasawara, Y. (2001). *Taiwan Aidenthithi to Hitotsuno Chugoku [Taiwan Identity and One China]*. Ogasawara Homepage. Retrieved November 7, 2021, from <http://www.tufs.ac.jp/ts/personal/ogasawara/paper/paper3.html>.
- Ogasawara, Y. (2016). *Ba Eikyuu Seiken no 8nen wo Kaiko Suru [Recollecting the 8 Years of the Ma Administration]*. Ogasawara Homepage. Retrieved April 1, 2022, from http://www.tufs.ac.jp/ts/personal/ogasawara/paper/look_back_on_ma's_eight_years.pdf
- Ogasawara, Y. (2017, January 16). *Suta-to Dasshu ni Shippai Shita Sai Eibun Seiken [The Tsai Administration Failed to Dash at the Beginning]*. Ogasawara Homepage. Retrieved April 3, 2022, from <http://www.tufs.ac.jp/ts/personal/ogasawara/analysis/tsaiadministration1.html>
- Okada, M. (2019, September 20). *Kuuboka suru 'Izumo' no Kunren Jittai, Nicchuu Kaizen yori Tairitsu Soutei Shita Nichibei Anpo Kyouka ['Izumo' Becoming an Aircraft Carrier: The Reality of Training. Strengthening the Japan-U.S. Security Assurances in Anticipation of Confrontation Rather Than Improving Japan-China Relations.]*. BUSINESS INSIDER JAPAN. Retrieved May 7, 2022, from <https://www.businessinsider.jp/post-199059>
- People's Daily Online. (2012, June 15). *Noda shi VS Hatoyama shi, Taichuu Gaikou Kousou de Tairitsu [Mr. Noda VS Mr. Hatoyama, They Opposed to Their China's Policies]*. People's Daily Online. Retrieved March 27, 2022, from <http://j.people.com.cn/94474/7721789.html>
- Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. (2014). *Abe Souridaijin Kishakaiken: Heisei 26nen 7gatsu Inichi [Prime Minister Abe's Press Conference: 2014/7/1]*. Japanese Government Internet TV. Retrieved March 8, 2022, from <https://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg10049.html>.
- Public Relations Office, Cabinet Office, Government of Japan. (2017, June 5). *Dai 23kai Kokusai Kouryuu Kaigi "Ajia no Mirai" Bansankai [The 23rd International Exchange Conference "the Future of Asia" Dinner Party]*. Japanese Government Internet TV. Retrieved March 20, 2022, from <https://nettv.gov-online.go.jp/prg/prg15492.html>

- Reuters. (2017, February 10). *Beichuu Shunou ga Denwa Kaidan, Torannpu shi 'Hitotsu no Chuugoku' Seisaku Iji de Goui [The U.S.-China Telephone Talks Was Held: Trump Agreed to Maintain 'One China' Policy]*. Reuters. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/china-usa-ft-idJPKBN15P0E5>
- Reuters. (2017, November 24). *Taiwan, 2017nen Seichou Mitooshi wo 2.58% he Hikiage Yushutsu ga Kouchou [Taiwan Raises 2017 Growth Forecast to 2.58%, Exports Is Strong]*. Reuters. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/taiwan-gdp-idJPKBN1DO0WR>
- Reuters. (2020, January 14). *Shaynhai, Puraha tonno Kankei Teishi: Taipei tonno Shimaitoshi Kyoutei Teiketsu de [Shanghai Suspends Ties with Prague due to its Sister City Agreement with Taipei]*. Reuters. Retrieved April 29, 2022, from <https://www.reuters.com/article/china-czech-taiwan-idJPKBN1ZD2AY>
- Reynolds, I., & Nobuhiro, E. (2020, June 2). *Ayaui Nichuu Kankei "Shin Jidai," Beichuu no Tairitsu Gekika no Makizoe ni [A "New Era" of Dangerous Japan-China Relations, Collateral Damage of Escalating US-China Conflict]*. Bloomberg.com. Retrieved March 23, 2022, from <https://www.bloomberg.co.jp/news/articles/2020-06-02/QB8K1HT0AFB401>
- Sahashi, R. (2019, June 12). *America to Chuugoku (6) Torannpu Seiken to Taiwan [The U.S. and China (6) The Trump Administration and Taiwan]*. The Tokyo Foundation for Policy Research. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://www.tkfd.or.jp/research/detail.php?id=3147>
- Saito, N. (2019). *Nichuu Mitsugetsu Kankei wa Tsuzukunoka? [Will the honeymoon relations between Japan and China last?]*. *Daiwa Souken Chousa Kihou*, 33, 102–111.
- Sankei Shimbun. (2013, March 5). *"Chuugoku Shigeki Suruna," Noda Seiken no Senkaku deno Shoukyoku Shisei Mata Hanmei ["Don't Stimulate China," Noda's Passive Attitude toward Senkaku Has Become Clear Again]*. Sankei News. Retrieved March 27, 2022, from <https://www.sankei.com/article/20130305-RLHSOOCRI5MVHJ4PLMT63V6T6E/>
- Sankei Shimbun. (2017, May 17). *Taiwan Sai Eibun Seiken, 20ka de Ishuunenn: Shijiritsu Teimei, Tsuzuku Chuugoku kara no Atusyoku [Taiwan's Tsai Ing-wen Administration Marks First Anniversary on the 20th: Slump in Support, Continuing Pressure from China]*. Sankei Shimbun. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://www.sankei.com/article/20170517-O6MKGMFUZJKZLEBRF7OGKB2KIE/>

- Sankei Shimbun. (2017, June 14). *Taiwan, Dankou Rensa ni Kikikan [Taiwan Is Feeling a Sense of Crisis to the Continuing Breaking Off of Diplomatic Relations]*. Sankei Shimbun. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from https://www.nikkei.com/article/DGKKASGM13H7L_T10C17A6EA1000/
- Sankei Shimbun. (2021, March 27). *Anpo Kanrenhou Shikou 5nen Shuudanteki Jieiken Koushi Zero Demo Nichibei Kankei Antei ni Kouken [Five Years since the Legislation for Peace and Security Went into Effect: Contributing to the Stability of Japan-U.S. Relations Even If the Right of Collective Self-Defense Is Not Exercised]*. Sankei Shimbun. Retrieved May 6, 2022, from <https://www.sankei.com/article/20210327-IIT2SRPSUFNFVKRB45X3UCO7XU/>
- Sugino, K. (2017, January 14). *Chuugoku Tairiku Izon Herasu “Shin Nankou Seisaku” Fukusoutou ga Nihon Kigyuu ni Sanka Yobikake [“New Southbound Policy” not to Lean on China, Vice President Calls Japan to Participate]*. Excite News. Retrieved April 3, 2022, from https://www.excite.co.jp/news/article/Jpcna_CNA_20170114_201701140005/
- Sui, C. (2016, January 29). *Hikaeme na Inshou no Oku ni Fukutsu no Ishi, Taiwan Hatsu no Josei Soutou [Unyielding Will behind a Modest Impression, the First Female President of Taiwan]*. BBC News. Retrieved April 1, 2022, from <https://www.bbc.com/japanese/features-and-analysis-35436296>
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan. (2018, March 2). *Gaikoubu, Beikoku Jouin ni yoru “Taiwan Ryokou Hou” Kaketsu ni Kansha [Foreign Affairs Department Thanks U.S. Senate for Passage of “Taiwan Travel Act”]*. Taipei Economic and Cultural Representative Office in Japan. Retrieved April 11, 2022, from https://www.taiwanembassy.org/jp_ja/post/54998.html
- Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Osaka. (2019, January 2). *Shuu Kinpei, Chuugoku Kokka Shuseki ga ‘Taiwan Douhou ni Tsugeru Sho’ Happyou 40 Shuunen Kinen Shikiten de Nobeta Danwa ni Taisuru Wagakuni no Tachiba [Taiwan’s Position on the Statement by Chinese President Xi Jinping on the 40th Anniversary of the Release of the ‘Letter to Taiwan Compatriots’]*. Taipei Economic and Cultural Office in Osaka. Retrieved April 15, 2022, from https://www.roc-taiwan.org/jposa_ja/post/14969.html
- Takeuchi, T. (2017). “1992 Consensus” no Yuuyousei to Genkai [Utility and Limitation of the “1992 Consensus”]. *Ba Eikyuu Seikenki No Chuutai Kankei to Taiwan No Seiji Keizai Hendou [The Cross-Strait Relations under the Ma Ying-Jeou Administration and Taiwan's Political and Economic Change]*, 14–27.

- Takeuchi, T., & Ikegami, H. (2019). 2018nen no Taiwan: Chihou Touitsu Senkyo ni Okeru Yotou Minshintou no Haiboku [Taiwan in 2018: Defeat of the Ruling DPP in Local Election]. *Asia Doukou Nenpou [Yearbook of Asian Affairs]*, 171–198. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24765/asiadoukou.2019.0_171
- Takeuchi, T., & Ikegami, H. (2020). 2019nen no Taiwan: Soutousenkyo Kouho no Senshutsu to Tsuyomaru Chuugoku no Atsuryoku [Taiwan in 2019: Selection of Presidential Election Candidates and Growing Chinese Pressure]. *Asia Doukou Nenpou [Yearbook of Asian Affairs]*, 151–178. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24765/asiadoukou.2020.0_151
- Takeuchi, T., & Ikegami, H. (2021). 2020nen no Taiwan: 2kime ni Haitta Sai Eibun Seiken to Taiwan Kaikyou deno Gunjiteki Kinchou [Taiwan in 2020: The Tsai Ing-wen Administration in its Second Term and Military Tensions in the Taiwan Strait]. *Asia Doukou Nenpou [Yearbook of Asian Affairs]*, 149–176. https://doi.org/https://doi.org/10.24765/asiadoukou.2021.0_149
- The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan. (2021, October 14). Rikken Minshu Tou “Seisakushuu 2021” [The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan’s Policy Proposal 2021]. Tokyo; The Constitutional Democratic Party of Japan.
- The Liberal Democratic Party. (2019, July). *Chikarazuyoi Gaikou, Bouei de Kokueki wo Mamoru: Juuten Seisaku [Protecting Japan by Strong Diplomacy and Defense: Key Policies]*. The Liberal Democratic Party. Retrieved March 27, 2022, from <https://www.jimin.jp/policy/promise1/>
- The Liberal Democratic Party. (2021). Reiwa 3nen Ji Min Tou Seisaku BANK [The Liberal Democratic Party’s Policy BANK of 2021]. Tokyo; The Liberal Democratic Party.
- Togo, K. (2018). Torannpu Seiken no Toujou to Nihon no Gaikou Senryaku: Kitachousen, Chuugoku, Roshia [The Trump Administration and Japanese Foreign Policy: North Korea, China and Russia]. *Mondai to Kenkyu [Issues and Studies]*, 47(1), 1–38.
- Watanabe, T. (2016). Taiwan Sai Eibun Seiken no Taichuu Rosen Tenkan to Genkai [Taiwan’s Tsai Ing-wen’s Shift in China Policy and its Limitations]. *Kyorin Shakaijaku Kenkyu*, 32(3), 15–29.
- Yin, H. (2015). Kan Naikaku no Taichuu Seisaku to Nicchuu Kankei [The Kan Administration’s China Policy and Japan-China Relations]. *Kokusai Nihongaku*

[*Journal of Global Japanese Studies*], 13, 3–13.
<https://doi.org/http://doi.org/10.15002/00022232>

Yomiuri Shimbun. (2022, March 25). *Shushou, Tairo, Taikira de Renkei “Chitsujo Mamorinuku Ketsui” [Prime Minister, Cooperation in Russia and North Korea Issues, “Our Determination of Protecting Order”]*. Yomiuri Shimbun Online. Retrieved March 29, 2022, from <https://www.yomiuri.co.jp/politics/20220326-OYT1T50039/>

Yoshida, K. (2020). Hatoyama Yukio Seiken ni okeru Gaikou Seisaku no Kenkyuu [A Study on Foreign Policy in the Yukio Hatoyama Administration]. *Seisaku Kagaku [Policy Science]*, 27(4), 231–249.

Zakowski, K. (2014). 2012nen Senkaku Shotou Kokuyuuka wo Meguru Kettei Katei no Ichikousatsu [A Study of the Decision Process Concerning the Nationalization of the Senkaku Islands in 2012]. *Hou to Seiji [The Journal of Law and Politics]*, 64(4), 121–143.

Zakowski, K. (2016). Abe dai 1ji, dai 2ji Seiken no Taichuugokugaikou: Hikakubunseki no Kokoromi [Abe’s First and Second Administrations’ Diplomacy with China: A Comparative Analysis]. *Silva Japonicarum*, 49, 24–40.
<https://doi.org/10.14746/sijp.2017.49.2>

[Sources in Chinese]

Legislative Yuan, Republic of China. (2020, September). *110 Niandu Zhongyang Zhengfu Zongyusuanan Zhengti Pinggu Baogao [Overall Evaluation Report of the Central Government Budget for 2020]*. Legislative Yuan, Republic of China. Retrieved May 21, 2022, from <https://www.ly.gov.tw/Pages/Detail.aspx?nodeid=43953&pid=199189>

Lin, L.-sheng. (2017, October 18). *Wu Dun-yi Tan ‘92 Gong Zhi’ Chong Shen Huan Wen de Nei 35 ge Zi [Wu Den-yih said ‘92 Consensus’ Can Be Rephrased as That 35 Characters]*. Liberty Times Net. Retrieved April 5, 2022, from <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/2226297>

Wu, S.-wei. (2021, May 25). *Tingdian + Yiqing Mindiao: Cai Ying-wen Shengwang Chuang 21ge yue Yilai Xindi [Power Outage + Epidemic Poll: Tsai’s Popularity Hits A 21-month Low]*. Liberty Times Net. Retrieved May 3, 2022, from <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/politics/breakingnews/3545232>

Zheng, Z.-lan. (2016, January 16). *Hao Wu Xuan Nian! Cai Ying Wen Cheng Wei Tai Wan Shi Shang Show Ren Nv Zong Tong* [There Is No Doubt! Tsai Ing-wen Becomes the First Female President in Taiwan's History]. BBC News Zhongwen. Retrieved April 3, 2022, from https://www.bbc.com/zhongwen/trad/china/2016/01/160116_taiwan_tsai_elected

Zhong, L.-hua, & Shi, X.-guang. (2017, May 3). *Tsai Ing-wen Pao Liang'an "San-xin" Pan You Jiegouxing Hezuo* [Tsai Ing-wen Throws Out the "Three New" Cross-strait Issues, Hoping for Structural Cooperation]. Liberty Times Net. Retrieved May 24, 2022, from <https://news.ltn.com.tw/news/focus/paper/1099399>

