

A CONSTITUTIVE ANALYSIS OF HUSSERL'S INTERSUBJECTIVITY

By Cheng-Yun Tsai

蔡 錚 雲*

摘 要

互為主體性概念的真諦隱含在對胡塞爾現象學眾多不同，甚至對立的詮釋中：有人主此胡塞爾的互為主體性理論只是用來補充其笛卡兒式哲學之不足，另有人認為胡塞爾的超越觀念論卻能藉此跨越觀念論的侷限，進入社會哲學的領域，本文企圖從胡塞爾的現象學哲學中說明其互為主體性的理論，此外，由於胡塞爾認為現象學方法不外是一種形構，我們在此所進行的方式便是一項形構分析

Intersubjectivity, which is one of the leading issues in our time, was first brought to our attention by Husserl's phenomenology.¹ However, the true meaning of this idea remained hidden in many different, or even contrary, opinions of Husserl's basic teachings: Some contend that intersubjectivity is a mere supplement to his Cartesian philosophy;² others insist that Husserl's transcendental idealism is thus converted to a sociophilosophical realm.³ This essay attempts to untangle this

* 作者為本校哲學系副教授

¹ Cf. E. Husserl, *Zur Phänomenologie der Intersubjektivität, texts aus dem nachlass, Erster Teil, 1905-20; Zwiter Teil, 1921-28, Dritter Teil, 1929-35.*, ed. by I. Kern, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1973. Hereafter is cited as PI.

² See, for example, J. Huertas-Jourda, "The Origin of Otherness and Ownness in the Living Present" in *Continent Philosophy in America*, eds. by H. J. Silverman, J. Sallis & T. M. Seebohm, Pittsburgh: Duquesne Univ. Press, 1983, pp. 37-63, and G. Funke, "A Transcendental-Phenomenological Investigation Concerning Universal Idealism, International Analysis and the Genesis of *Habitus*", trans. by R. M. Harlan, in *Apriori and World*, eds. by W. McKenna, R. M. Harlan & L. E. Winter, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1981, pp. 71-113.

³ This view is held by, for example, A. Schutz, *The Phenomenology of the Social World*, trans. by F. Walsh & F. Lehnert, Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967, and R. Toulemont, *L'essence de la société selon Husserl*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1962.

puzzle by drawing a clear picture of Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity from his phenomenological philosophy. To do so, it is our task to give a constitutive analysis here, since the phenomenological approach, in Husserl's concern, is a matter of constitution.

I. HUSSERL'S ORIGINAL CONCEPTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY

The idea of intersubjectivity is inaugurated by Husserl in the "Fundamental Problems of Phenomenology".⁴ Briefly speaking, according to our natural standpoint or natural worldconcept (*natürliche Weltbegriff*),⁵ what appears to us in our essential intuition of reality is not a simple existence as that which is assumed by our knowledge as Kant suggests, but a living being with its content from our ordinary experience. For example, a piece of paper, which I am now looking at, is not just a thing with a white color and a rectangle shape occupied in a space, but also something which is ready for me to write as my thought goes on in this particular time. Things in this living context connect with each other in accordance with my view as the surrounding world. They are presented in a vague fashion, not in a particular mode that we made a judgement on, for all those which appear in this surrounding world has not been determined yet. This is exactly why our experience of them may include not only the actual being but also our possible thinking in its respective spatial-temporal way. In fact, they have thus been experienced along with my surrounding world as something similar and yet contrary to myself, namely, the other. Such an experience of the other, to be sure, must be justified in an ideal-normal sense, for each and every one of us is only the central point of our own world. However, it is by no means to say that this experience of other is also produced by our self-reflection. On the contrary, the distinction between my own field and the other merely discloses themselves as a fact before a validation of this natural standpoint is called for. Our empathic experience clearly exhibits such a fact that we perceive this central point of us as some else in a relative way without contradicting our direct view.⁶

But then, what is this other? It is to answer this question that makes all the

⁴ Husserl, PI I, Nr. 6, "Aus den Vorlesungen Grundprobleme der Phänomenologie Wintersemester 1910/11", pp. 111-94.

⁵ Ibid., cf. chapter one, pp. 111-38.

⁶ Ibid., p. 116. Also see E. Stein, *On the Problem of Empathy*, trans. by W. Stein, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1970.

confusions in determining the true meaning of Husserl's intersubjectivity. Because Husserl believes that our empirical knowledge should be given a phenomenological reduction, if these presentations to our essential intuition are able to constitute a universal structure from their meaningful context.⁷ Prior to this reduction, in other words, the actual existence of the other is taken from the natural standpoint as nothing but psychological data. These data may appear in a universal way, but they never appear in a priori sense. Is this view contradictory to what we have just described above? Husserl apparently thinks not. But, it does take him a long journey from eidetic phenomenology to transcendental phenomenology to develop a phenomenological theory of constitution in order to remove this apparent contradiction. Limited by the space here, we cannot follow Husserl's itinerary step by step to draw a full picture of this development. Nonetheless, it is still possible to give a constitutive analysis of Husserl's intersubjectivity, if we clarify the issue itself as we have set up at the outset. That is to say, let us put the question of 'what the other is' into a bracket and turn our attention to how the other appears to be a intersubjectivity.

Under this direction, the difficulty of making a coherent view of intersubjectivity is suddenly expelled, since we are doing precisely what Husserl demands, that is, a phenomenological reduction. Having reduced those appearances in our surrounding world to our consciousness, their confinement in the factual stance is suspended except the very experience of their present form, as Husserl held,⁸ for the latter remains as an index to all possible modifications of the former. In this a priori sense, those appearances in our surrounding world, as psychological data, are motivated by the unity of our temporal consciousness into one and the same temporal background so as to receive the universal structure, in addition to their empirical evidence. The complicated issue of this temporal constitution will be accounted for later on. For the moment, one should notice that the empathy of the other is not thus replaced by the constitution of one's ownness; on the contrary, it may very well be confirmed by constituting another consciousness whose structure is the same as my own consciousness analogically. Because, contrary to the transcendental argument that the Idealistic philosophy has achieved, the identity between constituting and constituted consciousness on this phenomenological standpoint is not founding

⁷ Ibid., p.174. Also see E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and to a Phenomenological Philosophy, First Book, General Introduction to a Pure Phenomenology*, trans. by F. Kersten, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1983, p. 113. Hereafter is cited as *Ideas I*.

⁸ Ibid., cf. Chapter two to four, pp. 138-71.

but founded on the objectification of subjectivity.⁹ That is to say, while the other is justified by the motivation of our consciousness instead of the empathic perception of our natural standpoint, it comes to be not by what was in my own field as a result of duplicating oneself in the stream of conscious life, but by becoming another conscious life, in contrast to mine, insofar as it is presented as the subjective data in the realm of pure psychology.¹⁰ The distinction between my own field and the other itself has never been surpassed after the constituted world of physical things is fully thematized as we normally infer; rather, it opens the possibility of communalization with regard to the cultural phenomenon by constituting an other consciousness. This is what Husserl has in mind as he takes up the issue of intersubjectivity.

II. HUSSERL'S REFLECTION OF INTERSUBJECTIVITY IN TERMS OF THE DEVELOPMENT OF CONSTITUTION

Although the true meaning of Husserl's intersubjectivity is uncovered by our formulation as an elaboration of the phenomenological experience of reality, it is doubtful that he has already issued an adequate account of intersubjectivity simply from this manner. By raising a similar question, M. Scheler lays it bare as the distinction between "by what right is a particular individual . . . entitled to postulate the existence of any given community, and of some other given person?" and "what kind of cognitive acts must already have been accomplished before awareness of others can appear."¹¹ Indeed, intersubjectivity which originated from phenomenology is not the same as intersubjectivity which is subjected to phenomenological understanding. To be a legitimate issue, it should be examined under the same methodological consideration that brings forth its first appearance. As his

⁹ Objectivity for German Idealism is subject to the synthetic movement of subjectivity by self knowing. See F. W. J. Schelling, *System of Transcendental Idealism*, trans. by P. Heath, Charlottesville: Univ. Press of Virginia, 1978, p. 27. As for Husserl, the subject must objectify itself as the foundation of the world so as to allow its believing in the world to be recovered with certainty. See Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. 220.

¹⁰ Husserl, *PI I*, Nr. 5, "Vorbereitung zum Kolleg 1910/11: Die reine Psychologie und die 'Geisteswissenschaften, Geschichte und Soziologie. Reine Psychologie und Phänomenologie. — Die intersubjektive Reduktion als Reduktion auf die psychologisch reine Intersubjektivität." pp. 70-90.

¹¹ Max Scheler, *The Nature of Sympathy*, trans. by P. Heath, London: Rouledge & Kagan Paul, 1954, p. 217.

transcendental turn indicated, the very same question contributes Husserl's transition from his first proposal of the theory of science to what he later revises as the fundamental structure of a universal philosophy. But, while it is disputable that whether this transcenental turn is successful,¹² our strategy is once again to suspend those different understandings of the true character of Husserl's phenomenology and turn our attention to the development of this transcendental turn to see how and what does constitution bring to intersubjectivity.

1. The Intersubjective Theme of Constitution

Phenomenology first comes into view in the *Logical Investigations* by Husserl's self-criticism of his earlier psychologistic position.¹³ In the *Prolegomena*, he demolishes psychological account of a universal theory of formal deductive systems, which he held in the *Philosophy of Arithmetic*,¹⁴ for the sake of a pure logic or '*Wissenschaftslehre*' (Theory of Science). It is then defined as "an a priori, theoretical, nomological science which deals with the ideal essence of science as such." But, this rational essence of deductive science is not self-contained in the philosophical sense, the theory of essence still needs a preparation for the epistemological criticism and clarification of pure logic.¹⁵ In the following investigations of this work, Husserl thus sets forth a phenomenology which has experiences intuitively seizable and analyzable in the pure generality of their essence, so that the 'clearness and distinctiveness' of logical concepts and laws

¹² Whether is it a neo-Cartesianism or a non-Cartesianism? The former view is emphasized by G. Berger, *The Cogito in Husserl's Philosophy*, trans. by K. McLaughlin, Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1972; the latter view is supported by I. Kern, "The Three Ways to the Transcendental Phenomenological Reduction in the Philosophy of Edmund Husserl", in *Husserl: Expositions and Appraisals*, eds. by F. A. Elliston & P. McCormick, Notre Dame: Univ. Press of Notre Dame, 1977, pp. 126-49. Or, is it an idealism after all? This is favored by R. Ingarden, *On the Motives Which Led Husserl to Transcendental Idealism*, trans. by A. Hannibalsson, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1975; and against by L. Landgrebe, "Husserl's Departure from Cartesianism," in *The Phenomenology of Husserl: Selected Critical Readings*, ed. & Trans. by R. O. Elveton, Chicago: Quadrangel Press, 1970, pp. 259-306.

¹³ E. Husserl, *Logical Investigations*, 2 vols., trans. by J. Findlay, N. Y.: Humanities Press, 1970. Hereafter is cited as LI.

¹⁴ E. Husserl, *Philosophie der Arithmetik*, Halle a. S.: C. Pfeffer, 1891.

¹⁵ Husserl, LI, p. 248.

will emerge as a governing formula of essence under this phenomenological description.

If phenomenology is characterized as a descriptive psychology, how does it distinguish itself from psychologism which it just replaced? To answer it, Husserl's phenomenology is subsequently transformed from "a preparatory step towards theory, not theory itself" into a science of "what may be seen through a purely intuitive apprehension of essence, whether generic or specific."¹⁶ This modification should not be treated lightly in a sense of apology; it rather represents a maturity of Husserl's phenomenology in the methodological sense. While it was a preparatory step towards the theory of science, phenomenology was simply 'thinking over' what was exemplarily performed on an actual given basis of experiences of thinking and knowing. But, the possibility of such a 'thinking over' has never been justified. Only after the distinction between natural thinking and philosophical thinking is undertaken in *The Idea of Phenomenology*¹⁷ — what was supposed to raise to clearness regarding the pure forms and laws of knowledge, by tracing knowledge back to an adequate fulfillment in intuition, is put into question in the name of natural thinking — Husserl realizes that the very act of cognizing the universal is still something singular. Its belonging more to the psychological phenomenon than the pure phenomenon indicates that one has to grasp the absolute 'seeing' by getting hold of himself. Accordingly, all those acts which have been reduced epistemologically by eidetic abstraction in phenomenological description are further reduced by bringing their universal objects into the consciousness of the universal. What is thus retained is nothing but the principle of 'freedom from presuppositions' in operation, or what is called philosophical thinking. This philosophical principle brings up the pure phenomenon, as it displays the universal itself in the pure cogitation through constitution, wherein possibility of 'thinking over' is confirmed by a pure 'seeing'.

Ironically, such a phenomenological knowledge can no longer be satisfied with its purely intuitive apprehension of essence in this accomplishment of the phenomenological reduction. After the transcendence of the objective phenomenon is reduced immanently to pure phenomenon, everyday lived-experience, which has been given to our essential intuition, comes to be the 'thesis of the world' which

¹⁶ Ibid., p. 262. Also see the comparison between the 1st edition of 1900 and the revised 2nd edition of 1913 in the introduction of vol. II.

¹⁷ E. Husserl, *The Idea of Phenomenology*, trans. by W. Alston & G. Nakhtnikian, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960.

is constituted as the non-real (*irreal*) out of reality. Nevertheless, what this non-real signifies is more of an initial approach to the transcendental realm than a finished task in its eidetic form, if we recall what Husserl has said. In the *Logical Investigations*, the object of pure logic comes directly before us as embedded in a concrete mental state which further functions either as the meaning-intention or the meaning-fulfillment of certain verbal expressions. That is to say, to be a theory of science, phenomenology simply makes itself aware of the fact the "the intrinsic being of objectivity becomes 'presented', 'apprehended' in knowledge, and so ends up by becoming subject."¹⁸ Thus, it is able to understand reality through its intentional context, as the theory of meaning implied in phenomenological description. Such a presupposition regarding intentional psychology however cannot be held under the phenomenological reduction in what the *Ideas* exemplifies as the transcendental turn.¹⁹ Because the 'thesis of the world' which pertains to a universal structure must be grounded in the justification of the subjective process of our intentionality, when the presence of things themselves is based on the presentation (*Vergegenwärtigung*) of our consciousness by a transcendental reduction to the presentation of pure consciousness. Therefore, in order for this consciousness of reality to be understood as certain as its purely intuitive apprehension of essence, what has been presented to our description in its meaningful context should also be suspended in pure consciousness.

But, what is this pure consciousness that provides a transcendental justification for a descriptive psychology? A significant digression is given by Husserl's answer in the *Ideas I* that "it is in and for itself indescribable: pure Ego and nothing further."²⁰ It is said that while the nature of pure consciousness is unknown, the way it justifies the intentional context of reality discloses a double function of intentionality in presentifying the 'thesis of the world'. Just as it has first been characterized by the absolute flow of temporal consciousness in *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*,²¹ Husserl suggests that, in describing everyday lived-experience, consciousness constitutes itself as an immanent temporal flow by embracing its own contents on the one hand, while abiding in itself as a sheer experiencing of what it constitutes, a kind of endless reservoir of conscious life, on the other hand.

¹⁸ Husserl, LI, p. 254.

¹⁹ Husserl, *Ideas I*, p. xix.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 233.

²¹ E. Husserl, *The Phenomenology of Internal Time-Consciousness*, trans. by J. S. Churchill, Bloomington: Indiana Univ. Press, 1964.

Pure consciousness thus provides a transcendental justification for a descriptive psychology, for it is something which we speak of in conformity with what is constituted by nothing temporally objective. In other words, that which appears to us presents 'what it is' exactly by 'how it is'. Accordingly, there is no name for that which this flow is, but it can be seen by what appears as its temporal constitution in experience.

In following with this digression, many claim that the sense for consciousness turns out to be the sense in consciousness.²² As a matter of fact, Husserl does return to the structure of intentionality, i.e., the noesis-noema correlation,²³ to elaborate this constitutive nature of pure consciousness in the *Ideas I*. The noema is signified not by the presence of the object but by the way it is present, and the noesis means that the objectivity cannot be effected in the description of the theory of meaning unless it becomes a synthetic activity of the present. However, this is by no means to say that Husserl's transcendental turn is a denial of the world, or replaces it with the constitutive nothingness in the idealistic sense. In dealing with the theory of constitution in the *Ideas II*,²⁴ transcendental phenomenology is so concerned with the world that the phenomenologically reduced reality takes the place of phenomenological reduction in order to thematize the intentional grounding of pure consciousness. After all, the present of this intentional structure is not given by the auto-constitution of the ego in the unity of immanent time; but rather, it is founded on the constitution of the animate body which is inhabited by pure consciousness in its temporal constitution. Put in another way, this embodied form of phenomenological seeing in its constitution, e.g., sensoriality, is not only motivated in the free spontaneity of a course of conscious processes; but it also goes beyond itself into the spatial order of things.

Now how does this thematization of pure consciousness mean differently in contrast to its previous psychological manifestation? Here, the intersubjective theme of constitution comes to view. There are two apprehensions in terms of the constituted, if the ego is objectified by constituting itself. On the one side, its adumbrations are elaborated into a flowing sensual schema which in turn moves

²² See E. Fink, "The Phenomenological Philosophy of Edmund Husserl and Contemporary Criticism", in Elveton, op. cit., pp. 73-147.

²³ Husserl, *Ideas I*, cf. the 3rd section of the 4th chapter, pp. 282-353.

²⁴ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Second Book, Studies in the Phenomenology of constitution*, trans. by R. Rojcewicz & A. Schuwer, London: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 1989. Hereafter is cited as *Ideas II*.

beyond itself into the identical object. On the other side, this sensation announces its belonging to a psyche and simultaneously reveals my body as mine. An habitual body rather than an empty subject results from these constitutive apprehensions, for it is what has localized sensations, and to be the bearer of the psyche by virtue of that sensation. Intersubjectivity thus presents itself from this analogical appresentation, or empathy, of the habitual body. Because things which are constituted in a manifold for one individual subject can only be its pure subjective appearances. But when the person becomes the body's reference point at the center of a surrounding world under the law of motivation, what is thus constituted is not only the mathematization of reality but also the cultural world. It is because that, on the level of his soul-body, motivation is twisted into causality in order to explain, but on the level of his spirit, causality is turned back into motivation for understanding. The phenomenologically reduced reality therefore receives an ontological priority of spirit over nature.²⁵ Obviously, this priority does not have any idealistic implications. It merely signifies that, if the world bears a universal structure, its objectivity must be contemporaneous with intersubjectivity.

2. The Constitutive Character of Intersubjectivity

This last remark of the intersubjective theme of constitution clearly distinguishes Husserl's transcendental phenomenology from all sorts of idealistic conjectures. In the *Ideas III*, Husserl even claims that "one must differentiate between the eidetics of states of consciousness, which is a piece of the rational ontology of the psyche, and eidetics of the transcendently purified consciousness . . . the genuine and pure phenomenology."²⁶ But, why is this genuine theme of transcendental phenomenology not immediately explicit to the psychological elaboration of the 'pure' mathematics of nature, instead, it is brought out by further reflection of the way it leads to phenomenology? To answer this question, one has to go back to the phenomenological reduction that Husserl employs in relation to 'what the other is'. If we recall, having reduced those appearances in our surrounding world to our consciousness, their present form becomes an index to all possible modifications

²⁵ Ibid., cf. the 3rd chapter of 3rd part, pp. 281-302.

²⁶ E. Husserl, *Ideas Pertaining to a Pure Phenomenology and Phenomenological Philosophy, Third Book, Phenomenology and the Foundations of the Science*, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, trans. by E. Klein & W. Dohl, 1980. p. 64. Hereafter is cited as *Ideas III*.

of their factual stance. How are we able to do so? The reason for us to go beyond the actual mental processes under considerations is that every mental process has a horizon, a horizon of potentialities, which, taking it purely as an actual mental process, are specifically implied in it. In other words, to analyze thematically is not to decompose its constitution into the constitutive parts but to reveal its intentional implications. In the *Afterword*,²⁷ Husserl brings out this transcendental realm of intentional analysis by pointing out a parallelism between phenomenological psychology and transcendental phenomenology. On the psychological standpoint, or our natural standpoint, we unconsciously have reference to the finished actual world as context. Having moved to the philosophical standpoint through phenomenological reduction, or what we should call transcendental reduction here, the object that has been taken into account is not just its complete unity but also the terminus of its genesis. There is implied in the objective sense a sedimentation in the unconscious under our intentional analysis, but it is hidden from the active constitution in our rational psychology. Thus, a thematic consideration is to unfold how, beginning from a basic sense which derives from a former performance, the present sense of the object is formed. In comparison with idealism in a normal sense, this phenomenological idealism is playing its pre-constitutive role in experience rather than the actual constitution of our knowledge.

Once transcendental phenomenology is presented with this genetic format, it is frequently characterized by Husserl as a transcendental ego in terms of its field of transcendental experience. In the *Cartesian Meditations*, for instance, it is formulated as the ego incorporating with its cogitations through cogito.²⁸ In this genetic analysis, however, the constitutional structure of the *Ideas* gives way to a systematic verification of originary evidence. The constitution of pure consciousness becomes a matter of concrete formation of the ego in view of the full presentation of the noema-world, insofar as the constituted object has been regarded as a transcendental guide in the realm of transcendental subjectivity. It is said that, on the one hand, the universal genetic forms remain, as soon as I make all the factual motivations vary in imagination. Such a consideration of transcendental phenomenology turns the phenomenologically reduced reality into one of many presentations in the universal structure of its phenomenological experience, for the

²⁷ Husserl, *Ideas II*, pp. 405-30.

²⁸ E. Husserl, *Cartesian Meditations*, trans. by D. Cairns, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1960, p. 43. Hereafter is cited as CM.

temporal style of every synthesis is now taken to be the condition of the possibility for my ego in general. Just as the transcendental ego is given an eidetic reduction to the *eidos* ego, on the other hand, the immutable style of compossibility that imaginative variation brings out replaced pure consciousness with what is called monad. Because, thanks to its intentional implications, pure consciousness is no longer just the identical pole of the multiplicity of acts and the manifold of cogitations, but also the sedimented history which inhabits its world. Husserl's transcendental phenomenology therefore should be accounted for in this twofold sense: as a static phenomenology, it remains at the mundane level with regard to the intentional constitution of objective reality; as a genetic phenomenology, it uncovers the already constituted world by means of the laws of association in passive synthesis.

After transcendental phenomenology is explicated by the genetic analysis as an archaeology in dealing with the origin of presence,²⁹ undoubtedly, Husserl's concern of intersubjectivity is not hindered by the developmental his theory of constitution; on the contrary, the former cannot help coming into being as an irrevocable theme having transcendental solipsism as the conclusion of the latter. It is true that the archaeological discovery of transcendental experience comes from a self-explication of monad in such a fashion that there is something 'alien' after there is something 'own', not vice versa. But, it is no less true that the otherness of this very experience is also justifiable by way of the ego presenting to myself. After all, if the analysis of transcendental realm is ultimately to examine whatever we experience, why should the otherness not be taken with any serious considerations? Under this direction, my transcendental being is given an abstract epoché by Husserl in the Fifth Meditation of the *Cartesian Meditations* to reduce those objects which have been constituted in my ego into the sphere of my ownness (*Eigensphäre*).³⁰ While my own sphere as the terminus of a purification becomes a primordial institution by being the intentional nexus of abstraction, it also becomes the point of departure for constitutional performance, insofar as I make my body reduced to my ownness stand out (*herausstellen*). As a residue, so to speak, it is the other itself rather than its otherness that encroaches on the sphere of my ownness by mirroring itself in it. His earlier account of intersubjectivity by means of the theory of analogy in empathy toward the other is therefore confirmed by this exhibition of the other itself. Because, the nature of my ownness in this genetic analysis, in contrast to

²⁹ G. Funke, op. cit., p. 74.

³⁰ Husserl, CM, pp. 89-106.

the emergence of intersubjectivity during the period of the *Ideas*, is not only revealed along with the temporal constitution, but also uncovered with a nature centered in my body. That is to say, nature becomes the surrounding world of my body correlatively as "I have carried out a mundanizing self-apperception",³¹ even though it is unfolded as a movement toward the fullness of the ego through abstraction. Having sunken into the midst of nature in this way, I am thus able to experience myself as a member of this totality of things outside me; in other words, the world which we live comes to be the world in which we live. In distinction from its psychological definition of the mundane world, Husserl calls this intersubjective constitution of the world transcendental intersubjectivity.

Although it is still debatable to many scholars, including his faithful followers, that this transcendental intersubjectivity accomplishes its role to justify psychological intersubjectivity,³² it is agreeable to them that, thanks to this exegesis of my monad in genetic phenomenology, what emerges from our experience is the common world for everyone rather than the 'thesis of the world'. Because, it is not just the world in which we have always lived but also the world to which all of us necessarily have experiential access. Husserl later calls it 'life-world' (*Lebenswelt*) in the *Crisis*³³ to emphasize that this eidōs constitutively relates to me in my facticity. That is to say, since this is no longer an issue of the justification of the 'natural world concept' but a thematization of the intermonadic community that fulfills the universal historicity of intersubjective constitution,³⁴ a historical reduction to this 'life-world' is called into play. As the transcendental turn suggests that phenomenological time is revealed by the reduction of cosmic time, nevertheless, this historical reduction is not a direct reflection on history as a flux of events; rather, it is experienced with our bodily functions by means of a constitutive reflection on the kinaesthetic performance of motion, i.e., 'I move' precedes 'I can'. Once the experience of this ability is carried into effect, my undeniable 'there' and that of the other presents itself as apodictically certain of an operative living present, or life-history. From this 'there', which is thus experienced as the limit in a genetic sense, each monad

³¹ Husserl, CM, p. 99.

³² For example, see A. Schutz, "The Problem of Transcendental Intersubjectivity in Husserl", in *Collected Papers III*, ed. by I. Schutz, Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1966, pp. 51-84.

³³ E. Husserl, *The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology*, trans. by D. Carr, Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1970, p. 127.

³⁴ *Ibid.*, cf. "The Origin of Geometry", pp. 353-78.

is certainly in and for itself, but has sense only within a plurality grounded in and unfolding from itself. In other words, the primal striving of the monad is based on the intentionality of communalization; as a primal impulse, it is from the outset related to the other and finds in it its response. Inasmuch as a 'there' becomes common in this fulfilment, intersubjective constitution is consequently related to the 'earth' to blend into a universal history of nature in which man reaches a life form. The intermonadic community which is given within this infinite perspective but also within the totality of understanding finally opens the socio-philosophical realm for Husserl.

III. CRITICISM AND CONFIRMATION

Having elaborated the intersubjective theory that Husserl develops from his transcendental phenomenology, the dual aspects of my own field and the other itself is retained in their correlation. On the one hand, though the world-phenomenon must be justified by the constitutive function of transcendental subjectivity, the life-world still remains as a pregivenness to the pre-reflective experience of our genetic analysis. In this sense, whatever transcendental phenomenology has accomplished is no other than the intersubjective structure of the world. On the other hand, while intersubjectivity is present with me and yet as the presence of the other, this worldiness of the other is founded in and by the sphere of my ownness. In this sense, transcendental intersubjectivity is able to present itself only under the transcendental-phenomenological reduction. In fact, it is this correlation that allows the other to present itself in my own field as well as opposed to it.

However, critics adopt this view to object Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity. They content that this is not self-contained in the philosophical sense as phenomenological knowledge demands in a rigorous science; but follows as a necessary consequence of the phenomenological regard on our experience, for it turns the correlation of my own field and the other itself by virtue of transcendental constitution into a paradox. This criticism is supported by one of the leading commentators on Husserl's teachings. P. Ricoeur puts it concisely "that it oscillates between an acute sense of the concrete and a no-less-pressing demand for the radical".³⁵ It is said that the monadological system of intersubjectivity thematizes

³⁵ P. Ricoeur, *Husserl: Analysis of His Phenomenology*, trans. by E. G. Ballard & L. E. Embree, Evanston: Northwestern Univ. Press, 1967, p. 140.

the intermonadic community in the genetic sense. But, since its thematization rests upon our self-awareness, it cannot be anything else than a system of sense possible for us. In this aspect, although the essence of intersubjectivity is revealed by its transcendental consideration, the latter has already been determined by former. The correlation between my own field and the other itself actually means a concordance without its concrete distinction. Under this interpretation, Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity is still limited to the system of a priori impossibility of my ownness instead of an open intermonadic society.

Nevertheless, one should notice that this objection to the validity of Husserl's transcendental intersubjectivity has never really overthrown the issue itself, nor challenged his goal of an open intermonadic society. In fact, it somehow confirms the meaning of intersubjectivity by giving such a negative regard to Husserl's phenomenology. For example, in A. Schutz's evaluation, while the constituting and the constituted are incompatible to be the ultimate source of the sense-giving in the theory of constitution, intersubjectivity is not accordingly conceived as a counterpart to cover the adequate expression of its sense-structure; rather, it follows from what the phenomenological constitution has gone through to attain its own unique style as being-in-the-world.³⁶ How can we make this reading any sense, if intersubjectivity, according to Husserl's view, is necessarily transcendental in order to be justified as an open intermonadic society? To answer this final question, we should recall that the constitutive correlation between possible thinking and actual knowledge is based on the distinction between my own field and the other itself, not conversely. When the criticism points out that there is a paradoxical consequence of justifying the presence of intersubjectivity by virtue of its transcendental constitution, it should not be regarded as a refutation of its correlation; rather, it is understood as a limit of reflection. That is to say, having recognized this correlation as a paradox, it must pose itself to reflection as the limit of reflection.³⁷ To be sure, there are always meanings, taken up into my own constitutive activity, which bear a reference to a constitutive activity other than my own. This presupposed

³⁶ "our everyday world is, from the outset, an intersubjective world of culture." A. Schutz, "Phenomenology and the Social Sciences", in *Philosophical Essays in Memory of Edmund Husserl*, ed. by M. Farber, Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press, 1940, p. 179.

³⁷ "Reflection finds itself unable so to extricate itself from the reflected as to establish the distance which reflection requires, and that it makes this discovery precisely in the course of the attempt to establish this distance." J. Sallis, "On the Limitation of Transcendental Reflection or Is Intersubjectivity Transcendental?", *Monist*, LV, 1971, p. 315.

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reference to another is the limit which reflection encounters, when it seeks to gain a sphere of ownness from which to exhibit the constitution of intersubjectivity. But, rather than simply permitting the posing of a mere external limit in a fashion of the idealistic transcendental exposition, reflection discloses, in the case of the other, that which is constituted on the noematic side has already been presupposed at every level of noetic activity in that all such activity is situated with the compass of a reference to the other. By means of this disclosure, therefore, subjectivity is thrown outside itself in such a manner that it escapes the grasp of reflection. Whereas Husserl's theory of intersubjectivity is able to return from its transcendental sense to the existential context without jeopardizing his transcendental phenomenology.