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THE TAIWANESE/CHINESE IDENTITY OF THE TAIWAN PEOPLE IN THE 1990S*

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Abstract

This article describes change in the distribution of Taiwan people's Taiwanese/Chinese identity in the 1990s, a time when the cross-Taiwan Strait relationship underwent a great deal of transition. This identity issue is often considered a key variable in explaining how Taiwanese think about politics, in general, and cross-Strait politics, in particular. Survey data collected by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University are used for the analysis. The results indicate that, regardless of ethnic background, age, educational level, gender, and partisanship, the 1990s saw a secular decline in Chinese identity and a steady rise in Taiwanese identity among people on Taiwan.

The term "Taiwanese/Chinese identity" refers to whether individuals in Taiwan identify themselves as

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Taiwanese or Chinese. The authors seek to demonstrate how the distribution of Taiwanese/Chinese identity changed in the 1990s and explore why.

Back in mid-1999 when relations between Taiwan and mainland China gradually congealed into a "cold peace" after the missile crisis during the 1996 Taiwan's presidential election, we wrote a research piece on the Taiwan/Chinese identity of the Taiwan people.[1] Based on four face-to-face interview survey datesets, conducted between 1994 and 1998 by the Election Study Center at National Chengchi University, we documented a secular decline in the Chinese identity ratio and a concomitant rise of the Taiwanese identity ratio of the Taiwan people. The pattern had been rather consistent across demographic groups defined by ethnic background, age, educational level, gender, and partisan identity. As more data are available, we want to revisit the identity issue, in the hope to shed additional light upon the identity of the people on Taiwan. The issue is important because many consider it a crucial factor in the uneasy development of the cross-Strait relationship.

In the Nick of Time

Much has changed in Taiwan since 1998, though these changes do not seem to have brought much impact on the "cold peace" across the Strait. First and foremost was the dethroning in the 2000 presidential election of the Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, or the KMT) which had governed Taiwan since 1949. The Democratic Progressive Party's (DPP) Chen Shui-bien soundly defeated the KMT's uncharismatic Lien Chan to become the President of the Republic of China. The KMT suffered yet another blow in the 2001 legislative elec-

[1] Liu I-chou and Ho Szu-yin, "The Taiwanese/Chinese Identity of the Taiwan People," *Issues & Studies* 35 (May-June 1999): 33.

tion, as it was replaced by the DPP as the largest party in the legislature.

Despite its claim to seek Taiwan's independence, the victorious pro-independence DPP has yet to change the institutions that deal with mainland China—i.e., the ROC Constitution, the Mainland Affairs Council, which is responsible for Taiwan's mainland policy-making, the Straits Exchange Foundation, which is the proxy agency of the government in its negotiations with the Chinese mainland, and the National Unification Guidelines. The DPP administration, however, does have a tone vis-à-vis the mainland that is different from its predecessor's. For example, high administration officials use the term *hua ren* (literally, ethnic Chinese), rather than *Zhongguo ren* (literally, Chinese), to emphasize the distinction between Taiwanese and Chinese in various policy statements. This change of tone certainly has not been lost on the PRC, which, on some occasions, has reiterated "no recognition of being Chinese (on the part of Taiwanese), no negotiation." And, indeed, a politics of semantics of sorts has characterized the "cold peace" across the Taiwan Strait since the inauguration of President Chen in May 2000.[2] This change of tone puts our current study in an event sharper relief, as the DPP administration continues to arouse and resort to various "Taiwan First" symbols. These political symbols served as the rally point for the DPP's victory in the 2001 legislative election.

Secondly, the KMT's loss in the 2000 presidential election means the end of the KMT's party stance toward the PRC. Mr. Lee Teng-hui, when in power, adroitly mingled his "Taiwan First" value with his party's traditional conciliatory stance toward China. In the jargon of political science, he was able to take the "median voter" position along the Taiwan independence—reunification spectrum. Given his popularity among native Taiwanese and his frequent use of folk talk to

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[2] Ho Szu-yin, "Politique et rhetorique dans les relations Chine-Taiwan," *Politique Etrangere* 1 (2001): 55-68.

promulgate his "Taiwan First" idea, Lee was widely credited as single-handedly arousing Taiwan consciousness among the people. After the presidential election, Lee, chairman of the KMT for over twelve years, broke with his former party and helped to form the Taiwan Solidarity Union. Lee's coattails were enough to hand the TSU a strong debut performance in the 2001 legislative election. The TSU is the most important political ally of the DPP in the Legislative Yuan. Lee seems determined to give the "Taiwan First" ideas one last strong push before he bows out of politics. President Chen stands to benefit from Lee's efforts in promoting Taiwan-first values, as his personally-approved biography, *The Native Son of Taiwan*, reveals.

Thirdly, in the past decade, Taiwan's economy was in relatively good shape. Dovetailing with the bull equity market in the United States in the 1990s, the electronics industry buoyed Taiwan's economic development. With huge foreign reserves (ranked as the third largest in the world behind Japan and the PRC) that were mainly the result of exporting high-margin high-tech electronic products, Taiwan was able to wade through the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis unscathed. However, the rapid decline in the American equity market following early 2000 wreaked havoc on Taiwan's economy. As high-tech exports to America dwindle and old-economy sectors keep hollowing out to China, Taiwan's economy fell into recession. The economy contracted by a whopping 4.27 percent in the third quarter of 2001. At the same time, Taiwan increased its dependence on the booming Chinese economy. China now stands as the second largest trading partner for Taiwanese exports and the largest destination for Taiwan's foreign direct investment. As one would expect, the socio-political implications of an assertive, distinctive Taiwan identity might be at loggerheads with those who are of increasing dependence on the Chinese market. Some preliminary, indirect evidence shows that the Taiwanese identity might be impacted by the brunt of the economic downturn. For

instance, the proportion of people who agree with the PRC's "one country, two systems" formula has drastically increased from less than 5 percent to more than 16 percent in less than one year's time, as shown by the Mainland Affairs Council's survey in 2001.

We, therefore, believe that it is high time to reexamine the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of the Taiwan people.

Conceptualization and Measurement

"Do you consider yourself Taiwanese or Chinese?" In the era of authoritarianism, that was a question that would raise some eyebrows. For one thing, it had a readily available politically correct answer. For another, people tended to think that the question was a no-brainer—Taiwanese are certainly Chinese.

Before Taiwan's political democratization, there were no studies regarding whether the Taiwan people identified themselves as Chinese or Taiwanese, for reasons stated above. By and large, researchers would use respondents' ethnic background or place of origin (*shengji*, or literally provinciality) as a proxy variable for self-identity.[3] After martial law was lifted

[3] E.g., Chen Wen-chun, "The Political Attitude of Secondary School Students in the Taiwan Area: Application of Aggregate Data Analysis," *Zhengzhi xuebao* (Political science journal) (Taipei), no. 11 (1983): 1-78. (In this article, the ethnic background of the people was implied by their mother tongues, such as the southern Fujian (Fulao) dialect, Mandarin, and Hakka); Hu Fo and Yu Ying-lung, "The Voters' Voting Inclination: An Analysis of Structure and Types," *ibid.*, 225-79. (*In this article, ethnic background was not a factor under consideration*); Hu Fo and Yu Ying-lung, "The Voters' Partisan Choice: An Analysis of Attitudinal Inclination and Individual Background," ibid., no 12 (1984): 1-59; Lei Fei-lung et al., "The Demographic Ecological Studies of Taiwan's Supplementary Legislative Election," ibid., no. 12 (1984): 61-121; Lin Jia-cheng, "A Study of the Electoral Behavior in 1983," ibid., 123-88; Lin Jia-cheng, "An Analysis of the Partisan Support Factor," ibid., no. 13 (1985): 131-67; Chang Mao-kuei, "Provincial Origin and Nationalism," in *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong* (Ethnic relationship and state identity), ed. Chang Mao-kuei et al. (Taipei: Yeqiang Chubanshe, 1993), 233-78.

in 1987, the conceptual mushiness regarding Taiwan people's self-identity in terms of the Chinese-or-Taiwanese dichotomy had given way to better conceptualization and measurement. Chang Mao-kuei and Hsiao Hsin-huang, in their 1987 article, linked "self-identification" with what they called "Chinese complex" and "Taiwanese complex."[4] Since researchers on Taiwan's public opinion had long been aware that "ethnic cleavage" (*shengji fenqi*) or "ethnic consciousness" (*shengji yishi*) was an important determinant of the political behavior of Taiwan people, the exploration of the concept has been couched largely in politics-laden terms. The term "identity" is given many modifiers, as in "ethnic identity" (*zuqun rentong*),[5] or "national-ethnic identity" (*guozu rentong*),[6] or "national identity" (*minzu rentong*);[7] or "state identity" (*guojia*

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[4] Chang Mao-kuei and Hsiao Hsin-huang, "The 'Chinese Complex' and 'Taiwanese Complex' of University Students: An Analysis of Self-Identification and Intermarriage Concepts," *Zhongguo luntan* (China tribune)(Taipei) 25, no. 1 (1987): 34-52.

[5] Cheng Su-fen, "An Analysis of the Correlation between Candidate Image and Voting Behavior," in *Xuanju xingwei yu Taiwan diqu de zhengzhi minzhuhua: Cong dierjie lifaweiyuan xuanju tantao* (Electoral behavior and the Taiwan area's political democratization: A discussion based on the second legislative election), a National Science Council research project report (NSC82-0301-H004-034), ed. Chen Yi-yen et al. (Taipei: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, 1993), 62-81; Chen Wen-chun, "The Unification/Independence Issue and the Electoral Behavior of the Voters: An Analysis of the 1994 Provincial Governor/City Mayor Election," *Xuanju yanjiu* (Journal of Electoral Studies) (Taipei) 2, no. 2 (1995): 99-136; Wu Nai-te, "Liberalism and Ethnic Identity: A Search for an Ideological Basis of Taiwanese Nationalism," *Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan* (Journal of Taiwan politics) (Taipei), no. 1 (1996): 5-39; Yu Ying-lung, "A Political Psychological Analysis of Taiwan's Ethnic Identity," ibid., 41-84; Tsai Meng-hsi, "A Study of the Changes in the Ethnic Identity, Unification/Independence Position, and Party Preference of the Taiwan People" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1997).

[6] Sun Tung-wen, "The Relationship between National-Ethnic Identity and the Taiwan People's Attitude toward the Hong Kong/Macau Issue," *Zhengzhi xuebao*, no. 29 (1997): 113-39.

[7] Chen Kuang-hui, "A Study of the Taiwan People's State Identity: A Discussion of Certain Concepts" (Master's thesis, Graduate Institute of Political Science, National Chengchi University, Taipei, 1997).

rentong).[8] When the identifier (self) in the identification equation is given more weight in conceptualization, identity can be construed as "self-recognition" (*ziwo rending*),[9] or "self-identification" (*ziwo rentong*).[10]

In this article, we will stick to a pure-and-simple conceptualization of identity. Identity presumes a self (the respondent) and group-objects (Taiwanese or Chinese) to which the self can relate his inner feelings, psychological orientations, or attachment.[11] We will not add any modifier to the concept. This clean-cut conceptualization will allow us to avoid much confusion that might arise given Taiwan's political discourse. For example, if identity refers to "ethnic identity," the term may have something to do with Taiwan's four major ethnic groups (Fulao, Hakka, mainlander, and aborigines) rather than with "China" and "Taiwan." Similarly, identity as "self-recognition" and "self-identification" does not really denote the relationship between one's self and "China/Taiwan."

Two data sets are used for analysis in this article. The first data set consists of five face-to-face interview surveys of adult citizens on Taiwan conducted by the Election Study Center of National Chengchi University, under the sponsorship of the Executive Yuan's Mainland Affairs Council.[12] We use this

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[8] Wu Nai-te, "Ethnic Awareness, Political Support, and State Identity: A Preliminary Theoretical Probe into Taiwan's Ethnic Politics," in Chang, *Zuqun guanxi yu guojia rentong*, 27-51; Chen, "The Unification/Independence Issue and the Electoral Behavior of the Voters."

[9] Chang and Hsiao, "The 'Chinese Complex' and 'Taiwanese Complex' of University Students"; Hsu Hua-yen, "Taiwan Electorate's State Identity and Partisan Voting Behavior: The Results of Empirical Studies from 1991 to 1993," *Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan*, no. 1 (1996): 85-127.

[10] Chen Kuang-hui, "A Study of the Taiwan People's State Identity: A Discussion of Certain Concepts."

[11] This conceptualization derives from *The American Voter*. Please see Angus Campbell, Philip E. Converse, Warren E. Miller, and Donald E. Stokes, *The American Voter*, unabridged edition (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1980, Midway Reprint), 120-22.

[12] The first survey was conducted from January 17 to February 20, 1994, with a total of 1,600 valid cases. The second survey was conducted from June 19 to the end of August of 1995, with a total of 1,634 valid cases. The third survey

dataset to describe the trends in Taiwan people's identity. The second data set was telephone interviews during twenty-seven time points by the Election Study Center, most of which were sponsored by the National Science Council of the Executive Yuan. We use this second dataset to explore the dynamic of the identity trends. The relatively large sample size of these surveys allows us to conduct comparatively stable cross-sectional analysis. The questionnaires and survey methods are uniform across the board, thus highly comparable.[13]

The sampling for the five face-to-face interview surveys was based on the stratified, stepped, equiprobable sampling method. Data were weighted to ensure that the demographic characteristics of the sample were approximately those of the population. As to the telephone surveys, various sampling procedures were applied. However, equal probability of selecting respondents was ensured during the process.

The Taiwanese/Chinese identity question takes the following form:

> In our society, some people say that they are "Taiwanese," some say that they are "Chinese," and some say that they are "both Taiwanese and Chinese." Do you think you are "Taiwanese," "Chinese," or "both Taiwanese and Chinese"?

For the sake of presentational convenience, those who replied that they were only Taiwanese are referred to as having a "Taiwanese identity," those who replied that they were Chinese as having a "Chinese identity," and those who replied

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was conducted from January 20 to March 14, 1997, with a total of 1,610 valid cases. The fourth survey was conducted from July 5 to September 5, 1998, with a total of 1,604 valid cases. And the fifth one was conducted between January 23 and March 27, 2000, with a total of 1,647 valid cases.

[13] Different interview methodology and different survey institutions may affect the variability of data. Flora Tien, "The Influence of Respondents Self-administered Questionnaire and That of Interviewers Asking Questions on the Answering Effect," *Diaocha yanjiu* (Survey studies) (Taipei), no. 2 (1996): 59-88; William S. Aquilino and Leonard A. Lo Sciuto, "Effects of Interview Mode on Self-Reported Drug Use," *Public Opinion Quarterly* 54 (1990): 362-95.

that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese as having a "double identity." The "double identity" category is somewhat complicated. Respondents presented with the Taiwanese/Chinese choice might have two or more different ideas regarding the domain of the Taiwanese/Chinese. Some of them might view Taiwanese as a subset of Chinese. Or they might think Taiwanese and Chinese are two mutually exclusive sets without any overlap. Or they might believe the two are overlapping sets.[14] Some might consider the question from a historical or cultural perspective, thus concluding that Taiwanese are a subset of the Chinese, or at least partially overlapping with the Chinese. Others might view the choice from a geographical or political perspective, thus easily concluding that Taiwanese and Chinese constitute two separate sets.[15] The survey results are the aggregation of people's rationales in answering the question.

The Trend

Table 1 shows the distribution of Taiwanese/Chinese identity in the five face-to-face interview surveys. In the first three surveys, conducted in 1994, 1995, 1997, respectively, the ratio of "double identity" respondents was the highest. However, the ratio of "Taiwanese identity" respondents rose through the years and surpassed the double-identity ratio in surveys con-

[14] For discussion of this kind, see Huang Kuo-chang, *Zhongguo yishi yu Taiwan yishi* (Chinese awareness and Taiwanese awareness) (Taipei: Wunan tushu chuban gongsi, 1992).

[15] It is not difficult to understand that, when such factors as history, language, and ethnicity are also involved, explanations of the identity issue will become even more complicated. Of two persons having the same identity, one may contemplate the question from two dimensions (e.g., historical and geographical) and say that "I am both Taiwanese and Chinese," while meaning that he/she is a Chinese when considering the history of Taiwan and he/she is also a Taiwanese because he/she lives in Taiwan. The other may consider the question from a single angle (either geographical or historical) and say that "I am a Taiwanese" or "I am a Chinese."

ducted in 1998 and 2000. Meanwhile, the Chinese identity ratio has dwindled from nearly a quarter of the sample in 1994 to less than 10 percent in 2000.

Table 1. The Distribution of the Taiwan People's Taiwanese/ Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Variable	No. of Persons	%
1994	Taiwanese Identity	461	28.8
	Double Identity	690	43.0
	Chinese Identity	386	24.1
	No Response	62	3.9
1995	Taiwanese Identity	474	29.1
	Double Identity	746	45.6
	Chinese Identity	344	21.1
	No Response	70	4.3
1997	Taiwanese Identity	544	33.8
	Double Identity	769	47.8
	Chinese Identity	230	14.3
	No Response	67	4.2
1998	Taiwanese Identity	711	44.3
	Double Identity	678	42.3
	Chinese Identity	160	10.0
	No Response	55	3.4
2000	Taiwanese Identity	823	50.0
	Double Identity	642	39.0
	Chinese Identity	136	8.3
	No Response	46	2.8

Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

In the following analysis, we will describe the change in identity in various demographic groups.

Ethnicity

Table 2 presents the distribution of the respondents' Taiwanese/Chinese identity by their ethnic background, i.e., Hakka, Fulao, and mainlanders. Since aborigines constitute less than one percent of the total population in Taiwan, their small number in the samples excludes them from the analysis. Hakka are descendants of immigrants from certain areas in

Table 2. Ethnic Background and the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Ethnic Background	Taiwanese Identity (row %)	Double Identity (row %)	Chinese Identity (row %)	No. of Persons
1994	Hakka	22.3	49.0	28.7	150
	Fulao	35.8	45.7	18.5	1,150
	Mainlanders	5.9	38.4	55.6	222
1995	Hakka	28.6	47.7	23.7	158
	Fulao	35.1	48.2	16.7	1,123
	Mainlanders	9.2	46.7	44.0	244
1997	Hakka	28.6	57.1	14.3	167
	Fulao	41.3	47.0	10.8	1,120
	Mainlanders	11.1	53.4	35.4	230
1998	Hakka	44.8	46.9	8.3	244
	Fulao	52.0	41.3	6.7	1,052
	Mainlanders	18.1	53.0	28.8	230
2000	Hakka	42.6	48.5	6.4	173
	Fulao	56.8	35.4	5.1	1,244
	Mainlanders	18.2	49.7	29.9	206

Note: All Chi-square tests of the five surveys are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.
Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

central China to Taiwan some three hundred years ago. Roughly 10 percent of Taiwan's twenty three million people are Hakka. The Fulao are descendants of immigrants from Chinese southeast coastal provinces (Fujian Province, in particular) to Taiwan about the same time when the Hakka immigrated to Taiwan. The Fulao are approximately 77 percent of Taiwan's total population. In Taiwan, the Fulao and the Hakka are customarily called "Taiwanese," as opposed to the mainlanders. The mainlanders are immigrants, or their descendants, from all over China since 1949 when the KMT withdrew to Taiwan in the wake of its military defeat by the Chinese Communist Party. The mainlanders are about 12 percent of the population. The physical attributes of these three groups are the same as the Chinese people (or *Han* people). The "ethnic" differences are mainly in the dialects used by these social groups, or in the subjective perceptions by these

groups of various aspects of daily life (politics, in particular). Thus, we are using the term "ethnic" in a relatively loose sense.

The Hakka's Taiwanese/Chinese identity was in between that of the Fulao and mainlander respondents. The Taiwanese identity ratio of the Hakka respondents was fifteen to twenty-five percentage points higher than that of mainlander respondents, but ten to fifteen percentage points lower than that of Fulao respondents. Their Chinese identity ratio was slightly higher than that of Fulao respondents, the differential being less than ten percentage points. Yet the Hakka are much less likely to be identified with Chinese than the mainlander respondents, with a twenty to twenty five percentage point difference.

Among all ethnic groups, the Taiwanese identity ratio of the Fulao was the highest. In the first three surveys, over 40 percent of Fulao respondents identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. In the last two surveys, the majority of the Fulao became identified with Taiwanese only. Concomitantly, Fulao respondents who chose to identify themselves as Chinese only declined from over 15 percent in 1994 and 1995 to 5 percent in 1998 and 2000.

All five surveys show that, of all ethnic groups, mainlander respondents have the strongest Chinese identity. In 1994, over 50 percent of mainlander respondents identified themselves with Chinese only. The ratio then declined to about 30 percent in 1998 and 2000. By corollary, mainlander respondents have the weakest Taiwanese identity. In 1994, mainlander respondents' Taiwanese identity ratio was lower than 6 percent, although this ratio climbed to slightly less than 20 percent in 1998. Since 1995, the most popular position along this identity spectrum for mainlander respondents has been double identity: around 50 percent of them believe that they are both Chinese and Taiwanese.

Though first-generation mainlanders spent the greater part of their lives in Taiwan, they still have strong emotional ties

with the Chinese mainland. This is either because China is their birthplace or because they still have relatives there. Thus, the older the mainlanders are, the stronger their tendency to have Chinese identity. Through political socialization, most of their children have inherited the same values, including the importance of the Chinese identity.[16] Yet, mainlanders of younger generations have their life experiences in Taiwan. So, for the time being, the mainlanders are, by and large, more oriented toward Chinese identity. As time passes, with the phasing out of first-generation mainlanders, the mainlanders should demonstrate a tectonic move toward Taiwanese identity.

Age

Age is an appropriate index of time. It represents accumulation of information or experience. Different ages represent the accumulation of different information and life experiences. Therefore, observing the attitudinal and behavioral distribution of respondents of different ages in surveys should give the researchers a sense of the effects of time on the persons under study. The chi-square tests of Table 3 have reached a statistically significant level ($p < .001$), meaning that different age groups do show different identity patterns.

As Table 3 shows, older people tend to have stronger Taiwanese identity. This result is at odds with the belief, held by many political pundits, that since Taiwan and mainland China have long been separated, younger people in Taiwan for their want-of-life experiences related to China should have stronger Taiwanese identity than older persons. Table 3 also

[16] Though, to the authors' knowledge, there has not been any survey study concerning the political socialization process of the mainlanders in Taiwan, ample anecdotal evidence suggests that political socialization plays a major role in mainlanders' generational value transmittal.

shows that the Chinese identity among the five age groups tends to have a shallow U-shaped distribution.

Table 3. Age and the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Age	Taiwanese Identity (row %)	Double Identity (row %)	Chinese Identity (row %)	No. of Persons
1994	20–29	20.7	55.1	24.2	439
	30–39	31.6	45.9	22.5	420
	40–49	31.1	42.3	26.5	252
	50–59	41.4	34.1	24.6	185
	Over 60	34.2	35.5	30.3	242
1995	20–29	15.4	61.5	23.1	433
	30–39	29.4	51.3	19.3	430
	40–49	39.2	44.3	16.5	267
	50–59	44.5	33.7	21.9	166
	Over 60	37.7	30.8	31.5	235
1997	20–29	20.4	65.2	14.4	404
	30–39	31.8	55.2	13.0	421
	40–49	41.0	46.5	12.5	307
	50–59	47.2	38.8	14.0	174
	Over 60	50.4	26.6	23.1	237
1998	20–29	33.6	55.3	11.1	380
	30–39	39.1	51.5	9.4	395
	40–49	54.4	35.5	10.2	320
	50–59	58.5	36.1	5.4	183
	Over 60	54.0	31.0	15.0	258
2000	20–29	39.9	51.9	7.2	376
	30–39	46.1	42.5	8.5	410
	40–49	53.5	36.4	8.2	349
	50–59	63.1	25.5	4.2	198
	Over 60	55.3	28.7	11.9	298

Note: All Chi-square tests of the five surveys are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.
Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

This can be explained by political socialization in Taiwan. With regard to Taiwan's political relations with China, Taiwan's official stance, under the KMT regime, had been unequivocally to seek unification without any specific timetable. This stance is propagated in all kinds of political institutions, official documents, and the contents of school

education.[17] As the youngest respondents are most likely influenced by the effects of political socialization in schools, they would take a position close to this "mainstream" value. The process of political socialization, however, continues into adulthood. People receive new political information as they age. After Taiwan's democratization brought about complete freedom of speech, various "nonmainstream" values (e.g., Taiwan's independence) gained acceptance in society. Therefore, it is quite possible that people may move from pro-unification (the result of the socialization of schools) toward pro-independence (the result of continuing political socialization) as they age.[18] To the degree that the contents of this political socialization bear upon one's Chinese/Taiwanese identity, we can expect the youngest respondents are most likely to show Chinese identity. The oldest respondents' tendency to have Chinese identity also could be accounted for by political socialization. After a lifelong exposure to the official stance, they are less likely to give up Chinese identity than their middle-aged counterparts. Having said all this, we do not mean that political socialization of the official position accounts for all the variation in Chinese/Taiwanese identity. Obviously, it doesn't, as the oldest people are still more oriented toward Taiwanese identity than toward Chinese identity, in within-group or across-group comparisons. The process of political socialization is a complicated one. We will have more say on this.

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[17] Some may argue that Lee's "special state-to-state theory" represents a deviation from this official stance. We believe that, in *realpolitik* terms, this might be the case. But in terms of symbolic politics and its policy applications, Lee hardly made a dent on this official stance. Lee's justification of his new stance was based on giving the status quo a semantic spin. Lee finally backpedaled his "special state-to-state theory" under American pressure. The theory, after all, remains just a detour.

[18] Liu I-chou, "Generational Divergence in Unification/Independence Position," in *Liang'an guanxi wenti minyi diaocha xueshu yantaohui lunwenji* (A collection of papers presented at the Symposium on Cross-Strait Relations Opinion Polls), 4-3-1—4-3-21. The symposium was co-sponsored by the MAC and the NCCU Election Study Center in Taipei, May 17-18, 1997.

The double identity ratio tends to decline with age. Double identity is the majority position for the youngest respondents, as, across five surveys, over 50 percent of this group identified themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese. Double identity used to be the modal position for both the 30-39 and 40-49 groups before 1997, but since 1998, double identity has given way to Taiwanese identity for these two groups. For those who are over fifty in all five surveys, double identity was never the most popular position, always coming second to Taiwanese identity.

Education

Educational background is usually an index of one's ability to absorb and use information. We expect that people with higher educational attainment will have more political information and better ability to process political information. The educational background of respondents is, therefore, important for our understanding of people's political attitudes. Table 4 cross-tabulates respondents' educational background and their Taiwanese/Chinese identity.

As Table 4 shows, Taiwanese identity and educational level are negatively correlated, double identity and educational level are positively correlated, while Chinese identity and educational level are weakly correlated—depending on the survey years. About 50 to 60 percent of the respondents who had received at least senior high school or vocational education said that they were both Taiwanese and Chinese. We have good reason to believe that better-educated people are better equipped to approach the identity issue from various political, historical, cultural, and ethnic perspectives, rather than treat it as a one-dimensional issue.

Table 4. Education and the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Education	Taiwanese Identity (row %)	Double Identity (row %)	Chinese Identity (row %)	No. of Persons
1994	Elementary & below	43.6	35.9	20.4	500
	Junior secondary	32.6	47.5	19.9	237
	Senior secondary & vocational	23.6	51.0	25.4	431
	Junior college	17.2	47.4	35.4	198
	University & above	17.5	48.8	33.7	171
1995	Elementary & below	49.5	34.4	16.2	464
	Junior secondary	33.7	48.2	18.1	233
	Senior secondary & vocational	19.2	55.0	25.8	482
	Junior college	17.8	55.1	27.1	185
	University & above	19.4	54.2	26.4	181
1997	Elementary & below	57.4	29.5	13.1	416
	Junior secondary	34.0	46.3	18.8	209
	Senior secondary & vocational	29.8	56.5	13.7	471
	Junior college	21.6	60.0	18.4	199
	University & above	19.8	66.6	13.6	245
1998	Elementary & below	62.1	30.2	7.6	486
	Junior secondary	50.3	40.2	9.5	261
	Senior secondary & vocational	37.3	52.5	10.2	455
	Junior college	30.4	52.4	17.2	190
	University & above	30.5	56.8	12.7	154
2000	Elementary & below	63.9	23.2	7.0	536
	Junior secondary	55.6	33.8	8.2	276
	Senior secondary & vocational	41.5	50.1	7.5	471
	Junior college	35.9	51.9	11.8	195
	University & above	36.6	52.5	10.0	159

Note: All Chi-square tests of the five surveys are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.
Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

Gender

Table 5 indicates that, during these five surveys, the modal opinion of both men and women was double identity until

1997. In 1998, Taiwanese identity began to take precedence over double identity, becoming the mode for both genders. Women were more oriented toward Taiwanese identity, and, in contrast, men are more oriented toward Chinese identity.

Table 5. Gender and the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Gender	Taiwanese Identity (row %)	Double Identity (row %)	Chinese Identity (row %)	No. of Persons
1994	Male	34.6	45.5	29.9	793
	Female	35.7	44.2	30.0	740
1995	Male	26.6	49.1	24.3	805
	Female	34.2	46.2	19.6	747
1997	Male	32.5	50.6	16.9	800
	Female	38.2	49.0	12.8	743
1998	Male	42.7	45.4	11.9	795
	Female	49.2	42.0	8.7	754
2000	Male	47.5	39.5	9.8	828
	Female	52.6	38.3	6.7	817

Note: All Chi-square tests of the five surveys are statistically significant at the $p < .05$ level.
Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

Partisan Identification

The main difference among Taiwan's major political parties is their stance on cross-Strait relations, which can be succinctly expressed in terms of Taiwan's independence, status quo, or reunification with China. The New Party is generally regarded as located in the unification end of the spectrum, while the Taiwan Independence Party is at the other extreme. Since the 2001 legislative election, the Taiwan Solidarity Union has replaced the Taiwan Independence Party. In between are the DDP, situating itself toward the independence end, and the KMT and People First Party (a party split from the KMT,

formed after the 2000 presidential election) toward the unification end. Many studies on Taiwan's elections have consistently shown that supporters of these political parties demonstrate their unification/independence positions in accordance with their parties.[19] Therefore, we believe that partisanship should bear upon the identity issue, as both partisanship and identity have a great deal to do with independence and unification.

Table 6 demonstrates several features. First, DPP partisans have been staunch in their Taiwanese identity through the years. Their variation among the three identity categories across the years has been relatively moderate, compared to other party supporters. DPP supporters obviously have had a very clear Taiwanese identity. This is in line with the general understanding that DPP members consist mainly of the Fulao and the Hakka. Secondly, though the New Party supporters are more attached to Chinese identity than other partisans, their Chinese identity has been much diluted in recent years—in 2000, more New Party supporters identified themselves with the Taiwanese than with the Chinese. Thirdly, KMT supporters have gravitated toward Taiwanese identity from double identity. Up until 1998, double identity was the mode for KMT supporters' self-identity. But in 2000, the proportion of KMT supporters who identified themselves with Taiwanese, for the first time, exceeded that of KMT double-identifiers. Meanwhile, the percentage of KMT supporters identifying themselves as Chinese decreased, continuing to plummet through the years. Finally, due attention should be given to the category of "others." This category includes nonpartisans or supporters of other political parties. Their choice of the Taiwanese/Chinese identity lies between that of the KMT and DPP supporters. They constitute a gray area between the two

[19] Chen, "Ethnic Groups, Ethnic Awareness, and Political Support"; Yu, "A Political Psychological Analysis of Taiwan's Ethnic Identity"; Chen, *Taiwan diqu minzhong guojia rentong zhi yanjiu*, 64-65; Tsai, "A Study of the Changes," 39-40; Wang, "Ethnic Awareness, Nationalism, and Partisan Support."

Table 6. Partisan Identity and the Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1994–2000

Year	Partisan Identity	Taiwanese Identity (row %)	Double Identity (row %)	Chinese Identity (row %)	No. of Persons
1994	KMT	18.3	44.9	36.8	358
	DPP	53.9	35.8	10.3	117
	NP	13.5	46.4	40.1	57
	Others	32.3	45.9	21.8	1,006
1995	KMT	19.0	46.6	34.4	363
	DPP	61.4	32.8	5.8	113
	NP	4.1	51.4	44.5	65
	Others	32.5	49.6	17.9	1,012
1997	KMT	23.6	52.7	23.7	421
	DPP	52.1	39.0	8.9	197
	NP	9.8	69.9	20.3	106
	Others	40.4	48.4	11.2	819
1998	KMT	34.0	48.5	17.5	441
	DPP	59.5	35.9	4.6	256
	NP	18.4	59.6	22.0	53
	Others	49.9	42.6	7.5	799
2000	KMT	44.6	37.1	11.6	506
	DPP	68.1	28.1	2.6	328
	NP	21.5	52.2	16.0	47
	Others	47.8	35.8	8.1	763

Notes:
1. KMT = Kuomintang, DPP = Democratic Progressive Party, NP = New Party.
2. "Others" include those who were neutral, those who had no partisan identity, and those who gave no response to this question.
3. Note: All Chi-square tests of the five surveys are statistically significant at the $p < .001$ level.
Source: Data obtained from the island-wide personal-interview surveys conducted by the NCCU Election Study Center under MAC sponsorship.

major parties and, hence, are subject to ideological pull-and-push between the two major parties.

For better visual representation of these aforementioned trends, we transform the data in Tables 2 to 6 into Figures 1 to 10.

We now summarize our descriptive findings: First, since the mid-1990s, the Taiwanese identity ratio has continued to rise sharply, regardless of ethnic groups, age, educational background, gender, and partisan identity. Second, there has been a corresponding decline in the Chinese identity ratio, which is

Figure 1. Ethnic Background and the Taiwanese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 2. Ethnic Background and the Chinese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 3. Age and the Taiwanese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 4. Age and the Chinese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 5. Education and the Taiwanese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 6. Education and the Chinese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 7. Gender and the Taiwanese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 8. Gender and the Chinese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 9. Partisanship and the Taiwanese Identity, 1994–2000



Figure 10. Partisanship and the Chinese Identity, 1994–2000



even more conspicuous than the rise in the Taiwanese identity ratio. This trend has existed among all demographic groups of respondents. Third, the direction of change began with a switch from the Chinese identity to the double identity among some people, and from double identity to the Taiwanese identity. Thus, the shift from the Chinese identity to the Taiwanese identity occurred gradually. Fourth, the highest Taiwanese identity ratio is found among the Fulao. The mainlanders are most attached to Chinese identity. In both identity accounts, the Hakka are somewhere in between. The trend is for the mainlanders to move from Chinese identity to double identity, and the Fulao and the Hakka to move from double identity to Taiwanese identity. Fifth, both the middle-aged (aged forty to fifty-nine) and the elderly (over sixty) had a higher Taiwanese identity tendency than younger people (under thirty-nine). Sixth, the educational level of respondents is inversely related to Taiwanese identity, but positively related to Chinese identity. Seventh, women are more identified with Taiwanese, and men are more identified with Chinese. Eighth, the DPP supporters have the strongest Taiwanese identity, followed in descending order by "others," KMT supporters, and NP supporters. For both the NP and KMT supporters, the trend is toward Taiwanese identity.

The Dynamic of Change: Indigenization, Desinolization, or Mere Politicization?

In order to explore the dynamic of trends documented above, we needed to resort to a different set of data that would give us more points of observation. As stated earlier, the data used in this stage were collected over ten years from 1991 to 2000,[20] through telephone interviews at twenty-seven time points. The wordings and questionnaires are comparable over time.

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[20] No appropriate data is available for 1993.

We have employed cohort analysis to decipher the impact on the *change* of the Chinese/Taiwanese identity of age, generation, and period. We are fully aware of the underidentification problem involved in cohort analysis with cross-sectional or time-series data. Presumably the underidentification problem can be solved only with panel data.[21] Yet, we believe that, for illustrative or exploratory purposes, the trichotomy of age, generation, and period still provides a good starting point.[22] We will explore if and how life-cycle (age), generational effects, and period events impact the change of identity of Taiwan people. Conceptually, life-cycle effect refers to the systematic change in a variable as cohorts age. A generational effect measures the extent to which cohorts entered the electorate with some distinctive values. A period effect reflects any short-term shift in a variable in response to the unique events at any given time.

Table 7 presents the distribution of Taiwanese-, Chinese-, and double-identity of the Taiwan people from 1991 to 2000 at twenty-seven time points.

The proportion of Taiwanese-identity began on a base of 19.8 percent in December 1991, peaked in July 1999 with a reading of 42.1 percent, and ended in December 2001 with 31.8 percent. The one-decade growth rate is 60.6 percent. In contrast, the proportion of Chinese-identity dwindles from 25.5 percent in the beginning of the 1990s to 10.3 percent at the end of 2000, showing a negative growth rate of 59.6 percent. The

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[21] William Claggett, "Partisan Acquisition Versus Partisan Intensity: Life-Cycle, Generation, and Period Effects, 1952-1976," *American Journal of Political Science* 25, no. 2 (1981); Norval D. Glenn, *Cohort Analysis*, Sage University Paper Series on quantitative Applications in the Social Sciences, 07-005 (Beverly Hills and London: Sage Publications, 1981).

[22] In the study of partisanship among the American electorate, scholars have used cohort analysis to separate the effects of age, generation, and period on the change of partisanship, even though the empirical indicator of each effect is an exact function of the empirical indicators of the other two effects (hence, underidentification). Barring any panel data design, the intractability of this problem can be more or less ameliorated by using side information to specify the effects of this trio. And this is what we intend to do here.

Table 7. Distribution of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity, 1991–2000

Time	Taiwanese Identity	Double Identity	Chinese Identity	Number of Cases
Dec 1991	19.8	54.8	25.5	926
Jun 1992	19.5	50.9	29.6	2774
Jul 1994	21.7	49.9	28.4	1115
Apr 1995	26.7	47.0	26.3	1133
Nov 1995	31.0	49.1	19.9	1100
Dec 1995	23.6	57.8	18.6	2417
Feb 1996	22.6	59.3	18.0	1075
Mar 1996–1	24.1	57.9	18.0	1023
Mar 1996–2	25.4	55.0	19.6	1012
Jun 1996	27.1	57.5	15.5	1086
Oct 1996	26.8	50.2	23.0	1149
Nov 1996	26.2	52.6	21.2	1152
May 1997	33.5	46.2	20.3	1172
Feb 1998	35.3	48.2	16.6	1165
Apr 1998	36.1	44.9	19.0	3222
Jul 1998	34.1	47.8	18.1	1052
Oct 1998	35.3	49.0	15.8	1146
May 1999	37.2	48.2	14.6	3215
Jul 1999	42.1	44.8	13.1	1053
Nov 1999	36.2	53.0	10.8	1903
Dec 1999	38.1	51.6	10.3	4158
Feb 2000	33.7	53.4	12.9	1219
Mar 2000–1	35.1	53.0	11.9	1219
Mar 2000–2	32.5	54.2	13.3	1501
Mar 2000–3	38.7	45.1	16.2	1056
Apr 2000	40.2	45.7	14.1	1045
Dec 2000	31.8	57.9	10.3	1018

Source: Election Study Center, National Chengchi University

overall trend is the same as we demonstrated above by using the five personal interviews survey data.

The nadir point for the proportion of Chinese identity (10.3 percent) was reached in December 1999 and, again, in December 2000, the end point of this data series. The proportion of double identity showed much less volatility than the other two categories, beginning the time series with a reading of 54.8 percent and culminating in 57.9 percent at the end. Two patterns stand out in the distribution. Double identity people always outnumber, sometimes by a very large margin, people

in adjacent categories. Also, people in the categories of Taiwanese identity and double identity are much more likely to exchange their positions than people in the categories of double identity and Chinese identity, as shown by the magnitude of the negative correlation coefficient between the Taiwanese identity group and double identity group (−.588) as opposed to the insignificant correlation coefficient (−.119) for the groups of double identity and Chinese identity. Thus, people with Chinese identity may have a more stable, more intense level of identity, as they seldom jump back and forth between the two adjacent categories of Chinese identity and double identity. In contrast, people with Taiwanese identity are more likely to add Chinese identity to their Taiwanese identity, or, once in the realm of double identity, more likely to drop the Chinese identity completely. The identity of people in these two categories is quite fluid.

Next, the effect of aging on the change of identity from 1991 to 2000 will be examined. Table 8 through Table 10 present, respectively, the distribution of Taiwanese identity, double identity, and Chinese identity among different age groups. Data collected at different time points in a particular year are collapsed into an annual data pool.[23]

Of the three tables, Table 8 is worth special mention. For aging to have any impact on the collective change of Taiwanese identity through time, it must be shown that people in the later years in our time series increasingly identify with Taiwan as they age than do people in the early years of the time series. If one reads Table 8 column-wise, one would find an identity "plateau": people at the age of 40 to 49 are unanimously more identified with Taiwan than are people ten years younger.[24] For this plateau, people in later years in the time series do *not* necessarily increasingly identify with Taiwan

[23] No appropriate data available for 1993.

[24] Of course, other plateaus could be found, say, between people of 20-29 and people of 30-39, or between people of 40-49 and people of 50-59. Yet the "elevation" of these plateaus is not as sharp as the one between age 30-39 and

Table 8. Distribution of Taiwanese Identity among Age Group, 1991–2000

Age	1991	1992	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
20–29	15.6	12.7	15.5	20.2	21.2	31.9	35.7	34.4	33.8
30–39	18.5	19.8	21.3	24.5	23.8	35.5	33.6	34.7	34.1
40–49	19.0	22.6	29.5	33.5	31.0	40.4	41.7	47.2	41.6
50–59	21.6	24.6	25.8	30.3	32.3	38.9	46.2	50.3	46.6
60 & +	28.1	25.7	20.1	30.1	29.8	32.2	41.4	44.4	46.4
N	927	2765	1103	4615	6411	1156	6451	9142	6954

Table 9. Distribution of Double Identity among Age Group, 1991–2000

Age	1991	1992	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
20–29	60.1	58.0	56.3	62.5	65.1	53.3	50.5	55.9	57.6
30–39	55.9	52.9	56.5	56.5	59.2	47.4	50.1	53.3	56.1
40–49	57.0	47.7	39.2	47.5	49.5	41.3	41.3	41.9	45.6
50–59	46.4	48.9	46.3	46.2	44.9	44.3	35.7	36.8	36.6
60 & +	45.4	38.4	37.4	38.4	39.7	29.1	30.2	37.0	30.1
N	927	2765	1103	4615	6411	1156	6451	9142	6954

Table 10. Distribution of Chinese Identity among Age Group, 1991–2000

Age	1991	1992	1994	1995	1996	1997	1998	1999	2000
20–29	24.4	29.3	28.2	17.3	13.7	14.8	13.8	9.7	8.6
30–39	25.6	27.4	22.2	19.1	17.0	17.0	16.2	11.9	9.8
40–49	24.0	29.7	31.3	19.0	19.5	18.3	17.0	10.9	12.8
50–59	32.0	26.5	27.9	23.5	22.9	16.9	18.1	12.9	16.8
60 & +	26.5	35.9	42.5	31.5	30.5	38.7	28.4	18.6	23.5
N	927	2765	1103	4615	6411	1156	6451	9142	6954

more than people in earlier years. The growth rates of Taiwanese identity between people of 30-39 and people of 40-49 through the years are quite uneven: 2.7 percent (1991), 14.1

age 40-49. The plateaus capture the change in tendency of people's Taiwanese identity at different age groups.

percent (1992), 38.5 percent (1994), 36.7 percent (1995), 30.3 percent (1996), 13.8 percent (1997), 24.1 percent (1998), 36.0 percent (1999), and 22.0 percent (2000).[25] Therefore, we argue that age does *not* really account for the rise of Taiwanese identity in the 1990s.

If we read Table 8 row-wise, we find three ascending "ladders" of Taiwanese identity for each age group: 1991-94, 1995-96, and 1997-2000. This pattern fits well with the general trend found in column 1 of Table 7.

Table 9 demonstrates that the younger the people, the more likely they will hold double identity. People in the later years in the time series, however, are not any more prone to double identity as they age than are people in the early years in the time series. Again, age cannot account for the change in double identity.

Table 10 reveals a pattern that, the older the people, the more likely they will hold Chinese-only identity. Other things being equal, if aging had meant an increase in the Chinese identity ratio, we would expect that, say, those who were 50-59 in 1991 would demonstrate a higher Chinese identity ratio in 2000. But in the decade of the 1990s, older people were just as likely to move out of the Chinese identity category as younger persons. For example, 32 percent of those who were 50-59 in 1991 were Chinese-only identifiers. But some ten years later, as this group aged, only 23.5 percent of them remained identified with Chinese only. Age, therefore, does not explain the overall decline in the ratio of Chinese identity.

We now turn to the impact of generational change on the identity change of Taiwan people.

Each line in the figures represents the identity of people of a particular age bracket at 1991 (the starting point of each line) and their identity through the years as they age. For example, the top line of Figure 11 is the proportion of

[25] The numbers are derived from (ratio 40-49 minus ratio 30-39)/ratio 30-39, for any particular year.

Figure 11. Generational Impact on Trend of Taiwanese Identity, 1991–2000



Figure 12. Generational Impact on Trend of Double Identity, 1991–2000



Figure 13. Generational Impact on Trend of Chinese Identity, 1991–2000



Taiwanese identity of those who were in their forties in 1991 and this group's identity as they progress through the years. In Figure 11, all age cohorts demonstrate the same upward slope in their Taiwanese identity. Similarly, a downward slope pattern can be observed for all age cohorts for double identity and Chinese identity categories, in Figures 12 and 13, respectively. We hardly can tell any distinctiveness in the change of their identity as time progresses for any particular age cohort (generation), presumably with its unique upbringing. Hence, generational change has no impact on the change of identity of the people on Taiwan.

We, therefore, surmise that the change of identity of the people on Taiwan in the past decade has a great deal to do with period effects, as we suggested in our 1999 article. Though there have been some positive turns in cross-Strait relations (e.g., more social, economic, cultural, and educational exchanges between Taiwan and the mainland), their effects on Taiwan people's identity have been greatly compromised by negative events like the Qiandaohu incident (1994) or the missile crisis (1995-96). Here, we need to stress that the events that impacted the identity of the Taiwan people in the 1990s are political in nature. There is very little evidence in Taiwan's daily life showing that political de-Sinification has spilled over to other domains of society. The political content of the identity issue is demonstrated in Figure 14, in which support for Taiwan's independence, a politically charged issue in Taiwan politics, moves quite nicely with Taiwanese identity. Their correlation coefficient is a positive .799.

Moreover, historical evidence suggests that the Taiwanese identity had its origin in politics. After carefully examining the narrative and discourse in travel logs, morality books, Chinese and Japanese newspaper editorials, commentaries, novels, and some private diaries during the colonial period, sociologist Fong concludes that the identity of Taiwanese then was mainly with the Chinese motherland. *Kominka* (high Japanization)

Figure 14. Trends of Taiwanese Identity and Independence Supporter



gradually galvanized Taiwan away from China.[26] It seems that the February 28, 1947 Incident, which saw the killings of thousands of Taiwanese by Chiang Kai-shek's troops, was the precipitating event that ultimately crystallized Taiwanese identity.[27]

Conclusions

The objective of this article is to describe and explore the changes in the Taiwan people's Taiwanese/Chinese identity in the 1990s. Our major conclusion is that the Taiwan people have shown a clear tendency to move from having a Chinese identity toward exhibiting a Taiwanese identity. Our data indicate that, regardless of ethnic background, age, educational level, gender, and partisan identity, the Taiwan people's Chinese identity ratio has declined while their Taiwanese identity has risen sharply. On the whole, the changes have taken place gradually, characterized by a switch from the Chinese identity to the double identity and then a switch from the double identity to the Taiwanese identity.

We also demonstrate that the change in the identity of Taiwan people in the 1990s was mainly due to period effects, that is, events in the 1990s. The identity issue is one in the political arena, and it is very politically charged. Change in Taiwan people's identity can be accounted for by political events, especially the Qiandaohu Incident (1994) and the missile crisis across the Taiwan Strait (1995-96). Having said this, the identity issue in Taiwan—as elsewhere—is an extremely complicated one. As Lance Bennett cogently argues, public opinion, of which identity is a part, has three domains: the

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[26] Shiaw-chian Fong, *In Search of Identity: Colonial Taiwan, 1895-1945* (in Chinese) (Taipei, Taiwan: Zhuliu Publishing Company, 2001).

[27] Lai Tse-han, Raymond H. Myers, and Wei Wou, *A Tragic Beginning: The Taiwan Uprising of February 28, 1947* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1991), 141-93.

domain of the individual and society, the domain of issue formation and political communication, and the domain of political institutions and culture.[28] We now know that the identity issue in Taiwan has shown trends of indigenization and de-Sinification, but both trends are seemingly limited to the political arena only. When the identity issue is full of political contents and subject to politicization, we need to know how political parties and political figures in Taiwan manipulate and interact on this issue, how the two sides across the Taiwan Strait perceive and, again, interact on the issue, how the issue is formed and communicated, and how the society in Taiwan, in general, impacts the issue. As for the near future, we feel that more social and economic interaction between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait will almost certainly cast some impact on the identity configuration in Taiwan. This essay is merely a small step in achieving a better understanding of the change of identity in Taiwan.

What are the impacts of Taiwanese/Chinese identity changes on Taiwan's domestic politics and cross-Strait relations? As for domestic politics, the identity issue has both positive and negative sides. On the positive side, the identity issue could be used to integrate the ethnic groups in Taiwan. Before the 1998 Taipei mayoral election, President Lee Teng-hui proposed the "new Taiwanese" slogan when campaigning for Ma Ying-jeou. By including the mainlanders into the "Taiwanese" category, this slogan urged those who originally belonged to the "Taiwanese" category to expand their "we group feeling" to include all mainlanders living in Taiwan. Naturally, this new "we group feeling" was helpful in attracting support for mainlander candidates. According to our analysis in this essay, the Taiwan public, whether they are identified with Taiwanese, Chinese, or both, have shown a trend to move away from Chinese-only identity and toward Taiwanese-only identity.

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[28] W. Lance Bennett, *Public Opinion in American Politics* (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1980).

The Taiwanese have consolidated their Taiwanese identity and the mainlanders have gradually switched from Chinese identity to double identity, and some have even switched further to Taiwanese identity. This Taiwanese identity convergence trend is the real index for the formation of the "new Taiwanese." In the long run, if other conditions remain unchanged, the trend to converge on Taiwanese identity will remain the same and there will be fewer differences in the distribution of the Taiwanese/Chinese identity. When the whole society gradually forms a consensus on the issue, the so-called "new Taiwanese" might all become "old Taiwanese." On the negative side, the identity issue could be a rallying point for politicians to mobilize electoral support. In various elections, we have seen no dearth of politicians who cannot resist the convenience the identity issue can bring to them. In the future, demagogic politicians could come from any ethnic group.

In terms of electioneering, once Taiwanese identity becomes the "median voter position," the party that can best claim the position will have a natural electoral advantage. Of course, we do not mean that the identity issue is the sole determinant in election results; elections are indeed concerned with many issues. But we do suggest that, given the current trend in Taiwan people's identity, the DPP should have the upper hand in Taiwan's national-level elections. And since the identity issue is political in nature, any stern comments or behavior from the PRC regarding Taiwan's elections is likely to work in favor of the party that most advocates the Taiwan-first value, that is, the party that most wants to claim the "median voter" position.

The change in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity can also bear some significance in cross-Strait relations. Increased economic, social, educational, and cultural exchanges in the past decade across the Taiwan Strait have certainly increased Taiwan people's awareness of the symbiosis of Taiwan and the Chinese mainland. This awareness is also reflected in a num-

ber of Taiwan official documents stating that Taiwan can identify itself with China in terms of culture, history, geography, and even commerce. But with regard to politics, political institutions, and political ethos, Taiwan and China are as far apart as ever. Because much of the cross-Strait relationship is seen on Taiwan through a political prism, events since 1994 certainly have had dampening effects on the Taiwan people's Chinese identity. This collective mentality can be viewed as the larger context in which President Lee made his "special state-to-state" statement on July 9, 1999. Despite the verbal invective from the PRC and much diplomatic pressure from the United States in the wake of the statement, Taiwan people have been overwhelmingly supportive of the statement, according to various public opinion surveys. Clearly, there exists a strong "we" sense in Taiwan.[29] This does not mean that the trend toward Taiwanese identity will necessarily lead to confrontation with the PRC, however. For one thing, the trend is not fixed; it can be varied or even reversed once there is a qualitative improvement in the content and atmosphere in the cross-Strait political relationship. For another, nonpolitical exchanges across the Taiwan Strait serve as a centripetal force on Taiwan toward the Chinese mainland. For example, Taiwan has accelerated its dependence on the Chinese mainland market since 2000. Yet another reason, the matter of war and peace is an extremely complicated one. International structure, domestic politics of relevant players in any sort of cross-Strait conflict, nationalism, and some unforeseeable factors will all have various impacts on the decisions of leaders to pursue war or maintain stability and peace. In our assessment, the trend toward Taiwanese identity in public opinion on Taiwan is far from being a determining factor in war-or-peace decisions across the Taiwan Strait. Yet, we do believe that a fundamental rapprochement between Taiwan and China will certainly

[29] For their part, many Chinese officials and scholars tend to believe that Taiwan people's dislike for China is the result of political manipulations by Taiwanese politicians.

require some degree of Chinese identity on the part of the Taiwan people.