
EPISODE V

Apperceiver and Homo sentiens

Those who believe in the forms came to this belief because they became convinced of the truth of the Heracleitean view that all sense-perceptible things are always flowing. So that if there is to be explanatory knowledge and wisdom about anything, there must be certain other natures...the Platonists [thereby] make them separate, and such beings they called 'ideas.'

– Aristotle, *Metaphysics, Book XIII*

Self-Consciousness exists in and for itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged.'

– G. W. F. Hegel, *Phenomenology of Spirit*

Objectivity

1. Earlier in the previous episode, we have seen that how the embedment of subjectivity can set us straight about the very idea of 'the subjective angle.' Now we shall see another application of the same argument – the application on Kant's thinking about the relation between consciousness and self-consciousness. After this, I will introduce McDowell's criticisms against the dualism of scheme and content, connecting it to the present topic, and to many previous discussions in my previous episodes.

McDowell begins by venturing an interpretation of the Transcendental Deduction. Following Strawson, he thinks that in the Deduction,

Kant seems to offer a thesis on these lines: the possibility of understanding experiences, 'from within,' as glimpses of objective reality is interdependent with the subject's being able to ascribe experiences to herself; hence, with the subject's being self-conscious.¹

McDowell is not aiming to argue for the legitimacy of the interpretation here; instead, he argues that other parts of Kant's thinking render the interdependence thesis not satisfying. Here it goes:

When he introduces the self-consciousness that he argues to be correlative with awareness of objective reality, he writes of the 'I think' that must be able 'to accompany all my representations.' In the Paralogisms of Pure Reason, he claims that if we credit this 'I' with a persisting referent, the relevant idea of identity through time is only formal.²

Kant uses 'I think' and 'apperception' interchangeably. 'Apperception' is a term coined by Leibniz.³ He defines apperception as 'consciousness or reflective knowledge of this inner state itself and which is not given to all souls or to any souls all of the time.'⁴ Although with complications, Kant's usage of this notion is basically the same. We can simply understand it as 'self-consciousness' for our purpose. I shall illustrate this with an example. Suppose that I think that the present essay won't have a great success. Now I can hold this without consciously entertaining the thought all the time. But if I say to someone, or even myself, 'I think that the present essay won't have a great success,' I have a piece of 'reflective knowledge' concerning the thought. So Kant's 'I think' and Locke's 'consciousness' are generally the same notion; this is, of course, not to deny that they have extremely different theories behind their notions.

According to McDowell, Kant supplements this with an unhappy thought that the 'I think' is only 'formal.' How does Kant arrive at this dim conclusion? The situations are somewhat complicated, for this involves how Kant conceives the reasoning of Descartes. I shall quote McDowell first and explain:

Kant's point in the Paralogisms is that the flow of what Locke calls 'consciousness' does not involve applying, or otherwise ensuring conformity with, a criterion of identity...when a subject makes this application of the idea of persistence, she needs

¹ *Mind and World*, p.99.

² *Ibid.*, p.99. *Critique of Pure Reason*, B131 and A363, respectively.

³ Peter Remnant and Jonathan Bennett (trans.) *New Essays on Human Understanding* (Cambridge University Press, 1981).

⁴ Nicholas Rescher (trans.) *Monadology* (London, Routledge, 1991), p.637.

no effort to ensure that her attention stays fixed on the same thing. For a contrast, consider keeping one's thought focused on an ordinary object of perception over a period. That requires the ability to keep track of things, a skill whose exercise we can conceive as a practical substitute for the explicit application of a criterion of identity.⁵

This is essentially the same line of thought as the one applies to Parfit. But here the player is Descartes:

If the topic of the thought is a substantial continuant, what its continuing to exist consists in must be peculiarly simple. The notion of persistence applies itself effortlessly; there is nothing to it except the flow of 'consciousness' itself. This looks like a recipe for arriving at the conception, or supposed conception, of the referent of 'I' that figures in Descartes.⁶

We have seen that Parfit avoids this reasoning by reducing 'consciousness' to a series of co-consciousness. This is a way to *deflate* the very idea of self-consciousness. Now Kant does not share the reductionist agenda, so he attempts to deflate 'consciousness' in another way, as McDowell observes, 'it can easily seem that we had better draw Kant's conclusion: the idea of persistence that figures in the flow of "consciousness" had better be only formal.'⁷ McDowell's response here, again, is virtually the same as his treatment to Parfit's problem:

It is true that the continuity within the subjective take does not involve keeping track of a persisting thing, but this effortless does not require us to agree with Kant that the idea of identity here is only formal. Even 'from within,' the subjective take is understood as situated in a wider context; so there can be more content to the idea of persistence it embodies. The wider context makes it possible to understand that the first person, the continuing referent of the 'I' in the 'I think' that can 'accompany all my representations,' is also a third person, something whose career is a substantial continuity in the *objective* world: something such that other modes of continuing thought about it would indeed require keeping track of it.⁸

Although this argument has been explained in my previous episode, let me say something more in line with the present context. The 'identification-freedom' is the

⁵ *Mind and World*, p.100.

⁶ *Ibid.*, p.101.

⁷ *Ibid.*, p.101.

⁸ *Ibid.*, pp.101-2, my italics.

shared starting point of all camps. The Cartesian explains this by substance dualism: within this realm of mental substance, everything is transparent, so one does not need to keep track of her mental phenomena. Kant resists this reasoning by insisting that the ‘I think,’ apperception, is only formal: the fact that we enjoy effortless when it comes to our own mental phenomena implies that the ‘I think’ is only formal, that is, does not have any hidden aspect.

But McDowell points out that this argument doesn’t go through, for it involves two different senses of effortless. What the ‘accompanying’ idea implies is ‘first-person effortless,’ but what implies the ‘formal’ idea is ‘effortless *simpliciter*’: if we get effortless all the way out, then the subject matter in question is indeed insubstantial. But we need to remember that from a third-person point of view, any ‘I think’ need to be kept track if the idea of persistence is to be applied. Every ‘I think’ is also a third person, embedded in the objective world.

After pinpointing the faulty of Kant’s argument, McDowell goes on to explain why Kant’s picture is unsatisfying. First the characterization:

The result of Kant’s move is that the subjective continuity he appeals to, as part of what it is for experience to bear on objective reality, cannot be equated with the continuing life of a perceiving animal. It shrinks, as I said, to the continuity of a mere point of view: something that need not have anything to do with a body, so far as the claim of interdependence is concerned.⁹

And then the criticism:

If we begin with a free-standing notion of an experiential route through objective reality, a temporally extended point of view that might be bodiless so far as the connection between subjectivity and objectivity goes, there seems to be no prospect of building up from there to the notion of a substantial presence in the world. If something starts out conceiving itself as a merely formal referent of ‘I’ (which is already a peculiar notion), how could it come to appropriate a body, so that it might identify itself with a particular living thing?¹⁰

The argument here is that it comes too late to do justice to the fact that every one of us, ‘the subject of its experience, as a bodily element in *objective* reality – as a bodily presence in the world.’¹¹ It is too late, because

⁹ Ibid., p.102.

¹⁰ Ibid., pp.102-3.

¹¹ Ibid., p.103, my italics.

it leaves us with what look like descendants of those problems [i.e. the familiar Cartesian problems about the relation between a peculiar substance and the rest of reality]. If we start from a putative sense of self as at most geometrically in the world, how can we work up from there to the sense of self we actually have, as a bodily presence in the world?¹²

The general thought is this. It is a fact that we are bodily presences in the objective world; we are subjects, to be sure, but we are also *objects*. It is not the case that only our bodies, our behaviors, are objects in the world, objects of other subjects' experiences. What we should say is that it is *we*, not our bodies and behaviors conceived in behavioristic terms, are objects in the objective world. We are not mere points of view in the geometrical realm. Any conception of subjectivity has to respect this, but obviously Kant's picture fails exactly at this point. The acceptance of the narrow assumption betrays Kant's residual Cartesianism.

Kant is always hostile to the Cartesian philosophy, so officially he rejects the narrow assumption – '*I think* is thus the sole text of rational psychology, from which it is to develop its entire wisdom.'¹³ – pointing out that it is not warranted by 'first-person effortless'; however, his failure to distinguish between 'first-person effortless' and 'effortless *simpliciter*' betrays his unwitting commitment to that very assumption, as in Parfit case.

2. The issue about 'identification-freedom' is itself a big topic, and here is not the place to get involved too much. However, since McDowell's argument is aiming at Kant, I must take care of this exegesis aspect to some extent. My way of doing this is to consider objections from Maximilian De Gaynesford, who thinks McDowell's, and indeed Strawson's, presentation of Kant's argument is unfair.¹⁴

De Gaynesford first reconstructs McDowell's argument as follows:

- (1) The *I* of the 'I think' refers.
- (2) There is no Cartesian ego (rational psychologism's immaterial substance) for the *I* of the 'I think' to refer to.
- (3) The narrow assumption holds for the 'I think.'

¹² Ibid., p.104.

¹³ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A343 / B401.

¹⁴ There have been many objections against McDowell at this point, but de Gaynesford's objections are based on a thorough reconstruction and evaluations. For other dissent voices, see for example Graham Bird, 'McDowell's Kant: *Mind and World*,' *Philosophy* 71 (1996), pp.219-43; Truls Wyller, 'Kant on *I*, Apperception, and Imagination,' in Audun Fsti, Peter Ulrich, and Truls Wyller (eds.) *Indexicality and Idealism* (Mentis Publishing, 2000), pp.89-99. De Gaynesford has a paper exclusively on the plausibility of the 'identification-freedom' itself: 'On Referring to Oneself,' *Theoria* 70 (2004), pp.121-61.

- (4) Criterionless self-ascription holds for the ‘I think.’
- (5) So the referent of the *I* of the ‘I think’ must be merely formal (if it were a substantial subject, then it could only be an immaterial one, *pace* (2)); for only so could the idea of its persistence be provided for in accord with (3) and (4) – i.e. effortlessly and entirely from within the flow of self-consciousness).¹⁵

I disagree with many points in this reconstruction, but I shall present them in replying to De Gaynesford’s particular objections. The only thing I want to say before going into the details is that in the above reconstruction De Gaynesford never refers to specific passages from McDowell, and this makes it hard to take issue with this detailed reconstruction. Even before the reconstruction, De Gaynesford refers to *Mind and World* only seldom. Generally, I think his reconstruction over-complicates the matter, but let me show this with De Gaynesford’s framework.

The first objection from him is about (1) and (5) that ‘Kant is careful not to commit himself to the claim that the *I* of the ‘I think’ refers.’¹⁶ We can agree on this to some extent, but with a proviso: though Strawson, Evans and McDowell frame the issue with terms like ‘reference,’ we need to remember that Kant was not doing philosophy of language in the contemporary sense, and Strawson et al. certainly know this. I believe a charitable understanding of their interpretation of Kant should recognize this, and try to understand their interpretation without regarding those terms in philosophy of language as central. Now I think my way of reconstructing the argument is better in this respect; to rehearse: Kant points out that the ‘I think’ must be able to accompany all my representations, which implies the effortless in our own case, and this effortless in turn implies that the ‘I think’ must be a formal condition. Nothing in this line of reasoning, as far as I can tell, invokes notions like ‘reference.’ So I think this first objection can be answered by pointing out that notions from philosophy of language in the contemporary sense are not essential to interpretations offered by Strawson et al.

The second objection is against (2). De Gaynesford argues that ‘Kant does not reject the rational psychologist’s conception of the ego as one of his premises in the Paralogisms.’¹⁷ As he reminds, the falsity of a given paralogism is due to its form ‘whatever its content may otherwise be.’¹⁸ Indeed, everyone who is familiar to the *First Critique* to some extent knows that in Paralogisms Kant’s aim is to expose bad *reasoning*, not bad theses. Now how could McDowell miss this? Or better, how could De Gaynesford think that McDowell misses this? Again, McDowell’s reconstruction

¹⁵ ‘Kant and Strawson on the First Person,’ p.158.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.158.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, p.159.

¹⁸ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A341 / B399.

of Kant's argument is from the 'accompanying' idea to the 'effortless' and finally to the 'formal condition.' Nothing here involves a blank rejection of Cartesian substance dualism. That's why what McDowell says is that 'it can easily seem that we *had better* draw Kant's conclusion.'¹⁹ McDowell of course notices that Kant is pointing out that rational psychologist's inference is *not compulsory*.

The third objection is also not difficult to answer. 'The narrow assumption is Kant's *target* in the Paralogisms, not his tenet,'²⁰ *pace* (3). As I have said earlier, the residual Cartesianism accusation is that Kant *tacitly* assumes a central Cartesian assumption, not that he happily endorses that. In failing to distinguish first-person effortless and effortless *simpliciter*, Kant's argument for his own position nevertheless involves the narrow assumption. De Gaynesford quotes Kant's declaration of the denial, but he does not notice that without the narrow assumption, Kant's original argument cannot go through.

The following two objections from De Gaynesford are closely related, so I shall answer them together. Against (4), he argues that the 'criterionless self-ascription' may be correct, but 'Strawson fails to show that Kant held it,' and 'it would be oddly inconsistent for Kant to hold it.'²¹ De Gaynesford first points out that Strawson and McDowell are 'almost alone among Kant's commentators in even mentioning the thesis...in relation to Kant,' and they do 'not cite texts where the thesis is adopted by Kant, either explicitly or implicitly.'²² And he further presents how Kant himself conceives the situation. This raises important exegetic issues, but I tend to think that we can say Kant *implicitly* adopts that thesis in connecting his positive and negative thoughts: his claim that *I* of the apperception must be able to accompany all one's representations, and that rational psychologist's reasoning to the substantial *Cogito* is a *non sequitur*. To make sense of the relation between the Transcendental Deduction and Paralogisms, it seems reasonable to say that Kant commits the 'criterionless of self-ascription' tacitly. The thesis as such is harmless; the trouble lies rather in the narrow assumption. De Gaynesford's presentation of Kant's relevant texts is helpful, but it does not undermine the Strawson-McDowell diagnosis.

The issue concerning McDowell's interpretation of Kant is enormous, and to give a satisfying defense is definitely transcend my ability. But I hope my discussions of the above objections from De Gaynesford can at least damp some initial worries about the exegetic aspect of McDowell's thinking.

¹⁹ *Mind and World*, p.101, my italics.

²⁰ 'Kant and Strawson on the First Person,' p.159.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p.159, 160. I omit De Gaynesford's final objection, that 'Strawson's argument for it seems to be indebted not to Kant but to Wittgenstein,' especially his *Blue Book*, for here our main concern is not the latter. Notice that though De Gaynesford refers only to Strawson here, his arguments can be generated to McDowell also.

²² *Ibid.*, pp.159-60.

3. At this stage I would like to connect the present discussion to a larger concern of McDowell, that is, his attacks on the dualism of scheme and content. I want to do so because that larger concern also underlies most, if not all, of McDowell's thinking, which has been discussed throughout the essay. Let me start with the very idea of that dualism.²³

'Scheme-content dualism' was first introduced by Donald Davidson as a critical target.²⁴ In a later paper he comments that '[t]his picture of mind and its place in nature has defined many of the problems modern philosophy has thought it had to solve.'²⁵ This theme was subsequently taken up by McDowell in various writings, as we shall see. Both of them are hostile to this dualism, but they also find each other's characterization of it problematic: both of them present the dualism as a conception of the relation between mind and world, but while Davidson construes it in *evidential* terms, McDowell thinks it does not go to the root of the problem and present his version in *intentional* terms. Let me start with Davidson. The opening paragraph of his 1974 paper goes like this:

Philosophers of many persuasions are prone to talk of conceptual schemes. Conceptual schemes, we are told, are ways of organizing experience; they are systems of categories that give form to the data of sensation; they are points of view from which individuals, cultures or periods survey the passing scene. There may be no *translation* from one scheme to another, in which case the beliefs, desires, hopes, and bits of knowledge that characterize one person have no true counterparts for the subscriber to another scheme. Reality itself is relative to a scheme: what counts as real in one system may not in another.²⁶

Here we can see that the dualism itself has many faces and to a large extent metaphorical, but we can see that in characterizing it, Davidson uses 'translation,' a *semantic* notion. So one would not be surprised when Davidson says this in response to McDowell:

I was clear from the start that unconceptualized 'experience,' sense data, sensations, Hume's impressions and ideas, could not coherently serve as *evidence* for beliefs:

²³ In what follows I draw materials from my 'Scheme-Content Dualism, Experience, and Self,' unpublished.

²⁴ 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme.'

²⁵ 'The Myth of the Subjective,' in Michael Benedikt and Rudolf Berger (eds.) *Bewusstsein, Sprache und die Kunst* (Edition S. Verlag der Österreichischen Staatsdruckerei, 1988) reprinted in his *Subjective, Intersubjective, Objective*, pp.39-52, at p.41.

²⁶ 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' p.183, my italics.

only something with propositional content could do this.²⁷

For Davidson, the target to be criticized is conceptual relativism, as he makes clear at the beginning of the 1974 paper. And for A to be relative to B, both of them must be *contentful* in the first place. Now, given that both of them are contentful, ‘evidence’ is the only thing that can determine whether they are commensurable or not. So it seems natural for Davidson to grant contents to the alleged conceptual schemes and to focus on the notion of ‘evidence.’

McDowell objects to this. He thinks Davidson grants too much to the opponent. He writes:

The dualism, on my reading, generates a much more radical anxiety about whether we are in touch with reality. Within the dualism, it becomes unintelligible that we have a world view at all.²⁸

McDowell further argues that on the one hand, his understanding and diagnosis of the dualism are more basic, since Davidson leaves the contentfulness of the conceptual scheme unquestioned; on the other hand, Davidson gives up too much when he renounces ‘minimal empiricism,’ the idea that experiences constitute the tribunal for human rationality. But I shall leave this aside and turn to McDowell’s analysis of the dualism. McDowell’s main thought is that since it is a kind of dualism, the two elements must be ‘dualistically set over against’ each other.²⁹ Thus, the content side should be ‘non-conceptual content,’ and the scheme side ‘non-contentful scheme.’ But this generates a problem immediately:

If abstracting it from content leave a scheme empty, what can be the point of identifying this side of the dualism as *the conceptual*? It is not a routine idea that concepts and their exercises, considered in themselves, are empty, and it is not obvious why it should seem that we can abstract them away from what makes the embracing of beliefs or theories non-empty, but still have concepts and their exercises – what they essentially are – in view.³⁰

The problem is this: scheme-content dualism is supposed to be an extraordinarily tempting view, for it sets out the agenda of modern philosophy, both Davidson and

²⁷ ‘Reply to John McDowell,’ in Lewis Edwin Hahn (ed.) *The Philosophy of Donald Davidson* (Open Court, 1999), pp.105-08, at p.105.

²⁸ ‘Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism,’ in *Philosophy of Donald Davidson*, pp.87-104, at p.92.

²⁹ *Mind and World*, p.3.

³⁰ ‘Scheme-Content Dualism and Empiricism,’ p.88.

McDowell argue. But if the scheme side denotes ‘non-contentful scheme,’ or more annoyingly, ‘non-contentful *concept*,’ it is not clear that this dualism has any initial plausibility at all. McDowell damps this doubt in this way:

First, that the linkage between concepts that constitute the shape, so to speak, of a conceptual scheme are linkages that pertain to what is a reason for what. Second, that if matter, in this application of the form-matter contrast, is supplied by the deliverances of the sense, then the structure of reason must lie on the other side of the matter-form contrast, and hence must be formal; reason is set over against the senses.³¹

As McDowell understands it, the scheme side should be understood as ‘reason,’ or more precisely, ‘*pure* reason,’ as opposed to ‘*empirical* content.’ It is our rational structure, as opposed to sense content. This, I believe, makes the dualism more plausible. And this looks like Kant’s insistence that the *I* of apperception is only ‘formal,’ so as to be able to ‘accompany all one’s representations.’ We have seen how McDowell criticizes Kant’s argument for this position, and now I suggest that this can be further related to McDowell’s denial of the dualism.

As we shall see presently, McDowell applies his diagnosis of this dualism to many issues, and I will take care of them one by one. In the present case, we can see the dualism as an instantiation of the inner space model, constituted by the formal *I* and its representations. This model is a nonstarter, for it makes intentionality unavailable to us. And given Kant’s thesis of the interdependence between self-consciousness and consciousness of the world, the model also makes apperception unavailable.

We can also see the connection between scheme-content dualism and the inner space model in the context of knowledge. In my second episode, we have seen that McDowell thinks epistemology in twentieth century suffers the ‘interiorization of the space of reasons.’ After identifying the space of reasons with the space of concepts, he suggests that

[W]e can see the interiorization of the space of reasons as a form of a familiar tendency in philosophy: the tendency to picture the objective world as set over against a ‘conceptual scheme’ that has withdrawn into a kind of self-sufficiency. The fantasy of a sphere within which reason is in full autonomous control is one element in the complex aetiology of this dualism. The dualism yields a picture in which the realm of matter, which is, in so far as it impinges on us, the Given, confronts the realm of forms, which is the realm of thought, the realm in which subjectivity has its

³¹ Ibid., p.88.

being.³²

McDowell also calls this dualism the ‘dualism of subjective and objective – or inner and outer.’³³ Once we conceive our inner world as under full autonomous control, our reach to the external world becomes problematic.

A related discussion can be found in the relation between German Idealism and the inner world conceived by Wittgenstein. German idealism gives up the ‘in itself’ talk, arguing that ‘world and thought are constitutively made for one another.’³⁴ In this context, one may want to rebut this by saying that ‘in the inner life the “in itself,” brutally alien to concepts, insistently makes its presence felt. The inner world is a lived refutation of idealism.’³⁵ But as we have seen, the retreat from the external world makes the external world totally unavailable to us.

Another prominent example is the conceptuality of experience. In the opening of his Locke Lecture, McDowell mentions Kant’s famous slogan: ‘Thoughts without content are empty, intuitions without concepts are blind.’³⁶ This can be read with the dualism of scheme and content, that is, frictionless scheme and nonconceptual given. If one recognizes that nonconceptual given cannot bring us intentionality and justification, one is prone to accept coherentism; if by contrast, one insists on the crucial role of nonconceptual, experiential intake, one commits the Myth of the Given.³⁷ We have seen the inadequacy of both positions in my second episode, and McDowell’s alternative, as I discussed in my previous episode, is that experiences are conceptual all the way down; scheme and content do not dualistically oppose to each other. In this way, McDowell applies the diagnosis of scheme-content dualism to the topic of ‘experience.’ This can also be related to the inner space model: ‘pure’ empirical content, ‘uncontaminated’ by reasons, can serve to sustain intentionality. This does not work, for ‘experiences’ so conceived just ‘stand there like a sign-post.’³⁸ This normatively inert thing cannot do any work for intentionality. In addition, though we often concentrate on ‘outer’ experience, ‘the dualism ought to be equally wrong about purely “inner” experiences: pains, tickles, and the like.’³⁹ He explains further:

³² ‘Knowledge and the Internal,’ p.408.

³³ *Ibid.*, p.409

³⁴ ‘Intentionality and Interiority in Wittgenstein,’ pp.306-7.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, p.307.

³⁶ *Critique of Pure Reason*, A51 / B75.

³⁷ According to McDowell, though Davidson is definitely hostile to this dualism, he nevertheless falls into coherentism, for his formulation of the dualism does not quite go to the root.

³⁸ *Philosophical Investigations*, §85. Also see McDowell’s discussions in ‘Meaning and Intentionality in Wittgenstein’s Later Philosophy.’

³⁹ ‘One Strand in the Private Language Argument,’ *Grazer Philosophische Studien* 33/34 (1989), pp.285-303; reprinted in his *Mind, Value, and Reality*, pp.279-96, at p.279.

What is essential is to avoid the temptation to suppose that when, say, a cat, or a human infant, is in pain, what constitutes the relevant kind of episode in our inner lives is *all there* in the cat's, or infant's, consciousness, barring only the ability to talk...⁴⁰

Here McDowell connects scheme-content dualism to the factorization approach: it is tempting to think of animals' or human infants' inner experiences in a factorized way, but that generates hopeless problems as we have seen in other cases. Although it is easiest for us to lapse in this domain, we should hold firm to the lessons we have learned elsewhere.

The final example I want to discuss is McDowell case against Hume's conception of causality, briefly discussed at the end of my previous episode. For Hume, 'singular causal relations are not given in experience,' and 'this recommendation seems inextricably bound up with a "dualism of scheme and content, of organizing system and something waiting to be organized..."'⁴¹ For Hume and his followers, experience is unorganized, but this falls into the guilty dualism. As mentioned earlier, this 'Nomological Character of Causality' is accused by McDowell as 'the fourth dogma of empiricism.' This is, nevertheless, accepted by Davison and most contemporary empiricists.

Although McDowell disputes Davidson's exact formulation of the dualism, he definitely agrees with Davidson that

In giving up the dualism of scheme and world, we do not give up the world, but re-establish unmediated touch with the familiar objects whose antics make our sentences and opinion true or false.⁴²

And the recapitulation above shows how this repudiation of the dualism can be done in different regions of philosophy. If we want real *objectivity*, we must acknowledge the 'interpenetration of the subjective and the objective,'⁴³ contra most philosophical outlooks.

Subjectivity

1. My title for the essay is *World and Subject*, and the title for the introductory

⁴⁰ Ibid., p.294.

⁴¹ 'Functionalism and Anomalous Monism,' p.340.

⁴² 'On the Very Idea of a Conceptual Scheme,' p.198.

⁴³ Recall my discussions of 'Singular Thought and the Extent of Inner Space' in the second episode. For interesting connections between scheme-content dualism, conceptual relativism, Davidson, and Gadamer, see 'Gadamer and Davidson on understanding and Relativism.'

episode is 'The Many Faces of Human Subject.' So far I have been exploring aspects of subject through discussing McDowell's philosophy, and my working hypothesis, as I said in the introduction, is that the best way to understand subjectivity is to understand various *aspects* of it. Now I come close to the core of this project, that is, subjectivity *per se*. By this I mean the narrow sense of subjectivity – the 'what it is like' aspect. Any conception of subjectivity should not content itself if it doesn't offer any account of consciousness.

However, 'consciousness' is never a main theme of McDowell's thinking. He does talk about it from time to time, but always only in passing. The reason is that what he concerns is the direct contact between mind and world, and the problem of sentience is hardly central relative to this goal. Therefore, in this section I need to elaborate, as opposed to merely interpret and evaluate, McDowell's line of thought. This requires me to say something not directly about McDowell, but the digression will prove helpful.

I shall begin by an observation from Ned Block:

The greatest chasm in the philosophy of mind – maybe even all of philosophy – divides two perspectives on consciousness. The two perspectives differ on whether there is anything in the phenomenal character of conscious experience that goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive, and the functional...Those who think that the phenomenal character of conscious experience goes beyond the intentional, the cognitive, and the functional believe in qualia.⁴⁴

Let me explain. Almost everyone agrees that there are two main aspects of the mental, the phenomenal and the intentional. The former refers to the 'what it is like' aspect; the latter refers to 'what it is about.' Some mental states sustain both aspects, like perception, some others sustain only one of them, like pain (phenomenal) and belief (intentional).⁴⁵ What's at issue is that whether the phenomenal 'goes beyond' the intentional, as Block puts. Those who hold the positive answer commit the existence of 'qualia.' 'Qualia' is the plural of 'quale,' which has been heavily theory-laden, but we can learn its essential traits by considering the positions that deny its existence. As Block succinctly summarizes above, qualia is non-intentional, non-functional, and non-cognitive qualities of experience. I slightly change Block's order, for we can understand 'non-intentional' and 'non-functional' with the notion of 'non-relational,'

⁴⁴ 'Mental Paint,' in his *Consciousness, Function, and Representation* (MIT Press, 2007), pp. 533-70, at p.533. Tim Crane disputes this observation in 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' in *Perceptual Experience*, pp.126-46. I will discuss this later, and that will bring us back to McDowell's disjunctive conception of appearance.

⁴⁵ All examples here are controversial, but for our purpose we do not need to go into them.

that is, ‘intrinsic.’⁴⁶ Therefore, we can identify qualia as ‘non-cognitive’ and ‘intrinsic’ qualities of experience.⁴⁷ Now those who think intentional properties exhaust phenomenal characters deny the existence of any ‘non-cognitive,’ ‘intrinsic’ quality of experience. This denial of qualia has been called the ‘intentional theory of consciousness,’ or simply ‘intentionalism.’⁴⁸ Intentionalism maintains that there is no intrinsic quality of experience, and experiences are cognitive through and through. I shall argue that McDowell holds a form of intentionalism.⁴⁹

Let me begin by McDowell’s own words:

I urge that we could not recognize capacities operative in experience as conceptual at all were it not for the way they are *integrated into a rationally organized network of capacities* for active adjustment of one’s thinking to the deliverances of experience. That is what a repertoire of empirical concepts is. The integration serves to place even the most immediate judgements of experience as possible elements in a world-view.⁵⁰

He extends this claim even to ‘concepts of secondary qualities,’ though they are only ‘*minimally* integrated into the active business of accommodating one’s thinking to the continuing deliverances of experience...’⁵¹ The main reason for this, not surprisingly, is transcendental: intentionality and rational entitlement are possible only if every bit of mentality is *integrated* into a *cognitive* net. Suppose, for the sake of argument, that I am struck by a bunch of blue qualia. By definition, it follows that I am struck by a bunch of blue *non-cognitive* qualities of experience. Now how could these qualities, given that they are non-cognitive, have any intentional and rational bearings with my thoughts? How can I, for example, refer to my non-cognitive blue qualia to *justify* my experiential judgments? Philosophers who commit the existence of qualia seldom address, or even recognize, this puzzle. Although McDowell never makes clear about his attitude towards qualia, it is reasonable to conjecture that he holds a version of

⁴⁶ Again, details are pretty complicated. The relation between intentionalism and functionalism is itself a big issue, but for our purpose, we only need to remember that the contrast between them and the qualia theory is that the later commits *intrinsic* qualities of experience. Block’s version is rather a special case, for he thinks qualia are physically reducible, therefore not intrinsic.

⁴⁷ Dennett identifies four characteristics of qualia; they are ‘ineffability,’ ‘intrinsicity,’ ‘privacy,’ and ‘immediate apprehensibility’; see his ‘Quining Qualia,’ in A. Marcel and E. Bisiach, (eds.), *Consciousness in Modern Science* (Oxford University Press, 1988); most philosophers agree that ‘intrinsicity’ is essential to the notion of qualia. Although other properties are often regarded as characteristics of qualia as well, I will focus on only ‘intrinsicity.’ Dennett’s paper has been reprinted in many places; for a recent version, see David Chalmers (ed.) *Philosophy of Mind: Classical and Contemporary Readings* (Oxford University Press, 2002), pp.226-46.

⁴⁸ The situation here is parallel to that of the qualia theory. Here I will keep complication to minimal.

⁴⁹ Although later I will argue that we should use the term ‘representationalism’ in the present context.

⁵⁰ *Mind and World*, p.29, my italics.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp.29-30, my italics.

intentionalism.

A similar consideration is from his rebuttal of the dualism of scheme and content. The scheme side is constituted by rational connectedness; the content side is thereby populated by items that do not have any rational relations with each other. It seems clear that the qualia theory is a variant of scheme-content dualism, and we have also seen why we should resist it.

So far I have concentrated on the ‘non-cognitive’ aspect, but the argument can be naturally extended to ‘intrinsicity’: the *cognitive* net is constituted by rational *relations*, so ‘non-cognitive’ and ‘intrinsic’ go hand in hand. If we accept the two lines of argument presented above by McDowell, the two essential traits of qualia are thereby rejected. It should be clear, then, that McDowell is an intentionalist about consciousness.

2. Since the present essay is not primarily about consciousness, I have omitted lots of complications surrounding this heated topic. However, there is one issue that I must deal with: the issue about the compatibility between *intentionalism* and *disjunctivism*. I cannot ignore this concern because my goal in this essay is to present McDowell’s philosophy, and consistency is arguably the minimal requirement. Readers shall find that the situation is extremely convoluted, and the needed clarifications will be lengthy. I will explain why these two views seem to be incompatible at the first blush, but first consider this passage from Tim Crane:

I [argue] that there is a large chasm in the philosophy of perception, but that is created by the dispute about whether experience is *relational*. It is this dispute – between ‘intentionalists’ and ‘disjunctivists’ – which contains the most recalcitrant problems of perception. The major theories of perception in contemporary analytic philosophy line up on either side of this dispute.⁵²

In saying this, Crane has Block in mind as his main opponent:

I [argue] that as far as the philosophy of perception is concerned, the dispute over the existence of qualia is not very significant at all...It may be that in other parts of philosophy of mind...the existence of qualia is a chasm-creating question. (Actually, I doubt this too...)⁵³

In his footnote, Crane says that Chalmers and Block ‘express the problem of

⁵² ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’ p.128.

⁵³ *Ibid.*, p.127.

consciousness in terms of the notion of qualia,' but 'their dispute is not over the existence of qualia, but over whether they can be physicalistically explained.'⁵⁴ Crane's choice of example strikes me as gerrymandering, for often the debate between Block and Chalmers is seen as a family quarrel between qualia theories. A better example is the debate between Block and Dennett; see Dennett's paper referred above. I cannot of course defend Block's claim with these few sentences, but since here our topic is perception, I shall leave this to my readers, with a reminder that choosing a right pair of competitors is important in this context.

Crane claims that the debate between intentionalism and disjunctivism creates *the* chasm in philosophy of perception. If this is so, my attribution of intentionalism to McDowell is problematic, for he is a self-deemed disjunctivist. I will argue, however, that Crane chasm-creating claim is based on a false conception of issues concerning perception, and that there is a much deeper problem concerning the notion of 'intentionalism' accepted by Crane and many others. Without these two failures, one can consistently hold intentionalism and disjunctivism at the same time. But before that, I need to say something more about disjunctivism, and McDowell's version of it.

According to Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson, disjunctivism about perception can be roughly divided into three versions. They are J. M. Hinton's and Paul Snowdon's 'experiential disjunctivism,' John McDowell's 'epistemological disjunctivism,' and M. G. F. Martin's 'phenomenal disjunctivism.'⁵⁵ The experiential version is about 'the nature of experience,'⁵⁶ more precisely, about perceptual 'state.'⁵⁷ Therefore I suggest that we call this version '*state* disjunctivism,' in order to highlight its difference from the phenomenal version. The epistemological version is about 'the epistemic warrant'⁵⁸ provided by experiences. The phenomenal version concerns 'experience's phenomenal character.'⁵⁹ There might be another version of disjunctivism, which maintains that 'a veridical experience shares no content with its corresponding hallucination.'⁶⁰ I shall call this 'content disjunctivism.' Haddock and Macpherson regard state (experiential) and phenomenal disjunctivism as 'two sub-varieties of *metaphysical* disjunctivism,'⁶¹ as opposed to McDowell's epistemological version. I find this way of putting things potentially misleading: presumably, phenomenal disjunctivism can be seen as a kind of metaphysical

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p.127.

⁵⁵ 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' in Adrian Haddock and Fiona Macpherson (eds.) *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, and Knowledge* (Oxford University Press, 2008), pp. 1-24. They also discuss disjunctivism about action, but we do not need to enter that in the present context.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p.1.

⁵⁷ See Snowdon, 'Perception, Vision, and Causation,' *Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society* 81 (1980-1), pp.175-92.

⁵⁸ 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' p.1.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, p.1.

⁶⁰ Alex Byrne, 'Intentionalism Defended,' *The Philosophical Review* 110 (2001), pp.199-240, at p.202.

⁶¹ 'Introduction: Varieties of Disjunctivism,' p.21, my italics.

disjunctivism because it is about the *nature*, the *metaphysics* of phenomenal character. By the same token, state and content disjunctivism are metaphysical in the sense that they are about the nature, the metaphysics of state and content, respectively. But if so, the so called ‘epistemological’ disjunctivism is metaphysical in the same sense, for it is about the nature, the metaphysics, as opposed to the *epistemology* of reason. So I suggest that we replace the label ‘epistemological disjunctivism’ with ‘*reason* disjunctivism’: it is not the case that we have the same reason in subjectively indistinguishable veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart; instead, in the good case we have an *indefeasible* reason, which is absent in the bad case. So according to my way of labeling, we have four versions of disjunctivism about perception: Hinton’s and Snowdon’s *state* version, McDowell’s *reason* version, Martin’s *phenomenal* version, and Byrne’s *content* version.⁶²

What version(s) of disjunctivism does Crane have in mind when he makes the chasm-creating claim? There he mentions most representatives, including Hinton, Snowdon, McDowell, Martin, Putnam, and Williamson, so we cannot find out the answer through the player list. Fortunately, later he says that disjunctivism ‘[denies] that the hallucination and the subjectively indistinguishable perception are *states* of the same fundamental psychological kind.’⁶³ Therefore we can reasonably think that he locates the battlefield within the ‘state’ view. Now a quick argument on McDowell’s behalf might be suggested: since McDowell’s disjunctivism is the *reason* view, the putative inconsistency between *state* disjunctivism and intentionalism is simply irrelevant. This does not work, unfortunately, because according to my interpretation McDowell also holds state disjunctivism. Consider McDowell’s main target in his overall thinking, the inner space model. This putative inner space is constituted by self-standing mental *items*. Items are things, and McDowell’s alternative is that mental things – mental *states* – are prime, that is, *inextricably* involved *external* conditions.⁶⁴ The inner space is a metaphysical position, and McDowell’s anti-Cartesian alternative, i.e. disjunctivism, must have some metaphysical flavor too. In particular, the inner space theory is wrong about the nature of mental *states*, i.e. as free-floating items, so its opponent disjunctivism should be about mental *states* either.⁶⁵ This is not to fly in the face to the obvious fact that in his papers on epistemology McDowell argues for the reason version of disjunctivism; it is just that in responding to different challenges, he defends different versions of the

⁶² In his paper, Byrne does not explicitly commit this disjunctivism, but since here what I am doing is classification, I shall leave open whether he subscribes content disjunctivism.

⁶³ ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’ p.139, my italics.

⁶⁴ To rehearse, the ‘inextricability’ stands for ‘primeness,’ which implies ‘broadness,’ signified by ‘externality.’

⁶⁵ Also consider McDowell’s criticisms against Kripke’s ‘master thesis.’ Kripke’s ‘common kind assumption’ is definitely not about reason and justification.

doctrine.

What's the relation between the state and the reason version of disjunctivism? In their co-authored paper, Alex Byrne and Heather Logue argue that the former implies the latter, but not vice versa.⁶⁶ I shall not take issue with this claim, but dispute their claim that McDowell denies state disjunctivism. They offer two textual evidences, from 'Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge' and 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument' respectively.⁶⁷ First, '[i]t "look[s] to one exactly as if things [are] a certain way" (p.385) in the good case and the illusory cases, and there is the strong suggestion that this is a perfectly proper mental respect of similarity.'⁶⁸ I do not understand. Here McDowell only says 'it *looks* to one exactly as if...', but this is no more than a description of subjective indistinguishability. Maybe by this remark McDowell rejects strong phenomenal disjunctivism, as I shall explain presently, but that is irrelevant to state disjunctivism. Let's turn to the second quotation. There McDowell says that the 'difference in epistemic significance is of course consistent with all sorts of commonalities between the disjuncts. For instance, on both sides of the disjunction it appears to one that, say, there is a red cube in front of one.'⁶⁹ Again, I do not see how the quoted remarks help establish their point. For one thing, 'it *appears* to one that...' is again phenomenal⁷⁰; for another, to say that the difference in epistemic significance is consistent with all sorts of commonalities is not to say that other forms of disjunctivism are precluded. It is just that reason disjunctivism does not expel the common kind theory in other domains. Byrne and Logue's case for the claim that McDowell refuses to accept state disjunctivism fails. Indeed, if they noticed that McDowell argues against self-standing mental *items* in the 'singular thought' paper, they would have realized that McDowell himself argues for state disjunctivism. They does cite the paper, but for some other purpose.

So we need to respond to Crane's challenge after all, given that McDowell is a state disjunctivist. But again before this, I hope to say more about McDowell's relations to other two versions of disjunctivism. Sometimes McDowell writes as if he thinks a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart can share the same content, for example he says that 'a kind of actualization of conceptual capacities [are operative in] cases of *perceiving*, or at least *seeming* to perceive, that things are thus and so'⁷¹ But I

⁶⁶ 'Either / Or,' in *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, pp.57-94. Their terminologies are 'metaphysical / epistemological disjunctivism,' and I have said why I prefer my own way of labeling.

⁶⁷ The later paper appears in *Disjunctivism: Perception, Action, Knowledge*, pp.376-89.

⁶⁸ 'Either / Or,' p.67.

⁶⁹ 'The Disjunctive Conception of Experience as Material for a Transcendental Argument.'

⁷⁰ Their failure here may also be reflected in the fact that they lump Martin with Hinton together under the label 'metaphysical disjunctivism.'

⁷¹ 'Conceptual Capacities in Perception,' p.1068. In private occasions he also says perceivings and seemings can share the same content.

think it is better to say that he also holds *content* disjunctivism, which says that in the good case and in the bad case there is no shared content in play. Let me explain. There is a sense in which there is one and the same content shared by a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart: that both of them can be characterized by ‘that things are thus and so.’ I think this is what McDowell insists on. But in a more important sense, those episodes do not share the same content, for in the good case the contents of experience are facts, and facts do not present in the bad case. We can say that those episodes share the same content, ‘that things are thus and so,’ and in the good case the content is true, in the bad case the content is false. This is plain, but we need to remember that for McDowell, true contents are facts. When the content is true, the nature of this very content has been transformed from ‘mere appearance’⁷² to ‘fact.’ For McDowell, we cannot *factorize* facts into truth value and contents. So I think it is better to say that McDowell is a *content* disjunctivist, with the proviso that he does not deny that a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart can have the same propositional structure, ‘that things are thus and so.’

How about phenomenal disjunctivism? This version of disjunctivism itself comes with two sub-versions. The weak one leaves subjective indistinguishability in place, but argues that the explanations of the phenomenal characters in veridical experiences and deceptive ones are different.⁷³ The strong one challenges the indistinguishability itself.⁷⁴ Now we have seen that McDowell always starts his argumentation against the inner space with the acknowledgement of subjective indistinguishability; maybe he does this for the sake of argument, but anyway there is no reason to saddle him with strong phenomenal disjunctivism. How about the weak version? This weaker one says that though a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart can share the same phenomenal characters, we need to have different explanations for the good case and the bad case respectively. Since McDowell is an intentionalist, he would invoke the intentional part of experience to explain its phenomenology. And since for him in the good case and in the bad case we do not have the same content, we can have different explanations for phenomenal characters in the good case and in the bad case respectively.⁷⁵ Just how this can be done exactly is not clear. But I think it is safe to

⁷² ‘Criteria, Defeasibility, and Knowledge,’ p.386.

⁷³ M. G. F. Martin, ‘The Transparency of Experience,’ *Mind and Language* 17 (2002), pp.376-425, at p.402.

⁷⁴ M. G. F. Martin, ‘On Being Alienated,’ in *Perceptual Experience*, pp.354-410, at pp.366-72.

⁷⁵ In recent terminology, McDowell holds ‘weak intentionalism,’ which claims that the phenomenal *supervenes* on the intentional, for the same phenomenology in different cases is explained by different contents. By contrast, ‘strong intentionalism’ holds that the relation between the phenomenal and the intentional is *identity*. I use ‘intentional part’ to stay neutral between so-called ‘pure’ and ‘impure’ versions of intentionalism. For details of these matters, see Crane’s ‘Intentionalism,’ forthcoming in Ansgar Beckermann and Brian McLaughlin (eds.) *Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Mind* (Oxford University Press, forthcoming). Also see David Chalmers, ‘The Representational Character of Experience,’ in Brian Leiter (ed.) *The Future for Philosophy* (Oxford University Press, 2004), pp.

say that McDowell is a weak phenomenal disjunctivist: as a philosopher who abandons the Cartesian inner / outer divide by externalizing reasons, mental states, and mental contents, there seems to be no reason for him to stop in the case of phenomenology.⁷⁶ However, I must admit that so far I see no clue to pursue this line. I shall leave this to other occasions, and back to Crane's challenge that the controversy between disjunctivism and intentionalism creates a large chasm in philosophy of perception.

3. Philosophy of perception, like other philosophical enterprises, consists in plenty of intertwined questions. But most if not all practitioners agree that arguably the most central question is our perceptual *contact* with the world, challenged by the argument from illusion and from hallucination, among others.⁷⁷ Crane echoes this point by saying that '[w]ithout challenges like this [i.e. those which are raised by the argument from illusion and related arguments], it is somewhat hard to see why we would need a philosophical theory of perception at all.'⁷⁸ I agree with this, but I disagree with Crane's claim that he has shown 'how the main theories of perception are best seen as responding to these problems.'⁷⁹ To see this, we must consider the argument from illusion as such.⁸⁰

Here I adopt A. D. Smith's formulation. Schematically, it runs as follows:

- P1. The Possibility of Illusion
- P2. The Sense-Datum Inference
- P3. Leibniz Law
- P4. The Generalizing Step

P1 is true because 'any sense involves the functioning of sense receptors that can, in principle, malfunction.'⁸¹ And we are entitled to ask if illusions do occur, what do we perceive in those cases? This is a question concerning the *object* of experience. P2 says that 'whenever something perceptually *appears* to have a feature when it actually does not, we are aware of something that *does* actually possess that feature.'⁸² And we

153-81.

⁷⁶ Gregory McCulloch takes a similar line in his 'Phenomenological Externalism,' in *Reading McDowell: on Mind and World*, pp.123-39. In his reply, McDowell says nothing against this; see the same volume, pp.284-86.

⁷⁷ For a comprehensive and profound discussion of these matters, see A. D. Smith, *The Problem of Perception*.

⁷⁸ 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.142.

⁷⁹ *Ibid.*, p.142.

⁸⁰ For our purpose, we do not need to note the differences between this argument and the one from hallucination.

⁸¹ *The Problem of Perception*, p.25.

⁸² *Ibid.*, p.25, my italics.

introduce ‘sense-datum’ as a name for these perceived objects.⁸³ P3 is an application of Leibniz Law, saying that ‘since the appearing physical object does not possess that feature which...we are immediately aware of in the illusory situation, it is not the physical object of which we are aware in such a situation.’⁸⁴ Now one has established that sense-data are objects of perception in the illusory cases. P4 is served to extend this conclusion to normal perceptions. A usual reason for this is that ‘being aware of a sense-datum is *exactly like* perceiving a normal object.’⁸⁵ If we accept this, then the sense-datum theory follows. Here is not the place for me to peruse the details of this argument (Smith devotes more than two hundred and fifty pages for this), but I shall argue that Crane’s way of conceiving extant theories of perception does not reflect the real structure of this argument. Furthermore, I will offer my alternative of conceiving those theories, arguing that with this right framework we can see that there is no inner tension between McDowell’s intentionalism and disjunctivism, and that we can have a better understanding of complicated issues concerning perception only if we respect the agenda set by the argument from illusion.

To repeat, Crane thinks that ‘there is a large chasm in the philosophy of perception, [and] that is created by the dispute about whether experience is *relational*.’⁸⁶ He then classifies the ‘three dominant theories’ as follows:

[T]he sense-data theorist and the disjunctivist say that there is a perceptual relation, but while the sense-data theorist says that in cases of illusion and hallucination the relatum is not an ordinary mind-independent object, the disjunctivist says that genuine perception is a relation to ordinary mind-independent objects, but that there is *no common fundamental kind of state* – ‘perceptual experience’ – present in cases of genuine perception, which is a relation to a mind-independent object, and illusion and hallucination, which are not. The intentionalist theory of perception in effect denies that perceptual experience is a relation at all.⁸⁷

According to Crane, the sense-datum theory and disjunctivism belong to the relational view, and intentionalism belongs to the non-relational view. Notice that among the relational view, disjunctivism further objects to the ‘common kind assumption.’ This is true, to be sure, but one should wonder why this important thesis is relegated to a sub-category within the relational view. And it becomes fishier if we notice that often

⁸³ As an intentionalist, Smith thinks that P2 ‘is the heart of’ the argument from illusion, and he devotes ‘all of the Part I’ of his book to ‘consideration of this claim and to attempting to see a way around it.’ See p.25. This will proved to be important in my objections to Crane.

⁸⁴ *Ibid.*, p.25.

⁸⁵ *Ibid.* p.26.

⁸⁶ ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’ p.128.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, p.134-5, my italics.

the sense-datum theory is a version of the common kind theory: it is by virtue of this thesis that the generalizing step can be accepted. Besides, intentionalism characterized by Crane is also a common kind theory, for what defines disjunctivism is its rejection of the common kind assumption (it wears this on its sleeve), and intentionalism in Crane's sense is outright incompatible with disjunctivism. Whether the common kind assumption is true is crucial for the argument from illusion, for it determines one's attitude towards the generalizing step. On the contrary, relationality has no place in the argument from illusion. As we have seen, Crane agrees with most others that the argument from illusion is our starting point, so he cannot propose a criterion that does not reflect the real structure of that argument.

The argument from illusion consists in four steps: the possibility of illusion, the sense-datum inference, Leibniz Law, and the generalizing step. No one disputes the possibility of illusion and the application of Leibniz Law, so virtually we have two ways to carve the battlefield. On the one hand, we can anchor the discussion with the sense-datum inference, saying that the crucial divide is between those who admit this inference, like the sense-datum theory, and those who refuse it, like intentionalism and the adverbial theory.⁸⁸ On the other hand, we can anchor the discussion with the generalizing step, saying that the crucial divide is between those who admit the step, like the sense-datum theory, and those who refuse it, like disjunctivism.⁸⁹ Neither corresponds to Crane's way of conceiving the debate. We can see this by noting that neither of them groups disjunctivism and the sense-datum theory together, *pace* the framework proposed by Crane.

Now I prefer the latter framework, though in fact they are equally legitimate. At the early stage of this debate, philosophers were divided into the sense-datum theorists and those who objected to it. Therefore the former way of carving the battlefield – anchoring the debate through the sense-datum inference – may be preferable. But nowadays the core of the relevant debates has been shifted to whether any form of disjunctivism is true, and the defining feature of disjunctivism is the rejection of the generalizing step. In other words, now the central stage has been taken over by the debate between disjunctivism and the common kind theory. It is not that the older core issue has been solved; of course not: the question about whether we can introduce things like sense-data is still controversial. What I would like to stress is that the

⁸⁸ I will say more about the adverbial theory presently. I do not mention disjunctivism here because it is not necessary to reject the sense-datum inference for being a disjunctivist. For example, Austinian disjunctivism accepts the inference but rejects the generalizing step. See Alex Byrne and Heather Logue, 'Either / Or,' pp.63-5.

⁸⁹ I do not mention intentionalism and the adverbial theory here because the defining feature of them is the rejection of the sense-datum inference. They often do not object to the generalizing step, but we need to keep clear about what is essential for being a certain theory. Actually we should not mention the sense-datum theory either, for though it almost always accepts the generalizing step, this step is not part of its definition. Again, consider Austinian disjunctivism.

relative importance of the two crucial moves has been changed: at the early stage, most people focused on the sense-datum inference (Austin seems to be an importance exception), but now more and more people are interested in whether there is a common kind – mental state, reason, phenomenology, or content – shared by veridical experiences and their deceptive counterparts. Therefore it is preferable to invoke this latter framework. Besides, our present purpose is to understand McDowell's intentionalism(s) and whether it is (they are) compatible with his disjunctivism(s), so the former framework based on the sense-datum inference is in effect of no use for us.

Let me say something about the adverbial theory. It appeared in the mid-twentieth century, by C. J. Ducasse and Roderick Chisholm.⁹⁰ The adverbial theorists hold that 'we should think of [the experienced] qualities as modifications of the experience itself.'⁹¹ 'Experience' here is understood as an act, which is modified by an adverbial; 'perceiving brownly' for example. One of its defining features is its rejection of the sense-datum inference. This theory does not occupy a central place in the present context, but we should remember that there is nothing about the generalizing step in the very idea of the adverbial theory.

We have reconceived the spirit of the argument from illusion, concentrating on the debate between disjunctivism and the common kind theory.⁹² Now it should be clear that as far as the argument from illusion is concerned, there is *no* inconsistency between disjunctivism and intentionalism, and indeed, between disjunctivism and the sense-datum theory / the adverbial theory, for there is *nothing* about the generalizing step *in the very ideas* of the sense-datum theory, the adverbial theory, and crucially, intentionalism: the controversies between these three theories are located by the first framework, which concerns the sense-datum inference. Although those three theories are almost always associated with the common kind theory, conceptually they need not be. In particular, intentionalism can be a common kind theory if it holds that one and the same representation can occur in a veridical experience and its deceptive counterpart, but this is a further claim. As a disjunctivist, McDowell can subscribe intentionalism by rejecting the sense-datum inference and explaining the good case and the bad case with different *intentional* nature, for instance the distinction between 'presentation' and 'representation,' as Crane notices.⁹³

⁹⁰ C. J. Ducasse, 'Moore's Refutation of Idealism,' in Arthur Schilpp (ed.) *The Philosophy of G. E. Moore* (Northwestern University Press, Chicago, 1942), pp.225-51. Roderick Chisholm, *Perceiving: A Philosophical Study* (Cornell University Press).

⁹¹ Tim Crane, 'The Problem of Perception,' in *Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy*. See its section 3.2.

⁹² In 'On Being Alienated,' p.357, Martin also proposes this framework, but he doesn't find fault in Crane's chasm-creating claim. In addition, he places the sense-datum theory into the common kind theory, but in effect the existence of sense-datum is compatible with disjunctivism, as Austinian disjunctivism shows.

⁹³ 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.140. There he mentions Searle's *Intentionality*, p.45-6, and McDowell's comments on this in 'The Content of Perceptual Experience.' Frank Jackson, who

Crane plays down the importance of externalism in the disagreement between disjunctivism and intentionalism, but I disagree.⁹⁴ According to my framework, if one wants a version of intentionalism incompatible with disjunctivism, he needs to supplement intentionalism with the common kind thesis. The outcome is to hold that there is a common ‘representation’ in the good case and in the bad case, regardless the presence of the worldly objects. But this is a version of internalism, which holds that the nature of representation is irrelevant to the directed external objects. By contrast, disjunctivism is a version of externalism, saying that the presence of the directed objects *changes* the nature of (re)presentation. This amounts to the broadness claim discussed in my second episode. A disjunctivist can further commit the primeness claim, insisting that the way the directed objects change the nature of the mental states is constitution, as opposed to causation. McDowell holds this prime disjunctivism. This recognition of the relevance of the internalism / externalism debate helps us to see that the framework provided by Tamar Szabó Gendler and John Hawthorne is also in trouble.⁹⁵ They claim that there are two opposing ‘analytical projects,’ ‘*factorizing accounts*’ and ‘*disjunctive accounts*.’⁹⁶ This is pretty close to truth, for the common kind theory does belong to the factorizing camp: it factorizes the good case into a representation shared by the bad case *and* the representation’s directed objects. But it flies in the face of the fact that the disjunctivism can be rendered compatible with the factoring approach, for it can claim that though the directed objects change the nature of the (re)presentation, the way they change it is one of causation, which means the directed objects themselves are not part of the mental states. The distinction between the factorizing / conjunctive view and the disjunctive view does not carve the issue at its joints either.

Crane’s insistence on the importance of relationality is not well-placed. He declares that his understanding of intentionalism is Brentano’s one: intentionalism is ‘the

converted into an intentionalist, draws a relevant distinction between ‘instantiated properties’ and ‘intensional properties.’ This distinction seems to be incompatible with the common kind thesis, for if there is a single ‘representation’ shared by a veridical experience and its deceptive counterparts, how can it be that in one case it (re)presents instantiated properties and in the other it represents intensional properties? See his ‘Mind and Illusion,’ in Peter Ludlow, Yujin Nagasawa, and Daniel Stoljar (eds.) *There is Something about Mary: Essays on Phenomenal Consciousness and Frank Jackson’s Knowledge Argument* (MIT Press, 2004), pp.421-42, especially pp.427-30. Notice that he uses ‘intensionalism-with-a-s’ instead of ‘intentionalism-with-a-t,’ see pp.430-1. I think there are something important in this, but we do not need to go into this. Also notice that in his forthcoming ‘Intentionalism,’ Crane says that in illusion and hallucination what are represented are ‘mere intentional objects,’ and he leaves open the question how this should be explained. However, it is quite reasonable to assume that he prefers a deflationary reading of this. If this is so, we can combine this with McDowell’s ‘mere appearance,’ also under a deflationary reading, suggested by Byrne and Logue, in ‘Either / Or,’ p.66. But again this is another story.

⁹⁴ See ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’ p.135 and p.137.

⁹⁵ ‘Introduction: Perceptual Experience,’ in *Perceptual Experience*, pp.1-30.

⁹⁶ *Ibid.*, p.21.

non-relational, representational conception of experience...'⁹⁷ But this begs the question against another way of developing intentionalism, suggested by Terence Parsons, that intentional objects are in a significant sense *real*.⁹⁸ If this inflationary construal of intentionalism turns out to be true, then perceptions *are* relations even in the bad case. In his forthcoming paper Crane says that he does 'not attempt to explain [the nature of intentional objects],' but he forgets this claim of neutrality when he claims that intentionalism is by definition a non-relational view. Relationality does matter, but it does not create a large chasm in philosophy of perception, but rather figures in one of the family quarrels within intentionalism.⁹⁹ In fact, Brentano himself is not so determined about this:

The terminus of the so-called relation does not need to exist in reality at all. For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with something relational here, and not, rather, with something somewhat similar to something relational in a certain respect, which might, therefore, better be called 'quasi-relational.'¹⁰⁰

Here Brentano expresses skepticism about the prospect of developing intentionalism in the inflationary way, but he is extremely ambivalent. Relationality is not part of the definition of intentionalism, and even if it turns out that non-relational intentionalism is true, intentionalism is still compatible with disjunctivism, for a disjunctivist can hold that in the bad case there is *no* relation between representation and the relevant mere intentional objects, but in the good case there *is* a relation between the mental state and its directed external objects. Relationality just isn't one of the joints of the argument from illusion.¹⁰¹

4. To rehearse, disjunctivism and intentionalism are compatible because their defining characters lie at different levels: the former is at the level of the generalizing step, and the latter is at the sense-datum inference. This brings us to the further distinction between intentionalism in philosophy of mind and philosophy of perception. It is widely, if not universally, assumed that intentionalism in these two areas is one and the same theory. For example, Crane takes issue with Block's

⁹⁷ 'Is There a Perceptual Relation?' p.135, my italics.

⁹⁸ *Non-Existent Objects* (Yale University Press, 1980).

⁹⁹ If one holds non-relational intentionalism, relationality becomes a family quarrel within the common kind theory, for the sense-datum theory holds that perceptions are relations between a subject and her sense-data. See Martin, 'On Being Alienated,' p.357.

¹⁰⁰ See his Appendix to the 1911 edition of *Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint* (Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1874/1911/1973).

¹⁰¹ A further trouble with relationality is that it is not clear that whether it is compatible with prime disjunctivism, for the notion of relation seems to imply that two relata are distinct. Fortunately, the framework constituted by disjunctivism and the common kind theory does not make use of the notion of relationality.

chasm-creating claim in the context of philosophy of perception, but the claim is made in the context of qualia. This is wrong, for the core tenet of intentionalism in philosophy of mind is that ‘*all* mental facts are representational facts;’¹⁰² its opponent, the qualia theory, says that there are *some* mental facts that are non-representational, that is, intrinsic. So intentionalism in philosophy of mind is about the *scope* of the intentional. However, intentionalism in philosophy of perception is defined by the denial of the sense-datum inference, and offering its explanation with the notion of ‘intentional object.’ It does not make any claim about the scope of the intentional at all. I suggest that we reserve the term ‘representationalism’ for philosophy of mind, for as Block notices, the debate between it and the qualia theory can be nicely captured by asking ‘is experiencing just *representing*?’¹⁰³ And the term ‘intentionalism’ should be invoked in philosophy of perception, for the key claim of it is that in deceptive cases we perceive mere *intentional* objects, rather than sense-data. ‘Representationalism’ and ‘Intentionalism’ are often interchangeable in the literatures.¹⁰⁴ This can be innocuous, but we need to remember that there is no single theory which is called ‘intentionalism’ or ‘representationalism’ occurs in philosophy of mind *and* philosophy of perception. Crane argues that the qualia theory is not central in philosophy of perception, and I agree with him (though I do not accept his argument for this based on relationality), but he should have noticed that if the qualia theory is not central for perception, so is its opponent representationalism (or intentionalism) in philosophy of mind. This view has a place in philosophy of perception only because of its claim about intentional objects, not because its rejection of qualia.¹⁰⁵

A few words about qualia. Crane tends to align the qualia theory with the adverbial theory, for the latter ‘explains the phenomenal character of experience in terms of its *intrinsic* qualities.’¹⁰⁶ But this doesn’t seem right, for while the adverbial theory conceives experiences as *acts*, the qualia theory tends to treat experiences as *things*: while the former uses adverbials to characterize experiences, the latter uses adjectives. Moreover, the qualia theory is not a response to the argument from illusion, so we are not obliged to give it a central place in philosophy of perception. It has some place, to be sure, like in the discussions concerning transparency of experience, which will be

¹⁰² Dretske, *Naturalizing the Mind* (MIT Press, 1995), p.xiii, my italics.

¹⁰³ ‘Is Experiencing Just Representing?’ in *Consciousness, Function, and Representation*, pp.603-10, my italics.

¹⁰⁴ Although philosophers have their own idiosyncratic preference, for example Michael Tye prefers ‘representationalism,’ Crane prefers ‘intentionalism,’ and Block uses ‘representationism.’

¹⁰⁵ Crane insists that the qualia theory ‘is not simply the denial of representationalism...’ in ‘Is There a Perceptual Relation?’ p.131. His reason for this is that there is room for the view that uses ‘intentional *mode*’ and other intentional factors to explain phenomenal characters (p.143); this is his ‘impure intentionalism’ (see his forthcoming paper). But this is useless, for impure intentionalism is representationalism after all; it holds that experiencing is just representing.

¹⁰⁶ ‘The Problem of Perception,’ section 3.2.1, my italics.

explained shortly, but this is far from central if we respect the thought that the central issues we are dealing with arise from the argument from illusion.

If I am right about the distinction between representationalism and intentionalism in my sense, the failure of distinguishing them is striking. What can possibly explain this? I propose two reasons. First, one line of argument for representationalism is the so-called ‘transparency of experience.’ Generally, it says that when we pay attention to our perceptual experiences, we are only aware of properties of external objects, as opposed to properties of experiences. If this is correct, the qualia theory is falsified, for transparency shows that all properties present in perceptual experiences are not intrinsic to experiences. Philosophers like Tye use this to rebut the qualia theory. But notice that transparency (if any) is a phenomenon about *perceptual* experiences, not experience in general. Maybe transparency does show that in perceptual experiences, there is no intrinsic quality of experiences, but this is not the conclusion about the scope of the representational at the general level. In using transparency as an argument against the qualia theory, representationalists shift their topics to perception, a *particular kind* of experience. The second reason is that intentionalists like Crane read the argument from illusion as a *phenomenological* argument, for example he says that ‘[t]he adverbial theory explains the *phenomenal character* of experience in terms of its intrinsic qualities,’ as quoted above (I add italics for this time), and that disjunctivism holds that ‘the *phenomenal character* of a genuinely perceptual experience depends upon these [mind-independent] objects.’¹⁰⁷ Phenomenology to an important extent underlies the sense-datum inference and the generalizing step, to be sure, but phenomenology itself is not the very thing for those theories to debate; rather, those theories disagree with one another principally about the *object* of perception. They also disagree about phenomenology, but those are not *the* objective of responding to the argument from illusion. In reading the argument in the phenomenological sense, philosophers are led to think that intentionalism here is the same theory as the one in philosophy of mind. Crane’s colleague Martin also reads the argument in this way; that’s why his disjunctivism is the phenomenal one. It is of course legitimate to urge phenomenal disjunctivism, but we should not, *pace* Martin, regard it as a direct response to the argument from illusion.

To sum up, McDowell is a *representationalist* in the sense that he rejects the existence of qualia, and he seems to be an *intentionalist* disjunctivist, for his talk about ‘mere appearances’ can be read as ‘mere *intentional* objects,’ in the deflationary sense of course, and his commitment to the distinction between presentation and representation seems to allow him to say that perception is a form of *intentionality* without buying the common kind thesis. What’s more, he seems to be a disjunctivist

¹⁰⁷ Ibid., section 3.4, my italics.

about *state*, *reason*, *content*, and *phenomenal character* (at least the weak version), with the primeness reading. In this way, he can be an intentionalist without the narrow assumption that associated with the common kind version.¹⁰⁸

As I mentioned in the beginning of this section, McDowell does not say much about sentience *per se*. I attempt to say something about it for him by clarifying the issues about representationalism, the qualia theory, intentionalism, and disjunctivism. Although this detour is far from satisfying, at least it fits well with the following remarks by McDowell:

Not, of course, that we cannot distinguish sapience from sentience. But they are not two simply different problem areas: we get into trouble over sentience because we misconceive the role of sapience in constituting our sentient life.¹⁰⁹

And explaining sentience is one of the most central projects for the followers of McDowell, or so I shall urge.¹¹⁰

¹⁰⁸ I argue that representationalism is a theory about philosophy of mind, not about perception. But I acknowledge that there are some relations between representationalism and disjunctivism. For example, in my footnote 62 I mentioned Byrne's suggestion; his view seems to be that content disjunctivism is consistent with weak representationalism, which explains qualia with the relation of supervenience. They are compatible because weak representationalism allows that different contents determine the same phenomenology. See also Tye, 'Intentionalism and the Argument from No Common Content,' in John Hawthorne (ed.) *Philosophical Perspectives* 21 (Northridge: Ridgeview Publishing, 2007), pp.589-613. The distinction between pure / impure representationalism may also be relevant: weak representationalism seems to encourage pureness, for it has allowed for different contents, and there seems to be no reason to complicate the issue by saying that the modes are also different. Besides, intentional modes may generate additional problems here, for perceiving and seeming to perceive are presumably different modes, but it seems clear that different phenomenal characters are not due to the difference between modes. But these issues deserve further considerations, for example, in his forthcoming paper Crane identifies the impure version with the 'inter-modal' version, but this seems to be falsified by the fact that, say, seeing and seeming to see are different modes (I suspect that he thinks they are the same mode, given his common kind assumption). If we distinguish the impure from the inter-modal, maybe we can hold the latter without committing the former. I myself tentatively maintain inter-modal weak representationalism cum disjunctive intentionalism.

¹⁰⁹ 'One Strand in the Private Language Argument,' p.296.

¹¹⁰ Part of this episode is extracted as 'Disjunctivism, Intentionalism, and the Argument from Illusion.' I have made various revisions there, but since it has not been stable, I shall not revise the materials in the present episode.