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Many philosophers find it difficult to have a comprehensive and thoroughgoing understanding of John McDowell's philosophy. McDowell's thinking ranges from ancient philosophy, ethics, philosophy of language and mind, epistemology, metaphysics, and German Idealism. Besides, his way of putting things is often not very straightforward. Pitfalls and difficulties await anyone who tries to articulate McDowell's overall position. In his Master Thesis, Huei-Ying Cheng embarks on this daunting task by concentrating on aspects of subjectivity as McDowell conceives them. The working hypothesis of this exposition is that different portions of McDowell's thinking form a systematic whole, which requires us to understand it in a systematic manner.

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