

## 參考文獻

### 中文部分：

曾巨威（2004），「地方財政能力與教育經費負擔之分攤機制」，人文及社會科學集刊，16 卷 2 期，頁 197-239。

黃上紡（1996），「選舉與經濟—政治性景氣循環」，美歐月刊，11 卷 5 期，頁 51-66。

黃智聰與程小綾（2005），「經濟投票與政黨輪替—以台灣縣市長選舉為例」，選舉研究，12 卷 2 期，頁 45-78。

黃耀輝（2003），「強化財政紀律是改善財政的關鍵」，經濟前瞻，90 期，頁 48-51。

傅彥凱（2006），「地方政府預算制定之政治經濟分析：政治預算循環的觀點」，選舉研究，13 卷 1 期，頁 119-162。

蔡吉源與林健次（2005），「台灣中央與地方財政關係—制度與歷史的觀察（1952-2003）」，財稅研究，37 卷 5 期，頁 137-154。

蔡吉源（2006），「當前地方財政困難及其解決方向」，財稅研究，38 卷 3 期，頁 127-149。

### 英文部分：

Akhmedov, A. and Zhuravskaya, E. (2004). "Opportunistic Political Cycles: Test in a Young Democracy Setting." *Quarterly of Journal Economics* 119, 1301-1338.

Alesina, A. and Perotti, R. (1995). "The Political Economy of Budget Deficit." *IMF Staff Paper* 42, 1-31.

- Alesina, A., Perotti, R. and Tavares, J. (1998). "The Political Economy of Fiscal Adjustments." *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* 1, 197-248.
- Atkinson, A. B. and Stiglitz, J. E. (1980). *Lectures on Public Economics*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2004). "Political Budget Cycles in New versus Established Democracies." *NBER Working Paper Series* 10539.
- Brender, A. and Drazen, A. (2005). "How Do Budget Deficits and Economic Growth Affect Reelection Prospects? Evidence from a Large Cross-section of Countries." *NBER Working Paper Series* 11862.
- Brender, A. (2003). "The Effect of Fiscal Performance on Local Government Election Results in Israel: 1989-1998." *Journal of Public Economics* 87, 2187-2205.
- Drazen, A. and Eslava, M. (2005). "Election Manipulation via Expenditure Composition: Theory and Evidence." *NBER Working Paper Series* 11085.
- Easaw, J. and Garratt, D. (2000). "Elections and UK Government Expenditure Cycles in the 1980s: An Empirical Analysis." *Applied Economics* 32, 381-391.
- Fiorina, M. (1981). *Retrospective Voting in American National Elections*. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Fisher, R. C. (1996). *State and Local Public Finance*. Chicago: Richard D Irwin.
- Frey, B. S. and Schneider, F. (1978). "An Empirical Study of Political-Interaction in the United States." *Review of Economics and Statistics* 60, 174-183.
- Fujita, M. (1989). *Urban Economic Theory: Land Use and City Size*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

- Gonzalez, M. (2002). "Do Changes in Democracy Affect the Political Budget Cycles? Evidence from Mexico." *Review of Development Economics* 6, 204-224.
- Greene, W. H.(2003). *Econometric Analysis*. Upper Saddle River, New Jersey: Prentice Hall.
- Happy, J. R. (1992). "The Effect of Economic and Fiscal Performance on Incumbency Voting: the Canadian Case." *British Journal of Political Science* 22, 117-130.
- Hendrick, R. (2004). "Assessing and Measuring the Fiscal Health of Local Governments." *Urban Affairs Review* 40, 78-114.
- Hochman, O., Pine, D., and Thisse, J.-F. (1995). "On the Optimal Structure of Local Government." *American Economic Review* 85, 1224-1240.
- Khemani, S. (2001). "Decentralization and Accountability: Are Voters More Vigilant in Local than in National Elections?" *The World Bank Policy Research Working Paper Series* 2557.
- Kneebone, R. D. and McKenzie, K. J. (2001). "Electoral and Partisan Cycles in Fiscal Policy: An Examination of Canadian Provinces." *International Tax and Public Finance* 8, 753-774.
- Kramer, G. H. (1971). "Short-Term Fluctuation in U.S. Voting Behavior, 1896-1964." *American Political Science Review* 65, 131-143.
- Ladd, H. F. and Yinger, J. (1991). *America's Ailing Cities: Fiscal Health and the Design of Urban Policy*. Updated edition, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Levitt, S. D. (1997). "Using Electoral Cycles in Police Hiring to Estimate the Effect of Police on Crime." *American Economic Review* 87, 270-290.

- Long, J. S. (1997). *Regression Models for Categorical and Dependent Variables*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publication.
- Lowry, R. C., Alt, J. E., and Ferree, K. E. (1998). "Fiscal Policy Outcomes and Electoral Accountability in American States." *American Political Science Review* 92, 759-774.
- MacDonald, J. A. and Sigelman, L. (1999). "Public Assessments of Gubernatorial Performance-A Comparative Analysis." *American Politics Quarterly* 27, 201-215.
- Molina, J. (2001). "The Electoral Effect of Underdevelopment: Government Turnover and Its Causes in Latin-American, Caribbean and Industrialized Countries." *Electoral Studies* 20, 427-446.
- Musgrave, R. A. and Musgrave, P. B. (1980). *Public Finance in Theory and in Practice*. New York: McGraw-Hill.
- Niemi, R. G., Stanley, H. W., and Vogel, R. J. (1995). "State Economies and State Taxes: Do Voters Hold Governors Accountable?" *American Journal of Political Science* 39, 936-957.
- Oates, W. (1972). *Fiscal Federalism*. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich.
- Peltzman, S. (1987). "Economic Conditions and Gubernatorial Elections." *American Economic Review* 77, 293-297.
- Peltzman, S. (1992). "Voters as Fiscal Conservatives." *Quarterly Journal of Economics* 107, 327-361.
- Poterba, J. M. (1994). "State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effect of Budgetary Institutions and Politics." *Journal of Political Economy* 102, 799-821.
- Rogoff, K. (1990). "Equilibrium Political Budget Cycles." *American Economic Review* 80, 21-36.

- Rogoff, K. and Sibert, A. (1988). "Elections and Macroeconomic Policy Cycles." *Review of Economic Studies* 55, 1-16.
- Rosen, H. S. (2002). *Public Finance*. Boston: McGraw-Hill Irwin.
- Schuknecht, L. (2000). "Fiscal Policy Cycles and Public Expenditure in Developing Countries." *Public Choice* 102, 115-130.
- Stein, R. M. (1990). "Economic Voting for Governor and U.S. Senator: The Electoral Consequences of Federalism." *Journal of Politics* 52, 29-53.
- Tiebout, C. M. (1956). "A Pure Theory of Local Expenditures." *Journal of Political Economy* 64, 416-424.