

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

In this chapter, basic notions related to disagreement are reviewed. First, the preferred organization during a conversation is discussed and followed by the sequences which precede certain organizations. Second, since disagreement can be expressed directly as well as indirectly, direct and indirect speech act theories will be reviewed. Then, the notions of politeness and power, which are primary functional factors related to disagreement, will be provided. Last, previous studies on disagreement will be reviewed and discussed.

#### 2.1. Preference Organization

According to many studies (Sacks, 1973; Pomerantz, 1984; Levinson, 1983, Kotthoff, 1993), during conversation, there is a preference for certain structure in some adjacency pairs: following the first part of an adjacency pair, a certain second part is usually more preferred over other alternatives. For example, acceptance to offer and acceptance to request are more preferred than refusal and rejection. Thus, acceptance to offer and acceptance to request are considered as the preferred second part, while refusal and rejection are considered as the dispreferred second part.

The notion of preference has been evolved and expanded since Sack's (1973) introduction. He claims that the choice for certain responses over others should be seen as part of the structural organization of talk, i.e. "formal apparatus," instead of "a matter of individual preferences (1973: 65)." Pomerantz (1984), based on the Sacks' notion of preference, introduces the term "dispreferred-action turn shape." According to her, an action is dispreferred when "it is not 'oriented to' the talk as it was 'invited' (Kakava, 2002: 1540)." Thus, the notion of preference is not a psychological desire between the speaker and the hearer, but a structural phenomenon closely related to the

linguistic concept of markedness (Levinson, 1983: 332-3). In Table 1, Levinson (1983: 336) displays the most discussed adjacency pairs with their preferred/dispreferred second parts.

Table 1. Correlations of content and format in adjacency pair seconds (Source: Levinson: 1983)

First Parts		Request	Offer/Invite	Assessment	Question	Blame
Second Parts	Preferred	Acceptance	Acceptance	Agreement	Expected answer	Denial
	Dispreferred	Refusal	Refusal	Disagreement	Unexpected answer or Non-answer	Admission

Despite different content and different format, there appears to be a unified tendency of the preferred and dispreferred second parts. According to Levinson (1983: 333), the preferred second parts of the different and unrelated first parts (i.e. questions, offers, requests, etc.) tend to be structurally simpler and shorter (i.e. “less material”) than that of the dispreferreds. Beyond that, the preferred second parts have little in common; thus, the features among the preferred second parts are irregular. In contrast, despite the unrelated and different first parts, the dispreferred second parts have much in common. General characteristics such as delays, prefaces, accounts, and declination components may be found in the dispreferred second parts (Levinson, 1983: 334). Many scholars (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981; Pomerantz, 1984; Kuo, 1992; Wang, 1997; Lin, 1999) have identified some marked features of the dispreferred formats: they are often prefaced with discourse markers such as “uh” and “well”, weakened with qualifiers, and delayed with long pause or “no talk.”

Among the adjacency pairs in Table 1, Pomerantz (1984:63) conducts an in-depth discussion about agreement and disagreement in assessment. When proffering an initial assessment, though the relevance of a recipient’s agreement or

disagreement is provided, the next action may be so structured that it is invited over its alternatives. The next action as invited is the preferred next action and its alternative, the dispreferred next action. When a participant in the conversation does not follow the regulation to perform the preferred action, his/her action will be interpreted as a deliberately absence which requires inference to explain for it. According to Vuchinich (1990), conflict occurs when consensus between the speaker and the hearer breaks down. In other words, conflict talk sets its base on disagreement. Its formulation has often undergone the accumulation of disagreements or the escalation of the disagreement tension. It is considered as aggravated disagreement (Kuo, 1992; Rees-Miller, 2000) or disagreement without mitigation. In other words, in order to detect the possible occurrence of conflict talk, the recognition of linguistic features, interactional mechanisms, and pragmatic strategies in disagreement is indispensable. Also, since disagreement forms conflict talk, it is doubtless that in pre-conflict sequences, disagreement features will be found and are predictable outcomes.

## **2.2. Speech Act: Direct vs. Indirect**

The focus of the present study is on the dispreferred response of assessment: disagreement and this specific speech act can be performed directly or indirectly, which in turn would determine the strength of disagreement. Under such note, a review of speech act theory is indispensable.

Speech act is an essential component in language usage for its notion of doing something by saying something. The concept was initiated by Austin (1962) and later systemized by Searle (1969). In *How To Do Things With Words*, Austin (1962) discovers that when a speaker utters certain sentences, certain actions are carried out and imposed to the hearer simultaneously. He termed these sentences as performatives with its special focus on the performative verbs. Unlike the other constatives, such as

statements or assertions which determine their validity through the truth condition, performatives can only be performed successfully when all the felicity conditions are met. Austin proposes six general felicity conditions that must be met in order for the speech act to be valid. Violations of these six felicity conditions can be further grouped into three broad types of infelicities: misinvocations, misexecutions, and abuses (Austin, 1962; Sadock, 2004). The violation of different categories will result differently. When the felicity conditions in the first two categories are violated, the effect of the speech act simply does not come about. When the violation is on the category of abuse, the speech act would come off, but there is something wrong with it.

The distinction is clearer by adopting Fraser's (1974) vernacular and ceremonial speech acts. While the former can be performed by any member of the society in daily interaction, the latter can be conducted only when the right person, the right status, the right situation, and the right circumstances are brought together. Much of Austin's discussion involves ceremonial speech acts, which center around felicity conditions on the conventionality, completeness, and correctness of invocations and executions. However, daily conversations are more related to vernacular speech acts, which are concerned with the actions' sincerity. In other words, a person is expected not to do something when he/she is not intended to.

Austin's theory of speech act is later systematized by Searle (1969, 1975, 1976). First, like Austin's felicity conditions, Searle (1969) proposes that different speech acts are classified into four kinds of conditions: propositional content condition, preparatory condition, sincerity condition, and essential condition. Table 2 demonstrates the differences of the felicity conditions between two speech acts: request and warning.

Table 2. A comparison of felicity conditions on request and warning (Source: Levinson, 1983: 240)

Conditions	Request	Warning
Propositional content	Future act A of hearer H	Future event E
Preparatory	1. S [ <i>speaker</i> ] believes H can do A. 2. It is not obvious that H would do A without being asked.	1. S thinks E will occur and is not in H's interest. 2. S thinks it is not obvious to H that E will occur.
Sincerity	S wants H to do A.	S believes E is not in H's best interest.
Essential	Counts as an attempt to get H to do A.	Counts as an undertaking that E is not in H's best interest.

Next, dissatisfied with Austin's categorization through a taxonomy of performative verbs, Searle (1976) proposes five basic kinds of action that can be performed in speaking, namely, representatives, directives, commissives, expressives, and declarations. Among the five basic actions, disagreement is categorized under directives since directives "are intended to produce some effect through action by the hearer" (Leech, 1983: 106). When the speaker provokes disagreement with the hearer, the effect is to show opposition, or more severely, conflict.

The initial distinction between constatives and performatives is later renovated by Austin (1962). According to Austin, there are three essential components in a speech act: locutionary act, illocutionary act, and perlocutionary act. Locutionary act is the act to construct linguistic forms which determinate sense and reference. Illocutionary act, the central innovation, is the making of statement, offer, promise, etc. in uttering a sentence. It is carried out by the conventional forces associated with them. As for perlocutionary act, it is the act performed by speaking. It is the consequences or by-products of speaking, whether intended or not. Whatever sense

used by Austin or Searle, the speech acts they discussed refer to illocutionary acts, and through these acts, we can speak of illocutionary forces.

Illustrations on how the speaker carries out illocutionary acts are clear in the previous section, but, how the hearer perceives the force and, thus, successfully decode the illocutions requires a set of communicative rules. To reach such communicative goals, Grice's (1975) Cooperative Principle (CP) is treated as the intuitively conversational principles that serve as guidelines to ensure maximally efficient communication (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 94-5). Following are the four maxims and their related sub-maxims of CP.

Maxim of Quantity: Give the right amount of information.

1. Make your contribution as informative as is required.
2. Do not make your contribution more informative than is required.

Maxim of Quality: Try to make your contribution one that is true.

1. Do not say what you believe to be false.
2. Do not say that for which you lack adequate evidence.

Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.

Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous.

1. Avoid obscurity of expression.
2. Avoid ambiguity.
3. Be brief (avoid unnecessary prolixity).
4. Be orderly.

(Adaptation from Leech, 1983: 8)

These maxims serve as the basic assumptions underlying every verbal exchange. Although different societies and cultures might not apply all maxims, CP is defined as “an ‘unmarked’ or social neutral (indeed asocial) presumptive framework for communication” (Brown and Levinson, 1987: 5). By following the maxims, communicators are able to receive the real meaning and intention from each other where illocutionary acts can come to work. However, more than frequent, maxims are violated or flouted purposefully. Circumstances are when the hearer finds the

speaker's utterances do not meet the maxims in CP, the hearer is forced to make inference in order to derive "conversational implicature" (Grice, 1975). According to Grice, implicatures are things communicated beyond being said. They become conversational implicatures when the speaker's being cooperative needs to be assumed. With conversational implicatures, speakers are able to convey their meaning beyond the literal expression, and any verbal action that invites conversational implicature is taken as an indirect speech act.

The purpose of indirect speech act (ISA) is for the hearer to recognize the speaker's intention. ISA is composed of two illocutionary acts: the primary illocutionary act, which is non-literally expressed, and the secondary illocutionary act, which is literally coded. Through uttering the secondary act, the real meaning embedded in the primary act of the utterance is obtained. As Searle (1975) has proposed, the application of ISA to make inference cannot be fully realized without a theory of speech act, cooperative principle, and the shared information. In ISA, maxims are often violated and implicatures thus arise. The question here is: Why does the speaker deliberately violate CP when he/she knows the violation would cause unsuccessful communication? Politeness Principles (PP) can be a rescue.

### **2.3. Politeness**

ISA is often put into practice in order to prevent impoliteness. As Searle (1975: 268) points out, "In directives, politeness is the chief motivation for indirectness." Disagreement is an unavoidable conversational style in daily communication, but it serves as the dispreferred turn shape in assessment. The communication break-down caused by disagreement is seriously against the desire for successful communication in human interaction. Its violation of peace and harmony often acts as a threat to interpersonal relationships. Therefore, it is presumable that disagreement is mostly conducted indirectly. Thus, in order to realize the meaning in disagreement and to

decode the intention in any indirect utterances, theories of politeness are required.

Early studies on politeness within the linguistic frame are Lakoff (1973, 1975, 1977), Brown and Levinson (1978, 1987), and Leech (1983). In the influential article of *The logic of politeness: or minding your p's and q's*, Lakoff (1973) proposes an integration of Grice's Cooperative Principles with politeness, a politeness principle with two maxims: be clear (Grice's Maxims of Conversation) and be polite, which are subdivided into three submaxims of politeness—(1) don't impose (distance), (2) give options (deference), and (3) make the addressee feel good (be friendly). Politeness is realized through the priority of the three submaxims, which differs from culture to culture and the three principles are on a continuum of stylistic preferences, with Grice's maxims standing on one end and camaraderie (be friendly) on the other end (Lakoff, 1979).

The core of Brown and Levinson's (1987) politeness is derived from Goffman's (1967) idea of *face*. According to their definition (1987: 66), face is “something that is emotionally invested, and that can be lost, maintained, or enhanced, and must be constantly attended to in interaction.” In every person, there are two kinds of faces: negative face (i.e. the want to be unimpeded by others), and positive face (i.e. the want to be appreciated and approve by others). Founded on the face notions, Brown and Levinson (1987: 70) propose the face-threatening acts (FTAs) for acts that threaten face intrinsically. In Figure 1, Brown and Levinson (1987: 65) show five ways a person can deal with FTAs.




Figure 1. Possible responses to face-threatening acts



Disagreement is intrinsically face-threatening. Showing disagreement threatens the person's positive face—the want to be approved by others. Therefore, to perform disagreement means to do FTA, whether 'on record' or 'off record' (Lakoff's terminology to refer to direct or indirect communication). However, when considering socio-cultural perspectives, face-saving seems to be a better explanation.

According to Lii-Shih (1986:29), "[t]o be polite means to behave and speak appropriately according to the social norms of the society." Under this perspective, every society has a particular set of social norms which consists of explicit rules prescribing a certain behavior, a state of affairs, or a way of thinking within a context. Therefore, different expectations of the behavioral rules are found in different cultures. For example, in oriental society, such as in Chinese and Japanese cultures, avoidance of direct confrontation is considered as polite, while in western society, such as in American culture, the clarity of the conveyed message overrides avoidance of direct confrontation. Based on such belief, Lii-Shih (1986, 1994) proposes "face-satisfying-act" (FSA) in reaction to Brown and Levinson's (1978, 1987) "face-threatening-act" (FTA). Both FTA and FSA are concerned with the hearer's face wants; however, their influence on the hearer is different. Lii-Shih states that FTA sounds more suitable for western cultures, which are "more-individualism-oriented" and in which the participant's privacy, territory, and freedom are highly valued; however, FTA cannot so adequately account for Chinese culture, which is "situation-centered-oriented" (1994: 129). Take suggestion for example. When direct expression of suggestion, such as through the use of performative verb "suggest," is given, Americans tend to take it as offensive. However, for Chinese people, the same way to present suggestion is taken as supportive, i.e. the speaker is trying to minimize the cost to other and maximize the benefit to other as Leech's (1983) tact maxims prescribes. In Japanese culture, in pursuing communicative harmony and politeness,

Japanese always avoid direct confrontation by suppressing his/her personal opinions (Naotsuka, Sakamoto et al, 1981: 173-174), and the behavior of avoiding direct confrontation is considered as a sign of strength and maturity in self-control.

Following the same line, Richards and Sukwiwat (1983: 122) indicates that Thai people are reluctant to show direct confrontation and open criticism. Under such socio-cultural constraint, disagreement tends to be avoided for the sake of politeness. However, if disagreement is inevitable, the opposition is expected relatively indirectly, and the speaker's intention of doing so is to save the hearer's face, not to threaten it.

Another powerful theory on politeness comes from Leech's maxims of politeness (1983). The six maxims of Leech's Politeness Principles (PP) (1983: 132), which are analogous to Grice's maxims, are summarized in below.

- I. TACT MAXIM (in impositives and commissives)
  - (a) Minimize cost to other (b) Maximize benefit to other
- II. GENEROSITY MAXIM (in impositives and commissives)
  - (a) Minimize benefit to self (b) Maximize cost to self
- III. APPROBATION MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
  - (a) Minimize dispraise of other (b) Maximize praise of other
- IV. MODESTY MAXIM (in expressives and assertives)
  - (a) Minimize praise of self (b) Maximize dispraise of self
- V. AGREEMENT MAXIM (in assertives)
  - (a) Minimize disagreement between self and other
  - (b) Maximize agreement between self and other
- VI. SYMPATHY MAXIM (in assertives)
  - (a) Minimize antipathy between self and other
  - (b) Maximize sympathy between self and other

As indicated by Leech (1983: 69), the maxims of CP and PP (1) apply differently in different contexts, (2) apply to variable degrees in one's choice of utterances, (3) may compete with one another in conversation, and (4) may be exploited for the purpose of implicature. As Leech (1983: 83) points out, "[i]n being polite one is often

faced with a CLASH between the CP and the PP so that one has to choose how far to ‘trade off’ one against the other; ....” In different socio-cultural contexts, the application of CP and PP may alter, and consequently, the pragmatic descriptions are tightly sensitive to specific social conditions (Leech, 1983: 10).

Among the six maxims, TACT MAXIM and APPROBATION MAXIM concern with politeness on the other / hearer; GENEROSITY MAXIM and MODESTY MAXIM concern with politeness on the self /speaker, and AGREEMENT MAXIM and SYMPATHY MAXIM concern with politeness of both the self/speaker and the other/hearer at the same time. In Chinese culture, the hearer’s role is highly valued and carefully maintained, and to embarrass the hearer’s face is considered more serious and face-threatening than that of the speaker’s. Also, Bell’s (1984) theory of audience design also indicates that linguistic style-shifting occurs primarily in response to a speaker's audience. In his study, Bell found the same individual newsreaders would adjust their speech towards their audience to show solidarity or intimacy, or away from their audience to show distance. Since the degree of politeness in disagreement can be explained either from viewpoint of the speaker, of the hearer, or of the speaker and the hearer, their roles in the speech activity and the manipulation of disagreement need to be further examined. In Leech’s PP, AGREEMENT MAXIMS is highly related to conflict talk. In conflict talk, the interlocutors may disagree with each other on meaning contents or on opinions. However, any bald disagreement will jeopardize the hearer face and cause communication breakdown. Therefore, even though disagreeing with the hearer, the speaker must first wrap his/her disagreement with AGREEMENT MAXIMS to minimize the cost of face-threatening one must pay. Especially when disagreement convention of daily conversation, how the speaker apply AGREEMENT MAXIMS would show the interaction between CP and PP.

The current study of disagreement will base on Brown and Levinson's politeness theory and Leech's politeness maxims.

#### **2.4. Power**

Power and solidarity are closely related to disagreement, especially when social factors are involved. In Chinese culture, age implies power, especially when age difference exists between the speaker and the hearer. Solidarity is rarely seen when age difference is involved, especially in the competitive disagreement. Therefore, only power is reviewed and discussed in this section.

Tannen (1984) defines power as “controlling others—and extension of involvement—and resisting being controlled—an extension of independence.” Furthermore, she indicates that “power governs asymmetrical relationship where one subordinate to another” (Tannen 1994: 22). In disagreement, people are more likely to expect speakers who are more powerful to oppose to their less powerful hearers, and not vice versa. The asymmetrical relationship of power is clearly defined by Brown and Gilman (1960: 254), “[o]ne person may be said to have power over another to the degree that he is able to control the behavior of the other.”<sup>1</sup> In disagreement, the speaker with more power is more likely to control his/her interlocutor so that although his/her interlocutor disagrees with the speaker, he or she is unlikely to show opposition due to the inference of asymmetrical relationship of power, which accords with Brown and Gilman's (1960) second half definition, “[p]ower is a relationship between at least two persons, and it is non-reciprocal in the sense that both cannot have power in the same area of behavior.” Age is a crucial social factor that places powerful influences on interlocutors, especially in Chinese society. In the discussion of power of age class system, Bernardi (1985) believes that power should be viewed

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<sup>1</sup> Brown and Gilman's definition of power is indirectly quoted from Deborah Tannen (1993), *The relativity of linguistic strategies: rethinking power and solidarity*, in *Gender and Conversational Interaction*, Deborah Tannen (ed).

as a person's ability to perform social acts, which has its regulation limited by the age system. In this study, power is related to age. Under the socio-cultural norms of Chinese society, old people possess more power than young people. Therefore, when disagreement rises, old speakers are more likely to disagree with young hearers, but not vice versa. Moreover, when addressing to young hearers, pragmatic strategies and linguistic markers used by old speaker will be more direct and face threatening than addressing to hearer of the same age. Thus, power is realized through linguistic markers and pragmatic strategies.

## **2.5. Previous Studies on Disagreement**

Studies on disagreement, or similar activities<sup>2</sup>, has been explored and studied by many researchers. Some studies focus on the linguistic markers used in disagreement (Brenneis and Lein, 1977; Pomerantz, 1984; Boggs, 1978; Kuo, 1992; Kakava, 1993, 2002, Wang, 1997, Scott, 1998, 2002), and some have investigated the pragmatic strategies used in disagreement (Goodwin and Goodwin, 1987; Beebe and Takahashi, 1989; Muntigl and Turnbull, 1998; Tannen, 1984, 1993, 1994). Whether from the perspectives of child language acquisition, social and cultural factors, or gender differences, the field of disagreement is indispensable since disagreement itself is a vital social interaction among human beings (Simmel, [1908] 1955). In this section, previous studies related to the definition of disagreement, and its related linguistic markers, and pragmatic strategies are reviewed.

### **2.5.1. Definitions**

Although studies on disagreement have prevailed for decades since 1970s, the definition for is still debatable. According to Rees-Miller's (2000: 1088) definition,

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<sup>2</sup> According to Muntigl and Turnbull (1998: 225-6), terms referring to such activities includes disputing (Brenneis, 1988; Kotthoff, 1993), the adversative episode (Eisenberg and Garvey, 1981), conflict talk (Grimshaw, 1990), dialogical asymmetry (Knoblauch, 1991), verbal discord (Krainer, 1988), and oppositional argument (Schiffrin, 1985).

disagreement occurs when the speaker considers the proposition P uttered by the prior speaker is untrue, and, thus, reacts with an utterance which propositional content or implicature is not P. Based on this definition, what speaker and hearer are arguing about is the determination of the truth condition of the semantic propositional content of the utterance. However, different studies have given different explanations to the definition of disagreement. Kakava (1993: 31) uses the general term 'opposition' to cover forms from mild to aggravated disagreement, meaning "an oppositional stance (verbal or non-verbal) issued to an antecedent verbal (or non-verbal) action."

Disagreement involves the negation of a stated or implied proposition; therefore, it will always occupy the second conversational turn of an adjacency pair. She also defines the sequence of argument or dispute as the exchange of more than two oppositional turns.

According to Lin (1999: 21), disagreement refers to the situation when the content of the speaker's utterance is in opposition with the prior speaker's stance. She further takes Vuchinich's (1990) definition for verbal conflict to modify the definition of disagreement in her study. In Vuchinich's term, verbal conflict occurs when the consensus on a subject matter has broken down between the participants. In the end, Lin defines disagreement as "the situation that interlocutors disagree on matters of fact, judgment, obligation, rights, attitude, feeling, and so on" (1999: 21). From Lin's (1999) and Vuchinich's (1990) definitions, disagreement occurs not simply because there is an inconsistency in semantic propositions exchanged by the interlocutors. The appearance of disagreement has further entered the social factor of attitude, which a person displays through degree of preference. However, in the studies, no distinction is made between the two different types of disagreement.

Another frequently used term for aggressive disagreement is *conflict talk*.

Eisenberg and Garvey (1981) define verbal conflict as 'adversative episode,' which

means “the interaction which grows out of an opposition to a request for action, an assertion, or an action” (1981: 150). In each episode, there are generally three phases: an ‘antecedent event’, an ‘opposition’, and a ‘reaction’ to opposition. Kuo (1992) investigates conflict talk in two settings: casual conversations among friends and legislation interpellations between legislators and government officials. In the study, she determines segments containing verbal conflict begin with an antecedent event (i.e., an utterance that is arguable) and end with a resolution to the argument or topic shift. When a proposition is arguable, there is no definite truth or false within the discussed proposition, but only consensus between speaker and hearer. Thus, conflict occurs when consensus between interlocutors breaks down. Honda (1999) defines conflict in a rather clear way. According to her definition, conflict is “a speech activity in which two parties attempt to maintain their opposition by means of opposition, i.e. manifestation of negativity against the other party’s opposition that is opposed to one’s own.” In short, conflict talk is a speech activity that demonstrates opposition.

Much of the definition of disagreement is vague. Only one ground is shared: the consensus of the stated or implied proposition between speaker and hearer has broken down. In this study, disagreement is defined as the breakdown of the consensus of the intended proposition, whether literally stated or non-literally implied, between speaker and hearer, and the proposition is further divided into two kinds—content matter and attitude, which in turn determines the categorization of the linguistic markers and pragmatic strategies related to disagreement.

### **2.5.2. Linguistic Markers**

Sacks (1973: 65), considering disagreement as a dispreferred action, claims that the preference for agreement should be seen as part of the structural organization of talk (i.e., “formal apparatus”), instead of “a matter of individual preferences.” This implies that the choice of disagreement is governed by societal expectation, not by

individual's preference. In other words, disagreement is not an act randomly performed. Pomerantz (1984) introduces 'dispreferred-action turn shape' in second assessments. These dispreferred actions are structurally marked with features such as "delay, request for clarification, partial repeats, and other repair initiators, and turn prefaces" (1984: 70). Levinson (1983) further generalizes some features of dispreferred seconds such as delays, prefaces, accounts, and declination components.

Kuo (1992), in her study of conflict talk in casual conversations among friends and legislation interpellations between legislators and government officials, identifies several recurrent linguistic devices. In casual conversations among friends, in which the reason for verbal conflict is predominately differences in opinion, questions, hedges, and agreements preface disagreements are frequently used linguistic devices to mitigate the perlocutionary force of disagreement. Also, Pan (1994), in her study of politeness strategies used in Mandarin conversation, identifies the use of negation in institutional conflict talk. Wang (1997) locates nine linguistic features in her study in disagreement of Mandarin Chinese, including long pause, hesitation in various forms, use of negation, use of contrast, use of question or repair initiator, use of other discourse markers, tag *dui bu dui* 'right?', account, and partial agreement. Among these linguistic devices, account, negation, and hesitation in various forms are the top three linguistic features frequently used in disagreement. In addition, features that are related with degree of force in disagreement are also examined in Wang's study. According to her, the use of negation, question or repair initiator, and account are the primary three linguistic devices to show strong disagreement. This finding implies that different degree of disagreement may prescribe different linguistic features.

Lin (1999) takes Wang's categorization as the base to investigate disagreement in Mandarin Chinese conversation. She leaves out account and partial agreement because she considers these two categories to be "more like pragmatic strategies than



formal features” (24). She further adds three other features which she has observed in her real conversation data to her study: modal, interjection, and interruption.

Moreover, the ten linguistic features found in her data were further grouped into three major categories: syntactic (negation and question), hesitation marker (repair, pre-announcement marker, contrast marker, modal, interjection, and qualifier), and turn-taking devices (interruption and long pause). Lin indicates that repair, question, and negation are most used. Disagreement tends to be prefigured by hesitation markers (42.9%) and least performed by turn-taking devices, and the reason behind this priority of choice is consideration of politeness.

Based on the previous studies, it is clear that certain linguistic markers frequently occur in disagreement. However, some linguistic features that are considered as form or structure are more like linguistic strategies. In Lin’s (1999) categorization, repair, interjection, and interruption are considered as linguistic features. However, to Tannen (1993), interruption is considered as a linguistic strategy since it demonstrate a way of speaking. Thus, in this current study, linguistic markers are limited to linguistic forms only and repair, interjection, and interruption are considered as pragmatic strategies since they display ways of speaking.

### **2.5.3. Pragmatic Strategies**

Pragmatic strategies are indispensable in human communication. As shown in the discussion of speech act, CP, and PP, linguistic competence alone cannot fully explain the meaning in daily conversation. Tannen (1993: 166) has made the reason clear.

... the “true” intention or motive of any utterance cannot be determined from examination of linguistic form alone. For one thing, intentions and effects are not identical. For another, ... human interaction is a “joint production”: everything that occurs results from the interaction of all participants.

Thus, in order to discover the true intention in different disagreement, pragmatic strategies must be explored.

Kuo (1992) finds that when disagreement becomes aggravated, strategies such as formulaic opposition prefaces, uncooperative interruptions, and substitutions are applied. Interlocutors display their opposition to the discussed proposition in a direct and explicit way. She indicates that the use of direct speech act secures personal autonomy, which protects a person’s negative face. Kuo also mentions an interesting finding in her study. According to her, Chinese people also engage in social argument, which has been discovered in Eastern European Jews (Schiffrin, 1984) and Greeks (Kakava, 1993), to demonstrate collective involvement and solidarity. Kuo points out that in different contexts, social variables like power, affect, and interactional goals would influence the choice of linguistic devices and the use of linguistic strategies.

Pan (1994) discusses the politeness strategies applied in institutional conflict discussion. She takes the definition of verbal conflict proposed by Vuchinich (1990). Conflict occurs when consensus between interlocutors breaks down. It ends when oppositional turns cease and other activities take up. (Pan, 1994: 100) The three social variables examined are power, age, and sex. Listing from the most direct to the least direct, Pan (1994: 107-8) shows four ways to state opposition during institutional conflict talk are: (a) to use negation, (b) to show doubt and down-playing the proposition of the previous suggestion, (c) to give reason without overtly stating one’s position, and (d) to provide alternatives. Pan’s study shows that “the higher the rank

of a speaker, the more direct he is in expressing opposition” (1994: 108). The power derived from ranking difference gives the speaker the position or right to impose the hearer. Therefore, “don’t impose” (Lakoff, 1973) is a maxim uni-directionally applied by speaker of lower level to hearer of higher level in the institutional situation.

Based on the disagreement strategies in the works of Beebe and Takahashi (1989) and Muntigl and Turnbull (1998), Lin (1999) proposes eight strategies that can be categorized as the performance of disagreement: correction, account, challenge, clarification, defense, evasion, partial agreement, and suggestion. Lin finds that correction, account, and challenge, which are quite direct and offensive, are the most frequently used strategies. The use of aggressive and competitive strategies is anticipated because during conversation between close friends, “people tend to use the explicit and direct strategy to achieve their ultimate purpose of solidarity” (1999: 97). In Lin’s (1999) categorization, the definition for evasion is similar to the linguistic feature of qualifier; therefore, in this study, evasion will be excluded from pragmatic strategies.

In the current study, disagreement will be examined by their linguistic markers and pragmatic strategies. Through the categorization of recurrent patterns in speech activities, we will look for categorization that will help set the distinction between content matter disagreement and personal judgment disagreement.