

# CHAPTER 7

## Political Inclinations in Terms of Social Indicators

In this chapter we analyze the correlative effects of age, gender, education, marital status, income, occupation and source of financial support on the foreign respondent's political inclinations regarding the cross-strait situation.

### 7.1 Political Inclinations in Terms of Age

Next we divided the survey group into age groups. Although five respondents indicated an age of "1" or "2", my guess is that those respondents meant that they were in their teen years or in their twenties; consequently, because of the ambiguities, those respondents were not counted in the analysis on age, as with respondents who indicated they were "30 something" or 40+, along with surveys with the age question left blank. Despite these shortcomings, 290 surveys were collected with respondents' age properly indicated. The mean and median ages were 27.99 and 27, respectively, while the mode was 24 and 30 (both with 30 respondents). The oldest respondent was 60, and 2 18-year-olds participated in the study, representing the 2 youngest in the survey pool. The respondents were then divided into 6 categories by age with 16 in the 20 or younger category, 99 in the 21-25 category, 108 in the 26-30 category, 39 in the 31-35 category, 21 in the 36-40 category and 10 in the 40 or over category.

**Table 7-1: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Age**

Years	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
20 or younger No. (%)	16 (100)	0 (0)	5 (31.2)	1 (6.2)	4 (25.0)	5 (31.2)	0 (0)	2 (12.5)	0 (0)
21 – 25 No. (%)	99 (100)	2 (2.0)	9 (9.0)	19 (19.1)	28 (28.2)	23 (23.2)	8 (8.0)	9 (9.0)	1 (1.0)
26 – 30 No. (%)	108 (100)	3 (2.7)	8 (7.4)	19 (17.5)	27 (25.0)	23 (21.2)	8 (7.4)	14 (12.9)	5 (4.6)
31 – 35 No. (%)	39 (100)	0 (0)	5 (12.8)	7 (17.9)	6 (15.3)	9 (23.0)	3 (7.6)	0 (0)	9 (23.0)
36 – 40 No. (%)	21 (100)	0 (0)	2 (9.5)	2 (9.5)	4 (19.0)	3 (14.2)	4 (19.0)	6 (28.5)	0 (0)
Over 40 No. (%)	10 (100)	2 (20.0)	1 (10.0)	1 (10.0)	2 (20.0)	1 (10.0)	1 (10.0)	2 (20.0)	0 (0)

The results show that those 20 or younger are the most likely to support independence with 56.2% of the 16 supporting independence now or later. The results show that respondents aged 36 or older are most prone to leave the question blank, with 28.5% of those who are between 36-40 leaving the question blank and 20% for those 40 and older. In contrast, the younger age categories left the last question blank at a rate between 0% and 12.9%.

The results also show that the 40 or older crowd were among the 5 who rated answer 1 — unification now — with 20%, highest followed by those aged 26-30 (2.7%) and those 21-25 (2%). As for response 2, those in the 20 or younger age group stand out most by rating independence now at a rate of 31.2% (the same figure as they had rated status quo forever), which was followed by those 40, 20% of whom supported option 2. For answer 3, those in the 21-25, 26-30 and 31-35 rated the question in proximate range with each other indicating support of unification later at figures of 19.1%, 17.5% and

17.9% respectively. On question 4 — status quo now, independence in the future — the 31-35 age group diverged from the 21-25 and 26-30 age group, as well as the 20 and under age group. Whereas only 15.3% of those 31-35 supported the answer 4, respondents 20 and under, 21-25 and 26-30 supported status quo now independence later at a rate of 25%, 28.2% and 25%, respectively. Respondents from the 36-40 and over 40 age groups also saw similar rates of support for question 4, which were 19% and 20%, respectively, putting their level of support of the larger grouping of 20 and under, 21-25 and 26-30 and the grouping of respondents who were 31-35. As for answer choice 5, the age group of 20 or younger had the highest level of support at 31.2%, much higher than the support levels of those respondents in the 21-25, 26-30 31-40 and over 40 with 23.2%, 21.2%, 23%, 14.2% and 10%, respectively. But for question 6, the level of support for status quo forever was 0%, whereas the corresponding figures for 21-25, 26-30, 31-35, 36-40 and 40 and over were 8%, 8%, 7.6%, 19% and 10% respectively.

Based on the above analysis, we can see that all age groups, except for the over 40 category, are more pro-independence at some point in time, verses unification at some point in time. Namely, whereas the over 40 age group rated both unification at some point in time and independence at some point in time at 30% each, they can be seen as the major outlier of the major age groups. Namely, respondents were much more prone to be pro-independence at some point in time than any other category with those 20 or younger supporting it 56.2% of the time, followed by 21-25 age group 37.2% of the time, then by 26-30 age group 32.4% of the time, then by 31-35 28.1% of the time and by the 36-40 age group 28.5% of the time. It is noteworthy that the data suggests that as one gets older, he or she becomes less likely to support independence at some point in time, while the support rate tapers off at 30% for those 40 or older. Regretfully, our survey efforts yielded only three respondents who were 50 or older. Unpredictably, those respondents answered 1, 3 and 4, respectively, and thus highlighting the need for more older aged respondents included in the survey.

The 21-25, 26-30, 31-31, and 36-40 age groups supported unification now or in the future within a narrow band of nearly 18% and a little over 21% with 21.2%, 19.7%, 17.9% and 21.0%, respectively. While those aged 40 or over supported unification now or later 30% of the time, the results might be misleading because of the small number of respondents. The 20 or younger group is also least likely to support unification option

choices, with only 6.2% of the respondents supporting the response. This means that there is almost a nine-fold increase in support for pro-independence now or later versus pro-unification now or later, whereas the disparity between pro-unification now or later and pro-independence now sees a little less than twice the support for independence now or later compared to unification among 21-25 year olds, about 1.6X among the 26-30 age group, about 1.5X among those 31-35, a little over 1.3X among those 36-40, and 1X among those 40 or older.

## 7.2 Political Inclinations in Terms of Gender

In terms of gender, 195 surveys were collected from males and 104 from females. The results show that males were about twice as likely to leave the last question blank compared to females — 27.6% versus 13.4%, respectively — and that leaving the question blank was the most popular answer among males, whereas the most popular response for females was status quo now, move toward unification or independence in the future, a figure about 5% higher than the corresponding statistic for males. Both males and females both rated questions 1 and 2 — move toward unification now and move toward independence now — about equally at 2.5% for males and 1.9%, whereas 9.7% of males said they supported independence now and 10.5% of females supported it.

**Table 7-2:** Foreigners’ Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Gender

	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Male No. (%)	195 (100)	5 (2.5)	19 (9.7)	30 (15.3)	52 (26.6)	39 (20)	15 (7.6)	29 (27.6)	6 (3.0)
Female No. (%)	104 (100)	2 (1.9)	11 (10.5)	20 (19.2)	19 (18.2)	26 (25.0)	10 (9.6)	14 (13.4)	2 (1.9)

Aside from differences in their willingness to answer the question, males and females differed most on the issue of moving toward independence later or moving

toward unification later. Over a quarter of males (26.6%) supported independence later whereas less than 1 in 5 (18.2%) of females supported it. The fissure also becomes clear on answer 3. Whereas 15.3% of males opted for status quo now and unification later, 19.2% of females supported it, a full percentage point higher than the rate at which supported status quo now and unification later. On the whole though, both genders seem to be more in support of independence now or later rather than unification now or later, with over 1/3 of males (36.6%) supporting either question 2 and 4, whereas correspondingly 28.7% supported either one of the two options. In contrast males supported answer 1 and 3 17.8% of the time and the corresponding statistic for females was 21.1%.

### **7.3 Political Inclinations in Terms of Education**

In terms of highest education, information was gathered from 31 respondents with middle school or lower, 101 with a high school degree, 122 with an undergraduate degree and 45 with a master's degree or higher; 2 respondents out of the entire sample did not include a response on the education question. Results show that one's likelihood to answer the last question is positively correlated with the more education one has attained. 38.7% of those with middle school or lower did not answer the question, whereas for the corresponding figure was 29.7%, 2.4% and 2.2% for those with high school degrees, undergraduate degrees and master's degrees, respectively.

It also shows that those who have attained higher education are much more likely to respond to the question by up to 17.5X. Those with middle school or lower were also most likely to support either moving to independence or unification now, as compared to those with high school, undergraduate or master's degrees or higher. Namely, those with middle school degree or lower supported unification now 9.5% of the time while the corresponding figure for the other highest education levels were 1.9%, 0.8%, 4.4%, respectively. Meanwhile, those with middle school or lower supported independence now 23.8% of the time, substantially more than the other groupings based on education, namely 11.8%, 8.1%, 6.6%, respectively. The figures suggest that as one attains more education, their inclinations toward the cross-strait issue might be less extreme in that those with higher education are less likely to support action towards independence or unification now.

**Table 7-3: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Education Level**

	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Less than High School No. (%)	31 (100)	2 (9.5)	5 (23.8)	3 (14.2)	1 (3.2)	5 (23.8)	3 (14.2)	12 (38.7)	0 (0)
High School No. (%)	101 (100)	2 (1.9)	12 (11.8)	14 (13.8)	16 (15.8)	15 (14.8)	10 (9.9)	30 (29.7)	2 (1.9)
Undergraduate No. (%)	122 (100)	1 (0.8)	10 (8.1)	24 (19.6)	41 (33.6)	34 (27.8)	6 (4.9)	3 (2.4)	3 (2.4)
Master or Higher No. (%)	45 (100)	2 (4.4)	3 (6.6)	9 (20.0)	12 (26.6)	10 (22.2)	6 (13.3)	1 (2.2)	2 (4.4)

Support for status quo now and unification later seems positively correlated with one's highest level of education. The results of our survey suggests that those with a master's degree or higher support unification later 20% of time, whereas the corresponding statistic was 19.6% for undergraduates, 13.8% among high school and 14.2% with middle school or lower. However, the positive correlation is absent when the frequency of answer 4 — status quo now, independence later — is assessed. Namely, over 1/3 of undergraduates supported independence later, while only 1/5 of those who hold master's degrees or higher were, 1/6 of those with an undergraduate degree and about 1/30 of those with middle school degrees.

Whereas about 1/4 of those with middle school or lower, an undergraduate degree or a Master's degree or higher supported maintaining the status quo and decide the sovereignty question later, those with a high school degree, supported option 5 about 1/3 lower, at 14.8%, than the corresponding groups. Those with a undergraduate degree, however, represented the group with the lowest support for keeping the status quo forever, with only 4.9% support rate, which is almost half of high school graduates (9.9%), one-

fourth of middle school education or less and nearly one-third of those with Master's degree or higher.

Taken together this means that those with master's degree or higher and middle school or lower support unification at some point in time a little less this  $\frac{1}{4}$  the time, while those with undergraduates are marginally lower at 20.4% of the time. The age group representing the lowest support for unification now or later is the high school degree or higher group. Based on these results it is difficult to determine whether the independent variable of education can be correlated with pro-unification. In contrast, the answer choices in support of either independence now or independence later were most favored among those with undergraduate degrees, with 41.7%, followed by master's degree with 33.2%. Students with middle school or less and students with high school degrees supported independence now or later almost equally, with the corresponding figures of 27.0% and 27.6% respectively. This shows that those with higher education the more likely they are to support independence.

#### **7.4 Political Inclinations in Terms of Marital Status**

In terms of marital status, questionnaires were collected from 235 people who were single and 59 married, nearly a 4:1 ratio the statistics suggest that those who are single tend to be much more decided on the whether they support independence or unification than are married people. The prevalence of single people here may allude to the fact that for many, Taiwan has become a destination for single and mobile people to find work. Our study reveals that of those respondents who indicated their marital status and how long they plan to stay in Taiwan — 173 singles and 45 married — 71% of those who are single indicated they were leaving within the next 24 months, whereas the corresponding statistic for those who were single was only 40%. We contend that this unique correlation bespeaks the sense mobility one has if he or she was single. However, it is also possible that those who are married have spouses in other countries, which also presents a different set of priorities for men. Although the unique patterns of marriage is not directly the focus of this study, it helps to highlight a unique feature of the social stratification of foreigners in Taiwan.

**Table 7-4: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Marital Status**

	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W/ Weird answer
Single No. (%)	235 (100)	5 (2.1)	26 (11.0)	40 (17.0)	65 (27.6)	54 (22.9)	14 (5.9)	25 (10.6)	6 (2.5)
Married No. (%)	59 (100)	2 (3.3)	4 (6.7)	8 (13.5)	7 (11.8)	10 (16.9)	10 (16.9)	18 (30.5)	2 (3.3)

Regarding the independence versus unification question, however, married people tended to be less willing to make a response with 30.5% who left the question blank and only 10.6% for single people. In spite of these deficiencies, single people tend to be more disaffected by the status quo. Whereas married people supported unification now only slightly higher than the unmarried (3.3% and 2.1%) respectively, the study also found that married people were less in support of answer 2 (move toward independence now), answer 3 (move toward unification now), answer 4 (status quo now, independence later), and answer 5 (status quo now, decide later). In fact, on the pro independence questions, the unmarried were almost twice as likely to support independence now or later compared to married people. The married, however, were almost three times as likely to support answer 6 (status quo forever). This reveals that the unmarried are much more likely to choose a side on the independence and unification issue than are married people, who would favor more the maintaining of the status quo.

## 7.5 Political Inclinations in Terms of Income

Next we looked at income. The incomes ranged from 0 to NT\$200,000 per month. The incomes were grouped into following: 0-NT\$10,000/m. (33 respondents), NT\$11,000-NT\$20,000/m. (78 respondents), NT\$21,000-NT\$40,000/m (64 respondents), NT\$41,000-60,000/m (31 respondents), NT\$61,000-80,000/m (21 respondents), and NT\$80,000/m. and over (21). The survey yielded 248 respondents who answered the income question. In the two categories with the lowest incomes, we chose to separate the two income levels apart because they presented a clear division of occupations. Namely,



21 out of the 33 or 63% of the respondents in the lowest income category were students. As for the NT\$11,000-NT\$20,000 bracket, 52 of the 78 or 2/3s of the respondents made incomes that hovered around NT\$15,000-\$16,000; almost 2 in 5 of the 78 were making exactly NT\$15,840, which is in fact the amount that is commonly given to factory workers and caretakers, usually from Southeast Asian countries.

Delineating the NT\$10,000-NT\$20,000 categories helps to capture these economic realities. Moreover, since my survey sample is loaded highly with students, many of them who are not working had indicated NT\$30,000 as their monthly salary, their monthly allowance from scholarships such as the Taiwan Scholarship. Consequently, the NT\$21,000-\$40,000 category is filled mostly by students and teachers. Teachers, who are well represented by our study, generally predominate in the top three categories, that is, a salary that is at least NT\$41,000. The majority of teachers, though, make at least NT\$50,000 a month or more.

The data reveals that those comprising of the group making \$10,001-\$20,000NT a month are most prone to leave the last question blank with 34.6% doing so, followed by those making \$10,000 or less at 15%, followed by those making 21,000-40,000 at 7.8%. In contrast, the three categories demarcated NT\$41,000 or higher saw a response rate of 100% for the final answer. The relatively low rate of participation from the 21,000-40,000 income group helps illuminate the impact of socioeconomic status on participation, which is dismally lower among the group. It should also be unsurprising to find that 31 of the 66 total in the income group (31.8%) have received middle school or lower education and that 40 of the total had high school as their highest level of education (60.6%). This is in contrast to the categories denoting NT\$40,000 or more a month. Among the 125 respondents who fit into the higher income brackets, 78 of those had also revealed their education. Of the 80, 2 had middle school or lower (2.5%), 6 had a high school degree (7.5%), 53 had an undergraduate degree (66.2%) and 13 had a master's degree (16.25%). Since we have shown that respondents with higher education levels tend to answer the question, it should be unsurprising then that people with higher incomes tend to answer the question more since they are also more educated.

**Table 7-5: Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Income**

NT\$ per Month	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Less than 20,000 No. (%)	108 (100)	2 (1.8)	7 (6.4)	24 (22.0)	15 (13.7)	20 (18.3)	10 (9.1)	28 (25.6)	3 (2.7)
20,000 – 40,000 No. (%)	64 (100)	3 (4.6)	4 (6.6)	12 (18.7)	17 (26.5)	16 (25.0)	4 (6.2)	5 (7.8)	3 (4.6)
40,001 – 60,000 No. (%)	31 (100)	2 (6.4)	4 (12.9)	4 (12.9)	11 (35.4)	9 (29.0)	1 (3.2)	0 (0)	0 (0)
60,001 – 80,000 No. (%)	21 (100)	0 (0)	5 (23.8)	0 (0)	7 (33.3)	4 (19.0)	4 (19.9)	0 (0)	1 (4.7)
Over 80,000 No. (%)	21 (100)	0 (0)	1 (4.7)	5 (23.8)	9 (42.8)	3 (10.7)	3 (10.7)	0 (0)	0 (0)

A main finding is that those making between 60,000 and 80,000 are least likely to support unification with 0% of those respondents choosing answer choice 1 (unification now) and 3 (status quo now, unification later). The other categories, however, hovered around a band with a minimum of 19.3% (40,000-60,000) and a maximum of 24% (0-10,000). In terms of independence, those with higher incomes are generally more pro-independence. For instance, almost half (47.5%) those with incomes of 80,000 or higher chose answer choice 2 (independence now) or 4 (status quo now, independence later). Correspondingly, the figure was 57% for those making 60,000-80,000; nearly 50% for those making 41,000-60,000 (48.3%), and a little over a third for those making 0-10,000 a month. The main anomaly is the 10,000-20,000 income group who only chose the questions 2 or 4 12.7% of the time. In contrast, the 41,000-60,000 income group can be seen as most likely to want to decide the unification/independence question at a later date, with nearly 3 in 10 (29%) selecting answer choice 5. Moreover, those making 80,000 or more are more likely to have their minds made up on the issue with merely 10.7% supporting status quo now and deciding later. In contrast the 60,000-80,000 income group was most likely to favor status quo forever with a figure of 19%.

## 7.6 Political Inclinations in Terms of Occupation

Next we look at occupation. The respondent pool represented several professions including office workers, kitchen staff to visitors. 294 respondents participated in the question asking, “what do you do?” Of these, the highest frequency were from 95 students (32.3%), followed by 70 teachers (23.8%), followed by 48 factory workers (16.3%) and 22 caretakers (7.4%); together, they represented 79.8% of those who participated in the question. The factory workers and caretakers answered the last question with least frequency, represented by the figures 35.4% and 27.2% respectively. However, teachers were most prone to answer the question, with only 1.4% of them leaving the question blank, whereas for students the figure was correspondingly 3.1%. In all four cases, the respective professions chose answer 1 less than 5% of the time with caretakers responding 4.5% of the time, followed by students at 2.1% of the time, followed by factory workers at 2.0% of the time and by teachers at 1.4% of the time.

Among the four professions, students rated the option highest at just over  $\frac{1}{4}$ , nearly 10% higher than factory workers who ranked second highest in support for unification later, and dropping down to 8.5% among teachers. Oddly enough, our study suggests that caretakers were the biggest supporters of independence now, at 18.1%, among the four highest four high-frequency occupations, dropping down by about  $\frac{1}{3}$  for teachers to 12.8% and then dropping down again to 6.2% and 6.3% for factory workers and students, respectively. The low frequency may seem to contradict our previous findings suggesting that those who are female, with lower incomes, and from underdeveloped countries would be less in support of independence now.

However, we have already noted before that lower levels of education, especially those who have attained only middle school, are typically more in support of independence now, verses independence later or either unification now or unification later. According to our survey sample, 8 out of 22 caretakers (36.3%) had educations of middle school or lower. Also, 14 of the caretakers had only a high school degrees, which was ranked second highest in supporting immediate independence, according to the preceding words on education levels.

**Table 7-6:** Foreigners' Political Inclinations in Terms of Their Occupation

	Total	1- Unification now	2- Independence now	3- Unification later	4- Independence later	5- Decide later	6- Status quo forever	0- No answer	W- Weird answer
Caretaker No. (%)	22 (100)	1 (4.5)	4 (18.1)	3 (13.6)	2 (9.0)	3 (13.6)	3 (13.6)	6 (27.2)	0 (0)
Factory Worker No. (%)	48 (100)	1 (2.0)	3 (6.2)	8 (16.6)	5 (10.4)	7 (14.5)	4 (8.3)	17 (35.4)	3 (6.2)
Student No. (%)	95 (100)	2 (2.1)	6 (6.3)	25 (26.3)	23 (24.2)	31 (32.6)	4 (4.2)	3 (3.1)	1 (1.0)
Teacher No. (%)	70 (100)	1 (1.4)	9 (12.8)	6 (8.5)	29 (41.4)	16 (22.8)	6 (8.5)	1 (1.0)	2 (2.8)

Besides the observable differences in levels of support for immediate independence the political inclinations of factory workers and caretakers seem to bear some similarities. This may suggest that in terms political inclinations, a semblance of division between “blue-collar” and “white-collar” workers. For instance, both groups did not answer the last question at a much higher frequency than students and teachers. However, caretakers and factory workers, while not too unlike students and teachers in supporting answer 1 — unification now — both responded at a much lower frequency. Both caretakers and factory workers answered question 3 — unification later — at a similar frequencies with 13.6% and 16.6% respectively.

This also holds true for questions 4 — status quo now independence later — with caretakers responding 9.0% of the time and factory workers 10.4% of the time. In contrast, students and teachers answered question 24.2% and 41.4% at a time, respectively. Moreover, the difference can also be seen on question 5 with caretakers answering 13.6% of the time and factory workers 14.5% of the time while students and teachers at a much higher level, 32.6% and 22.8% of the time, respectively. But on question 6, factory workers seemed to express similar support levels with 8.3% and 8.5% while caretakers responded 13.6% and students only 4.2% of the time. Perhaps what we can say about the differences regarding “blue-collar” and “white-collar” workers is that

the former can be seen as having support more scattered around the spectrum of policy choices in both political and temporal dimensions, whereas “white-collar” interests tend to support action later — both independence or unification — at a later date.

## **7.7 Political Inclinations in Terms of Source of Financial Support**

Question 9 on our survey, “From whom do you receive financial support (please mark all that apply)?” was thrown out. While it was intended that respondents who were employed by a non-public entity to mark the first choice “From employers of the private sector”, what in fact happened was that most several respondents marked the answer choice 6 “No financial support received”, which was intended for unemployed people. It is a shame that responses from this question could not be analyzed as the intent was to explore the effects of foreigner’s economic connections to society on one’s political inclinations regarding the cross-Strait relationship.

## **7.8 Summary**

Based on the above analysis, we can see that all age groups, except for the over 40 category, are more pro-independence at some point in time, versus unification at some point in time. Namely, whereas the over 40 age group rated both unification at some point in time and independence at some point in time at 30% each, they can be seen as the major outlier of the major age groups. Namely, respondents were much more prone to be pro-independence at some point in time than any other category with those 20 or younger supporting it 56.2% of the time, followed by 21-25 age group 37.2% of the time, then by 26-30 age group 32.4% of the time, then by 31-35 28.1% of the time and by the 36-40 age group 28.5% of the time.

The results show that males were about twice as likely to leave the last question blank compared to females — 27.6% versus 13.4%, respectively — and that leaving the question blank was the most popular answer among males, whereas the most popular response for females was status quo now, move toward unification or independence in the future, a figure about 5% higher than the corresponding statistic for males.

Results show that one's likelihood to answer the last question is positively correlated with the more education one has attained. 38.7% of those with middle school or lower did not answer the question, whereas for the corresponding figure was 29.7%, 2.4% and 2.2% for those with high school degrees, undergraduate degrees and master's degrees, respectively. The figures suggest that as one attains more education, their inclinations toward the cross-strait issue might be less extreme in that those with higher education are less likely to support action towards independence or unification now.

Those with an undergraduate degree or higher were almost twice as likely to support independence later than those with a high school degree or lower.. Although less than 1 in 10 among respondents with less than high school degree supported unification now, they tended to rate it higher than the other groups — twice as much as respondents with a Master's degree or higher, 10 times as often as undergraduates and about 5 times as high school degrees.

we analyzed the correlations in marital status and political attitudes. In addition, we also looked at income which revealed that the income stratification in Taiwan among foreigners is somewhat rigidly distributed meaning that there were many people with jobs like that of teaching garnering high incomes and many people with low incomes like that of a factory, that of a caretaker and that of a construction worker. We found that income was related with their occupation, education and nationality. In terms of income, our main finding is that those with higher income tended to be more pro-independence later and almost 1/4 of those making NT\$60,001-80,000 support independence now. Those making NT\$80,000 or over a month and those making less than NT\$20,000 a month rated unification later higher compared to the other groups.

Similar correlations were also present when the data was disaggregated for occupation. However, over 1 in 4 students favored unification later, much higher than caretakers factory workers or teachers. Teachers were most in favor of independence later with 41.4%. In addition, caretakers and factory worker did not answer the question frequently with 27.2% and 35.4%, respectively, doing so. Due to weaknesses in the question, the results regarding a respondent's financial support was thrown out.