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碩士論文

Master's Thesis

The Perception of China Threat and Civil-Military

Relations in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era

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Chapter 1

Introduction

My intention in this thesis is twofold. First, I am intending to explain the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian presidency. The typology of civilian control in my thesis is referring to Huntington's division of civilian control, i.e. subjective and objective civilian control.[1] Second, I am also intending to explain the correlation between external threat and civilian control. In this case, the term external threat is referring to the threat from China or I would simply term it as *China threat*. The reason why I am interesting to explain the correlation between external threat and civilian control is because most studies on civilian control in Taiwan are more focusing on the domestic politics or identity politics as an independent variable that explains civilian control.[2] If any of these studies are ever focusing on the external threat as explaining variable, the conclusion would be the lack of correlation between the two. Specifically, this thesis will rely on the structural theory on civil-military relations developed by Michael Desch.[3] However, unlike Desch which argues that the source and degree of threat will define the degree of civilian control, I argue that the

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[1] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Soldier and the State: The Theory and Politics of Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Massachusetts: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 1957, especially chapter 4. For a critique to Huntington, see for example Peter D. Feaver, *Armed Servants: Agency, Oversight, and Civil-Military Relations*, Cambridge, Massachusetts and London: Harvard University Press, 2003, pp. 7-10.

[2] Most assessments on civilian control or civil-military relations in Taiwan are focusing on the democratization process and its influence to the establishment of civilian control or civil-military relations. For detail see the Literature Review and Limitations.

[3] Michael C. Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military: The Changing Security Environment*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1999.

source and degree of threat will only influencing civilian control if there is a congruency of threat perception among civilian groups. It is this congruency of threat perception among civilian groups which will define the type of control. This chapter's main aim is to provide background on civilian control in Taiwan as well as an outline of this thesis.

1.1. Background

The assessment on civilian control in Taiwan is usually divided into two periods: the period under the martial law and the period following the lifting of the martial law. The lifting of the martial law in 1987 is regarded as a mark for the establishment of objective or democratic civilian control. The lifting of the martial law is also considered as the mark for the implementation of democratization process in Taiwan.[4] The establishment of a democratic society supposedly leads to the establishment of a democratic or objective civilian control. In the case of Taiwan, however, the result of democratization process is not a democratic or objective civilian control but rather a subjective one. This thesis will seek the answer of why such an opposite result appeared.

Taylor Fravel writes that "since 1987, Taiwan has made considerable progress toward achieving civilian supremacy."[5] His understanding of civilian control is covering three components: the military is politically neutral or does not involve in politics, the military is under a democratic control by democratically-elected political

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[4] One could argue, however, that the democratization process started with the introduction of the Democratic Progressive Party or the introduction of direct presidential election or, even went back further to the introduction of Tangwai (opposition) movement. Since this is not the focus of my research, I would not enter such a debate on this matter.

[5] M. Taylor Fravel, "Toward Civilian Supremacy: Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan's Democratization" in *Armed Forces and Society* 29:1 (Fall 2002), p. 58.

institutions, and the military does not intervene in society's civil and economic life or in other word the military is clearly distinct from the society. His finding –covering only the period of 1947 to 2000– indicates an improvement in military's political neutrality, democratic oversight, and military's social responsibility (see Table 1.1)

Fravel also suggests that "the KMT has already established a tradition of *partial civilian control over the armed forces through a commissar system.*"[6] His indication implies that during the period under martial law, the term civilian control was not referring to democratic civilian control with the three indicators mentioned above but referring to a sort of Huntington's subjective control. In short, subjective control according to Huntington is characterized by military's allegiance to certain groups, military's involvement in politics as government tool to exercise power, and an unclear task or mission.[7] However, in this case it is not clear whether the control was conducted by civilian leadership within the party or by the party. The control itself was conducted with the implementation of Political Commissar System (PCS).

Table 1.1. Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan, 1949-2000 Source: Fravel, "Toward Civilian Supremacy", pp. 60-61 and 64-65			
	Indicators	**Status, 1949-1987**	**Status, 1987-2000**
Political neutrality	• Loyalty to the constitution, even if changed	• Loyalty to the KMT and Chiangs, not government	• Repeated declarations of loyalty to the constitution
	• No appointment of active duty officers and limited involvement of retired officers in civilian government	• 20 percent to 30 percent military membership on KMT Central and Standing Committees • Senior domestic posts filled by active and retired officers	• Memberships on KMT Central and Standing Committees by active officers eliminated and by retired generals reduced to < 5 percent (1993) • Dominance in EY of retired generals in MND, NSC, and NSB positions

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[6]Ibid, p. 63. Italics added.

[7] Huntington, *The Soldier and the State*, pp. 80-81. For detail see Chapter 2.

			• Retired generals serves as special advisors to the president
	• No involvement in selection of government officials, elected or appointed	• Participation in vote-mobilization efforts and official appointment process	• Isolated rumors of vote-mobilization activities
	• No involvement in formulation and administration of domestic policy, especially internal security	• Extensive involvement in domestic policies through the martial law institutions of the Taiwan Garrison Command and National Security Council	• Elimination of internal security role, except the Coast Guard (1992) • Political Warfare Department of MND maintains right to wiretap
	• Clear and defined external security mission	• Explicit internal security mission of suppression of communist rebellion and opposition to the regime	• Explicit internal security mission focus on defending the island against potential PRC missiles attack or invasion (1992)
	• Professional military culture	• Growth of professionalism in 70s and 80s	• Development of training program
	• Forces broadly representative of society at rank levels	• Officers corps dominated by Mainlanders, not Taiwanese	• Taiwanese Chief of General Staff appointed (1999) • Officer corps increasingly representative of society
Democratic control	• Constitutional supremacy of chief executive as commander-in-chief	• Constitutional separation, but overruled by the Temporary Provision	• Recognition by the military of President as commander-in-chief (1996) • Establishment of NSC as key policy advisory body for national security (1994)
	• Management and supervision of the military by executive agencies	• Two-track system whereby Chief of the General Staff reported directly to the President, not the EY	• Passage of National Defense Law (2000) • Passage of Defense Ministry Organization Law (2000)
	• Legislative oversight and monitoring	• Effectively none, due to the lack of opposition representation in Legislative Yuan	• Monitoring by LY through National Defense Committee (1992) • Regular interpolations of Defense Ministry and MND staff (1992)

		5	• Limited interpellation of Chief of the General Staff (1998) • Authority limited by system rotation, lack of staff expertise and lack of statue on information classification
	• Civilian expertise in security affairs	• No civilian research centers or experts	• Growing numbers of civilian research centers and defense experts
	• Internal autonomy of the military	• Extensive KMT political commissar system within all of the armed forces	• Elimination of formal party activities within the military (1993) • Freedom to make most day-to-day decisions
Social responsibility	• Reconciliation and healing for past abuses	• Silence on 2-28 and "White Terror"	• Public apology for 2-28 and legislation to compensate victims
	• "Demilitarization" of culture	• Mandatory military education program in all schools • Military ownership of media assets	• Elimination of military education and allegiance warfare programs • Student protests against military human rights and treatment of conscripts
	• Transparency of military activities	• Most information highly classified	• MND increasingly transparent, through National Defense Report and website

The PCS was the main tool of control in Taiwan during martial law period, which is also common in any Leninist-style governance. In analyzing the case of Taiwan, Cheng Hsiao-shih notes two differences of Taiwan's PCS from similar tool adopted by other Leninist-style system –his work is particularly dealing with Taiwan and the People's Republic of China (PRC or China). First, the ruling party in Taiwan (the Kuomintang or KMT) did not suffer from severe intra-party conflict that could drag the armed forces into due to the presence of strongman. Second, an analysis of civil-military relations in Taiwan must be made by considering Sun Yat-sen's three stages of development concept. Sun's concept refers to revolutionary stages to create

a prosperous and strong democratic republic through three steps, i.e. creation of military dictatorship to suppress anti-revolutionary forces, formation of party dictatorships with the aim of educating people with ideology of the Party (the Three Principles of the People or San Min Chu I), and establishment of constitutional democracy.[8]

Figure 1.1. Sun Yat Sen's three stage of development concept and the development of civilian control in Taiwan

Military Dictatorship

reason: war against Communist and desire to recapture the Mainland

result: military played a dominant role in almost all aspects of life

Party Dictatorship

reason: economic development; technocrats and middle class; waning dream of retaking the Mainland; democratization

result: military started to disengage from politics, the party took control over all aspects of life

Institutional Democracy

reason: democratization (the early stage)

result: civilian control started to flourish

During the early time of martial law, military took major role in politics due to several reasons such as the war against Communist and the desire to reoccupy the Mainland. For those two reasons, military penetration to the party was deep and influential. During the mid-1960s and 1970s, military started to disengage from governing for several reasons such as the initial wave of democratization, the successful economic development, the rise of technocrats and middle class in Taiwanese society, the fading myth of armed recovery of the Mainland, the

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[8] Cheng Hsiao-shih, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan: Paradoxes of Control*, Boulder and Oxford: Westview Press, Inc., 1990, pp. 123-126.

professionalization of the military[9], and the gradual strengthening of constitutional elements in Taiwan politics.[10] All of these factors came as a result of US massive assistance both in military and economic areas. During the final years of martial law period, the call for democracy was mounting. Continuous resistances from opposition party and civil society, internal changes within KMT, and pressures from the US are some of the reasons. In particular, the pressures from the US are important factor in the establishment civilian control through democratization process.[11] The argument is that creating a democratic society would enhance American support following the shift in diplomatic recognition from Taipei to Beijing.

Following the lifting of martial law, civilian control started to receive greater attention. The establishment of civilian control was possible with the stronger role of the opposition parties, especially the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP). The DPP was consistent in requesting and pressuring for military disengagement from the KMT. As a result, the military consistently declared their disengagement from the KMT, in particular, and politics, in general, but this neutrality would not apply to the issue of

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[9] Sun Ching-min offers a different opinion on the issue of military professionalization. He argues that military professionalism of Taiwan armed forces was deteriorating throughout the years instead of strengthening for five reasons: (1) insufficient training; (2) the rigid thinking among military officers; (3) the impact of political warfare system; (4) doctrinal changes; and (5) the impact of formality, hypocrisy, and administrative burdens. See Sun Chin-ming, "Taiwan: Toward a Higher Degree of Military Professionalism" in Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspectives*, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001, pp. 65-72.

[10] Cheng, *Party-Military Relations in the PRC and Taiwan*, pp. 126-133.

[11] Bernard Cole, *Taiwan's Security: History and Prospects*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, p. 138.

Taiwan independence.[12] Other word, the military would support KMT if the DPP advocated Taiwan independence.

Lee Teng-hui's term also witnessed a series of constitutional reform. These changes have an impact on the establishment of civilian control. The introduction of new National Defense Law and the Ministry of National Defense Organization Law that produce separation of the military command system and military administration system was one example that proved to be critical in placing military under civilian control.[13] These two laws placed the Chief of General Staff under the Minister of Defense which was over sighted by the Legislative Yuan. Its mean that the two laws forced the military to be fully placed under civilian control both executive and legislative powers.

Apart from the abovementioned achievements in the establishment of civilian control during Lee's era, critical assessment must also be pointed out. Democratization process during Lee's era did not only bring about progress toward the establishment of civilian control but also introduce harsher competition among groups, including among civilian groups, over variety of issues. In his attempt to acquire full power Lee skillfully conducted steps that resulted in sidestepping several strong and important military figures. Lee managed, for example, in removing General Hau Pei-tsun which was considered as important military strongmen with

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[12] Yang Chi-lin, *Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy: Changing Civil-Military Relations in the Republic of China (Taiwan), 1949-1994*, unpublished dissertation at the University at Albany, State University of New York, p. 240.

[13] Arthur Shu-fan Ding and Alexander Chieh-cheng Huang, "Taiwan's Military in the 21st Century: Redefinition and Reorganization" in Larry M. Wortzel, ed., *The Chinese Armed Forces in the 21st Century*, Carlisle, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1999, pp. 253-288 and Michael S. Chase, "Defense Reform in Taiwan: Problems and Prospect" in *Asian Survey* 45:3 (2005), pp. 366-371. It must be noted that the Legislative Yuan did not pass those laws and those law did not go into effect until Chen's term.

different view from Lee. Lee was clearly adopted subjective control during his presidency. He took an opposite strategy from that of Chiang Kai-shek and Chiang Ching-kuo –which preferred direct control over the military– since he understood that he could not act like his two predecessors for a number of reasons including his lack of influence among the military.[14]

In conclusion, we may say that during Lee's tenure, Taiwan was heading to the right direction toward the establishment of civilian control over the military. However, Lee's tenure also witnessed sharper conflict of identity among Taiwanese political groups. The mounting political rivalry between the KMT and the DPP reached its peak with the victory of Chen Shui-bian as the president of Taiwan. The military faced a new challenge of placing its loyalty to the new administration. The new ruling party also faced similar challenge in their effort to further strengthen civilian control. The efforts to establish civilian control, an objective one, was further complicated by the quarrel between the KMT and DPP. The rivalry grew stronger with DPP's failure to gain majority in the Legislative Yuan. This failure prevented Chen's government from fully implementing their desired policies in military and defense affairs and any security related issue such as Mainland policy. The KMT and its coalition partner –pan-blue camp– consistently blocked policies taken by the DPP administration to prevent the pan-green from gaining political victory. During the next eight years of Chen Shui-bian presidency Taiwan suffered from persistent political quarrels.

How did Chen's government deal with these quarrels in their attempt to establish civilian control in Taiwan? What type of control would be the result? Those are the questions I would like to address in this thesis. In particular, this thesis will

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[14] York W. Chen, *Fragile Partnership: Taiwan's Pol-Mil Relations, 2000-2008* paper presented at the Henry L. Stimson Center on 25 September 2009.

also seek the answer of how the threat environment surrounding Taiwan security influencing the type of civilian control.

1.2. Methodology

This research will be conducted through both quantitative and qualitative approaches. I will rely mostly on secondary data and analyses from existing academic literatures and primary data from the Ministry of Defense Affairs, Legislative Yuan, Presidential office, and other related agencies' publications. In addition, I will also use in-depth interviews with academics and person in-charge of military and defense affairs during the period under study to support my argument.

1.3. Literature Review and Limitations

Most literature on civil-military relations in Taiwan place civilian control in the context of transition to democracy. They, according to Fravel, treat civilian control or civilian supremacy as a dependent variable of the democratization process instead of the interdependent variable that explains the success of democratization process.[15] Civilian control is considered as the final result of transition to democracy or as one of the goals of the transformation from authoritarian to democratic society. Meanwhile, in historical approach, those studies are usually divided into two major periods, i.e. period under martial law and period following the lifting of the martial law. The lifting of martial law is commonly used as the starting point of transition to democratic civilian control in Taiwan. As a result, most assessments on the issue of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era are analyzing the issue in the framework of democratization process.

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[15] Fravel, "Toward Civilian Supremacy," p. 58.

Yisuo Tzeng frames the issue of the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan in the context of nationalization of the military.[16] He sees a neutral military, the one that does not involved in practical politics, as an important feature of civilian control. The nationalization of the military (or *guojiahua*; 國家化) requires the de-politicization of the military and it has four indicators, i.e. decreasing activities and the withdrawal of the KMT party connections in the security sectors, the implementation of rule of law and the cultivation of apolitical, democratic professional norms work through the legislation and enforcement of regulations that stipulates security officers' political roles and activities, whether or not the personnel promotion strategy adopted by civilian leaders is a political choice regardless of professional concern, and the way the security sector copes with political controversies. The success or failure of that process, according to Tzeng, is determined by three factors: threat environment, democratization outcomes, and party-military legacy.

A particularly interesting and relevant point with this thesis is Tzeng's assessment on the existence of China threat which he concludes as having a small impact on civilian control. During Chen Shui-bian presidency (Tzeng's research stops at 2007 instead of 2008), Tzeng concludes that "civil-military relations continue to exhibit the general trends toward civilian control and apolitical professionalism, however, the control pattern has gone a bit awry off the path towards the objective control and turned to an uncertain direction."[17] Three factors are responsible for this uncertainty of direction: i.e. the absence of political will, military's culture that remains reluctant to follow the reform protocols and resistant to accept civilian

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[16] Yisuo Tzeng, *Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan, 1986-2007,* unpublished dissertation at George Washington University, 2009.

[17] Ibid, p. 197.

control, and the politicization of defense issues by civilian politicians. [18] This conclusion suggests that the existence of civilian control is actually more as a function of democratization devices and party-military legacy rather than threat environment. Specifically, the direction of civilian control over the military in Taiwan is defined by politicization and de-politicization of defense/security issues by civilian politicians.

Tzeng also argues that the lack of correlation between threat environment and civilian control is due to the lack of leadership, the ideological incongruence between civilians and the military, and the incoherence within the civilian camps. Moreover, he notices that the incoherence within the civilian camps appears over how to approach or to deal with the threat instead of over the identification of threat itself. In conclusion, Tzeng argues that the subjective type of control during Chen Shui-bian era is a result of the overt-securitization conducted by Chen's government in order to bypass this difference in threat identification.

Another research on civilian control during Chen Shui-bian era that places emphasis on the democratization process is the work of York Chen. Chen writes that to understand civil-military relations in Taiwan one must take into consideration the democratization process in Taiwan which influences the search for balance in the relationships between the military and civilian.[19] In addition, he also notices the role of "the absence or evaporation of cultural, institutional, or leadership leverage."[20]

Similar with Tzeng's conclusion, Chen suggests that Chen Shui-bian tended to adopt subjective control. However, unlike Tzeng, Chen argues that the politicization of the military was an unintended result of tension between DPP and KMT. Chen sees the attempt to establish an objective control at that time as hardly possible due to the

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[18] Ibid, pp. 197-198.

[19] Chen, *Fragile Partnership*.

[20] Ibid, p. 1.

high tension in domestic politics. This tension took place in many occasions in which Chen analyze five major cases, i.e. the initiation of doctrinal change, the implementation of arms procurement package (both occurred during the first term of Chen's presidency), the removal of two Chiangs' symbolic legacy, the institutionalization of annual Yu-Shan exercises, and the establishment of Taiwan-goal Company (the last three cases took place during the second term).

In conclusion, Chen makes four conclusions regarding the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. First, Chen Shui-bian's attempts to establish an objective control were not possible due to the KMT-military connection which remains strong. Instead, he made efforts to build a constructive engagement of defense policy and took a pragmatic standing on defense reform as strategy to win support from the military and to break KMT-party connection. Second, the failure to gain majority in the parliament has caused Chen's government an inherent weakness in his efforts to create objective control. This problem prevented Chen from adopting an objective type of control. Third, Chen's failure to insert a civilian defense minister also contributes to his failure to establish an objective control. Fourth, Chen managed to create an institutional design of the MND that is favorable to the establishment of an objective type of control.

David Kuehn suggests that democratization in Taiwan brought a smooth transition to the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan.[21] He gives credit to civilian leaders' ability to foster the establishment of civilian control despite of the existing political contestations. The democratization process in Taiwan is the main reason for the absence of military intervention in politics. The existence of strong civilian political institutions is limiting military ability and chance to enter the core of

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[21] David Kuehn, "Democratization and the Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan," in *Democratization* 15: 5 (December 2008), pp. 870-890.

political arena. Using Croissant's framework on military exogenous and endogenous factors of military obedience, Kuehn finds the following result.

Table 1.2. Context factors and their influence on civilian control strategies Source: Kuehn, "Democratization and Civilian Control of the Military in Taiwan," p. 883			
	Factor	**Value**	**Influence on Control Strategies**
Initial Conditions	Authoritarian regime type Mode of transition	Civilian-dominated one-party regime Transition "from above"	Civilians direct course, speed, and scope of democratization; military not able to decide over its autonomies
Military endogenous factors	Corporate ideology	Increasing democratic professionalization of the officers corps	Promotes the principles of political neutrality and civilian supremacy
	Institutional cohesion	Sub-ethnic cleavage and inter-services rivalries	Weakens the military's ability to act as an unitary power group; enables divide and conquer" strategies
	Economic resources	Decreasing economic activity of the military	Reduces material independence and increases civilian leverage over the military
Military exogenous factors	Support for civilian regime	High support rates for democratic regime, good economic performance, no civic preferences for military regime	Stabilizes civilian elite position and discourages stronger political role of the military
	Civilian elites	Civilian consensus, but lack of civilian defense expertise and political capital	Conductive for demilitarization of politics, but hampers stronger civilian role in external defense
	Civil society	Active but peaceful civil societal mobilization	Provides public scrutiny and pressure to support official civilian control instruments
	Security environment	Existential external threat, no internal threats	Mitigates political conflicts, directs military attention toward external mission
	International influence	Dependence on military support from the US	Support civilian efforts to change defense strategy

One important note from Kuehn's work is his assessment that Taiwanese leaders used appeasement in the form of promotion preferences which proved to be an important blocking factor of the establishment of democratic or objective civilian control.

Another research by Wei-chin Lee also focuses on the issue of transforming Taiwan's military from one with strong inclination to the KMT to one with non-

partisan character.[22] He asks the question of military loyalty to the new administration which previously was their rival. Lee assessment focuses on DPP-military hatred and how the DPP government built their policies to promote democratic civilian control. His finding suggests that several policies such as "promotion and advancement based on candidate's ideological inclination as practiced by Taiwan's political leaders since 2000 will not advance civilian control of the military."[23] Lee criticizes Chen's policies which he considered as failed to enhance military professionalism and de-politicization of the military.

Such a literature review indicates that in analyzing the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan, most scholars put emphasis on identity politics as the most influential independent variables. Apart from identity politics, some also give emphasis on the role of the US in shaping Taiwan security policy making, and including in it is the establishment of civilian control. This thesis limits the analysis on the external threat perception factor in shaping the civilian control in Taiwan. This does not mean that the external factor is the only factor or the most influential factor in shaping civilian control. The conclusion of this research will add another possible explanation on the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan (see the following figure).

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[22] Wei-chin Lee, "The Greening of the Brass: Taiwan's Civil-Military Relations since 2000" in *Asian Security* 3: 3 (2007), pp. 204-227.

[23] Ibid, p. 221.

Figure 1.2. The explanations of the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era

1.4. Thesis Outline

This thesis will be organized as follow:

1. Introduction

    1.1. Background

    1.2. Methodology

    1.3. Literature Review and Limitations

    1.4. Thesis Outline

2. Theoretical Framework

    2.1. The Definition of Civilian Control

    2.2. Threat and Civilian Control

    2.3. Conclusion: Proposed Framework

3. The Typology of Civilian Control

    3.1. Framework

    3.2. Assessment

        3.2.1. Military Autonomy

        3.2.2. Intra-Civilian Rivalry

        3.2.3. Interpenetration

Chapter 2

Theoretical Framework

The goal of this chapter is to build a proposed-framework to explain the type of control and its relations with the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups. This thesis argues that the type of control is actually defined by the congruency of external threat perception among civilians.

This chapter will be divided into four parts. The first part provides the review of general theory on civilian control. It focuses on the definition of civilian control, how to measure civilian control, and the typology of civilian control. The second part explains the external threat as factor that explains civilian control. A debate between Harold Lasswell and Michael Desch over the impact of external security environment to the degree of control will be presented as focal point to develop the framework. This thesis argues that it is the perception of external threat rather than the degree of threat that has more effect on the type of control. The third part presents a review on the existing literatures on civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. Finally, a proposed-framework and hypothesis will be the conclusion of this chapter. The hypothesis of this thesis is that **"*a convergent China threat perception among civilian groups tends to establish an objective type of civilian control.*"**

Two notes are needed to clarify the intention of this thesis. First, this thesis does not argue that the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups is the only factor that explains the type of civilian control. Second, it does not suggest that the congruency of external threat perception among civilian groups is the most determining factor to the type of civilian control since such conclusion can only

be drawn after making a comparative assessment with the other explaining factors such as domestic politics or external pressure.

2.1. The Definition of Civilian Control

What is civilian control referring to? Muthiah Alagappa defines civilian control as "government's control of the military" and the criterion of civilian control is "the extent to which the armed forces as a whole respond to the direction of the civilian leaders of government."[24] Meanwhile, Harold Trinkunas defines civilian control as "military compliance with government authority."[25] But, who should be defined as "civilian leaders"? And what does the term "extent" refer to?

Cottey, Edmunds, and Forster argue that studies on civilian control usually refer to "control of the military by the civilian political executive."[26] It implies that in most cases control over the military does not also include oversight by legislative branch and civil society. On the question of the extent of control, an argument that civilian leaders should deal with the making of security policy and leaving the technical details of the implementation to the military is more accepted than civilian leaders should responsible to both policy making and implementation.

To define the extent of control, Trinkunas divides sphere of control into four areas ranging from external defense, internal security, domestic politics, and state leadership. Civilian control presupposes civilian domination in domestic politics and state leadership. Civilian control will be considered as strong if civilian dominates

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[24] Muthiah Alagappa, ed., *Military Professionalism in Asia: Conceptual and Empirical Perspective*, Honolulu: East-West Center, 2001, p. 5.

[25] Harold A. Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies: Argentina and Venezuela" in *Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs* 42:3 (Autumn 2000), p. 79.

[26] Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds, and Anthony Forster, "The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil-Military Relations" *Armed Forces and Society* 29: 1 (Fall 2002), p. 35.

most areas of policymaking and shares authority with the military over some aspects of external defense policy. Meanwhile, weak civilian control refers to military domination over external defense policymaking and shared-authority between military and civilian over internal security policy.[27] The following figure shows Trinkunas's idea.

Figure 2.1. Weak and strong institutionalized civilian control
Source: Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies," p. 85

Another way to measure the extent, or the degree, of civilian control is by looking at whose preferences prevails the most. Michael Desch writes that "the level of civilian control can be determined by whether or not civilians prevail in disagreement with the military."[28] Civilian control is strong when civilian preferences prevail most of the time and civilian control is weak when military preferences prevails most of the time (see the following Figure).

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[27] Trinkunas, "Crafting Civilian Control in Emerging Democracies," pp. 77-109.

[28] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 5.

Figure 2.2. The level of civilian control
Source: Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 6

Worst	**Mixed**	**Best**
Military preferences prevail		Civilian preferences prevail

Meanwhile, Samuel Huntington differentiates civilian control into two categories: objective and subjective civilian control.[29] Huntington argues that civilian control is possible only when the power of military group is reduced. He tends to see civilian control in term of maximizing civilian power, which he termed as subjective control, or maximizing military professionalism, which he termed as objective control. Furthermore, Huntington's differentiation lies in three aspects. First, subjective control is featuring with intra-civilian rivalry while objective control presupposes a balance of role between civilian and military. Second, as a result of intra civilian rivalry, subjective control presupposes military involvement in politics. This rivalry tends to drag the military to be involved in politics. Meanwhile, objective control terminates military involvement in politics. And finally, subjective control is characterized by the civilianizing of military while objective control is characterized by the militarizing of military. Other word, in subjective control there is an expanding role of the military while in objective control there is a more focused role of the military to defend the state. In addition, David Goldsworthy suggests that in subjective control "there is a permeation of the military by civilian values or a convergence of interest" while the essence of objective control is the recognition of an autonomous military sphere.[30]

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[29] Huntington, *The Soldier and The State*, p. 80.

[30] David Goldsworthy, "Civilian Control of the Military in Black Africa" in *African Affairs* 80: 318 (January 1981), pp. 53-54.

Another way to differentiate subjective from objective civilian control is by looking at the indicators of military professionalism. In relating civilian control and military professionalism, Alaggapa finds out as the following.[31]

Table 2.1. Relating civilian control based and military professionalism		
Source: Alagappa, *Military Professionalism in Asia*, p. 7.		
Professionalism characteristic	**Objective civilian control**	**Subjective civilian control**
Expertise	Highly specialized management of violence skill; military role sharply differentiated from other social and political roles	Military role is no sharply differentiate from other groups; military and political role indistinguishable
Social responsibility	Military's client is the state and society; its responsibility is to defend them from external aggression; it is a tool of state policy	Military's allegiance is to a specific form of government, social class, or ethnic group; its responsibility is to defend privileged position and rights of that government or group against other groups in society; as participant and tool in power struggle among different civilian groups, military has an internal focus
Corporateness	Sharp line between military and society; politically and socially isolated from society, military is a distinct group with its own value system and organization	No clear divide between military and society; military is not a distinct group set apart from society; it reflects dominant values and divisions in society

In conclusion, the differentiation between subjective and objective control lies in three aspects, i.e. the establishment of clear boundaries of role between civilian and the military, the existence of intra-civilian rivalry, and the existence of interpenetration. My framework to analyze the type of control will be based on these three indicators.[32]

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[31] Alagappa, *Military Professionalism in Asia*, p. 7. Alagappa's indicators of military professionalism are following Huntington's ideals. She differentiates Huntington's ideals of military professionalism which she termed as old professionalism from Stepan's definition of military professionalism which she termed as new professionalism. For detail of Stepan's new professionalism see Alfred Stepan, "The New professionalism of Internal Warfare and Military Role Extension" in Alfred Stepan, ed., *Authoritarian Brazil: Origins, Policies, and Future*, New Haven: Yale University Press, 1973.

[32] Further explanation will be given in the first part of Chapter 2.

2.2. Threat and Civilian Control

Another puzzle with regard to the study of civilian control is concerning with the factors that contribute to civilian control. Desch argues that an important explaining factor to the degree of civilian control over the military is the existence of threat.[33] He differentiates threat according to the intensity and the source of threat and concludes the following pattern.

Figure 2.3. Civilian control of the military as a function of threats
Source: Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*, p. 14

		External threats	
		High	Low
Internal threats	High	**Poor (Q3)**	**Worst (Q4)**
	Low	**Good (Q1)**	**Mixed (Q2)**

In quadrant 1 (Q1), state facing high external threats and low internal threats supposedly has the most stable civil-military relations. A demanding international or regional insecurity environment is more likely to bring to power a civilian experienced leadership with extensive knowledge in security affairs. The military focus will be outward due to the high level of external threats that further contributes to their expertise and skill. It will force the military to stay away from politics and the civilians are more likely to rely on sort of Huntington's objective control by trusting military to fight wars. Both civilian and military will be unified since they have to place national survival as first priority.

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[33] Desch, *Civilian Control of the Military*. I do not intend to explain another explaining variable of civilian control. To get a preliminary understanding on factors that influencing civilian control see Peter D. Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations" in *Annual Review of Political Science*, 2 (1999), especially pp. 222-224.

In the case of both high external and internal threats (Q3), a challenging security situation may bring an experienced civilian leader(s) but lead civilian leader(s) to adopt subjective control due to the existence of high internal threat and use the military in preserving his own needs and interests. High level of internal threat also contributes to the split in both civilian and military. In some cases, a coalition of civilian-military faction in order to preserve power can take place. The similar result can be applied for the low internal and external threats on which an unclear focus of security priority will give place to the split of both civilian and military that may resulted in a coalition of civilian-military factions in the struggle of power. A contrary opposite result from that of Q1 can occur in the case of low external threat and high internal threat. In this case, military will be inward oriented and tend to be used by civilian leader(s) to crack down their political opponents. Military's client is not state but certain groups that rule the country.

An opposite assessment from Desch's logic is given by Harold Lasswell. Lasswell argues that in a challenging international threat environment it will be difficult for civilian authority to control the military than in a relatively benign one. In such circumstances, state will be dominated by military officers who possess the management, technical operations, and public relations skills. An unfriendly international security environment will force the military to acquire those skills necessary for securing the survival of the state. Under such circumstances, the military can easily use the high degree of threat to manipulate population in order to gather public support and stay in power.[34]

In addition, military obedience toward civilian leadership, according to Aurel Croissant, is determined by combination of endogenous (push) and extraneous (pull)

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[34] Harold Lasswell, "The Garrison State" in *The American Journal of Sociology* 46:4 (January 1941), pp. 455-468.

factors.[35] Two important extraneous factors of the military restraint are internal and external security –and the other two are economic development and configuration of civil actors. Meanwhile, the endogenous factor includes ideological coherence, organizational cohesion, economic interests, and the availability of resources. In the case of Taiwan, Fiona Yap finds out that the impact of external and domestic threats to military's restraint is somehow weak.[36] She contends that in the case of Taiwan three contributing factors to military restraint are poor economic condition, domestic unrest, and a divided legislature.

2.3. Conclusion: Proposed Framework

Drawing from the abovementioned explanation, this thesis argues that civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian could be explained by looking at the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups. The following is the proposed framework to analyze civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. A clear note must be made not to confuse reader that the independent variable of the type of civilian control is not only the perception of external threat, which this thesis will be dealt with.[37]

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[35] Aurel Croissant, "Riding the Tiger: Civilian Control and the Military in Democratizing Korea" in *Armed Forces and Society* 30:3 (Spring 2004), pp. 357-381.

[36] O. Fiona Yap, *Military Restraint in South Korea and Taiwan: Evidence and Lessons*, paper presented at the Annual Midwest Political Science Association Conference, April 15-18 2004 at the Chicago Palmer House. David Kuehn assesses the case of Taiwan using Croissant's framework. The result will be included in the next part.

[37] Please bear in mind the limitations of this research as already stated earlier in Chapter 1.

Figure 2.4. Proposed framework to analyze the type of civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era

Independent variable
The congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups

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Dependent variable
The type of civilian control

The term congruency refers to the divergent or convergent perception of China threat among civilian groups. This will include two components. The first is the identification of threat and the second is the strategy to cope with those threats. The identification of threat is referring to two items. The first is the actual threat that came from China while the later is the perceived China threat which basically deals with China's intention to use its actual threat. Meanwhile, the second item focuses on whether or not civilian groups in Taiwan believe that China will use its force to occupy Taiwan.

Table 2.2. Independent variable: the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups	
Indicators	**Category**

Identification of threat
    The actual threat from China
    China's intention to use force
	Convergent or divergent

The strategy to cope with the threat	Convergent or divergent

Meanwhile, the dependent variable of this thesis, the type of control, as already suggested in the first part of this section, will follow Huntington's division of subjective and objective control. The indicators of the type of control in this thesis are including the military autonomy or the existence of clear boundaries between civilian and military domain, the nature of intra-civilians relationship or more precisely the existence of intra-civilian rivalry, and existence of interpenetration.

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Table 2.3. Dependent variable: the type of control		
Indicators	**Category**	
	Objective control	**Subjective control**
Military autonomy	Clear	Unclear
The existence of intra-civilian rivalry	Not exist	Exist
Interpenetration	Not exist	Exist

The thesis only produces one hypothesis as follow. ***A convergent perception of China threat within civilian tends to create objective civilian control.*** A more detail explanation of each variable will be made in the following two chapters.

Chapter 3

The Typology of Civilian Control

Analyzing the civilian control is one of challenging task. The major question is on the issue of how to measure the degree of civilian control. If we follow Desch's idea to measure the degree of control by looking at whose preferences are more prevailing if there is disagreement between civilian authorities and the military the problem then is does the military dare to publicly voicing different opinion from that of civilian authorities?[38] To overcome this difficulty, most scholars that deal with the issue of measuring the degree of civilian control will have to rely on personal accounts. In the face of such challenge, in this thesis, instead of measuring the degree of control I prefer to identify the type of control by following Huntington's division of civilian control.

This chapter will analyze the type of control adopted by Chen's government. It starts with developing a framework on the typology of civilian control. Three indicators will be used in the analysis, which are: military autonomy, the intra-civilian rivalry, and interpenetration. I am assuming the military as solid entity due to the existence of a solid and strict line of command and therefore do not consider intra-services rivalry as equally important to intra-civilian rivalry. The analysis on those three indicators will be the focus of the second part. The final part of this chapter is the conclusion.

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[38] An interview with an academic from Tamkang University. This question is off course not the case of the praetorian type of governances.

3.1. Framework

Huntington's division of subjective and objective control is closely related to military's political involvement in politics. In simple definition, subjective control is related to an overt involvement by the military in area other than their designated area while objective control related to military neutrality in politics in which the military's political role is limited to their designated area.

This division assumes sharp distinction between the military area and civilian area. There must be clear boundaries that divide the military from the society. The existence of these boundaries will define which type of control will prevail. Furthermore, the existence of boundaries must also be accompanied with the cohesiveness of both the military and civilian. Since the military is required to have strict line of command and spirit of togetherness –esprit de corps– one can easily assumes that the military would have such cohesiveness. This is not the case with the civilian. In the case where civilian is solid, military involvement in area other than their designated area will be less possible. On the contrary, if civilian is segregated into rival groups the military might easily be dragged to area other than their designated area. Military penetration to area other than their designated area is not the only factor that can determine the type of control. Civilian penetration to military designated area could also determine the type of control.

Huntington's work on the type of control gives weight on the concept of military professionalism. His understanding of professionalism is closely related to the idea of military neutrality in politics. It is noteworthy that this neutrality means military should play role only in their designated area as explained above. Huntington's attempt to link military professionalism with the absence of military political role is severely under attacks.

Samuel Finch is among those who refuse the idea to define military professionalism in term of military neutrality in politics. He argues that "higher levels of military professionalization have historically resulted in more institutionalized military intervention of politics and high levels of military autonomy." [39] His conclusion implies that military will always play role in politics no matter how the civil-military relations look like.

Finch then divides the pattern of civil-military relations in the following types: democratic control, conditional subordination, military tutelage, and military control (see Figure 3.1.). [40] The difference between those patterns lies in the degree of military role in politics.

In a consolidated democratic control, the military is fully subordinate to civilian authorities. [41] Civilian authorities are responsible to determine the budget and defense policy with the appropriate consultation and advice from the military. Civilian authorities are also responsible to supervise military education and professional socialization. If necessary, civilian authorities can make take steps to establish military reforms in order to ensure democratic control. Those are the boundaries of military area from civilian area. On conditional subordination, Finch writes that "the military reserves its right to intervene to protect national interest" but remain abstain from politics under normal condition. [42] Meanwhile, in military tutelage, the military participate in policy making and exercise oversight over civilian authorities –the later would not be the case of civilian control.

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[39] J. Samuel Finch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, Baltimore and London: The John Hopkins University Press, 1998, p. 3.

[40] Ibid, pp. 38-43.

[41] Ibid, p. 41.

[42] Ibid, p.40.

Figure 3.1. Patterns of Civil-Military Relations
Source: Finch, *The Armed Forces and Democracy in Latin America*, p.39.

Democratic control

Civilian	$\xrightarrow{\hspace{4cm}}$	Military

Policy control

Conditional subordination
Indirect influence in limited scope

Civilian	$\xleftrightarrow{\hspace{4cm}}$	Military

Limited policy control

Military tutelage
Direct and indirect influence

Civilian	$\xleftrightarrow{\hspace{4cm}}$	Military

Low policy control

Military control
Political control

Civilian	$\xleftarrow{\hspace{4cm}}$	Military

The extent of military role in politics, according to Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith is depending on four components, i.e. the extent of political participation, political strength of the military, strength of civilian institutions, and military-institutional boundaries.[43] The latter component, according to Welch, Jr. and Smith, is the most important component to define civilian control. If the boundaries are integral –meaning that "the military role and structure are sharply differentiated from the other organizations in making up the total system"[44]– the pattern of civilian control will be objective. Meanwhile, if the boundaries are fragmented the pattern of civilian control will be subjective.

In the case where civic polity has integral institutional boundaries, "the degree of interpenetration between the military and civilian authority structures is low."[45] This is possible when the military has had a good degree of autonomy so that the

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[43] Claude E. Welch, Jr. and Arthur K. Smith, *Military Role and Rule*, North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1974, pp. 34-77.

[44] Ibid, p. 40.

[45] Ibid, p. 44.

civilian authorities cannot interfere in. This autonomy is given over "the management of the formally organized resources of coercion."[46] To further ensure objective control, the existence of legitimate civilian political institutions that govern effectively is required. These legitimate and effective political institutions would prevent the military from entering the civilian area. In the fragmented boundaries condition, the military is most likely to lose their autonomy. This could take place if civilian authorities are under serious pressures from another civilian group or groups drag the military into area that is not their designated area to gain power.

Working exclusively on the case of Taiwan, Fravel defines political neutrality of the military as "the absence of military participation in spheres of politics outside the limited domain of defense policy."[47] He even goes further to identify six indicators of military political neutrality as loyalty to the constitution, involvement in domestic politics, selection of government officials, domestic policy implementation, clear and defined external security mission, and party involvement.[48]

Drawing from the abovementioned explanation and the theoretical framework available in Chapter 2, I will use the following questions to analyze the type of civilian control in Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian era.

1. Are there integral institutional boundaries that enabled the military to be autonomous?

2. Does the rivalry among civilian groups that potentially drag the military to enter political arena exist?

3. Does the penetration by the military into civilian area or by the civilian into military area exist?

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[46] Ibid.

[47] Ibid, p. 63.

[48] Fravel, "Toward Civilian Supremacy," pp. 63-68.

If we put those questions in table, it will look like the following Table.

Table 3.1. Framework to analyze the type of civilian control			
Integral institutional boundaries that clearly segregated the military from the society (military's autonomy)	Rivalry within civilian camps	Military or civilian penetration into area other than their designated area	Result (objective/subjective control)
Exist	Exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	
	Does not exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	
Does not exist	Exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	
	Does not exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	

Note:

	Subjective control
	Objective control

3.2. Assessment

My assessment in the following part will be based on the framework that has previously been developed. It starts with the issue of the existence of integral boundaries that set up military autonomy followed by the assessment on rivalry within civilian camps that open the possibility of military involvement and ended with the question of whether the military or civilian are conducting any penetration to the area that is not theirs.

A clarification of the area is required before I start my analysis. This civilian area is referring to all area other than defense policy and certain part of defense policy. In the defense policy area, both the military and civilian do not have full autonomy and must share responsibilities and rights. The military role is limited to build the technical decision and to give advice as required by civilian authorities –some would say requested by civilian authorities. Other words, the civilian authorities are required to hold consultations with the military in the defense policy making for three reasons: due to the military possession an expertise in defense affairs, to protect military

interests and resources, and to prevent any misuse of the military by civilian authorities.

3.2.1. Military Autonomy

Previous literatures suggest that the area where military could play role in politics is limited to certain area of defense policy. Civilian authorities still hold right to make defense policy but they must do so in close consultations with the military. The military role is limited to that of providing advice to civilian authority and making the technical detail to follow up and implement the policy that has been made by civilian authorities. The term close consultations are referring to a more bottom-up process rather than top-down process. This implies that civilian authorities shall take into serious consideration any of military's proposal. This step is important to ensure that civilian will not make decision based on their political needs and interests or open the possibility of military involvement in politics due to grievances.

The existence or non-existence of military autonomy will define which type of civilian control. If the military has their autonomy, there is a greater possibility for the establishment of an objective control and, on the contrary, the absence of military autonomy tends to create a subjective control.

In the case of Taiwan, the military-society segregation started to receive greater attention after the lifting of the martial law. It went in parallel with the introduction of democracy in Taiwan.[49] During the period under martial law, the military possessed an excessive role in domestic politics. They were not only dealing with external defense affairs but also involving in preserving domestic stability. The

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[49] Yang, *Military Politics in the Transition to Democracy*, p. 271.

military worked as party's tool to establish control over the society. The separation between the military and society simply did not exist.[50]

The introduction and development of democracy change the whole landscape of military role in politics. The military role in politics changed from a sort of *Nation Builder* in Edmunds, Forster and Cottey's term into *National Security*.[51] Taiwan military started to focus on external defense and leaving rather than national security as a whole. Previously, the military's main task was to protect the state from external threat and internal vulnerability. The later referred to communist infiltration and Taiwan independence movement. The introduction of integral boundaries culminated with the lifting of the martial law. Military's responsibility for domestic security were taken over by police authorities and other related governmental organs.

The termination of the Expediency Act in 1991, the disbandment of the Garrison Command and other repressive apparatus that previously were very dominant in maintaining domestic security during Lee Teng-hui era were some of the efforts to clearly define the boundaries between the military and non-military organizations. During Lee Teng-hui era, the separation between the military and

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[50] Monte R. Bullard clearly describes the military role as the agent of political socialization in his work. His work defines the non-existence of military-society separation. However, he tends to argue that this absence of separation does not necessarily mean that there is a lack of civilian control. In fact, this overt political role of the military was one of the most important reasons behind the development of Taiwan economy. See Monte R. Bullard, *The Soldier and the Citizen: The Role of the Military in Taiwan's Development*, New York and London: M.E. Sharpe, 1997.

[51] Edmunds, Forster, and Cottey distinguishes military role within society into five categories, i.e. National Security, Nation Builder, Regime Defence, Domestic Military Assistance, and Military Diplomacy. The National Security role means that the military role is limited to defend the society from external threat that might threaten the security of the society. Meanwhile, the Nation Builder role means that the military is a key agent of nation-building. For detail see Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster and Andrew Cottey, "Armed Forces and Society: a Framework for Analysis" in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds and Andrew Cottey, Eds., *Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe*, Hampshire and New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2003, pp. 1-22.

society started to grow. The heated debate over two national defense laws was actually an attempt to reach consensus among related-parties on the extent the military role in politics.

The introduction of the two laws which took place during Chen Shui-bian era normatively set the organizational boundaries between the military and civilian. The boundaries were clearly defined in which the military was positioned under full civilian control. The military was not only subject to executive control –by the Minister of Defense– but also subject to legislative oversight from Legislative Yuan. Taiwan has been able to create a normative framework for civilian control.

In conclusion, the military did have their autonomy with the enactment of two national defense laws during Chen Shui-bian tenure. However, this autonomy was without flaws. An example of these problems concerned with the MND power, according to the National Defense Law and the Ministry of National Defense Organization Law, to make important personnel decision which previously held by the CGS.[52]

The decision to concentrate power on the hand of civilian authorities could have two consequences. First, this strategy could lead to military intervention. Concentrating power on the hand of civilian, including those often regarded as "military decision" such as personnel policy could threaten military interests and values. As Croissant has argued, the safety of military interests and resources are among two endogenous factors that might provoke military intervention.[53] If this is the case, the goal of de-politicization of the military will fail. Second, if such decision is taken place in a segregated civilian camp, the application of subjective control would be more likely to happen. The civilian authorities could misuse the personnel

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[52] Chase, "Defense Reform in Taiwan," p. 368.

[53] Croissant, "Riding the Tiger", pp. 362-363.

policy as tool to attract support from the military men to win political contest against their rival. In Taiwan case, the personnel policy could be considered as civilian penetration to military area.[54]

The existence of integrated boundaries will also lead to military's repositioning to be above politics. Meaning, the military will place their loyalty to the state and will not follow any party's ideology. This is also an important feature in the establishment of objective control.

In the case of Taiwan, military loyalty to the constitution is one particularly important issue in the establishment of civilian control due to the long history of party (KMT)-military connection. The statement of loyalty to the constitution in Taiwan is often regarded as an assurance for military neutrality in politics. Fravel notes that in the wake of the 2000 presidential election, the then chief of general staff (CGS) Tang Yao-ming pledged "to the would-be commander-in-chief that the armed forces will be loyal and defend the national security of the Republic of China."[55] The similar statement of loyalty was also vowed by General Tang after the election. In addition, General Tang has also ordered the top brass of the military to gather at Mt. Yangmin to relieve suspicions about the DPP's pro independence activity.[56] It indicates the establishment of integral boundaries to ensure military autonomy.

To conclude with, Taiwan military during Chen Shui-bian era did have their autonomy. However, the military area was quite limited. In a way, this indicated the strong civilian political institutions and the weak political power of the military. Whether or not Taiwan would enjoy objective control is depending on the other two indicators.

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[54] The analysis of the personnel policy case will be given on the Interpenetration part.

[55] Fravel, "Toward Civilian Supremacy," p. 66.

[56] Tzeng, *Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan,* pp. 152-153.

3.2.2. Intra-civilian rivalry

Following the legislative election in 2001, Taiwan political scene was divided into two major camps: the pan-blue and the pan-green. There were four major parties in Taiwan politics following the 2001 election (and kept the same following the 2004 election). Those are DPP (87/89 seats), KMT (67/79 seats), the People First Party (PFP – 45/32 seats), and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU – 13/12 seats).[57] The pan-blue camp consisted of KMT and PFP and DPP and TSU formed the pan-green. The two camps' core difference is over the issue of national identity and Taiwan's China policy. There is a simplified tendency when one discusses Taiwan politics to identify pan-blue as pro-unification and pan-green as pro-independence or pan-blue as Chinese and pan-blue as Taiwanese. These identifications are neither fully flaw nor correct.

Chiung-chu Lin writes that two issues are particularly important in understanding Taiwan political polarization and Taiwan political parties' vote-gathering strategy.[58] Those issues are the unification vs. independence issue and political stability vs. political reform. Civilian camp in Taiwan is divided over these two issues in which pan-blue tends to prefer unification over independence and the pan-green is on the opposite. Meanwhile, on the issue of political stability and

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[57] The first number indicates each party's seats after 2001 election while the second indicate those of 2004 election. The data is taken from Chia-lung Lin and I-chuang Lai, "Taiwan's Party Reallignments in Transition" in Hsin-huang Michael Hsiao, Ed., *Asian New Democracies: The Philippines, South Korea, and Taiwan Compared*, Taipei: Taiwan Foundation for Democracy, 2006, p. 257, 264, and 266.

[58] Chiung-chu Lin, "The Role of Issue in Taiwan's Politics, 1996-2004" in *Issues and Studies* 44: 1 (March 2008), pp. 71-104. Lin also covers other two issues which are economic development versus environmental protection and expansion versus contraction of social welfare program. Those two issues play a more limited role in comparison with the other two mentioned here.

political reform, the mapping is a little bit different. Lin argues that it is only KMT that can be regarded as supporter of stability while the other three major parties advocate reform.[59] The role of the later issue –political stability versus political reform– is somehow limited in comparison with the former –unification versus independence. That is why Taiwan political landscape is identified as two confronting blocs that divided over the identity line.

The opposite camps in Taiwan politics define the other as rival in almost all issues, including on security affairs. The rivalry between pan-blue and pan-green appears in policy making of any affairs, including defense affairs. The problem with Taiwan defense policy making lies more on intra-Taiwan relations instead of Taiwan extra-relations.[60]

Taiwan experience represents case of attempts to establish civilian control in a society with deep cleavage over national identity. The establishment of civilian control is taking place in a society which has not yet done with its nation building process. In such case, the possibility that threat perception will be defined by an internal interest rather than external is high. This is exactly the case in Taiwan.

The issue of identity always appears in all subjects as a tool to garner voters. The differentiation between us and them is apparent. Identity issue is considered as the highest priority that debates over any issue is regarded as second priority. Tzeng

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[59] Ibid, p. 83.

[60] The problem also occurs in the other sector of society life. In the area of foreign policy, Eugene Hung-chang Kuan also makes a similar conclusion. His work on Taiwan's UN policy indicates that the most influencing factors that drive Taiwan's UN policy is not diplomatic needs or national interests but domestic politics. See Eugene Hung-chang Kuan, "Domestic Politics of Foreign Policy: Explaining the Formulation of Taiwan's 'Participate in the U.N.' Policy" in *Issues and Studies* 42: 1 (March 2006), pp. 137-162.

shares similar conclusion when he writes that "the interlocking connections between national identity politics and national security is very likely to place strategic doctrine, arms procurements, military training, education, and diplomacy in deadlock caused by identity contestations in political and civil society."[61]

One example that shows the negative impact of rivalry over national identity to the establishment of objective civilian control is the debate over Taiwan arms procurement program. In April 2001, the Bush government offered to sell arms package to Taiwan that included 8 diesel-electric submarines, 12 P-3C Orion maritime patrol aircraft, an integrated undersea surveillance system, 4 decommissioned KIDD-class destroyers, and some other items. In late 2001, the second offer came that include tanks, helicopters and PAC-3 missile defense system (for detail see Table 3.3).[62] Those were items that Taiwan asked for.

The debate between pan-blue and pan-green soon took place following the US announcement. DPP government wanted to purchase the weaponry system while KMT and its associate in the pan-blue rejected the idea. Both camps argued over the utility of these weapons for enhancing Taiwan security. After several debates and adjustments over the list of weaponry systems to be purchased, in June 2004 Chen's government put forward a proposal for special defense budget. Michael Chase argues that the decision to use the special defense budget instead of place it in regular yearly budget plan was to avoid the debate over guns versus butter and due to the high cost that the government needed to pay to purchase these already adjusted weapon

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[61] Yisuo Tzeng, *What's in a Name? Identity Politics and Civil-Military Relations in Taiwan* paper prepared for MPSA 2006, April 20-23, 2006 in Chicago, Illinois, USA.

[62] Michael S. Chase, "Taiwan's Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget Proposal: Domestic Politics in Command" in *Asian Survey* 48: 4 (2008), pp. 703-724.

systems.[63] The DPP was known as a strong advocate of welfare system. Such debate over guns versus butter would harden their own position in politics.

Table 3.2. Arms package offered to Taiwan in 2001 Source: Chase, "Taiwan's Arms Procurement Debate and the Demise of the Special Budget Proposal," p. 706	
Item	**Quantity**
Diesel-electric submarines	8
P-3C maritime patrol aircraft	12
Mark-48 anti submarine warfare (ASW) torpedoes	54
Harpoon submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles	44
M109A6 Paladin self-propelled howitzers	144
AAV7A1 amphibious assault vehicles	54
An/ALE-50 towed decoys for F-16s	--
MH-53 minesweeping helicopters	12
KIDD-class destroyers	4
Integrated undersea surveillance system	--
M1A2 SEP Abrams battle tanks	--
AH-64D Apache or AH-17 Super Cobra attack helicopters	At least 3
SIGINT aircraft	4
PAC-3 missile defense systems	6 new fire units (and upgrade of Taiwan's 3 existing Patriot batteries)
Note: the last 4 items were those that offered later in 2001. For comparison see Shirley Kan, *Taiwan: Major US Arms Sales since 1990*, Washington DC.: Congressional Research Services, 2005.	

This decision to use special defense budget created an even more heated debate. Pan-blue objected to this proposal for at least five reasons, as indicated by Chase, which include: the political cost in term of cross-strait tension that might came as result of this procurement, the high-price of the weapons and at the same time Taiwan was not in a good economic condition, the operational utility of these weapons in term of their capability to create sort of balance in cross-strait military capability, the use of special budget mechanism which pan-blue considered as inappropriate way of cutting of the regulations, and the huge amount of spending would not bring benefits to Taiwanese economy or create jobs at home.[64] The bottom

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[63] Ibid, p. 703.

[64] Ibid, pp.710-712.

line of those arguments was actually due to political rivalry between the pan-blue and pan-green in which the pan-blue wanted to deny political victory to the pan-green.[65]

In conclusion, the rivalry within civilian camp during Chen Shui-bian era did exist. This rivalry was due to ethnic polarization which directly related to Taiwan's China policy. This rivalry was one of the obstacles for the implementation of objective control.

3.2.3. Interpenetration

The study of civil-military relations is usually more focus on the issue of military penetration rather than civilian penetration. Military intervention is considered as something that must not be done. Military intervention would endanger the attempt to establish civilian control. In fact, sometime, military intervention is regarded as the failure of the establishment of civilian control. However, small attention has been given to civilian penetration. On my opinion, civilian penetration should also be considered as an important obstacle to the establishment of civilian control. The term civilian control does not necessarily means civilian controlling the whole activities of the military. There must be a balance role and power between civilian and military.

Military penetration to civilian area in the case of Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian era did not exist. There were some cases where the military, or to be precise, group or officer within the military, disagree with civilian authorities over certain issue. However, these disagreements could not be considered as crossing the line that separating military and civilian roles. On the other hand, I find several cases that I

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[65] Ibid, p. 704. See also Mark A. Stokes, "Taiwan's Security: Beyond the Special Budget" in *AEI Outlook* 2 (2006), p. 1 and Justin Logan and Ted Galen Carpenter, "Taiwan's Defense Budget: How Taipei's Free Riding Risks War" in *Policy Analysis of CATO Institute* 600 (September 13, 2007), p. 4.

would indicate as civilian penetration to military area. One of them is related to personnel policy. Personnel policy, on my opinion, should be on professional basis apart from the top rank generals which should be handpicked by the President. The overt involvement of the civilian authorities in personnel policy could disrupt internal control of the military and hence jeopardize military professionalism.

According to a KMT legislative member, Chen's government used the personnel policy as political tool to create military loyalty to him and his government.[66] He notes that from 20 May 2000 to 20 May 2008 Chen Shui-bian promoted 732 generals (558 to Major General, 147 to Lieutenant General, and 27 to General) in which during the same period there were only 677 generals retired from the military.[67] According to him, this was a clear indication that Chen Shui-bian used personnel policy for his own interests. The personnel policy was used as a tool to create loyalty to Chen, his government and his party. Furthermore, there were several posts that were held for less than 3 months, which according to regulations are "inappropriate."[68] A short period of tour of duty indicated a highly politicized personnel policy.

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[66] An interview with a KMT legislative member. See also Tzeng, *Civil-Military Relations in Democratizing Taiwan*, p. 162-163. On p. 162, Tzeng writes that" President Chen frequently came under attack for his personnel selection because of the fast-track promotion of his alleged "Bian Family" faction within the armed forces, which occurred through the distortion of personnel regulations and norms."

[67] Meanwhile, Wei-chin Lee counts that from July 2000 to January 2007, Chen promoted 487 officers to Major General, 129 to Lieutenant General, and 12 to General. See Wei-chin Lee, "The Greening of the Brass," p. 215.

[68] York Chen makes an excellent table indicating the changing of personnel for several important posts in the military and defense establishment such as Secretary General of NSC, Defense Minister, Vice Defense Ministers, CGS, Commander of the Army, Commander of the Navy, and Commander of the Air Force. See his appendix. Chen, *Fragile Partnerships*, p. 66.

Another case that indicates civilian penetration in defense affairs was the debate over military doctrine. Civilian authorities do hold right to build defense policy but it must be noted that civilian must listen to military suggestion in decision making process. The debate over military doctrine started before Chen was elected as President. In his presidential campaign in 2000, Chen introduced the concept of "decisive offshore battle" to replace the previous concept of "effective deterrence, resolute defense" adopted during Lee's era. In short, the Chen's doctrine would require Taiwan military to be able to fight the war as far as possible from the island. Thus, the military must rely on the capability to paralyze enemy's war-fighting capability.

The idea, which then was presented early during his presidency period, created a double rivalry within civilian and military camps. A KMT legislature member told me in an interview that Chen Shui-bian purposely aired the doctrinal change issue to gain control over the military.[69] Putting such a plan would mean a new and more important role for the Navy instead of the Army which was known as the politically strongest service. It was Chen's attempt to limit the political role and power of the Army and give the Navy a more dominant role since the Navy is considered as having lower hatred toward the DPP.[70] The change within the military would also bring advantage to Chen's government since there would be new personnel to be co-opted. Chen was not only being attacked by his civilian opponent but also by several figures within the military such as General Tang Yiau-ming.[71] The kind of divide-and-rule

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[69] Interview with a KMT legislative member.

[70] The DPP-Army resentment came from their political differences that centered on the issue of Taiwan independence. It is known that during the period under martial law the Army which was the major power in the military always considered Taiwan independence and communism as the enemy of the state.

[71] Chen, *Fragile Partnership*, pp. 23-24.

tactics used by Chen Shui-bian clearly indicated the subjective control. This divide-and-rule tactic, which aiming at weakening the military political position by creating division within the military, according to Feaver, is an indication of a subjective type of control.[72]

A counter argument, off course could also be presented to defend Chen's decision. Chen's strategy could be interpreted as attempt to cut the KMT-military connections which previously took place. This strategy was part of the de-politicization of the military. Even with such effort the DPP could not build strong tie with the military as the KMT previously did.[73]

The two cases explained above indicate that civilian penetration did take place during Chen presidency. Military penetration, on the other hand, did not take place.

3.3. Conclusion

The assessment over the three indicators of civilian control indicates that Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era did not enjoy objective civilian control. Attempts have been made to establish democratic, which also similar to objective, civilian control. Taiwan military has already possessed their autonomy with the introduction of the new set of national defense laws. These laws provided clear boundaries between civilian and military areas. One particular problem with the new established boundaries was the over concentration of civilian power.

The existence of clear boundaries per se would not necessarily lead to the establishment of objective control. The case of Taiwan during Chen's period indicated that the intra-civilian rivalry was both evident and persistent. The intra-civilian rivalry was the major cause for the failure of objective control. The problem grew bigger

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[72] Feaver, "Civil-Military Relations," p. 228.

[73] Chen, *Fragile Partnerships*, p. 60.

with the existence of civilian penetration to military area which was clear from the assessment over personnel policy and doctrinal change. The military penetration to civilian are, however, did not take place. The reason for the existence of civilian penetration lied in the new established boundaries that showed concentration of civilian power. The balance of role and power between civilian and military was rather too much tipping toward the civilian.

Table 3.3. The assessment on the type of civilian control			
Integral institutional boundaries that clearly segregated the military from the society (military's autonomy)	Rivalry within civilian camps	Military or civilian penetration into area other than their designated area	Result (objective/subjective control)
Exist	Exist	Exist	**Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian era: subjective control**
		Does not exist	
	Does not exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	
Does not exist	Exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	
	Does not exist	Exist	
		Does not exist	

Note: Subjective control
     Objective control

Chapter 4

The Perception of China Threat

This chapter focuses on the independent variable of this thesis which is the perception of China threat among civilian groups in Taiwan. The aim of this chapter is to analyze whether the perception of China threat among civilian groups in Taiwan is convergent or divergent. This chapter will be organized in the following order. The first part is the framework on the perception of China threat. It starts with the definition of the China threat and then followed by the measurement of China threat. The next part assesses the civilian camp's perception of China threat.

To begin with, several clarifications are deemed necessary. First, the term China threat to Taiwan security in this thesis refers to two components. Those two components are the identification of China threat and the strategy to cope with the threat. The identification of threat deals with the actual threat –which can be measured by looking at the gap in military capabilities and defense budget– and the Chinese intention to use force. Second, the term civilian groups refer to coalition of political parties in Taiwan which can be divided into two camps, i.e. the pan-green (DPP and TSU) and the pan-blue (KMT and PFP). In some cases, the civilian groups will refer only to DPP vis-à-vis KMT. The two camps, and/or parties, have different ideology concerning the identity of Taiwan which eventually leads to their different idea or understanding of Taiwan security. The identity rivalry itself is quite often cited as the main reason why Taiwan suffered from subjective control.

4.1. Framework

4.1.1. The China Threat

Raymond Cohen defines the perception of threat as "anticipation on the part of an observer, the decision maker, of impending harm –usually of a military, strategic, or economic kind– to the state."[74] The perception of threat, therefore, is referring to what the policy makers perceive as a threat to state security. The perception of China threat, if so, can be understood as how policy makers see and define the threat that came from China. It could be in the form of political, military, economic, diplomatic, or societal consequences.

In academic literatures, the term China threat has several understandings. Herbert Yee and Ian Storey point out that the term is actually came from "the idea that the PRC as a rising power represents a source of regional and international instability."[75] This understanding is a result of five contributing factors, which are: the rise of Chinese economy, the PRC's authoritarian socialist political system, the PRC's increasing military capability, the fear of political and economic collapse in the PRC which could affect her neighbors, and the rising Chinese nationalism.[76] Accordingly, the main component of the China threat is a belief that China's rising will be un-peacefully. It is understandable then if Chinese government develops and spreads the peaceful rise doctrine in their attempt to contain such belief.

Another issue that needs to be settled regarding the term China threat is concerning the question of to whom would China rise becomes a threat. Most literatures dealing with the concept of China threat tend to focus on the framework of

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[74] Raymond Cohen, *Threat Perception in International Crisis*, Wisconsin: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1979, p. 4.

[75] Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, "Introduction" in Herbert Yee and Ian Storey, Eds., *The China Threat: Perceptions, Myths and Reality*, London and New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2002, p. 1.

[76] Ibid, pp. 2-6.

China-US rivalry.[77] This is the reason why China rise is considered as threatening regional or international stability which in fact should be defined as threatening US role in Asia Pacific region and the world.

But, would it be the case to other countries in the region? China rise might possess a danger to US role and position in Asia but it is not necessary the case with the Asian states. David Kang argues that countries in East Asia tend to see China as an opportunity rather than as a threat. For these countries, the rising of China is considered more as a chance rather than a threat. His assessment is based on East Asian countries' strategy in dealing with China rise. He writes that "East Asian states see substantially greater economic opportunity in China than they do military threat, and hence East Asian states accept, rather than fear, China's expected emergence as a powerful and perhaps the dominant state in East Asia. They prefer China to be strong rather than weak, and although the states of East Asia do not unequivocally welcome China in all areas, they are willing to defer judgment about what China wants."[78]

A rather different conclusion on whether or not China rise would become a threat to Asian countries is drawn by Yoichiro Sato. Writing the conclusion part of his edited book (co-edited with Kevin Cooney), Sato argues that smaller countries like Southeast Asian countries, Taiwan, Korea, and India prefer to engage China as opportunity to boost their economies while stronger countries such as the US and

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[77] Numbers of books and articles are focusing on this topic. One particular worth attention book on China-US competition is the edited volume by Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon. This book is focusing on China-US rivalry in Southeast Asian. See Evelyn Goh and Sheldon W. Simon, Eds., *China, the US, and Southeast Asia: Contending Perspectives on Politics, Security, and Economics*, New York and London: Routledge, 2008. In addition, Arthur S. Ding writes an excellent assessment of Sino-US missiles rivalry. See Arthur S. Ding, *Sino-US Competition in Strategic Arms*, Singapore: S. Rajaratnam School of International Relations, 2008.

[78] David C. Kang, *China Rising: Peace, Power, And Order in East Asia*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2007, pp. 197-198.

Japan tend to see China as competitor even if they also admit the opportunity in doing business with China.[79]

In the case of Taiwan, China, rising or not rising, still constitutes as a source of threat to Taiwan security. However, further assessment is needed to determine the extent and scope of China threat to Taiwan security. Not to mention that this China threat is also interacting with other factors such as US security assurances and Taiwan's domestic politics.[80] To determine the extent and scope of China threat, a set of boundaries that must not be crossed by Taiwanese decision makers in dealing with China is required. China has constantly indicated that Taiwan is destined to be part of China's territory. Any attempts that lead to independence would be considered as threat to Chinese sovereignty and therefore deserves punishment. Taiwan independence or any action directed toward Taiwan independence, hence, is the boundary that must be crossed by Taiwan. This boundary is clearly defined with the enactment of anti-secession law in 2005.[81] What constitutes as attempts directed toward Taiwan independence, however, is not clear and subject to political interpretation.

Setting the boundary of China threat is only a preliminary step to assess the degree of the threat itself. Michael Chase proposes two indicators if one want to assess the degree of China threat to Taiwan security: by looking at the Chinese

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[79] Yoichiro Sato, "Conclusion: China in the Eyes of Asia and America" in Kevin J. Cooney and Yoichiro Sato, Eds., *The Rise of China and International Security: America and Asia Respond*, London and New York: Routledge, 2009, pp. 232-241. However, one can be critical over his categorization of "small" when he puts India in the small countries bracket.

[80] Michael S. Chase, *Taiwan's Security Policy: External Threats and Domestic Politics*, Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2008, p. 155.

[81] Cheng-yi Lin, "The Rise of China and Taiwan's Respond: The Anti-Secession Law as a Case Study" in *Issues and Studies* 43: 1 (March 2007), pp. 159-188.

military capabilities and Chinese intention to use force.[82] I would add the strategy to cope with the threat as the other indicator. In some cases, there is a congruent assessment on Chinese military capabilities and agreement on what would cause the intention to use of force but there is an incongruent decision on the strategy to cope with the threat.

In Taiwan, a democratic country with clear and deep civilian segregation, policy making is subject to political compromises among civilian groups. The real battlefield over the identification of China threat and the policy to cope with China threat is actually inside Taiwan border. Therefore, the assessment of China threat must focus on whose perception is prevailing in the political game. It is not always necessarily the ruling government's perception which will win the political battle. In some cases, the ruling government's perception can be blocked by opposition parties or bow to the opposition parties' wishes due to several reasons.

4.1.2. The Identification of Threat

Most analysts agree that China is the most important threat to Taiwan security. However, there is no agreement over the extent of China threat to Taiwan security and how Taiwan should handle the threat. One of the most important, and most cited, sources of China threat to Taiwan security is the Chinese military modernization program, which also includes the rise in defense budget.[83]

Assessment on Chinese military capabilities has always been an important part of the National Defense Report of the Republic of China or the white paper defense. It

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[82] Chase, *Taiwan Defense Policy*, pp. 155-166.

[83] The military dimension of China threat to Taiwan security is not the only dimension of China threat to Taiwan security. There are other dimensions such as political, economic, diplomatic, and cultural threats. The framework for this part will focus on military dimension while the next part will include the other dimensions.

is so important that each report would have a specific chapter on this topic. It is also the focus of most analysts' studies and writings on the issue of Taiwan security. However, most of these assessments tend to focus on military hardware, doctrine, tactics, and budget and seldom consider the political dimension in assessing the China threat. Understanding the political dimension of Chinese military capability, including in it is the role of People Liberation Army (PLA) in decision making process, is a key to precisely understand the Chinese intention to use force.[84]

4.1.2.1. The Actual Threat

It is widely believe that the gap of military capabilities across the Taiwan Strait has been tipping to China's favor. The gap in cross-strait military balance and defense spending is actually evident.[85] Those gaps are a result of Chinese military modernization program that started to take place during the reign of Deng Xiaoping and a stagnant development in Taiwan's military modernization program. Chinese military modernization program draws much attention in Taiwan for two reasons: because this modernization program is directed toward Taiwan[86] and because this

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[84] Denny Roy, "PLA Capabilities in the Next Decade: The Influence of Politics" in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, Eds., *Defending Taiwan: The Future Vision of Taiwan's Defense Policy and Military Strategy*, New York: RoutledgeCurzon, 2003, pp. 29-47. See also Maochun Yu, "Political and Military Factors Determining China's Use of Force" in Steve Tsang, Ed., *If China Attacks Taiwan: Military Strategy, Politics and Economics*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 17-34.

[85] See for example Cole, *Taiwan's Security*, chapter 3. Cole provides a handful of data on Chinese military capability on that section while the data on Taiwan military capabilities for the same period is appeared chapter 6, 7, and 8.

[86] Ellis Joffe, for example, writes that "the purpose of Chinese military build-up is to enable China to coerce Taiwan into accepting a "one China solution" to the Taiwan problem or to prevent Taiwan from moving toward formal independence." Ellis Joffe, "The 'Right Size' for China's Military: To What Ends?" in *Asia Policy* 4 (July 2009), p. 557.

modernization program has transformed Chinese military capabilities to a degree which Taiwan could no longer enjoy strategic advantage over the mainland.

In response to Chinese military build-up, Taiwan is also developing a military's modernization program. This program is in part as a response to Chinese military build-up and in part due to the democratization process that took place in Taiwan. Michael Swaine notices that the objective of Taiwan military modernization program is to establish civilian control over the military, to restructure, streamline, and modernize the military to able to meet the growing challenges to Taiwan security, to strengthen the overall national security and strategic planning, and to improve the efficiency and integrity of the procurement process and at the same time to diversify the sources of its weaponry system or to establish an indigenous production.[87]

There seem to be a congruent opinion among civilian groups in Taiwan on the actual threat from China. There is also no disagreement that Chinese military build-up is further undermine Taiwan security. However, the convergent opinion within civilian camps in Taiwan over the actual military threat from Chinese military build-up does not necessarily lead to a convergent idea of what would be the best strategy to deal with such threat.

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[87] Michael D. Swaine, "Taiwan's Defense Reform and Military Modernization Program: Objectives, Achievements, and Obstacles" in Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, Ed., *Dangerous Strait: The US-Taiwan-China Crisis*, New York: Columbia University Press, 2005, pp.132-141. See also Andrew L. Ross, "Taiwan's Defense Reform: Questions and Observations" in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, Eds., *Taiwan's Defense Reform*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 16-25; York W. Chen and Martin Edmonds, "An Overview of Taiwan's Defense Reform" in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, Eds., *Taiwan's Defense Reform*, London and New York: Routledge, 2006, pp. 63-78. For an assessment prior to Chen Shui-bian era see Alexander C. Huang, *Taiwan's Defense Modernization for the 21st Century: Challenges and Opportunities*, paper prepared for the Conference on War and Peace in the Taiwan Strait, February 26-28, 1999.

Chinese military modernization program has in fact caused differing opinion among Taiwanese leaders on the strategy to cope with threat. Some argue that Taiwan should not spending money and resources that most likely will only drag Taiwan and China into arm races. Instead, Taiwan should approach Chinese government to enhance cooperation that will minimize the Chinese intention and necessity to use its military forces. Others suggest that Taiwan should pursue tighter relations with the US to ensure US commitment in safeguarding Taiwan security and deter possible Chinese military operation toward Taiwan. Some others are proposing to enhance a defense modernization program so that Taiwan would be able to protect itself if such an attack by China is taken place.[88] Therefore, it is equally important to search on the Chinese intention to use force as part of our understanding of China threat.

4.1.2.2. The intention to use force

The main question with Chinese intention to use force is under what circumstances do the Chinese leaders will use their forces in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland. Susan Shirk argues that for China, Taiwan is a question of regime survival. No regime in China could survive the loss of Taiwan since the loss of Taiwan is a signal of the loss of other areas such as Tibet, Xinjiang, or Inner Mongolia.[89]

With such a burden, yet the Chinese leaders can do nothing to solve the problem due to the international implications of any military actions. One of the most important factors that Chinese leaders need to consider if they wish to use force in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland is the possible US intervention. Chinese use of force would definitely trigger US intervention, unless if the US perceives that the

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[88] Interview with scholar from National Chengchi University. See also Logan and Carpenter, "Taiwan's Defense Budget," p. 4.

[89] Susan L. Shirk, *China: Fragile Superpower*, New York: Oxford University Press, 2007, pp. 181-182.

Chinese decision is due to Taiwan's provocations. According to the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), the US must provide any necessary actions to safeguard Taiwan security. Unless China is willingly to confront US intervention, the Chinese leaders could only lean on US ability to set the stability in the triangular relations between China, Taiwan and the US. However, it must be noted that the US does have influence over Taiwan but the US cannot tell Taiwan what to do as the US wants Taiwan to do.

Knowing that the chance of the use of force is actually limited, since the 1980s Chinese leaders have developed a new approach to integrate Taiwan into the Mainland by relying on economic interdependence or dependence. China has continuously trying to boost economic relations with Taiwan to enhance political integration. However, the economic ties are not necessarily resulted in closer political ties across the Strait of Taiwan. The political integration somehow is on the opposite path from that of economic integration. The closer economic ties turned out to complicate Chinese intention to use force. The use of force would also bring destructions in infrastructure and damage the economy. The Chinese leaders need to precisely count the cost of war that they are ready to pay if they want to use force. China needs a careful planning of military strike with a sound precision to minimize the cost of war. Military readiness is therefore required.

China is willingly to use force but only if they have to. There are some preconditions for Chinese leaders to adopt the option to use force in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland. Those are the existence of a reasonable Taiwan's provocations, strategic calculation on the pace of US intervention, and Chinese military readiness.[90] Andrew Scobell develops two options that might be implemented

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[90] Steve Tsang, "Drivers Behind the Use of Force" in Steve Tsang, *If China Attacks Taiwan*, pp. 1-14.

by Chinese government to integrate Taiwan.[91] The first one is what he termed as coercive option and the later is the capture option. He suggests that the first option is more preferable than the later.[92] Furthermore, Joel Wuthnow argues that since 2001 China has been implementing an integrated strategy that includes both cooptation and coercive options.[93] The result of such integrated strategy is still on hold.

China's decision to adopt new policy initiatives to peacefully settle the Taiwan issue –that dated back in 1980s– resulted in doubt among Taiwanese leaders regarding Chinese intention to use force.[94] The 1995-1996 missile crises raised an alarm for Taiwanese leaders to once again consider Chinese intention to use force. Since then, diverse observations over the possibility of Chinese use of force grew. This differing opinion among civilian groups resulted in different opinion on what would be the best strategy to cope with China threat.

4.1.3. The Strategy to Cope with Threat

The military threat that came from China is not the only dimension of China threat. China is also considered by Taiwanese decision makers as having economy and political/diplomatic threat to Taiwan. The strategy to cope with China threat is

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[91] Andrew Scobell, "China's Military Threat to Taiwan in the Twenty-First Century: Coercion or Capture" in Martin Edmonds and Michael M. Tsai, *Taiwan's Defense Reform*, pp. 29-40.

[92] Scobell suggests that the capture option is only possible if three preconditions are met. Those are keeping actual fighting and war damage to a minimum, keeping the duration of the conflict brief, and keeping operational requirements manageable. Ibid, pp. 33-35.

[93] Wuthnow's coercive is similar with Scobell coercion option. Wuthnow's understanding of cooptation refers to "economic and political stratagems designed to attract support for the PRC position among various Taiwanese constituencies." Joel Wuthnow, "The Integration of Cooptation and Coercion: China's Taiwan Strategy since 2001" in *East Asia* 23: 3 (Fall 2006), pp. 22-45.

[94] Chase, *Taiwan Defense Policy*, p. 157.

depending on which threat is considered as urgent and most likely to take place. The decision is subject to parties' priorities, needs and interests.

The economic dimension of China threat is mainly focusing on Taiwan's over dependence on Chinese economy. As suggested earlier, China is using economic interdependence, or dependence, as one important tool in integrating Taiwan with the Mainland. The data indicates that there was actually growing economic ties across the Strait of Taiwan. The increasing ties were not only in numbers of trade and investment flows but also in characteristic of industries. Taiwan businessmen are not only investing in labor-intensive industries as they used to do but also investing in technology-based industries. These developments create a fear of the hollowing out of economy.

There are, however, disagreements over the extent and consequences of such dependency. Some suggests that the hollowing out of economy is actually not taking place in Taiwan. What happened is simply a deindustrialization which is a natural result of economic fatigue in Taiwan. The removal of technology-based industries from Taiwan to China is limited to that of low-tech industries. Taiwan is still keeping the research and development in the island that makes China industries in the tail of Taiwan and not the other way around. To settle the problem of deindustrialization, Taiwan government needs take several steps to upgrade its industries.

Another debate also appears concerning the consequences of these growing ties. Some afraid that China is going to use economic leverage as weapon to integrate Taiwan to the Mainland in several ways such as using sanctions, compelling Taiwan to make political concessions by threatening Taiwan investments in and trade with China, blocking Taiwan from regional economic integration, isolating Taiwan from the geo-economic order, or taking advantage of the limited state capacity to manage

internal cohesion.[95] The last three strategies, I would say, are worth attention since they create division within Taiwan society that goes in line with political ideology rivalry.

The debates over the extent and consequences of economic threat from China have been able in splitting civilian in Taiwan into two different camps. This division is somewhat following the political positioning of Taiwanese political parties. The pan-green camp tends to exaggerate, or at least concerned with, the real threat from and consequences of economic threat from over dependence to Chinese economy while the pan-blue less concerned with.

Another worthy attention dimension of China threat is the diplomatic isolation. Since the US shifted their recognition from Taipei to Beijing and Taiwan lost its UN seat, the Chinese government has been actively isolating Taiwan from international space. Taiwan was not only losing its position in various international organizations, both governmental and non-governmental, but also losing allies due to extensive Chinese diplomacy. The diplomatic rivalry between the two is evident in both bilateral and multilateral relations.[96] The "one China policy" is the main source of the rivalry between the two countries in which China has been actively forcing many states to adopt such policy. Samuel Ku suggests that Taiwan should adopt three

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[95] Chyungly Lee, "Cross-Strait Economic Ties and Taiwan's Economic Security: An Analytical Framework from a Nontraditional Security Perspective" in *Issues and Studies* 43: 1 (March 2007), pp. 189-216. On the first two fears see for example Chen-yuan Tung, "Cross-Strait Economic Relations: China's Leverage and Taiwan's Vulnerability" in *Issues and Studies* 39: 3 (September 2003), pp. 137-175.

[96] See for example Thomas V. Biddick, "Diplomatic Rivalry in the South Pacific: The PRC and Taiwan" in *Asian Survey* 29: 8 (August 1989), pp. 800-815 or Samuel C.Y. Ku, "Taiwan's Diplomatic Maneuvers in the Asia-Pacific: A Perspective of Complex Interdependence" in *Issues and Studies* 34: 6 (June 1998), pp. 80-97 or Robert R. Ross, "Explaining Taiwan's Revisionist Diplomacy" in *Journal on Contemporary China* 15: 48 (August 2006), pp. 443-458.

strategies of seeking full involvement in the areas of economic issues, developing bilateral interactions, and participating of activities in INGOs as a way to break Chinese isolation.[97] From those three strategies, however, only the first strategy is likely to succeed. Taiwan successful bid of WTO membership is one of the success stories of the implementation of strategy. Nowadays, Taiwan is giving full concern on the economic regionalization in Asia-Pacific in order not be excluded from such regional economic cooperation.

The diplomatic dimension of China threat is also capable of creating quarrel among civilian in Taiwan. An example of this would be Taiwan's World Health Organization (WHO) memberships. This issue creates sharp disagreement within civilian camp in Taiwan which parallel with political rivalry between pan-blue and pan-green camps. Taiwan's recent success in becoming an observer in World Health Assembly meeting, the highest body of the WHO, is under criticism from pan-green over the naming of Chinese Taipei and the fact that the invitation is available only under the consent of Chinese government. Such criticism shows that the main problem with the issue is within Taiwan border and not necessarily on cross-strait relationship.

In conclusion, the following table shows the indicators that I would use to analyze the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups in Taiwan. Since there is no disagreement over the actual threat that might came from China, I will not give a significant portion for this issue.

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[97] Ku, "Taiwan's Diplomatic Maneuvers in Asia-Pacific," p. 97.

Table 4.1. Framework on the Congruency of China Threat Perception among Civilian Groups in Taiwan		
Indicators		**Category**
Identification of threat	The actual threat	Exist Not exist
	The intention to use force	Likely Unlikely
The strategy to cope with the threat		Economy Political/Diplomatic Military

4.2. Assessment

As already mentioned in Chapter 2, most assessment on civilian control –or civil-military relations– in Taiwan is giving a particular importance to domestic politics or identity politics as factor that explain the establishment of civilian control while the other is focusing on the nationalization of the military or the de-politicization of the military. There is quite limited number of assessments that gives weight to the threat perception or security environment as factor that influence the establishment of civilian control.

The first two types of assessment argue that the establishment of objective control in Taiwan is not possible due to the existence of political rivalry among civilian based on identity line. The rivalry refers to political contest between pan-blue and pan-green which rooted in differences in identity attachment. I doubt this premise –that the rivalry is due to identity contestation– and consider the political rivalry between pan-blue and pan-green is not merely a result of identity contestation. In fact, identity politics is merely a cover for pragmatic political goal to gain voters. Parties' attachment on identity issue is subject to adjustment depending on circumstances and necessities. The strategy to gain voters has two components: voters' preferences and voters' ideology. Political parties must consider both of these components in their political behavior. In addition, political parties will also need to

consider their own ideological attachment. In conclusion, it is voters' preferences that steer political parties' strategy to use ideology as a tool to attract voters instead of identity attachment that drives voters' preferences toward certain party.

The following explanation is supporting this claim. The data suggests that most voters are in the center position of the contestation between unification versus independence, which quite often be interpreted as representing Chinese versus Taiwanese identities.[98] By center position means that most voters choose status quo rather than unification or independence. In term of identity holding, most voters would rather define themselves as both Chinese and Taiwanese than Chinese or Taiwanese. If most voters are on the center of the ideological contestation, all political parties in Taiwan are supposedly moving to the softer line of its ideology to garner voters and not the other way around. Yu-Shan Wu confirms this result when he analyzes the political parties' behavior in Taiwan, particularly on the issue of cross-strait relations.[99] According to Wu, there was a tendency of a convergent pattern of political parties' in the 2000 presidential election.[100] This trend, however, changed during the 2004 presidential election to a rather pro-independence stance due to Chen Shui-bian's and Lee Teng-hui's political maneuver over the referendum issue.[101] This shift, however, was conducted by both camps, especially DPP and KMT.

The 2004 shift, I would say, was following the major trend among the voters. The general shift to the direction of independence was due to growing perception of China threat among voters. T.Y. Wang confirms that "the policy preferences of the

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[98] See for example set of data from Election Study Center, National Chengchi University or Mainland Affairs Council (http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/01716483994.gif).

[99] Yu-Shan Wu, "Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations" in *The China Journal* 53 (January 2005), pp. 35-60.

[100] Ibid, p. 44.

[101] For detail see his explanation on Ibid, pp. 47-56.

island's citizens are not just a function of primordial factors but are also conditional on their perception of threats, i.e. the likelihood of armed intervention by the United States on Taiwan's behalf in a cross-strait military conflict and a generally unfriendly Beijing policy toward Taiwan."[102] His argument implies that China threat does play important role in voters' preferences so that political parties need to consider this perception in their strategy to attract voters. Wang also notices that Taiwanese public tends to take a softer position vis-à-vis China if China takes softer policy toward Taiwan or Taiwanese public believes that the US would intervene in the case of China's use of force. The latter signifies the importance of the strategy to cope with China threat, as forging a closer tie with the US is an option for safeguarding Taiwan security. In the case of period surrounding the referendum in 2004, the data from MAC indicated that public perception on Beijing hostilities toward Taiwan was considerably high.[103]

The main disagreement between pan-blue and pan-green over the issue of China threat is twofold. First, pan-blue is on the opinion that China does not only possess a threat to Taiwan security but also hold opportunity for Taiwan. Second, pan-blue would rather consider the option to engage China in order to maximize the opportunity rather than confront the threat. Both were not the opinion of Chen government. Chen and his party considered China threat as real including the possibility of the use of force. Chen's government was quite frequently citing the Chinese missiles directing toward Taiwan and the danger of over dependence to Chinese economy as serious threat to Taiwan. Chen's government did not feel hesitate

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[102] T.Y. Wang, "The Perception of Threats and Pragmatic Policy Choice: A Survey of Public Opinion in Taiwan" in *Issues and Studies* 41: 1 (March 2005), p. 87.

[103] The data could be seen in MAC website at

http://www.mac.gov.tw/public/Attachment/01716493383.gif.

to take action toward formal independence. The decision to do so is subject to Chinese intention to use force against Taiwan, as Chen cleverly stated in his first presidential remark.

However, instead of being ideological, at the beginning of his administration Chen was forced to open a wider economic links with Mainland. The decision was due to a deteriorating economic condition in Taiwan. The businessmen who eager for making profit in the tempting Chinese economy pushed the government to set regulations that will govern a closer economic cross-strait relationship. This decision, which showed Chen's pragmatism, indicates that ideological-pragmatic approach is the main driver of political parties' strategy.

In the military front, Chen government showed consistency in not to engage China. Since the beginning of his presidency Chen has been insisted that China possesses military threat to Taiwan due to the deployment of missiles along the eastern coast line directing toward Taiwan. In 2002, Chen accused Beijing with similar charge mentioning the deployment of more than five-hundred short-range ballistic missiles targeted at Taiwanese people, especially those who lived in Southern Taiwan which is known as the DPP base. Following this accusation, Chen proposed to hold referendum on independence as an attempt "to demonstrate Taiwan's courage against the military threat from China."[104] The referendum did take place in 2004 – simultaneously with the presidential election– but the result was considered invalid since only 45% of eligible voters took part.[105] The referendum indicated the DPP's seriousness in considering China threat. The referendum could also be easily

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[104] Mumin Chen, "From Five No's to Referendum: The Making of National Security Policy in Taiwan" in *Issues and Studies* 43: 3 (September 2007), p. 206.

[105] Ibid, p. 208.

interpreted as DPP's move of crossing the China threat boundaries. However, Chinese leaders seemed to be reluctant to use force in solving the problems.

Another case that shows the differing perception on China threat among civilian was the case of Chinese military modernization program. One important element in Chinese military build-up is the emphasis on missiles system and precise strike capability. Another focus of Chinese military modernization is on naval capability including amphibious attack capability.[106]

In response, Chen's government proposed a doctrinal change and weapons procurement plans to enhance Taiwan's capability to counter such strike. Chen argued that Taiwan should adopt the "offshore decisive battle" strategy or in York Chen's words "decisive campaign outside the territory." To implement this strategy, Taiwan must possess an excellent preemptive capacity to neutralize the possible enemy's attacks. For this reason, it is extremely important for Taiwan to have a sound naval capability, an enhanced missile system, and a good electromagnetic warfare system. When the US in 2001 offered such necessary weapons system, Chen was soon welcoming the offer. However, he needed more than two years to propose the budget plan due to political problem.

This idea soon received a bunch of criticisms from the pan-blue. Pan-blue opposed Chen's proposal which they consider as an attempt to cross the boundaries. The new doctrine and the procurement list could be considered by Chinese leaders as

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[106] For detail assessment on Chinese military modernization see for example Cole, *Taiwan's Security*, pp. 32-51 or Richard D. Fischer, Jr., *China's Military Modernization: Building for Regional and Global Reach*, Westport, Connecticut and London: Praeger Security International, 2008, pp. 66-79.

"provocative action." If such is the case, the Chinese leaders would not hesitate to strike Taiwan.[107]

The abovementioned two cases show that the problem with China threat perception within civilian camp is revolving around the judgment of whether or not such decision is crossing the boundaries that might resulted in Chinese use of force. Those cases also indicate that both camps were on different opinion over how to tackle such threat from China. It was due to those two differences that Taiwan suffered from subjective type of control. The rivalry that took place prevented Taiwan from fully implementing an objective civilian control.

The rivalry was further worsened by a successful Chinese strategy of divide-and-rule.[108] Chinese government always supported opposition leaders to gain political and economic benefits against the DPP. This strategy proved to be capable of creating confusion among Taiwanese and raised tension in Taiwan domestic politics. The case surrounding the enactment of anti-secession law in 2005 is a clear example of this success. Cheng-yi Lin writes that the KMT and PFP "blamed the DPP government, particularly President Chen Shui-bian, for forcing Beijing to adopt such a law."[109] Furthermore, soon after the passage of the anti-secession law, Chinese leader Hu Jintao invited Lien Chan, KMT chairman, and James Soong, the PFP chairman, separately to visit Beijing in which both Taiwanese opposition leaders pledged a shared commitment with Hu Jintao to oppose any moves toward Taiwan independence.[110] As a reaction to the enactment of the anti-secession law, the DPP

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[107] Logan and Carpenter, "Taiwan's Defense Budget," p. 4. See also Chen, *Fragile Partnership*, p. 23-24.

[108] Sheng Lijun, *China and Taiwan: Cross-Strait Relations under Chen Shui-bian*, Singapore: ISEAS, 2002, p. 74.

[109] Lin, "The Rise of China and Taiwan's Response," p. 172.

[110] Ibid, p. 174.

government mobilized a demonstration in Taipei to show public's opposition to unification. Polls also indicated that most Taiwanese rejected the enactment of the law.[111] The pan-blue camp, however, showed no interest in joining the action. The above case indicates that pan-blue and pan-green have different understanding of China threat, especially on what would be the best strategy to deal with China.

4.3. Conclusion

The 2002 National Defense Report of the Republic of China clearly states that the major threat to Taiwan security comes from the Beijing regime which has never renounced the use of force against the ROC as a means to resolve the cross-strait issues.[112] The report is actually dividing the China threat into five categories, which are political, military, economic, psychological intimidation, and diplomatic blockade.[113] Building the strategy to cope with such threat was actually not on the top list of the DPP government priority. The DPP was more concern in reaching a consensus on national identity rather than normalizing relations with Mainland. In detail, the following were the policies developed by the DPP administration to engage with China threat:[114]

1. To reach a consensus on national identity.

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[111] The polls showed that on the question of whether or not Taiwanese approved the enactment of the anti-secession law as legal excuse to take Taiwan by force in the future most chose the answer disagree was ranging from 62 to 93.4%. While on the question of whether Taiwan should conduct a defensive referendum the answer should do was ranging from 42 to 58%. For detail see Lin's table, Ibid, p. 177.

[112] The Ministry of National Defense, ROC, *2002 National Defense Report, Republic of China*, Taipei: The Ministry of National Defense, 2002, p. 51.

[113] Ibid, pp.52-57.

[114] Chen Ming-tong and the Taiwan Security Research Group, *The China Threat Crosses the Strait: Challenges and Strategies for Taiwan's National Security*, Taipei: Dong Fong Color Printing Co. Ltd., 2006, pp. 99-100.

2. To promote a future co-existence and co-prosperity.

3. To make interim arrangements by conducting the following steps: negotiating a cross-strait "framework of interaction for peace and stability," developing cooperative economic relations, and facilitating the democratization of the PRC government.

The DPP tried to give similar portion to all dimensions of China threat, which according to them consist of political, economic, societal, military, and diplomacy threats. In particular, the DPP government gave important attachment to possible military attack conducted by the PLA and economic dependence. In addition, the DPP was also concern with Chinese use of threat to divide-and-rule Taiwanese society.

The KMT and its pan-blue alliance, however, disagreed with DPP stance. The KMT acknowledged that China did contain threat to Taiwan security but at the same time China provided opportunity for Taiwan. The central problem between the DPP and KMT on the China threat issue therefore laid in the strategy to cope with the so called China threat. The KMT was also critical to DPP provocative decisions which could easily be interpreted as crossing the boundaries that might force China to use force. The following table shows the result of the assessment over the perception of China threat among civilian groups in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era.

Table 4.2. Result of the observation on the perception of China threat among civilian groups in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era			
Indicators		**Result**	**Observation**
Identification of threat	The actual threat	Convergent	Both camps agreed that there was an actual threat from China
	The intention to use force	Divergent	The KMT argued that China would only use threat if the DPP advocated provocative policies
The strategy to cope with the threat		Divergent	The KMT suggested to build a closer cross-strait interactions to weaken the threat while the DPP preferred a harsher (re)actions to China threat

Chapter 5

Conclusion

As already stated earlier, there are some limitations of this thesis. First, this thesis is not aiming at assessing whether or not China threat perception plays a dominant role in influencing civilian control in Taiwan. Second, this thesis is also not aiming at explaining the degree of civilian control but rather differentiate civilian control into subjective or objective civilian control categories. The division is following Huntington idea which in thesis a set of different indicators will be introduced. If Huntington focuses on the military professionalism this thesis put emphasis on military's autonomy, intra-civilian rivalry, and interpenetration. Finally, this thesis is aiming at explaining the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups as factor that influence the type of civilian control in Taiwan.

Most assessments on the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan draw several similar conclusions. First, the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan is a function of democratization process that took place in Taiwan since the lifting the martial law. The establishment of civilian control in Taiwan is considered as a result or product of the democratization process. By putting focus on democratization process, those assessments tend to underestimate the threat or security environment as factor that explains civilian control. And even if they consider threat or security environment as factor that explains civilian the conclusion is usually there is a lack of correlation between threat or security environment. If not, the conclusion will be threat or security environment plays a limited role in the establishment of civilian control in Taiwan.

Second, a quite dissent numbers of those assessments focus on the domestic politics or identity politics as factor that explain subjective control. The conclusion of such assessment is that it is due to the political consideration that civilian governments in Taiwan since Lee Teng-hui to Chen Shui-bian tended to implement subjective control and neglected the establishment of objective control. There are some efforts to establish democratic civilian control but it remain on the normative dimension. The explanation of domestic as a blocking factor in the establishment of objective civilian control is, in most cases, due to the existence of identity contestation between pan-blue and pan-green (or between KMT and DPP and within KMT during Lee's period).

This thesis is focusing on analyzing the type of control implemented by Chen Shui-bian during his presidency from the China threat perception perspective. I hypothesized that the divergent of China threat perception among civilian groups is the factor that explain subjective control in Taiwan. In doing so, I analyze the type of control in Chapter 3 and explain the threat perception in Chapter 4.

On Chapter 3, I explain that Chen Shui-bian was applying subjective civilian control rather than establishing an objective civilian control. This conclusion is based on the assessment on three indicators developed from various previous scholarly works: the military autonomy, intra-civilian rivalry, and interpenetration.

In term of military's autonomy, the enactment of two national defense laws have brought about defining boundaries between military and civilian spheres. Those laws were an instrument to place the military under full civilian control. With the introduction of those two laws, there was a clear line that sharply differentiating the military from the society. These boundaries, however, tended to be overtly made at the expense of the military. This resulted in a failed attempt of de-politicization of the

military and created a militarized-society in term that society possessed an overt power in security realm.

The intra-civilian rivalry was the clearest indicator to show the application of subjective control in Taiwan during Chen's era. A number of cases, as explained in Chapter 3, appeared to indicate contestation among civilian that not necessarily drag the military into civilian area but capable of preventing the DPP government to take steps toward the establishment of objective control. Any of DPP policies concerning defense affairs or civil-military relations would be a political commodity to be pressured by the KMT and its allies.

Finally, on the issue of interpenetration, the case of Taiwan under Chen Shui-bian showed the absence of military penetration into civilian area. However, the opposite –civilian penetration into military area– was taken place quite often. The main reason for this civilian penetration was the over-concentration of civilian power in defense affairs as legalized by the two national defense laws.

On Chapter 4, I assess the China threat perception among civilian groups in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era. Early in this Chapter, I develop the framework to measure the congruency of China threat perception among civilian groups in Taiwan. I introduce two indicators, which are the identification of threat and the strategy to cope with threat. The identification of threat consists of two components, i.e. the actual threat and Chinese intention to use force.

There is no disagreement over the actual threat that might come from China. However, pan-blue and pan-green hold different opinion on Chinese intention to use force. Pan-blue was on the opinion that Chinese would not hesitate to use force if the DPP adopted provocative policies toward China. Some examples of these provocative policies were the doctrinal change, the procurement decision, and defensive

referendum held in 2004. The KMT also criticized those policies as waging the China threat. The KMT and its allies were on the opinion that the best strategy to guarantee Taiwan security is by engaging China as partner.

The explanation throughout this thesis indicates that China threat factor does play role in explaining civilian control in Taiwan. Instead of the level of threat I prefer to deal with the congruency of perception among civilian. Desch's idea to link the level of threat and civilian control is not proven in the case of Taiwan. Since Taiwan constantly faces high degree of threat from China, considering that China never renounce the option of the use of force in integrating Taiwan into the Mainland, Taiwan therefore supposedly will always enjoy an objective control. This thesis suggests that Taiwan actually enjoyed subjective control.

By turning on the perception of China threat, I prove the argument that external threat could influence civilian control. Since the perception of China threat among civilian groups was divergent, the level of threat per se did not affect the establishment of objective control. To sum up with, it was the congruency of China threat perception which explain the establishment of subjective civilian control in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian era and not the level of China threat.

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
The Perception of China Threat and Civil-Military

Relations in Taiwan during Chen Shui-bian Era

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