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# Decision and behavior in ultimatum game with multi targets

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## Abstract

Usually, decision making problems could be viewed as choices among alternatives, and the traditional economic theories have told us that the rational subject should be free from the paradox of choice (Schwartz, 2003). Our main hypothesis assumes that the subjects could rationally evaluate physical outcome, but might not be able to rationally integrate their preferences' structures. There are three ultimatum game treatments in our experiments. One of these ultimatum games plays with a combined set of cash and chocolate. It's rare to find a research observing the subjects' proposals when they face to divide more than one item. Subjects' offers are obviously different from separate- to combined sets, and we conclude that bargainers' preferences are not always monotonic.

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