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選區服務與立法問政:選制變遷前後的比較(第2年)

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中文摘要：過去區域立委在複數選區單記不可讓渡投票制之下，有強烈的動機去建立個人選票，為了達到此一目標，有些立委強調選區服務，有些立委強調立法問政。在 2005 年 6 月將區域立委改為單一選區制，那麼，當選舉制度變革之後，立委的代表行為是否因為選制改變而有所調整？本研究以質化與量化為資料蒐集方法，聚焦在第五屆到第七屆區域立法委員（任期自 2002 年 2 月到 2012 年 1 月）。研究發現顯示：新選制下的立委較過去更強調選區服務，他們花更多的時間與資源在選區，且對選區服務的態度更為慎重，不僅作更多的選區服務，且服務的內涵更為廣泛多元。然而，他們也不偏廢立法問政，只是在資源與時間有限的情況下，會用更策略性的方式來從事立法問政：他們將立法權委任行政機關，然後僅加以小幅度修改，提出一到兩個條文的提案，甚至於有時他們會去與其他立委共同提案，這種立法型態在舊制下就有，但是在新制下更被增強。最後，當立委真的在選區服務與立法問政無法兩全，而必須二者擇一時，立委仍會以選區服務為重。

中文關鍵詞：選區服務、立法問政、選制改革、複數選區單記不可讓渡投票制、單一

英文摘要：Under the old SNTV electoral system, Taiwan's district legislators have an intensive motivation to pursue personal vote. To attain this goal, some legislators make more efforts on the activities of constituency service, while others make more efforts on the activities in the legislative process. In June 2005, Taiwan's electoral system for district legislators had reformed to a single member district plural system. In this article, I conducted quantitative and qualitative research methods and focus on district legislators from the Fifth to the Seventh Legislative Yuan (from February 2002 to January 2012) to explore whether legislators change their behavior because of the system reform. Research findings show: legislators under the new electoral system emphasized even more on constituency service. They spent more time and resources on constituency, and their attitudes toward constituency service were even more cautious. They not only conducted more casework, but also they conducted casework much more widely diversified. At the meantime, legislators did

not ignore legislative work. Owing to the limitation of time and resources, legislators engaged in the legislative process strategically. They delegated legislative power to the administrative branch. They then modified those bills proposed by the administrative branch and proposed their own version of bills with only one or two articles. Sometimes, they might co-author the bills proposed by their colleagues to save time and resources. This legislative style had appeared under the old system. It was reinforced under the old system. Finally, if they had to make a choice between constituency service and legislative work, most legislators were inclined to the constituency service.

英文關鍵詞： constituency service, legislative work, electoral reform, multi-member district single non-transferable vote system, single member district

再探選區服務與立法問政：選制改革前後的比較

一、前言

國會在民主制度的設計上，一方面是反映各自選區的利益與意見的代議機體；另一方面又是國家整體制訂法律的機體。也因此，國會議員有兩個主要任務，一個是選區服務，另一個是立法問政；前者泛指在選區的各種工作，諸如為選民作個案服務、為選區爭取預算與建設經費；後者泛指在國會中的各種工作，諸如制訂法律、通過決議、審查預算、監督行政。國會議員的選區服務與立法問政二者既為兩難，又為互補。之所以為兩難，是因為兩個主要理由：第一，國會議員的時間與資源有限，若將較多的時間與資源置於國會，可能會疏於選區服務；反之，若將較多的時間與資源置於選區，可能會疏於立法問政，結果誠如 Fiorina(1989)所指出的，美國國會議員將許多時間置於選區，以致於國會只淪為「星期二到星期四的俱樂部」，而國內學者黃秀端(1996)也指出我國立委在選區服務與立法問政上有兩難。第二，國會議員的選區與國家整體的利益相衝突，此時國會議員面臨到是堅持選區利益或維護國家整體立法完善的兩難。但是在另一方面，國會議員在選區與國會的工作也可能互為幫補，這是因為國會議員可以將選區的意見與需求表達給國會，使國會既滿足選區的需求，又制訂適當的法律與政策。而國會議員為了獲得國會同僚的協助立法，在平日就必須與他們保持友善的關係，誠如一位美國國會議員所說的：「國會議員有兩個選區，一個是在家鄉的選民，一個是在國會的同僚，為了要服務在家鄉的選民，也必須要服務好國會的同僚」(Davidson and Oleszek, 2002:6)，這也說明了國會議員在選區與國會的工作互為幫補。

我國區域立委過去在複數選區單記不可讓渡投票制 (single non-transferable vote, 以下簡稱 SNTV) 之下，有強烈的動機去建立個人選票，亦即使選民投票

給立委，是因立委本身的理由而非因政黨或其它的理由。為了達到此一目標，立委有兩個基本策略：第一是集中選票策略：集中服務於某一小群選民，與其建立深厚的恩庇侍從(patron-client)關係，平常為其選區服務，帶好處給他們，使其在選舉時報以選票支持；第二是分散選票策略：並不特別服務於某一地區或特定選民群，而是普遍地服務於所有選民，或者較勤於立法問政，甚或頻上媒體以博取知名度，如此雖然不會在某一個地區或人群中獲得特別高票，但集結不同地區與不同選民群的選票支持，也可當選。基本上立委可以在這兩種策略上作選擇，或者較偏於第一種，或者較偏於第二種，若偏於第一種，則可能較偏重服務選區，若偏於第二種，則可能較偏重立法問政，比較極端的是只專注於選區服務，或者反之只專注於立法問政，但多數都在這兩個極端中選擇某種比例的混合策略。

在 2005 年 6 月 7 日通過的修憲案將立委選舉制度改為單一選區相對多數與政黨比例代表的混合制。區域立委選制改為單一選區相對多數制，那麼，當選舉制度變革之後，立委在選區服務與立法問政的相對比重上，是否因為選制改變而有所調整？是否在新選制下，立委更加強調選區服務？那麼，立委如何兼顧制度上對其選區服務與立法問政的要求？

本研究以第五屆到第七屆立法院（2002 年 2 月到 2012 年 1 月）為分析的焦點，如此方能充分掌握從舊選制到新選制下立委的問政動機與行為模式的轉變軌跡。以下將首先檢視相關的文獻，接著就本研究的理論與假設加以說明，然後進行實際經驗資料的分析，說明在新舊選制下，立委如何進行選區服務、如何進行立法問政，並且說明當立委在時間與資源有限下，如何平衡選區服務與立法問政，最後對於研究結果加以討論。

二、文獻檢閱

誠如 Mayhew(1974)所言，以當選連任為主要目的的國會議員，其在國會

裡的行為必定與選舉的因素有關，也因此有關選舉制度與國會議員代表行為的研究在國會研究的領域可謂汗牛充棟。以下分國外與臺灣在這方面的研究狀況加以說明。

(一) 選舉制度與國會議員的代表行為

國會議員若需要靠自己而非政黨來尋求連任，那麼國會議員自然有動機去獲得個人選票(personal vote)，亦即國會議員憑藉自己的個人特質、資歷、表現等而獲得選票，而非憑藉政黨或其它非個人因素而獲得選票，而獲得個人選票的一個重要途徑是選區服務(Cain, Ferejohn, and Fiorina, 1984; 1987)。Carey 與 Shugart (1995)有系統的檢視世界各國選舉制度對於國會議員尋求個人聲望或政黨聲望的動機，他們發現下列因素會導致國會議員候選人追求個人聲望：當黨領袖愈不能控制候選人的提名與在黨名單上的順序、當同黨候選人的得票不合併計算、當選民是投給單一候選人；同時，若有黨內競爭，則選區的規模愈大，候選人愈有建立個人聲望的動機。根據上述標準，Carey 與 Shugart 指出在單一選區而政黨候選人名單屬開放式的（譬如實行初選）、開放式政黨比例代表制，以及 SNTV 制之下的國會議員，會有強烈的追求個人聲望的動機；反之，在單一選區而政黨能控制候選人名單、政黨名單比例代表制之下的國會議員，會有強烈的追求政黨聲望的動機。

在 Carey 與 Shugart(1995)的比較架構下，我們能理解雖然英國與美國都是單一選區相對多數制，因為政黨的運作以及選民的投票考量而對國會議員的影響大有不同，英國政黨領袖較有能力去影響其國會議員的當選，因此國會議員比較會有動機以集體的行動和政黨的標誌作為競選的主軸，如此選民按照政黨與國家整體政策作為投票依據，而非以個別的國會議員候選人或地區利益為投票選擇的基礎，其結果候選人當選之後尋求個人聲望的動機減小(Cox, 1987: 45-67)；反之，由於美國國會議員需要贏得初選與當選，所以相當仰賴選區，有相當強烈的追求個人聲望的動機。也因此美國國會議員一向被指出是相當顧慮選區需求的 (Fiorina, 1989; Jacobson, 1992; Kingdon, 1989; Mayhew, 1974; Miller and Stokes, 1963)，不僅作各樣的選區服務(Fenno, 1978)，也通過各種預算分配、肉桶立法帶各樣的好處到選區 (Arnold, 1979; Bickers and Stein, 1996;

2000; Lowi, 1965; 1979; Stain and Bickers, 1994), 且當政黨領袖在推動與一般公眾利益有關的政策時, 考量到國會議員的選區取向, 也會使用各種肉桶立法來籠絡國會議員, 以使政策可以順利過關 (Arnold, 1990; Evans, 2004)。

此外, 許多跨國的研究都顯示出國會議員因為與選舉相關的因素, 而產生不同的代表問政型態。Norris(2004)有系統的比較世界各國國會議員, 指出有四個因素影響國會議員是否強調選區服務: 選票結構(投給候選人、投給政黨、雙重選票¹、或偏好選票²)、政黨提名是中央集權或地方分權、選區規模、以及是否有對國會議員的屆期加以限制。他並將選票結構與政黨提名作為判斷國會議員代表取向的兩個面向, 指出若愈是強調投給候選人的選制, 且政黨提名愈是強調地方分權, 則國會議員會愈強調個人選票, 重視地方對其的課責性與特殊利益的授與, 並且黨紀微弱; 反之, 若愈是強調投給政黨的選制, 且政黨提名愈是強調中央集權, 則國會議員會愈強調政黨選票, 重視計畫性的利益授與, 並且黨紀堅強 (Norris, 2004: 233)。此外, Norris 也指出若選區規模愈小, 則國會議員愈會強調個人選票—強調他們的首要工作是代表其選區, 由於 Norris 沒有國會議員部份的經驗資料, 因此他是以選民的角度為出發點, 他發現選區規模愈小, 選民愈會與國會議員接觸, 且愈能夠認識國會議員(Norris, 2004: 242-243)。

另外, Crisp 等人(2004)研究六個總統制的拉丁美洲國家(阿根廷、智利、哥倫比亞、哥斯大黎加、宏都拉斯、委內瑞拉), 發現若選舉制度愈強調個人選票, 或政黨候選人的提名愈強調個人的獨特性, 則國會議員愈沒有動機提出計畫性與全國性的法案, 總統或執政黨較難推動計畫性的政策, 若要推動, 也通常需要負擔較高的代價(譬如以提供特殊好處給國會議員以換取其支持)。甚且, 若國會議員面臨尋求個人選票的壓力, 則選區愈大, 國會議員面臨的同黨競爭愈大, 國會議員就會愈加強調地區的利益(Crisp, et al., 2004: 843-44)。然而若國會議員的汰換率較高或連任的可能性較小, 則國會議員較不會尋求特殊利益的提案, 也不會推動這類法案的通過。此外, 與總統同一政黨的國會議員由於有行政機關會提出全國性的政策為其政黨聲望負責, 因此會給予國會議

¹ 雙重選票指混合選制, 選民一票可以投給候選人, 一票投給政黨。

² 偏好選票指開放式的政黨名單, 選民雖然是投票給政黨, 但可以在政黨名單內挑選偏好的候選人。

員較多朝向個人聲望努力的空間；反之，國會的反對黨往往與總統站在對立的立場以爭取政治空間，因此比較有動機尋求政黨聲望。

另外，Heitshusen、Young 與 Wood(2005)針對英國、澳洲、加拿大、愛爾蘭、紐西蘭五個西敏寺國家的國會議員進行研究，結果發現單一選區的國會議員有 54% 會將選區置於第一優先的地位，而相對的，複數選區的國會議員僅有 21% 會將選區服務置於第一優先的地位，而且若來自邊緣選區則對選區的重視增加，此一發現顯示單一選區的國會議員對於選區的重視甚於複數選區選出的國會議員。

另外，巴西的選舉制度是開放名單的政黨比例代表制，國會議員為了使自己可以與同黨的國會議員競爭，有尋求個人選票的強烈動機，Ames (1995)指出國會議員的選票愈集中在某些選區，愈有動機提供好處給他的選區。此外，Amorim Nato 與 Santos(2003)研究也發現那些得票較為集中的國會議員，有提出滿足選區偏狹利益法案的傾向。

日本在 1994 年修改選舉制度，將 SNTV 選制改為單一選區與比例代表的混合制，由於我國的選制改革與之相同，因此日本國會議員的立法行為是否因選制改革而有不同值得我們觀察。過去在 SNTV 之下，日本國會議員必須仰賴個人選票當選，因此有相當強的動機去提供特殊的利益給選民，尤其是自己背後的支持群與團體，而非選區內的所有選民(Ramseyer and Rosenbluth, 1993；Scheiner, 2007)。而在選制修改之後，Hirano(2006)指出在單一選區的國會議員仍然訴諸個人而非公共政策的傾向，然而與過去不同的是，國會議員關注的選民較以前擴大，會試圖與過去所沒有接觸到的選民群與團體建立關係，提供好處，不像在過去僅照顧選區中的部份選民。

此外，老牌的混合選制的國家德國，也提供我們可以檢視在同一個政治生態下，不同選舉制度對國會議員的動機與行為的影響，有研究發現指出單一選區的國會議員相較於政黨名單的國會議員，有較強烈的動機加入可以宣稱其功勞的委員會，以帶好處到其選區(Lancaster and Patterson, 1990; Stratmann and Baur, 2002)。另外，針對採用混合選制的墨西哥發現，單一選區的國會議員相

對於政黨名單的國會議員傾向在國會中提出議案 (proposition)—雖非真正的法案，但係個別國會議員針對政治、文化、經濟與社會問題的宣言，且常伴隨著對某一地區的特定計畫的直接金錢補助(Kerevel, 2010)，這些研究顯示來自選區的國會議員較政黨名單的國會議員更傾向突出個人的表現，帶好處到選區。

綜合上述，我們可以得知：與選舉有關的因素，包括選舉制度本身、候選名單是由政黨或選區決定、選民是投票給政黨、單一或多個候選人、得票是集中或分散、選舉安全或危險、代表種類（是單一選區或政黨名單國會議員）、...等等因素，都會相當程度地影響國會議員的問政動機與行為。因此臺灣選舉制度的變革，也提供我們一個準實驗的機會去檢視在同一個政治生態下，因為選制變革而產生的問政動機與行為的變化。

（二）台灣選舉制度與立委的代表行為

針對臺灣立委的行為研究指出，過去區域立委在 SNTV 制度之下，在選舉中大多是人人有希望，但個個沒把握，因此，立委有極強的動機去獲得選民的認識與支持，以建立個人選票(盛杏媛，2000：104)，他們不僅要尋求當選，而且要多得選票以鞏固他的連任機會與政治影響力。同時，由於立委面臨的是一個相當大的選舉區，所以僅要獲得一個相當低百分比的選票即可當選，因此許多立委會有緊緊的去抓住一群選民的動機，而緊緊的抓住一群選民的方式莫過於去經營選區，與選區建立恩庇侍從的關係，平常提供選民服務，譬如婚喪喜慶到場或地方建設的工程承包，使選民在選舉時報以選票支持（黃秀端，1994），而同時在立法問政時傾向提出授與特定選民群利益的法案（盛杏媛，2009; Sheng,2006；羅清俊與謝瑩蒔，2008；羅清俊與廖健良，2009），並且積極為選區爭取各樣好處（羅清俊，2004）。

此外，立委會使用各種方法帶各樣的好處到其選區，Batto(2005)以 1992 到 2001 年（第二到第四屆）立委的委員會選擇為分析對象，發現得票愈集中

的立法委員有愈強的動機去參與金錢委員會（包括財政、經濟、交通與預算審查時期的預算委員會），以有利於其去尋租。事實上此一立委傾向去滿足一小部份與立委接觸的個人或團體的看法，不斷地在許多研究中被指出，尤其在那些屬於顧客型政治的法案--政策利益集中在少數特定團體，但是成本卻是由社會大眾負擔--更是如此（蕭有鎮，1996；劉鳳珍，1996；黃秀端，1998）。

針對立委立法問政的研究發現顯示，愈到晚近，立委提案愈形踴躍，且立委提案大多是規模小、無黨派性、有相當濃厚的特殊利益取向的色彩（Sheng, 2006; 2009; 盛杏媛，2009），這一個現象說明了立委在立法院中以特殊利益的立法，提供給選民利益，以換取其在政治上的利益（無論是選票、政治獻金或經濟上的利益）。

那麼，是哪一些因素影響立委傾向以特殊利益的立法來經營選區？第一個重要影響因素是選區規模，Sheng (2006)、羅清俊與廖健良(2009)所作的研究³發現指出：選區愈小，立委愈有動機提出授與選區特殊利益的立法，因為選區愈小，立委愈能夠去就立法的結果宣稱功勞，同時也愈無法避免不提供特殊利益之後選民的懲罰。其次，選區內的黨內競爭程度也會影響立委提案的動機，Sheng(2006)發現若立委選區的黨內競爭程度愈高，愈會促使立委傾向去提出特殊利益的提案。此外，立委的地方民意代表背景也會影響立委提案的動機（Sheng，2006）。另外，立委是否是執政黨籍也會影響立委傾向以選區服務或以立法問政來執行其代表職責，由於執政黨必須要為行政院的政策護航，因此有時不方便提出自己的提案，且許多委員個人提案雖然能夠滿足選民的需求，但是卻也要增加國庫的負擔，因此執政黨立委比較不傾向以立法問政的方式，而以選區服務的方式來執行其代表的職責（王靖興，2009；盛杏媛，2003a；2005）。

綜合上述研究發現，立委的行為會相當程度受到選舉制度的影響，在過去

³羅清俊與廖健良(2009)發現在第五屆時，選區規模對立委的分配政策的影響十分明顯，選區愈小，立委愈會傾向提出分配政策的提案，但是在第六屆時，選區大小對立委提出分配政策的影響沒有這麼凸顯。筆者認為這可能是由於第六屆立委面臨即將來臨的新選制，其分配政策提案行為，已經不是反映出他們當選時的選區規模（大多選區規模大於1），而可能反映出新選制下的選區規模（選區規模等於1）的特徵，但是經由第五屆立委的研究，確實證明選區規模愈小，立委愈有動機勤於帶好處到選區，與選區建立緊密的關係（Sheng, 2006; 羅清俊與廖健良，2009）。

SNTV 選制下，立委有傾向獲得個人選票的動機，因此會相當強調選區服務，傾向參與能尋租的委員會，並且會透過特殊利益的立法或分配政策帶好處給選區，尤其是若立委的票源愈集中、選區的規模愈小、選區的黨內競爭程度愈高、立委有地方民代背景，或立委是執政黨籍則更傾向去經營選區。

至於新選制下立委是否依然強調選區服務，連勝然(2012)針對第六、七屆連任的立委進行深入訪談，指出選區「範圍」⁴變大的立委，選區服務增加；且選區範圍變大與不變的立委，都強調經費與建設的爭取；至於選區範圍變小的立委，服務個案更為重要，服務工作內容更為細緻，且對於紅白帖的態度更為慎重；至於選區範圍不變的立委，則選區服務並沒有太大的變化。另外盛杏媛(2008a)與 Sheng(2009)針對第六屆底以及第七屆初期面臨新選制的立委加以分析，發現新選制促使立委有愈強調選區經營的動機。本研究期望在這個基礎上，進一步說明新選制下的區域立委如何在時間與資源有限的情況下，在綿密與深入的選區服務之外，去從事立法問政。

三、立委在新舊選制下的代表行為：理論與假設

在立委選制改革之前，總數 225 席的立委是以混合制方式產生，其中有大約四分之三(168 席)是區域立委，由 SNTV 制產生，每一選區根據選區選舉人數多寡，產生 1 至 13 席不等的議席，⁵並有大約四分之一(49 席)是由政黨名單比例代表(PR)制產生，此外另有 8 席原住民立委，由 SNTV 制產生(見表 1)。在 2004 年 8 月，立法院通過選制改革的憲法修正案，將立委總席次減半為 113 席，並將區域立委選制由 SNTV 改為單一選區相對多數制(SMD)。此一修憲案在 2005 年 6 月由國民大會複決通過，也因此，於 2005 年 2 月就職的第六屆立委，知道

⁴ 連勝然(2012)文中使用「選區規模」一詞指涉選區幅員大小或選民數的多寡，然而由於選區規模一般指的是選區應選民額，因此這裡用「選區範圍」一詞，以免讀者誤會其意。

⁵ 在過去 SNTV 下，立委總席次與各選區規模經過數次調整，本文僅以選制修改前的第六屆立委選制加以說明。

他們在尋求連任時會面臨新選制，而許多立委輔一上任，就為下屆立委連任鋪路，有些立委開始重新規劃選區服務的範圍，甚至遷移選區服務處的位置，接觸以前沒有觸及的選民群。

在舊選制下，由於每一選區不止一名當選人，大的政黨通常在一選區不止提名一名候選人，由於政黨希望每一名立委的得票不要過於突出，以免影響同黨候選人的當選，因此在某些狀況下，立委與政黨的利益有潛在衝突：立委要拉高選票，以求當選且選得漂亮，而政黨要「平均」每位提名候選的選票，以免某些候選人得票太高，致使其他候選人落選（Cox and Niou, 1994）。在同黨候選人彼此有競爭的情況下，立委就有很強的動機去尋求個人選票，甚至於某些魅力型候選人的個人選票多到不太需要政黨選票即可當選。然而在新選制下，政黨在每一選區只會提名一名候選人，而候選人也需要獲得過半數的選票才能當選，因此候選人不僅需要個人選票，也需要政黨選票的奧援，而由於政黨只提名一名候選人，政黨與候選人的利益是相同的，都是要衝高政黨與候選人的選票。

舊選制下選區係以縣市行政區域為劃分的基礎，有些選區選舉人數可能超過 100 萬以上，但是由於同選區有許多立委名額，有許多候選人參選，因此候選人僅要獲得其中一小部份選民的支持即可當選，譬如台北市第一選區在 2001 年第五屆立委選舉時，總有效票數 619,102，應選名額 10 席，根據族普基數很保守的估算，⁶若參選人數只比議席數多一人，且每一個候選人的得票都很平均的狀況下，任一候選人僅要獲得 56,283 票即篤定可以當選，而若參選人數愈多，或得票數愈不平均的情況下，候選人可以不需要得到 56,283 即可當選，那次實際的選舉中，候選人多達 32 人，結果得票數僅 36,175（得票率僅 5.84%）的候選人即告當選。在如此低的得票率即可當選的狀況下，立委可以有兩種基本的得票策略：第一是集中選票策略：集中服務於某一小群選民，與其建立深厚的恩庇侍從

⁶ 族普基數 = [選舉人有效票總數 / (選區應選名額 + 1)] + 1，參見王業立(2001, 22)。

(patron-client)關係，平常為其選區服務，帶好處給他們，使其在選舉時報以選票支持；第二是分散選票策略：並不特別服務於某一地區或特定選民群，而是普遍地服務於所有選民，或者較勤於立法問政，甚或頻上媒體以博取知名度，如此雖然不會在某一個地區或人群中獲得特別高票，但集結不同地區與不同選民群的選票支持，也可當選。基本上立委可以在這兩種策略上作選擇，或者較偏於第一種，或者較偏於第二種，若偏於第一種，則可能較偏重服務選區，若偏於第二種，則可能較偏重立法問政，比較極端的是有些立委只專注於選區服務，或者反之有些立委只專注於立法問政，但多數都在這兩個極端中選擇某種比例的混合策略。根據盛杏媛(2000)對第三屆立委的研究發現：有大約三分之一的立委強調選區服務，有三分之二強調立法問政，那些票源愈集中的、黨內競爭愈強的、國民黨籍、新任、是財經委員會成員的立委會較重視選區服務，至於票源愈分散的、黨內競爭愈小的、小黨或無黨籍、以實現政治理想為目的、資深、是立法院程序委員會成員的立委愈重視立法問政。

相對於舊選制下立委的選擇較為多元與自由--可以在選區服務與立法問政的搭配上作選擇，新選制之下的立委代表方式選擇較為受限，他們既無法不作選區服務，但也無法疏於立法問政。

(一) 選區服務的動機

在過去一選區有數名立委的情況下，選民可以選擇不同的立委服務，譬如國民黨選民可以找國民黨立委服務，民進黨選民找民進黨立委服務，勞工可以找對勞工友好的立委服務，公務員可以找對公務員友好的立委服務，但是在新選制下，不同政黨偏好與背景的選民都只能來要求選區內唯一的立委服務，而若立委不提供服務或掉以輕心，可能馬上失掉這張選票以及連帶的人脈。譬如出席婚喪喜慶一向是立委很重要選區服務項目（黃秀端，1994），過去在一選區多位立委的情況下，當選民有婚喪喜慶，可能同時會邀請選區中的數位立委參加，因此若有些

立委忙碌而未參加主人面子也不會掛不住，但是當選區僅有一位立委的情況下，若立委不參加，主人面子掛不住，甚至於若立委沒有出席，他的挑戰者出席，則立委會面臨流失選票的風險。更由於區域立委由 168 席減為 73 席，每一個立委平均要服務的選舉人數增加，因此，在舊選制下立委本就有強烈的經營選區的取向，而此一取向在新選制下將更為強烈，不論是立委主動的想要去作選區服務，或者是立委被動的被要求作選區服務。

表 1：新舊選舉制度比較

	舊制度 ¹	新制度
總席次	225席	113席
選舉規則	168席 區域立委 SNTV 49席 不分區立委 PR 8席 原住民立委 SNTV	73席 區域立委 SMD 34席 不分區立委 PR 6席 原住民立委 SNTV
選區規模	1至13席 ²	1席
選區範圍	縣市 ³	按人口數劃分
選區選舉人數	3選區小於10萬 5選區介於10~30萬 9選區介於30~60萬 4選區介於60~90萬 8選區介於90萬以上	3選區小於10萬 大多數選區介於20~30萬

資料整理：整理自中央選舉委員會選舉資料庫。

說明：1.歷屆立委總席次人數、選區、選區規模有若干變異，這裡以第六屆立委選舉(2004年選舉)為例說明。

2.2004年立委選舉有4個選區僅有1席立委因為縣市人口數少。

3.人口數過多的縣市進一步劃分為數個選區，如台北市、高雄市分為2選區，台北縣分為3選區。

其次，在新選制之下，區域立委在尋求黨內提名時，面對強烈的競爭，過去在 SNTV 之下，由於選區中的同黨立委不只一席，而立委又比較容易從自己同黨的候選人手中挖票，因此候選人往往面臨激烈的黨內競爭。在新選制下，也面對強烈的黨內競爭，但是此一競爭並非來自於選舉時，而是來自於黨內提名，競爭者可能來自於地方上有實力的政治菁英(盛杏媛，forthcoming)。由於新選制下大多數選區的選舉人數在 20 到 30 萬之間，相對上來講，過去大多數選區的選舉人數大於 30 萬人，以 2004 年的第六屆區域立委選舉為例，有超過 21 個選區，154 席(83.4%)立委的選區是大於 30 萬選舉人數(見表 1)，也就是說，新選制下選區的幅員變小了，且許多選區與地方民意代表或地方行政首長的選區重疊，或甚至幅員更小，因此立委在尋求連任時，極可能要面對地方上有企圖心的政治人物的挑戰，這些人通常在地方上經營許久，與選民之間建立深厚的關係。且近年來主要政黨國民黨與民進黨在立委選舉的多數選區都以民意調查或初選，或某種比例的民意調查與初選的混合方式來決定候選人，這使得黨內競爭不亞於之前的 SNTV，只不過黨內競爭的時段不同，但是激烈的情況則相同。而一但有黨內競爭，立委就必須尋求個人選票，而尋求個人選票最直接有效的方法莫過於選區服務，即使選區服務並非唯一的方法。綜合上述，推論出以下假設：

假設一：新選制下的立委比舊選制下的立委更勤於選區服務。

(二) 立法問政的動機

在新選制下立委強調選區服務的同時，立委更有比舊選制下的立委強烈的動機去從事立法問政，這是因為幾點原因：

首先，只作選區服務不足以與地方上有實力的政治人物抗衡，因為地方上的政治人物本就相當嫻熟選選區服務，立委比地方政治人物更具優勢的是可以利用立法職權之便來圖利選區，如此當立委與地方政治人物競爭時才具有優勢，也因此立委除了加強選區個案服務外，也有動機在立法院透過立法提案、預算爭取以有利其選區。

其次，由於一選區僅有一席立委，因此若立委提供利益給選區，很容易去宣稱功勞，不像過去在複數選區下功勞比較難以歸屬，誠如 Lancaster(1986)所指出的，選區愈小，國會議員的可辨識性愈高，因此國會議員與選區的可課責性的連結愈容易，這使得國會議員提供選區特別好處的動機愈高。換一個角度，由於新選制下一個選區僅有一席國會議員，若立委怠惰，選民很容易發現，立委很難避免選民的責怪(Sheng, 2006)，這使得國會議員有動機去作立法問政以帶好處到選區。

第三，只作選區服務不容易獲得 50% 以上的選票，因為即便以服務見長的立委，也很難服務過半數的選民，根據跨國的研究指出，平均僅有 12% 的選民接觸過國會議員，而單一選區選制國家的平均值略高，有 16%，至於混合制之下的平均值為 10%，而過去臺灣僅有 8% 的民眾接觸過立委 (Norris, 2004: 241)。因此，立委為了要獲得過半數的選票，除了以選區服務建立與部份選民緊密深厚的關係，也必須在立法院中間政，以獲得普遍大多數選民廣泛的支持。

第四，過去在 SNTV 之下，同黨立委面臨黨內競爭，因此立委在立法上有走偏鋒以建立個人選票的動機。但是在新選制下，立委不止要靠個人選票，還必須仰賴政黨選票，因此有動機與同黨立委在立法院中共同努力立法，或阻擋他黨立法，以創造政黨集體的聲勢，這不止有助於政黨的聲望，也有利於立委自己的選情 (Cox and McCubbins, 1993)，甚且近些年來因為政黨競爭的激烈，政黨在重要表決常進行甲級動員並且訴諸黨紀，因此立委若拒不出席立法院，會冒受黨紀懲處的風險。因此，本研究推出下列假設：

假設二：新選制下的立委比舊選制下的立委傾向提出法案。

然而立委一方面要選區服務，又需要立法問政，在時間與資源有限的情況下，立委必須用經濟有效的方式立法，他可以有以下的行動策略：第一，將立法權委任給行政部門，借用行政部門的專業來提出政策方案，而立委只需要對行政院所提出的政策方案，加以修改其中少數條文，即可以提出自己的提案版本，如此可以以逸待勞，一方面對選民有交代，另一方面若通過法案又可以宣稱功勞，也因

此立委較少提出新法案或大規模修法，而傾向以小規模修改現有法規為主(盛杏媛，forthcoming)。

假設三：新選制下的立委提案的規模較舊選制下立委提案的規模來得小。

其次，立委不止自己擔任提案起草人，同時也可背書其他立委的提案，擔任共同提案人或連署人，如此一來，不僅立委彼此的提案都可以達到提案門檻，立委本身也因此可以有好的提案績效，如果提案通過，更可以向選民邀功。為了提升自己的立法表現，擔任共同提案人或連署人並非新選制下才有的作法，其實在第六屆以前就是立委常有的作法，只是在新選制下，立委如此作的動機更為強烈。然而由於在第五、六、七屆連署人的最低門檻不同，(第五、六屆時需要 30 人連署，第七屆時需要 15 人連署)，因此本研究只以立委提案的平均主提案人數來比較，提出下列假設：

假設四：新選制下的立委提案較舊選制下的立委提案平均主提案人數較多。

(三) 選區服務與立法問政的取捨

誠如上述，在新選制下，立委有強烈的動機作選區服務與立法問政，然而，立委的時間與資源相對上是有限的，那麼立委在面臨選區服務與立法問政無法兩全時，他的因應策略如何？本研究假設在立委無法兼顧時，立委仍舊會以選區服務為重，因為最後決定立委連任與否的是選區選民，且立委可以當政黨立法績效的免費搭車者(free-rider)，因為有許多同黨立委的努力，但是立委卻無法當自己選區服務的免費搭車者，因為在新選制下僅有 1 名立委。

假設五：在無法兼顧選區服務與立法問政時，新選制下的立委比舊選制下的立委更傾向重視選區服務。

四、研究設計與方法

本研究將以第五屆到第七屆立法院（2002 年 2 月到 2012 年 1 月）為分析的焦點，如此方能充分掌握立委從舊選制到新選制之下問政動機與行為模式的

變遷狀況。第五屆是舊制度時期，第七屆是新制度時期，而第六屆立委雖然都是用舊選制選出，但是由於立委多半以連任為目標，因此當他一上任之後即以以下一屆連任為目標，因此新選制仍會形塑第六屆立委的動機與行為模式，只不過立委仍受限於舊制度下的選區範圍，以及立法院的總議席數，因此第六屆立委行為模式會反映出兩種制度的特色，且當愈靠近第七屆立委選舉，愈會反映出新選制的影響。

本研究以第五屆到第七屆立法院為觀察焦點，而非將時間點涵蓋更早以前，除了因為研究可以經濟有效之外，在這個時段臺灣政黨競爭激烈，同黨立委在立法院中凝聚力都達到一個高點（盛杏媛，2008b），因此本研究可以比較有效排除掉各屆立委政黨向心力的差異對研究造成的干擾。此外，由於這個時段主要政黨對立委提名的方式比較固定，雖然歷屆有些微差異，但是差異不大，基本上都比較偏向地方分權而非中央集權，也因此可以有效排除掉政黨提名的差異對研究造成的干擾。

本研究僅以區域立委為分析的焦點，因為選制的改革主要是在區域立委選舉的部份，且本文的主要焦點在於比較立委的選區服務與立法問政，不分區立委沒有固定選區，雖然有些不分區立委會「認養」選區而從事選區服務（連勝然，2012），但是其意義畢竟與區域立委有所不同。

本研究採用三種合併量化與質化的資料蒐集與分析方法：首先，有關於立委的選區行為，主要係來自於數波立委助理的調查訪問，包括第五屆一波，訪問時間點是在選前三個月內；第六屆與第七屆分別有兩波，第一波於第四會期，第二波於進入下屆選舉之前三個月內，第六、七屆兩波調查有助於瞭解立委在選舉與非選舉期間的行為模式，與本研究有關的調查問卷題目見於附錄 A；其次，有關於立委的立法問政行為，主要資料係來自於立法院資訊檢索系統，立委法律提案的內容分析。第三，研究者亦於第五、六、七屆期間訪問立委與立委助理，以瞭解立委面對新選制的感受、應變策略以及行為模式。

五、新舊選制下的選區服務比較

以下說明比較新舊制下區域立委在資源與時間安排、選區服務的變化，以及當面臨選區與政黨的立場不一致時，立委的因應策略。

(一) 立委資源與時間的安排

根據 Fenno(1978)的經典著作《家鄉的風格》(Home Style)，國會議員資源與時間的安排，是其選區經營的極重要一環(Fenno,1978)。立委跨不同的屆期，在資源與時間的安排上見於表 2。從表 2 得知，區域立委專任助理人數在新選制下略微增加，由平均 9.7 名增加為 12 名，而選區立委助理佔所有助理的比重也有增加，從 61.8%增加到 68.5%，也就是說選區助理從大約 6 名增加到 8 名選區，同時跟據研究者對立委助理的訪談得知，在選舉時，立法助理也會臨時編制為選區助理，以因應選舉時更多的選區任務，甚至於，在選舉時，部分立委國會辦公室僅留守極少數助理，大多數助理均被調派選區。更值得注意的是，從第六屆立委在面臨下屆選舉時即明顯表現出新選制的影響，立委自己以及立委辦公室花在選區的時間比例大幅增加，在第六屆立委面臨第七屆選舉時，立委花在選區的時間比例約為 57.9%，比前一屆高出近 8%，而到了第七屆立委面臨第八屆選舉時，立委花在選區的時間高達 63.3%，若比較第七屆與第五屆立委在選舉時花在選區的時間比例，發現在第七屆立委自己花在選區的時間高出第五屆立委大約 12.5%，而立委辦公室所花的時間比例，第七屆也遠比第五屆高出 14.5%，若以一個星期的工作時數 70 小時計算，平均每週大約多花將近 10 個小時在選區。

綜合上述得知，從第六屆立委面臨第七屆立委選舉時，立委即開始顯現出新選制的影響，在人員編制上，晉用更多選區助理，除此之外，比較第六、七屆第一波與第二波立委助理訪問的差異得知，立委在選舉期間與在非選舉期間在時間分配上有相當大的差異，在選舉期間，立委花在選區的時間相對上更多，但是即

便如此，第七屆立委即便在平常時期，也比在舊選制下的立委在選舉時期，將更多時間放在選區，顯示在新選制下立委對於選區較舊制更為關注。

表 2：區域立委在時間與資源的安排

	第五屆	第六屆	第六屆	第七屆	第七屆
	期末	期中	期末	期中	期末
專任助理數	9.7	9.4	10.0	11.1	12.0
選區助理佔助理比例 ¹	61.8	62.5	63.5	62.5	68.5
立委花在選區時間比例 ²	50.8	50.3	57.9	55.9	63.3
立委辦公室花在選區的時 間比例	50.9	n.a.	66.2	n.a.	65.4

資料來源：盛杏媛（2003b；2006-2008；2011-2012）。

說明：1.僅計算專任助理，未計算兼任助理。

2.僅計算立委在選區與立法院佔其工作時間的比例，不包含立委花在自己事業的時間。

3.表中數字為百分比。

（二）立委在選區服務上的改變

表 3 為區域立委每星期處理的個案服務件數以及收到紅白帖的張數。從表中數據可以得知區域立委每星期服務的個案數自第六屆立委面臨新選制以來即表現出大幅增長的趨勢，尤其第七屆期中立委服務個案數高達 70 件以上，較第五屆時增加了五成之多，唯第七屆末期服務個案數卻往下滑落到 50 件左右，究竟何以如此？是立委真實的行為改變，還是測量的誤差，或是平均數本身會過度反映極端值的影響所致？還是因為這些題目的回答人數（僅涵蓋區域立委助理）僅有 52 名，因此造成估計值的不穩定？由於立委收到紅白帖的張數雖然可以代表「潛在」的立委服務積極程度，但是更重要的是立委收到紅白帖之後的因應態度，因此本研究也詢問受訪者當立委收到紅白帖之後的反應，從表 4 得知，愈到晚近，

區域立委面對紅白帖的態度與處理方式更為慎重，立委面對紅白帖幾乎都參加的比例大幅提昇，在第五屆時僅有不到三成是幾乎全部參加，到第六屆期中時，有44.4%的立委面對紅白帖幾乎都參加，而第七屆立委，即便是在會期中，都比選制改革前面臨選舉時的立委更來得積極，而到了第七屆立委面臨下屆選舉前幾乎全部參加的立委比例更高達53.8%，部份參加與幾乎全部參加比例加起來達到九成以上，這顯示幾乎所以區域立委都無法疏於選區服務。

表 3:區域立委平均每星期處理的個案服務件數與收到紅白貼的張數

	第五屆 期末	第六屆 期中	第六屆 期末	第七屆 期中	第七屆 期末
個案服務	47.6	54.4	66.2	71.4	50.1
紅帖	32.0	28.9	n.a.	30.5	23.1
白帖	47.6	38.4	n.a.	34.2	31.0

資料來源：盛杏媛（2003b；2006-2008；2011-2012）。

說明：表中數字為平均個數。

表 4:區域立委面對紅白帖的處理方式

	第五屆 期末	第六屆 期中	第六屆 期末	第七屆 期中	第七屆 期末
不予理會	0.7	0.7	0.8	0.0	0.0
禮到人不到	2.2	1.5	0.8	3.4	0.0
僅偶爾選擇性參	17.3	15.4	13.7	10.2	5.8
部分參加	50.4	50.0	40.3	45.8	40.4
幾乎全部參加	29.5	32.4	44.4	40.7	53.8
合計	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(139)	(136)	(124)	(59)	(52)

資料來源：盛杏媛（2003b；2006-2008；2011-2012）。

說明：表中數字為平均個數。

此外，本研究也直接詢問第七屆立委的助理，在新制下受理服務個案數的增減，以及服務種類的變化，訪問結果如表 5 與表 6 所示，由表 5 得知，84.6%的立委辦公室宣稱服務個案數增加，僅有 15.4%宣稱沒有改變，而完全沒有是認為減少的。同樣的，從表 6 得知，有 73.1%立委辦公室宣稱服務個案種類更為廣泛多元，僅有 26.9%宣稱沒有改變，而完全沒有認為是縮減的。

表 5:自新選制以來委員辦公室受理服務個案的個案數是增加、減少，或沒有改變
(區域立委)

	次數	%
增加	44	84.6
沒有改變	8	15.4
減少	0	0.0
合計	52	100.0

資料來源：盛杏媛(2011-2012)。

表 6:自新選制以來委員辦公室受理服務個案的種類是更廣泛多元、縮減，或沒有改變？(區域立委)

	次數	%
廣泛多元	38	73.1
沒有改變	14	26.9
縮減	0	0.0
合計	52	100.0

資料來源：盛杏媛(2011-2012)。

(三) 當立委面臨選區與政黨意見或立場不一致時的抉擇

當政黨與選區之間有意見或立場不一致時，立委考量的優先順序也反映出立委是否是重視選區的。從表 7 可以看到，相當戲劇化的是，若以第六屆中期當作一個分界點，在此之前，國民黨立委與民進黨立委著重選區或政黨的比例正好相反，國民黨重視選區或政黨的比例是六比四，而民進黨則相反的大約是四比六，

到了第六屆期中，國民黨與民進黨立委逐漸趨同，兩黨立委對選區與政黨的重視比例都大約五比五，而在第六屆底隨著即將進入第七屆立委選舉，兩黨都成為重視選區遠多於重視政黨。在第七屆立委面臨下屆選舉前，民進黨立委又稍往政黨偏斜，但重視選區的比例仍高於重視政黨的比例，而國民黨則維持以選區為重的傾向，此統計數據說明在新選制之下，當立委在選區與政黨的意見相左時，相較於舊制，立委會以選區為重。

表 7:區域立委在政黨與選區意見不一致時會優先考量政黨或選區

		第五屆 期末	第六屆 期中	第六屆 期末	第七屆 期中	第七屆 期末
國民黨	選區	62.2	51.9	66.7	77.3	75.8
	政黨	37.8	48.1	33.3	22.7	24.2
民進黨	選區	36.7	51.0	60.0	75.0	53.3
	政黨	63.3	49.0	40.0	25.0	46.7

資料來源：盛杏媛（2003b；2006-2008；2011-2012）。

說明：表中數字為百分比。

由上述綜合各種測量方式與角度觀察，面臨新選制下的立委確實對於選區服務更為看重，不僅立委自己花在選區的時間增加，也投注較多的辦公室時間與資源在選區，並且對於選區服務的個案數增加，受理服務個案的種類更為廣泛多元，對於選區服務的態度更為慎重，此外，若選區的意見與政黨的意見不一致時，立委會以選區為優先考量。綜合上述，在新選制下的立委較舊選制下的立委更重視選區服務，假設一獲得證實。

六、新舊選制下的立委立法問政比較

前述我們看到舊選制下的立委本就有動機去作選區服務，而在新選制下的立委有更強烈的動機去做選區服務。現在我們將焦點置於立委在立法院內的提案行為。

（一）立法提案次數與時間

表 8 顯示的是區域立委在不同的屆別與會期的提案狀況，從表 8 中得知，第五、六屆立委平均每會期僅有 4 到 4.5 個左右的提案，但第七屆立委每會期的平均提案數有 11.13 個之多，大約是前面兩屆立委的 2.5 到 2.8 倍之多，顯示在新選制下，立委有更強烈的提出法案的動機，此證實了假設二：新選制下的立委比舊選制下的立委傾向提出法案。

也值得注意的是第七屆立委雖然平均每會期的提案數最多，但是其變異係數(1.12)卻是最小，顯示第七屆立委在提案的自由彈性較小；相對上而言，第五屆立委雖然平均每會期的提案數最少，但是其變異係數(1.46)卻是最大，顯示第五屆立委在提案的自由彈性最大，也就是說，第五屆立委有的提案多，有的提案少，而提案少的立委可以用其他方式（如選區服務）來吸引選票，但是在新選制下，立委普遍都需要重視立法提案，因此平均提案數的變異較小。

此外，也值得注意的是，所有屆的立委都顯示出，在第一會期時提案數都最多，中間會期逐漸往下滑落，最後一個會期提案數最少，之所以立委通常在第一個會期提案最為踴躍，極可能是因為立委在歷經選舉之後，迫不及待地要將自己的競選承諾加以實踐，同時因為法案屆期不連續的規定，也使立委有動機將欲通過的法案早早提出，排入議程，以免臨到屆期最後法案塞車，無法過關，而在最後一個會期，由於即將面臨選舉，因此大多數立委會將時間、心力與資源放在選區，立法提案因而減少。將此一研究發現比較表 2 與表 4 所顯示的第七屆選舉期間與非選舉期間的選區服務狀況，在選舉期間立委花在選區的時間愈多(見表 2)，且在選舉期間立委對紅白帖的態度更為慎重（見表 4），亦可發現在選舉時相對於非選舉時，立委更傾向於選區服務。

表 8：區域立委平均每會期提案數

	第五屆	第六屆	第七屆
第一會期	7.31 (7.91)	6.87 (8.08)	13.97 (14.54)
中間會期	3.84 (5.45)	4.08 (5.02)	11.34 (12.48)
選舉會期	1.14 (2.06)	2.83 (5.03)	6.84 (9.05)
合計	4.00 (5.85)	4.45 (5.79)	11.13 (12.52)

資料來源：整理自立法院資訊檢索系統國會圖書館法律提案系統。

說明：1.表中數字為平均數，括弧中數字為標準差。

2.第五、六屆中間會期指 2-5 會期，第七屆中間會期指 2-7 會期。

（二）立法提案規模

在這部份的分析與前面不同的是，前面的分析係以立委為分析單位，但這部份的分析係以各屆立法院的委員提案為分析單位，而且由於委員提案需要一定人數的連署，而大多數提案都參雜著區域立委、不分區立委與原住民立委擔任主提案人與連署人，因此這部份的分析並未刻意扣除不分區立委與原住民立委的提案。

本研究觀察提案規模的方式有兩種，其一是觀察提案的類型是新制訂法案、大幅修正法案、還是小幅修正法案，其次再觀察提案的條文數。⁷ 從表 9 當中可以發現小幅度修正法案在各屆都佔了七成五以上，甚且，此一比例逐漸升高，到第六屆底時達到八成，而到第七屆時達到八成二，顯示第七屆絕大多數的提案都是小幅度修正法案。更值得注意的是，立委極少提出新制訂法案，而此一趨勢到第七屆更達到極致，僅有不到一成是新制訂法。

⁷新制訂提案指的是過去未曾有過此法，而由立委或政府自行擬訂的完整法律提案；大幅修正提案指的是對現有法律作全文修正或 10 個條文以上的部份條文修正提案；小幅修正提案指的是對現有法案僅作少數幾個條文的修正提案，或 10 個以下的部份條文修正，譬如「行政院組織法部份條文修正草案」，其修改條文為 24 條，則為大幅修正法案；而「行政院組織法第三條條文修正草案」，則為小幅修正法案。

接著再以提案的條文數來看各屆立委提案的規模大小，統計結果見於表 10。首先我們可以發現，無論在哪一屆，立委的提案以 1-2 個條文的提案都佔最大多數，高達六成以上，而且到了第七屆，更有高達四分之三的立委提案是僅有 1-2 個條文，此顯示立委提案的規模相當小，多半是針對舊有的法案進行修正，或對行政院提案版本作極少數條文的修正。值得玩味的是如此小規模的提案，立委不在各自政黨內部的黨團會議中表現立場，以被吸納到黨團或政府的提案當中，也不在法案討論的過程當中以發言的方式修改法案，而是大張旗鼓的以提案的方式來表示其立場，這說明了立委表現自我的意願相當強烈，為了使選民清楚知道是誰的提案，用以宣傳自己、表達立場與宣稱功勞，因此用比較凸顯的方式來表現。而此一趨勢，在新選制之立委強調選區服務，又必須立法問政的情況下，發揮得更是極致，此顯示新選制對立委提案動機的影響是存在的，它增強了過去選制下立委提案小規模的傾向，此證明了假設三：新選制下的立委提案的規模較舊選制下立委提案的規模來得小。

表 9：立委提案類別(新法案、大幅或小幅修正)

	第五屆	第六屆	第七屆
新法案	17.9	12.9	8.9
大幅修正法案	7.5	6.4	8.5
小幅修正法案	74.6	80.1	82.6
合計	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(1655)	(1574)	(2792)

資料來源：整理自立法院資訊檢索系統國會圖書館法律提案系統。

說明：表中數字為百分比，括弧中數字為立委提案數。

表 10：立委提案的條文數

	第五屆	第六屆	第七屆
1-2 個條文	60.9	67.0	73.6
3-4 個條文	8.8	7.7	8.5
5-9 個條文	7.1	7.3	5.5
10 個條文以上	23.3	18.0	12.4
合計	100.0	100.0	100.0
	(1625)	(1587)	(2803)

資料來源：整理自立法院資訊檢索系統國會圖書館法律提案系統。

說明：表中數字為百分比，括弧中數字為立委提案數。

表 11 顯示的是歷屆委員提案的主提案人數的統計資料，第七屆立委提案平均主提案人數確實較前兩屆來得高，雖然平均數 3.29 較之第五屆的 2.91 或第六屆的 3.13 並不算高出很多，且第七屆的中位數是 3.00，第五、六屆是 2.00，但由於第七屆立法院的總席次數是 113 席，是前兩屆的一半，因此此一主提案人數的增加，顯示新選制下的立委較諸前兩屆，有較高的彼此簽署提案，以衝高提案表現的動機，此證實了假設四：新選制下的立委提案較舊選制下的立委提案平均主提案人數較多。。

表 11：立委提案的主提案人數

	第五屆	第六屆	第七屆
平均數	2.91	3.13	3.29
標準差	2.70	2.75	2.49
中位數	2.00	2.00	3.00

料來源：整理自立法院資訊檢索系統國會圖書館法律提案系統。

七、新舊選制下選區服務與立法問政的取捨比較

從前面的分析得知，新制下的立委既有動機去從事選區服務，也有動機去作立法問政，然而，若時間資源有限下，究竟立委會比較用心在哪一部份工作？我們詢問立委助理：「如果我們把立法委員的工作簡單的分為選區服務與立法問政兩類，並且把選區服務和立法問政放在天秤的兩端，您認為貴委員在哪一方面的用心比較多？」表 12 顯示在選制改革前後的差異，在選制改革之後，顯然立委有愈來愈偏向選區服務的趨向。比較第七屆第一波與第二波的調查結果可以發現，在選舉期間，立委對選區的關注會明顯較多些，然而，第七屆立委即便在平常時期所表現出的對選區的關注，也不亞於第五屆立委在選舉期間對選區的關注。此顯示選制改革之後，立委對選區的關注較之以前更有過之，而相對上來說，當選區服務與立法問政無法兼顧時，立委會犧牲立法問政，畢竟新選制下每一選區僅有 1 名立委，立委無法推諉塞責，或當免費搭乘者，此證實了假設五，在無法兼顧選區服務與立法問政時，新選制下的立委比舊選制下的立委更傾向重視選區服務。

表 12:區域立委以選區服務或立法問政為重

	第五屆 期末	第六屆 期中	第六屆 期末	第七屆 期中	第七屆 期末
選區服務	50.4	54.0	n.a.	51.7	61.2
立法問政	49.6	46.0	n.a.	48.3	38.8

資料來源：盛杏媛（2003b；2006-2008；2011-2012）。

說明：表中數字為百分比。

八、結論

本文探討在新舊選制下，區域立委在選區服務與立法問政的變遷狀況。研究發現顯示，在舊制下，許多立委有強烈的動機經營選區，而在新選制下，一選區僅有一席立委，立委更必須深耕選區，花時間、心力與資源在選區，以建立個人選票，因此經營選區的動機更有過之。同時在另一方面，立委也有立法問政的強

烈動機，一方面立委有用立法職權去帶好處到選區的動機，以與地方上有實力的政治人物抗衡，另一方面，為了獲取選區過半數選民的支持，立委也有尋求政黨選票的動機，因此必須與同黨委員一起在立法院制訂政策與法律，以建立政黨集體聲勢，以有利於自己的連任。

只是立委雖然有立法問政的必要，卻並非有必要擔任積極發起、草擬與推動立法的角色，因為立委在立法的資源、時間與能力受到限制，而行政院是制訂政策與法案的重要部門（盛杏媛，forthcoming），且政治上政以黨成，政黨、尤其是執政黨才是制訂政策與法律的樞紐，立委在立法上表現出對立法問政的關心，提出小規模的立法提案，然後將大部份的立法責任委諸行政院與政黨，然後扮演遵循政黨主導的角色。而且一旦立委面臨到選區服務與立法問政的兩難時，新選制下的立委較會犧牲立法問政，畢竟新選制下每一選區僅有 1 名立委，立委無法推諉塞責。

從上述的分析，發現立委在選區服務與立法問政方面，既是兩難，但也互為幫補，兩難表現在立委的時間與資源有限，若將之放在選區，則極可能疏於立法問政，但是，在另一方面，立委也可能將攸關選區利益的立法方案提出於立法院，在立法院提案所需花費的成本不高的情況下，立委之間可以彼此互相幫助，在立法院中帶好處到選區，過去在舊選制下立委已然表現出上述的行為模式，而在新選制下，此一代表模式更被增強。

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附錄 A：本研究使用的調查訪問問卷題目

A1. 請問貴委員總共雇用多少專職助理？_____位，平均年資_____年。

其中國會助理有幾位？_____位，平均年資_____年。

選區服務處助理幾位？_____位，平均年資_____年。

A2. 請問貴委員總共雇用多少兼職助理？(臨時性的不包括在內) _____位。

A4. 平均來說，請問貴委員（包括助理）每星期受理多少件選民服務個案？
（包括國會辦公室與選區服務處）_____件。

A5. 平均來說，請問貴委員每星期收到多少張紅白帖？
（包括國會辦公室與選區服務處各種婚、喪、喜、慶的邀請）

紅帖_____張

白帖_____張

A6. 請問您，當貴委員收到紅白帖時，他會怎麼處理？

- 1 不予理會
- 2 禮到人不到
- 3 僅偶爾選擇性參加（委員自己或派代表參加）
- 4 部份參加（委員自己或派代表參加）
- 5 幾乎全部參加（委員自己或派代表參加）
- 6 其它（請說明）_____

B1. 請問您，在立法院會期中，貴委員平均每星期花在下列事項上的時間有多少？

a. 立法院中 _____小時

b. 選區 _____小時

c. 自己的事業 _____小時

C1. 如果我們把立法委員的工作簡單的分為選區服務與立法問政兩類，並且把選區服務和立法問政放在天秤的兩端，您認為貴委員在哪一方面的用心比較多？

- 1. 選區服務
- 2. 立法問政

D1.有人說，自新選制以來立法委員受理個案的種類更為廣泛多元，也有人說是較為縮減，請問貴辦公室的狀況是？

- 1.廣泛多元
- 2.縮減
- 3.沒有改變

D2.有人說，自新選制以來立法委員受理選民服務的個案數有所提高，也有人說是較為縮減，請問貴辦公室的狀況是？

- 1.增加
- 2.減少
- 3.沒有改變

Determinants for Reelection — A Comparative Study between Taiwanese Old and New Electoral Systems

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Abstract

Taiwanese electoral reform emerged in the year of 2005. It provides a chance of “natural experiment” to examine the matter of electoral systems regarding the determinants for reelection—party endorsement or personal performance. Due to intra-party and inter-party competition, personal votes and party votes dominate Taiwanese electoral results for a long time. Legislators won reelection based either on their individual attributes and activities or on party support. Does personal votes and party votes remain their determination under the operation of the new electoral system? This research explores the campaign pictures of the new electoral system, and illustrates the matter of electoral-system designs toward electoral calculations.

Taiwanese old electoral system consisted of a multi-member district single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system and a closed-list proportional (PR) representative system. In June 2005, it was replaced by a mixed system of single member district (SMD) plural system plus a closed-listed PR system. This research conducted a series of surveys on legislator assistants (1996 to 2011) and collected longitudinal data on legislators’ case work, constituency services and introduction of bills. Heckman probit regression model is employed to explain the results of reelection. Exploring the determinants for reelection under Taiwanese old and new electoral systems, we may be able to interpret the dynamics of legislators’ behavior.

Key words: Personal vote, party vote, electoral reform

I. Introduction

What are determinants for reelection? Do legislators' motivations of personal vote or party vote remain their determination under the operation of different electoral systems? Do inter-party and intra-party competitions provide strong incentives to promote party vote or personal vote across the electoral reform? This study attempts to answer these questions by examining the significant associations between reelection results and the determinants. Taiwanese electoral reform provides a chance of "natural experiment" to examine the matter of electoral systems regarding the determinants for reelection—personal performance or party endorsement.

Before 2005, Taiwanese electoral system consisted of a multi-member district single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system and a closed-list proportional representation (PR) system. Due to the multi-member design, high intra-party and inter-party competition, district legislators sought to enhance their personal vote and party vote, and attracted constituency support through either their party identities or their personal reputation, activities, qualification and records (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1984; 1987; Sheng, 2006; 2009). However, legislators kept the track to pursue constituent interests rather than party interests if there are conflicts between them. Considerable casework services, bills introduced for particularistic interests and pork barrel projects emerged in exchange for constituency support (Hawang, 1994; Luor, 2001; 2004; Sheng 2005; 2006; 2009; Luor & Liao 2009). The representative behavior and electoral calculations were built upon personal-vote-seeking and party-vote-seeking incentives which drove the electoral campaign dynamics.

After June 2005, Taiwanese electoral system has become a mixed system of single member district plurality system (SMD) plus a closed-listed PR system. Since then, the dynamics of legislative process and congressional election campaigns have altered. Due to the single-member-district design and the greater inter-party competition, legislators realized that party labels stand for their political courses and, in extent, bring some degrees of electoral support from voters. The inherent political culture and belief systems drove the ideology in Taiwanese party politics. Candidates get votes inevitably based on their party labels and party reputation. Besides, due to intra-party competition, legislators have become more particularistic and localized if

compared to legislators under the old electoral system (Sheng, 2009). They were encouraged to claim credits from their legislative behavior and constituency-service effort, but avoid the blames from their constituencies. As the consequence of intra-party and inter-party competition, party endorsement and personal performance both could be important for legislators' political career (Sheng, 2009).

This study plans to compare the determinants for reelection under Taiwanese old and new electoral systems. Previous studies explored the incumbency advantages and personal-vote incentives for U.S. representatives and British members of parliament (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1984). The findings indicated that incumbency advantages and personal vote indeed existed in Great Britain and the U.S., and which have greater effect on the U.S. representatives than on British MP. Constituency services, especially, contribute to personal votes in the U.S. electoral arenas.

Carey and Shugart (1995) further analyzed incentives to enhance personal vote across different electoral systems. Some variables were recognized as to enhance personal vote-seeking behavior: 1) the lack of party leaders' control over the rank on ballots; 2) votes gotten from individual votes or from co-partisans; and 3) the decisions of votes based on a single intra-party vote (rather than multiple votes or a party-level vote). Some literature detected factors affecting congressional reelection in Taiwanese 4th legislature (Wu, 2003), personal vote-seeking behavior in Taiwanese legislature (Sheng, 2006), and Taiwanese legislators' behavioral reaction to the new electoral system (Sheng, 2009). Wu (2003) analyzed the factors influencing legislators' behavior under the old Taiwanese electoral system (SNTV). She found that party endorsement, legislative activities, constituency services and personal reputation have effect on the results of reelection. Sheng (2006) detected legislators' incentives to propose particularistic benefit bills. The research results indicated that legislators from SNTV system, smaller districts and homogeneous constituencies are more likely to promote particularistic benefit bills. Sheng (2009) further found that Taiwanese legislators under the new SMD system are even more localized and particularistic; however, facing the large inter-party competition, legislators simultaneously behave cohesively with their partisans to enhance their party reputation.

Most of pervious research focused on incentives formulating personal vote or party vote in elections. Generally the lack of the previous work is a comparative study focusing on a single-country context to interpret the matter of electoral designs across

eras of electoral reform and transitions. A longitudinal-data research is needed to compare personal-vote to party-vote effects on reelections under Taiwanese old and new electoral systems. By doing so, we may further our understandings on legislators' election calculations across different electoral systems.

This research conducted a series of surveys on legislator assistants. We collected longitudinal data (1996 to 2011) of legislators' constituency services, and secondary data overtime for legislators' introduction of bills, party-endorsed candidate lists and legislators' local representative background. Heckman probit regression model is employed to explain the results of reelection. In empirical legislators under certain conditions would be more likely to enter the reelection campaigns and then have greater probabilities to obtain the renew terms. By employing the two-stage Heckman probit model, the latent factors to affect the participation in reelection are taken into account, and the potential biases due to nonrandom sample selection could be avoided. The first stage uses a selection equation to estimate the participation of reelection campaigns, and the second stage adopts a corrected probit model to estimate the results of reelection. Through the conduction of the longitudinal research, we may be able to interpret the dynamics of legislators' behavior regarding the matters of electoral-system designs.

The following paragraphs, firstly, describe the determination of personal vote and party vote across different electoral systems; and, secondly, address the dynamics in Taiwanese old and new electoral systems. The next section states the theoretical hypotheses and the conceptual framework in this research. We then represent the research method, measurement and descriptive statistics of variables, research finding and discussion, and conclusions.

II. Personal-vote or Party-vote Orientation across Different Electoral Systems

Legislators, as single-minded reelection seekers, would behave in the ways centering on electoral connection and maximizing the probabilities to be reelected (Mayhew, 1974). Legislators concerning reelection, as the consequence of rational choice, behave in some ways toward electoral calculations and attempt to enhance their personal and party reputation (Mayhew, 1974; Carey & Shugart, 1995). Personal

vote, by definition, is the vote obtained based on candidates' personal attributes, qualification, activities and connections to constituencies. Party vote, by definition, is the vote counted on party affiliation, party-ideology labels and party reputation (Cain, et. al., 1984; 1987; Sheng, 2006). On one hand, if legislators have to rely on personal vote to obtain a renew term, they have strong incentives to promote their personal reputation and construct dense personal connections with the constituencies. On the other hand, if legislators attract electoral support based on party support, they have strong incentives to promote their party interests and party reputation, and demonstrate their strong connections to party decision-making structures.

An “efficient secret” model (Cox, 1987) describes a party-centric representative style in Britain’s legislature. Because of the party-oriented interaction between party and members of parliament, Britain’ parliament elections became party-centered instead of candidate-centered. Britain has single-member-district (SMD) plurality system with party endorsement. Their party leaders present a fixed ballot, their voters cast a single vote for one party, and the votes pool across whole party. Legislators rely largely on their party support to obtain a renew term, and, consequently, act collectively to promote their party reputation. The representative styles became more partisan, party-oriented and policy-oriented (Shugart & Carey, 1992: 168-169; Carey & Shugart, 1995). In order to secure reelection, British members of parliament demonstrate their party loyalty and behave in the ways to increase their party votes. On the contrary to the British style, legislators in the United States rely more on personal vote rather than party vote to win the reelections. American congressional election adopts primary systems. Their party leaders do not control access to ballots or rank (Carey & Shugart, 1995). As the results, the representative style is more constituency-oriented because they should rely on personal vote to compete with other candidates in the primary elections (Cain, Ferejohn & Fiorina, 1984; Carey & Shugart, 1995). Personal resource and individual support from constituencies are determinants for the reelection results. Providing casework services, promoting pork barrel projects to the constituencies, introducing particularistic and localized bills became popular strategies to please district constituencies and specific interest groups (Mayhew, 1974; Fiorina, 1980; 1989; Jacobson, 1992).

Legislators’ personal-vote or party-vote seeking behavior may emerge because of the consequence of electoral designs. Carey and Shugart (1995) indicate that

candidates in congressional elections under multi-member district single non-transferable vote (SNTV) system, open-list proportional representation (PR) system, and single-member-district system with open-endorsement designs (i.e. primary system) would be more likely to rely on personal vote to win the elections. On the contrary, candidates under single-member-district (SMD) plurality system with a party leader endorsement and closed-list PR system would be more likely to count on party vote to achieve electoral success (Carey & Shugart, 1995:425).

Electoral-system designs matter the determinants for congressional elections. Brazil has an open-list PR system in the congressional elections. Their legislators face fierce intra-party competition, thus have strong incentives to promote personal vote built upon individual behavior, personal qualities and connections to constituencies. Bringing “pork” to the constituencies—such as specific grants, infrastructure projects and subsidies, would provide special favor to the constituencies, strengthen legislators’ personal vote bases, and build positive relationships with voters. Particularistic bills to further parochial benefits would be helpful toward reelection (Ames, 1995; 2002). Personal performance becomes determinant and drive vote-obtained motivation and legislators’ representative styles.

Before 1994 Japan had a SNTV electoral system with a parliamentary cabinet government structure. Although the parliamentary structure inherently favors the determination of party vote (i.e. Britain), the effects from SNTV electoral system provide strong incentives to promote parochial benefits. The dominance of personal vote could be reflected by the uneven and financially inefficient allocation of public funding due to the campaign promises of candidates. In fact, around 30 percent of the budget is allocated particularly and parochially (Shugart and Carey, 1992: 169). Ramseyer and Rosenbluth (1993: 16-37) indicate that party leaders in Japan even help assign legislators to particular committees so they could promote the pork and claim credits easily. It is party decision that fosters legislators’ personal-vote-seeking effort and encourages the promotion of parochial and localized interests.

The importance of electoral system regarding determinants for reelection has been discussed extensively; Carey & Shugart (1995:426) argue that the Germany-style mixed electoral system (with a closed-list formula and votes pooling across whole party) has the smallest increase in personal-vote values. The electoral designs imply higher importance of party vote rather than personal vote. However,

according to Lancaster & Patterson's (1990) and Stratmann & Baur's (2002) observations, Germany's plurality-SMD legislators provide relatively stronger incentives to promote the pork if compared to the PR legislators.

A further discussion of determinants for reelection under the SMD system is needed. Since Taiwan has experienced the electoral reform from SNTV system to SMD system in the district representative elections, a comparative study of determinants for reelection under the old and new systems would be meaningful. It provides an unusual opportunity of natural experiment which may promote our understandings about the change or continuity of legislators' electoral calculations across electoral systems.

III. The Old and New Electoral Systems in Taiwan

Electoral designs in Taiwanese old and new systems

Before 2005, the electoral system in Taiwan was a SNTV system plus a closed-list PR system. Taiwanese party leaders presented party ballot, but voters may "disturb" the list (Carey & Shugart, 1995). Within the total 225 seats, around three fourth were elected through SNTV system, and around one fourth were selected through a closed-list PR system.

The electoral system reformed in June 2005. The old system was replaced by a mixed system of SMD plurality system plus a closed-list PR system. There are two ballots—one is for electing single candidate per district, and the other one is for party. Within the total 113 seats, approximately two third were elected through SMD plurality system, and approximately one third were selected through a closed PR system. The following Table 1 shows the designs of Taiwanese old and new electoral systems.

Table 1 Taiwanese old and new electoral systems

	The old system	The new system
Total seats	225	113
Formula	168 from SNTV 49 from closed list PR 8 aboriginal representatives	73 from SMD 34 from closed list PR 6 aboriginal representatives
Magnitude of a district	One to m (m= magnitude of the district)	One
District divisions	A county	Depending upon the number of population
Number of eligible voters per district	Four districts less than 200,000, 25 districts more than 200,000, the one district more than 1,200,000.	Most districts around 200,000 to 300,000.
Vote-obtained percentage to win the election	1/m percent of votes plus one vote	50 percent of votes plus one vote (in most districts)

Source: Sheng (2009: 33)

Behavioral incentives of Taiwanese district representatives under the old and new systems

SNTV system for district representatives: Before mid-1980s

Kuomintang (KMT) was the dominant party in Taiwanese legislature before mid-1980s. Its party members occupied over 80 percent seats in the Legislative Yuan. Due to the multiple-member design under the SNTV system, the KMT strategy was to nominate multiple candidates and, thus, resulted in the potentials of intra-party competition. For controlling over the negative impact from intra-party competition, KMT employed a campaign strategy called “Responsible Zone Strategy” (Liu, 1990) so that every candidate was responsible for one small and specific geographical area and get “not too many but enough votes” to win the elections. Every candidate’s votes were limited by party strategies to ensure the moderate distribution of votes and to maximize numbers of KMT seats in the legislatures. The election dynamics was operated by party-calculation instead of personal-calculation. It was party vote factors that drove behavioral incentives for most Taiwanese legislators during that period.

Under the successful party operation, more than 95 percent KMT candidates won the elections or obtained a renew term, and hereby the party effect enhanced legislators' loyalty to the party line (Ho, 1986).

SNTV system for district representatives: 1986 ~ 2000

During the year of 1986 to 2000, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) emerged and increased its competitive capacity toward legislative elections. With the lack of long-established networks with constituencies, DPP candidates had the incentives to rely largely on party label and work cohesively to “grasp votes from the majority party, the KMT” (Sheng, 2009: 12). They needed to hang together and take actions collectively to strengthen their party election capacity. And, they had to aggregate issue power to impress voters and further change voters' mind to cast votes to DPP instead of KMT. Although the SNTV system allowed multiple members per district in which personal vote and intra-party competition could be inherently emphasized, DPP candidates had incentives to promote their party reputation and, based on the party label win the election. (Sheng, 2008).

On the contrary to DPP legislators, KMT legislators faced an increasing intra-party competition during the time period from 1986 to 2000. The moderate vote-obtained rate of KMT no longer guaranteed the reelection. KMT candidates needed to increase their votes, and, even, they had to get the votes from supporters of their co-partisans. Intra-party competition became fierce. KMT candidates and legislators with reelection incentives behaved in the manners to enhance their personal vote. They became pork-barreling oriented, casework-service oriented, and constituency oriented (Hawang, 1994; Sheng, 2000; Batto, 2005; Luor & Hsieh, 2008). Even, legislators would NOT keep the loyalty to their party but stand on their constituency line if there were some contradictions that occur between party and constituency preference (Sheng, 1996; 2001a).

SNTV system for district representatives: 2000 ~ 2004

In the year of 2000, DPP won the presidential election and became the ruling party. In 2001, DPP became the largest party after the legislative elections. Some KMT legislators left KMT and turned to People First party (PFP), which would contribute to such decline of the KMT in the legislature. The KMT competitive

capacity was weakened and the rest KMT seats in the legislature were only 30.2 percent (while the DPP members occupied 38.7 percent of seats in the legislature). The remainder KMT legislators perceived increasing inter-party competition in the legislative dynamics. Simultaneously, the other party—Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU) emerged and stood the extreme line of political ideology toward Taiwan's independence from China. Based on the party propositions, two party coalitions had formulated in the legislative action arenas—pen-blue coalition (KMT+PPF) & pen-green coalition (DPP+TSU). The pen-blue coalition has been recognized as to be closer to China (unification) in the unified-independent spectrum, while pen-green is opposite (independence). On one hand, coalition members acted corporately in order to balance the other side, and the inter-coalition competition became severe especially facing substantial legislation. On the other hand, some intra-coalition competition became obvious because members in one coalition shared common supporting groups (Yu, 2005). Legislators had even higher incentives toward personal vote in order to distinguish themselves from their co-partisans. Particularistic-interest, small-impact, narrow-scope and non-partisan bills were introduced by legislators with the considerations to benefit their constituencies (Sheng, 2006; Luor & Hsieh, 2008; Luor & Liao, 2009).

SMD system for district representatives: after 2005

Before the 2008 legislative election, several PFP legislators decided to return to KMT, and this movement made KMT “again” became the biggest party in Taiwanese legislature. On the contrary, DPP faced serious corruption scandals which led to the decline of DPP and brought DPP legislators a very disadvantaged situation toward reelection.

Under the new SMD system, each party endorsed one candidate per district, thus party-endorsement status stood for party support and could ensure certain degree of vote obtained toward election/reelection. Legislators had increasing incentives to pursue party vote. However, the incentives to promote personal vote would be strengthened as well. Because there was only one representative per district, it was hard to avoid constituency blame in case the legislator was idle. On the other hand, the one-representative design did not allow any free rider of the “pork” effort. The identifiability for individual legislator is higher under the SMD system. It was easily

to claim credits for accountability and local development effort, so legislators acted to maximize their constituency benefits in order to exchange electoral support from their constituency (Lancaster, 1986; Carey & Shugart, 1995; Norris, 2004; Sheng, 2006). Besides, prior to the recent legislative l elections, both KMT and DPP have conducted primary elections where the candidate nominations were decided approximately 30 percent based on party member votes and 70 percent according to citizen surveys (Hu, 2007). Intra-party competition became fierce. Legislators considering reelection need to compete with local politicians and co-partisans for obtaining opportunities of party nomination. They had strong incentives to establish patron-client relationship with the constituencies. In fact, incentives to promote personal vote and party vote would be both emphasized in Taiwanese new electoral system. Due to intensive inter-party and intra-party competition, the representative behavior of Taiwanese legislators underlined higher party loyalty and constituency identifiability. The following Table 2 summarizes behavioral incentives of Taiwanese legislators across electoral reform.

Table 2 Behavioral incentives of Taiwanese legislators across electoral systems

Electoral systems	Period	Major Party	Behavioral incentives	Reasons
S N T V	1980s	KMT	Party vote	1. KMT dominance & legislators who are loyal to the party line can be nominated. 2. Responsible Zone Strategy
	1986~ 2000	DPP	Party vote	1. Aggregating issue power to impress voters 2. Grasping votes from KMT
		KMT	Personal vote	Getting votes from a co-partisan is easier.
	2000~ 2004	KMT DPP	Party vote Personal vote	Inter & intra-party competition
S M D	After 2005	KMT DPP	Party vote Personal vote	1. Fierce inter-party competition in election campaigns 2. Fierce competition in candidates selected within the party

Note: The electoral systems are referred to district representative elections.

Source: The authors

In short, behavioral incentives are shaped by rational calculation of actors. Literature indicates that when Taiwanese legislators face strong inter-party competition, they act collectively to promote party reputation and may aggregate their

effort to enhance party vote. When legislators perceive fierce intra-party competition, they would pay much attention on pork barrel, local development infrastructure projects, constituency services as well as particularistic interest bills. Personal-vote incentives drive legislators' representative behavior. Previous research points out the connection between legislators' behavior and personal-vote/party-vote incentives across Taiwanese electoral-reform transition. Based on their findings, this research tries to further examine the determinants for reelection across Taiwanese old and new systems (the research scope is SNTV and SMD systems for district representatives). In case personal vote/party vote determine reelection results, legislators could ensure that they are doing the right things and in the right track toward reelection.

IV. Determinants for Reelection: Theoretical Hypotheses

Taiwan has experienced an electoral reform since 2005—from SNTV to SMD systems for district representatives. Under the SNTV system, each voter casts only one ballot for a specific candidate, and a certain number of candidates with the most votes are elected regardless their party affiliations. Candidates of small parties or even independent candidates have the opportunities to be elected as long as he/she can obtain sufficient votes. Candidates of big parties face a great intra-party competition in that big parties usually nominate more than one candidate per district. They may lose the election campaigns sometimes because of the competition from co-partisans. Therefore, candidates from the same party are diverse regarding their electoral fates. In contrast, under SMD system, candidates from the same party share the same electoral fate. Due to the single-member design, political parties nominate only one candidate per district. Intra-party competition is reduced and candidates act aggregately to enhance their party competition capacity. Therefore, candidates of big parties are more advantaged if compared to those of small parties and independent candidates. As Maurice Duverger (1954) argued, single member plurality inherently favors two-party system. Under the mechanics of single representative/per district, small parties are more difficult to win seats because the electoral designs are bound to the results that fewer parties will occupy the seats of parliament (Farrell, 2001). Due to psychological considerations, voters do not waste their votes to smaller parties but

rather vote to big parties in that they are more likely to put the election promises into effect. As the results, big-party-endorsed candidates demonstrated their political identities because it would bring some degrees of electoral support from voters. Endorsed by the big parties significantly increases the probabilities to be reelected; on the other hand, independent candidates suffer the lack of party identities and are less likely to have the chance to win the reelection. Under the new SMD system, party endorsement, especially endorsement from a big party, plays an even more important role on reelection if compared to the old SNTV system.

Party endorsement hypothesis

H1-1: Legislators in the same party share the same electoral fate in the New SMD system compared to the Old SNTV system.

H1-2: Legislators of big parties have greater opportunities to be reelected than those of smaller parties and independents under the SMD system.

Besides party endorsement, personal performance would not be ignored under the old SNTV and new SMD systems. Since the emergence of DPP, KMT legislators had perceived that party reputation alone could not guarantee to be reelected so they had the incentives to enhance personal votes. Under the old SNTV system, legislators faced the challenges from co-partisans and local politicians due to increasing intra-party competition. They were encouraged to introduce bills for particularistic and narrow-scope interests and to establish patron-client relationships for exchanging electoral support from constituencies. Pork-barreling oriented, casework-service oriented, personal-connection oriented and local-representative oriented behavior seemed to provide more certainty for reelection (Fiorina, 1989).

Entering into the new SMD-system era, Taiwanese legislative election would emphasize not only party votes but also personal votes. Legislators who introduce more bills, service more caseworks, and spend more time on constituency services, would be more likely to get endorsement in nomination and obtain the renew term in election. It might be individual increasing identifiability that enhances the effect of personal vote. The most essential difference between Taiwanese old and new electoral

systems is “the number of representatives” per district. Because per district had more than one representatives, legislators under SNTV may have choices to be either a hard worker in the Legislative Yuan to make more laws, or be a loyal server in the constituency. Both ways may bring them personal vote. Approximately two thirds legislators chose to be the former one, while one third decided to be the later one (Sheng, 2000: 96). However, when the game rule changed from multi-member to single-member design, legislators needed to please most constituents in order to be elected. “This may lead them centripetal in issue positions, or take a vague position in controversial issues” (Cox, 1990; Sheng, 2009:15). Instead of being identified with an extremely political course, legislators would rather play a safe game and spend more time on constituency services. Given that personal performance is a direct way to establish reputation and identification, constituency-oriented activities would be more popular and have a greater effect on reelection under the new system. Spending more time on constituency services seems to bring more electoral support to the legislators.

Personal performance hypothesis

H2: Personal performance is determinant for reelection in both Taiwanese old and new electoral systems.

Constituency services hypothesis

H3: Time spent on constituency services becomes more important in the new system than in the old one.

The following Figure 1 shows the conceptual framework of this research. Under different electoral systems, the determinants for reelection would consist of party endorsement as well as personal performance.




Figure 1 Conceptual framework

Source: The authors

V. Modeling and Estimation—Heckman Probit Regression

Through taking party votes and personal votes into account, we may be able to explain the results of reelections. The outcomes of reelection is estimated through a two-step approach—Heckman probit selection regression. The first step uses a sample selection equation to diagnose the problems due to nonrandom sample distribution. Observations for reelection candidates suffer from nonrandom selection problems; that is, legislators under certain conditions would be more likely to enter the reelection campaigns and then have more probabilities to obtain the renew terms. This study employs the Heckman selection technique to diagnose such potential errors. Several factors are included in the first-step equation to estimate the participation in reelection campaigns. Corrected probit models are employed in the second-step operation to predict the results of reelection.

Heckman probit regression (Heckman, 1976) is applicable to estimate the dichotomous outcomes of the dependent variable—win or lose the reelection campaigns. It is a bivariate probit model with a designed sample selection procedure (Meernik, Krueger, & Poe, 1998; Blanton, 2000). The selection equation is adopted with a LR test to ensure the necessity of the selection procedure, and then a corrected probit model is utilized to estimate the results of reelection. Through applying the “nested” bivariate probit model, factors generating the potential of reelection are taken into account, and the biases in the probit models could be avoided.

Sample selection equation

The first-stage sample selection equation estimating the participation in reelection campaigns contains the following factors: 1) victory margins in the last election campaign; 2) bills introduced during the incumbent period; 3) attendance of constituency ceremony invitations; and 4) party job in legislature.

Victory margins in the last election campaign stands for the magnitude of constituency support in the elections. Experiencing a strong victory margin generates an advantaged image that legislators can remain the constituency support and obtain a similar magnitude of support again in the coming reelection. Hence, the higher magnitude of victory margin in the last election campaign the more likely the legislators decide to participate in the coming reelection campaign.

Introduction of bills and attendance of constituency wedding and funeral ceremony invitations establish a positive image of personal performance during the incumbent periods. When a legislator has more effort on bill introduction and constituency ceremony attendance, he/she expects to have higher personal reputation and more social networks with the constituency. Therefore, they would be more likely to participate in the reelection campaigns.

Occupying party positions in the legislature (the so called party whips) implies greater party support in the legislative campaigns. With party support, legislators have a better chance to be nominated and participate in the reelection campaign.

Including the above four factors in the selection equation, the models would suffer fewer bias problems due to nonrandom sample selection. The findings from statistical results would be more convincing.

VI. Measurement, Data Collection and Descriptive Statistics

For detecting the determinants for reelection, one dependent and two sets of independent variables are derived from the research hypotheses. The results of reelection (obtaining a renew term or not) stand for the dependent variable; and party endorsement and personal performance are independent variables. The following paragraphs address operative measurement of the variables, the methods of data collection and the descriptive statistics.

A. Dependent variable—Reelection results

The dependent variable in this research is individual reelection results under the old and new electoral systems. If one observation (legislator) wins the reelection in the coming election campaign, he/she is coded as 1=obtaining a renew term. If one observation (legislator) loses the reelection in the following term, the code becomes 0=breaking down the legislator status. Data of the reelection results are coded from the Taiwanese Parliamentary Library Legislative Yuan website.¹

B. Independent variable—Party endorsement

The independent variables in this research are party endorsement and personal performance. The concept of party endorsement is strongly associated with party support in the election campaign circumstance. The operative measurement is party-endorsement status when the observations enter the campaign arenas. If the observation have a party-endorsed identity, he/she is coded as 1=endorsed by the party; if not, he/she is coded as 0=not endorsed by the party. Data of the party-endorsed identity are coded from Taiwanese Central Election Commission historical data website.² Observations are grouped into four categories of party identity—KMT, DPP, small parties and independent candidates.

¹ The Taiwanese Parliamentary library Legislative Yuan website: <http://npl.ly.gov.tw/do/www/commissioner?act=current&blockId=2>, retrieved August 1, 2012 ~ January 9, 2013.

² Taiwanese Central Election Commission historical data website: <http://db.cec.gov.tw/>, retrieved August 1, 2012 ~ January 9, 2013.

C. Independent variables—Personal performance

According to previous conceptual construction, personal performance in Taiwanese legislative election would be associated with legislators' 1) introduction of bills, 2) constituency services. Introducing bills is one of the major patterns of legislative behavior whereas legislators can specifically and practically exercise the legislative power. Numbers of bill introduced, itself, could quantitatively reflect legislators' efforts on law-making. Data of numbers of bill introduced are coded from the Taiwanese Parliamentary Library Legislative Yuan website.

Constituency services could be measured by the number of caseworks undertaken by legislators and the proportion of time spent on constituency services. Constituency services facilitate person-to-person interaction channels and may establish street-level personal connections and social networks. In this research, five surveys were conducted to collect the data of caseworks and the proportion of time spent on constituency services. Each questionnaire survey was conducted three months prior to the reelection date and had 80% and higher responsive rate. The survey respondents were the assistants of the legislators in the 3rd to 7th Legislative Yuan. They were asked the questions: "How many caseworks does your legislator undertake per week?" "How many hours per week does your legislator spend on legislative activities and constituent services?"

The descriptive statistics show that the average numbers of bills introduced by individual legislators increase after the electoral reform (from 3.57 to 5.84 per session). The increased rate is as high as 58.54%. Numbers of caseworks/per week and time proportion of constituency services have a similar trend. Under the new electoral system, the average numbers of caseworks increases 37.97% (from 36.98 to 51.02 per week), and the average time proportion of constituency services increases 24.8% (from 39.32 to 49.07). The following Table 3 summarizes the descriptive statistics.

Table 3 Descriptive statistics of personal performance

Measurement of variables	N		Mean		Std. Dev.		Min		Max	
	Old	New	Old	New	Old	New	Old	New	Old	New
Bill introduced /per session	629	366	3.57	5.84	3.35	6.42	0	0	32.5	37.38
Casework /per week	426	235	36.98	51.02	52.35	64.3	0	0	700	650
Constituency service time proportion (%)	423	247	39.32	49.07	0.21	0.24	0	0	92.86	96.43

Note: The observations include legislators filling a vacant position.

Source: The authors

D. Control variables

Three control variables are included in the statistical models in order to take into account the impact from legislative resources. The control variables are local representative background, the status of chairperson of a standing committee and seniority on legislative experience. Legislative resources may provide legislators more opportunities to facilitate particularistic benefits bills, and further obtain credits on legislative performance and the success of casework operation. Data of chairperson and seniority in legislation are coded from the Taiwanese Parliamentary Library Legislative Yuan website. Local representative background is measured by legislators' occupational background. If the observations have any previous experience in local representatives/legislatives or farmers/fishers associations (cooperatives), he/she is coded as 1=having local representative background; if not, he/she is coded as 0=having no local representative background. Data are recoded from Taiwanese Parliamentary Library Legislative Yuan website.

E. Variables included in the selection equation

Variables included in the selection equation are victory margin in the last election campaign, bill introduced, attendance of constituency ceremony invitations, and party job occupation in legislatives. The measures and data collection for those overlapping with independent variables are previously addressed. Victory margin is measured by the formula = vote-obtained rate/Droop Quota, where Droop Quota= [total valid

$\text{poll}/(\text{seats} + 1)] + 1$ (Droop, 1869; 1881). Data of vote obtained are collected from Taiwanese Central Election Commission historical data website. Data of attendance of constituency invitations are collected by questionnaire surveys.³ Data of party whips are provided by legislative assistants.

VII. Research Findings and Discussion

The following Table 4 shows the statistical results of the Heckman probit models estimating reelection under Taiwanese old and new electoral systems. The Heckman probit models have Wald Chi-Square=23.78 and 3699.53 in the old and new-system models respectively, and the Chi-Square probabilities are both 0.00. The results of Log-Likelihood tests are -320.6759 and -187.4397 respectively. The model-fit examination results show that the Heckman probit models of estimation are necessary if compared to the intercept only models.

³ The survey questionnaires ask “How many wedding/funeral ceremony invitations does your legislator receive per week? And what is his/her attitude toward the invitations?” The answer options are: 5=Attend almost all invitations; 4=Attend some invitations; 3=Attend few or selected invitations; 2=Not attend but give gifts; 1=Not attend and no gift. However, the attitude toward ceremony attendance does not have much difference from the old system to the new one. Although after electoral reform more legislators have the attitude magnitude 5=attend almost all invitations (from 14.31% to 26.23%), most legislators have a moderate attitude toward ceremonies in the both systems (attitude magnitude 3=attend few or selected invitations; 44.52% & 43.99% respectively).

Table 4 Estimation of reelection through the two-stage Heckman probit models

		Coefficients (with standard errors in parentheses)			
		Model1 The old system		Model2 The new system	
Party endorsement					
	KMT endorsement	0.62	(0.24)**	0.92	(0.52)*
	DPP endorsement	0.58	(0.25)**	-0.17	(0.48)
	Independent candidates	-0.52	(0.35)	0.22	(0.61)
Personal performance					
	Bill introduced	0.04	(0.02)*	0.04	(0.02)**
	Casework	0.19	(0.82)**	0.02	(0.08)
	Time proportion of constituency services	-1.25	(0.41)**	1.02	(0.61)*
Control variables					
	Local representative background	-0.14	(0.15)	-0.17	(0.16)
	Chairperson	0.09	(0.17)	-0.26	(0.16)
	Seniority	-0.12	(0.07)	-0.14	(0.08)
Selection models					
	Victory margin	-4.80	(2.74)*	0.60	(0.36)*
	Bill introduced	0.43	(0.02)*	0.01	(0.01)
	Attendance of ceremonies	0.12	(0.04)**	0.04	(0.00)***
	Party whip	-0.42	(0.14)**	0.02	(0.16)
	Observation	348		200	
	/Athrho	0.93	(0.57)	-15.86	(3891.02)
	Wald Chi2(9)	23.78		3699.53	
	Prob > Chi2	0.00		0.00	

*p<0.1, **p<0.05, ***p<0.01

In the old-system model, two categories of party endorsement have positive and significant associations with reelection; they are, “KMT endorsement” and “DPP endorsement”. The estimate of KMT endorsement (.62) is almost the same as that of the DPP endorsement (.58), and both estimates of KMT and DPP endorsement are significantly larger than the estimate of small party endorsement (0). In the new-system model, only the endorsement by the biggest party—KMT has positive and significant associations with reelection. The relative larger gap between estimates of the KMT endorsement (.92) and the DPP endorsement (-.17) shows that candidates of the same party share the same electoral fate in the SMD system. The party endorsement is more important for legislators in the SMD system. Relatively, the KMT endorsement has a greater help for its candidates. This proves that legislators in the same party share the same electoral fate in the SMD system if compared to the SNTV system. In the meantime, legislators of bigger parties are more advantaged under the SMD system if compared to small parties and independent candidates.

Indeed, the new system brought party-to-party competition into stages. The biggest party (KMT) owned the campaign advantages based on its long-established relationships and trust with the constituencies. Also it is advantaged because of the mechanism effect and psychological effect as Duverger mentioned. The secondary party (DPP) was less advantaged due to the impact from some events at the time, such as the corruption of the ex-President Chen Shui Bian, and the Red Shirts protest against Chen Shui Bian. As the results, only KMT endorsement significantly helped the reelection. Under the new system, candidates from small parties and independent candidates have fewer probabilities to win the reelection if compared to the candidates from KMT. The SMD electoral design strengthens the campaign capacity of the biggest parties but, on the other hand, limit the opportunities for smaller parties and independent candidates.

Personal performance has positive and significant association with reelection. The statistical findings prove *the personal performance hypothesis (H2)*. The variables of “bill introduced”(in the two models), “casework” (in the old-system model) and “time proportion of constituency services” (in the new-system model) have positive and significant associations with reelection. The second hypothesis stating that “*Personal performance is determinants for reelection in both Taiwanese old and new electoral systems.*” and the third hypothesis stating that “*time spent on constituency services becomes more important in the new system than in the old one.*” is proved by the statistical results. Indeed, facing fierce intra-party competition, legislators have to enhance their personal performance on legislative activities and constituency services in order to compete with co-partisans and local politicians. Although Taiwanese electoral reform strengthens inter-party competition, single-minded reelection legislators seek to maintain or promote personal votes otherwise other challengers would sense the opportunities to grasp the seats from incumbents. Party endorsement is especially important under the new SMD system, so legislators would like to keep their party support and try to avoid serious challengers from co-partisans. Individual identifiability in districts and the operation of primary elections even stress the determinants of personal-vote factors. Due to the single-representative-per- district design, legislators are easy to claim credits but hard to avoid constituency blame from idle legislations and constituency services. The adoption of primary election further

reinforces intra-party competition where final party-endorsement decisions were approximately 30 percent based on party member vote and 70 percent according to citizen surveys. Legislators perceive the needs to introduce more bills and spend more time on constituency services to demonstrate their accountability and responsiveness.

The proportion of time spent on constituency services (as contrast to legislations) has a negative but significant association with reelection in the old-system model, but positive and significant association with reelection in the new-system model. That means, under the old system, spending more time on legislative activities significantly helps legislators obtain the renew terms, but under the new system, spending more time on constituency services instead of legislations significantly helps the reelection. Indeed, with severer issue polarization in recent Taiwanese elections, legislators would prefer to play a safe game and be centripetal in issue positions. They rather spend more time on constituency services to impress voters, instead of picking up one side to demonstrate their issue positions. Furthermore, under the sharpened inter-party competition in the new system, legislators have to insist on their party line, especially when facing substantial legislations. Although they do introduce more bills in the legislative process, they would be the followers of party decisions or only co-sponsored bills initiated by other legislators. Again, individual identifiability and the adoption primary elections would also contribute to the reasons why legislators prefer to spend more time on constituency services rather than other activities. Spending more time on constituency makes legislators more identifiable, visible and appreciable.

Findings from the selection models

This research includes a selection equation to estimate the participation in reelection campaigns. The findings indicate that “attendance of constituency ceremony invitations” has positive associations in both the old and new-system models, “bill introduced” and “party job in legislatives” have positive in the old-system model, and “victory margin in the last campaign” have positive association in the new-system model. That means, when legislators introduce more bills, occupy legislative party jobs, have a positive attitude toward constituency ceremony invitations, and experience in higher victory margin in election campaign, they would be more likely to participate in the next election campaigns.

It is worth to notice that “victory margin in the last campaign” is NEGATIVE and significant in the old-system model. Taiwanese old SNTV system is a multi-member design. It is possible that, with a high victory margin in the election campaign, the candidates would grasp the votes from co-partisans, and consequently reduce the overall party seats in the parliament (here, thinking of previous mentioned KMT strategy of “Responsible Zone Strategy”). For maximizing the party seats in the parliament and solving the problems of intra-party competition, the party would finally decide to place the high-victory-margin legislators to other positions or put him/her into the closed PR lists, as long as he/she is away from the campaign arenas. As the results, under the old multi-member SNTV electoral system, high victory margin became the obstacle to participate in the reelection campaigns.

VIII. Predicted Probabilities

In observational studies looking at independent variables’ marginal effect (changes of X’s) on the success of dependent variables ($Y=1$) is meaningful and can reveal the substantive significance of determinant predictors (Hanmer & Kalkan, 2013). Predicted probability is referred as the probability of the occurrence of dependent variables. Measuring changes in predicted probabilities for dependent variables would provide a valuable statement to illustrate the effect from multiple independent variables (Gelman & Pardoe, 2007). Especially, this study attempts to compare the determinants for reelection in Taiwanese old and new electoral systems. Evaluating marginal effect of predictors would effectively reflect their difference on reelection predicted probabilities. The following Table 5 shows the marginal effect on predicted probabilities for reelection by the hypothesized predictors. And the $(- \& + \text{standard deviation})/2$ is displayed in parentheses.

In general, marginal effects of predictors are greater in the new-system model than the old one. Regarding the effect of party endorsement, “KMT endorsement” has the highest marginal effect on reelection predicted probabilities and after the electoral reform its effect is even higher. The increase rate is greater than 10 times (from 0.4734 to 5.4391) between the two models. Regarding the effect of personal performance, marginal effects in the new-system model are greater too. It is worth to notice that marginal effects of the predictors “constituency service time rate” is

originally negative, but it becomes positive in the new-system model. The marginal effect of “time proportion of constituency services” changes from -0.3764 to 0.9193. In the old-system model, predictor “casework” generates the highest positive effect on reelection predicted probabilities (marginal effect is 0.0105). In the new-system model, predictor “time proportion of constituency services” has the highest positive marginal effect=0.9193. Associated with the combined effect of independent variables, the determinant predictors are altered and the focus of electoral calculation would be switched as well.

According to the findings from “marginal effect on reelection predicted probability”, the marginal effects of party endorsement and personal performance are greater in the new system than the old one. The statistical results state that the effects from both party endorsement and personal performance on reelection are strengthened in the new SMD system.

Table 5 Marginal effects on reelection predicted probabilities

Variables		Marginal effect (with \pm sd/2 in parenthesis)	
		The old system	The new system
Party endorsement	KMT endorsement	0.4734 (0.2283)	5.4291 (0.9921)
	DPP endorsement	0.4497 (0.2134)	4.7654 (0.9819)
	Small party endorsement	0.1729 (0.0722)	-0.1775 (-0.0279)
	Independent candidates	-0.1729 (-0.0395)	0.1775 (0.0419)
Personal performance	Bill-introduced	0.0105 (0.0409)	0.0197 (0.1304)
	Casework	0.0668 (0.0677)	0.1322 (0.121)
	Time proportion of constituency services	-0.3764 (-0.0654)	0.9193 (0.1391)
Control variables	Local representative background	-0.0521 (-0.026)	0.0721 (0.0349)
	Chairperson	0.0274 (0.0126)	-0.147 (-0.0733)
	Seniority	-0.0269 (-0.0283)	-0.0715 (-0.1017)

Source: The authors

The following Figure 2 & 3 display the trends of predicted probabilities divided by parties and by changes of the predictors “bill introduced” and “casework” in the old and new systems. Every effort from introducing bills or providing casework services may generate different magnitudes of effect on the changes of reelection predicted probabilities across different parties. Interpreting such difference might be meaningful for illustrating the determinants of reelection.

Generally speaking, the slopes of the KMT lines are gentlest in the four figures, and the lines of other parties are the steepest; that means, the marginal effects of every increased “bill introduced” and “casework” are more significant in the observations of other parties if compared to KMT and DPP. The old-system figures indicate that the lines of KMT and DPP are pretty closed; in contrast, in the new-system figures, the lines of DPP move ahead the other-party lines. That implies, the electoral reform alters election campaign patterns: It enlarges the distance between DPP and KMT, and expands the marginal effect of personal performance especially for smaller political parties.




Figure 2 Predicted probabilities by changes of bills introduced

Source: The authors




Figure 3 Predicted probabilities by changes of caseworks

Source: The authors

IX. Conclusions

Taiwan has experienced an electoral reform since 2005, which provide a “natural experiment” to examine the effect of electoral designs on the results of reelection. Party endorsement and personal performance contribute to the determinants for reelection according to previous observations; however, a comparative study focusing on a single-country context to interpret the matter of electoral designs is still needed. This study conducted a series of surveys on legislator

assistants and collected secondary data on legislative activities, legislators' representative backgrounds as well as victory margins in the elections. The data of constituency services, casework and attitude on ceremony invitations are collected by questionnaire surveys. The methods of two-stage Heckman probit regression and predicted probabilities of the outcomes are employed in this research.

The research findings indicate that both party-vote and personal-vote factors contribute to the determinants for reelection under Taiwanese old and new systems. Nevertheless, compared to the old SNTV system, the new SMD system moves closer to party-vote determination due to the party-to-party competition in the election campaigns. Legislators endorsed by a party may significantly affect their reelection results—win or lose in election. Legislators from the big party, KMT, have a better chance of reelection, while legislators from small parties and independent candidates are less likely to be reelected. These findings prove the Duverger's law, that is, plurality rule elections structured within single-member districts tends to favor a two-party system.

Given this, we still could not underestimate the determination of personal performance. Under the new SMD system, legislators have a high identifiability; that is, legislators are easy to claim credits from their effort on legislation and constituency services, but hard to avoid blame from idleness. There is no free-ride space due to the design of single representative per district. Legislators who have single-minded-reelection incentives would dedicate to maximize the constituency benefits in order to obtain electoral support.

Besides, due to severe intra-party competition, legislators perceive the needs to enhance their personal reputation (and campaign capacity) in order to grasp the opportunities of party endorsement. Especially in recent Taiwanese elections, party member votes and citizen surveys were conducted prior to party-endorsement decisions. Legislators, thus, undertake more constituency services and introduce more bills to demonstrate their accountability and responsiveness; otherwise serious challengers emerge and catch the party-endorsement chances. Good performance on services and legislation seem to provide more certainty on party endorsement as well as reelection. The long-established reputation of the incumbents would deter the challenges from "serious" co-partisans. It is personal performance that promotes party-endorsement opportunities and further ensures to win the reelection.

The determinants for reelection provide incentives and drive legislators' representative behavior. In extent to party endorsement and personal performance, the research findings imply that legislators would stand their party lines in the legislative dynamics and simultaneously take care of their constituency benefits. Due to individual identifiability and concerns for constituency connections, spending time on constituency services seems more important than on legislation. Legislators, as rational actors, behave in the manners to maximize their self-interests and calculate the outcomes of their effort to cultivate their personal votes which in some degrees extends the opportunities for next party endorsement, and further grasps opportunities of winning in elections.

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科技部補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2014/04/26

科技部補助計畫	計畫名稱: 選區服務與立法問政:選制變遷前後的比較
	計畫主持人: 盛杏媛
	計畫編號: 100-2410-H-004-096-MY2 學門領域: 政治理論
無研發成果推廣資料	

100 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：盛杏溪		計畫編號：100-2410-H-004-096-MY2					
計畫名稱：選區服務與立法問政：選制變遷前後的比較							
成果項目		量化			單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）	
		實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數（含實際已達成數）	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	1	0%	篇	已投稿，但評審結果還未出來。
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	1	1	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（本國籍）	碩士生	6	6	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
博士後研究員		2	2	100%			
專任助理		0	0	100%			
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	1	0	0%	篇	論文初稿已完成，目前正在修改，之後會投稿。
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	1	1	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（外國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		

<p>其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)</p>	<p>本研究計畫所蒐集的資料，期中立委助理的調查研究將公開供學術界使用。</p>
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	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0	

科技部補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

已發表兩篇研討會論文，中文論文並已投稿 TSSCI 期刊，英文論文正在修改中。

盛杏媛，2013. 〈再論選區服務與立法問政：選制改革前後的比較〉，「國會與政府體制」學術研討會，5 月 17-18 日，台北：東吳大學。

Sheng, Shing-Yuan and Ssu-Hsien Chen, 2013. 'Determinants for Reelection: A Comparison between Taiwanese Old and New Electoral Systems.' Midwest Political Science Association Annual Meeting, Midwest Political Science Association. April, 10-14, Chicago, U.S.A.

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

一、學術價值：2005 年 6 月臺灣修改立委選舉制度，此一制度的變革，提供了一個去觀察制度變遷後，立委行為產生變遷或持續的一個準實驗的情境，此一研究機會，不僅對臺灣立委行為的理解有十分重要的意義，對於全球的國會研究也有莫大的意義，因為從一個複數選區單記不可讓渡投票制，到比例代表與單一選區相對多數制的混合制的選制變遷，世界各國例子不多，比較接近的例子是日本，但是仍然不盡相同。如此提供了一個與國會研究中重要理論對話與重新檢視的機會。

二、應用價值：此一研究得以理解立委行為及其背後的原因，也為日後修改立法制度、或進一步修改選舉制度，提供了一個事實的經驗證據作為參考。