

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 成果報告

退化、生命與倫理(第 2 年) 研究成果報告(完整版)

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計畫主持人：邱彥彬

計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：李奕青
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中 華 民 國 101 年 12 月 11 日

中文摘要：生命與死亡的辯證，是自由主義的生命政治最引人非議之處，也是思索如何超越生命政治、打開生死交纏的糾結時必然面對的課題。班雅民曾於《拱廊街計畫》中提示以「清醒透明」（sober transparency）作為從 19 世紀的「交互混雜」（interpenetration）中甦醒過來的途徑：「今天的通關密語不是交纏而是透明（啊！科比意）」（Mla, 4）。換句話說，對班雅民而言，從 19 世紀內外空間交互滲透如劇院包廂的拱廊街，一直到 20 世紀科比意（Le Corbusier）以透明落地窗取代封閉磚牆的撒扶以別墅（Villa Savoy），與其說是一部西方近代建築的發展史，還不如說是一條救贖路徑的提示，擺脫既是…又是/ 既不是…也非的否定（negative）辯證邏輯，邁向毫不拐彎抹角、扭曲遮掩的肯定（affirmative）揭露的一條解放道路。在生命政治的治理下，生命已經不再站在死亡的對立面，也不再具備抵拒、否定死亡、療癒死亡傷口的超越力量。當生命已然成為一個生死糾纏的內在性平面，任何企圖超越平面的否定踐作或論述都有被平面吸附的危險時，究竟如何才能在生命平面上，而非平面外，解開生命與死亡的辯證糾結？究竟活物、裸命、或聖/剩人等揭示生死交纏的歷史思像，本身如何超越在概念上對生命政治的否定批判，進而對倫理或解放政治帶來積極的肯定意義？本二年期計畫擬定從班雅民的〈暴力批判〉出發，來思索班雅民的提問。第一年的計畫將針對〈暴力批判〉中政治與生命同時退化的議題，重建退化論述的系譜，闡明生命政治中充滿否定性的生死辯證本是退化的症狀。既然生命與政治的退化是問題根源，將生命灌注到弱化的政治當中顯然是一條可以擺脫生死辯證的道路。第二年的計畫將以灌注生命的政治為思考核心，除了追隨班雅民的腳步，正視這樣的解決方案可能隱含的危險，並肯定班雅民對神聖暴力與神秘暴力的區分具有高度的生命政治意義之外，同時也計畫將巴迪烏的基進倫理觀帶入，彰顯班雅民分區辯神聖暴力與神秘暴力的倫理意涵，以期在滿山遍野一片逢大敘事必反的生命政治聲浪中，重新思索一種可以真正對內在性的生命平面進行裂解的另類超越性。

中文關鍵詞：退化、暴力、裸命、阿岡本、班雅民

英文摘要：When the entanglement of biopolitics and thanatopolitics is understood in its proper dimension, some of the groundwork for unraveling the lethal knot has been laid. Vitalization of the weakening politics is widely held among some contemporary intellectuals (Carl Schmitt is a classic

example) as the efficacious remedy for biopolitical degeneration. Despite its *prima facie* viability, Benjamin has never looked upon this supposed cure—all without apprehension. He takes us to the nub of the matter when he re-routes the line of argument away from Schmitt to trace instead the fine line between 'mythic violence' and 'divine violence,' that is, between the vitalized politics which is genuinely affirmative, and the vitalized politics which is readily susceptible to the life-and-death dialectics. In the second year of this project, I will follow in the Benjamin's footsteps to revisit the biopolitical import of this delicate differentiation. Further on, I will seek to incorporate Alain Badiou's radical reformulation of ethics to substantiate this distinction, also in the hope that the ethical significance of 'divine violence' can be brought into sharper relief and puts to shame the biopolitical incredulity toward grand narratives.

英文關鍵詞： degeneration, violence, bare life, Giorgio Agamben, Walter Benjamin

行政院國家科學委員會補助專題研究計畫 ☒ 成果報告
☐ 期中進度報告

(計畫名稱)

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計畫主持人：邱彥彬

共同主持人：

計畫參與人員：李奕青、李憲榮

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中 華 民 國 101 年 12 月 7 日

(二) 中英文摘要及關鍵字

1. 中文摘要

生命與死亡的辯證，是自由主義的生命政治最引人非議之處，也是思索如何超越生命政治、打開生死交纏的糾結時必然面對的課題。班雅民曾於《拱廊街計畫》中提示以「清醒透明」(sober transparency)作為從 19 世紀的「交互混雜」(interpenetration) 中甦醒過來的途徑：「今天的通關密語不是交纏而是透明（啊！科比意）」(M1a,4)。換句話說，對班雅民而言，從 19 世紀內外空間交互滲透如劇院包廂的拱廊街，一直到 20 世紀科比意(Le Corbusier)以透明落地窗取代封閉磚牆的撒扶以別墅(Villa Savoy)，與其說是一部西方近代建築的發展史，還不如說是一條救贖路徑的提示，擺脫既是...又是/ 既不是...也非的否定(negative)辯證邏輯，邁向毫不拐彎抹角、扭曲遮掩的肯定(affirmative)揭露的一條解放道路。在生命政治的治理下，生命已經不再站在死亡的對立面，也不再具備抵拒、否定死亡、療癒死亡傷口的超越力量。當生命已然成為一個生死糾纏的內在性平面，任何企圖超越平面的否定踐作或論述都有被平面吸附的危險時，究竟如何才能生命平面上，而非平面外，解開生命與死亡的辯證糾結？究竟活物、裸命、或聖/剩人等揭示生死交纏的歷史思像，本身如何超越在概念上對生命政治的否定批判，進而對倫理或解放政治帶來積極的肯定意義？本二年期計畫擬定從班雅民的〈暴力批判〉出發，來思索班雅民的提問。第一年的計畫將針對〈暴力批判〉中政治與生命同時退化的議題，重建退化論述的系譜，闡明生命政治中充滿否定性的生死辯證本是退化的症狀。既然生命與政治的退化是問題根源，將生命灌注到弱化的政治當中顯然是一條可以擺脫生死辯證的道路。第二年的計畫將以滿注生命的政治為思考核心，除了追隨班雅民的腳步，正視這樣的解決方案可能隱含的危險，並肯定班雅民對神聖暴力與神秘暴力的區分具有高度的生命政治意義之外，同時也計畫將巴迪烏的基進倫理觀帶入，彰顯班雅民分區辯神聖暴力與神秘暴力的倫理意涵，以期在滿山遍野一片逢大敘事必反的生命政治聲浪中，重新思索一種可以真正對內在性的生命平面進行裂解的另類超越性。

關鍵字：退化、裸命、暴力、班雅民、阿岡本

2. 英文摘要

In Convolute M, Walter Benjamin sings a paean to Le Corbusier for his precipitating the consummation of the 19th century covered arcades: “Today, the watchword is not entanglement but transparency. (Le Corbusier!)” (M1a,4). Sweeping though it has often been felt to be, this generalization is not so much an observation about the change in the architectonic method, as a pointer on how to break free from the

biopolitical regime. This paean, in short, is Benjamin's conception of redemption in a nutshell. Just as the convoluted entanglement characteristic of the architectonic composition of arcades finally gives way to Le Corbusierean transparency, so the dialectical intertwining of biopolitics and thanatopolitics should be decoupled in order to restore life and politics their affirmative character. This two-year project will be started in the first year with the biological and political degeneration as analyzed in Benjamin's "Critique of Violence." This seminal essay has been tenaciously oriented our studies on the passing of biopolitics into thanatopolitics, but the issues of degeneration has never been explored in their depths and researched in all their complexity. Read in conjunction with Georges Sorel's *Reflections on Violence*, Carl Schmitt's *Political Theology*, and Hannah Arendt's *The Human Condition*, Benjamin's essay will be proven able to pin down with striking precision the causes of biopolitical negativity, effectively attributing the life-and-death dialectics to the global degeneration of life and politics under the regime of biopolitical governance. When the entanglement of biopolitics and thanatopolitics is understood in its proper dimension, some of the groundwork for unraveling the lethal knot has been laid. Vitalization of the weakening politics is widely held among some contemporary intellectuals (Carl Schmitt is a classic example) as the efficacious remedy for biopolitical degeneration. Despite its prima facie viability, Benjamin has never looked upon this supposed cure-all without apprehension. He takes us to the nub of the matter when he re-routes the line of argument away from Schmitt to trace instead the fine line between "mythic violence" and "divine violence," that is, between the vitalized politics which is genuinely affirmative, and the vitalized politics which is readily susceptible to the life-and-death dialectics. In the second year of this project, I will follow in the Benjamin's footsteps to revisit the biopolitical import of this delicate differentiation. Further on, I will seek to incorporate Alain Badiou's radical reformulation of ethics to substantiate this distinction, also in the hope that the ethical significance of "divine violence" can be brought into sharper relief and puts to shame the biopolitical incredulity toward grand narratives.

Keywords: degeneration, bare life, violence, Walter Benjamin, Giorgio Agamben

(三)報告内容

1. 前言

在後結構主義的浪潮以及後現代的思維結構主導西方的批判理論期間，法國與義大利的哲學界早已默默地展開典範轉移的大工程。雖然立場互異，甚至兄弟鬩牆的狀況也時有所聞，但這批為後後結構主義時代揭開序幕的哲學家，一致認為後結構主義的激進只是一種與後現代一搭一唱的虛無姿態。在他們眼中，後結構主義雖然善於拆解、暴露西方形上學義理結構中的缺口與難局，但永無止境的解構卻是將救贖延宕至不可知的未來，弔詭地成為協助現狀進行再生產的一股另類動力。阿岡本曾在一篇短文中，以典型的後結構技術瓦解了支撐「赤裸」(nudity)概念的神學結構，並認為沙特在 *Being and Nothingness* 中對於身體與肉體(flesh)的區分，也是一種後結構主義式的理論操演，暴露出「赤裸」只是一個從未發生的發生(happening, event)，是一個不可能的事件。但阿岡本的提問是，像沙特一般只是在神學結構的內部進行拆解、暴露難局的解構操作究竟有何用處？如此翻來覆去、轉譯再內爆的理論操作難道不就像是在如來佛手中的孫悟空，任憑你翻來覆去也逃不出結構的匡限？為了逃離永無止境的解構所帶來的失能窘境，阿岡本於是在這篇短文中思考如何讓不可能的事件首度發生的關鍵問題。阿岡本的提問，代表著從後結構主義的虛無思想情境中脫困的嘗試，也是本年度的計劃依循的主要思想道路。

2. 研究目的、研究方法、與研究結果

本人在 97 與 98 年度的國科會研究計畫「班雅民的裸命、活物與科技技術複製性」執行期間，主要從傅科、阿岡本與班雅民的角度，持續關注並思索生命政治與死亡政治如何互為因果、相互證成。班雅民的「裸命」(bare life, *bloßes Leben*)與阿岡本的「聖/剩人」(*homo sacer*)，都是意涵飽滿的歷史思像(*Denkbild*)，一方面揭示生命政治已然取代左右兩派在政治論述與踐行上的霸權地位，成為政治治理的新範式，另一方面則直指「以生命為本」的普世理念，如何讓生命機器因為內部防火牆的設置或免疫系統的建立，搖身一變成為製造裸命、活物、聖人的殺人機器。生命與死亡的辯證，顯然是自由主義引人非議之處，也是思索如何超越生命政治、打開生死交纏的糾結時必然面對的課題。本人在前項五年內研究成果提到，班雅民在《拱廊街計畫》中提示以「清醒透明」(*sober transparency*)作為從 19 世紀的「交互混雜」(*interpenetration*)中甦醒過來的途徑：「今天的通關密語不是交纏而是透明(啊！科比意)」(M1a,4)，換句話說，對班雅民而言，從 19 世紀內外空間交互滲透如劇院包廂的拱

廊街，一直到 20 世紀科比意 (Le Corbusier) 以透明落地窗取代封閉磚牆的撒扶以別墅 (Villa Savoy)，與其說是一部西方近代建築的發展史，還不如說是一條救贖路徑的提示，擺脫既是...又是/ 既不是...也非的否定 (negative) 辯證邏輯，邁向毫不拐彎抹角、扭曲遮掩的肯定 (affirmative) 揭露的一條解放道路。在生命政治的治理下，生命已經不再站在死亡的對立面，也不再具備抵拒、否定死亡、療癒死亡傷口的超越力量。當生命已然成為一個生死糾纏的內在性平面，任何企圖超越平面的否定踐作或論述都有被平面吸附的危險時，究竟如何才能在生命平面上，而非平面外，解開生命與死亡的辯證糾結？究竟活物、裸命、或聖/剩人等揭示生死交纏的歷史思像，本身如何超越在概念上對生命政治的否定批判，進而對倫理或解放政治帶來積極的肯定意義？這些受班雅民啟發的提問，將是本人在 99 與 100 學年度的國科會二年期計畫中所擬定思考和研究的焦點。

假如在生命政治的治理底下，生命與政治的唯一連結是在於兩者的同時退化，同時陷入既生又死、不生不死的生死辯證過程，那麼如何解開陷入否定辯證的生死交纏，以肯定的方式建立生命與政治的新關係，將是超越生命政治一條可資依循的路徑。至於如何超越裸命、活物、或聖/剩人的臨界處境、反轉隱含在這組思像中的否定邏輯，這將是本計畫的第二年所預定研究的根本課題。1934年4月11日，班雅民再度針對卡夫卡作品中有關救贖的表述，寫了一封信給修連姆 (Gershom Scholem)：「不管學徒們是丟了鑰匙，還是沒有能力解讀，到頭來都是同一碼事，因為，沒了屬於聖經的那一把鑰匙，聖經再也不是聖經，而是生命。就像是蓋了城堡的那座山，山腳下的村落所過的生活的那種生命。把生命轉形變成聖經的嘗試，在這裡頭我看到了「反轉」(Umkehr, reversal)的意義，這正是多數卡夫卡的小說傾盡全力想要達成的目的」(*The Correspondence of Walter Benjamin and Gershom Scholem, 1932-1940*, 135)。聖經變成山下村落的日常生活，意味著律法/政治「往內在流變」，墜入生命的內在平面，也是在生命政治底下，政治退化，超越性盡失，進入政治與生命一併墜入生死辯證、彼此也「難以區辨」的臨界狀態。根據班雅民的提示，卡夫卡所致力的目標，正是要「反轉」生命政治的否定邏輯，將生命「轉形變成」律法/政治，試圖以生命的肯定力量來重新界定政治，將政治從生命的平面拉起，重新定義政治的超越性。艾思普濟托 (Roberto Esposito) 曾以尼采哲學為主要的思考標的，針對超越生命政治的議題，最終同樣提出類似的卡夫卡式的反轉策略：為了抵拒生命政治，「我們必需將生命注入 (vitalize) 規範的矯正措施，以挑戰納粹矯正生命的作法」(*Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, 184)。如同本人在第一年計畫中所草擬的，面對政治暴力的退化趨向，索黑與施密特都試圖以「舊有的兇狠驍勇」或「法律外」的主權決斷等肯定的生命力量，灌入退化的政治/法律系統，企圖讓政治超越生死辯證，還原充滿生命活力的政治力。而班雅民的「神聖暴力」之所以有別於帶來血腥毀滅的「神秘暴力」，

道理同樣也在於「神聖暴力」超越性與滿注的生命力。

但如此充滿生命力、正向的政治力量一旦創生，是否就保證生命政治的生死辯證就得以超越？事情自然沒有如此簡單，索黑、施密特與班雅民三人的觀點當然也不可能完全雷同。以滿注生命的政治力來對抗生命政治的生死辯證，最大的危險在於萬一肯定的（affirmative）生命是建立在否定否定（negative）的生命的基礎上，那創生出來的肯定生命自然會被重新拉回生死辯證邏輯的泥淖。這是尼采試圖以肯定的生命來否定退化的虛無生命時，必然的潛在危險（Esposito, *Bios: Biopolitics and Philosophy*, 78-101）。同樣的危險，在也出現在施密特的政治決斷論之上。從班雅民與施密特幾次交手的過程，阿岡本察覺出兩人最根本的爭議所在：「〈暴力批判〉的策略，目標在於確立一種純粹的、崩壞秩序(anomic)的暴力的存在，但施密特則是反其道而行，試圖把這樣的暴力導回某種立法情境」(*State of Exception*, 54)。換句話說，對施密特而言，政治決斷，或者例外狀態等等外於法律的、超越的政治力——阿岡本稱之為律法之力（force of the Law）——的宣布，目的只是在確保、或回復正常法律秩序的運作，導致自然的（霍布斯式的）、「秩序崩壞」的力量重新被政治/法律秩序所吸納，依據〈暴力批判〉的說法，就是落入「創制法律的暴力」與「維存法律的暴力」之間的惡性循環，最終導致創制法律暴力的不斷「弱化」，讓創新的政治力到頭來唯一的成就僅僅止於守成。相對地，不以血腥暴力作為懲戒、不以孳生罪惡感為目的、純粹站在超越的高度以中斷現狀為手段的神聖暴力，則是接受肯定生命全然灌注的純粹政治力。

阿岡本從班雅民的角度對施密特的批判，建立起一套判準，可供我們區辨真正的政治力與偽政治力，辨識什麼樣的政治力確實可以超越生命政治的否定辯證，而什麼樣的政治力，灌注其中的僅僅是鎖死在生死辯證中的偽生命力而已。順著這樣的脈絡，本年度計畫的課題之一，在於重新探究班雅民與修連姆兩人對於卡夫卡詮釋的爭辯，藉以釐清班雅民有關「反轉」論的確實意涵。其二，為了確保「反轉」不會再度轉回辯證的迴圈，明確辨識真正的政治力與偽政治力的界線所在，班雅民與舒密特之間的關係，特別是「神聖暴力」的概念與強調主權決斷的專政論之間的差異，更是一個需要進一步深究的課題。事實上，除了《政治神學》之外，舒密特寫於1938年的《利維坦與霍布斯的國家理論》（*The Leviathan in the State Theory of Thomas Hobbes*），更足以代表他與班雅民之間更為直接的對話，除了阿岡本的《例外狀態》（*State of Exception*），甚少直接處理這本著作與〈暴力批判〉的關連性，值得在探索神聖暴力的確切意涵時多做探究。

為了更進一步釐清神聖暴力對生命政治的有效抵拒，及其化解生死辯證的倫理意義，本年度計畫擬再從巴迪烏（Alain Badiou）對於事件、真理過程（truth process）以及「對真實的激情」（passion for

the real) 的論述，以巴迪烏的《倫理》(*Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil*)、《保羅：普遍主義的創生奠基》(*St. Paul: the Foundation of Universalism*) 以及《世紀》(*The Century*) 三本書為主軸，試圖將有如雷電般對生命內在性平面的猛然一擊的神聖暴力，視為巴迪烏所謂的事件，接近保羅在書信中以其「對真實的激情」所宣揚的耶穌復活，一舉斬斷法律施行所帶來的生死交纏。但為何是巴迪烏，而非身為班雅民的最佳詮釋者之一的阿岡本？考夫曼 (Eleanor Kaufman) 在 "The Saturday of Messianic Time (Agamben and Badiou on the Apostle Paul)" 中，曾對阿岡本與巴迪烏有過一段簡單但一針見血的比較。考夫曼認為，阿岡本的著作一以貫之聚焦在「生命與死亡的鎖鍊點上」，但巴迪烏的思想完全不想為「曖昧的空間」或生死關係「留下半點餘地」(*SAQ* 107.1: 42)。換句話說，雖然阿岡本的聖/剩人說，精準點出生命政治與死亡政治的辯證流通，但對於如何劈開生命與死亡的糾纏，阿岡本似乎欠缺一個相對應的明確交代。相較之下，巴迪烏的論述沒有生死曖昧存在的餘地，一方面暗示巴迪烏對於後現代逢大敘述必反的不耐，更加趨近班雅民對於「清醒透明」的救贖期待。在另一方面，生死曖昧乃是生命內在性平面的糾結情境，作為巴迪烏倫理思考的起點也是核心元素，事件的迸發代表的正是超越對於平面的裂解，一切生命與死亡的辯證在此中斷，在開出倫理行動的缺口上，自然不見生死的曖昧纏綿。基於事件作為情境 (situation) 的中斷，巴迪烏不認為邪惡 (evil) 是倫理行動的起點，因為邪惡的內涵的定義完全是由當代的生命政治治理所主導，舉凡傷害他人生命、權力、安全等各種「普世」福祉的行為一律歸為非倫理的罪惡行徑，因此巴迪烏稱呼生命政治宰制下的倫理主體都是那些終日將自己圍限在「終將死亡」(mortal) 與生死糾結的層次 (也就是鄂蘭所謂的「生物過程」的循環迴圈)、「有能力把自己視為受害者」的人 (*Ethics*, 10, 12)。簡言之，以邪惡為起點的行動毫無倫理可言，也非真正帶有肯定態度的行動，只是以否定 (不要傷害...) 出發，將自身侷限在現有生命平面與生物過程的退化行為 (受害意識)。真正的倫理行動是以肯定的真理為出發點，像保羅對耶穌的復活一樣是一種對於事件的忠誠 (fidelity)，一種「對真實的激情」、在一段「真理過程」中的決斷與踐作。如此對生死辯證全然決裂 (耶穌的受難只是在生命的內在性平面上事件迸發的場景，跟復活沒有必然的辯證關連)，熱情擁抱肯定的倫理行動，是否正是班雅民弔詭地認為「神聖暴力」或「無產階級總罷工」是「非暴力」行動 (246) 的原因？施密特的主權決斷是否一如阿岡本所暗示，只是將「外於法律」的斷裂吸納進入既有體系的非倫理行為，可視之為背叛斷裂、背叛事件的偽倫理行動？在生命政治的情境底下，巴迪烏對倫理的思考，是否可以在阿岡本之外，更進一步幫助我們區辨什麼才是真正注滿生命的政治力 (《世紀》中所說的真正的「對真實的激情」)，什麼是依舊匡限在死生辯證當中不得超脫的偽政治力 (顯然就是假的「對真實的激情」)？再則，巴迪烏的哲學是否也有助於思考在生

命的內在性平面上，何以具有宗教的超越高度的「神聖暴力」，可以是倫理行動愛戀所繫的事件，而不致於再次淪為血腥殺戮的動力？在生命與政治共同呈現退化跡象的生命政治底下，這些必要思考的核心議題，也是本年度計畫的研究重點所在。

本年度有兩篇出版的研究成果，其中一篇“Being-There: The Ontology of Biopower in H. G. Wells’ *The Island of Doctor Moreau*”，刊載於*Nineteenth Century in Literature* 15卷2期（2011年8月）。這篇論文原先是以會議論文的形式，2010年12月在韓國的ELLAK上發表（2010 ELLAK International Conference: Crossing Borders and Building Bridges in Glocal and Transcultural Contexts），經過數度修改後出版。本文主要處理的是生命政治自始自終秉持的一項信念：賜生。19世紀不乏談論創造生命的小說，但沒有一本比H. G. Wells的*The Island of Doctor Moreau*更可以直接、精準地碰觸到生命政治的幽微處：所謂生命政治的「賜生」，並非如同神一般從無到有的創造，而是從無到「剩」（remainder）。在這一點上，傅科明顯是站在傳統的創造論的立場來描述規訓權力與生命權力：雖然前者針對的是個人，後者施作的對象是人口，但兩者同樣的目的都是型塑生命，企圖將生命的能力極大化。關於此點，H. G. Wells與阿岡本可說是與傅科針鋒相對。一如阿岡本在*The Remnants of Auschwitz*中所言，生命政治的精髓並非傅科強調的「賜生」，而是“make survive”。同樣的道理，在H. G. Wells的筆下，我們看到Dr. Moreau在荒島所有殘無人道的整型實驗，也不是對*creatio ex nihilo*邪惡、卑劣的仿擬，而是create what remains。這點從「獸人」（the Beast Folks）在整型（失敗）後，身體特徵慢慢從獸人退化回獸便可得到明證。但講的更精確一點，這些手術之後被棄置在荒島洞穴中的「獸人」，並不是慢慢退化回原本的獸身，而是在半人半獸身上或慢慢、或迅速地長出一些「肉」（flesh）。不是退化，而是從非人非獸的「獸人」，轉化為非非人非非獸——一個無法被整併到任何歸類體系的肉身，一個剩餘、只能被棄置在那頭（being-there）的存有，精確地傳達了生命權力，即是一種棄置的權力的生命政治實相。

99年度的第二篇出版的研究成果是〈在「我可以有一件襯衫」之後：論生命政治的失能與裸命的大能〉。這篇文章的初稿發表於2010年11月的國科會外文學門91-98研究成果發表會，經過修改後，即將刊登在32期的《中山人文學報》上。這篇論文主要要處理的問題是：當國王（Power）與乞丐（power）在彼此的聖/剩命上找到同質點時，國王的神聖生命因為被整編到法律—政治體制的結果，變成有權無能的王權（即為生命政治的政治力退化現象），而乞丐的裸命則是遭到體制的棄置，但也因此變成無權但卻有能的存有。王權無能，因為它只能以否定生命的方式來肯定生命，但裸命有能，則是因為這個被棄置、在不斷的化約後淪為生命政治物質的存有，已經變成了

體制再也無法召喚的對象。但這並不是裸命之所以具備大能的原因。本文試圖論證的是，必須有待一次終極的切割，將裸命轉化為非非裸命（也就是類似H. G. Wells 小說中非非人非非獸的存有），裸命才有可能具備大能。而阿岡本的潛勢（potentiality）說，目的便在於將終極切割的發生理論化，確定一個攻擊生命政治治理的最佳手勢。

（四）計劃成果自評

在本計劃第二年的執行期間，本人已完成中英文論文各一篇，並於計劃執行期限前順利刊登。其中的中文論文，我嘗試從班雅民與阿岡本的角度，探討君王與裸命在神聖生命上的異質同構，思索裸命如何展現其大能，讓裸命此一不可能、未曾發生的事件進而發生。另外一篇英文論文則是藉由 H. G. Wells 的小說，探討造人機器的運作模式，試圖挖掘被小說家低估裸命的激進潛力。這兩篇文章均試圖從阿岡本的班雅民的視角，嘗試打開被後結構主義封閉住的逃逸路線，目的不只在於找到生命政治治理機器的缺口，而是試圖掌握停止治理機器運作的時間點。在後結構主義依舊思想主流的今天，本人認為我的研究成果初步已達到反思後結構思想霸權的目的。

（五）附錄：出版之期刊論文

在「我可以有一件襯衫」之後：論生命政治的失能與裸命的大能

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前言：兩個阿岡本？

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*本文初稿發表於「國科會外文學門 91-98 研究成果發表會：新世紀文學研究」（2010 年 11 月 26 至 27 日，國立中山大學外國語文學系承辦），為個人國科會研究計劃「退化、生命與倫理」（NSC 99-2410-H-004 -037 -MY2）研究成果的一部份。在此特別向兩位匿名審查人致謝，兩位一針見血的批評與建議對於作者修正一些基本論點有極大的助益，也提供了日後深化思考的方向。

從解放政治的角度來看，阿岡本（Giorgio Agamben）的生命政治理論一直存在著一股令人困惑的內在張力。一方面阿岡本突出「裸命」（bare life）的概念，強調身份與權利被剝奪殆盡、最後僅以生物存在殘存於世的裸命，不單單是在納粹殺人機器的啟動下才出現的特殊存有，它更是普遍存在於現代西方的存有現象，是與西方的世俗化的過程，伴隨產出的一個神聖不可碰觸的卑賤殘餘（2007：77-82）。阿岡本主張「集中營……是我們迄今依然生活於其中的政治空間的隱藏母體與規域」（Agamben 2000：37），顯然是將集中營從一個偶發的歷史事件，轉譯為現代政治的運作的典範，以當代化來重新構思裸命的歷史性。於此同時，阿岡本也在這看似幽暗無望的生命政治風景之中，看到一個指向無限可能的光影，在裸命的生物存有裡發現救贖的契機所在。卡夫卡曾說，世間充滿救贖的希望，但「『不是為我們而存在』」。阿岡本的解釋將這句格言複音化，與悲觀的基調同時進行的，是勝利凱歌前的序奏：卡夫卡的意思是，救贖不可能「『為我們而存在』」，因為我們不是救贖的對象；作為裸命，我們反而是「讓救贖成為可能」的「前提」（2005c：56-57）。正因為裸命具備驅動救贖的能力，「在一個決定性的關鍵片刻」，畸零的殘存生命成為「唯一真正的政治主體」（2005c：57）。

阿岡本的生命政治論述是一幅既蒼白又明亮的疊影。但多數的批評家並不怎麼欣賞阿岡本蒙太奇式的場面調度，大多認為阿岡本在裸命的理論鋪陳上出現了論述的矛盾與斷裂。阿岡本一方面強調裸命的失能，另一方面又主張裸命先於救贖存在，因而早已具備獲得救贖的大能，殊不知前者的主張足以抵銷後者的正當性。雷衛爾（Judith Revel）的批評頗具代表性。她認為阿岡本的裸命說很弔詭地跟當今的「生物科技與基因工程」沆瀣一氣，同樣試圖把「生命『生物化』」（"biologization" of life），反觀傅科（Michel Foucault）在一九八〇年代以後發展出來的生命觀，則是強調「生命可以確立自我進行創造生成的能力（*puissance*）」，一個無法被生命權力「據用」的「潛能」（*potential*），因此無法被化約為「生物」的存在（51-52）。雷衛爾雖然沒有明說，但她視阿岡本與傅科為兩條對立路線，顯然暗示阿岡本將裸命定義為生物存有的說法，足以讓裸命喪失抗拒生命權力的「潛能」。奈格里（Antonio Negri）更是直截了當。綜觀阿岡本的著作，他認為當中存在著兩個阿岡本：「一個在存在的、命定的、令人懼怖的陰影之下逗留徘徊」的阿岡本，另一個則是對「存有力量」（*power of being*）心領神會的阿岡本，這兩個阿岡本「總是並存」於字裡行間：「在你最沒有預期的時候，前者會再度現身並模糊了後者的面貌」（2007：117，原標重點）。換句話說，阿岡本的裸命論不僅具有無從調和的雙重面貌，就重要性而言，失能的裸命更壓過可以展現「存有力量」的生命，在阿岡本的生命論述中取得主導地位。在一次與馬克斯主義者的對談中，訪談者直言阿岡本對「泥淖與失敗」的強調更甚於「彌賽亞時間」（*kairos*），對阿岡本失敗主義與悲觀論調的困惑與不滿完全溢於言表（Smith 123）。

面對馬克斯主義者質疑，阿岡本反將一軍。「我確信你比我更悲觀」，這是阿岡本的回答。一句狡黠的回應，強而有力地反駁了阿岡本有兩個的相關批評。阿岡本的生命政治論述並非既明亮又蒼白，而是因蒼白而明亮。拒絕蒼白就看不見明亮——這是阿岡本堅信他的訪談者比他更悲觀的原因。阿岡本曾說，遺忘與喪失會以緊急事件的樣態對在主體內部產生緊迫力（*exigency*），但與「知覺記憶」（*conscious memory*）的操作方式不同，要實現（*actualize*）因遺忘與喪失而誘發的緊迫驅力，要件不在於「想起」或拾回，而必須以「被遺忘」的形式與主體長相伴隨，如此才能真正「永遠不被遺忘」（2005c：39-40）。阿岡本式的救贖，講求的不是失而復得（記起遺忘的事物），但也不是就此陷入「偶然」（*contingency*）的黑暗泥淖（無奈地安於遺忘），將救贖延宕至不可知的未來，而是讓遺忘與喪失產生自我分裂，當下從中斷離出「永遠不被遺忘」以「實現」遺忘的緊迫力。換句話說。遺忘與喪失，是救贖的關鍵點。同樣的道理，作為喪失的賦形，裸命正是因為被剝奪到僅剩下生物生命，才具備了「在一個決定性的關鍵片刻」成為「唯一真正的政治主體」的潛能，而阿岡本之所以在「令人懼怖的陰影下」流連，也是因為暗影幢幢的地域才是彌賽亞時間可能驟然出現的所在。在絕望的迷霧籠罩的時刻，阿岡本在一片漆黑中瞥見一道「距離我們無限遙遠」、遠到根本感覺不到存在的光，正「朝著我們射過來」（Agamben

2010：14-15）。班雅民（Walter Benjamin）在〈卡夫卡〉（"Franz Kafka： On the Tenth Anniversary of His Death"）最後一節所轉述的猶太笑話，精準地在一片黑暗之中捕捉到這一道看不見的光。本文擬以這則笑話為經緯，來架構並耙梳阿岡本的生命政治論。在將批評家眼中失焦渙散的阿岡本圖像重新對焦的同時，本文試圖從阿岡本的角度，說明裸命的確為巨大死亡陰影所籠罩，而在生命政治治理下處於「例外狀態」中的世界，確實也呈現出一個看似一切皆可能、但事實上卻是一切皆不可能的死寂狀態，但在裸命化的運途上，「存有力量」同時也取得迸發的可能。要讓「一切皆可能」不再淪為生命樣態的反諷，關鍵不在單方面強調「存有力量」，或是徹底遺忘一直在「令人懼怖的陰影」中流連再三的阿岡本。相反地，逼視裸命，並進一步將裸命的能力導入政治鬥爭的場域，與整個生命政治機器作一完整的切割，這才是生命政治年代下解放政治成功與否的關鍵。

壹、「我可以有一件襯衫」：去政治化的生命政治

在〈卡夫卡〉一文中，班雅民轉述了一個典型的猶太笑話。在安息日的傍晚，一群猶太人在一間破舊的酒館聚會。一陣閒聊後，有人提議每人講講自己的願望。於是大家開始各言其志，要錢、要女婿、要全新的板凳等等願望輪番出籠，最後就只剩下一個衣衫襤褸的乞丐，從一開始就沈默不語，獨自蹲坐在酒館後頭的陰暗角落。輪到他時，他才「勉強以略帶猶豫」的語氣說，他希望自己是一個威震山河的國王，某個晚上在他就寢之後，敵軍以迅雷不及掩耳的速度攻陷了他的城堡，匆忙之間，他來不及著衣，顧不得身上只披了一件襯衫就趕忙逃命去，沒日沒夜翻山越嶺，最後終於擺脫敵軍的追捕，平安抵達酒館的這個角落。語畢，眾人面面相覷大惑不解。有人問他：「你從這樣的願望裡究竟得到了什麼好處？」。「我可以有一件襯衫」，乞丐如此回答（Benjamin 1934：812）。

在接下來的段落裡，班雅民為這則笑話下了一個謎一樣的註腳：這個乞丐過著「『愉快地飛逝』的『正常』生命，甚至沒留給他一個願望的時間，但他卻在不正常、不愉快的生命裡（也就是他故事中命也沒似地逃亡）免於這個願望的約束，用願望來交換願望的實現」（813）。或許班雅民暗示這是一個樂天知命、安於貧困的乞丐，根本無法、不想、或沒時間從短暫的「正常」生命中挪出多餘的時間留給願望，在無願可許但又非許不可的情況下，逼不得已只好「勉強」說出自己的願望。也正因如此，他竟然期盼自己是一個狼狽的亡國之君，在歷經一段亡命天涯的「不正常」生活之後，最後回到現實的原點：畢竟安然蹲坐在酒館的陰暗角落的現實，帶給他的自然不是願望背道而馳的無奈與不滿，反倒實現了逃脫敵軍追捕的願望。這個已然實現的願望，是乞丐「用願望來交換願望實現」的結果，而現實等同於願望的達成，也讓願望不再是願望，乞丐因而得以擺脫願望的糾纏，自外於內含在每一個願望當中「難道只能如此」的烏托邦律令。

但許了一個不成願望的願望，自然讓在場的聽眾大惑不解，不由追問乞丐在繞了這麼一大圈之後，到底得到什麼逃脫於閉鎖的現實迴圈之外的「好處」。乞丐的願望當然不是只想呆坐在酒館的角落而已；兜了這麼一大圈，他心中的願望其實也很卑微，只不過是想藉此得到一件襯衫而已。但這則笑話的笑點何在？似乎乞丐希望自己是一個威震山河的君王，因為這樣才能有亡命天涯的機會，並且趁倉皇逃逸之際從宮中摸出一件襯衫。但光靠這個看似合乎邏輯的推演，並不足以把人逗笑。要營造笑點，非得靠另外一個與邏輯推演相衝突的因素配合方能成事：為什麼想得到一件僅供蔽體的襯衫，就非得大費周章先當上一個未來的亡國之君不可呢？

這樣的提問，不只是想瞭解這則笑話引人發噱之處，而是想按圖索驥，在確定笑點所在之後，進一步挖掘出這則笑話的生命政治意涵。我們可以先從當上國王才能得到一件襯衫談起。有關襯衫才是乞丐真正的慾望物，韋柏（Samuel Weber）說得很清楚。他認為「永久統治不是乞丐的願望，他所要不多，只是想再多活一陣子罷了，縱使只有一件背在身上、隸屬自己名下的襯衫」（201，原標重點）。要坐上王位才能得到一件襯衫，這裡牽涉的是願望的置換：不需反覆權衡估算，乞丐輕易捨棄了代表永

世尊榮的權位，選擇了可以讓他得以繼續苟活的「一件襯衫」。如同韋柏所言，「再多活一陣子」是乞丐的最高指導原則，在這項原則的驅使下，願望可以輕易置換，從希望作一位權勢威赫的君王，轉換為幾近回歸乞丐生命原點的卑微心願。

我們可以說，「活著」是驅使乞丐進行願望置換的動力，同時也暴露了要當上國王才能得到一件襯衫這個滑稽邏輯背後的生命政治意涵。事實上，這條從一個烏托邦的想望，到願望與願望實現近乎無差別疊合的置換軌跡，放大來看，可說是構成了一部從法律——政治權力（juridico-political power）轉換為生命權力（bio-power）的系譜，記錄了政治主權基礎與權力部署（apparatus, dispositif）在「活著」的指導原則下不得不然的遞嬗。¹ 從傅科的角度來看，這則笑話裡的在位——戰爭——得到一件襯衫三部曲，對應著西方從中世紀到法國大革命後，歷史書寫與權力概念的跳躍轉進。傅科在《「社會必須被保衛」》（'Society Must Be Defended'）中講得很仔細，中世紀的王權史以王權的正統性為軸心，以「儀式」般的書寫形式歌詠君王與「古羅馬的血緣系譜」，歷史書寫自此成為「令人目眩的論述」，以一脈相傳的權力繼承與君王的彪炳戰功，提供王權「媚惑、威嚇」的權力工具（68-79）；霍布斯（Thomas Hobbes）「向戰爭說不」的主權論，則在同樣的脈絡下，將此類歷史書寫推向另一波高峰（92-98）。但中世紀之後，戰爭論述萌芽，原本被君王的英雄事蹟所掩蓋的暴力衝突鬥爭浮出地表，反歷史（counterhistory）至此蔚為主流，與儼然成為「貧窮與起義武器」的聖經互通聲息，共同構成挑戰王權的論述基礎（69, 71-72, 78）。到了十八世紀，將君王英雄化的「朱彼得式歷史」（Jupiterian history）（68）面臨的挑戰更為巨大，以「種族鬥爭」（race struggle）為主軸的戰爭論述（例如 Anglos 與 Normans 的對抗，法國這邊則是將 Franks, Gauls 與 Romans 之間的爭鬥殺伐與合縱連橫搬上歷史書寫的枱面），企圖將種族鬥爭的戰線拉長，貫穿整個社會內部，霍布斯把終結內戰，結束自然狀態視為建立王權的先決條件的說法，至此受到徹底的質疑（152-63）。但法國大革命後，大家開始慢慢警覺到，以社會永久戰為基礎概念建立起來的歷史論述，是社會的穩定的一大威脅，也會讓權力行使的效益產生遞減效應。傅科認為，為了因應此類的威脅而展開的權力——知識部署，主要目標並不在消滅戰爭與種族鬥爭論述，反倒是透過「自我辯證」（auto-dialecticization）與「歷史布爾喬亞化」（embourgeoisement of history）的啟動，誘導「歷史」從貫穿社會內部的戰線上退防，轉往「生物」（the biological）與「醫療」（the medical）的方向「撤離」；戰爭論述開始進行角色轉換，「建構歷史」不再是它的工作，捍衛生命，「保衛社會抵抗來自社會、與潛在於社會的威脅」成為轉化並動員戰爭能量的新目的（213-14）。² 換句話說，假如從中世紀以降，戰爭一直是扣合歷史知識與法律——政治權力的鍊結，也是王權與權利的法律與政治基礎的話，戰爭論述的「自動辯證」，不僅無損於知識與權力的匯通紐帶，也正因為彼此之間依舊暢行無阻，知識與權力部署因而產生「生物化」的新動向，以保衛社會生命不受危害為職志的生命權力於焉誕生。

「我可以有一件襯衫」的小小願望，可視之為生命權力意志的彰顯。「不是想要永久統治，而是很卑微地想要再多活一陣子，縱使只有一件背在身上、隸屬自己名下的襯衫」——韋柏的解釋，讓乞丐願望置換精準指向權力的換軌，點出法律——政治權力與生命權力的不同趨向。乞丐逃得比誰都快，壓根沒想要累積彪炳的戰功來鞏固自我的王權，也沒有絲毫想藉由社會內部階級或種族鬥爭，來挑戰

¹ 願望與權力（power, potentiality, *potenza*, *puissance*）之間的對稱性不難想見。德勒茲（Gilles Deleuze）認為尼采（Friedrich Nietzsche）的「權力意志」不能詮釋成「意志想要權力或希望宰制」（will wants power or wishes to dominate），作為「創造與給予」而非「攫取」的權力意志，權力「不是那個意志想要的東西，而是在意志中想要的那個東西」（is not that which the will wants, but that which wants in the will）。這裡先不深究權力意志論的正解為何，也先不論以肯定（affirmation）先行導致否定結果的主動力量（active forces），與否定先行結果卻佯裝肯定的反動力量（reactive forces）之間的差別有何重大意義，肯定與否定這兩個權力意志的「感質」（qualia）全都指向「想要」或「希望」。權力與願望這兩個概念的互通性可以從這個角度來解釋（Deleuze 73-74）。

² 傅科指出，從一八四八年到一八七一年，在歐洲第三波的革命運動期間，首見精神醫學與心理學取代法律、政治與歷史，成為區辨某些政治行動或政體好壞的判準（discriminant）。義大利的犯罪學家龍布羅索（Cesare Lombroso）在更早就已經開始運用生物學、解剖學、解剖學與精神醫學的知識，用來點評當代的社會主義以及無政府主義運動（Foucault 153-54）。

當道或鞏固自身權力的意圖。他只是想要待在酒館，外加一件襯衫，以保衛卑微的生命免受風寒之苦。

乞丐的生命權力意志，是以自我的生命維存為導向。³ 從尼采的角度來看，這個卑微的願望，是對生命與權力意志的誤識、限縮、弱化、甚至是否定。尼采提醒當時的生理學家，不要錯把「自我維存的驅力」看作是「有機存在的首席驅力」，因為「一個生命體的首要慾望在於宣洩它的力量——如此的生命正是權力意志」，而「自我維存」不過是生命「最常見的間接結果而已」(44)。倒果為因，用目的論(自我維存的驅力)來框限生命，規定權力意志的走向，無異是生命在宣洩力量的過程中劃地自限；生命的洪流橫掃一切，但在遇到生命自身時，彷彿因為心中「不！我不能沖毀自身！」的盤算而縮手，以致於維存生命跟弱化生命、否定生命到頭來成了同一回事。自我維存造成了生命的難局，生命權力的弔詭也大抵源自於此。再度借用尼采的話，「可以有一件襯衫」的卑微願望，說明乞丐是一個弱者的事實：

做為戰爭的他，根本的慾望是應該結束戰爭；跟具有鎮靜效果的藥劑與思維模式（譬如說伊比鳩魯學派或基督教）一樣，休憩的幸福、寧靜的幸福、飽足的幸福、統合的幸福，這些他最終得到的幸福就是他眼中最首要的幸福，作為「安息日中的安息日」的幸福。(121)

安息日的傍晚，難道不就是尼采所謂的「安息日中的安息日」？本該像是戰爭一般迸發力量的生命，在乞丐的願望敘事中，難道不是有如風中殘燭一般逐漸熄滅？回到酒館一隅安靜的蹲坐著，可以有一件襯衫，難道不是尼采眼中透過否定生命而換來的幸福？可以超克一切（包含超克一切的生命自身）的宣洩力量，一旦遭到以保衛生命為名的生命維存驅力的掣肘，弱化是它的必然命運，生命作為肯定的權力意志，因而遭逆轉為防衛生命的反動力。⁴ 此時，生命維存的驅力會以尊重生命、肯定生命之名，化身為佯裝肯定的反動力量，對任何危及生命的威脅進行大規模的摧毀。反動力量變裝為肯定力量，如此的佯裝，讓人誤以為我們活在一個的生命權力意志已經全然貫徹的世界，也就是一個可被、或已經被超克的現實。在此滿溢蜂蜜流奶之地，所有的願望都可、或總是已經實現。⁵ 班雅民於是說，乞丐是「以願望來交換願望的實現」。換句話說，願望與現實的無差別疊合，是這則笑話揭露的生命政治困境。⁶ 當所許的願望都早已實現（待在酒館）、或是在現實的規範條件下可能被實現（一件襯衫）時，現實就此墮入虛無主義的荒蕪實境，豐饒的田園牧歌景觀其實只是一處沒有事件發生的沙漠，所有的改變在此不僅沒有必要，也失去可能。齊傑克（Slavoj Žižek）說，我們活在一個一切都可能，也

³ 審查人在此提醒筆者注意，乞丐只想得到一件襯衫的願望，不見得是生命維存的驅力使然，畢竟襯衫「應該還是國王的襯衫或至少是不符合乞丐身份的襯衫，涉及是否『隸屬自己名下』的符號位置」。不管乞丐的願望如何與願望的實現幾近貼合，得到一件襯衫畢竟還是願望，這件襯衫必然還是與「乞丐身份」有些微不合襯之處。但不管如何，這件襯衫到底不可能是代現王權的符碼。回到笑話本身，在倉皇逃難之際，乞丐根本來不及著衣，只穿了這件襯衫就趕忙逃去。換句話說，乞丐的襯衫並不是足以代表王權的華袍，而是剝除了王權符碼後僅剩的只供蔽體的襯衣。這也是為何班雅民在德文的原文中使用的字眼是“Ein Hemd”——同時是襯衫、也是襯衣（Unterhemd）（Benjamin 1977：433）。

⁴ 尼采認為生命即是權力意志，即是肯定的超克。艾思普齊拖（Roberto Esposito）對這一點有清楚的解釋：生命「如火焰的漩渦一般運行，破壞或燒毀每一道防衛的隔牆、每一層閹限的隔膜，每一處界定的疆界。他跨越所有的歧異，連結所有的區隔，所及之處，無不被它吸收、吞服與啃噬。生命不只超克所有的它遇到的障礙，從本質來看，它本身即是對他者、最終包含自身的超克。生命即是自我的超克，意味著生命不再是「在自身」——它總是被拋擲於自身之外。但假如生命總是被推離自身，或是承認它位於境內的域外，也就是說，肯定自身的話，生命本該是不斷地變異，因而持續地被否定，因為它就是生命」（Esposito 87-88）。

⁵ 註釋 1 提到肯定與否定是權力意志裡的兩大「感質」。德勒茲便是透過這兩大感質之間的非二元關係，來凸顯主動力量（active force）與反動力量（reactive force）不可化約的差異：「……主動力量肯定，並且肯定它們的差異：在主動力量裡，肯定位居首位，否定充其量只是一個結果，某種歡愉的過剩。而反動力量的特色在於...反對所有它們不是的東西，習於框限他者：在反動力量裡，否定位居首位；透過否定，它們達成一種肯定的佯裝」（Deleuze 74）。

⁶ 有些批評家認為生命政治的確帶來現實與願望的疊合，卻不覺得這是什麼困境，反倒以為這是生命政治的革命性格的展現。歐加康葛斯（Mika Ojakangas）便曾發表類似的議論：他認為從傅科的生命權力論來看，我們當今所處的世界早已遠離法律——政治權力的宰制，在生命權力的開明作為下，我們正以穩健的腳步邁向一個「法律弱化與政治實用化」（the neutralization of the law and the pragmatization of politics）的世俗世界，幾近於烏托邦的完整實現（Ojakangas 25-26）。

一切都不可能的世界，便是對生命政治此般弔詭的情境最割切的觀察（2010：93）。⁷ 如果烏托邦式的願望是解放政治的一種表現型態，「以願望來交換願望實現」、現實等同於願望達成這種心不想事便成的生命政治實境，無異宣告了解放政治的終結，進入阿岡本所謂「去政治化」的虛無實境：在「沒時間留給願望」的生命政治的情境下，「唯一僅存的，只有……生物生命本身作為其至高無上的政治（或非政治）使命，藉此達成人類社會的去政治化」（2004：76；2009：22）。⁸

貳、起乩的波坦金：乞丐的裸命與國王的神聖生命

生命政治下，一切都可能，也一切都不可能的弔詭，也許就是這則笑話引人發噱的一個深層因素。但至於前面提過的另一個問題——為什麼想得到一件僅供蔽體的襯衫，就非得大費周章先當上一個未來的亡國之君不可——又該作何解？這樣的提問又可以指向生命政治的哪一個面向？要思索這個問題，乞丐弱化的生命樣態可以是思考的起點。

班雅民的乞丐，跟鄂蘭（Hannah Arendt）的「域外之人」（alien）與阿岡本的「裸命」（bare life）或「聖人」（homo sacer）可以共同組成一個概念星陣。班雅民在〈經驗與貧困〉（"Experience and Poverty"）裡有此一問：「一旦與經驗分離，我們的文化又有何價值」？在仔細闡述文化如何與經驗分離，又如何導致文化的價值中空之前，班雅民用了一個比喻來捕捉當代文化的貧困面貌。他說，抽離經驗的文化有「一張臉——一張跟中世紀的乞丐一樣稜角分明的臉」（732）；與經驗「分離」的文化，長相就像是瘦骨嶙峋的乞丐一樣，各有一張瘦成皮包骨的臉。班雅民將瘦巴巴的乞丐與經驗萎縮的當代文化作一類比，顯示乞丐的生命存在並不是建立在「他**有**什麼？」，而是「他**沒有**什麼」的提問上。換句話說，「匱缺」（privation, *Armut*）才是乞丐的存有樣態：缺乏日常生活的必須，單獨（privately）坐在酒館的陰暗角落，夢想能夠獨自擁有一件屬於自己的襯衫（privatize），更重要的是，敵軍進犯讓乞丐失去了（being deprived of）王位而淪為乞丐。

被剝奪王權，在崇山峻嶺間逃亡，在小鎮間遊蕩的乞丐，若要在現代世界找一個相對應的生命形式，恐怕非鄂蘭筆下的「域外之人」（alien）莫屬。所謂的域外之人，一次大戰後湧現的無國籍難民（the stateless）是其中一個典型。鄂蘭如是描述域外之人的處境：他們「被迫離開公共世界生活」，「在文明的進程中」，重新「被扔回他們自然天生的樣態」；墮入動物界的域外之人，「人權」被剝奪，「失去了職業、喪失公民身份」，失去一切可以「確立自我認同」的東西，更加「弔詭」的是，在失去這一切的「同時」，域外之人也從「具有人格權的人（a person）變成了人類（a human being in general）」（302）。換句話說，人變成非人的同時他變成了人類，「域外之人」既是人又是非人。阿岡本進一步發展鄂蘭筆下的弔詭，將既是人又非人的域外之人，稱之為同是非人（he is not human）與非非人（he is not not-human）的「聖人」（homo sacer）或「裸命」（bare life），角色也從國際人球換成了集中營裡的猶太人。裸命的「權利遭到徹底剝奪，到一種不管對他們採取什麼行動都不構成犯罪的程度」（2000：41）。⁹ 裸命不

⁷ 齊傑克曾經將尼采的「末代人」（the Last Man）挪用來描述後現代情境。他認為「興奮」（也就是他說的一切都可能）與「鎮靜」（也就是一切都不可能）的兩相疊合，構成「後現代的末代人」的生命特徵：「難道因否定生命而孳生的過剩不是某種復仇，一種在否定生命的壓抑後過剩的回返」？齊傑克顯然是以精神分析的術語，來解釋否定的反動力最後得致肯定的佯裝的過程（Žižek 2003：98）。

⁸ 施密特（Carl Schmitt）曾經做過類似的觀察，不過他是從批判政黨政治的角度，思考一旦私領域（包含生命）從國家撤離，一個外於國家的自由社會形成之後，接踵而來的去政治化效應。施密特認為，個人權利的過度張揚，讓「『社會』中無法控制的隱形力量」四處氾濫。這一股混亂、各有各的利益趨向的社會力構成政治政黨系統的基礎，讓私利導向的力量取得「政治權力」，但卻不需擔負任何伴隨政治力而來的「責任」與「風險」。施密特把這股眾聲喧嘩的社會力稱之為「間接力」（indirect power），是摧毀巨靈、搗毀政治機器、掏空政治力的元兇（Schmitt 73-74）。從名詞來看，「間接力」雖然是（或因為是）弱化的政治力，但它在超克巨靈時所施展的力量卻充滿「肯定」的力道。但很明顯的，間接力的肯定只是看似肯定的佯裝；假如間接力有任何肯定特質的話，那也只是來為了捍衛自身的社會利益，對異於自身的國家巨靈所展開的防禦性攻勢，並非純然的肯定超克。在這一點上，我們可以說「間接力」與取得肯定「佯裝」的反動力量具備同樣的變裝形構，但對施密特而言，與間接力相對的政治力，國家這部巨靈機器是它的道成肉身，這也許是施密特的政治力跟連帶自身一併超克的生命權力意志最關鍵的差別。

⁹ 阿岡本的裸命，原型大半來自列維（Primo Levi）對滅絕營（extermination camp）的記述。當中他稱呼關在裡頭的猶太人為「倒臥

是人，因此殲滅他們不算謀殺行為，但他們也沒有因此變成絕對的非人，在被推離於世俗法律秩序之外成為非人的同時，他們還是無權進入非人的神聖地域，所以是非非人。阿岡本於是說，他們「可以被殺但不能祝聖」(*may be killed and yet no sacrificed*)，一開始就「被擱置在人類法律管轄之外，但卻沒有因此被帶入神聖律法的領域」；「雙重排除」(*double exception*)的結果，讓聖人與裸命站在世俗與神聖的門檻上，懸置非人與非非人之間(Agamben 1998, 8, 82, 原標重點)。這裡我們必須小心重蹈主體論的窠臼，錯把「裸命」理解為主體的受難樣態。「雙重排除」的說法，目的不在控訴裸命正在蒙受苦難，也不是看到他們徬徨在世俗群體與神聖領域之間而心生悲憫。道理很簡單，面對裸命，我們無法控訴也無從悲憫，因為「裸命」早已喪失「蒙受」、「徬徨」或「遊走」的行動與感知能力。無法被世俗秩序與神聖秩序所含攝，失去所有生命屬性的裸命從主體變形為本體，他們以「自然天生」充滿獨一性(*singularity*)的非人樣態存在著，「只是人而已別無其他」(*homo tantum*)，只是存在(*existence*)別無其他的「如是之人」(*humans as such*)。¹⁰ 如此單薄的「如是之人」，誕生在世俗與神聖之間的門檻上；更精確的說法是，裸命無法遊走於門檻兩端，因為門檻就是他們的存在，他們的存在即是遊走，自我從自我逸離出去的存在。換言之，裸命是自我內在斷開處的外顯。¹¹ 從這個角度來看班雅民的乞丐，我們可以說「擁有」不等同於「存有」，主體也不等同於本體，但兩者也不相互排斥，而是以交叉錯列(*chiasmus*)的圖陣架構彼此的連結：簡言之，乞丐的本體現身於「沒有」的空白處。

從乞丐到域外之人再到裸命，這並不是一個任意的連結；班雅民在猶太笑話的同一節，直接點出內在分裂構成乞丐生命存在的事實。班雅民照例拐了個大彎，先談到他晚期相當關心的複製機器：「在我關係最為疏離的時候，電影與留聲機問世」(1934: 814)。班雅民不認為複製機器文化工業的一環，目的不在透過自我欺瞞來彌補現代人的孤寂與不幸。電影與留聲機的普及，也不僅僅只是充當第二自然的打手，專門負責人際疏離的再生產而已，而是更有效地將疏離推至極端，從而暴露掩藏在人際疏離下更為根本的自我分裂：「實驗早已證明人認不得自己在電影上的步態(*gait*)，也認不得從留聲機中傳來的自己的聲音」(1934: 814)。對班雅民而言，複製機器的功能不只是無限制地製造副本，而像是加速細胞分裂一般，讓「原版」的「可複製性」(*reproducibility*)、也就是從自身逸離出去的「可分裂性」浮上意識的檯面。人早已遺忘、因此不再認得自己的「步態」與「聲音」，而複製機器就像神奇的寫字板(*mystic writing pad*)一樣，恆常保存著銘刻在無意識的所有痕跡。¹² 在電影院裡或留聲機前，

在谷底深淵」(*lie on the bottom*)的人(Levi 26-27)。

¹⁰ 「別無其他」翻譯自阿岡本所說的“not otherwise”。當中的否定語氣否定的是「作為特性的述詞(在本質的層次)，但隨後又以作為非——特性(*im-properties*)與無隸屬屬性(*improprieties*)重新被拾起」；「別無其他」就是「如是」(*thus*)或「此般」(*as such*)，跟物自身(*thing-in-itself*)無關。阿岡本舉了一個簡單的例子來解釋「別無其他」：「這片葉子是綠色的；因此(*hence*)它不是紅色也不是黃色」。阿岡本在此看似以差異(*difference*)說來反本質論，但這只是看似而已。假如是索緒爾，他應該會說：「這片葉子是綠色的，因為它不是紅色也不是黃色也不是……」。在邏輯上差異先行的作法，當然是瓦解同一性的思想利器。但阿岡本認為這樣的說法仍嫌不足。在他舉的例子裡，「因此」這個副詞清楚表明他想要一舉超越本質論與差異論的意圖。這是一片綠葉，已經不是因為它不是紅色或不是黃色；換句話說，「綠色」已經是一個無法被語言的差異秩序所含攝的「非——特性」，指向既不是紅色也不是黃色的獨一性(*singularity*)(Agamben 1993: 93-94)。回到論文的脈絡，獨一性的說法顯然部分是針對鄂蘭的「人類」(*a human being in general*)而發，裸命是具備獨一性的存在，鄂蘭“in general”一詞並沒有精確掌握域外之人的生命型態。此外，從同一性到差異性再到獨一性，這一路的思想挺進，與阿岡本對保羅的解釋有密切的關連，這點在論文的最後一部份會再提及。

¹¹ 齊傑克曾經以史蒂芬金的「沒死」(*undead*)來解釋康德對否定判斷(*negative judgment*)與不定判斷(*indefinite judgment*)的區隔。「他死了」這個肯定判斷可以用否定跟不定兩種方式來進行否定：可以是「他沒有死」(*he is not dead*)的否定判斷，也可以是「他是沒——死的」(*he is un-dead*)的不定判斷。透過「對非述詞的肯定」，「不定判斷」超越了肯定與否定的區隔與生死的對立，「開啟了瓦解深層區分的第三領域：「不死」(*the undead*)」。「不死」的狀態是「非生也非死，是標準的魑魅魍魎『活死人』」。根據同樣的邏輯，「『他是非人』(*he is inhuman*)不等同於『他不是人』(*he is not human*)」——後者只是講「他不具備人性」，但前者的意思截然不同，指的是「他不是人也不是人，駭人的殘餘過剩(*terrifying excess*)是他的基本特徵，雖然否定了一般理解的『人性』，但這樣的過剩殘餘卻是作為人(*being-human*)的內在必然」(Žižek 2006: 21-22)。裸命的身上同樣帶有「他是非人」的不定判斷印記，殺他的人不用負法律責任，所以裸命不是人，但同樣他不可能在死後得道昇天，因此他也不是不是——人(*not not-human*)。裸命是世俗與神聖之間的斷開(*caesura*)，懸置在生死之間無法被兩端統攝的門檻，是為對立秩序的過剩殘餘。

¹² 「光學無意識」(*optical unconscious*)的概念可作此解。

我們得以目睹或親耳聽聞遺忘事物的驟然、頑強地回訪。在此當下，發生的不是遺忘的事物「進入意識」(becoming conscious)的過程，而是直接經驗自我的「可複製性」，見證自我的分裂。¹³緊接著光學無意識的問題，班雅民話鋒一轉，突然把複製機器、吉軻德爺(Don Quixote)、乞丐與國王串連起來，將蹲坐在酒館板凳上無所事事的乞丐比喻成「騎士」，力戰從「遺忘」那頭吹來的「暴風」，「騎著馬朝他的過往」衝去，企圖在「奔逃的國王身上逮住自己」(1934: 814)。透過這複雜的親屬連結，班雅民經營了一段充滿蒙太奇疊影的場面調度，乞丐自我的「可複製性」在重複曝光的影像交錯中已經不言可喻：他除了是國王之外，還是個「奔逃的國王」，一個逃離自我，不斷逸離在自我之外的國王。

為何要取得一件襯衫就非得先當上國王不可？這個問題班雅民已經為我們提供了部分解答。國王是乞丐遺忘的自我，既陌生又熟悉；不是非先當上國王不可，而是乞丐本身就是國王，只是一直不認得而已。我們可以接著問：如果世俗與神聖的交界構成了乞丐的裸命存在，那國王的生命與乞丐的生命之間，是否存在著一直隱而不顯的同構性？是否在乞丐奮勇追捕落難國王之前，他一直遺忘的國王生命其實也跟他一樣，同樣是「只是人而已別無其他」的存在？另外一個值得思考的問題是，在安息日的傍晚，當他蹲坐在板凳上無所事事享受「休憩的幸福」的片刻，乞丐為何得以在生命政治貫穿乞丐生命的同時，奮力展開對逃命國王的追捕行動，讓隱晦的國王生命變得清晰可讀(legible)？

國王生命，是班雅民在〈卡夫卡〉一開頭就開宗明義提到的問題。班雅民一本身為說書人的初衷，轉述了一個十八世紀俄國名將、同時是凱薩琳大帝的寵臣、也是當時帝國的地下統治者波坦金(Grigori Alexander Potemkin)的故事。話說罹患憂鬱症的波坦金長期臥病，許久不理國事，以致公文堆積如山。某天一群高階官員心急如焚，抱著一堆待核的文件不知如何是好，這時一位小職員舒瓦金(Shuvalkin)自告奮勇，拿了那一疊文件直接闖入波坦金昏暗的寢室，二話不說，沾好墨水就把筆遞給坐在床上、身上僅著一件破舊睡衣的波坦金。雖然波坦金還是睡眼惺忪，但他竟然也接過筆來開始簽閱擱在他膝上公文。一件一件簽完之後，舒瓦金看也沒看，就志得意滿地飛快把那一堆簽畢的文件送回給官員。當官員把文件打開一看，全部的人當場傻眼，因為每一份公文上頭的簽名寫的都是「舒瓦金」(1934: 794-95)。班雅民在卡夫卡的小說中發現許多像波坦金一樣「行動遲緩、哈欠連連、不修邊幅」的當權者——諸如「住在閣樓的法官或城堡裡的秘書」都可歸為同類(1934: 795)。另一個可以馬上聯想到的例子是德國哀劇中的無能君王。普遍存在在哀劇中的君王，原本都該是握有神聖權力的統治者，但卻屢屢陷入「統治權力與統治能力不對稱」的狀態；縱使位高權重，君王始終難以擺脫「卑微的人類位階」，不時陷入毀滅性的「心神喪失」狀態，面臨國家需要他「在第一時間」宣告「緊急狀態」的關鍵時刻，他卻難當大任，「沒有能力作出決定」(1922: 70-71)。換言之，巴洛克君王的普遍問題，似乎肇因於自然身體(natural body)的缺陷所連帶導致的政治身體(political body)失序。原本強調政治身體可以脫離自然身體永世存在的國王的兩個身體論(the King's two bodies)，在巴洛克墮落又無能的君王身上完全瓦解；政治身體往自然身體塌陷的結果，政治身體可以獨立於自然身體之外自主存在的法律構想，至此全然失效。同樣的問題也出現在波坦金身上。理想中的兩個相互連結但又可自主存在的國王身體(Agamben 2005a: 66-67)，因為憂鬱身體的巨大感染力，原本已經開始正常運作的政治身體(由那群心急如焚的官員、舒瓦金、以及有如神靈附體的波坦金所組成)，在舒瓦金的名字出現在公文上的那一剎那，又倒回去與波坦金的自然身體形成無差別的一體狀態。但假如這樣的說法可以完全成立，我們又該如何定位波坦金開始簽公文時那有如神蹟降臨的起乩身體？

波坦金的起乩身體顯然暴露了兩個身體論的侷限。阿岡本不同意坎托羅維茲(Ernst Hartwig Kantorowicz)關於國王有兩具身體的說法，他認為國王只有一個身體，但「內含兩種生命」——「一

¹³ 班雅民在〈科技複製性時代的藝術品(第三版)〉(“Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility”)中，把電影的攝影師比喻成外科醫生：跟透過手觸來治病的魔法師不同，攝影師不會跟他所要拍攝的對象之間保持距離，他像外科醫生一樣，直接「侵入病人的身體」，深入病人的「組織」，只有當他的手「小心謹慎地在器官間移動」時，他跟病人的距離才「稍稍拉開」。我們可以直接就字面義來理解攝影師對拍攝對象的侵入性：攝影對象直接被開膛破肚，就像人在電影院中直接經驗自我的分裂一樣(2003: 263)。

個自然生命（*natural life*）以及一個神聖生命（*sacred life*）」（1998：100）。阿岡本的批評極富創意。他懷疑坎托羅維茲跟他的得意門生居榭（*Ralph Giese*），因為擔心國王的政治身體與聖人或裸命的身體會有混淆不清的狀況，於是刻意忽略「基督教的政治神學」與羅馬帝國的祝聖儀式之間的延續性（1998：93-94）。根據羅馬的祝聖儀式，帝王駕崩之後，除了為死亡的自然身體舉行正規的喪禮之外，還必須另立栩栩如生的芻像（*effigy*），進行第二場甚至更為正式、規模也更大的葬禮與公共悼念（*Iustitium*），至此才算完成葬禮的祝聖儀式（*Agamben* 1998：94-95）。換句話說，國王自然身體的死亡，會釋放出神聖生命，但神聖生命並不同於坎托羅維茲設想中的政治身體，可以在國王的自然生命結束之後，讓被解放的政治身體，立即化為王位永世傳承的法律基礎，讓子民發出「國王已死！國王不死」（*Le roi est mort ! vive le roi !*）此類兩具身體論的吶喊。畢竟真正擁有雙重身體的不是國王，而是擬似自然身體、同時也如政治身體一般不朽的帝王芻像。相較於在公共悼念儀式中展示的芻像，國王只有一個身體，在他的自然生命終結的那一刻釋放出來的神聖生命，必須仰賴芻像予以安頓，在完成第二場虛擬葬禮（*funus imaginarium*）之前，神聖生命根本無法昇天成聖，自然也無法為王位順利繼承提供堅實的政治神學基礎。因此，國王的神聖生命很弔詭地與裸命形成一種同構的關係：神聖生命的解放，說明它已經離開國王的自然生命，但在揮別世俗之後，它並沒有就此進入神聖領域，跟裸命一樣，世俗與神聖、非人與非非人交界的幽冥地域，恐怕才是國王的神聖生命統御的國度（*Agamben* 1998：100-01）。不管從自然身體（世俗）或政治身體（神聖）的角度，我們都無法妥善解釋為何臥床多時的波坦金可以一方面突然丟棄他罹病的自然身體，一方面卻是在文件上簽下舒瓦金的名字。唯一的解釋是，在突然暴走的波坦金身上，我們看見的不是蒼白無機的自然身體，亦非失序的政治身體，而是逸離在君王的自然生命之外四處流竄的神聖生命，等待祝聖儀式的收束，將它導入神聖領域。乞丐想要抵抗遺忘，在「奔逃的國王身上逮到自己」，根據阿岡本對兩具身體說的批判和補充，乞丐在這場吉軻德式的征戰過程中，見證了裸命與神聖生命的首度遭逢，初次在君王暴走的神聖生命上發現與自身裸命的同構性。

14

面對裸命與聖人的親屬結構，阿岡本不忘提醒兩者的差別所在。就生命政治的理論建構而言，這個差別可能比神聖生命的發現更具關鍵意義。在阿岡本從兩具身體論中提取出不見容於基督教政治神學的神聖生命之後，他建議讀者直接從表面義來理解 *le mort saisit le vif* 這句規範王權繼承的俗諺（1998：101）。*le mort saisit le vif* 的說法不是用來歌詠具備兩個身體的不朽國王，「國王崩殂之後王權迅速轉移給生者」的法律意涵也無法窮盡它的意義，唯有把它直譯成「亡者攫住生者」才能直探它的奧義。假如基督教的政治神學，與羅馬的異教葬禮儀式有著秘密的聯姻關係，真正確保王位順利繼承的，已經不是坎托羅維茲筆下的政治身體。如前所言，真正擁有兩具身體的是國王栩栩如生的芻像，國王本身從頭到尾就只有一個身體，而芻像所代表的政治身體，其合法性基礎在於從已逝國王的單一身體中解放出來的神聖生命。阿岡本認為「為王權奠基的神聖生命」才是賦予「王位繼承人」權力的活水源頭，道理便在於此（1998：101）。換句話說，亡者釋出的神聖生命確立了王權的綿延不絕，所以是「亡者攫住生者」。如此一來，原先用來作為王權延續的象徵、代表永世和平的政治身體，勢必也要重新定義：一如波坦金是凱薩琳大帝的愛人兼帝國的地下統治者，王權的基礎顯然來自不可捉摸、難以歸類的神聖生命，因此神聖生命的駭人幽靈牢牢盤據在不朽的政治身體之上，讓政治身體的譬喻從「王權綿延不絕的象徵」，搖身一變成為指向「王權的集權、非人（*inhuman*）性格」的「密碼」（*Agamben* 1998：101）。¹⁵ 神聖生命在恆常不動的政治身體下暴走，揭露了掩藏在王權永續這塊和平面紗底下的「集權、非人性格」。

¹⁴ 從乞丐與波坦金同樣坐在陰暗的角落，身上的衣服也是一樣破舊襤褸。從兩人身處的空間和衣著，我們同樣也可窺見裸命與神聖生命的同構性。

¹⁵ 這裡的“*inhuman*”跟史蒂芬金的「不死者」（*the undead*）一樣，必須從康德的不定判斷來理解。詳見註釋 10。

可以進入政治身體，成為至高王權的根基，這個事實標示出神聖生命與裸命的最大距離。阿岡本挖掘基督教政治神學與羅馬祝聖葬禮的隱晦連結，目的不只在於彰顯不朽王權底下的鬼影幢幢而已。原本難以定位、也無法規範的神聖生命，透過雙重葬禮等儀式，終究還是得以晉升神聖秩序，成為絕對王權的基礎；神聖生命可以被體制化、被王權秩序整編的事實，應該是這個概念最為核心的部分。儘管神聖生命與裸命具備高度的同構性，都是以非人與非非人之間的門檻為其存在。但相較於可以被體制化的神聖生命，為生命政治機器所製造的裸命，卻很弔詭地從生命政治的部署圖上消失：「聖人」是「最後剩下、無法再行化約的裸命」，注定「被排除在外，直接暴露在沒有任何儀式、任何犧牲可以前來救贖的死亡跟前」（Agamben 1998：100）。乍看之下，阿岡本對裸命與神聖生命的區分令人困惑。如果國王的神聖生命與裸命本屬同構，都是屬於遭到「雙重排除」的生命，到底是什麼樣的因素或機制介入，讓國王的神聖生命得以為體制吸納轉化，同時讓裸命完全被「排除在外」？這個問題牽涉阿岡本生命政治理論的核心，必須先從生命政治機器生產裸命的機制談起，方能理解裸命被棄置在死亡面前的原因。

阿岡本曾以納粹帝國下猶太人為典範，來解釋生命政治如何透過政治決斷對人民的生命微分再微分，直到出現「無法再行化約的裸命」為止。自 1933 年起，納粹以確保德國人民的優生健康為名，持續不斷以切分、斷開（*caesura*）的方式來確定威脅的所在位置：從區分雅利安人跟非雅利安人開始，再以非雅利安人的後裔為範圍從中區分純種猶太人（*Volljuden*），跟祖父母中只有一位是猶太裔的雜種（*Mischlinge*），之後就順著同樣邏輯，不斷在「生物的連續性平面」（*biological continuum*）上切完再切，「從猶太人到被驅逐者，從被驅逐者再到囚犯」，最後「在集中營裡到達最終門檻」，浮現一個無法再繼續化約下去的「生命政治物質」（*biopolitical substance*），最後從生命中獨立出一個「無法分派給任何一個特定承載者或主體」的物質，也就是沒有任何儀式可以救贖的「穆斯林」（*Muselmann*）（Agamben 2005a：84-85）。¹⁶

「穆斯林」會成為「被排除在外，直接暴露在沒有任何儀式、任何犧牲可以前來救贖的死亡面前」的裸命存在，與生命政治造人機器充滿矛盾的操作手法息息相關。按理來講，屬於實然層次的「生物的連續性平面」應當是維繫德國人民一統性的堅實基礎，理應盡力保持其連續性才是，但納粹卻反其道而行，以不斷在內部進行切分的方式造成連續性的斷裂，透過人民生命的內除（*inclusive exclusion*）來求取人民一統性的實現。納粹的殘酷代表的不是歷史的偶然，也不是西方現代化進程走上岔路的結果。事實剛好相反。納粹以破壞實然來實現實然、以排除人民來確保人民存在、以違反普遍主義來成就普遍主義的矛盾操作，實為「根植於人民概念內部的生命政治裂縫」（*biopolitical fracture*）所致（Agamben 1998：177-78；2000：32）。「有人民的地方就有裸命」（*Where there is a People, there will be bare life*）（1998：179），有普遍主義存在的地方就有例外，在納入與排除、人民（*People*）與賤民（*people*）兩股相對力量的拉扯下，形成「根植於人民概念內部的生命政治裂縫」，也徹底改變了生命政治治理下的人民形構：人民不再是政治哲學中指稱的實體，而是政治行動創造的事件；換句話說，人民不再是為普遍主義全數納入、共享平等權利的公民（*People*），也不是個別主義中所指稱的遭到排除的苦難階級（*people*），而是隨著持續的政治決斷與區分，擺盪在普遍與例外之間的畸零構成，表現出集合論中「包含」與「屬於」的衝突邏輯，成為「所有無法被包含在它屬於的整體」當中、也是「所有不屬於早就將它包含在內的集合」的殘餘（1998：177-78；2005c：57）。為了人民而反人民的政治決斷，讓人民成了屬於人民但不包含他、包含他但不屬於人民的過剩。阿岡本認為，根據現代造人機器生產裸命的機制，「早已是人的」被「排除於自身之外而成為非（或尚未是）人」（*excluding as not (yet) human*

¹⁶ 山特納（Eric L. Santner）如此描述「穆斯林」這個「生命政治物質」：「穆斯林」被「完全約化到一個『畏縮』（a “cringe”）的物質，他的存在被減縮到他純粹、原初洪荒的存有，就在那兒，但卻早已不在『世界當中』。在社會存在的零度，在象徵死亡與真實死亡之間的地域，殘存下來的不是純然的生物（動物或植物）生命，而是……社會象徵意義進入『緊急狀態』的道成肉身」（Santner 100）。

an already human being from itself) (2004: 37)。只要把引句中的「人」置換為「人民」，重新將人民理解為因內在斷裂而形成的自我匱缺——人民是將早已是人民的人民排除於自身之外的事件——我們便可理解懸宕在人與非人、非人與非非人之間的裸命，是如何以其門檻的存在，賦予政治決斷下喪失實體性的人民一副赤身裸體的血肉之軀 (flesh)，成為人民作為殘餘的道成肉身，也是生命政治造人機器的完全見證。在力求人民的普遍性與完整性的前提下，將揭露「生命政治裂縫」的畸零生命殲滅，讓裸命「直接暴露」在沒有任何救贖可能的「死亡」面前，於是被認為是填平「生命政治裂縫」的釜底抽薪之道。這也是猶太人必須被滅絕的根本原因。但可以想見的是，以滅絕人民來成就人民一體性的作法，只不過是在惡性循環的泥淖中開鑿另一道「生命政治裂縫」的開端而已 (Agamben 1998: 179-80)。

「現代性必然在其自身內部創造出裸命與人民，但裸命與人民也是它無論如何都無法容忍的存在」 (Agamben 1998: 179)。一旦普遍主義的人民概念被推到極端，裸命必跟隨之，而殲滅這個令人「無法容忍的存在」自然也成為縫合生命政治裂縫其中一個必然的手段。但談到生命政治機器對裸命的排除，有一點必須要先澄清。雖然「生命政治」在希特勒的德國已經與「死亡政治合而為一」的說法 (2005a: 83) 已然成為阿岡本的生命政治理論的識別標記，若再搭配上「集中營……是我們迄今依然生活於其中的政治空間的隱藏母體與規域」的大敘述 (Agamben 2000: 37)，阿岡本過度放大死亡的生命政治觀，更是引來諸多批評家的非議，認為他講的生命政治根本是死亡政治，不適用於當代生命政治的實況。¹⁷但這些批評家似乎都低估了、甚至漠視阿岡本有關「死亡」只不過是生命政治「衍生的次級現象」 (epiphenomenon) 的說法 (2005a: 86)。假如「現代性必然在其自身內部創造出裸命與人民」，這表示阿岡本認為死亡是生命政治內部的衍生現象，無關乎違逆現代性的死亡政治，這也是阿岡本認定集中營不是死亡政治的空間，而是「同時既是生命空間也是死亡空間」的「生命政治空間」的原因 (2005a: 85-86)。換句話說，集中營彰顯的問題，不在納粹的嗜血，而在於現代生命政治如何因為內在的裂縫而裂解出死亡空間的可能性；以創造生命為上的生命政治，何以到頭來製造出走調的生命，而原本強調人民生命一體性與完整性的生命政治又如何被推至極端，以致於與死亡政治完全疊合，這些才是阿岡本自始至終關心的問題。因此，就裸命的理論意義而言，死亡從來不具備任何壓過生命的優位性。阿岡本提出裸命的理論，目的不在控訴加諸於「穆斯林」身上的殘酷死亡，而是試圖在指向生命政治裂縫的裸命存在裡，尋找如何讓生命不再走調的線索。

一旦廓清阿岡本只談死亡不談生命的疑慮，反倒可以更清楚掌握裸命如何被生命政治機器「排除在外，直接暴露在沒有任何儀式、任何犧牲可以前來救贖的死亡跟前」。我嘗試把這裡的「排除」重新理解為對裸命的拒絕承認 (disavowal)，主張生命政治機器一向是以拒絕裸命的機制來排除它所生產出來的裸命，而種族滅絕只是其中一種拒絕的極端形式而已。假如在「雙重排除」機制的運作下，裸命的存在被排除在世俗與神聖領域之外，因而卡陷在非人與非非人之間，拒絕承認可說是建立在雙重排除機制之上的第三重排除。透過帶有救贖意味的主體化過程，拒絕的機制一方面讓裸命得以脫離雙重排除的存在困境，但實際上卻因拒絕裸命的臨界存在而導致裸命的「鬼魅」化與二次去主體化。換句話說，拒絕機制的啟動不以殲滅裸命製造死亡為目標，而是讓裸命進入主體化的過程，但在去主體化過程如影隨形的共伴效應下，主體化非但無法為裸命帶來新生，反倒造成裸命原本就迴盪在門檻上的存在魅影化，陷入第二度的生命變異。這正是裸命注定被生命政治機器「排除在外」的主要原因。

跳脫希特勒的德國，阿岡本在當今主體化與去主體化的過程中，發現與納粹的生命政治機器相同的拒絕，可以作為「集中營……是我們迄今依然生活於其中的政治空間的隱藏母體與規域」的佐證。阿岡本認為傅科有關生命治理技術 (techniques of governance) 的說法有其侷限，談的不外乎是正規的「主

¹⁷ 羅斯 (Nikolas Ross) 就是一個典型的例子。他在立場上傾向傅科，批評阿岡本將生命政治與死亡政治劃上等號的說法並不符合當代的實狀。他認為傅科在區分法律——政治權力和生命權力的差別時，提到的是「讓死 (to let die)」，而不是「賜死 (to make die)」。¹⁸他認為傅科的理論比起阿岡本的死亡政治論更具當代性，因為畢竟真正「困擾我們這個年代的，不是過往歷史的再次啟動」，因為當今已經再也找不到什麼「『君王』會希望或計畫讓我們的公民同胞罹病和死亡」 (Ross 58)。

體生產」過程，只是圍繞著治理部署（apparatus）如何藉由製造舊主體的分裂（split）來催生「新主體」打轉，未能精確掌握在「現今的資本主義階段」，去主體化早已不是主體化過程中的一個辯證時刻，可以與之攜手共創一個摧毀——創造的迴圈來「重組新主體」；相反地，兩者相互脫勾的趨勢越來越明顯，形成一種彼此「互不相干」（reciprocally indifferent）的關係（Agamben 2009：20-21）。在這樣的關係底下，主體化的動能幾近耗竭。或更精準地說，原本創制主體的動能，在生命政治機器的媒介下，轉化成讓「幼蟲般」（larval）或「鬼魅般（spectral）」的（偽）主體得以孳生的熱能（Agamben 2009：21；2005a：148；2000：6-7）。阿岡本從九一一後生命政治與認同政治的連動中，觀察到生命政治特有的去主體化現象。在批評生命政治的反恐面向時，阿岡本順著「集中營……是我們迄今依然生活於其中的政治空間的隱藏母體與規域」的思考脈絡，懷疑九一一之後氾濫橫行的生物辨識系統根本就是納粹殺人機器的變形。在生物辨識系統的騷擾下，所有馴服於生命治理的良民都被視為潛在的恐怖主義者（Agamben 2009：22-23），淪為為了良民反良民下的受害者，見證後九一一的「生命政治裂縫」。在另一方面，生物辨識系統也將個人「釘死在」與個人無關、但也無法脫離的「生物資料」與「非社會身份」上（Agamben 2011：52-53），個人的指紋與虹膜等生物資訊因此形同當代的「生命政治物質」，體現了後九一一年代個人的「穆斯林」化與去主體化。更重要的是，主體化與去主體化過程「互不相干」的連動，在將人化約為裸命的同時，也「應許」去主體化的個人「一種能力」，讓他「得以在網路上戴上所有不屬於他的面具，取得所有可能的、但也不屬於他的第二與第三生命」（Agamben 2011：53）。裸命在網路上取得的多重生命與身份，就是阿岡本所謂的「帶有『幼蟲』或『鬼魅』形式」的偽主體，是生命政治機器的允諾，目的是想藉由百花齊放、可以蛻變為各種形式的多元身份（identity），來遮掩懸宕於非人與非非人之間的去主體實境。在另一篇談論威尼斯的文章裡，阿岡本認為在後現代與後歷史情境下的威尼斯，如同拒絕承認死亡的鬼魅，「未能瞭解自己早已圓寂（reached completion），還一直假裝自己「依然有體重有血肉」，「擦脂抹粉來掩飾自己孱弱、無血色的身軀，好展示給買了入場券的遊客觀看」，展現十足的「幼蟲」、「夜魔」（incubi or succubi）般的「鬼魅性格」（2011：39-41）。從這個角度來看，生命政治機器允諾給裸命的多重身份，跟威尼斯商人在「早已圓寂」的威尼斯身上塗抹的胭脂水粉一樣，拒絕裸命的功能殊無二致。用遮掩來拒絕裸命的結果，主體化與去主體化過程之間原有的辯證連結就此切斷，主體化因頓失動能而空洞化，重生的承諾也化為幻影。裸命變成魅影，城市淪為鬼域，這是生命政治與認同政治聯手，加上主體化與去主體化互不相干的連動所必然導致的結果。

當今的生命政治機器不再以殺戮來對待裸命，而是賜予裸命一個新生的允諾，但在拒絕裸命的大前提下，它許下的承諾也隨即遭到自己的背叛。雖然認同政治打開一個讓裸命得以形塑多重身份的主體化空間，但由於身份的生成與蛻變只是用來遮掩個人約化成「生命政治物質」的裸命狀態，裸命因此不再是勾連主體化過程、提供「重組新主體」必要動能的辯證時刻，而是一個在主體化進程中被拒絕、因而與主體化過程脫勾的存在。在提供主體化動能的傳輸線被截斷的情況下，不僅讓去主體化與主體化過程變成兩道「互不相干」的平行線，也讓在兩者的連動下死而復活的裸命，在空洞的主體化過程中，變形為不知自己早已死亡的鬼魅，造成裸命二度的生命變異。在生命政治與認同政治的聯手並進下，主體化與去主體化過程相互連動又彼此斷裂，一方面開啟了建構多重身份的空間，許諾給生命政治治理下的個人一個一切皆可能的虛擬世界，但也同時讓生成蛻變的虛擬世界淪為鬼影籠罩、生命變調、阻斷主體創制的沙漠，因許諾的自我背叛而成為一個一切皆不可能的世界。生命權力是一股佯裝肯定的反動力量，從主體化與去主體化既分裂又連動的角度來看，是再也清楚不過的事實。

從這個角度來看，我們可以進一步理解為何阿岡本一面強調裸命與國王神聖生命之間的同質性，一面也不忘提醒裸命注定被「排除在外」，不像國王的神聖生命一樣可以為體制所吸納轉化。阿岡本在這個論點上並無矛盾之處。前面說過，阿岡本懷疑坎托羅維茲刻意切斷基督教的政治神學與羅馬帝國的祝聖葬儀之間的關連，為的是要撇清國王的政治身體與裸命的親屬關係。換句話說，透過政治身體來

收束、安頓神聖生命的作法，其實已經暴露了拒認裸命的生命政治症狀。坎托羅維茲的理論進路與生命政治的主體化過程如出一轍，同樣在拒認裸命的前提下，給了神聖生命一個重生的承諾。將神聖生命導入如此空洞的、非辯證的主體化過程，導致王權帶有「集權、非人性格」而顯得魅影幢幢。阿岡本重讀坎托羅維茲的兩個身體論，目的在於透過反思基督教的政治神學，開啟一扇可以洞察生命權力部署的窗口。阿岡本從羅馬帝國的祝聖葬儀中，解析出坎托羅維茲拒認的神聖生命，將國王的兩個身體論視為神聖生命被體制吸納轉化的過程，他的本意不在於標榜神聖生命與裸命的殊異，而是想藉此指向生命政治主體化過程中特有的拒認機制：在「賜生」的大原則下，所有的裸命都會被導入主體化的進程，但在主體化的過程中，所有的裸命也都會被以拒認的形式「排除在外」，而王權的「極權、非人性格」正是在排除神聖生命之後，在王權臉上閃現的一副鬼臉（grimace），體現了神聖生命在王權中既缺席又在場的弔詭狀態。

參、權力太大、能力太小：例外狀態常規化與權力失能

一開始，我對猶太乞丐的笑話作了兩個提問，試圖探究這則笑話引人發噱的緣由。初步發現，這則笑話的笑點，分別折射出生命政治情境下兩個息息相關的幽暗場景：一方面乞丐只想要呆坐在酒館，外加一件襯衫，「以願望交換願望的實現」，顯示出以保衛生命為名的否定反動力，佯裝成肯定的生命權力意志（向襯衫說是，其實是向生命說不的結果），凸顯出生命政治所打造的是一個一切皆可能、同時也都不可能的去政治化世界。在另一方面，乞丐非得要先當上國王才能得到一件襯衫，這樣的鋪梗手法其實指向乞丐作為裸命，與君王作為神聖生命的同構性，暴露裸命在生命政治的主體化過程中，必然被排除在外的命運。班雅民，或更精確的說，阿岡本的班雅民對生命政治的觀察，具體而微地濃縮在這則笑話裡頭。從班雅民與阿岡本的觀點來看，受到生命政治規範的世界，改變的不可能已然成為世道的常態。去主體化的傾向甚囂塵上，魅影般的身份認同成為主流，必須要「預設主體與真實身份（例如勞工運動、布爾喬亞階級等等）才能啟動的「政治」行動，在「治理踐作當道」（the triumph of the *oikonomia*）的情況下日益「萎縮」，想要改變現實的框架似乎比登天還難（Agamben 2009：22）。¹⁸

阿岡本對於去主體化過程的描述十分陰暗，裸命必然被生命政治機器「排除在外」的說法也帶有明顯的絕望論調，這引來許多理論家分別從傅科、德勒茲或是史賓諾沙等角度對阿岡本提出他們的疑問，質疑的重點不外乎阿岡本有關去主體化、去政治化的說法，過度放大生命權力部署的宰制力，導致個人生命權力的極度窄縮。像奈格里（Antonio Negri）就質疑阿岡本對權力的認知過於狹隘，理論充滿太多不必要的失敗主義論調。他認為阿岡本的裸命說把權力一律視為「恐怖主義的行動」，全盤否定「存有的權力」，從「本體論的角度徹底摧毀權力表現的可能性」，甚至有和「肯定存有的優生學建構同聲共氣」之嫌，「不允許現在代表我們唯一希望的『怪獸』（monster）擁有任何存在的空間」，於是試圖透過「裸命」的概念「從內部瓦解」怪獸，把怪獸「稀釋」成受盡「暴力」虐待的「穆斯林」，讓「任何抵抗行動成枉然」（2008：209-10）。¹⁹ 在一次的對談中，奈格里主張必須拉開生命政治概念的縱深，在兩個沒有任何的「辯證中介」可以調合的「敵對」概念之間作一嚴格區分：一個是「生命權力」（*biopotere*）的概念，指的是「宰制生命」、「創造生命形式（*bios*）」的權力，另一個概念是「生命能力」（*biopotenza*），強調「建制力的潛能」，以「生命形式來創造權力」（Casarino and Negri 167-68）。²⁰ 在同樣後現代的思

¹⁸ 包曼（Zygmunt Bauman）也有類似的觀察。他認為如今要把「早就已經從階級或性別離座（disembedded）的個人重新鑲嵌回去（reembedding）」機率微乎其微，這個不可能性流動的現代性（liquid modernity）與堅硬的現代性（solid modernity）在主體化與身份認同上最大的差別（Bauman 32-34）。

¹⁹ 馬左爾（Mark Mazower）認為阿岡本一切等待救贖的觀點太過「低估在現今的政治秩序中採取有意義的行動的可能性」，理論充滿「不難在南歐左派身上看見的極度悲觀」（Mazower 32-3）。同樣批評阿岡本漠視、甚至扼殺社會力的說法非常多見，典型的說法見 Laclau，頁 20-21 與 Huysmans，頁 174-79。

²⁰ 奈格里不斷強調生命權力與生命能力之間是一種非辯證性的衝突關係，主要的考量在於，既然我們「身居在後現代的情境中」，「所有

考脈絡下，哈德（Michael Hardt）揣摩傅科在 1970 年代中葉之後對生命治理的突破性思考，提出區隔生命權力（biopower）與生命政治（biopolitics）的建議：前者是「加諸在生命之上的權力部署」（the deployment of power over life），強調權力對生命的治理，而後者則提供「我們為自身創造另一種生命自由的空間」，蘊藏了生命對抗生命治理的能力與潛力（195）。奈格里與哈德提出「生命能力」與「生命政治」的概念，顯然是針對阿岡本而發，企圖從傅科與史賓諾沙的角度，糾正阿岡本窄化生命與權力面向的單向度思考，去政治化的絕望陰影，並在生命權力的部署下，重新思考以生命本體為反抗基點，進行政治化與主體化工程的可能性。

暫且不論阿岡本是否如批評者所言，有過度放大生命權力的宰制力，讓所有的生命只能淪為完全被排除在外的裸命之虞。但在批評阿岡本的論調過於絕望的同時，奈格里與哈德同樣忽略了阿岡本一個重要的論述走向：在班雅明的影響下，阿岡本認為當今生命權力部署的問題不在於權力太大，而是能力太小（德國哀劇中遲遲下不了決定的君王、上面討論的波坦金、乃至於笑話中的國王，難道不是王權過份孱弱的例證？），而裸命雖然在生命機器的蹂躪下受盡生命不斷變異的苦楚，但作為代表生命政治切割的極限，體現「生命政治裂縫」的「生命政治物質」，裸命難道不可能以其注定被「排除在外」的存在，讓生命權力的種種部署左支右絀，甚至完全失靈？在安息日的傍晚享受「休憩幸福」片刻的乞丐，可以同時起身「騎著馬朝他的過往」衝去，企圖在「奔逃的國王身上逮住自己」，這難道不是暗示瘦骨嶙峋的裸命具有不可低估的能動性，比起能力太小的王權，裸命「如是」、「此般」的存在反而可以強大到足以「逮住」國王，並中斷整個生命權力的部署？與奈格里與哈德一樣，阿岡本念茲在茲的也是生命存有可能迸發的能力，論述看似有耽溺於死亡的巨大陰影之虞，但在面對生命政治背叛自我對生命的允諾時，要保全生命存有的能力，突出生命治理的死亡面向是非作不可的指控。但不同於奈格里與哈德的後現代思維，阿岡本不認為裸命與生命政治部署之間的衝突，是兩個「絕對」力量在同一個「平面」上進行的直接對撞。相反地，「平面」只是後現代大量製造的幻象。衝突得以發生，事實上來自階層排序（hierarchy）的可翻轉性：在權力與能力分裂的情況下，原本遭受生命權力部署強壓的裸命，反倒以其無權但有能的存在提供了翻轉階層排序的動能，成為抵抗有權無能的生命政治的契機所在。從這個角度來看，乞丐與國王的同構性在此取得更深一層的意義：有同構性，不意味乞丐與國王是位在同一扁平平面上的兩個無差別的「絕對」，而乞丐可以「逮住」國王，其實是無權有能的生命存有，與有權無能的權力部署，兩相遭遇之下導致階層翻轉的結果。換句話說，權力與能力的分裂，雖然是奈格里與哈德區分生命權力與生命能力時的基本假設，但在後現代的平面說底下，權力與能力雙雙被「絕對化」，權力與能力的分裂變成絕對權力（也就是生命權力）與絕對能力（生命能力或生命政治）的對壘。將權力與能力的分裂外部化、絕對化的結果，奈格里與哈德忽略了分裂同時存在於裸命存有，與生命權力部署內部核心的非後現代情境，因而無法對裸命與生命權力部署之間有宰制也有抵抗的關係做出更細膩的處理。²¹

阿岡本解構施密特的「例外狀態」論的重點之一，便在於強調權力與能力分裂的內部性。我在第二節結束的部分提到，暴走的神聖生命藉由葬禮儀式被導入政治身體的過程，可視為是生命政治主體化過程的隱喻，而魅影幢幢的王權結構，也揭露了生命政治本質上的自我背叛，在排除裸命的機制運作下，成就了一則以一切皆可能來遮掩一切皆不可能的虛假諾言。阿岡本回到坎托羅維茲的兩具身體論與羅馬國葬儀式，矛頭瞄準的不只是坎托羅維茲而已，背後其實還隱藏了與施密特（Carl Schmitt）的

的矛盾衝突老早就喪失了階層分立（hierarchical）的面向」。在後現代的腳本中，「平面——一個扁平的平面」是衝突的兩造對峙的場域。因此奈格里不認為自己在一九八三年於羅馬接受的審判具備任何「階層分立的功能」。法庭是一處平面，發生於其中的對峙，不是萬能的法律對無助的被告上對下的宰制，或者是下對上的憤恨，而是兩個「絕對（absolutes）兩相對撞又彈開」的對決（Negri 2010：6-7；2009：57）。

²¹ 奈格里的兩個阿岡本論，同樣也是將權力與能力的不對稱外部化與絕對化的結果，誤以為阿岡本談裸命時，關心只是絕對的生命權力，但在提及「存有能」時，絕對能力又突兀地被搬上檯面。

「例外狀態」(state of exception) 論對話的意圖。前頭所說的用認同政治的一切皆可能來掩飾主體創制的不可能，在此轉回主權決斷自身，暴露出在主權結構內部權力(一切皆可能的主權決斷)與能力(終結自然狀態的不可能)的不對稱。簡單來講，施密特一直把「例外狀態」視為「自然狀態」(state of nature)的對立面，在法律規範與事實出現法律裁判無法彌合的裂縫，因而導致失序的自然狀態時，必須以主權決斷凌駕失能的法律判斷，透過政治力的介入，形成足以終結自然狀態的例外狀態以穩定法律秩序。對施密特而言，自然狀態是被例外狀態「排除在外」(except)的混亂失序，阿岡本於是順著施密特的邏輯，認為既然自然狀態是被例外狀態被排除在外的例外(exception)，那本身也是處於例外狀態的自然狀態，就不可能僅僅是外於例外狀態的對立項，而有可能與例外狀態形成一體兩面的關係。一如裸命與國王的神聖生命是王權中缺席的在場，導致王權結構呈現魅影化的態勢，被例外狀態排除的自然狀態，也同樣讓藉由例外狀態來穩住局面的法律秩序露出詭異鬼臉。因為自然狀態缺席的在場而搞得鬼影幢幢的法律秩序，證明了主權決斷不是不受法律規範限制的絕對權力，也不是一股可以讓一切都變成可能的神蹟力量；在例外狀態的中介下，遭到自然狀態滲透的法律秩序，反倒暴露出主權決斷無從終結自然狀態的失能窘境。這是阿岡本討論施密特時不斷提及的重點，也是可以用來回應奈格里與哈德批評的思考起點。

從表面來看，創造例外狀態的主權決斷確實有如神蹟一般，可以拯救法律秩序於既倒。根據施密特的說法，「法律秩序的概念……包含兩個不同法理元素的對照——規範(norm)與決斷(decision)」，但兩者並不具平行的位階：「跟其他的秩序一樣，法律秩序的基礎在於決斷，而不是規範」(2005: 10)。決斷可以取代具備普遍性的規範成為法律秩序的基礎，其正當性來自規範與事實(facts)之間先天存在的裂縫。簡單來講，法律的「意念無法自我實現」，規範本身無法指導、決定或規範法律對特定事實情境的適用與否，一般都需要「決斷」的介入，才能彌合規範與事實之間的斷裂(Huysmans 168)。但事實變化莫測，規範與決斷於是有如蹺蹺板的兩端，隨情境的改變產生你上我下，或我下你上的連動關係：在正常的狀況下，決斷的自主性「縮至最小」(recede to a minimum)，但若遇到規範窒礙難行的非常狀況出現，「摧毀規範」、開創一個「法律條規」得以有效適用的全新「情境」(situation)，是一條解決法律困局、鞏固法律秩序的必要途徑，而真正具備主權的，就是有能力「決斷」這個可以讓法律條規有效施行的「正常情境是否確實存在」的人(國家)(Schmitt 2005: 12-13)。在正常情境下，依循正常的法律程序來進行決斷不會有太大困難，此時決斷似乎只是司法機器中不可或缺的小螺絲釘，作為法律秩序基礎的自主性自然無法彰顯。但在非常時刻，一旦面臨窮盡一切法律程序也無法做一決斷的現實情境時，規範與事實無從黏合，法律秩序陷入崩潰的危機，此時決斷作為法律秩序基礎的重要性就完全浮顯出來。很弔詭地，在規範與現實完全分離的情況下，唯一能挽救規範秩序於即倒的，就只有沒有法源依據(legally underived)、跳脫既有的法律框架的政治力來作關鍵的決斷，判斷我們「是否處在形式與理性程序都已失能的情況，又該對現況作什麼樣的因應」(Huysmans 168)。在非常狀況下的決斷時刻，決斷展現「絕對純粹」的力道，與規範「分道揚鑣」，及時填補規範失能而留下來的決斷空缺。這就是力挽法律狂瀾的法律例外狀態，證明「要創造法律，根本不需要有法律基礎」(Schmitt 2005: 13)。透過決斷形成法律真空，中斷或甚至廢止現有的法律規範來確立法律秩序，施密特把法律的例外狀態類比為「神學裡的神蹟」看似有幾分道理(2005: 36)。

但對於例外狀態是否真如施密特所言，是神蹟降臨的時刻，阿岡本的態度相當保留。施密特自己都認為，雖然例外狀態的主權決斷沒有法源依據，但例外狀態的法理意義無庸置疑：例外狀態不是「無政府或失序狀態」，在此當下，「縱使跟尋常的定義有所不同，但法理意義上的秩序還是屹立不搖」

(Schmitt 2005: 12)。既然例外狀態具備堅實的法理基礎，例外狀態可否類比於降臨人世的神蹟就不無疑問。因此韋柏(Samuel Weber)認為，施密特原本的意圖是想透過政治與神學(例外狀態與神蹟)的類比，「喚回」已經為「現代政治理論的內在性概念」所「遺忘」的「政治概念」，但這些概念本身

的「異質性」(heterogeneity)到頭來還是跟主流的內在性概念「殊無二致」(the same)(186)。換句話說，施密特的政治神學頂多只是政治世俗化過程中的橋段之一，稱不上是挑戰現代政治理論的逆流。在施密特不斷神化主權決斷與例外狀態的字裡行間，阿岡本同樣也發現了「規域(nomos)與例外狀態」的「鄰近性」(proximity)(1998:36)。但阿岡本倒不認為把充滿「異質性」的神蹟或例外狀態概念導入法理秩序有什麼不對。例外狀態原本就是法律的「構成面向」(constitutive dimension)，這可以說是施密特的一大洞見(2005b:60)。真正引發阿岡本質疑的，是施密特堅持例外狀態不是「無政府或失序狀態」的說法。在霍布斯的身影之下，施密特將「無政府或失序」的自然狀態清楚定位成例外狀態的對立項，並藉此把例外狀態視為終結自然狀態的天降神蹟。在阿岡本看來，施密特對立例外狀態與自然狀態的看法，無法精確掌握他自己理論的精髓。阿岡本於是改以莫比斯環(Möbius strip)的拓樸結構來重新定位例外狀態與自然狀態，一方面拆解霍布斯將兩者定位為外部關係的理論骨架，一方面藉此重新理解例外狀態的構成：根據原本預設，存在於法律秩序外部的「自然狀態」(the state of nature，也就是霍布斯筆下人吃人的世界)會順著「莫比斯環」，轉進內部形成「例外狀態」(1998:37)。換句話說，自然狀態與例外狀態是逆轉生成的內部關係，而非對立的外部關係。因為施密特對例外狀態的法理性相當堅持，又高度凸顯「自然狀態」與「例外狀態」的對立性，以致於忽略了自然狀態與例外狀態其實是莫比斯環的兩個側面，他所構想的例外狀態不但無法終結自然狀態，甚至還是自然狀態直行後自動反轉的結果。換句話說，對阿岡本而言，施密特的例外狀態只是自然歷史的一個片刻，神蹟似的阻斷(interruption)始終沒有發生(Weber 191)。在佯裝神蹟的主權決斷下，看似一切皆可能，但一切皆不可能才是例外狀態中的真正現實。

阿岡本用莫比斯環來理解例外狀態的說法，其實比施密特更能掌握例外狀態的弔詭。前面說過，主權決斷的功能在於以例外狀態來彌合規範與事實的間隙，用主權決斷來填補法律決斷的不能。誠如施密特如所言，例外狀態有助於法律秩序的穩固。但在此同時，阿岡本認為既然規範已被中止適用，作為法律秩序基礎的主權決斷也讓新規範的建立失去必要性，在例外狀態下的法律因此分裂為「不施行的純粹法律效力」(a pure being-in-force without application)與「沒有法律效力的純粹施行」(a pure application without being in force)兩端，代表「法律形式」(the form of law)與「(打叉)法律之力」(force-of-[barred] law)的裂解，一邊是有法律效力但不施行，另一邊則是施行中但沒法律效力，顯然規範與規範的適用與施行依舊處於分離狀態，規範與現實的分裂危機也沒因為主權決斷而解除，此時法律呈現出分裂的「鬼魅」性格，阿岡本認為這是自然狀態附身在例外狀態上的結果(Agamben 2005b:40, 60)。²² 主權決斷雖然是法律秩序的基石，但施密特因為過度信賴主權決斷的穩定效果，沒能注意到「俗世的規域」(nomos of the earth)反而可能因為例外狀態的支撐而坍塌。阿岡本在此回到班雅民對德國哀劇的探討，認為無能決斷的君王是班雅民對主權決斷論的一個反制。但班雅民不是為了跟施密特唱反調而已，而是試圖揭示主權決斷失能這個施密特一直不願面對的真相。阿岡本認為，透過巴洛克君王在「權力與能力」(Macht and Vermögen, power and its exercise)上暴露出來的反差，凸顯出例外狀態下規範與規範施行依舊分裂的「災難」情境(2005b:54-57)。換句話說，例外狀態表面上看起來是主權決斷的火力展示，事實上卻暴露了主權有權力但沒能力的窘境。

施密特打開了潘朵拉的盒子，卻將邪靈當成天使。主權決斷的無能，當然不是因為權力太小，而是因為權力大到自覺有能力可以藉此填平規範與事實之間的裂縫，將自然狀態完全「排除在外」，因而無視於法外之法(law beyond the law)內部分裂的鬼魅性格，以至於被內在的自然狀態所吞噬。班雅民在〈論歷史概念〉("On the Concept of History")第八提綱中提到的例外狀態常規化，便可以從這個主

²² 例如在納粹時期遭到凍結的威瑪憲法第一一四、一一五、一一七、一一八、一二三、一二四、與一五三條，就是阿岡本所講的「不施行的純粹法律效力」。另外，因為「法律之力」是「沒有法律效力的純粹施行」，也就是中斷規範適用、沒有法律基礎的主權決斷，所以法律一字必須打上叉叉。

權無能的角度來理解：「被壓迫階級的傳統教導我們，我們活在其中的『緊急狀態』（"state of emergency"）其實不是例外而是常規（not the exception but the rule）（392）。從班雅民的角度來看，例外狀態與例外狀態常規化不是歷史進程中一前一後的兩個階段，例外狀態常規化也不是例外狀態持續不間斷的結果；兩者的關係不存在於時間向度，而是同時座落在拓樸結構當中。簡單來說，例外狀態的常規化其實是被例外狀態壓抑的自然狀態浮上地表、也是被排除在外的自然狀態回返於內部的結果，或可稱之為例外狀態的絕對自然狀態化。根據阿岡本的解釋，如果法律秩序或常規（rule）的確立必須倚賴例外狀態的話，例外狀態的常規化，代表常規跟常規所「賴以維生」（lives by）的例外狀態合而為一，常規變成自己「賴以維生」的食物，形成常規吃常規（人吃人的例外狀態版）的自然狀態（2005b：58）。換句話說，常規化的例外狀態，不是從暫時的例外狀態中發展出來的新型態，而是例外狀態的自我解構；原本被排除在外的自然狀態在例外狀態中直接外顯，讓例外狀態與自然狀態形成無差別的疊合，這就是例外狀態的常規化。常規化的例外狀態經常被視為代表政治力的最高峰，在政治決斷凌駕一切的時刻，看似一切都可能，但對阿岡本而言，這也是政治力的谷底，標示出主權決斷在面對自然狀態時最為無能的時刻，在歷史自然化的狀態中，所有改變的可能早已煙消雲散。

肆、結語：裸命之大能

在常規化的例外狀態下，注定被「排除在外」的裸命何來救贖的可能？在權力高張的時刻，被化約為「生命政治物質」的裸命豈不是更加絕望無助？但照阿岡本對施密特的解構閱讀，我們不難從中嗅出翻轉權力位階的可能性。看似具有無上權力的主權決斷其實最無能，而被生命政治機器完全排除在外，被持續不斷的政治決斷化約到不能再化約的裸命，難道不能以其作為「生命政治物質」的存在，見證政治決斷無法再行化約的無能？位處政治決斷與生命權力所及之處的臨界，裸命的存在不也具備一定的外部性，在遭受全然剝奪的存有狀態中，取得一定挑戰既有的生命權力部署的能力？在这一切都可能、一切也都不可能的年代，就像卡夫卡在〈法律之前〉（"Before the Law"）所寫的一樣，法律之門全然洞開，但正因沒有禁令、也沒有主人對奴僕的宰制，鄉下來的年輕人才會被擋在法律門外，終其一生也進不了門，只有到了臨終的那一刻，法律之門才為他關閉，解除因絕對「開放」而導致絕對僵斃的弔詭狀態，彷彿他一生就是用他的存在來作關閉法律之門的準備。只有存在，別無其他。就像是在安息日的傍晚享受「休憩幸福」的乞丐，同時起身「騎著馬朝他的過往」衝去，企圖在「奔逃的國王身上逮住自己」，同時也逮住國王一樣，鄉下來的年輕人不也是用他裸命般的物質存在來關閉法律之門，解除了法律的無上禁令？但這樣的說法，是否也暗示裸命不需作任何事也不用下任何決斷，光憑藉它的存在就可以讓整個生命政治的權力部署自動失效？

當然不是如此。作為「生命政治物質」的裸命畢竟依舊是生命政治機器的產物，不管裸命的存在如何暴露「生命政治裂縫」，如何叫生命政治機器「難以容忍」，也不管在主體化與去主體化的連動過程中它如何被拒認、被排除在外，裸命的存在依然尚未與生命政治機器完全斷離。原因很簡單：因為裸命是在生命政治機器對生命的持續微分過程中，最後被斷離在外的「生命政治物質」，也是在主體化過程中，被拒認在外的存在，因此裸命與生命政治機器之間的分割線是一條無法清楚區分內外的疆界，既將裸命排除於生命政治機器之外，又將之包含在內。在這樣的情況下，裸命非得要將加諸在自體身上的生命政治切割極端化不可，透過再次的切割，求取與生命政治機器的完全斷離。

談到如何解決猶太人與非猶太人的區隔，阿岡本提出「阿佩里斯的切割」（the cut of Apelles）的概念。他認為要解決種族主義的種族區分，泯除疆界並非恰當的作法，在「普遍」的「超越原則下」接受或容忍差異也非治本之道；依照保羅的說法，若要實現真正的普遍主義，反倒必須在原先根據割禮儀文而劃定的切割線上，以「屬靈」（according to the breath）與「屬肉」（according to the flesh）的二元對立為刃，對原先的建立在「屬肉」標準上的二元對立再進行一次所謂的「阿佩里斯的切割」，從猶

太人與非猶太人的兩大區塊裡，微分出「屬靈」與「屬肉」的猶太人與非猶太人，如此一來，原本清晰明確的疆界從中裂解，所有在「阿佩里斯的切割」中誕生的種族身分都會是猶太人與非猶太人的二元對立無法整併的殘餘：比如說，「屬靈」的猶太人自然不是非猶太人，但因為「屬肉」的猶太人的存在，因此也「不可能是所有猶太人的屬性」，同樣的道理，「屬肉」的非猶太人既非猶太人，也不能代表所有的非猶太人，兩者因而同時是普遍性的身份概念無法含攝的「非非猶太人」(non-non-Jew)，見證了猶太人與非猶太人兩大身份標記的「不可能」(2005c: 49-53)。²³

表面看來，「阿佩里斯的切割」跟生命政治機器在「生物的連續性平面」上的不斷微分無異，都是一種曝現「生命政治裂縫」症狀的主權決斷作為，而已經無法再行切割的「生命政治物質」，也一如「非非猶太人」，同樣是種族主義無法含納的殘餘。阿岡本刻意創造一個模糊空間，讓帶有救贖作用的「阿佩里斯切割」與納粹的主權決斷進入一種無法分辨彼此的關係，一方面意在凸顯施密特的主權決斷論，在主權決斷尚未去神蹟化而淪為有權無能的政治力、也就是當神聖生命尚未被吸納入法律體制而被「排除在外」之前，卻確實具備相當建制創造的能力。另一方面，就是因為無能的主權決斷最終毀棄了原先再造政治力的允諾，「阿佩里斯的切割」於是肩負了貫徹主權決斷的使命，企圖重新回復在去神蹟化過程中折損的政治力。換句話說，在主權決斷暴露失能傾向的同時，看似具有相同操作模式的「阿佩里斯的切割」與主權決斷出現了一個關鍵差異：假如「生命政治物質」的出現標示了主權決斷的極限，代表政治力無能再行切割的終界，以切割本身，而非「生物連續性平面」為切割對象的「阿佩里斯切割」則具備了繼續挺進的能力，可以在主權決斷劃下的最後一道切割線上再次進行微分，讓「生命政治物質」產生內在分裂，從裸命的畸零生命中解離出「非非裸命」。換句話說，假如生命政治機器企圖透過主體化過程為用多重身份為裸命擦脂抹粉，「阿佩里斯的切割」則是反其道而行，不僅卸除所有附加在裸命上的面具，更進一步從裸命中切離出非非裸命，一舉斬斷與生命政治機器的藕斷絲連。

「非非裸命」存在的必要性，說明光靠裸命的畸零存在並不足以改變現狀。例外狀態下裸命的殘餘存在，確實讓主權決斷面臨有權無能的窘境，彰顯生命權力的部署的自我解構。但從解放政治的角度來看，一旦將生命政治機器必然的自行瓦解理解為救贖的完成，救贖就會淪為皮相。在生命政治自我解構的狀況下，所有的認知基礎與思維框架也隨之崩解，與救贖互為表裡的真理也會在後現代的虛無情境中被相對化，或是被延宕到一個不可知的未來。在這樣的情況下，若把生命政治機器的自動停擺等同於救贖的完成，救贖的行動將陷入阿岡本所謂的「仿如」(as if)的虛構邏輯：明知窮盡一切的努力也無法換得真理/救贖的實現，但人還是繼續他的真理行動，「仿如」有朝一日救贖一定會到來(2005c: 35-37)。雖然真理行動還是繼續，但這樣的行動主體很弔詭地依舊把自己擺放在等待的時間位置，「仿如」救贖行動正在進行中。主動的行動其實只是被動的等待，救贖只是皮相，整個生命政治的現狀並沒有因為行動而有絲毫改變，這也就是裸命不能靜待生命政治機器瓦解，必須透過「阿佩里斯的切割」進一步作用到裸命的存在上，才得以與生命政治機器徹底一刀兩斷的原因。

從裸命到非非裸命，裡頭牽扯的是行動邏輯從「仿如」到「如非」(as not, *hōs mē*)的轉變。「如非」

²³ 「阿佩里斯切割」的效應遠比這裡說的複雜。屬靈的猶太人之所以「不可能是所有猶太人的屬性」，不只是因為在猶太人的範疇中還有屬肉的猶太人的存在而已。只從這個角度來看「阿佩里斯切割」，反倒是把屬靈與屬肉的猶太人共同視為猶太人這個大的身份範疇的一部份，等於是再次接受割禮儀文與律法對猶太人與非猶太人的嚴格界定。事實上，根據保羅的說法，假如「真割禮也是心裡的、在乎靈不在乎儀文」，那屬靈的猶太人就與「未受割禮」但「全守律法」的屬靈的非猶太人一樣，都是「真猶太人」。同樣的道理，「有儀文和割禮」但「竟犯律法」的屬肉的猶太人，證明了「外面肉身的割禮，也不是真割禮」，因而與屬肉的非猶太人一樣，必須接受屬靈的猶太人與非猶太人等「真猶太人」的審判 (Romans 2: 25-29)。換句話說，以屬靈屬肉的二元對立切割以屬肉為本的二元對立的結果，猶太人與非猶太人的身份產生交叉式的流動，瓦解了兩大身份範疇的統括功能，讓在「阿佩里斯切割」下誕生的身分成為無法烙上猶太人與非猶太人標記的殘餘。審查人之一認為「保羅神學不斷切割」的作法，目的在於引領人「進入情境差異」的思考，這可能不完全符合阿岡本的解讀。「情境差異」的說法，似乎還停留在將屬靈與屬肉的猶太人與非猶太人定位為猶太人與非猶太人這兩大範疇下的不同情境：有些猶太人屬靈、有些屬肉，在非猶太人這邊也一樣，也有屬靈屬肉兩部分。事實上，阿岡本意圖論述的，恰恰是想透過「阿佩里斯切割」，更進一步把情境差異取消，把屬靈與屬肉這兩部分，視為屬於但不包括在猶太人或非猶太人等子集中的過剩殘餘。

語出哥林多前書：「從此以後，那有妻子的，要像沒有妻子，哀哭的，要像不哀哭，快樂的，要像不快樂，置買的，要像無有所得」(I Corinthian 7: 29-30)。這裡援引的中譯，是把保羅的話依「仿如」的邏輯來解釋。這點阿岡本當然不會同意，因為保羅這裡操作的不是「有要像沒有」的「仿如」邏輯，而是「如非」。但「哀哭的，如非哀哭」的說法，也不能依矛盾調和的辯證觀將之理解為「哀哭等同於不哀哭」。依照「如非」的邏輯模式，這段話的斷句應該是「哀哭，如非，哀哭」(2005c: 25)。如此一來，「如非」就像阿佩里斯的切割一樣，從哀哭的情緒狀態中，斷離出一個既非不哀哭，也無法為哀哭的概念所統攝的「不不哀哭」。換句話說，在「如非」邏輯的介入下，「不不哀哭」已經逸離出「哀哭」與「不哀哭」的對立邏輯，成為「哀哭」與「不哀哭」這兩個對立的普遍性概念所無法含攝的殘餘狀態。因此，雖然在經文中以「哀哭」來代表斷離開來的「不不哀哭」，但這裡牽涉的並非負負得正的邏輯，而是一個從「哀哭」到「不不哀哭」的跳躍，一個從普遍性的概念到獨一性(singularity)存在的躍進。在經文中，「如非」的前後同是「哀哭」，自然不是意味著一切都沒改變；從普遍性到獨一性，當中的改變並非表現在生命個體自此被帶向一個完全不受生命政治機器蹂躪的超越境地，被賦予了一個全新的身份，而是從現有的生命狀態中斷離出一個生命權力部署完全無法管理的基進存在。

與「如非」一樣具有阿佩里斯切割的功能的，還有「被稱呼」(being-called)，也就是保羅口中的「蒙召」。阿岡本曾經嚴格區分「是紅色」與「被稱呼為紅色」(1993: 10)。前者表現的是物的性質，是將物含攝在「紅色」的普遍概念之下，以述詞來作指稱，但後者則是如本文註釋 10 中所說的「如是」、「別無其他」的獨一性存在，是從「紅色」當中斷離出來的「非非紅色」。在這裡阿岡本並沒有針對「被稱呼」多作解釋，也沒有交待為何「被稱呼」的介入，會讓「紅色」從一個普遍性的概念搖身一變成為獨一性的存在。但「被稱呼」的說法，不由得教人想起在哥林多前書中，保羅說：「個人蒙召的時候是什麼身份，仍要守住這身份」(“Let every man abide in the same calling wherein he was called.”) (I Corinthian 7: 20)。保羅口中的「蒙召」是「被稱呼」的概念來源，一如「如非」，同樣具有阿佩里斯切割的功能：「彌賽亞的蒙召將所有的天職(klēsis)從其自身分離出來，在其自身的內部創造出張力，但沒有提供它某種其他的身份；職是之故，猶太人如非猶太人，希臘人如非希臘人」(Agamben 2005c: 53)。「仍要守住這身份」，意味著蒙召結果，並非創造出「人」這個更具普遍性的新身份來含納猶太人跟希臘人，用以泯除彼此之間的隔閡。因為大家都是人，所以猶太人就是希臘人，希臘人也是猶太人——這樣的普遍主義是與蒙召的「如非」邏輯格格不入的。「能要守住這身份」的基進之處，在於透過蒙召的切割，猶太人從內部斷裂出非非猶太人，希臘人也從內部斷裂出非非希臘人，雙雙成了生命權力部署無能標定的殘餘生命，進而中止生命政治機器驅動主體化過程的正常運作。

雖然與「蒙召」的概念相通，但發動阿佩里斯的切割的力量，並非出自某個超越的主宰對世界的介入性決斷，而是來自裸命。作為神聖不可碰觸的卑賤殘餘，裸命遊走於神聖與世俗之間的幽冥地域，也被排除在主體化過程之外，本來就代表一股生命政治機器「無法管理」的力量(the ungovernable)。被生命權力部署賦予多重身份認同的「幼蟲」主體，是生命權力透過拒認裸命的機制，將裸命移入部署陣式的結果，如此一來，裸命注定無法成為啟動阿佩里斯切割的力量來源。從阿岡本的觀點來看，多元身份認同很難成為超克生命權力的致勝武器，道理便在於此。要將裸命完整移出生命權力的陣地，跟生命政治機器作一阿佩里斯式的切割，被整個主體化過程排除在外的裸命是唯一可能的動力來源，是那道阿岡本所謂的看不見的光。但必須再次強調的是，裸命的存在雖然足以讓生命權力的部署左支右絀，但裸命畢竟還是生命政治機器的產物，而光靠生命權力的自我解構也只會讓生命個體陷入「仿如」的邏輯，反倒讓現狀得以繼續維持。因此，相對於有權無能的生命權力，無權的裸命的確具備超克生命權力的能力。但必須小心的是，裸命本身的能力並非絕對。裸命一方面可能受到「仿如」邏輯的支配，成為鞏固現狀的幫兇，而生命政治引導的主體化的過程，也有可能造成裸命的失能。因此，如何將裸命難以治理的力量導入阿佩里斯的切割過程，從裸命中斷離出非非裸命，讓無權有能的裸命

得以超克有權無能的生命權力，這不僅是裸命是否能展現大能的關鍵，也決定了生命政治年代下解放政治的成功與否。

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摘要

阿岡本一方面不斷強調裸命的失能，但另一方面又主張生命的創造力，論述的兩面性時而為批評家所詬病。本文的目的不在填補阿岡本論述的裂縫，而是試圖透過班雅民在他那篇談論卡夫卡的文章最後講述的猶太笑話，證明裸命的失能跟生命的大能實為一體的兩面，兩者之間並無論述的斷裂存在。與一般阿岡本的批評家所持的意見不同，本文主張權力與能力之間的不對稱是造成裸命增能與生命權力失能的主要原因。但儘管權力與能力的不對稱有可能帶來階層排序的翻轉，我們不能將裸命超克生命權力部署的能力視為理所當然。只有在裸命的能力被導向促成裸命自我解離的當下，裸命才算真正具備抵拒生命權力部署的大能。因此我們可以說，裸命之所以具備倫理性的存有，主要的原因在於裸命的自我解離，而非畸零的生命存在本身。

關鍵字：班雅民、阿岡本、施密特、生命政治、裸命、神聖生命、權力、能力

ABSTRACT

Giorgio Agamben has often been criticized for the duality in his conceptualization of bare life. While the disempowerment of bare life takes the center stage of his multifaceted philosophical ruminations, there is no lack of remarkable references to potency and constituent power of life throughout his oeuvre. This paper aims less to bridge the gap than to argue for the inextricability of these two aspects, which, in my reading, is concisely encapsulated in the Jewish joke relayed in Walter Benjamin's Kafka essay. Pace Agamben's critics, I will argue that the dissymmetry between *potere* and *potenza* is the major contributory factor both to the empowerment of the damaged bare life and to the irrevocable failure of biopolitical governance. Notwithstanding the prospective inversion of hierarchy, the *potenza* of bare life cannot be celebrated without qualifications and banked upon without reserve when it comes to the overcoming of biopower. The biopolitical machine will keep rolling until, and only until the *potenza* of bare life is adequately harnessed to separate the wretched *homo sacer* from itself; hence the ethical power of being of bare life which enables it to defy the agile subsumption of biopolitical apparatuses. If there is an apt description for the *potenza* of bare life, it will be more the non-coincidence of bare life with itself, than the deprived existence as such.

Keywords : Walter Benjamin. Giorgio Agamben, biopolitics, bare life, sacred life, *potere*, *potenza*

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Being-There : The Ontology of Biopower in H. G. Wells' *The Island of Doctor Moreau*

Yen-bin Chiou

As the “linguistic turn” virtually fades into oblivion, the “ontological turn” comes into fashion nowadays and becomes a more and more prominent battle cry in the field of literary studies. However, justifications for this new wave of reorientation of thinking are strikingly scarce, so much so that “ontological turn” ends up becoming a chic yet empty term that is simply bandied about on shaky ground. In fact, there is the historical basis for the ontological turn of thinking. Ontology becomes a topic worthy of intensive scrutiny, primarily because life has already replaced identity as the paramount site of political intervention at the time when bio-power is at its height. What truly matters in the circumstances is not so much the symbolic status of the individual, as is the ontological peculiarity of life that arises as the corollary of biopolitical intervention. Mindless of the consequential shift in the affected locus, we might fight on the wrong front. Worse yet, a tenacious dissident might consequently become the cohort of bio-power that is supposed to be contested. When it comes to emancipatory politics, identity politics is all in a worthy cause, to be sure. It puts high on the agenda the struggle for recognition, concerning itself

chiefly with restoring or establishing the right and the identity that are somehow stolen away. However decent its goal may be, identity politics is inadvertently moving forward in the direction dictated by bio-power. Just as bio-power has as its self-professed goal the optimization of life, endowing life with every quality requisite for a good form of life, so that identity politics has commitment to putting the much-sought-after identity back on the minorities who have been divested of it for diverse reasons. The line and goal of identity politics are deeply informed by bio-power, inasmuch as the process of addition that bio-power triggers is in turn upheld by identity politics as the topmost virtue. Identity politics grounds its undertakings on the Christian myth of *creatio ex nihilo*, the resurgence of which is greatly indebted to the prevalence of bio-power. Identity politics is misguided for this reason, insofar as it loses sight of the sophisticated mechanisms installed at the heart of bio-power. Apart from the self-declared process of addition, there is in fact a clandestine process of subtraction implicated in the biopolitical project of life engineering. Going hand in hand, these two conflictual processes come together and end up imparting complex dynamics to the biopolitical “humanizing process,” to use H. G. Wells’ locution. Instead of the prototype of human beings, the outgrowth of their collaboration is such ontological peculiarities as the “existence deprived of life,” or the “flesh without body” (Esposito 134). It is an intellectual and political imperative to be fully cognizant of the alarming presence of these ontological oddities we are confronted with day by day. In the final analysis, it is the urgency of addressing the ontologico-political problems thus caused that propels the said “ontological turn” and imparts motion to the writing of this article.

Wells’ *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896) takes us directly to the nub of the problems bedeviling the biopolitical project of life engineering. The unanesthetized vivisection the infamous Moreau regularly performs unveils the

secret kinship between the process of addition and the process of subtraction at work in the said project. More importantly, it is from the complex dynamic that arises the unfortunate marriage between bio-power and thanato-power. The anthropo-genetic machine that Moreau installs on the island therefore comes as the epitome of the full-scale penetration of bio-thanato-power into life, which culminates in the creation of the Beast People. However, what best epitomizes the eerie infants springing from the biopolitical womb, I will argue, is not so much the Beast People as the non-Beast People, i.e. the degenerating Beast People who show the sure signs of “reversion” and gradually metamorphose into the “flesh without body,” which is the ontologico-political being par excellence. Coming as the realization of biopolitical engineering at its purest, the production of the degenerating Beast People turns out to be the travesty of Christian creation myth, which trivializes and replaces the doctrine of *creatio ex nihilo* with its virtual antipode—the creation of what remains, of the being depleted of vivific life and beatific body. How do the good-meant bio-power and the ill-intentioned thanato-power dovetail and wind themselves into an unbreakable knot? How do the non-Beast People qua “flesh without body” then arise as the ontological outcome of bio-thanato-power? What is the ontological morphology of such dematerialized flesh that is incessantly sprouting amidst the jarring noises of the anthropo-genetic machine? How can it be properly traced? Are the non-Beast People thus created simply the victims of bio-thanato-power? What is the likelihood that they can be considered as the ontological oddity that is foreign to the biopolitical grid of intelligibility so as to become a fatal threat to the operation of bio-power? This set of questions constitutes the ontological subtext of Wells’ novella. To unlock them, an in-depth scrutiny of “humanizing process” as depicted in Wells’ novella provides a key.

I. Prendick's "about-face": Bio-Power and the Victorian Vivisection Controversy

Moreau's "humanizing process" (*Moreau*, 67) is in theory conceived at the behest of bio-power. Michel Foucault has offered a capsule characterization of bio-power as the power to "'make' live" (2003: 241). Coming into play ever since the second half of the 18th century, bio-power has the life of "man-as-species" as its topmost concern, and develops accordingly a set of "security mechanisms" in a drive to "optimize a state of life" (Foucault 2003: 243, 246). The optimization of life that bio-power strives for thus finds its counterpart in the "humanizing process" that Moreau contrives. As with bio-power which is aimed to make the life of "man-as-species" more capable and worthy of living, Moreau's objective is to "burn out all the animal" and "create a rational creature of my own" (*Moreau*, 78). Compared with the lofty biopolitical calling, Moreau's vocational dedication to plucking the life of animal species from bestial meanness is no less noble. Besides, it is more worthy to note that Moreau's reconstructive surgery brings the veritable novelty of bio-power into crystal-clear view. Since the plastic surgery is performed on the unanesthetized animal, the main site of biopolitical intervention is the living organism rather than the animal carcass, to say nothing of its identity. Life henceforth replaces death and identity to be the magnetic field charged with political power. Ever since power is less a matter of death or identity, the coincidence of the political project and the ontological enterprise becomes the norm for the first time.

The benignancy of bio-power cannot be inordinately celebrated, notwithstanding. The pastoral care of life is a double-edged vocation *ab initio*. This can be best illustrated by Moreau's "humanizing process," which, while upholding life as an incontrovertible value, has never been frugal with wielding

the rod of death from the outset. However legitimate his purpose may appear, Moreau's well-intentioned endeavor may be too much of a good thing. Prendick denounces Moreau's experiment as sheer atrocity for an excess of pain involved in his self-invented grafting operations (*Moreau*, 95). As is always the case, the cruelty in question is readily to be misconstrued as the disregard for the stipulated sanctions of bio-power. A point that Foucault reiterates to bring the novelty of bio-power to fore is its distinctive relegation of death to invisibility. As bio-power ceases to assert its clutches by inflicting pain in public on its intended target, death noticeably retreats from the public sphere into the private zone, to the point that "Power no longer recognizes death. Power literally ignores death" (Foucault 2003: 248). Given the invisibility of death required in the biopolitical domain, it seems to Prendick not unwarranted to condemn Moreau's "humanizing process" as an obvious breach of biopolitical sanctions. After all, he performs the unanesthetized grafting surgery well nigh out in the open, so much so that the shrieks of the vivisectioned puma is hardly beyond Prendick's earshot.

Be that as it may be, nothing is further from Moreau's mind than to concede he has been wrong. His striking straightforwardness with regard to the necessity of inflicting pain is again illuminating, insofar as it helps maintain our perspective to view bio-power in a more comprehensive framework. Moreau virtually makes no secret of his atrocious theater, never shying away from christening his life laboratory as the "House of Pain" (*Moreau*, 59). What takes the center court of Moreau's apologetics for the gruesome infliction on experimental animals is, again, his well-intentioned attempt to "burn out all the animal" and "create a rational creature of my own" (*Moreau*, 78). The escalating intensity of physical pain, Moreau avers, will in all probability drive bestial creatures towards a threshold beyond which all the inherent taints of animality will be wiped out and an unalloyed "rational creature," hopefully, will then emerge from ashes. It seems to be all in a good cause to prescribe a

high dose of pain for the eventual completion of “humanizing process.” Pain, in other words, is the cost necessarily incurred in Moreau’s biopolitical project. Frank McConnell is a bit off the mark on that score when he derisively puts Moreau’s obsession with pain down to the “chaste sadism” characteristic of a celibate mad scientist (92). The driving force behind the infliction of pain, after all, is the pastoral care of life, rather than the blood-thirsty passion for death.

The necessity of pain takes us right to the nub of the problem concerning the political ontology of bio-power: if giving birth to “a rational creature” is a worthy cause, then what’s the point in going to great lengths to inflict pain, even death, on the life that the whole “humanizing process” is intended to “optimize”? This problem is a variation on the question that an increasing number of contemporary critics address to the “security mechanisms” installed by bio-power: if bio-power, as it stands, is the power *of* life which is exercised to regulate and maximize the capacities of living individuals or population, why does it betray its principles so often that it ends up reverting to the power *over* life, that is, to the sovereign power that has the subjugation of life as its means and even end? What is the secret kernel that is buried deep at the heart of the mechanisms of bio-power and threatens either to trigger their “paroxysms” (Foucault 1980, 149), or simply to allow the coincidence of bio-power and thanato-power (Agamben 1999: 83; Esposito 110-45)?

Prendick’s wavering stance on vivisection is instrumental in placing in perspective the strained dynamic inherent in the mechanisms of bio-power. Throughout the novella, Prendick looks at the practice of unanesthetized vivisection through a well nigh denunciatory optic. He has grilled Moreau on why he inflicts “all this pain” on animals (*Moreau*, 73). Despite his patient expounding, the grisly violence and death that Prendick encounters thereafter convince him of the “viler aspect of Moreau’s cruelty” (*Moreau*, 95). His repulsion against Moreau cuts deep as his empathy with the Beast Folk is

more and more in evidence: "Poor brutes!" thus he mourns the fate of Beast People on an elegiac note (*Moreau*, 95). Such is the growing division between Moreau and Prendick that it is not unwarranted to identify Prendick as a sympathizer of the Victorian anti-vivisection movement, which reached a crescendo in the first half of 1870s and faced a downward spiral after the passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876.¹⁾ It is a general observation that this wave of controversy culminated in George Hoggan's letter to *The Morning Post* of 1 February 1875. Hoggan was then a British doctor who had worked in Claude Bernard's laboratory for four months. As the first-hand disclosure of the cruel experiments conducted by Dr. Bernard and his assistants, Hoggan's letter ignited pervasive disgust toward laboratory science and lent credence to the general distrust of avant-garde medicine (Harris 102). By dramatizing the contrast between the "sensitive" laboratory dogs and the "unfeeling scientist," Hoggan rendered his letter so inflammatorily heart-rending that it ended up becoming "a staple of antivivisectionist rhetoric" (Mayer 407). It is no exaggeration to say Hoggan's letter has tremendous resonance for

1) Richard D. French has provided a succinct account about the rise and fall of the English anti-vivisection campaign in Victorian society. See pp. 266-70. Martin Willis does not agree the passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876 spelt an end of the English anti-vivisection movement. Though the Act put a dent on the anti-vivisection lobby, "the controversy that it [i.e. animal vivisection] was supposed to bring to an end lingered in the public imagination through the 1880s." Willis establishes that the anti-vivisectionists regained force when the British Institute of Preventive Medicine was created in 1889. Its establishment reawakened the general xenophobic apprehension about the foreign methodology of animal experimentation and the prospective Pasteurization of England. In 1891, Francis Power Cobbe, the spearhead of the English anti-vivisection movement and the founder of the Victoria Street Society, published a pamphlet to disclose Pasteur's abominable engagement in animal cruelty. Then the anti-vivisectionist movement reached another climax in 1890s, and the heated controversy was in all probability within Wells' earshot when he came to write *The Island of Doctor Moreau* in 1895. See Willis, pp. 213-18.

anti-vivisection propaganda. In Prendick's polemics against Moreau, the legacy of Hoggan's humane "rhetoric" is very much in evidence.

Prendick is critical of vivisection, to be sure, but there is no lack of jarring notes in his skepticism. When the phenomenal "Moreau Horrors" comes back to him, Prendick distinctly remembers how a journalist sneaks into Moreau's laboratory with the help of a "laboratory assistant." In a bid to break the spell of the laboratory which has long been shrouded in mystery, the prying investigation, Prendick goes on to add, is carried out "with the deliberate intention of making sensational exposures." As it is played out, the "exposures" definitely arouse far more explosive popular response than intended because of "the help of a shocking accident—if it was an incident": "[o]n the day of its publication a wretch dog, flayed and otherwise mutilated, escaped from Moreau's house" (*Moreau*, 34). Prendick obviously has doubts about the truthfulness of this accident. After all, in such a "silly season" (*Moreau*, 34), it might well be a standard practice for a journalist to spice up stories by staging incidents. Of course, it is toward the press that Prendick points his accusing finger. What invites suspicion in this context is rather the ulterior motive involved in the publicity campaign, not the anti-vivisection cause. Indisputable as it, however, is that Prendick is reticent to oppose Moreau's diabolic practice when he suggests "The Moreau Horrors" is a complete fabrication. Besides holding back in his criticism, he even comes forward to speak up for Moreau, slamming "his fellow investigators" and "the great body of scientific workers" (including Hoggan?) for their "tepid support" and "desertion" (*Moreau*, 34). No matter if Prendick ascribes Moreau's expulsion from England to fraudulent journalism or to the lack of comradeship among his peer scientists, his otherwise trenchant criticism of animal vivisection is considerably neutralized. Given the sharp contrast between relentless denunciation and warm-hearted support, little wonder Elana Gomel detects in Prendick's flip-flopping stance on

the anti-vivisection issue “a complete about-face” (412).

Then, the crux of the matter is how to conceive of Prendick’s “about-face.” In fact, Prendick’s slippery take on the anti-vivisection issue has nothing to do with a deficiency of logical reasoning, and has everything to do with the wide currency of the biopolitical faith in the intactness of life. Under the sway of bio-power, the vivisectionists and anti-vivisectionists have a lot more in common than we are accustomed to expect. And it is this much-ignored common ground that makes allowances for Prendick’s about-turn.

To better understand how the exercise of bio-power unites two conflicting positions, let’s return to see how the crossfire was played out after the passage of the Cruelty to Animals Act of 1876. In response to the attacks of anti-vivisectionist polemics, the scientists started in the early 1880s to launch an organized publicity campaign, with a view to defending the necessity of their research method and reasserting their moral correctness. Unified in well-nigh concerted effort, the medical scientists provided a point-by-point rebuttal to anti-vivisectionist causes. A fundamental principle which informed the various claims they made, to put it simply, was that the legitimacy of experimental physiology was derived from the power *of* life, the bio-power that “fosters life” in Foucault’s phraseology (1980: 138), rather than the power keeping a tight hold *over* life. This pro-vivisectionist claim can be best exemplified by the national resolution issued by the British Medical Association (BMA) late in 1881. In the resolution, Dr. Humphrey from Cambridge spoke out loud for the indispensability of animal vivisection. Lying at the core of his statement was the primacy of life over disease and death: “That this Association desires to express its deep sense of the importance of vivisection to the advancement of medical science, and the belief that the further prohibition of it would be attended with serious injury to the community, by preventing investigations which are calculated to promote the

better knowledge and treatment of disease in animals as well as man” (“Forty-Ninth General Meeting of the British Medical Association,” 332).

If the security and intactness of all much-neglected lives is of particular concern for the Victorian anti-vivisectionists, the wellbeing of all living creatures is the goal that the pro-vivisectionists such as Humphrey vowed to further. Despite different leanings, no parties involved in the vivisection controversy are committed to putting life at risk. On the contrary, a drive they share is to extend the reach and range of rescue operations, in a bid to give refuge to as many precarious lives as possible. As Sherryl Vint points out, the Victorian anti-vivisection movement is not only “a plea for animal rights.” Connected with its consistent “critique of the culture of science” is its concern with the marginalized status of women, who are generally relegated to the category of animals (Vint 89-91). The gap between particularism (targeting assistances towards animals and women) and universalism (assuming responsibility for all living creatures) may well be a point where the anti-vivisectionists and pro-vivisectionists diverge, but it is not difficult to bridge it by the least common denominator of their respective battle cries—i.e. to safeguard lives against the threat of pain and death. The real bone of contention, in fact, lies nowhere else than in the competency in saving lives. To state differently, what distinguishes the pro-vivisectionists from the anti-vivisectionists is not the alleged fact that they are the mouthpiece for the power subjugating life, but rather the self-declared competency in defending maximal lives against danger. While the anti-vivisectionists would criticize their enemies for animal cruelty, the vivisectionists would confront the opponents in return with the charge of sabotaging the wellbeing of the majority. The power *over* life thus becomes well nigh a slur that both parties are eager to cast on their enemies. The apparent differences in opinions between the pro-vivisectionists and anti-vivisectionists are accordingly much smaller than it might seem. However

divided are their respective causes, both parties scramble unanimously to claim the power of life and put it in the center of their respective discursive pictures. No matter whether the threat is caused by unanesthetized vivisection or sluggish progress in medical knowledge, “avoiding injury to life” is the common ground on which they firmly stand. Viewed from this perspective, the competing standpoints involved in the vivisection controversy are nothing more than the different nodal points on the same network woven by bio-power.

Prendick’s “about-face” on the vivisection issue encapsulates the pervasiveness of the power of life in a crystalline form. A superficial reading should suffice to discover the commonality of Prendick and Moreau in their commitment to the intactness of human life. All the sympathy and disgust Prendick feels toward the “crippled and distorted” Beast Men (*Moreau*, 35) arise in the main from the perception of their deviation in shape and demeanor from the course of a normal human being. What he encounters on the island is so intolerably confusing, primarily because it displaces his “general impressions of humanity” with are otherwise “well defined” (*Moreau*, 84). The same goes for Moreau, yet with one difference. Not content with Prendick’s “general impressions of humanity,” Moreau goes further to sublimate them to a point of sophisticated ideality. Despite being a staunchest advocate of animal vivisection, Moreau has never set infliction of pain as his ultimate goal. Pain, as he expounds to Prendick, is only a path to the complete elimination of pain. An impeccable human being created according to his “humanizing process” will be akin to an impregnable citadel, which does not need to bank on pain as “the goad to keep them out of danger” any more (*Moreau*, 74). Rising from the excruciating crucible will be a new human body with more “well defined” contours, a “more intelligent” life that is liberated from the bestial shackles of reflex response. Be it keeping the intactness of human life passively (Prendick), or optimizing and maximizing the capability of life actively (Moreau), they

both are acts resting on the bedrock of the primacy of life.

The shared faith of Moreau and Prendick on life points directly toward the common root running under the heated dispute over animal vivisection. The biopolitical common ground to a large extent debunks the binary schema of cruelty versus wellbeing, death versus life that undergirds the rhetoric brandished by rival camps. That's why there is no lack of moments when Prendick's disgust toward Moreau subsides and his opposition to animal vivisection starts to lose trenchancy. Prendick's "about-face" transpires when the shift in register leads him to re-scrutinize Moreau's experiment through the biopolitical optic. The critical import of Prendick's flip-flopping take on the vivisection issue partly consists in its revelation of the ubiquitous presence of the power of life. What else is more telltale than the finale in the chapter entitled "Doctor Moreau Explains," where Prendick's change in perspective is much in evidence after Moreau has clearly set out the "humanizing process"? Standing right across him then, as Prendick comes to find, is no longer a cold-blooded butcher, but an conscientious progenitor of the life engineering project who is himself a beatific figure:

I looked at him, and saw but a white faced, white-haired man, with calm eyes. Save for his serenity, the touch of beauty that resulted from his set tranquility and from his magnificent build, he might have passed muster among a hundred other comfortable old gentlemen. (*Moreau*, 79)

II. Postlapsarian Nudity: Bio-Thanato-Power and the Inclusive Exclusion of *Zoē*

For all that, this is not to overemphasize the far-reaching bio-power and

put the concomitant thanato-power in the shade. After all, the marks that the power of death leaves on the island are indelible and the havoc Moreau creates can't possibly escape our notice. If Prendick's "about-face" speaks volumes about his tacit appreciation of Moreau's biopolitical project, then his concomitant apprehension about the cruelty is all the more symptomatic of the unseverable umbilical cord that lashes together the power of life and power over life. Prendick's about-turn on the vivisection issue, in short, points to the originary dissymmetry of bio-power. Constitutively cut across by thanato-power, bio-power is not only the wellspring funding Moreau's "humanizing process," but also the seedbed for all the inflictions imposed on life. As an instance of the dramatic reversal in his stance, Prendick's "about-face" comes to synchronize these two conflictual moments of bio-power and disclose the opposite fronts of its Janus face at the same time.

Hence the Wells' insight into the dynamic of bio-power, which virtually coincides with Foucault's blindness as it were. The duality of bio-power is central to Prendick's "about-face," but to a considerable extent relegated to marginality in Foucault's genealogical description of bio-power. As Foucault is never tired of averring, the technologies of bio-power is in the main geared to bring a capable body into existence:

Already in the control authorities that appeared from the nineteenth century onward, the body acquired a completely different signification; it was no longer something to be tortured but something to be molded, reformed, corrected, something that must acquire aptitudes, receive a certain number of qualities, become qualified as a body capable of working. (Foucault 2000: 82)

Foucault's genealogical description of the biopolitical production of the

human body bears a striking resemblance to Moreau's "humanizing process." Moreau's anthropo-genetic laboratory is a biopolitical apparatus par excellence, inasmuch as the reconstructive surgery performed therein is also aimed to "mold" animals into "more intelligent" species: "All the week, night and day, I moulded him. With him it was chiefly the brain that needed moulding; much had to be added, much changed" (*Moreau*, 76). Nevertheless, as is suggested in Prendick's "about-face," something more is involved in Moreau's "humanizing process" apart from the biopolitical optimization of life. Foucault's description of biopolitical molding is too schematic and one-sided to shed sufficient light on the subtle relationship between bio-power and thanato-power.

With regard to this problem, Aristotle's discussion of the Athenian democracy comes as a useful complement to Foucault's somewhat limited horizon. The coincidence of the ontological and the political is not so much a novelty peculiar to the biopolitical epoch, as it is the foundational problem the answers to which, as it were, determine the vicissitudes of the Western politics. To that extent, Aristotle is the founder of the Western politics so to speak. Of particular concern to him is a politico-ontological question which the biopolitical regime has never ceased to address and occupies the forefront of Moreau's experimental physiology—i.e. the question concerning how to transform and upgrade a life immersing itself in the satisfaction of basic needs (*zoē*) into a good life which is more worthy of living (*bios*). Compared with Foucault's partial perspective, the comprehensiveness of Aristotle's discussion deserves further scrutiny.

In *The Politics*, Aristotle traces a quasi-evolutionary trajectory from bare life (*zoē*) to a good, politically qualified form of life (*bios*), in order to better explain the making of man as the political animal and of a state as the aggregation of good lives: "When several villages are united in a single complete community, large enough to be nearly or quite self-sufficing, the state

comes into existence, originating in the bare needs of life, and continuing in existence for the sake of a good life" (1252b, 27-30). The line of demarcation Aristotle draws between *zoē* and *bios* is so fine and wafer-thin that we can hardly ascertain whether their relationship is discontinuous or not. On the one hand, he differentiates between "bare needs of life" and "a good life" to establish the superiority of *bios*, which emerges, to put it simply, as a result of the subtraction of *zoē*. On the other hand, *zoē* serves as a fertile ground for the germination of *bios*, which means the cultivation of "a good life" entails a process of addition, of supplementing *zoē* with something more, rather than subtracting.

There are no other philosophers who are more capable of appreciating Aristotle's ambivalence more than Giorgio Agamben. In his understanding, the transformation of *zoē* into *bios* is neither simply a matter of subtraction, of shedding the undesirable burden of *zoē*, nor merely a matter of addition, of enhancing *zoē* by investing it with extra qualities. Involved in the making of political qualified life, to do justice to Aristotle, is a process of "an inclusive exclusion," of an inclusion "by means of an exclusion" (1998: 7). To unpack Agamben's dense argument, we may rephrase it in this way: man can be included in the polis and take on *bios* only on condition that he is cut in himself to exclude *zoē* from nowhere else than from himself. The originary exclusion is the cutting of *bios* itself, insofar as *zoē*, as Aristotle states, is there inside every *bios* and hence politicized, or as Agamben argues, insofar as there is always already an "implication" of *zoē* in *bios* (1998: 7). As the main site of political intervention of bio-power, *zoē* is always already politicized from the outset and comes to emerge as *bios*. To present itself as *bios*, however, *zoē* has to be excluded from *bios* qua politicized *zoē*, or to say the other way round, from politicized *zoē* qua *bios*; hence the self-mutilation of *bios* in a manner of speaking. From Aristotle onward till today's biopolitical regime,

Western politics has never grounded the making of *bios* simply on investing bare life with a wide array of civil rights (addition). Nor is it a standard practice to expel *zoē* from *bios* (subtraction). As ever, the constitution of *bios* instead gets underway at an interstitial moment when the upward traces of addition and downward trajectory of subtraction enter into indistinction. At the core of Western politics is a striking paradox that the politically “good life” is constituted by an originary self-cutting, a radical exclusion of *zoē* from the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios*. Even more paradoxical is the fact that the bringing into existence of the politically qualified life coincides exactly with the production of uncanny remainders, or explicitly stated, of the *zoē* which persistently remains after it is banished from the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios*. Hence the importance of the question as to why “Western politics first constitutes itself through an exclusion (which is simultaneously an inclusion) of bare life” (Agamben 1998: 7).

Given the originary cut, we may understand why bio-power is intertwined with thanato-power *ab initio*. If bio-power is exercised mainly to produce qualified form of life, to include and transform bare life into “a good life,” then, as Agamben clearly stated, it is produced and included by exclusion of the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios*. Such is the repeated practice of bio-power that the operation of “inclusive exclusion,” as it turns out, makes for the intertwining of bio-power with thanato-power. A blind spot pertaining to Foucault’s genealogical description of bio-power usually lies in its partial grasp of this operation. Focusing solely on the process of addition, Foucault is like always too engrossed in describing how bio-power invests the body with desirable qualities and “molds” it into shape as proper and docile as intended. Judith Butler has suspected Foucault is inordinately alert to the “materialization” of the body, too inquisitive about the biopolitical “principle of intelligibility” which serves to govern the whole process of materialization and

make the body intelligible. Such is the weakness of the Foucault's genealogical description. His description, Butler contends, almost pays no attention to the "dematerialized," thus unintelligible matter which at once undergirds the symbolic inscription of bio-power on the body, and "*has to be excluded*" from the process of body's materialization (33-35, emphasis original). Along the similar line of Agamben, Butler urges forward the simultaneous interplay of addition and subtraction involved in the process of materialization of the body. More importantly, she never ceases to remind us of the persistence presence of the "dematerialized" matter, of an uncanny substance which, as the leftovers of materialization, is testimony to the biopolitical operation of "inclusive exclusion."

It is not off the mark to underline the biopolitical import of Butler's "dematerialized" matter, for this biopolitically unintelligible substance is ontologically very similar to the uncanny *zoē* which is produced in the midst of its being expelled from the always already *zoē* qua *bios*. If in Western politics the production of "good life" comes to present itself as a process of "inclusive exclusion," then it remains to be scrutinized what will be the morphology of its end product—i.e. the *zoē* which is excluded and thus dematerialized.

Agamben has pressed into his service the Christian idea of nudity to illustrate this fuzzy and well-nigh ungraspable *zoē*. Agamben is struck by the complexity of this idea when he finds that in Christianity nudity is not conceived of as a natural, material state we are born within, but rather as a dematerialized corporeality which is at once presupposed and created by sin. It is commonplace to say Adam and Eve feel ashamed of their nudity after their immaculate naked bodies are tainted by sin. Presupposed in such an opinion is the assumption that there are two naked bodies in Christianity—i.e. the paradisiacal body that Adam and Eve were born with, and then the

post-lapsarian body that makes the first humans feel ashamed. However, Agamben suspects that in Christianity there is no such thing as paradisiacal nudity in the rigorous sense of the word. The so-called paradisiacal body is not naked at all primarily because the bodies of the first couple are clothed with grace *ab initio*. Nudity cannot come into view and become a stigma, until the paradisiacal body is undressed because of sin (Agamben 2011: 55-60). Then, we come up against a standard Catch-22 situation. If sin creates nudity by undressing the paradisiacal body, there must be presupposed a body which is naked through and through, sinful in itself, and on which God puts his grace in order to cover up its shameful monstrosity. Here a time loop is very much in evidence: the shameful nudity, the nudity par excellence, is the product of denudation and a presupposition at the same time. It is at once *a posteriori* the creation of sin, and *a priori* a presupposition, without which not only the vestment of divine grace is unnecessary, but the first couple will have nothing to be ashamed of when they are undressed. Hence nudity as a presupposed “event”:

. . . nudity is not actually a state but rather an event. Inasmuch as it is the obscure presupposition of the addition of a piece of clothing or the sudden result of its removal—an unexpected gift or an unexpected loss—nudity belongs to time and history, not to being and form. We can therefore only experience nudity as a denudation and a baring, never as a form and a stable possession. At any rate, it is difficult to grasp and impossible to hold on to. (Agamben 2011: 65)

If we read Agamben’s discussion here into his interpretation of Aristotle, first we will find a clear parallel between the paradisiacal body and the always already politicized *zoē*. Just as the pre-lapsarian body is always already vested with God’s grace, so the *zoē* is right from the beginning implicated in *bio*,

always already politicized by bio-power and invested with all the “qualities” requisite for a qualified life. The worker’s docile body which has been effectively “molded, reformed, corrected” is paradisiacal in this sense.

Nonetheless, this is not the creation story in its entirety—be it the creation of human body in general, or the worker’s body in particular. To go one step further, we find the parallel between the paradisiacal body and the laborer’s body not only illustrates the always-already-politicized *zoē*, but also deconstructs the creation myth of Christianity. It suggests to the effect that the immaculate body of the first couple is far from primordial, inasmuch as it is artificially enhanced and prosthetically empowered. The creation myth reconstructed by Agamben verges on travesty when he goes further to state that the primordial (or “presupposed” in his wording) naked body is actually created, or exposed, by “denudation and baring.” The creation, thus said, amounts to a counter-productive production, a production qua destruction. The primordial naked body, as Agamben argues, “comes back to light whenever the caesura of sin once again divides nature and grace, nudity and clothing” (2011: 64). Creation is nothing more than stripping bare and cutting. It divides the always-already-politicized *zoē* qua *bios*, in order to exclude *zoē* from the entity in which *zoē* and *bios* is as mutually indifferent as “nature and grace, nudity and clothing” in the paradisiacal body.

More worthy of note at this point is the result of creation qua cutting. What is created by means of cutting? What does remain after the “caesura of sin” and what is the morphology of this remainder? The dividing in question has nothing to do with the breaking up of a twin into two. It is an unlikely scenario that the cutting could readily break down the worker’s body into *zoē* and *bios*. Nor is it likely to divide the paradisiacal body in half and return “nature and grace” to their own original places. If *zoē* is always already politicized, and the paradisiacal body is always already vested with grace in

the same vein, there does not exist other modalities of *zoē*. What remains after the dividing of *zoē* qua *bios* and the denudation of the paradisiacal body, in other words, can't possibly be *zoē* or nature as such, that is, the naked *zoē* or bare nature prior to the investment of God's grace. If the primordial *zoē* or nature does exist, it is, as Agamben avers, nothing but a presupposition. In reality, the primordial naked body does not exist *before* the paradisiacal body is undressed, but is instead created by "the caesura of sin" *after* denudation. Or to speak more precisely, the primordial nudity is only a presupposition *after the fact* (of undressing). It steps into the view of the first humans always too late and too early—it comes later than itself as a presupposition, and earlier than itself as an "event." Agamben is right to a point in stating that "nudity belongs to time and history, not to being and form." The primordial naked body does not assume a form enclosed with contours as definite and "well defined" as the paradisiacal body. It is so primarily because of its non-coincidence with itself, its in-adequation to itself. As a remainder of the pre-lapsarian body at once before and after its denudation, the primordial naked body is the excess par excellence. Stripped bare and shame-arousing, the primordial naked body just lingers out there, as forsaken as the "existence deprived of life," "a flesh without body" (Esposito 134). In a similar vein, Agamben christens the primordial naked body as "naked corporeality" (2011:76), which is the dematerialized flesh as spectral and monstrous as an organ without body.

The "naked corporeality" gives "flesh" to the *zoē* that is internally excluded by bio-thanato power. If bio-power creates "good life" only by means of the self-cutting of *bios*, what the so-called power *of* life produces is nothing more than a dematerialized and amorphous remainder, the *zoē* which remains after its being excluded from the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios*. That *zoē* in question is not *zoē* as such, but what remains after the denudation of the

paradisiacal body—i.e. the spectral being stripped of grace, the monstrous “existence deprived of life.” The birth of the internally excluded *zoē* marks the very moment when bio-power comes to be indistinguishable from thanato-power. The political hence finds its obverse in the ontological, insofar as the ontological predicament is closely bounded up with the full-scale operation of bio-thano-power. Crystallized in the ontological oddity thus created, so to speak, is the suicidal driving force behind the operation of bio-power. The impulse of bio-power is self-annulling, in that it lends fuel to the ongoing creation of qualified lives, yet ends up churning out the uncanny *zoē* that persistently remains after the concomitant process of exclusion. In a bid to garnish the world with good lives, the backfiring apparatus of “inclusive exclusion” turns out to pack the world with monstrous leftovers. From the existence of de-corporalized *zoē*, it is readily to be extrapolated the fundamental failure of bio-power.

Jean Luc-Nancy has added a spatial note to the *zoē* that comes into existence at once too early and to late, proposing the idea of “being-there” to trace the temporalizing-cum-spacing of its monstrosity. “There” refers to none of any definite place, for it is “not to be designated at all” (Nancy 46). Instead, the vacuous “there” opens up “a spacing,” which is by implication devoid of any set of plain coordinates requisite for the exact positioning of being (47). Being-there is thus the being of a “naked” life that is “thrown” into “a spacing,” radically bared of “its attributes” and “its very essence” (46-47). The “stubborn beast flesh” that gradually “creep[s] back” to the body of the Beast People (*Moreau*, 77-78), as I will argue in the next section, is the most apt epitome of the being-there of Moreau’s spectral creatures. In *The Time Machine*, Wells fantasizes that the Time Traveller becomes as “attenuated” as “a vapour” when the machine is proceeding at breakneck speed (20). Enlisted to speed up the progress of evolution, Moreau’s life-making

apparatus is for this reason an anthropo-genetic counterpart of the time machine. What is produced in Moreau's "humanizing process," in a similar vein, is nothing more than the "attenuated" body of the Beast People, the "stubborn beast flesh" that persistently comes back to warp their corporal shape. Wells has dropped a hint in this direction when we are told the Beast People are banished from the "House of Pain" as soon as the "beast in them" is detected, and just "go" unaided to find shelters on their own (*Moreau*, 78-79). Completely left to their own devices, Beast People are thus expelled to the dens that is "not to be designated" for them, i.e., to "there" the vacuity of which displaces all the reassuring "essence" and attenuates their being by spacing. Linger in the wilderness, the Beast People are just being there qua internally excluded *zoē*, qua the "stubborn beast flesh" twisted out of beatific shape. Being stripped bare, the Beast People brings into view the being-there of their being, which spells out the ontological predicament they undergo when Moreau's biopolitical apparatus is in full-scale operation.

III. The Fated Failure of Bio-Power as Vivi-Section: The "stubborn beast flesh" of Non-Beast People

As the overcoat of *creatio ex nihilo* is turned inside out, what faces out is the creation of what remains. The proliferation of being-there is the denouement of the biopolitical creation myth, rather than the worst-case scenario that bio-thanatopower might come up against. Viewing from this perspective, little wonder that Moreau's biopolitical project of human engineering is doomed to fail. Neither is it off the mark to say that the small-scale failure of Moreau's "humanizing process" is a capsule containing the large-scale failure of bio-power. Agamben is very explicit about

counter-productiveness of bio-power when he avers that the installation of “the anthropological machine of the moderns” ends up not so much in humanizing the animal as in animalizing the human: “it functions by excluding as not (yet) human an already human being from itself, that is, by animalizing the human” (2004: 37). It is the same mechanisms of “inclusive exclusion” that are up and running in Moreau’s “humanizing process,” the end-point of which, not surprisingly, sees the churning out of the “not (yet) human,” the “being-there” of “the stubborn beast flesh” that gives devastating twists to the morphology of Beast People. Hence the biopolitical import of the “reversion” of Beast People back to animals. As a sure sign of Moreau’s failure, the discernible “reversion” clearly traces the fated reversal of the humanization of the animals into the animalization of the human, and correlatively the mutual implication of bio-power and thanato-power. The “stubborn beast flesh,” I will argue, is hence the “naked corporeality” at once engendered by the anthropological machine and bearing testimony to its malfunctioning.

On the surface, the failure of Moreau’s elaborate grafting surgery seems to arise from technical difficulties. There are some body parts, Moreau admits, which are not ready to “grafting and reshaping,” such as claws, hands, brain, and last but not least, “somewhere . . . in the seat of the emotions” (*Moreau*, 78). But the hurdles turn out to be so overwhelmingly tremendous that the technical problems become doom: “always I fall short of the things I dream” (*Moreau*, 78). However resourceful and arrogant he may be, Moreau has to admit defeat when he finds the animal traits he has taken pains to eliminate start sneaking back to the Beast Folk one after another: “somehow the things drift back again, the stubborn beast flesh grows, day by day, back again. . . .” (*Moreau*, 77). Prendick provides bountiful of evidence to prove the truthfulness of the “reversion of the beast folk,” among which we see the “losing shape and import” of language, walking on all fours, “drinking by suction,” and so

on and so forth (*Moreau*, 122-23). If Moreau has been dreaming of accelerating evolution by vivisection and grafting surgery, the relentless counter-evolution as is shown by the striking “reversion” bursts his bubble.

As the animalization of the human comes to challenge his project of humanizing the animal, Moreau is doomed to take a humiliating beating in every showdown. Prendick has attributed all the tragic failure to “a blind fate” (*Moreau*, 96). The attribution is absolutely justifiable, given the fate is described as “a vast pitiless mechanism” (*Moreau*, 96) that operates along the same line with the life-making apparatus of bio-power. Just as bio-power excludes *zoē* from the always-already-politicized *zoē qua bios*, so that the “blind fate” wields its relentless power by “cut[ting] and shap[ing] the fabric of existence” (*Moreau*, 96). In other words, there is no mysterious overlord pulling the strings. It is the bio-political synchronization of cutting and shaping that leads Moreau and his victims to their eventual downfall. More worthy of note is the fact that the biopolitical fate falls to its own doom. For all its clutches, the rip it causes in “the fabric of existence” it weaves predestines the whole attire of life to fall apart at seams. The “stubborn beast flesh” is the threadbare rags that remain, persistently staying “there” to sound the knell for the malfunctioning bio-power.

In fact, the repulsive morphology of Beast People has shown the sign of the failure of Moreau’s biopolitical enterprise, way before the irreversible degeneration befalling his creatures. At first glance, the techniques involved in Moreau grafting surgery are the technologies of bio-power as defined by Foucault. When he recalls his early foray, Moreau thus describes how he puts a huge amount of work into changing a gorilla: “All the week, night and day, I moulded him. With him it was chiefly the brain that needed moulding; much had to be added, much changed” (*Moreau*, 76). Moreau’s remembrance of his toil repeats Foucault’s genealogical description of bio-techniques almost

verbatim. To humanize the animal entails “moulding” and adding human traits to the animal life. Involved in this undertaking is noticeably a process of addition, of shaping *zoē* into *bios* by investing it with every needed aptitude, with a view to forming a paradisiacal body in the end.

However, the eerie hybridity of Beast People marks the point where Wells and Foucault diverge. Moreau’s “humanizing process” is presented in this novella as the Aristotelian moment of his experimental physiology, in a bid to travesty the biopolitical dream of human engineering. Revealed in the hybridity of the Beast People is the first peculiarity of biopolitical ontology: i.e. *zoē* (animal life) is always already implicated in *bios* (good human life), so that *zoē* is the always-already-politicized *zoē* qua *bios*. Wells pushes this Aristotelian moment to its logical end, satanically turning the product of the anthropological machine from the qualified good life, as is intended by bio-power, into grotesque hybrids. Is there any other figure that is more suitable to embody the always-already-politicized *zoē* quo *bios* than Beast (*zoē*) People (*bios*)? Given the deformed life is considered as the most apt figure for the good form of life, it makes little sense to distinguish human beings as such from Beast People. A fundamental truth revealed in *The Island of Doctor Moreau* is that, be it the male citizens who are entitled to human intercourse in the polis, or those well-disciplined bodies on the shop floor, they are all Beast People, as long as they are human beings. Little wonder Prendick finds it hard to differentiate “one of the bovine creatures who worked the launch treading heavily through the undergrowth,” from “some really human yokel trudging home from his mechanical labours” (*Moreau*, 84). It comes as still less of a surprise that he, when back in London, finds it even harder to convince himself that “the men and women I met were not also another, still passably human, Beast People, animals half-wrought into the outward image of human souls” (*Moreau*, 130). Prendick’s cynicism bespeaks not so much a

tribute to Gulliver as his appreciation of Aristotle, whose political discourse, once read through the Agambenian optic, has already anticipated the upending of the human engineering project and prefigured the fated failure of bio-power.

Wells' critique of bio-power will lose much of its trenchancy if he does not underline the deliberate infliction of excruciating pain imposed upon Beast People. The process of addition, as I've argued, does not exhaust the operation of anthropological machine in its entirety. Wells seems to be fully cognizant of the complexities inherent in the biopolitical project of human engineering. The infliction of pain, which corresponds to the process of subtraction I discuss above, is then thrown in for good measure to account for why the biopolitical project falls through. The citizens in the polis or the able laborers on the shop floor would find their *doppelgänger* in Beast People, primarily because the humanity and animality in them are not just being added up and melded into a pleasing unity. Beast people is not a hybrid species which is at once human *and* animal, but neither human nor animal. As soon as Moreau's scalpel incision leaves its first painful mark on his victims, the fabric of Beast People thus created is ripped off. Alongside the self-declared process of addition, the extreme measures of subtraction gets underway at the same time, which are generally intended to search, isolate, and then exclude, or in Wells' phraseology, "burn out" the undesirable animal traits from the emerging qualified life. Thus created, Beast people are reduced to the mere existence deprived of the good form of human life, insofar as the incision amounts to the mutilation of *zoē qua bios*. Neither are Beast People animals any longer, in that the incision scar is testimony to the exclusion of *zoē* from within their being. Beast People hence are neither human nor animal, and that's why they are born with repulsive looks. The infliction of pain thus brings the biting critique inherent in the hideous make-up of Beast People to its completion. The pain requisite for the making of *bios* turns the benignity of bio-power inside

out and shows us its horrid front. At this point in time, a joint venture of bio-power and thanato-power rears its head, so much so that the well-meant creation of *bios* ends up becoming the ruthless chopping of the *bios* in the making. In view of this, it is for good reasons to take vivisection literally: vivi-section, the “life-dissecting.” Thus understood, vivi-section turns out to be a metaphor for the mutual implication of bio-power and thanato-power. Vivi-section, which involves a set of elaborate medical techniques for the creation of a qualified life, is at the same time a cutting which slits life open with a view to isolating and banishing *zoē* (animal traits) from the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios* (the qualified life in the making).

Wells' polemics against bio-power do not leave off at this point. Moreau's failure is twice assured when the reversion of the Beast Folk is more and more perceptible. If the cross contamination of the power of life and power over life assures the first defeat of bio-power, it is then in the grip of another beating: the *zoē* it expels turns monstrous and persistently returns to harass and challenge the ordering it imposes on life. “The stubborn beast flesh” growing back on the Beast People is exactly the *zoē* which is excluded from the always already politicized *zoē* qua *bios*, the “naked corporeality” which cannot be explained, defined, and accounted for by the biopolitical grid of intelligibility. As animality is found waxing and humanity waning, the regrettable reversion of the Beast Folk is pretty conclusive. The reversion in question is actually an act of denudation that strips the Beast Folk of one human trait after another, and the animality they gradually regress toward is in turn created by this “event.” It is the increasing loss of humanity that makes for the increasing gain of animality, not vice versa. It cannot be argued the other way round because every sign of reversion is established with the “Law” as the ultimate point of reference. “Not to go on all-Fours; that is the Law. Are we not Men?” the Law thus dictates (*Moreau*, 59), so any Beast Man who is found “running on

toes and finger-tips, and quite unable to recover the vertical attitude” is diagnosed with reversion beyond any doubt (*Moreau*, 123). Every demeanor dictated by animality is interpreted as a deviation from the course of humanity, so that every revelation of animality is rendered possible by the deprivation of human traits. There is no such thing as unalloyed animality to go back to, precisely because it is the dwindling of humanity that brings animality into view. Thus created, animality is not a “state,” but a dynamic process in the midst of which “the stubborn beast flesh grows,” as if the flesh were freshly sprouted. By way of illustration, I quote the following passage at full length to see how the flesh of the Beast People develops *shortly after* they are denuded of “human semblance:”

It would be impossible to detail every step of the lapsing of these monsters; to tell how, day by day, the human semblance left them; how they gave up bandaging and wrappings, abandoned at last every stitch of clothing; how the hair began to spread over the exposed limbs; how their foreheads fell away and their face projected; how the quasi-human intimacy I had permitted myself with some of them in the first month of my loneliness became a horror to recall. (*Moreau*, 123)

Created in the midst of denudation, the gradually emerging flesh comes to trap the Beast Folk in a process that is even more liminal than the beast-man state. When Moreau’s scalpel incision leaves its first mark on his handpicked beasts, they become beast-men, coming into existence as a hybrid species which is neither human nor animal. Hideous though they may look, there is no shortage of the fleeting moments of “quasi-intimacy” in which Prendick may find solace during his lonely sojourn in the island. This is not to aver that Beast People are unambiguously human before the signs of reversion are in evidence. Nothing is further from his mind than the harmonious union of

animality and humanity, *zoē* and *bios* in *Beast Men* when they are in his company. The intimacy he then is luxuriating in is way more apparent than real. After all, it's "quasi-intimacy." The repulsiveness of the always-already-politicized *zoē* qua *bios* becomes tolerable, simply because "the stubborn beast flesh" just stepping into his view is more horrifying than ever.

If *Beast People* are neither human nor animal, the flesh just rapidly sprouting from their bodies transfigures them into non-*Beast People*, so to speak. The process involved in the making of the non-*Beast People* has nothing to do with "making a positive by multiplying two negatives." If *Beast People* is as far from being human as from being animal, non-*Beast People* are not the *Beast People* turning positive, either becoming *Beasts* or *People* as such. It goes without saying that non-*Beast People* can't possibly be human, insofar as their hideous existence is noticeably further removed from the category of humanity. Neither do the degenerating *Beast People* become ordinary animals, because "these creatures," as Prendick observes, "did not decline into such beasts as the reader has seen in zoological gardens" (*Moreau*, 124). In consequence, the being of non-*Beast People* are relegated to an ontological double bind, assuming an existence that is all the more liminal than the interstitial being of *Beast People*. If *Beast People* are non-human-and-non-animal, "the stubborn animal flesh" makes these pathetic degenerating creatures become non-non-human-and-non-non-animal. My self-coined epithet is pretty confusing, so is the being of non-*Beast People*. Such bearers of "the stubborn animal flesh" are unlikely to be rendered "intelligible" by any existent order. As the being exceeding the perimeters of human, animal, and *Beast People*, non-*Beast People* are the existence of excess par excellence. Getting stuck in the interstice of interstices, in the second-order "rip in the fabric" of being so to speak, the degenerating *Beast Folk* thus enters into a relentless process of absolute spacing. They are just there, being there qua being-there,

and lack any attribute serviceable to pin them down; hence the “existence deprived of life.” Due to the ongoing process of reversion, non-Beast People are deprived of the body which may gives them definite “form”; hence “the flesh without body.” The being-there of being thus finds its clearest illustration in non-Beast People. As with Adam and Eve who feel ashamed of their “naked corporeality,” non-Beast People in the circumstances have never been at ease with their bare flesh:

It is a curious thing, by the by, for which I am quite unable to account, that these weird creatures—the females I mean—had in the earlier days of my stay an instinctive sense of their own repulsive clumsiness, and displayed in consequence a more than human regard for the decencies and decorum of external costume. (*Moreau*, 84)

The “naked corporeality” of non-Beast People deals a deadly blow to bio-power, even more deadly than ever. Their ontological double bind does not simply unveil the cross contamination of bio-power and thanato-power. With the being qua spacing, they even go beyond the complicity in question and exceed altogether the perimeters of the biopolitical “order of things.” As a result, non-Beast People end up becoming the most dematerialized, unintelligible, and fuzzy existence which readily slips through the fingers of bio-power. Dumbstruck by what it creates, bio-thanato-power is at its wit’s end and suffering its all-time worst defeat. Such is the power of the “naked corporeality” of non-Beast People that it even widens the tear in the fabric of biopolitical network, enlarging it into a fault line which threatens to break the anthropological machine and suspend the operation of bio-power.

IV. Epilogue: The (Dis) Position of Moreau

Then, what does Moreau stand in the circuits of bio-power? As I have argued above, no matter whether it is Moreau or Prendick, pro-vivisectionists or anti-vivisectionists, all of them are standing on their respective nodal points spreading across the same biopolitical network. The only yet crucial difference is that Moreau, in comparison to Prendick, is a far more active administrator of the biopolitical dictates. Such is his immense passion for experimental physiology that he is the only person in the novella who can carry the dictates of bio-power to extremes, and follow them to their logical end. Who else can best serve as a synecdoche for the derailed bio-power but a deranged medical scientist? Who is more ready to turn bio-power inside out and shows us its bloody lining than an ahead-of-time vanguard?

For all his function as a mouthpiece for bio-power, it hardly escapes notice that Moreau is also a victim as “attenuated” as his creatures. Given Moreau is among the victim of the “blind fate” (*Moreau*, 96), it comes as no surprise that the evidence pointing in this direction can multiply. For example, just as Beast People is banished to dens that are not “designated” in advance to be their habitats, so that Moreau are expelled to an uncharted island that “hasn’t go a name” (*Moreau*, 12). After Moreau dies, Prendick takes over his “vacant scepter,” which serves obviously in this context as a metonymy for an heirless sovereign (*Moreau*, 117). In many places, Beast People are also described as “vacant” as Moreau’s precarious rule, to the extent their “offspring” is either engineered to “serve for meat,” or simply devoured by Beast People themselves (*Moreau*, 85). Still another example is the way Moreau is slaughtered, which makes him virtually a carbon copy of the brutes he has vivisected:

He lay face downward in a trampled space in a can-brake. One hand

was almost severed at the wrist, and his silvery hair was dabbled in blood. His head had been battered in by the fetters of the puma. The broken canes beneath him were smeared with blood. (*Moreau*, 105)

Being twisted out of shape, Moreau's body is battered into a mass as amorphous as "the stubborn beast flesh." As he lies out there with his face "downward" and his blood soaking the trampled cane-brake, the close proximity of his flesh and the earth is strongly suggestive of the "spacing" of his being, of the irreparable tear in "the fabric of existence."

In fact, way before he is crushed into a mass of "flesh without body," the being-there of Moreau's existence is already yet indiscernibly being described as "the existence deprived of life." When finishing expounding his theory with trenchancy and unrestrained passion, Moreau gets up to press Prendick to express his view. Dumbfounded and speechless, Prendick just sits there without making a sound, albeit because he is deeply struck by the placidity of Moreau's complexion and demeanor (*Moreau*, 79). With repeated emphasis on Moreau's composure—"calm eyes," "serenity," "his set tranquility"—and snow-white looks—"white-faced, white-haired"—Prendick tries leading his readers to believe the "magnificent build" looming large in front of him is a lifeless yet beautiful saint statue carved in a serene posture (*Moreau*, 79). Emerging as such a holy icon, Moreau is the "existence deprived of life" par excellence. He appears lifeless in the circumstances, precisely because he is larger and smaller than life at the same time. On the one hand, he is too saintly to be himself qua a pitiless scientist. On the other hand, since Moreau is such an avid researcher who "might have passed muster among a hundred other comfortable old gentlemen" (*Moreau*, 79), he is short on the prestige he deserves and appears far less prominent than he is supposed to be. Now too less, now too much—Moreau is in any case presented as nothing but the

self-nullifying non-coincidence. As an existence qua excess, Moreau's being is predicated on exceeding the established perimeters of his own life. Disowned by his own life so to speak, his being is cut across by a constitutive spacing and hence appears as dematerialized as non-Beast People. Moreau thus emerges at that point as another *zoē* that is excluded from the *zoē* qua *bios*, another remainder that can't possibly be settled on any grid of intelligibility. For this reason, it comes as little surprise that Moreau's extraordinary composure chills Prendick to the bone: "Then I shivered" (*Moreau*, 79). Stunned by the uncanny junction of sublimity and ignominy, Prendick must have gone pale with as much fright as when he runs into the degenerating Beast People.

All in all, Moreau is concurrently an administrator of bio-power and its victim, a sovereign and a member of non-Beast People. He stands firmly on a nodal point of the biopolitical network, and fashions himself as an instrumental cog in "the anthropological machine of the moderns." On the other hand, he is also the "flesh without body" which either stubbornly defies assimilation, or even proves to be a deadly hazard to the operation of biopolitical apparatuses. As a staunch adherent and a monstrous stranger to the bio-power at the same time, Moreau is another victim of "inclusive exclusion," ripped apart by his unlocalizable position in the circuit of bio-power. Inside and outside at the same time, Moreau (dis) positions himself on the biopolitical atlas. In other words, he is just being there qua being-there.

Then, it remains to be seen whether Moreau's ontologico-political (dis) position is a helpless gesture of resignation, or the gauntlet thrown down to the face of bio-power. The tragic end of Moreau seems to suggest it is more a case of the former. Moreau is battered into a lump of beast flesh by the puma he has vivisected. Such a sad ending adds a fatalist note to Moreau's (dis) position, encapsulating how a sovereign is consigned to the beast status by the biopolitical "Fate," and how a bio-engineer is entrapped and minced in the

anthropological machin. The gashed flesh of Moreau, in other words, speaks volumes about the untouchable mightiness of bio-thanato-power. As its operation is unhindered, every life within its reach is rendered precarious. Neither is there any measure to take when the predestined degeneration of good life into inconsequential being-there is irreversibly in progress.

Bio-thanato-power is truly pitiless, to be sure, but there is no lack of awkward moments in its operation. As I've discussed above, the anthropological machine would break down as it churns out the flesh that is too monstrous to be set in place in the biopolitical grid of intelligibility. Moreau's (dis) position marks the very embarrassing moment when bio-power comes up against its intractable excess and finds nothing can be done about it. Prendick's "shiver" arises as the corollary of the ultimate failure of bio-power to grasp, domesticate or press its excess into its service. To take a truly polemical stance against the inexorable bio-power, it is yet to be seen how the power of horror thus evoked can be mobilized to cause fatal failure to the operation of biopolitical apparatuses. It's a pity to find Wells' novella holds back before bringing the critical import of Moreau's (dis) position to its logical end. It is all thanks to Wells' ingenuity that the cross contamination of bio-power and thanato-power is brought into sharp relief. The ontological peculiarity consequent upon the operation of bio-thanato-power also attains its most crystalline epitomization in the figure of degeneration Beast People. Even more worthy of note and admiration is the presentation of Moreau's ontologico-political (dis) position, which actually hints at the much-sought-after possibility of breaking loose from the grip of bio-power. Despite all the revealing insight into the biopolitical mechanisms, Wells stops short, showing no intention of going further to scrutinize the radical front of Moreau's (dis)-position. This is not meant as a scathing comment on Wells' novella. On the contrary, any polemic against bio-thanato-power should start where Wells

leaves off. Moreau's (dis) position and the ontological predicament of the non-Beast People should be taken as the point of departure, and brought to bear in a uphill effort to release life from the restraints of bio-power.

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Being-There: The Ontology of Biopower in
H. G. Wells' *The Island of Doctor Moreau*

Abstract

Yen-bin Chiou

In the epoch of biopolitical administration, it is noticeable that ontology has regained currency in the fields of literary, philosophical, and political studies. The “ontological turn” is an emergent trend of reorienting thinking toward the devastating yet indiscernible effect of bio-power on life. How does bio-power goes hand-in-hand with thanato-power to bring constraints to bear on life? How does bio-thanatopower engineer life? What is the ontological predicament consequent on the unfortunate marriage of bio-power and thanato-power? Is the predicament in question a sign of doom, or a beacon of hope? This article aims to read H. G. Wells' *The Island of Doctor Moreau* (1896) as a philosophical novella that raises, analyzes, and answers these questions with stunning exactitude. From Moreau's grafting surgery to the uncanny existence of the degenerating Beast People, Wells traces clearly how bio-power and thanato-power dovetail in the biopolitical effort to produce the “stubborn beast flesh,” rather than the “well defined” form of qualified life as originally intended. For all the precise grasp of these core problems, this novella eventually fails to bring the radical observation to its logical end. It still remains to be seen if the “being-there” of the “stubborn beast flesh,” as Wells suggests, adds up only to a foreboding reminder of the precariousness of life.

► Key Words: H. G. Wells, Giorgio Agamben, Michel Foucault, bio-power, ontology, non-Beast People

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國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(或大陸地區)出差或

研習心得報告

日期：2012 年 12 月 7 日

計畫編號	NSC 99-2410-H-004-037-MY2		
計畫名稱	退化、生命、與倫理		
出國人員姓名	邱彥彬	服務機構及職稱	國立政治大學英文系副教授
出國時間	2011 年 8 月 10 日至 2011 年 8 月 18 日	出國地點	法國巴黎

一、 國外(大陸)研究過程

此次巴黎的移地研究，主要的行程包含 Arcades 的實地踏查，以及法國國家圖書館和法蘭西學院的參訪。在 Arcades 的部份，總共花了五天的時間走訪各個 modernized 或 renew 的痕跡不甚明顯的 arcades，包含 Galerie Vivienne, Galerie Vero-Dodat, Passage du Grand Cerf, Passage Bourg L'Abbe, Galerie des Varietes, Passage Panoramas, Passage Jouffroy, Passage Verdeau 等等重要的拱廊街。

二、 研究成果

在此次參訪 Arcades 的行程中，發現大部分未經徹底更新的拱廊街，依舊保留著班雅民在 1920 年代親眼目睹的廢棄感，在在凸顯了拱廊街逸離出線性時間與同質空間而從中閃現的 now-time：在深鎖的鐵門後佈滿灰塵的櫥窗，裡頭精心擺設著沒有人購買的商品，詭異的景象不僅指向一個跳脫當下的空間，也同時把繁華的過往拉回至當下，讓當下直接從線性的時間與同質的空間中脫離，冒現出班雅民所謂的 now-time 以及阿岡本所謂的彌賽亞時間。此次實地的踏查參訪，讓我直接感受到阿岡本如何從班雅民的思想中，提陳出一個跳脫當下時空、讓線性時間與同質空間產生斷裂的彌賽亞時間，並據之以批評後結構主義中不斷強調的往後延宕的彌賽亞時間。阿岡本在談論彌賽亞時間時，甚少提到班雅民的 *The Arcades Project*，或許這個連結是往後可以嘗試思考的方向：不管是 flaneur、prostitute 或者是 collector，或許他們都是卡夫卡的 *The Trial* 中，那位在法律之門的寓言裡的鄉下年輕人，同樣都是以 provocation 的姿態迫使真正的彌賽亞得以降臨，以斷裂當下時空的方式，讓真正的彌賽亞降臨時發現自己竟然已經來過人世。

此次參訪的一個意外收穫是在法蘭西學院遇到一位同來研究的法國學者，與他聊了一個下午，談起傅科為法蘭西學院留下的思想遺產，以及他與阿岡本在思想上的連續與斷裂。他提醒我注意阿岡本與晚期傅科一脈相承之處。回國後，我再拿起傅科晚年在法蘭西學院的講稿再次仔細閱讀，確實發現阿岡本的 *Sacraments of Language* 與傅科有關 care of the self 的說法似有可相互增補之處，值得再加思考。

附件六

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告

日期：____年____月____日

計畫編號	NSC — — — — —		
計畫名稱			
出國人員姓名		服務機構及職稱	
合作國家		合作機構	
出國時間	年 月 日至 年 月 日	出國地點	

一、國際合作研究過程

二、研究成果

三、建議

四、其他

國科會補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2012/12/11

國科會補助計畫	計畫名稱: 退化、生命與倫理	
	計畫主持人: 邱彥彬	
	計畫編號: 99-2410-H-004-037-MY2	學門領域: 文學理論

無研發成果推廣資料

99 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：邱彥彬			計畫編號：99-2410-H-004-037-MY2				
計畫名稱：退化、生命與倫理							
成果項目			量化			單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）
			實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數(含實際已達成數)	本計畫實際貢獻百分比		
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	1	1	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（本國籍）	碩士生	2	2	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	1	1	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%	章/本	
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（外國籍）	碩士生	1	2	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		

<p>其他成果</p> <p>(無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)</p>	無
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	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
<div> 科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目 </div>	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與（閱聽）人數	0	

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

☒達成目標

☐未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

☐實驗失敗

☐因故實驗中斷

☐其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文：☒已發表 ☐未發表之文稿 ☐撰寫中 ☐無

專利：☐已獲得 ☐申請中 ☒無

技轉：☐已技轉 ☐洽談中 ☒無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

在本計畫第二年的執行期間，本人已完成中英文論文各一篇，並於計畫執行期限前順利刊登。其中的中文論文，我嘗試從班雅民與阿岡本的角度，探討君王與裸命在神聖生命上的異質同構，思索裸命如何展現其大能，讓裸命此一不可能、未曾發生的事件進而發生。另外一篇英文論文則是藉由 H.G. Wells 的小說，探討造人機器的運作模式，試圖挖掘被小說家低估裸命的激進潛力。這兩篇文章均試圖從阿岡本的班雅民的視角，嘗試打開被後結構主義封閉住的逃逸路線，目的不只在於找到生命政治治理機器的缺口，而是試圖掌握停止治理機器運作的時間點。在後結構主義依舊思想主流的今天，本人認為我的研究成果初步已達到反思後結構思想霸權的目的。