

行政院國家科學委員會專題研究計畫 期末報告

重整公眾外交以做為台灣外交戰略工具(第2年)

計畫類別：個別型
計畫編號：NSC 99-2410-H-004-221-MY2
執行期間：100年08月01日至101年09月30日
執行單位：國立政治大學外交學系

計畫主持人：黃奎博

計畫參與人員：碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：周容卉
碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：蔡智棠
碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：張書銘
碩士班研究生-兼任助理人員：王大維
博士班研究生-兼任助理人員：王聖智
博士後研究：平思寧

報告附件：移地研究心得報告
出席國際會議研究心得報告及發表論文

公開資訊：本計畫涉及專利或其他智慧財產權，2年後可公開查詢

中華民國 102年02月27日

中文摘要：本研究首先概略介紹公眾外交及對我國之重要性，次以由行政院組織再造之變動觀察各相關部會反應在公眾外交業務上之單位調整，指出這些調整並未有利於我國公眾外交計畫的發展，反而因為各部會橫向政策聯繫與協調不彰、傳統官僚組織習於「被領導」、資源未有效集中、訓練未逐步落實，所以如果外交部與原新聞局負責國際新聞與傳播業務人員未能妥為融合，又如果各相關部會仍多半各行其是，則我國的公眾外交的推展難有實質突破。

中文關鍵詞：公眾外交、臺灣、行政院、外交部、新聞局

英文摘要：First, this research introduces briefly the concept of public diplomacy (PD) and its significance for Taiwan, ROC. Then it begins with the observations on the dynamics of the Executive Yuan 's organizational restructuring and with the adjustments of related agencies responsible for PD. The finding indicates that these adjustments haven 't been useful for the development of Taiwan 's PD programs. To the contrary, because of the problem with the horizontal policy coordination among related agencies, the tendency of bureaucratic organizations to be led, and the failures of pulling resources effectively and implementing training gradually, it is difficult for Taiwan 's PD to come up with some substantive breakthroughs. It is particularly so if the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ex-officials of the Government Information Office cannot be integrated well, and if the other relevant agencies in the Executive Yuan still continues to work on their own.

英文關鍵詞：Public Diplomacy, Taiwan, Executive Yuan, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Government Information Office

重整公眾外交以做為臺灣外交戰略工具(初稿)

中文關鍵詞：公眾外交、臺灣、行政院、外交部、新聞局、組織再造

中文摘要：本研究首先概略介紹公眾外交及對我國之重要性，次以由行政院組織再造之變動觀察各相關部會反應在公眾外交業務上之單位調整，指出這些調整並未有利於我國公眾外交計畫的發展，反而因為各部會橫向政策聯繫與協調不彰、傳統官僚組織習於「被領導」、資源未有效集中、訓練未逐步落實，所以如果外交部與原新聞局負責國際新聞與傳播業務人員未能妥為融合，又如果各相關部會仍多半各行其是，則我國的公眾外交的推展難有實質突破。

英文摘要：First, this research introduces briefly the concept of public diplomacy (PD) and its significance for Taiwan, ROC. Then it begins with the observations on the dynamics of the Executive Yuan's organizational restructuring and with the adjustments of related agencies responsible for PD. The finding indicates that these adjustments haven't been useful for the development of Taiwan's PD programs. To the contrary, because of the problem with the horizontal policy coordination among related agencies, the tendency of bureaucratic organizations to be led, and the failures of pulling resources effectively and implementing training gradually, it is difficult for Taiwan's PD to come up with some substantive breakthroughs. It is particularly so if the staff of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the ex-officials of the Government Information Office cannot be integrated well, and if the other relevant agencies in the Executive Yuan still continues to work on their own.

I.

傳統國際社會中，國與國之間的「外交」幾全數透過官方管道為之。但是，隨著公民社會（civil society）的興起、科技交通的進步、國際事務的多元、政府資源的相對不足等多重因素的出現，民間管道也逐漸成為推動外交活動的一股重要力量。對中華民國（以下以「臺灣」稱之）而言，由於臺灣特殊、艱難的國際處境，以及中國大陸綜合國力日漸強大，導致臺灣對外關係呈現不正常的狀態，往往需要依賴非官方管道為之；因此，以非官方管道為主軸的公眾外交（Public Diplomacy，中國大陸稱「公共外交」）便有可能成為臺灣最有效的對外施力點。

公眾外交的定義很多，中外文獻也曾整理過各種的定義，本文因篇幅所限將不再贅述。¹ 至於其相關行為者與對象的區別，主要可分為「政府對人民」及「人民對人民」，兩大類，²其本質可以是指政府對於他國人民，或是我國人民在政府支持下對於他國人民進行的外交活動。本文旨在探討我國政府對公眾外交的活動，故採取「政府對人民」做為探討公眾外交的主要管道，將公眾外交定義為由政府規劃、執行或協助以促進本國與外國人民間的雙向溝通、建立共同認知價值的外交工作。此外，公眾外交也因此可視為執行國的涉外事務決策及工作者為了更瞭解他國的態度與立場，以強化該國人民與社會對執行國的認知與支持，並鼓勵執行國官方與民間向他國人民進行更廣泛接觸的一種外交操作。

I) 為何需要公眾外交？

為何要在國家正式管道的外交之外，推動公眾外交做為國際交流的重點呢？國內外文獻對於公眾外交的起源已著墨甚多，因此本文僅做一簡單介紹。公眾外交的概念最早源自 20 世紀前半葉的美國，當時美國政府逐漸發現以影響他國人民做為外交政策目標的重要性。美國發展公眾外交的時空背景確有不同，大致可分為兩類：第一，戰時（war time），在第一次以及第二次世界大戰時，美國便針對敵國的人民進行外交影響，以媒體配合政府單位實施國際宣傳，推銷以和平的價值達到終戰之最終目的，例如政府內的「作戰資訊辦公室」（Office of War

¹，有興趣請參考 Mark Leonard. 2002. *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre, p. 1; Nicholas J. Cull. 2009. "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase," in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor Eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. NY: Routledge.

² 卜正珉，公眾外交：軟性國力，理論與策略。允晨大學叢書，2009 年，頁 19~20。

Information, OWI),³以及屬於傳播委員會的「美國之音」(Voice of America, VOA)；⁴ 第二，非戰時，其主要目的在於改善美國的形象，以避免讓「非武裝」上的衝突最後導致誤解、誤判，甚至武裝衝突，例如冷戰時與前蘇聯的對立，讓兩國不斷地刻意扭曲及抹黑對方的國家形象，又如在「九一一」事件後，或因過於強勢的全球反恐行動，致使美國國家形象受到影響，所以美國感到改善國家形象非常重要，否則將抵銷許多外交的努力，因此公眾外交的價值再度浮現。為達前述目的，美國早自 1948 年以便於國務院設立「美國公眾外交諮詢委員會」(United States Advisory Commission on Public Diplomacy, ACPD)，藉由研析報告的撰述與研討會的舉行，提供國務院相關評估上的協助。

簡言之，傳統外交主要就是官方對官方的接觸、溝通與談判，公眾外交則因傳統外交在世局變化時的限制應運而生；公眾外交的做法更為靈活，實施的對象也更為多元，但仍是國家對外政策工具的輔助選擇。美國的公眾外交目的在增加他國人民對美國民主和平以及人道價值的認識，避免錯誤的印象與理解。即便美國的國家硬實力 (hard power) 極為強大，但仍時時提倡公眾外交，只不過說法或有出入，而公眾外交已是美國執行外交政策工具的重要輔助。倘吾人根據前述說法觀察臺灣的外交，則必須思考的問題是，在缺乏強大硬實力但仍有經濟實力做後盾的同時，臺灣是否更需要公眾外交呢？

II) 為何臺灣需要公眾外交？

相較於其他實力相等的國家，臺灣在傳統外交上揮灑空間非常有限，以往傲人的經貿外交在近年來雙邊或多邊區域經濟合作趨勢中卻似遇到瓶頸，除了憑藉經貿交流以換取相關官方的互動外，對於雙邊或多邊自由貿易則難有影響力。此時，臺灣應該考慮重整對外關係的工作，考慮從公眾外交的途徑以為「活路外交」找出新活路。為何如此？吾人可從臺灣的國際與兩岸關係，以及我國的國家特色來說明。

首先，馬英九總統曾於 2008 年第一任期之初，宣示臺灣將在「活路外交」

³ Wilson P. Dizard Jr. 2004. *Inverting Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Informational Agency*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, Inc., p. 3.

⁴ 美國之音參與二戰的角色與歷史，請見 <http://www.insidevoa.com/about/history/a-13-34-Beginning-of-an-American-Voice-111602684.html>

政策下，對中國大陸進行「外交休兵」。當這樣一個逐漸互相減少衝突調和的兩岸關係開始有所進展時，公眾外交明顯地成為一個對臺灣越發重要的外交政策工具，因為相對而言，它的作法較不易引起兩岸政治爭議。

公眾外交可以是比台海兩岸競爭正式外交關係更有效的措施。在這樣的新氛圍下，臺灣有可能透過成功的公眾外交以增進許多國家民眾對於臺灣的了解，進而對臺灣產生善意，不必花費大量的資源與政治資本來吸引外國政府或人民的支持。

臺灣在經濟上的成就有目共睹，於 2011 年的經貿進出口總額達 427 億美元，居全球第 17 名，也是美國的第十大貿易夥伴；臺灣在軍事實力方面也不容小覷，根據「環球軍力網站」（Global Fire Power, GFP）的調查排名，臺灣在 2011 年排名全球第十四強。⁵ 雖然如此，不僅美國經驗已經明白指出，軍事與經濟實力不一定等於能夠獲得他國的尊敬，遑論中國大陸日益強大的綜合國力，已讓臺灣在國際上更難將前述的強項轉化成外交的動力。雖然目前國際上只有 23 個國家承認中華民國，⁶但我國在海外設有 119(?)個館處及代表團，分佈在 80(?)個國家，甚至有些國家設有超過一個以上的我國駐外單位，例如美國、日本、德國、瑞士、澳洲、加拿大、印度、越南等等。⁷ 如此多的駐外單位理應可為我國形成一股堅實的外交力量，在官方交涉管道常常受限的情況下，努力找出其他有效管道，尤其是「政府對民間」為主的公眾外交，以有限的資源與人力達成可長可久的外交效益。

再者，臺灣本身的特質也是培育出適合公眾外交的環境，例如臺灣的軟實力（soft power）。⁸ 軟實力是實施公眾外交的重要關鍵，因為軟實力可視為在以非

⁵ 請參考「環球軍力網站」，<http://globalfirepower.com/>，2012 年 4 月 9 日進入查詢。

⁶ 至民國 101 年 4 月 9 日，我國邦交國包括教廷、布吉納法索、聖多美普林西比民主共和國、史瓦濟蘭王國、甘比亞共和國、吉里巴斯共和國、諾魯共和國、帛琉共和國、馬紹爾群島共和國、所羅門群島、土瓦魯國、貝里斯、多明尼加共和國、薩爾瓦多共和國、瓜地馬拉共和國、海地共和國、宏都拉斯共和國、尼加拉瓜共和國、巴拿馬共和國、巴拉圭共和國、聖克里斯多福及尼維斯、聖露西亞，以及聖文森（及格瑞那丁）共 23 國，請參考外交部網站：<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Regions/AlliesIndex/?opno=777f1778-f578-4148-b22a-b62f81be5f57>。

⁷ 資料來源：我國外交部駐外館處通訊錄，<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Regions/Index/?opno=cecdc3f9-5642-4076-a902-f8276783163d#download>。

⁸ 軟實力（soft power）這個概念是由哈佛大學甘乃迪學院政府系教授奈伊（Joseph Nye）於 1990 年在《責無旁貸的領導》（*Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*）一書中所提出，關於軟實力的討論已經充斥學界的研究中，因此本文不多加著墨，有興趣者請參考 Joseph S. Nye

強迫的手段（包括軍事與經濟脅迫）下，吸引國外行為者並與之良性溝通與交往的涉外模式。臺灣身為中等國家（middle power），軍事與經濟能力具有一定規模，但不至於位居霸權或區域強權，⁹如何在政治實力略遜於其他強國（特別是中國大陸）的強況下，以軟實力走出自己的路特別重要。例如臺灣可以強調本身對於正統中華文化的保存和國家發展的成就，也可以藉此與多國家公民社會進行交流，如此不但可以節省「支票簿外交」的資源虛擲，還能夠避免創造或升高新的外交衝突。

而臺灣如何以軟實力吸引國外的目光而達到公眾外交的目的呢？作者借用認為國家藉由軟實力的吸引力的特質，來檢視臺灣是否具備公眾外交的基礎：¹⁰

第一，道德與價值觀（ethics and values）。具有較高道德以及相似價值觀的國家，會比較容易相互交往。早期臺灣反共色彩濃厚，在冷戰初期，臺灣的反共意識的確實為我國爭取到不少盟邦以及國際友人，但近年來「反共」已不再成為國際社會的主流意識，不過民主價值與成就仍成為臺灣可以與其他國家對話的共同語言。第二，消費性產品（consumers products）。早期臺灣製的產品總給國際社會不可靠的印象，但是臺灣近年來拜科技進步之賜，台製「3C 產品」行銷全世界，並獲得不小的成功，例如宏達電（HTC）、宏碁（Acer）等等。HTC 在 2011 年末尼爾森公司（A. C. Nelson）的調查中，全球(?)市佔率僅次蘋果（Apple）的 iPhone，約有 21%¹¹；宏碁電腦在對產品品質要求甚高的德國，市佔率甚至為第

Jr. 1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books; Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S Nye, Jr. 1998. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77(5): 81-94; Joseph S. Nye, Jr. 2004. "The Decline of America's Soft Power: Why Washington Worry," *Foreign Affairs* 83(3): 16-20.

⁹ 中等國家（middle power）指不是霸權或強權國家，卻在國際上卻擁有足夠的影響力，雖然對中等國家的定義眾說紛紜，但作者認為臺灣身為中等國家這個主張是合理的，對中等強權的研究請參考：Richard A. Higgott and Andrew Fenton Cooper. 1990. "Middle Power Leadership and Coalition Building: Australia, the Cairns Group, and the Uruguay Round of Trade Negotiations," *International Organization* 44(4): 589-632; Janis Van Der Westhuizen. 1998. "South Africa's Emergence as A Middle Power," *Third World Quarterly* 19(3): 439-456.

¹⁰ Leonard 與 Alakeson 提出 8 項有關國家如何創造吸引力的特質，包括道德與價值觀（ethics and values）、民主機制與政治（democratic institutions and politics）、文化與生活形態（culture and lifestyle）、消費性產品（consumer product）、媒體與資訊提供者（media and information providers）、對外傳統外交講求的是實力，政治實力支配著對外發聲的力道，包括軍事優勢以及經濟脅迫。然而，政治實力的堅強不代表可以贏得他國的尊敬，因此美國在九一一事件之後更加的重視公眾外交，希望更多能夠藉由傾聽（listening）來自國外的聲音來消彌他國對美國的誤會。取向與內部開放（outward orientation and inward openness）、教育（education）、以及相關性（relevance），但本文僅選取其中屬於臺灣國家特質的。

¹¹ 中央社，尼爾森：手機市占率 HTC 第二，民國 100 年 12 月 29 日。

一名¹²，可見臺灣至少在「3C 產品」方面，的確有其競爭優勢。第三，教育（education），臺灣強調教育的文化根深蒂固，美國學者 Root 更將東亞（包括臺灣）的經濟奇蹟歸因於東亞國家傳統上對教育的重視。¹³

除了道德與價值觀、消費性產品以及教育之外，國家的「自由開放」程度同樣是吸引他國的特質，當一個國家越自由、越開放，那麼自然會吸引其他國家人民的歡迎。Leonard 以及 Alakeson（2000）所謂的「自由開放」程度包括了民主制度與政治（democratic institutions and politics）、媒體與資訊的提供者（media and information providers）、以及外部取向與內部開放（outward orientation and inward openness），其中民主制度與政治特質屬於政治自由，媒體與資訊的提供者視為媒體自由，而外部取向與內部開放較偏向經濟自由的範疇。

根據自由之家（Freedom House）提供的數據（請參考圖一），¹⁴臺灣的政治與司法環境自 2002 年迄今皆不超過 10 分（分數愈低表示愈自由），均屬自由的程度，與歐美先進國家相比不遑多讓。臺灣的經濟自由則亦被評為 10 分以下（分數愈低表示愈自由）。當國家的經濟制度透明度達到一定程度，他國才較相信這樣的制度可以保障國際經濟活動所得的財產，因此臺灣的國際經貿環境在全世界各國之中亦屬良好。最後，媒體與資訊等的言論自由是民主的根基，臺灣不論在新聞媒體、網路傳播等流通上，均享有極大的自由。自由之家的數據顯示，臺灣新聞自由的指標在 2006 年之前，都是最佳的 0 分（分數愈低表示愈自由），雖然自 2007 後開始上升，但仍屬自由的範圍（0—30 分）。¹⁵因此，臺灣在這些領域的發展成就，均可在詳加規劃運用後，成為公眾外交的基底。


圖一 臺灣政治、經濟與媒體自由（2002 年～2011 年）

¹² 聯合報，宏碁 歐洲獲利將回神，民國 101 年 3 月 7 日。

¹³ Hilton L. Root. 2006. *Capital and Collusion: The Political Logic of Global Economies Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p. 82.

¹⁴ 資料來源：自由之家，請參考 <http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-press>

¹⁵ 2007 年開始向上的分數，主因在於政府加強了對媒體的制度規範，因此造成分數的上升，但由於措施主旨均非箝制媒體言論，因此臺灣的媒體仍屬自由。事實上，身為民主的模範國的美國，媒體自由也並非為 0，2011 年的指標為 17 分，因此，並非毫無管制就是民主。



註：司法環境指標由 0—30 分都屬自由的司法，自由的政治環境分數則是 0—40 分，分數越低代表該國司法與政治環境越自由。

除了政經社會的發展之外，以資訊便利而帶來的「感知權力」(perceptual power) 會影響他國政府與人民的意見，也是公眾外交得以施行且日益重要的原因之一。¹⁶

綜觀以上特質，臺灣已具備許多軟實力的特質，因此如何在以軟實力為主的公眾外交上多所著墨，應是臺灣未來外交工作的重點之一。大部分植基於軟實力的公眾外交，其目標是要呈現一個有關臺灣現在在哪裡、發展特色與優點為何、未來往何處去的精準圖像。這對任何一個國家來說，都是困難的挑戰，但對於臺灣來說更是難上加難，特別是在近期之內，因為目前中央政府和負責臺灣對外形象機構的正在進行組織改造。

II. 公眾外交的途徑

¹⁶ Ali S. Wyne. 2009. "Public Opinion and Power," in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor Eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. NY: Routledge.

公眾外交研究的困難有二，除了公眾外交的成效不易檢驗外，公眾外交也難以傳統的國際關係理論來解釋。儘管如此，許多學者仍對公眾外交提出了架構性的分析，本文將以其中一種途徑來解釋我國組織在公眾外交中所扮演的角色與功能。

英國學者 Mark Leonard (2002) 認為，若要從事公眾外交首先必須認清公眾外交的三個面向 (dimensions)，而這三個面向也有從幾「天」，到幾「年」不同長短政策上的反應時間：

- 資訊的管理 (news management)

資訊的管理簡而言之就是處理「每天」(day-to-day) 所發生的事件 (events) 或議題。國際社會每天發生的事件層出不窮，而當中的許多也無法預測，而政府組織實行公眾外交的主要對象在於他國的聽眾 (主要是人民)，因此在傳統外交的政策制訂之外，政府必須有一套對於每日可能突然發生的國際事件擬出回應的方案。這個面向的特性就是處理「突發」的事見，因此政府的反應 (reactive) 必須是即時的，同理可證，在這個面向的公眾外交所得到的反應與效果也是最快的。

- 戰略性的溝通 (strategic communications)

每個國家在外交政策制訂上都有自己的立場，但是在推廣公眾外交的過程中，政府組織必須能夠戰略性地融合國家的立場，才能有效地發揮公眾外交的功能。例如，不同的政府組織可以「主動」(proactive) 地制訂「議題」(news agenda)，在輔助的角色上傳達國家所想要表達以及影響他國人民的訊息。這種創造議題的方式有可能會喚起他國人民的注意，但是效果不會向第一個面向 (回應議題) 般的立竿見影，或許政策效果會隨著議題的緊急性有不同的反應時間，因此，可能少則幾週，多至數月才可見到政策的效果。

- 關係的建立 (relationship building)

第三個面向是這三個面向中耗時最久的，與重要的個體建立長久的關係，建立關係的手段不限，被動的反應國際事件，或是主動的創造議題都可以，主要的目的就是建立關係，不同的是，關係的建立不僅是傳達訊息而已，必須對國家長期的目標有所貢獻。Leonard 建議，建立長期關係最有效的方式在於需要長期計畫以及行政參與的學術計畫訪問，以及其他的交換計畫，這些不僅需要長期籌備，也索費不貲。因此，目的在於使他國人民能夠真正的瞭解我國的價值觀，是需要長期的時間投資的。


此外，Nicholas Cull (2008) 研究公眾外交的五大途徑也是廣泛為人引用的。他認為實施公眾外交有以下五種方式，也就是他所謂的途徑 (approaches)：¹⁷

第一是「傾聽」(Listening)。傾聽是公眾外交最基本的要素，因為無論任何政策實施之際，我們必須先瞭解與聆聽政策實施對象的聲音。而從事公眾外交時，負責的單位首要任務就是蒐集資料 (data)，也就是海對對該國的聲音，才能根據資料作後續策略的擬定，例如可針對海外民眾做民意調查 (polling)。第二是「倡議」(advocacy)。倡議基本上就是操作「國際環境」(international environment)，所以必須主動作「議題」的推廣與操作，重點在於控制輿論，雖然「傾聽」是公眾外交最基本的工作，但是創造議題是公眾外交裡最重要，也可謂是無所不在的工作，倡議的途徑端賴外交人員的對於議題的創造與反映能力，如果我們把 Cull 的此項途徑與 Leonard 的公眾外交的面向做結合，那麼倡議的途徑是具有短期效益的(short-term)，少至幾日內，多則數月會收到效果。第三是「文化外交」(culture diplomacy)。「文化外交」也可作為公眾外交的別稱。簡言之，「文化外交」就是以文化作為主要資源，進行對外的議題創造，讓他國人民以文化作為主要媒介來認識我國。第四是「交流外交」(exchange diplomacy)。與「文化外交」同樣地，在對外推廣的手段上採取以將國內人原送到國外的方式，以增進互相的瞭解與交流，以 Leonard 的觀點看來，這是最有效的公眾外交途徑。最後的途徑是「國際新聞報導」(international new broadcasting)，同樣地，國際新聞報導作為公眾外交的途徑，也就是透過國際的網路、廣播、電視、廣告等媒介途徑，以期增加國

¹⁷ Nicholas Cull. 2008. "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(1): 31-54.

外人民對我國的認識。因此，Cull 所提供的五大途徑，嚴格來說是以「傾聽」與「倡議」為兩大主軸，而「文化外交」、「交流外交」以及「國際新聞報導」都是「倡議」所執行方式（如圖二所示）。

圖二 公眾外交的五大途徑



因此，下節將先介紹臺灣有關單位對於公眾外交的貢獻，再以 Leonard 與 Cull 兩大學者對公眾外交的面像以及途徑作為架構分析之。

1) 臺灣的公眾外交

與美國等國家不同的是，臺灣並無一個專職機構負責統籌與執行公眾外交。美國在國務院內設有「公眾外交與公共事務次卿」(Undersecretary for Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs)，英國外交部下轄「公眾外交委員會」(Public Diplomacy Board, PDB)，以及挪威外交部有「公眾外交委員會」，¹⁸然而臺灣執行公眾外交似乎是根據各部會原本的職務而加以延伸，因此，研究臺灣政府的公眾外交無法以單一機構做為主體，任何相關的機構都是本文討論的對象。

根據中華民國憲法，國家中央組織為「一府五院」，即為總統(包括其幕僚)、以及行政院、立法院、司法院、考試院以及監察院，在中央機關下，又下轄不同等級的地方機關。本文所探討公眾外交之範圍，限縮在我國的中央機會對他國人民以不同的方式施以外交影響力，排除地方機關實施公眾外交的探討。另外，由

¹⁸ 卜正珉，頁 76, 80-82。

於五院分支機關眾多，本文也以業務與公眾外交最為相關的行政院，以及總統府作為研究的主要對象。以下首先討論總統府。

1. 總統府

根據中華民國憲法，「外交權」為總統諸項權力之一，因此，除了正式的外交管道之外，吾人在討論公眾外交之際，總統府仍然是必須納入的相關機構。雖然表面上總統為一國之尊，對外行為通常為總統與「他國總統」（或相同等級的國家元首），但憲法既然給予總統最高的「外交權」，因此，公眾外交的整體策略仍然是在總統府的指揮之下進行。例如，民國 96 年 10 月巴拉圭共和國總統杜華德伉儷訪問臺灣，由當時的總統陳水扁先生簽署的「中華民國（臺灣）巴拉圭共和國聯合公報」中闡明兩國合作事宜，包括了第十一項的「兩國總統承諾共同致力改善兩國在國際社會所塑造之形象，相互知會彼此在經濟、社會及人文方面之進展，同時規劃兩國內部採取之『公共外交』策略」¹⁹。這是總統在對外關係上對公眾外交推行的宣示。由此得知，總統府對於公眾外交有指導性的作用，雖然無實質的上的作為，但是在政策指導上卻居於指標性的作用。以其他國家為例，法國早在拿破崙總統時代便提倡公眾外交，認為這是戰爭之外的另一個重要戰場。

20

另外，馬英九總統自 2008 年當選以來，以國家元首為等級的外交又展開了一個新的面向：由總統夫人周美青女士代為出訪的「第一夫人」外交。「夫人外交」當然不是正式的外交途徑，但是藉由領導人夫人女性柔性的特質在非正式的權力政治之外，能夠開闢另一種是國家領導人不容易做到的外交面向，不失為公眾外交的一種。例如，周美青女士從 2008 年起經常帶領具有臺灣特色的團體以及臺灣各界的愛心出訪世界各國，進行種種文化以及人道關懷為主的交流，。例如，周美青女士曾擔任雲門舞集榮譽團長率隊多次出訪，包括義大利、華府、西

¹⁹ 請參考總統府網站公報查詢：

<http://www.president.gov.tw/Default.aspx?tabid=84&lctl=view&itemid=5812&ctid=95&q=>，（2012 年 4 月 2 日查詢）

²⁰ Michael Vlahos. 2009. "Public Diplomacy as Loss of World Authority," in in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor Eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. NY: Routledge, p. 27; 李翔宙。「中國大陸推動公共外交政策之分析」，*全球政治評論*，第 35 期，2011 年，66 頁。

班牙、加拿大以及俄羅斯等國²¹，與朱宗慶打擊樂團赴尼加拉瓜演出並客串打擊表演²²，赴美在洛杉磯道奇球場（Dodgers Stadium）開球、在洛杉磯與舊金山的中文學校為小朋友說故事²³，擔任明華園榮譽團長赴歐洲六國表演²⁴，擔任臺灣世界展望會愛心大使與中華民國紅十字會榮譽會長訪海地與多明尼加²⁵，擔任台北愛樂室內合唱團榮譽團長赴美巡演，²⁶為臺灣書院在美成立揭幕²⁷等。雖然總統府扮演公眾外交指導性的角色，但藉由「第一夫人」與他國藉由「柔性」議題的交流，也在實質上幫助了總統推廣公眾外交。

總統府參與公眾外交的角色正如卜正珉所言，「實務上要切割外交政策過程、區分傳統外交與公眾外交又是不可行的，因為公眾外交就是外交政策制訂過程的環節」²⁸，而以美國為例，白宮也是影響美國公眾外交政策與方向最重要的角色，²⁹總統府雖較多進行著「政府對政府」的外交活動，但卻是公眾外交政策的主要規劃與實踐者之一。

以 Leonard 以及 Cull 的架構來分析總統府在公眾外交的定位，總體而言，總統府以「關係建立」作為主要的目的，所以屬於長期的經營。然而，由於現任總統夫人周美青對於文藝活動的參與，讓總統府又多了一項「文化外交」以及「交流外交」的任務，由此可知，總統府在公眾外交的角色，屬於長期經營的角色。

2. 行政院

有鑑於組織繁雜以及因應國際變遷的趨勢，行政院自民國 98 年起開始陸續進行「組織改造」的行政程序，從行政院現行的 37 個中央二級機關，縮減為未來的 29 個，調整為 14 部、8 會 3 獨立機關、1 行、1 院、2 總處。³⁰本文也將檢討

²¹ 雲門舞集網站：雲門消息。<http://www.cloudgate.org.tw/cg/cgnews/news.php?id=1178>；

<http://www.cloudgate.org.tw/cg/cgnews/news.php?id=1184>（2012 年 4 月 2 日瀏覽）。

²² 中央社新聞，「周美青與朱宗慶打擊樂團在尼國表演造成轟動」，2009 年 7 月 5 日。

²³ 中央社新聞，「挺體育愛藝文 周美青展軟實力」，2011 年 9 月 14 日。

²⁴ 中央社新聞，「率明華園歐洲巡演 周美青返台」，2010 年 10 月 16 日。

²⁵ 中央社新聞，「關懷之旅 周美青返國精神愉悅」，2010 年 9 月 7 日。

²⁶ 中央社新聞，「周美青將赴美 率愛樂合唱巡演」，2011 年 3 月 3 日。

²⁷ 中央社新聞，「臺灣書院成立 周美青紐約揭幕」，2011 年 10 月 14 日。

²⁸ 卜正珉，頁 70。

²⁹ 卜正珉，頁 70。

³⁰ 資料來源：行政院組織再造網頁，<http://www.rdec.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=4151901&ctNode=11593&mp=14>

在未來「組織改造」後的中央政府對於公眾外交推廣的影響。本文以外交部、國防部、教育部、經濟部、僑務委員會、文化部及已裁撤的行政院新聞局為主要討論標的，並將外交部置於最後，因為外交部所扮演的公眾外交功能最為顯著及重要。

1) 國防部

國防部一般不進行外交活動，在形象上與「軟實力」便相異其趣。但是，國防部轄下的單位在公眾外交領域，的確做了些許的貢獻。我們以倡議的三種途徑來檢視國防部是否具備公眾外交的功能：

國防部雖然不具備「文化外交」的特質，然而，我國在科技以及專業技術上的成就確有顯著的成就，因此，在國際交流方面，國防部的確可作為公眾外交重要的環節。首先，臺灣的醫療技術世界聞名，隸屬於國防部的國防醫學院再推動以醫療作為傳遞我國形象的外交方面不遺餘力，以國軍在醫療方面的專長參與我國援外的項目。例如，我國位在西非的邦交國家布吉納法索（Burkina Faso），由於國家貧窮，醫療品質低落，我國除了有退休軍醫在當地擔任醫療工作外，在國防部長高華柱要求下，三軍總醫院（隸屬於國防醫學院下）為布國提供了「遠距離醫療」服務，除了在當地的軍醫親自看診外，並藉由現代科技進行與三軍總醫院內不同的專科醫師共同遠距離會診。³¹再者，國防部下設「遠朋高階複訓班」（簡稱遠朋班），早期目的在訓練國外高階人才的反共運動，但隨著時代轉變，目前為代訓國外友邦的政經人才。雖然主要對象是友邦的高階軍官，但隨著知識的傳播與交流，我國在專業知識上的聲譽經過國際交流也達到傳播至國外人民的效果。

除了國際交流之外，國防部下設的漢聲廣播電台從事國際新聞傳播的責任。從早期進行對內的廣播，到近年來逐漸將廣播對象轉為對岸人民，以促進兩岸和平相處為要旨。例如，我國前總統陳水扁先生在 2002 年 6 月 1 日漢聲廣播電台六十週年台慶時接受該台訪問，特意呼籲海峽兩岸的人民能夠和睦相處，追求和平。因此，漢聲廣播電台不僅是臺灣對內的國家發聲機器，也在對外（主要是大

³¹ 聯合晚報，「退伍醫官黃其麟，行腳非洲 20 年」，2012 年 3 月 17 日。

陸區民) 宣揚臺灣的民主價值與社會繁榮。³²對中國大陸人民的宣傳也是公眾外交的一種，以公眾外交的手段能改變敵對國家(中國)人民對我方的態度，屬於以「競爭式」(competitive)的途徑實施公眾外交。³³

從體制而言，國防部，其所屬單位與涉外事務較相關的包括戰略規劃司、整合評估司、國防採購室、情報參謀次長室、軍事情報局和駐外武官，主要聚焦於軍事外交與情報及人員交流。在公眾外交方面，國防部最適合的單位是總政治作戰局，但卻僅有對內文宣政戰等等的功能，並未發展至對國外的層次，也因而未與外交部相關單位有適切的互動。

國防部雖然是屬於執行國家「硬實力」的單位，但是從下屬的單位業務範圍觀察，在「交流」以及「國際傳播」的途徑上上，仍然可以軟實力來幫助我國推廣公眾外交。

2) 教育部

教育部在公眾外交的推廣方面以「獎學金」計畫最為有效，以學術交流為方式促進他國人民的瞭解。與 Cull 所提出的「交流外交」不同的是，Cull 認為的「交流外交」是單方面的(one-way)以促進「相互」的瞭解，也就是派駐我國人員，向海外的人民做推銷我國的計畫。然而，以獎學金為激勵的學術交流不同的事，吸引他國人民來到我國從事學術交流，在從旅居我國的過程中瞭解我國，而達到在最終歸國時能夠對我國的形象進行正面的推廣，以及對我國文化與科技獲其他方面的認同。目前國內已經有些許研究，發現以「獎學金」作為公眾外交的手段的確會有顯著的效果。³⁴

首先，教育部在海外共 18 個國家設有文化代表處³⁵，在「傾聽」的功能上，教育部為臺灣的海外學術交流活動蒐集資料。而行政院在 2004 年開始籌備的「臺灣獎學金計畫」，雖然負責單位不僅有教育部，還包括了外交部、經濟部與國科

³² 中央社，「陳總統接受漢聲電台訪問希望兩岸加強交流」，2002 年 6 月 1 日。

³³ 卜正珉，頁 50。

³⁴ 賴淑慧，《公眾外交運用之研究—以歐洲聯盟「伊拉斯莫斯世界」獎學金為例》(台北：國立政治大學歐洲語文學程在職專班碩士論文，2006 年)；周容卉，《臺灣公眾外交的策略與實踐：以臺灣獎學金計畫為例》(台北：國立政治大學外交學系碩士論文，2012 年)。

³⁵ 駐外單位包括了在美國、加拿大、巴拉圭、英國、法國、歐盟兼比利時、德國、奧地利、波蘭、瑞典、日本、印度、韓國、泰國、越南、馬來西亞、俄羅斯以及澳大利亞等 18 國，請參考教育部網頁：http://www.edu.tw/BICER/content.aspx?site_content_sn=13047 (2012 年 4 月 16 日進入)。

會共同參與，希望吸引國際間對中華文化，以及在臺灣特有的繁體字中文有興趣的學生前來。「臺灣獎學金計畫」有兩大項：「臺灣獎學金」與「華語文獎學金」，而負責單位以外交部（外交部臺灣獎學金）與教育部（教育部臺灣獎學金）最主要，提供國外對華語以及中華文化有興趣的學生來台學習。³⁶

根據美國新聞總署（United States Information Agency, USIA）對美國公眾外交成效所做的問卷發現，交流計畫（exchange programs）的效果在美國各項公眾外交的執行方式中最為顯著（其他政策成效請參考表一）。³⁷同樣地，Leonard 的研究也認為，學術交流計畫的成效最好，³⁸由此得知，教育部的交流業務若能妥為執行，將會在「交流外交」這方面的的貢獻非常顯著。

在蒐集資訊方面，我駐外各館處亦能提供公眾外交的聆聽功能，此外，故宮文物的展出也為公眾外交提供了寶貴的文化資源。簡而言之，教育部的公眾外交成效雖均屬長期性的，卻是非常廣泛。

從體制而言，教育部最主要的相對應設計就是國際及兩岸教育司，以及高等教育司、技術及職業教育司，改組後解散的行政院青年輔導委員會青年國際交流業務則交由教育部轄下新設的青年發展署負責。在推動交流方面，教育部著力甚深，但似並未與其他相關部會多所協調。

此外，教育部與外交部合作執行臺灣獎學金、華語獎學金計畫（特設獎學金），並另外執行專供外籍生的普通獎學金（Common Scholarships）計畫，但與外交部的協調充其量不過是以名額分配為主，非常可惜。

表一³⁹ 美國公眾外交成效民調*

政策	平均分數**
Exchange programs	4.85
Educational exchange, e.g. Fulbright, American Studies	4.85
Face-to-face interaction with local publics	4.84
International visitors programs	4.81
Dialogue with political elites and other opinion leaders	4.67

³⁶ 詳情請見「臺灣獎學金作業要點」，<http://english.moe.gov.tw/public/Attachment/7829910971.pdf>

³⁷ Kathy R.Fitzpatrick. 2010. *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Mautinus Nijhoff Publishers, pp. 147-149.

³⁸ Mark Leonard, pp. 20-21.

³⁹ 此表為調查「美國」公眾外交成效，為了避免翻譯過程中對美國特有政策的誤會，因此，作者刻意保留原文。

U.S. government libraries	4.54
Media relations	4.46
Speaker programs	4.35
International broadcasting	4.22
Performing arts	4.18
Interviews with U.S. officials by the foreign media	4.11
Cultural exhibits	3.95
U.S. government publications, i.e. magazines, brochures, etc.	3.88
Wireless file	3.81
Technical and development assistance	3.80
Editorials, op-eds in local media	3.78
Documentaries and films	3.64
Internet sites	3.61
American corners	3.52
Democracies initiatives	3.36
Psychological warfare	2.26
Disinformation campaigns	2.15
Paid advertisements in national/local media	1.19

*樣本數：213 份。

**平均分數：調查「有效性」的給分採累進指標，1 代表「沒有效果」，最高 5 分代表「非常有效。」

3) 經濟部

雖然經濟部的業務主旨為促進我國的經濟發展以滿足全國人民福祉，然而，我國以貿易立國的情況之下，經濟部同樣為重要的涉外單位之一，於海外 51 個國家設有駐外據點，⁴⁰也因此具備「聆聽」的功能。行政院組織改造將調整該部的部分核心職務，將具市場機能及地方特色之業務委外或下授，並可能調整該部名稱，但迄今仍未定案。

當臺灣自有品牌在國際間也廣受好評，臺灣品牌已成功提昇我國的國際知名度時，經濟部也努力地向其他的國際企業行銷與推廣臺灣的投資環境，將臺灣穩定的政治環境與友善、具有前景的經濟環境向國際社會傳達。除了「聆聽」之外，經濟部在「倡議」這部分也做出巨大的貢獻，除了經濟部設有「投資臺灣」(Invest in Taiwan) 網站，經由網路科技推廣臺灣投資環境外，經濟部也定期在海外舉辦

⁴⁰ 經濟部的海外據點包括香港、泰國、日本、韓國、菲律賓、馬來西亞、吉隆坡、新加坡、紐西蘭、越南、印尼、印度、澳洲、美國、巴拉圭、薩爾瓦多、加拿大、哥倫比亞、巴拿馬、宏都拉斯、巴西、墨西哥、尼加拉瓜、阿根廷、智利、秘魯、瓜地馬拉、多明尼加、芬蘭、比利時、法國、斯洛伐克、俄羅斯、奧地利、德國、瑞士、匈牙利、波蘭、土耳其、英國、捷克、希臘、荷蘭、丹麥、義大利、瑞典、以色列、沙烏地阿拉伯、約旦史瓦濟蘭、象牙海岸，以及南非共和國，資料來源：<http://www.trade.gov.tw/Pages/List.aspx?nodeID=34>。

招商說明大會，大會包括在新加坡（2010年）、印度（2011年）、美國（2011年）以及日本（2011年）。而2011年有荷蘭商愛司摩爾（ASML）、DSM工程塑膠、美商3M等來台投資，⁴¹安鈦生技在臺灣設立總部、⁴²以及許多國際企業在臺灣設立研發中心。⁴³

此外，2010年6月，經濟部受命組成「台灣美食國際化推動小組」，由常務次長擔任召集人，當時外交部、農委會、衛生署、僑委會、交通部、文建會、原民會、客委會、勞委會、教育部均派代表出席。這可謂是「美食外交」（Gastro Diplomacy）的首次跨部會任務編組。

總體而言，經濟部以「國際新聞傳播」，以及「交流外交」的方式達到公眾外交的目的。經濟部設有「投資臺灣」（Invest in Taiwan）網站⁴⁴，介紹臺灣的環境，也列舉了目前所達成之成就，經建會主委以多次出訪參加招商大會，以期吸引國外企業的投資。作者認為，經濟部所做的公眾外交有兩大特色：第一，經濟部所推廣的公眾外交，不僅為我國增加能見度與提昇國際地位外，吸引國外廠商投資亦可以促進我國經濟成長，更增添另一種實質上的成效。第二，公眾外交的成效往往難以測量，但是經濟部努力的推銷臺灣的投資環境，是可以被量化的指標，例如國外直接投資（Foreign Direct Investment, FDI）的金額，是反應國外廠商對臺灣經濟環境最直接的反饋。

從體制而言，經濟部的國際貿易局與駐外單位，加上在臺灣的中華民國對外貿易發展協會，成為臺灣對外招商及行銷產品的主要力量，但有時該部與外交部在相關涉外政策上均仍有本位主義，雙方駐外人員交流與協調亦未臻理想，耗損了一些推動政策的能量。

4) 僑務委員會

僑務委員會（簡稱僑委會）主要負責我國海外僑民事務，然而卻不僅限於服務僑民，業務也包括許多推廣我國文化以及經貿發展等重要角色。僑委會與僑民外交息息相關，在政策上「協助行銷臺灣，使台灣與國際主流社會接軌」，在「大

⁴¹ http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/matter/show_chn.jsp?ID=432&MID=5

⁴² http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/matter/show_chn.jsp?ID=5159&MID=5

⁴³ http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/matter/show_chn.jsp?ID=433&MID=5

⁴⁴ http://investtaiwan.nat.gov.tw/library/main_chn_general.jsp

僑社」的理念下，經營友我的海外僑社，深化僑商與我國的互動，並推動海外華語文及僑教，吸引更多華裔學子來臺。由於與我息息相關之海外僑社均位於國際大都市，而在若干國家的僑務工作確實也對該國培養友我人士有所助益，因此一般而言，一個與外交部充分協調的僑委會將是公眾外交極重要的推手。

在傾聽海外聲音方面，僑委會同樣也設有駐外單位於 21 國。⁴⁵除了傾聽的角色及服務海外僑民外，僑委會對外政策作者總歸為三大類：第一，推動海外華語教育以及我國文化的推廣。僑委會利用數位科技推廣全球華文教育，例如設立「全球華文網」⁴⁶、配合文建會所籌辦的「臺灣書院」運作與推廣等，配合辦理「文化外交」。第二，招商。我國主要招商的任務仍然是經濟部的職權，但是僑委會吸引僑民回國投資也是同樣地責無旁貸，例如配合政府的產業政策辦理僑界產業界回國研習以及參訪等。⁴⁷第三，國際傳播。在國際傳播方面，僑委會設立了「宏觀電視網」，在全球亞洲、歐洲、美洲、非洲以及澳洲等地區的部分國家都可觀看，⁴⁸除了提供僑胞我國資訊外，除了吸引了中文聽眾之外的外國人民觀看。

雖然僑委會整體而言的定位在於服務海外僑胞，但以 Cull 的公眾外交的五大途徑，僑委會至少滿足了傾聽海外人民，以及以「文化外交」、「國際傳播」以及「交流外交」等政策，促進了我國的公眾外交。

⁴⁵ 僑委會海外設置業務單位的國家包括美國、加拿大、馬來西亞、菲律賓、日本、泰國、印尼、越南、韓國、德國、法國、荷蘭、英國、紐西蘭、澳洲、巴西、巴拿馬、巴拉圭、多明尼加、阿根廷以及南非等 21 國，請見僑委會網頁

<http://www.ocac.gov.tw/service/service.asp?no=542&level=B> (2012 年 4 月 20 日)。

⁴⁶ 「全球華文網」，以數位科技突破學習的地理疆界，請參考 <http://www.huayuworld.org/>。

⁴⁷ 關於僑委會在僑界招商的成效，請參考僑委會網頁

<http://www.ocac.gov.tw/public/public.asp?selno=9559&no=9559> (2012 年 4 月 20 日)。

⁴⁸ 包括香港、中國、越南、日本、韓國、汶萊、柬埔寨、印尼、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡、泰國、印度、阿爾巴尼亞、安道爾、奧地利、亞塞拜然、比利時、白俄羅斯、保加利亞、克羅埃西亞共和國、賽普勒斯、捷克共和國、埃及、愛沙尼亞、芬蘭、法國、喬治亞共和國、德國、希臘、匈牙利、愛爾蘭、義大利、拉脫維亞、黎巴嫩、立陶宛、盧森堡、馬其頓、馬爾他、摩爾達維亞、荷蘭、挪威、波蘭、葡萄牙、羅馬尼亞、俄羅斯、斯洛伐克、斯洛維尼亞共和國、西班牙、瑞典、土耳其、烏克蘭、英國、南斯拉夫、加拿列群島、賴索托、以色列、約旦、哈薩克、科威特、摩洛哥、莫三比克、阿曼、卡達、沙烏地阿拉伯、南非共和國、史瓦濟蘭、突尼西亞、土庫曼、阿拉伯聯合大公國、葉門、美國、加拿大、阿根廷、百慕達、玻利維亞、巴西、哥倫比亞、古巴、智利、薩爾瓦多、瓜地馬拉、海地、宏都拉斯、牙買加、墨西哥、尼加拉瓜、巴拉圭、秘魯、波多黎各、多明尼加、烏拉圭、委內瑞拉、以及澳洲等國家都可透過衛星收視「宏觀衛視」，請參考宏觀衛視網頁：<http://www.pts.org.tw/macrovie/> (2012 年 8 月 20 日)。

5) 文化部（前身為文化建設委員會）

文化部的前身文化建設委員會最初設立的初衷是建設與發展我國文化與藝術的政體策略，而目前全球正掀起一波漢學熱，臺灣身為正統中華文化的一支，保留與傳承中華文化更是責無旁貸，在馬總統文化政策的緣起下，文建會現已改為文化部，負責「臺灣學院」的建立與發展，具體政策包括第一，設置「臺灣書院」數位資訊整合平台，以服務全球網路使用者；第二，華語文教學及正體字推廣；第三、活絡臺灣研究及漢學研究並擴展其成果；第四、辦理「臺灣書院」獎助學金；第五，向世界介紹多元精緻的臺灣文化；第六，設立「臺灣書院」據點及聯絡點。⁴⁹文建會主要的任務是幫助臺灣的「文化外交」，但其所提出的「臺灣書院獎學金」也達到「交流外交」的重要任務。

此外，文化部的對外（國）藝文策展亦可被視為我國公眾外交的工具之一，而且包括明華園、優人神鼓等團體赴國外展演，或者協助國內藝術家參與法國安古蘭國際漫畫節（Angoulême International Comics Festival）、協助國內電影界參與國際重要影展等工作，往往締造良好口碑，使臺灣從文化的視角上更為外國人士所知悉。

從體制而言，文化部主要是由文化交流司負責涉外事務，輔以位於紐約、巴黎及東京的文化中心，以及目前在紐約、休士頓、洛杉磯設置的臺灣書院（Taiwan Academy）。我國的文化外交也常藉助外交部（包含改組前的新聞局）之助，在業務上相互分工、協助，但在政策上似少有聯繫。

6) 行政院新聞局

新聞局最早成立的要旨就不僅限於國內的廣電業務，更包括了國際宣傳，⁵⁰目的在於推動兩國間新聞、文化、觀光乃至於一般國情資訊之傳播與交流，以增

⁴⁹ 請參考文建會「臺灣書院」網頁，<http://taiwanacademy.tw/ch/about/about.jsp>（2012年8月20日）。

⁵⁰ 中華民國新聞局在民國36年於南京正式成立，下設三業務處：分別掌理國內宣導、國際宣導、傳播業輔導以及新聞分析事項，請參考新聞局網頁 <http://info.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xitem=11677&CtNode=4681&mp=1>（2012年4月20日）。

進兩國政府與人民之認識與瞭解，⁵¹並負責我國國際文宣的宣傳主軸。臺灣許多參與國際的政策或許不是新聞局所擬定，但是在對外廣告上，新聞局卻是最主要的角色，包括製作廣告至海外放送。而外國人民對臺灣（正式）的瞭解，新聞局也是重要的窗口。因此，不難瞭解以 Cull 的途徑說，新聞局在「國際傳播」議題的倡議，可謂是我國公眾外交的專門組織。

此外，新聞局也有駐外單位，涵蓋五大洲共 40 個國家，⁵²因此，在隨時瞭解國際情勢回應的強況下，新聞局同樣也扮演了「聆聽」的功能。然而因我國的行政院組織改造政策，民國 101 年 5 月起成立的文化部將會取代新聞局文化與國內傳播等部分的業務，「聆聽」與「國際傳播」的業務都移轉至外交部的業務範圍，並另設「國際傳播司」。

7) 外交部

外交部是傳統外交的主要負責單位，在公眾外交日漸興起的同時，外交部也參與或者會同其他政府部會共同合辦公眾外交。外交部的業務涵蓋範圍廣泛的「設外」事務，在行政院組織改造後成立任務編組形式的公眾外交協調會，下設執行長一人並兼發言人。為了能夠清楚的瞭解外交部在公眾外交所執行的功能，作者仍沿襲 Cull 的分析架構，解析外交部在公眾外交中的地位。第一，「聆聽」，外交部駐外單位是我國駐外最主要的單位，除了 28 個邦交國外，高達 80 個國家設有我國外交部的駐外單位（含邦交國），⁵³在無論是瞭解國外官方單位，亦或者是國外智庫、大學、民間組織的聲音，外交部都具有此項功能。第二，「倡議」。倡議又可分三種途徑達到製造議題的效果：交流、文化以及國際傳播。在「國際傳播」方面，目前我國對外國際宣傳的重責大任屬於新聞局，外交部有此項業務，但是屬於輔助性質。在部會改造之後，外交部將負起「國際傳播」的主要業務。

⁵¹ 資料來源：新聞局網頁 <http://info.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=46128&CtNode=4710&mp=1>（2012 年 4 月 20 日）。

⁵² 新聞局駐外單位包括於美國、加拿大、瓜地馬拉、多明尼加、巴拿馬、秘魯、尼加拉瓜、薩爾瓦多、宏都拉斯、巴西、阿根廷、智利、墨西哥、巴拉圭、義大利、法國、德國、英國、荷蘭、丹麥、西班牙、奧地利、比利時、匈牙利、捷克、波蘭、瑞典、南非、菲律賓、泰國、日本、俄羅斯、澳洲、韓國、印尼、以色列、馬來西亞、新加坡、紐西蘭，以及印度等 40 個國家，請參考新聞局網頁：<http://www.gio.gov.tw/ct.asp?xItem=32028&CtNode=2400&mp=807>（2012 年 4 月 21 日）。

⁵³ 同註 7。

在「文化外交」方面，外交部基本是「文化外交」的規劃與實踐者之一，我國任何以「文化」為資源的出訪，外交部更須參與。例如總統夫人周美青女士多次擔任榮譽團長出訪國外，外交部都偕同辦理。

而在交流方面，若以最有效的學術交流為例，外交部與教育部以及國科會合作，提供多種國外學生（人）來台的獎學金，包括臺灣獎助學金（TAFS）、外交部華語文獎學金、外交部臺灣獎學金、外交部臺灣獎助金，以及外交部鼓勵研究臺灣參與東亞經濟整合獎學金等，⁵⁴因此，在「交流外交」方面，外交部在與國外民間的互動，也不亞於官方對官方的熱絡。再者，除了獎學金的學術交流外，外交部積極培養國際人才，並派至海外教育或受訓，例如與公視合作「外交小尖兵」⁵⁵，以及國際青年大使等的交流計畫⁵⁶，向國外人民宣示我國在外交困境中絕不放棄的精神。最後，臺灣於民國 48 年成立「農業技術團」，以我國特有先進的農業技術推廣至海外，此項計畫特別的是，不僅當地政府因我國幫助而更加鞏固兩國邦誼，更重要的是，臺灣印象卻更深入了當地人民的心中。然而，在考慮到技術團的世代交替，外交部自民國 85 年開始規劃「海外合作役」，並在內政部的協同幫助下，於 89 年改善為「外交替代役」，將技術團與我國兵役制度結合，將具有專門技術的我國青年人才送至友邦服務當地。⁵⁷

簡而言之，外交部的業務範圍非常多元，即便不主導以不同資源進行的公眾外交，卻仍以偕同辦理的角色促進我國的公眾外交。而由以上多種角色看來，外交部在「交流計畫」上著墨甚多，這也不難瞭解，因為交流計畫在公眾外交中，是被認為最具成效的。當國際傳播司在外交部開始運作後，該司與公眾外交協調會均將由司長級官員主政；另由制度和傳統而言，外交部政務或常務次長將會督導這些單位，而這些次長未必會是同一人。國際傳播司現由前新聞局官員主政，而公眾外交協調會則交由於去年 9 月改組的外交部新聞文化司官員來主持。

⁵⁴ 詳情請參見外交部網頁，

<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Home/RelatedLink/?opno=b4e67302-74aa-45fd-aa22-c09f78b5caa6> (2012 年 4 月 21 日)

⁵⁵ 請參考「外交小尖兵網站」：<http://mofa.pts.org.tw/>。

⁵⁶ 請參考外交部「國際青年大使交流計畫」網頁：

<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Official/Home/SubTitle/?opno=64292afb-8ee8-49c6-819e-dfd7efc86773>。

⁵⁷ 請參考「外交替代役男」網頁：

<http://www.mofa.gov.tw/Soldier/Introduction/Index/?opno=4717c1fe-5c2f-4c57-aafc-66007002a01b>

III) 行政院組織整併與我國的公眾外交

有鑑於我國中央組織繁雜，部分功能重疊與缺乏效率，又為了因應國際情勢變遷，我國在民國 98 年陸續開始了組織改造的籌備工作，於民國 99 年 1 月，立法院三讀完成行政院組織改造法案。也因此，作者上述的中央部會執行公眾外交的角色，在「組織改造」於民國 101 年 1 月起慢慢開始轉變。政府官員對我國公眾外交的基本態度與回應，發出問卷三百餘份，回收率約六成，部分的結果將於本文中引用，詳細之分析將於另文交代之。

再者，吾人不難觀察到公眾外交相關組織任務的重疊。比較大的變動包括：第一，教育部的擴張。上述教育部的公眾外交途徑包括「傾聽」（駐外單位）以及「倡議」當中的「交流外交」（學術交流與獎學金）。未來教育部除了增加現有行政院青年輔導委員會（簡稱青輔會）以及行政院體育委員會（簡稱體委會）的業務外，部分的業務將拆開分至新成立的文化部。第二，文化部的成立和新聞局的裁併。文化部是行政院組織改造後合併現今數個單位組織而綜合成立的新單位，例如合併了「文化外交」最重要的文化建設委員會，以及承接了部分新聞局對內（國內）的業務，而新聞局對外的宣傳任務（包括有關國際傳播整體規劃及駐外業務），則回歸到傳統的外交負責單位外交部。

這次的改變或許讓人想起美國新聞總署和國務院合併的例子。那次的合併是根據外交事務改革與調整法案（1998 年），和統一緊急追加撥款綜合法案（1999 年）而來。美國新聞總署普遍被視為美國公眾外交的關鍵機關。在 1999 年之後，美國新聞總署的任務大幅地和國務院的國際新聞計畫局、教育與文化事務局整合，此二單位都受公眾外交和公眾事務次卿（等於是常務次長）的督導。此次整合的支持者主張，這次的整合將在公眾外交的領域中帶來更高的政策整合。反對者則認為在冷戰結束後，公眾外交便遭到政府的忽視，導致美國新聞總署官員的士氣低落，且美國新聞總署的既有業務由於國務院對外交政策的執行有不同看法而不被重視。換言之，問題不在於結構，而在於資源和權威的分配。

因此，吾人可以合理的預期，臺灣主要公眾外交機關的整合也會產生類似美國經歷過的問題，或是任何政府機構整合所碰到的問題。如果這樣一個重大改變，在過程中完全沒有遇到任何明顯的困難，才是令人驚訝的事。

公眾外交有五個基本方法，即：傾聽、倡議、交流計畫、文化外交與國際廣

播。在實作上，新聞局極注重國際廣播和倡議，方法則是透過實體與電子的雜誌和時事通訊，和一些社會媒體。新聞局的國際交流計畫一直以來多侷限於外國記者、專家或教授。外交部則透過官方和非官方管道，花較多心力在交流外交上。新聞局與外交部都宣稱在文化外交上有功，但事實上還有一段很長的路要走，必須要有正確設計的公眾外交計畫，而不是一次性的活動。傾聽則似乎是新聞局或是外交部都很少運用的公眾外交策略。臺灣的公眾外交計畫仍會嚴重的受到這些問題的阻礙，即便這次合併案將新聞局和公眾外交有關的任務、人力與資源全都移至外交部的指揮之下。因為公眾外交最主要的政府單位還是外交部，因此外交部的組織調整勢必成為本文的重點。

首先，整合兩個具有共同但有差異的核心任務的組織，將受到官僚體系的挑戰。新聞局執行的是國際新聞和海外傳播業務，與外交部的核心任務（與他國政府的多面向傳統外交）不同。合併後若無有效的任務整合機制與策略計畫及協調，官員在實現這些目標時，可能會在辨認政策目標與宣傳口徑一致上更感壓力。

第二，從李登輝前總統最後一任的任期開始，新聞局在十七年內換了十六個首長，這樣不斷的首長人事更迭，嚴重的影響新聞局的一致性、減低其影響力，並在某種程度上削弱其在國際領域上的行動力。這使得新聞局官員與其既有的目標及計畫，在併入外交部時可能產生劣勢。如果他們仍想保有以往的作法及資源，甚至有時像以前一樣想要主導相關事務的結果，新聞局官員可能會面對一場艱難的挑戰。

所有公眾外交的計畫，無論過去是新聞局還是外交部所執行，都將會置於外交部其中一位次長的督導之下，而他不一定了解公眾外交的本質和運作。因為缺乏替新聞局發聲的關鍵人物（通常為部長級的新聞局局長，替新聞局所偏好的公眾外交計畫和執行方案說話），所以吾人無法確定，具新聞局觀點與專業的官員是否仍有影響力。外交部新設的國際傳播司（包含了前任的新聞局官員，且將會負責國際新聞和傳播計畫）是否能在沒有過多的高層官僚干預下，完成一己的任務，對於臺灣的公眾外交將會非常關鍵。

第三，嘗試整合兩群擁有不同工作文化的官僚，將會存在許多人事（性）的挑戰。儘管新聞局的國際新聞與傳播人員和外交部人員類似，平常多半在與外國人打交道，但從他們不同的任務與目標所反映出來的是，他們在工作文化上仍可

能存在極大的不同。一般相信，比起外交部，新聞局比較不拘泥於形式，形成決策時較少層層節制，在工作上則比較鼓勵創意。因此，吾人可以理解何在整併過程中，新聞局官員的士氣與動力可能會遭到衝擊，必須妥為處理。一個讓新聞局國際新聞與傳播得以「軟著陸」的計畫，將有助於培養一個正面且可繼續推動整合這兩個機關公眾外交業務的環境。

最後，臺灣目前對於公眾外交的知識和體認尚不足以發展、執行一個更現代且整合的公眾外交計畫。在本職訓練上，大部分的新聞局和外交部官員並不具備適當的公眾外交能力與技巧，但這些能力與技巧和公眾關係卻密切相關，諸如：品牌/行銷、跨文化傳播和社會媒體（social media）。這就是因為政府尚未提供夠一個密集且有系統的訓練來栽培這些「新公眾外交官」。

行政院組織再造後，政府對於公眾外交的重視似乎在體制上做出了些許反應，但亦有論者認為新聞局國際新聞業務併入外交部是組織調整上的僵化限制及內政考慮的結果，亦即組織再造規定了每個部僅能有8個司、6個處，行政院整體將由37個內閣層級的單位縮減為29個，所以新聞局只好走入歷史。

除了外交部與新聞局的合併之外，其他中央部會的組織改造對於我國當前的公眾外交並未有助益。無論是從組織面、資源面還是政策面觀之，我國的公眾外交工作尚未獲得重新梳理的機會，因此公眾外交對我國雖然重要，但政府對其重視的程度似仍遠遜於傳統外交以及與傳統外交相關的業務。前述的各部會下屬單位或多或少從事公眾外交的工作，但少見橫向的政策聯繫與協調，最常見的僅是公務執行層面的協助。當公眾外交對臺灣日形重要而政府資源有限時，橫向政策的聯繫與協調方能有效調整政策作為並集中各項資源，成功推動公眾外交。

III. 結論

馬英九總統曾在其第一任期之初，也就是 2008 年時，宣示臺灣將在「活路外交」政策下，對中國大陸進行「外交休兵」，雙方不再爭奪對方的邦交國，以和緩兩岸關係。因此，公眾外交可以是比與對岸競爭正式外交關係或具衝突性的「烽火外交」更有效的措施。於這樣的氛圍之下，我國可以透過成功的公眾外交

增進許多國家民眾對於臺灣的了解，因而對臺灣產生善意，而非花費財務資源、政治資本和透過促進發展提議來吸引外國政府。例如臺灣可以強調本身對於正統中華文化的保存和國家的發展成就，也可以和許多國家公民社會的意見交換。如此不但可以節省資源，還能夠避免創造與升高新的外交衝突，造成區域或世界不穩定。

大部分植基於軟實力的公眾外交，其目標是要呈現一個有關臺灣現在在哪裡、未來往何處去的精準圖像。這對任何一個國家來說，都是困難的挑戰，但對於臺灣來說更是難上加難。臺灣囿於現實國力以及兩岸、外交關係之考量，必須「以柔克剛」，因此軟實力的提升與運用成為朝野的基本共識。在外交上，臺灣雖然可以軟、硬實力靈活運用，但目前的政策作為似乎已很明顯的以軟實力的發揮為主。馬總統近年來一直強調，台灣應成為和平締造者、人道援助者、文化交流推動者、新科技及商機創造者、中華文化領航者，讓臺灣成為受人尊敬、讓人感動的國家，其實均著眼於臺灣軟實力的發揮與昇華，以形塑更多外交上的有利環境。因此，我政府不僅在資源的配置上必須重新調整，在此之前，各相關部會於行政院組織再造後所呈現的架構以及所須執行的政策目標，更是影響政策成敗的重要關鍵。沒有架構配置得宜的政府組織以及分工又協調的政策目標，我國強調軟實力的公眾外交將難在缺乏跨部會協調一致的支持之下得以發揮。

因為與其他國家執行正式外交關係上受到限制，公眾外交對於臺灣更是重要。有效的公眾外交將會幫助臺灣找到更多有價值的機會，而這些機會將同時促進並使馬政府的「活路外交」政策更為多元。有了整合較佳的公眾外交計畫，臺灣將能夠打響自己的國家品牌，讓目標國的受眾能夠更了解並更接受臺灣。因此，創造一個能達成上述目標的適當組織架構非常急迫且重要。

一旦新聞局的國際業務開始與外交部整併時產生嚴重問題的話，無論這些後果是既存的或是正在浮現的，對於我國的公眾外交工作都是一大挫傷。外交部將必須與僑委會、教育部、新設的文化部及其他組織合作，以在世界舞台上適當的啟動公眾外交政策。重新配置和再造外交部的公眾外交計畫，將會是外交部最近的迫切任務之一。否則，僅僅在體制上將新聞局的國際新聞與傳播業務整併進外交部，對臺灣的公眾外交並非有益。

由前述可知，從公眾外交的角度觀之，行政院的組織再造讓原新聞局多數的

國際傳播人員移入了外交部，外交部成立了一個任務編組型的公眾外交協調會，事實上並未特別有助於我國公眾外交的推動。

至於其他部會的相關單位，在行政院組織再造後似並未有針對公眾外交協調事務的設計。依照官僚組織文化的運作原則，教育部、文化部、僑委會、經濟部與國防部在公眾外交範疇內雖也責無旁貸，但恐難積極與外交部協調合作。外交部的公眾外交協調會仍以與國內記者聯繫交流為主，於部內的公眾外交業務尚未形成領頭協調的氛圍，遑論去協調其他部會的相關業務；國際傳播司基本上仍在執行以前新聞局的國際新聞業務，偶爾觸及國際學術交流，但應愈來愈少，因為外交部各地域司及研究設計會方為主政單位。

另外，行政官僚傾向於由上級單位領導，同級單位協調的可能較難有成效，在訪談過程中，有不少官員確實傾向由國家安全會議或另設一高層單位主持公眾外交的分工協調。除了這個懸而未決的問題之外，各部會從事公眾外交相關業務的官員愈缺乏足夠的訓練及資源。

公眾外交需要以軟、硬實力做後盾，具備外交、行銷、公關、傳播等多種工具與技能方能成事，但現在不僅行政院組織再造後並未針對公眾外交有任何實質上的著墨，除了臺灣書院的運作勉強可見跨部會協調的身影外，也未見政府單位專業訓練、集中資源、協調工作，仍是任由各相關部會「放牛吃草」。從行政院組織在造後中央政府架構觀察，再輔以訪談及問券的分析，顯見相關政府單位的公眾外交仍未「各就各位」，主要還是沿襲過去的作業模式以操作新公眾外交業務，這將是臺灣在提升國家軟實力以創造友善的外在環境時的重大考驗。

主要參考文獻

卜正珉。公眾外交：軟性國力，理論與策略。台北市：允晨文化，2009年。
高飛。「公共外交的界定、形成條件及其作用」。外交評論，第82期，2005年，
頁105-112。

Allison, Graham and Philip Zelikow. 1999. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*, 2nd Edn. New York: Pearson.

Batora, Jozef. 2005. *Public Diplomacy in Small and Medium Sized States: Norway & Canada*. Netherlands: Clingendael Netherlands Institute of International Relations.

- Cohen, Michael A. and Maria Figueroa Küpçü. 2005. "Privatizing Foreign Policy," *World Policy Journal* 22(3): 34-52.
- Cowan, Geoffrey and Nicholas J. Cull. 2008. "Public Diplomacy in a Changing World." *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(1): 6-8.
- Cull, Nicholas. 2008. "Public Diplomacy: Taxonomies and Histories," *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 616(1): 31-54.
- Cull, Nicholas J. 2009. "Public Diplomacy before Gullion: The Evolution of a Phrase," in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor Eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. NY: Routledge.
- Dizard Jr., Wilson P. 2004. *Inverting Public Diplomacy: The Story of the U.S. Informational Agency*. Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner Publications, Inc.
- Fitzpatrick, Kathy R. 2010. *The Future of U.S. Public Diplomacy: An Uncertain Fate*. Leiden, The Netherlands: Mouton de Gruyter Publishers.
- Ham, Peter Van. 2001. "The Rise of Brand State." *Foreign Affairs* 80(5): 2-6.
- Leonard, Mark, Catherine Stead, and Conrad Smewing. 2002. *Public Diplomacy*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Leonard, Mark and Vidhya Alakeson. 2000. *Going Public: Diplomacy for the Information Society*. London: Foreign Policy Centre.
- Melissen, Jan, ed. 2007. *The New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Nye, Jr., Joseph S. 1990. *Bound to Lead: The Changing Nature of American Power*. New York: Basic Books.
- Nye, Joseph S., Jr. 2004. *Soft Power*. New York: Public Affairs.
- Keohane, Robert O. and Joseph S Nye, Jr. 1998. "Power and Interdependence in the Information Age," *Foreign Affairs* 77(5): 81-94.
- Rawnsley, Gary. 2000. *Taiwan's Informal Diplomacy and Propaganda*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Rawnsley, Gary. 2003. "Selling Democracy: Diplomacy, Propaganda and Democratisation in Taiwan." *China Perspectives* 47(3): 58-67.
- Root, Hilton L. 2006. *Capital and Collusion: The Political Logic of Global Economies Development*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Seib, Philip. 2009. *Toward a New Public Diplomacy: Redirecting U.S. Foreign Policy*. New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2009.
- Snow, Nancy and Philip M. Taylor, eds. 2008. *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. New York: Routledge.
- Vlahos, Michael. 2009. "Public Diplomacy as Loss of World Authority," in Nancy Snow and Philip M. Taylor Eds., *Routledge Handbook of Public Diplomacy*. NY: Routledge.

- Waller, J. Michael. 2007. *The Public Diplomacy Reader*. Washington DC: The Institute of World Politics Press.
- Wang, Jian. 2006. "Managing National Reputation and International Relations in the Global Era: Public Diplomacy Revisited." *Public Relations Review* 32(2): 91-96.
- Wolf, Charles, Jr. 2004. *Public Diplomacy: How to Think about and Improve It*. Santa Monica, CA: Rand Corporation.
- Yun, Seong-Hun and Elizabeth Toth. 2009. "Future Sociological Public Diplomacy and the Role of Public Relations: Evolution of Public Diplomacy." *The American Behavioral Scientist* 53(4): 493-503.

2011 年美國南加州大學訪談摘要

11/17 (Thu.)

11:00 Nicholas Cull

Master Program of Public Diplomacy

Ph: 213 821 4080

Office: ASC326

cull@usc.edu

Cull 教授首先介紹南加大公眾外交碩士學位學程的背景與發展現況，提及該校傳播學院與國際關係學院合作為重要關鍵，如何讓學生了解並掌握全球民意脈動、非國家行為者與國際新聞及傳播對公眾外交的影響則是此一跨領域單位的教學重點。該單位的學生分成在職生（至少 5 年工作經驗）與一般生兩班；前者每班約 12-15 人，為期 1 年，而後者每班原則上 20 餘人，需 2 年完成學業。

Cull 指出美國的公眾外交政策無論是否相對的好，總是飽受批評，尤其 1999 年將美國新聞總署併入國務院之舉，美國目前的公眾外交應該要建立政府通盤性的檢討與執行機制，在短期可見成效的部分傳統外交作為與需長期耕耘方能成功的軟實力公眾外交之間，更應有所區分請不能偏廢。此外，美國的公眾外交或許跟其他國家的類似，均缺乏國內群眾的有力支持，所以更需要努力在國內推廣之。

本人則介紹此次國科會研究計畫之概略內容，並說明臺灣在公眾外交領域之獨特性，可惜少有學者關注。本人亦介紹政治大學與南加大於此之相似處，並請其於未來政治大學有類似學程時可多予指導。

12:30

Paul Seib

ib@usc.edu

Sherine Badawi Walton, Deputy Director

sbwalton@usc.edu

Center on Public Diplomacy

(213) 821-2078

本人首先感謝Seib教授及公眾外交中心於2009年10月下旬贊助該校多位教授至台北參加由本人於外交部服務時所支持舉辦的National Security, Public and

Cultural Diplomacy, Smart Power: Future Directions for Smart Nations研討會，並探詢未來與我國合作相關國際會議之可能。**Seib**主任回以，其至土耳其等地參與公眾外交研討會，甚具意義，未來亦樂意有機會至我國參加相關會議。

Seib主任與**Walton**副主任表示，目前該中心為一純研究中心，範圍則涵蓋學術與政策，日常運作均多依靠碩士班學生與實習生維持，因此每一屆的傳承變得非常重要。至於未來研究主題方面，**Seib**主任表示該中心即將展開的研究重點是水資源與公眾外交。因水資源而引起的國際衝突在所多有，他目前雖然沒有具體的規劃，但認為瞭解「水外交」(**water diplomacy**) 並發展相關政策建議以供各國參考是當務之急，而各國相關學者與技術專家的參與，將有助於將這樣的爭奪轉化成合作，進而為各地人民帶來更大的福祉。

「水外交」是該中心「科學外交」(**science diplomacy**) 研究計畫的一個重要環節，希望由公眾外交的角度出發，使科學家與學者協力找出解決之道；而美國國務院亦開始推動「科學大使」(**science envoy**) 計畫，至非西方世界教育及倡導科學合作，等於是呼應了「科學外交」在公眾外交的重要性。

2:00 **Jian Wang** ASC 324

Ph: 213 740 9686

Office: ASC 324B

wangjian@usc.edu

Wang 教授以戰略溝通 (**strategic communication**) 與公眾外交觀察中國大陸近年來的軟性外交成果，認為上海世博會是一個極佳的觀察點。上海世博會為中國大陸帶來了擦亮建立國家品牌的機會，未來是其研究的重點之一，希望能夠藉由傳播、公關理論與國際關係理論以檢視該次之成效；此外，藉由研究數國於上海世博會的作為，以及對中國大陸參展民眾之間卷或電話調查，其亦希望能夠了解大陸人民對研究選中之國家有何認知或觀感上的不同，亦即了解這些國家在品牌建立時的策略效果。

對中國大陸而言，公眾外交或相關作為是否有效仍然爭論不休，但顯然的中國大陸已經展開其重新塑造形象的工作。無論這個工作將如何繼續，更重要的是管理其國際形象，而這將是其近期的研究重點。本人則介紹政治大學相關研究供其參考。

此外，Wang 教授亦分享其於公關業界的諮詢經驗，認為公眾外交仍有需多可研究之處，尤其在連結公關、傳播理論與實務作為上。

5:00 **Mai'a K. Davis Cross**

E-mail:mkcross@usc.edu

Phone: (213) 740-8982

Office: VKC 330

Cross 教授專長在歐洲外交與安全，但因家庭因素，對東亞地區也保持一定的關注。本次訪談聚焦於「巧實力」的運用，尤其是以知識為基礎的社群與合作如何協助國家民族獲致和平。

基本上其認為歐洲經驗讓軟實力受到高度的重視，但歐洲並未放棄硬實力，歐盟外交社群的努力配合歐盟在軍事科技的優勢，使歐洲在國際舞台上得以持續發揮影響力。

本人亦介紹臺灣當前所處之國際與區域環境，以及目前政府如何降低兩岸關係的緊張，同時說明了臺灣與歐盟之間的「友好非實質關係」，如何成為支持我國外交及國際參與的助力。

11/18 (Fri.)

因該日 David Kang 教授與 Saori Katada 教授確定因公不克會晤，本日行程主要為與南加大美中學院的 Clayton Dube 院長及政治系 Stanley Rosen 教授之晤談。本次晤談以午餐會議方式進行，由於所訪問之兩位學者專家對於兩岸關係均頗嫻熟，因此首先觸及的議題便是兩岸關係在國民黨政府時代的機會與挑戰。本人亦說明公眾外交是目前臺灣在「外交休兵」時更需要推動的計畫，因為一來較不會激化兩岸關係，二來又可培養臺灣國際參與的能量，事實上符合臺灣利益。

與本次研究主題較為相關的對話之一是中國大陸如何藉由「孔子學院」及學術交流進行公眾外交的工作。據悉中國大陸雖資助南加大相關單位，但除「孔子學院」外，並未介入其研究或交流活動；此外，中共政府對於公眾外交已加大力道，在外交部與民間均成立對應單位，部分重點大學亦增強相關研究能量，頗值得注意。此外，Dube 與 Rosen 認為兩岸均可藉由電影進行公眾外交，例如「賽德克巴萊」便可使外國人民更願意了解台灣的過去，進而帶起他們了解臺灣現狀的意願。

最後，兩位學者專家亦認為美國在調整國際宣傳機構時遇到不少問題，在我行政遠組織調整時應該參考美國的經驗，以盡量避免不必要的問題。

The Asia-Pacific Context of Cross-Strait Relations*

Kwei-Bo Huang*

The Taiwan Strait has always been a flash point in the region of the Asia-Pacific. Beyond a doubt, the dynamics of cross-Strait relations can have intertwined impacts on the other areas of dispute, such as the Korean Peninsula and the South China Sea, as well as on Tokyo-Beijing and Washington-Beijing relations to some extent. In an era when Taipei-Beijing relations “are entering a new, more delicate phase,”¹ it is especially interesting to observe the development of cross-Strait relations in the context of the Asia-Pacific.

An intuitive argument about the Asia-Pacific context of cross-Strait relations is that countries in the Asia-Pacific will benefit from the dividends of peace brought about by stable and peaceful relations across the Taiwan Strait. Such an argument sounds logically correct. Yet, if carefully examined on the basis of regional political, economic, and military realities, it might not accurately demonstrate the effect of better cross-Strait relations on the region of the Asia-Pacific. As Chinese philosophy tells us, there must be some reference to the opposite when talking about *ying* or *yang*. On the one hand, improved relations between Taiwan and mainland China does have resulted in some positive signs for greater stability of the region; but on the other hand, current Taipei-Beijing relations may have some unintended consequences whose influence on the Asia-Pacific remains uncertain or is likely to be negative. In other words, at the moment it can be conceptually complex to discern the effects coming with the stable development of cross-Strait relations.

* This is a revised version prepared for the annual meeting of the American Political Science Association, September 1-4, 2001, Seattle, Washington, USA. The original version was delivered at the conference “Facing the Challenges to Cross-Strait Relations in 2012,” to be held at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC, July 7-8, 2011.

* Associate Professor of Department of Diplomacy and Founding Director of the Center for Foreign Policy Studies, College of International Affairs at National ChengChi University (NCCU), Taipei, Taiwan, R.O.C. He is also Director of the Preparatory Office of the International Master’s Program in International Studies at NCCU College of International Affairs. He can be reached at <kweibo@nccu.edu.tw>.

¹ Douglas H. Paal, “Taiwan: Double-Edged Victory,” *Carnegie Commentary* (November 30, 2010); available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42059>.

Accordingly, it is the major purpose of this paper to figure out whether or not the current progress in cross-Strait relations has created more positive forces than negative ones for the Asia-Pacific. This paper is divided into four parts. The first part aims to introduce the positive, negative, and uncertain influences, mainly internal, that are shaping the development of cross-Strait relations. The second part deals with the Asia-Pacific context of cross-Strait relations by examining three commonly seen statements associated with the improvement in cross-Strait relations, major power politics, and territorial sovereignty disputes in East Asia. The third part also focuses on the Asia-Pacific context of cross-Strait relations, yet by considering the association of contemporary Taipei-Beijing interactions and regional economic and non-traditional security issues. The last part is the concluding remarks.

PART I: Internal Forces that Change Cross-Strait Relations

Since President Ma Ying-jeou took office in May 2008, generally speaking, Taiwan has been successful in turning potential conflicts with mainland China into a state of less violence and more communication. The underpinning of such a success lies largely in Ma's insistence on the "1992 Consensus" and the "no unification, no (Taiwan) independence, and no use of force" policy toward Beijing. Although the former still has an ambiguous definition, it has become the starting point of the breakthroughs in political and economic relations across the Strait.² The latter, sometimes criticized of being less active or too conservative, has been of help for the restoration of stability and the maintenance of status quo of the Taiwan Strait to a certain degree. Furthermore, cross-Strait relations have been less volatile as Ma calls for "Diplomatic Truce" with mainland China in order to reduce the uncertainty or unconstructive factors in his attempt to transform Taipei-Beijing relations into a positive circle.

It is worth noting that Ma's policies would not have worked had Hu responded to them negatively or uncooperatively. Regardless of the real intention behind the scene, mainland China under Hu's leadership has either proclaimed its willingness to work with

² The "1992 Consensus" was put by Chi Su (then Chairman of the Mainland Affairs Council of the ROC) in April 2000 to describe the agreement and disagreement in exchanges of the two sides of the Taiwan Strait since the early 1990s. Put it simply, Taiwan prefers to construe this consensus as "One China, respective interpretations," whereas mainland China prefers to look at the "One China" part.

Taiwan to benefit the people on the two sides of the Taiwan Strait, or selectively acted in concert with Taiwan's advocacy on cross-Strait and foreign affairs. This demonstrates the fact that no unilateral action of Taipei or Beijing can alter relations across the Taiwan Strait in a peaceful and constructive way – in other words, it takes two to tangle.

Arguably, there are several salient positive influences on the Asia-Pacific resulting from the gradual recovery of cross-Strait relations after May 2008, but some changes in association with the development of cross-Strait relations seem to remain negative or indeterminate in terms of their influences on the region of the Asia-Pacific. The following paragraphs aim at introducing in brief the positive, negative, and uncertain internal forces leading the dynamic changes in relations across the Strait to the next stage, in the hope that they can serve as a foundation of better understanding of cross-Strait relations in the Asia-Pacific context.

Positive Forces

The most important force that is bringing cross-Strait relations forward is the gradual institutionalization of cross-Strait talks and consultations. For Taiwan, this institutionalization is stated clearly in Article 4 of the *Act Governing Relations between Peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area*, which provides:

The Executive Yuan may set up or designate an institution to handle the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.

The Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan may entrust the institution referred to in the preceding paragraph or any private organization meeting the following criteria to handle the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area...

The Mainland Affairs Council, Executive Yuan or each competent authorities approved by the Executive Yuan..., based on the need and the nature of the affairs to be handled, entrust any accountable, professional, and experienced non-profit juristic person other than those referred to in the preceding two paragraphs on a case-by-case basis to assist the handling of the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area; if necessary, it may also be entrusted to execute agreements.

The institution or private organization referred to in the preceding two paragraphs may upon the approval of the entrusting authorities, entrust any other non-profit juristic person as referred to in the preceding paragraph to assist the handling of the affairs relating to any dealings between the peoples of the Taiwan Area and the Mainland Area.

Therefore, the Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) was established by Taiwan in November 1990 as an authorized private institution handling part of cross-Strait affairs. For mainland China, the Association for Relations across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS) was set up correspondingly in December 1991 as SEF's counterpart. Beginning from June 2008, there have been six rounds of the Chiang-Chen Talk, meetings of the heads of both SEF and ARATS, held in mainland China and Taiwan in turn. In addition, with the delicate evolution of cross-Strait engagements, for technical and functional discussions senior officials and their staff from the two sides of the Taiwan Strait now can meet frequently to "communicate" (*yewu goutong*) as to whether certain matters may be listed as topics of negotiation by the following round of the Chiang-Chen Talk.

The second positive force that needs to be mentioned here is both sides' self-consciousness of undertaking cautious measures to prevent "surprises" from slowing down various exchanges between Taiwan and mainland China. It is evident that both Ma and Hu have exerted great self-restraint to deal carefully with sensitive cross-Strait interactions. Their strategy of gradual reduction in tension (GRIT) not only stabilizes the Taiwan Strait but also creates an environment for which both sides can find ways to foster stronger mutual confidence incrementally.

The last, but not least, positive force resulting in the advance of cross-Strait relations is the continued technical and functional exchanges and people-to-people exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait. The effect of these exchanges has not loomed large in the political realm, but these exchanges have prompted both governments in Taipei and Beijing to consult with each other to minimize possible problems and obstacles and contributed to further cooperation and integration in the non-political realms. Moreover, these exchanges being unfolded are beyond the scope of those in the Korean Peninsula and are probably on the largest scale between two competing regimes in the region of the Asia-Pacific.

Negative Forces

Despite these positive driving forces behind the improved relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, there are still at least three negative forces that may become hindrances to the development of contemporary cross-Strait relations. The first has to do with the lack of trust between the two regimes across the Strait. More specifically, both because of the poor understanding of each other's political intention and strategic goals, and because of the uncertainty about the future with further policy accommodation, the degree of mutual trust between Taipei and Beijing is still very low. As Taiwan remains to have a politically divided society and as leaders in mainland China still has a strong irredentist thinking and the fear of losing power if their Taiwan policy turns out unsuccessful, it is extremely difficult, perhaps untimely as well, to untie the knot (i.e., to solve the problem with the lack of mutual trust) quickly for the time being.

The second negative force that has an impact on cross-Strait relations and the Asia-Pacific concerns the possibility of leadership change of Taiwan, ROC, and the Chinese Communist Party, respectively. In Taiwan there will be a possible regime change every four years, which further complicates dynamic relations across the Strait due to the sharp difference of mainland policies of the two major parties. In mainland China the leadership will change roughly once every ten years, and whether its policy toward Taiwan and the Asia-Pacific, including the US, is a function of the replacement of one set of leaders by another remains to be seen, owing to the mysterious political decisionmaking process. Therefore, the two sides across the Strait have the possibility of being inconsistent in their external policies in 2012.

The last negative force emerging in cross-Strait relations is the unsolved dilemma regarding endless struggles for sovereignty between the Republic of China and the People's Republic of China. It is obvious that this issue is at the core of cross-Strait relations. Even though in 1992 Taiwan reaffirmed its sovereignty over the Chinese mainland in accordance with the Constitution, but it also acknowledged that it no longer exercised jurisdiction over the Chinese mainland. According to Ma, although both Taiwan and mainland China can not recognize each other's sovereignty because their sovereignty claims completely overlap, their mutual non-denial of jurisdiction can become a pragmatic reflection of the status quo. In the foreseeable future, nevertheless, it is not likely that mainland China will abdicate its territorial claim over Taiwan and try to come up with a new framework by which both Taiwan and mainland China can

interact politically on an equal footing. Now the Chinese Communist Party has eyed its relations with the Kuomintang (KMT) on the basis of equality and mutual respect, but in terms of government-to-government relations mainland China always sticks to the traditional concept of sovereignty and has no interest to face the reality that in “China,” broadly defined, there are two separate governments that rule part of the territory and people. These endless struggles for sovereignty also hinder the constructive dialogue of the two sides of the Strait on how their joint efforts and agreements can be a driving force for the Asia-Pacific development in many critical areas.

Uncertain Forces

In addition to those positive and negative driving forces affecting the course of cross-Strait relations, it appears difficult to discern the consequences of the closer economic bonding between Taiwan and mainland China under the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA).

In the short run, signing the ECFA is mutually beneficial, not only economically but also politically. For Taiwan, it finally reached a free trade agreement-like deal with one of its major trading partners, and it generally helps expand the share of Taiwan’s products in mainland China. Moreover, the Ma administration is able to claim the achievements followed by signing the ECFA, therefore strengthening the political support for the KMT. For mainland China, with the ECFA being viewed as a tool for economic unification which may lead to political unification, “Taiwan is on a short leash as far as its economic integration with other East Asian countries is concerned,” despite Taiwan’s economic progress and gains.³ What is also important to note is that in ECFA-related negotiations mainland China releases some goodwill to Taiwan but never gives way to Taiwan’s requests that would dampen mainland China’s core economic interest.

Regionally, with the ECFA’s help, Taiwan can provide know-how about doing business in mainland China, act as a risk buffer to enter mainland China’s market, or serve as a gateway to mainland China. Yet, the ECFA that facilitates economic and trade interflows between Taiwan and mainland China might lead to an outcome placing the

³ “Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA): Domestic Opportunities and Challenges,” *FOCUS*, No. 4 (March 2011), Institute of Strategic and International Studies (Malaysia), p. 9; available at http://www.isis.org.my/files/ISIS_FOCUS_INDEX_2011/ISIS_Focus_4/ISIS_Focus_4-2011.pdf.

Asia-Pacific countries in an inferior position – that is, an outcome that the growth of Taiwan’s market share in mainland China and foreign direct investment from mainland China are at the expense of the neighboring countries.

Some other uncertain forces may include mainland China’s enactment of the Anti-secession Law in 2005 when the internal problems are being intensified, as well as Taiwan’s continued struggle for more international space that comes with the growing “Taiwan identity,” which may not necessarily lead to Taiwan independence. The former’s effect is uncertain because it is in fact a domestic law of mainland China that provides both pacific and violent means to achieve peace and stability of the Taiwan Strait and the ultimate goal of national unification. Given the complex consequence of the Anti-secession Law, the Chinese Communist Party has seldom mentioned it in order to avoid hurting Taiwan people’s feeling. The influence of the latter is indefinite largely because on the one hand the Ma administration’s desire for greater international participation is aimed to become a responsible stakeholder in the region and in the international community, but on the other hand such a desire has been linked to the “Taiwan identity” by Beijing leaders as a dangerous step which eventually facilitates Taiwan independence.

PART II: Cross-Strait Relations and East Asian Major Power Politics and Territorial Disputes

The afore-mentioned forces that influence relations across the Taiwan Strait are endogenous, but they are of significance in the sense that they are both variables affecting cross-Strait relations and the underlying factors helping observe and analyze the Asia-Pacific context of cross-Strait relations. This part of the paper focuses on some major “high politics” issues of East Asia vis-à-vis changing cross-Strait relations, and the section that follows will look at the “low politics” issues having to do with the Asia Pacific context of Taipei-Beijing relations.

It is not surprising at all if one argues that the better cross-Strait relations, the greater benefits the region of the Asia-Pacific will have. Intuitively, this argument should be correct. Very few observers would hold that peaceful cross-Strait relations have been the potential cause of instability, mostly the tilting balance of power and the intensifying

complexity and competition in the territorial disputes in the region. Then, what if the intuitive reasoning fails to be correct and the pessimistic scenarios prevail? Since one can not exclude this possibility, it appears worth of scrutinizing the commonly seen arguments for the purpose of figuring out whether or not improved relations across the Strait are not as beneficial as most people would have anticipated.

To better achieve the goal of this analytical paper, I will focus on three pessimistic statements that are in the context of the Asia Pacific, or, more specifically, that touch upon the connection between cross-Strait relations and intra-regional relations of East Asia. Hopefully with a more prudent examination, some of their specious conclusions that may misinterpret the state of cross-Strait relations and their impact on the “high politics” issues in the Asia Pacific can be rebutted in a logical manner.

Statement 1: *The improvement in cross-Strait relations will weaken Taiwan’s strategic position in the US policy toward East Asia.*

This pessimistic statement is based on the premises embedded with the sentiment that relations between the US and mainland China are always strategically competitive and can possibly turn into serious armed conflicts if not managed well, and that Taiwan’s strategic position has always relied principally on Taiwan’s long-term political independence of mainland China and strong military self-defense capability. As a result, certain inaccurate arguments can be derived from such a premise, such as:

Since Ma is in office, Taiwan has become the weakest link of the US strategy in the Asia-Pacific – Taiwan’s leaning toward mainland China politically and economically has resulted in the gradual loss of Taiwan’s political independence, as well as Taiwan’s abandonment of the will of self-defense; and

Taiwan may be dumped by the US that either fears large-scaled conflicts with mainland China over Taiwan or loses confidence in Taiwan carrying out the rapprochement policy toward mainland China.

In general, five major pillars are of great importance for sustainable and robust relations between Taipei and Washington: first, the sharing of such common value as democracy and freedom of speech and association; second, the economic prosperity of Taiwan and the close bonding of bilateral economic relations between Taipei and Washington; third,

Taiwan's US policy and US's Taiwan policy that remain consultative and as transparent as possible through various channels of communication; fourth, the appropriate defense capability and will of Taiwan that not only help Taiwan defend itself from external intervention and aggression but also give Taiwan more confidence to be engaged in constructive dialogues and exchanges with mainland China; and last, US strategic perceptions of mainland China that correctly tell the challenges posed by mainland China with ambivalent strategic goals. Now the question lies in whether these pillars are shaky or deteriorating?

It goes without saying that the first and second pillars remain strong. The third pillar standing for frequent communication between Taipei and Washington seems functioning, but two obvious obstacles still remain – that the level and frequency of mutual communication have been limited due to the strong pressure from Beijing, and that there are a range of voices in and from Taiwan that confuse US decisionmakers about the Ma administration's resolve of protecting Taiwan while changing Taiwan's relations with mainland China in a nuanced and pragmatic way.

The fourth pillar appears to be weakening in part because Taiwan has not been able to compete with mainland China in massive arms build-up and in part because Taiwan's defense modernization has been stalled by the difficulty of the Ma administration in acquiring key advanced weaponry systems from the US.⁴ Again, without the strong self-defense capability that comes mainly from US arms transfers will Taiwan have no confidence to negotiate with mainland China.

What is also important to know is that the fourth and fifth pillars are interlinked. The US strategic perception of mainland China certainly influences the internal interagency consultation within the US government regarding arms transfers to Taiwan. Such a perception, if leading to a waning political and defense support of the US for Taiwan, can wear off Taiwan's determination of self-defense to a certain extent. As mainland China is on the rise, it will be "less likely to tolerate US military aid to Taiwan," so the US should "reconsider its current strategy and contemplate broaching a conversation with

⁴ For instance, the US has remained undecided to sell the F-16 C/Ds package to Taiwan, even if both former President Chan Shui-bian and President Ma have called for such a sale continuously. According to Ma, the US does not even want Taiwan to present the letter of request for the F-16 C/Ds deal. See Elaine Hou, "President Ma Calls for F-16 C/D Sale to Taiwan," *Taiwan Today*, June 27, 2011; available at <http://taiwantoday.tw/ct.asp?xItem=169144&CtNode=413>.

[mainland] China about mutual constraint.”⁵ If the US misreads and is deterred by mainland China’s strategic intention and power in the region of the Asia-Pacific, it is possible that the US might want to prevent Taiwan from appearing on its strategic radar screen in order to eschew a major “problem” that lies between Washington and Beijing.

Taiwan and the other US allies in the western Pacific region are in cooperation with the US to engage mainland China constructively and to deter mainland China militarily. Ultimately, it is up to the US to determine what its strategic map in the Asia-Pacific will look like. Yet, US reconsideration and contemplation regarding this issue should not be at the expense of Taipei-Washington ties at various levels that have come into existence since the 1950s, or the security commitment offered by the US to its allies around the world will become ambivalent and dubious. Some interpret US Deputy Secretary of State James Steinberg’s “strategic reassurance” toward mainland China as a dual policy which the US reassures mainland China that it has no intention of containing a rising mainland China and which the US is undertaking “the most minimalist interpretation” of the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) to keep its last commitment to Taiwan.⁶ If this is really the case, the fifth pillar fostering stronger Taipei-Washington relations will turn incomplete, eventually affecting the fourth pillar, i.e., Taiwan’s defense capability and will.

Statement 2: The improvement in cross-strait relations will trigger the greater concern of Japan over the Beijing-Taipei ties that may bring Japan strategic and economic disadvantages.

Japan is another major power in the Asia-Pacific that pays close attention to the development of cross-strait relations. There is a fixed impression of Japan that Japan does not want to see closer relations across the Taiwan Strait because Japan has deep anxieties of getting involved in a Taiwan conflict on the side of the US and of facing a unified China which may threaten Japan’s energy supply and geopolitical and geo-economic interests.⁷ Hence, Japan would view Taiwan as a strategically significant

⁵ Michael D. Swaine, “Avoiding U.S.-China Military Rivalry,” *Diplomat*, February 16, 2001; available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=42645>.

⁶ Daniel Blumenthal, “Rethinking U.S. Foreign Policy towards Taiwan,” Shadow Government (Blog), March 2, 2011; available at http://shadow.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/03/02/rethinking_us_foreign_policy_towards_taiwan.

⁷ Richard. C. Bush, *China-Japan Tension, 1995-2006: Why They Happened, What to Do*, Policy Paper NO.

actor helpful for Japan, particularly in the era of mainland China's ascent.

The above-mentioned argument is based on two premises at least – first, that closer relations between Taiwan and mainland China will lead to ultimate unification of China, and second, that a unified China will respond to Japan in a defensive manner. It is probably too intangible to talk about whether or not a unified China will be a security concern for Japan, but it is worth explaining why closer relations across the Strait will not be detrimental to Japan. Leave alone mainland China's policy and attitude toward Japan. For Taiwan, it will never change its good-neighbor policy during Ma's presidency, and it will not accept any offer or suggestion of mainland China that will damage the interest of Taiwan people and the stability of the region as cross-Strait relations have made progress after May 2008. A stable framework of cross-Strait relations will contribute to peace in East Asia, which meets the practical need of Taiwan, Japan, and the region as a whole. In addition, Ma has reaffirmed a few times that Taiwan endorses bilateral and multilateral arrangements, including the US-Japan security alliance, in the Asia-Pacific beneficial to regional peace and stability. That being said, even if Tokyo-Beijing relations are sour, there is no strong justified reason to deny the fact that the improvement in cross-Strait relations will lessen Taipei's amity and goodwill to Japan, or that recent Taipei-Beijing engagements will be harmful for Japan's strategic and economic interests.

More specifically, no matter how Tokyo-Beijing relations will evolve and no matter what mainland China is going to do to persuade Taiwan on its side, Taiwan's foreign policy will remain independent, and its determination to support regional arrangements that are helpful for peace and stability of the Asia-Pacific will be the same. What Japan should be worried about should be its long restrained relations with mainland China. The "history" issue, the East China Sea and Diaoyutai issues, the strategic and military mistrust which coexists with the so-called "China threat," Japan's stance and attitude toward Taiwan, as well as Japan's hope for the United Nations Security Council seat, for example, are all distinctly perceived hindrances to the development of Tokyo-Beijing relations. Hence, how can the two governments consult each other to build normal and friendly relations will be key to the validity of the argument that better Taipei-Beijing ties will run parallel with Japan's national interest in the Asia-Pacific.

16, June 2009 (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution, 2009), pp. 11 & 16-17; available at http://www.brookings.edu/~media/Files/rc/papers/2009/06_china_japan_bush/06_china_japan_bush.pdf.

One very interesting question remains unanswered, that is, will both Taiwan and mainland China cooperate in the future to deal with the territorial disputes with Japan? This question will be answered in the following paragraphs, along with the analysis of the South China Sea dispute.

Statement 3: *The improvement in cross-Strait relations has helped mainland China concentrate on the disputed areas, in particular the Diaoyutai and the South China Sea.*

As mentioned, improved cross-Strait relations can bring about dividends of peace for the Asia-Pacific. Because of this positive development in relations between Taipei and Beijing, it appears to be a majority view in Taiwan that the chance of diplomatic and sovereign conflicts between the two sides will remain, but the breakout of direct military conflict between the two sides will be very low in the short run and the foreseeable future.⁸ By the same token, *China's National Defense in 2010* published in March 2011 in Beijing, mainland China indicates that the two sides can have contact and exchanges on military issues “at an appropriate time” and discuss “a military security mechanism of mutual trust,” endeavoring to work together to take on measures to further stabilize cross-Strait relations and avoid repeating the unpleasant history of violent conflict between fellow countrymen – although the reality is that the military deployment of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) continues to pose an immediate and immense threat to Taiwan. A more cautious warning is thus that the status quo of the Taiwan Strait is changing dynamically in favor of mainland China that has “consistently maneuvered to build up leverage... and influence vis-à-vis Taiwan.”⁹

Neighboring countries of mainland China are watching closely how this issue will be resolved by mainland China, as it can be a sign of its attitude toward the sovereignty disputes in which it is involved. With the seeming de-escalation of military conflict in the Taiwan Strait, “theoretically” mainland China could induce the less assertive military posture of mainland China in the Asia-Pacific. However, the facts may have surprised some people holding this kind of optimistic thinking.

⁸ “Academics Assess Cross-strait Peace Index,” *Want China Times*, April 21, 2011; available at <http://www.wantchinatimes.com/news-subclass-cnt.aspx?cid=1101&MainCatID=&id=20110421000060>.

⁹ Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, “Cross-Strait Relations in a New Era of Negotiation,” July 7, 2010; available at <http://www.carnegieendowment.org/2010/07/07/cross-strait-relations-in-new-era-of-negotiation/21v>.

Approximately beginning in September 2010, when a mainland Chinese fishing trawler collided with two Japanese coast guard vessels, the heated rhetoric between Japan and mainland China has reached a new high. Then there were a series of incidents in which Japan has accused mainland Chinese vessels, helicopters, and planes of illegal or reckless behavior in the “sensitive waters” of the East China Sea and the surrounding waters of the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai Islands). To counter mainland the strategic moves of mainland China on the rise, Japan has galvanized its efforts to empower its Self Defense Force with a well-built presence in the southern borders, especially those in the disputed areas with mainland China.

Down south of the disputed areas between Japan and mainland China, in recent years maritime skirmishes have been sporadically taking place in the South China Sea between claimants. With better financial ability and with a greater need for the preservation of strategically important natural resources in the South China Sea, most of the Southeast Asian claimants, Vietnam and Malaysia in particular, are modernizing its military force. Even so, mainland China still enjoys predominant military advantage over the other claimants, including Taiwan.

A “core interest”, the South China Sea in mainland Chinese leaders’ mind is invaded incrementally again a few years since the signing of the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea in November 2002. In addition to continued diplomatic negotiation and military presence, the gesture of mainland China in this area seems more assertive after US Secretary of State Hillary Clinton’s remarks at the 2010 ASEAN Regional Forum in Hanoi, where she called for a multilateral and peaceful settlement of the South China Sea territorial dispute in accordance with the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Her remarks were viewed by Beijing as a disguise whose real objective was to internationalize the sovereignty dispute over the South China Sea – or put it a little bit differently, to back the positions of Southeast Asian countries claiming sovereignty over the disputed area.¹⁰ Later in this year, mainland China even demonstrated coercing attitude toward Southeast Asian countries adjacent to the South China Sea. For instance, the PLA Air Force’s advanced air fighters appeared and buzzed over Filipino OV-10 planes and oil-exploration vessels over and near the Reed

¹⁰ “Foreign Minister Warns of South China Sea Issue,” *China Daily*, July 26, 2010; available at http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2010-07/26/content_11046544.htm.

Bank Basin a couple of times; and *reportedly* the ex-Soviet Aircraft Carrier Varyag, now named the Shi Lang, as well as the newest carrier-based J-15 fighters and the J-18 vertical/short-takeoff-and-landing fighters,¹¹ will lead the way to help mainland China exert greater influence on the strategic calculations of countries involved in the South China Sea dispute.

It is not very certain why in recent years mainland China adopts such assertive measures around the disputed islets and reefs surrounded by the East China Sea and the South China Sea. Four most likely explanations for that are:

the ascent of the hawkish faction within the Chinese Communist Party with stronger confidence and nationalism that results mainly from the rapid growth in politico-economic influence and military capabilities;

the intention of using the escalation of the Diaoyutai and the South China Sea disputes as the scapegoat for the intensified domestic problems;

the recent remarks of the US about the Diaoyutai and the South China Sea that may have triggered the self-defensive perception and emotion of Beijing leaders; and

the insecure feeling of mainland Chinese leaders about the increased scarcity of resources.

Interestingly, one can not rule out the possibility that, as some China watchers argue, the progress in cross-Strait relations in recent years makes mainland China able to shift its strategic focus on the other sensitive areas of dispute.¹² Logically, other things being equal, such a possibility does exist. To cope with this consequence, the best strategy for the parties concerned is not to make the Taiwan Strait a dire area again, because such a decision is the outcome of the irresponsible beggar-thy-neighbor policy that will produce an unconstructive impact on them as well. The parties concerned ought to exert self-restraint and abide by the United Nations Charter and other international laws to

11 "Is China Developing a VSTOL Fighter?" *Defense News*, April 22, 2011; available at <http://www.defensenews.com/story.php?i=6301965>."

12 See, for example, Ji Shi, "南海主權爭端集中爆發 中國不讓寸土," March 2, 2009; available at <http://www.chinareviewnews.com/doc/1009/1/5/4/100915459.html?coluid=37&kindid=711&docid=100915459&mdate=0322004545>.

settle these disputes in a nonviolent way, while encouraging cross-Strait relations to move forward as an example in which conflict is being transformed gradually into peace for the benefit of all people in the world. Specifically for mainland China, it is thus of great importance for Beijing to contemplate the condition that the pacific and stable development of cross-Strait relations, if continued in the foreseeable future, will become a showcase of Hu's "Harmonious World" that can apply to the other parts of East Asia where mainland China is engaging other countries in territorial disputes and/or economic competitions.

In the discussion of Statement 3, a question that has not yet been answered is: will both Taiwan and mainland China cooperate in the future to deal with the territorial disputes with Japan? Similarly, some would pose the question as to whether both Taiwan and mainland China will cooperate in the future to deal with the territorial disputes in the South China Sea. The answers are definitely negative.

From the position of Taiwan, Republic of China, so long as there is a violation of sovereignty or an infringement on Taiwan's economic interest, the ROC always files strong protests to re-affirm its sovereignty and calls on the other party or parties to the dispute to take into account the mutually beneficial relationship and the necessity of avoiding unilateral measures that might upset the peace and stability of the said areas of dispute. Equally important, it always upholds the basic principles of "safeguarding sovereignty, shelving [sovereignty] disputes [with the other parties concerned], peace and reciprocity, and joint exploration" and remains willing to work with other countries in exploring the resources of these areas over which many East Asian countries have mutual territorial disputes.

The ROC also has overlapped jurisdiction and sovereignty claims with the Beijing authority both in the Diaoyutai area and the South China Sea, which has not been able to resolve. It is then too far-fetched to argue that Taipei and Beijing will be able to sit down to talk about these issues in the foreseeable future. A key prerequisite for one of these overlapped claims to be settled peacefully between Taipei and Beijing is that the two governments must be able to reach consensus to conduct political (sovereignty) consultations and negotiations on an equal footing, not to mention that it is likely to be a very tough issue hovering over cross-Strait communication as the two sides of the Taiwan Strait must agree on the formula before such consultations and negotiations begin – e.g.,

the formula of “One China,” “One China, Two Systems,” “One China, Two Governments,” “One Country, Two Governments,” “One China, respective interpretations,” or “One China, One Taiwan.” Given the fact that both sides of the Taiwan Strait do not recognize each other’s jurisdiction and sovereignty, this prerequisite will be a hardly surmountable impediment to the beginning of any political consultation or negotiation between Taipei and Beijing.

It is natural for mainland China to wish that Taiwan can join its side to defend bilaterally these areas claimed by Japan and some Southeast Asian countries. Yet, one of the possible consequences is that the level of international intervention in these areas will become higher because of the worry regarding the next step mainland China is going to take, which will hinder the interest of mainland China instead. On this issue, the ROC on Taiwan under Ma’s leadership will never lean toward any party to solve the said disputes, and it will endeavor to seek the possibility of engaging in rational and constructive dialogue with the other parties to the disputes. Besides, as implied before, it should have no intention to cooperate with mainland China to exclude the other countries’ opportunities to participate in joint exploration of resources or even to solve the sovereignty dispute in the disputed areas, even if mainland China is willing to treat and negotiation with Taiwan equally. Accordingly, improved cross-Strait relations are one thing, and Taipei and Beijing working together to claim the sovereignty over the disputed areas is another.¹³

PART III: Cross-Strait Relations and East Asian Economic and Non-traditional Security Issues

As argued before, the positive development of cross-Strait relations will come up with dividends of peace to the region of the Asia-Pacific. The previous section has concentrated on the “high politics” dividends of peace and responded analytically to some wide-spread arguments in association with the improvement in relations across the Taiwan Strait. This section examines the “low politics” dividends of peace brought by

¹³ It is believable that this policy also applies to the relationship between Taiwan and the other parties to the dispute. Specifically, Taiwan agrees to shelve the sovereignty dispute and include the other countries’ opportunities to participate in joint exploration of resources in the disputed area, and in the foreseeable future Taiwan will never work with mainland China bilaterally on the South China Sea issue.

improved cross-Strait ties after May 2008. Two major issue-areas will be touched upon. The first issue-area is the ECFA and its impact on regional economic order. The second deals with the possibility of cross-Strait coordination and cooperation in intraregional mechanisms of the non-traditional security realm, such as counter-terrorism, environmental protection, and energy security.

ECFA and the Asia-Pacific Economic Integration

The ECFA that enhances economic and trade interflows between Taiwan and mainland China might lead to an outcome that the growth of Taiwan's market share in mainland China and foreign direct investment from mainland China is at the expense of their neighboring countries. This seems inevitable when a bilateral free trade agreement (FTA) or FTA-like arrangement is put into practice but the neighboring countries with no better access to foreign trade do not form similar mechanisms or fail to join the said agreement or arrangement. But to think it further, the ECFA is the very first "FTA" Taiwan signed with its major trade partners. With the signing of the ECFA, Taiwan can keep its momentum of economic growth and somewhat eschew the tendency of further marginalization in regional economic liberalization and integration; further, "ECFA and its enabling agreements will likely prompt both [mainland] China and Taiwan to gradually reduce [World Trade Organization (WTO)]-inconsistent measures and make the future cross-straits FTA a WTO-plus one."¹⁴ It appears that the ECFA is a choice Taiwan has to take for now, and that the ECFA will not offset existing economic and trade interests of the Asia Pacific region as a whole. However, if not managed well, the ECFA could also increase Taiwan's chance of economic over-dependence on mainland China and of domestic industries' hollowing-out.

Interestingly enough, for mainland China, the ECFA does not always produce positive consequences. For instance, future cross-Strait relations with the gradual institutionalization of the ECFA will be tough to handle if Taiwan people do not feel that this agreement really helps Taiwan's economy in general, or if Taiwan people believe its implementation comes with an "evil" plot of Beijing that would hollow out Taiwan's economy. Furthermore, the deepening of cross-Strait economic relations may lead

¹⁴ Pasha L. Hsieh, "The China-Taiwan ECFA, Geopolitical Dimensions and WTO Law," *Journal of International Economic Law*, Vol. 14, No. 1 (June 2011), p. 146.

”

Taiwan people to the deliberation why mainland China is willing to develop with Taiwan an economic framework guided by the ECFA but is reluctant to let Taiwan launch bilateral FTA negotiations with others. A fact that can not be denied is: when the Trans-Pacific Partnership (TPP) Agreement, the mainland China-Japan-South Korea FTA, “ASEAN plus 1” FTAs, and so on are emergent or underway, they will seriously offset the economic and trade benefit of Taiwan gained solely from the ECFA.

By the same token, mainland China’s domestic politics can hinder the positive development of cross-Strait economic relations based on the ECFA. For example, if the KMT loses the presidential election in January 2012, there could be severe challenges from the hardliners of the Chinese Communist Party to level a reproach against those who adopt the “profit yielding” approach to deal with the KMT government. What has to be noted here is that this paper does not mean to identify and probe into the pros and cons of cross-Strait ECFA. Neither it is to argue that signing the ECFA is springboard for Taiwan to join a variety of regional multilateral economic liberalization and integration regimes. The message it is trying to carry is the need to be cautious of the ECFA’s subtle nature that interacts with domestic politics of Taiwan and mainland China.

The improvement in cross-Strait economic relations can pave the way for regional welfare by linking Taiwan, mainland China, and the rest of the Asia-Pacific. More specifically, the enhancement and institutionalization of cross-Strait economic ties, prompted by the ECFA, may be of help to “tap into the strength offered by the Greater China market, including Hong Kong and Macao,” which will hopefully turn into another force for the economic cooperation and integration of the Asia-Pacific.¹⁵

Many questions that take place or will take place in cross-Strait economic interactions will also occur in the economic integration process of the Asia-Pacific – e.g., whether countries concerned can use democratic means to garner popular support for free and fair trade, as well as whether the outcome of the integration leads to an open and apolitical process that benefit all people in the region. The enhancement and institutionalization of cross-Strait economic ties and their future relationship with the other forces for the economic cooperation and integration of the Asia-Pacific can be a test stone for the success of the Asia-Pacific economic cooperation and integration. It is thus arguable

¹⁵ “Remarks by Vice President Vincent C. Siew at the international conference on ‘ECFA and East Asia Economic Integration’,” National Policy Foundation (Taipei), April 30, 2011.

that while “the ECFA’s impact on cross-Straits ties and East Asian regionalism remains to be seen, this agreement provides an important gateway to regional stability and presents a valuable example of bilateral trade liberalization with the broad framework of the multilateral trading system.”¹⁶

The Non-traditional Security Issues

What with the positive development of cross-Strait relations, and what with a practical and urgent need for functional cooperation between the two sides, the first three years of cross-Strait re-engagement has witnessed a string of joint measures strengthening food sanitation and safety (the 2nd Chiang-Chen Talk in November 2008), crime-combating (the 3rd Chiang-Chen Talk in April 2009), agricultural product quarantine and inspection, protection of fishing crew (the 4th Chiang-Chen Talk in December 2009), and medical, pharmaceutical and health cooperation (the 6th Chiang-Chen Talk in December 2010). Besides, in September 2010, for the very first time relevant non-military departments and bureaus of Taiwan and mainland China successfully held a joint maritime search and rescue exercise in the waters between Kinmen and Xiamen.

As exchanges between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait on the basis of the “Three Links” have become frequent, the so-called “non-traditional security measures” must be planned and implemented in a cooperative manner to enhance the individual’s quality of life and safeguard national security exposed to the dynamic environment in the post-Cold War era where security threats exist and develop in various forms. Further, the non-traditional security issues of the two sides can have some positive externality not merely for the Asia-Pacific but also for the whole world.

Now, leave aside cross-Strait cooperation in managing non-traditional security threats. Another issue that deserves more attention is whether or not political leaders in the Asia-Pacific can enjoy the fruits of such expanding cross-Strait cooperation by downplaying the sovereignty issue between Taipei and Beijing and highlighting the value of joint effort to better people’s quality of life with some sort of political accommodation. Otherwise, it will be a pity if the achievements in cross-Strait non-traditional security cooperation are greatly confined and unable to spill-over to the other areas suffered.

¹⁶ Pasha L. Hsieh, *Ibid.*, p. 156.

In the Asia-Pacific, non-traditional security issues are discussed and handled by various regional mechanisms such as the East Asia Summit (EAS), the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), and the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). Except APEC, the other mechanisms that can deal with these issues more effectively are mostly international governmental regimes whose membership is strictly sovereign state-based. That is to say, nowadays cross-Strait non-traditional security cooperation only seems able to spread its positive externality through the arrangements of APEC.

At the Track one and a half level, the Council for Security and Cooperation in the Asia Pacific (CSCAP) is an informal mechanism for the discussion of regional traditional and non-traditional security issues. The Indonesia-organized Workshop on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea, another time-honored mechanism of Track one and a half, also touches upon transnational cooperation in coping with non-traditional security concerns in or around the South China Sea. In the former, Taiwan can not participate as a full member but is allowed to send scholars in the individual capacity to join some of the meetings, even though cross-Strait relations have been more relaxed and even though CSCAP is not an international governmental organization. In the latter, Taiwan has been an active participant and come up with a few proposals aimed to foster “low politics” exchanges and cooperation of certain aspects among participating members.

In sum, to take advantage of the positive externality of cooperation in cross-Strait non-traditional security, regional actors, state and non-state, should strive for a commonly acceptable way to take Taiwan in. It would be odd if they stand aside and let go the contribution in related experiences, know-how, financial resources, etc. resulting from the growing number of non-traditional security cooperation between the two sides of the Taiwan Strait.

PART IV: Concluding Remarks

It appears that so long as cross-Strait relations can continue to move forward, they will benefit the region of the Asia-Pacific in many ways. Mainland China that calls for peaceful development and “harmonious world” has been too important and influential to

ignore, and Taiwan with stable democracy, robust economy, and free society is also an important player that vows to be a responsible stakeholder and peace creator in the region. If this period of “strategic opportunity” can be seized not only by the two sides of the Taiwan Strait but also by the region as a whole, it will facilitate the future development of the Asia-Pacific to a great extent.

Despite the fact that between Taiwan and mainland China there are some negative or uncertain forces which may divert the positive development of Taipei-Beijing relations to an outcome that is too complex to analyze suitably, these years are arguably the most stable and promising period in cross-Strait history. Even though, logically, one still cannot rule out the possibility that mainland China will shift its strategic focus on the other sensitive areas of dispute after it has succeeded in reducing the likelihood of Taiwan independence after May 2008, in the foreseeable future the improvement in cross-Strait relations will not weaken Taiwan’s position in the Asia-Pacific strategic map of the US, will not bring Japan’s strategic and economic to a dangerous and inferior position, and should not give mainland China a good chance to garner Taiwan’s support for the collective action against the other parties to the territorial disputes in the West Pacific.

As cross-Strait relations are making salient progress, the bilateral economic cooperation and the success in fulfilling a couple of agreements of functional cooperation can definitely attach something positive to the current development of the Asia-Pacific. The other countries in this region should view the current state of cross-Strait relations as a valuable asset, rather than a troublesome liability.

Finally, to guide cross-Strait relations to the encouraging direction that can contribute to the development of the Asia-Pacific region, three conditions must be met. The first condition is that both Taiwan and mainland China need to exercise great caution and self-restraint to avoid violent consequences of further interactions. The second condition is that the other parties concerned should play an impartial and supportive role in encouraging constructive dialogue between the two sides of the Strait to move on, witnessing proactively the consensus and agreements reached by Taiwan and mainland China, as well as providing security guarantee to ensure the engagement process will not be in favor of any side. The last condition is for all parties, including Taiwan and mainland China, to use fair principles and focus on interests of the region and their

people, not individual party's position, or the sovereignty dispute between Taipei and Beijing will frequently hover over the Asia-Pacific and therefore lessen the spill-over of the benefits of cross-Strait interflows.

國科會補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2013/02/27

國科會補助計畫	計畫名稱: 重整公眾外交以做為台灣外交戰略工具
	計畫主持人: 黃奎博
	計畫編號: 99-2410-H-004-221-MY2 學門領域: 國際關係
無研發成果推廣資料	

99 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：黃奎博		計畫編號：99-2410-H-004-221-MY2					
計畫名稱：重整公眾外交以做為台灣外交戰略工具							
成果項目		量化			單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）	
		實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數（含實際已達成數）	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	0	1	80%	篇	期刊論文初稿已完成
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	1	100%		與澳洲國際事務協會執行長共同申請 2012 年 International Studies Association (ISA) 有關東亞國家公眾外交的發表小組，並結合我國與美國學者一同參與。惜未獲通過。
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力（本國籍）	碩士生	4	4	100%	人次	
		博士生	1	1	100%		
		博士後研究員	1	1	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		
	國外	論文著作	期刊論文	1	0	0%	篇
研究報告/技術報告			1	1	100%		
研討會論文			0	0	100%		
專書			0	0	100%	章/本	
專利		申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
技術移轉		件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	

參與計畫人力 (外國籍)	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次
	博士生	0	0	100%	
	博士後研究員	0	0	100%	
	專任助理	0	0	100%	

其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)	籌畫及參與美國布魯金斯研究院' ' ' ' Public Diplomacy in Northeast Asia: A Comparative Perspective' ' ' ' 座談會並擔任發表人(2012年5月30日)，邀集南加大、美利堅大學、雪城大學相關知名學者專家共聚一堂。 (http://www.brookings.edu/events/2012/05/30-asia-diplomacy)
--	---

	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科 教 處 計 畫 加 填 項 目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與(閱聽)人數	0	

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

臨危授命擔任本校全新國際研究英語碩士學位學程主任(自 100.11 籌備處起算)，該學程滿額為 20 名學生但僅有「半個」助教、無專任教師，以致嚴重影響原欲執行之訪談政府官員、重要相關民間人士計畫，導致目前僅有問卷作為分析基礎之一，尚缺有系統之訪談成果以為輔助。

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：(以 100 字為限)

另有技術報告形式之專論刊載於 2012 年 5 月 10 日美國布魯金斯研究院東北亞研究中心網頁：'Taiwan's Public Diplomacy at a Time of Institutional Change'
(<http://www.brookings.edu/research/opinions/2012/05/10-taiwan-diplomacy-huang>)。

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

本研究並非純理論性的研究，而係一本土化之研究；相關文獻亦極為欠缺，往往需要相對較多的直覺式的觀察與分析。本研究之主要目的在於為我國未來的公眾外交找出一條尚可為多數人所接受且可長可久之道。短期的公眾外交大多是透過媒介（體）以傳播可靠及對我有力的資訊，而長期的公眾外交著眼於文化與教育交流、維持可信度與互利，因此本研究試圖將我國公眾外交與政府宣傳（propaganda）脫鉤，並分析在中共勢力不減反增的情況下，我國政府官員如何看待公眾外交，以及行政院組織改造後各相關部會所反映出對公眾外交的重視又如何。前述針對公眾外交未來走向的研究與建言，可以做為未來政府領導人擘劃施政藍圖時的參考。由於國際上公眾外交期刊與專書少有討論我國，因此本研究計畫之成果可以英文為之提供給相關學術社群做參考。