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台灣民眾之政策偏好與政策回應之研究(第3年) 研究成果報告(完整版)

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中文摘要：過去學者多以政黨認同、候選人取向、選民與候選人的議題立場來解釋選民的投票行為，假設民眾大多數依循這三項長期與短期的心理態度決定其行為。本文試圖分析個體資料，以選舉課責的角度探討選擇現任者的重要因素？那些因素決定是否出席投票？資料來源是 2009 年縣市長選舉前的電話訪問調查。

中文關鍵詞：課責、政策偏好、預算分配

英文摘要：

英文關鍵詞：

目錄

一、前言	2
二、研究目的	2
三、文獻探討	3
政策偏好	3
選舉課責	6
施政評價、地方政治知識與投票參與	8
四、研究方法	11
五、結果與討論	13
參考書目	32

圖次

圖 一：2010 年五個縣市的社福、交通、治安、環保等每人平均決算（千元）	14
圖 二：社會福利滿意度與是否投給現任者.....	15
圖 三：交通滿意度與是否投給現任者.....	17
圖 四：治安滿意度與是否投給現任者.....	18
圖 五：環保滿意度與是否投給現任者.....	19
圖 六：各縣市包含社會福利滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機 率.....	21
圖 七：各縣市包含交通滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機 率.....	22
圖 八：各縣市包含治安滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機 率.....	23
圖 九：各縣市包含環保滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機 率.....	24
圖 十：模型 1 的現任者投票之預測機率變化.....	28
圖 一一：現任者投票之預測機率變化.....	31

表次

表 一：地方施政滿意程度、馬總統施政滿意程度與投票行爲，2009 年縣市長選 舉	26
表 二：地方施政滿意程度、政治知識、馬總統施政滿意程度與投票參與，2009 年縣市長選舉.....	29

一、前言

在民主國家，公民透過公平的選舉，投票給候選人或政黨組成政府，當選的候選人獲得人民的授權，推動政策並在下一次選舉接受檢驗。具體而言，民選的政治人物必須向公民交代，為何實施以及如何實施各種政策，稱為政治課責 (Political accountability)(Moncrieffe 1998)。但是什麼樣的制度保證政治課責？人民的授權如何保證會用在正確的地方？Weir and Beetham(1999:9) 認為透過選舉的授權以及各種法律及財務的監督機制，得以確保政治課責的理想，而且他們強調公民的參與是政治課責的關鍵。

二、研究目的

政府施政不僅要謀求民眾之福祉，而且應該以民眾需求為依歸。而為了爭取連任，理論上現任者必須以良好的施政，包含妥適地分配政府預算，爭取民眾的施政滿意度。但是選民是否能夠回應政府的預算分配，以致於支持現任者？

課責的依據究竟是純粹對該政府的表現進行評估？還是反應出比較其他同級政府的表現，得到一種相對的評價？更進一步言之，民眾的態度是否會受到所在環境的影響如果是前者，政府只需要重視所在地民眾的評價，至於與其他縣市之間的發展比較，則不需要太過重視，因為民眾只衡量所在縣市的狀況。如果是後者，也就是民眾的評價受到其他縣市發展的影響，而不單單考慮所在縣市政府的表現。因此，在統計上應該將所有縣市的受訪者納入同一個模型一起估計影響其政府評價的變數。而這樣的政府課責可以視為比較全面的、相對公平的，因為民眾不僅從自身縣市政府有無進步來評價，而且會比較其他的縣市。如果所在的縣市已經具有相當的發展，受訪者或許只會關注自身縣市政府有無進步。如果是來自相對較為落後的縣市，受訪者可能會考慮其他縣市的進步，更加要求縣市政府的表現。

從一般的經驗來看，民眾只關心所在地的縣市，並不會因為其他縣市的情況而提高或降低評價的標準。但是台灣幅員並不大，而且資訊流通快速，民眾並不

難瞭解其他縣市的狀況，或者是縣市首長的評價，例如天下雜誌每年公佈的縣市首長滿意度，都會引起媒體一定的注意。又例如某些縣市的治安情況特別令人詬病，其他縣市的民眾在回答問卷題目時可能會比較自身縣市的狀況與其他縣市的治安。換句話說，民眾是否會視其他縣市政府的表現，調整對於所在縣市的評價，是一個可以探究的問題。

過去的研究較少考慮到跨政府的評價，因為多數政府課責的研究策略是進行個案研究，也就是觀察單一或數個縣市民眾的投票行為及政治態度，試圖從資料分析中找出政府表現對於選民行為的影響。這樣做的好處是可以深入地瞭解研究對象的狀況，例如候選人形象、地方議題等等。但是如果只觀察單一或數個行政單位，例如台北市、新北市，無法進而推論其它縣市的情形，更因為單一縣市限制了環境特徵的變異，無法探討民眾所處的環境對於其態度與行為的作用。

多層次統計模型剛好可以讓研究者同時分析來自不同群體、區域的資料，而且允許研究者解釋個體資料時，以個體或總體資料做為可變動的截距，顯示出環境因素影響態度解釋行為的程度。此次五都選舉提供了一個應用多層次統計模型於選舉課責的機會。台灣民主化調查 (TEDS) 2010C 的調查資料中包括台北市、台中市、高雄市等三都的受訪者。如果進一步將受訪者分為台北市、台中市、高雄市、台中縣、高雄縣等五群，而且運用改制前各縣市的預算資料，我們可以建立數個多層次模型，以總體的預算及其它變數同時解釋所有受訪者的施政評價。我們所選定的是社會福利、治安、交通、環保等四項政策，在問卷中詢問受訪者對於這些政策 1 到 4 分的滿意程度，並由此評估三都（五個縣市）的所有選民基於預算分配，以其滿意度決定是否投票給現任者的程度。

三、文獻探討

政策偏好

有關民意的經驗研究，可以回溯至 Lippmann (1922, 1925)。Lippmann 的理

論是我們所生活的環境太過複雜，因此需要一個比較簡單的模型來面對各種政治的活動。Downs (1957)的理性抉擇理論與 Lippmann 所強調的自我中心理論相呼應，認為民眾是以自利為出發點來瞭解政治，選擇能夠帶來最大福祉的候選人。從 Downs 的理論可推理出，選舉應該是民眾留下好的現任者或是趕走不好的現任者的一個絕佳機會。

Downs 的理論一開始並未得到經驗資料的驗證。Campbell, Converse, Miller, and Stokes (1960)對於美國民眾投票的研究顯示，民眾會因為其政黨支持而選擇政策立場，但是沒有政黨支持的民眾不一定瞭解政黨的議題立場。因為民眾的政黨認同長期不變，選民的行為只會跟隨社會化過程所獲得的政黨認同投票。很少人會因為政黨的議題立場而選擇政黨。但是 Nie, Verba, 與 Petrocik (1976) 發現美國的兩大黨之間的議題立場距離越來越大，而民眾的政黨認同經過越戰之後下降，根據政黨的議題立場投票的民眾越來越多，雖然這可能是因為新選民的加入。Key(1961)強調政府必須注意民意。他定義民意的範圍不僅包括對於議題的看法，還包含對於許多政治事務的看法，例如政治制度、戰爭、經濟情況等等。Key (1966)認為，民眾的議題立場受到政治精英的立場影響，如果精英的立場不明，民眾也不會建立其議題立場。他認為民眾的確會根據議題或者是政府表現投票，證據是選民會因為政黨的立場而決定再投給同一個政黨還是投給別的政黨。

議題投票的爭議涉及不同的時空背景、研究方法、測量方式、概念定義等等。Carmines 與 Stimson (1980) 試圖再為議題投票加上「容易/困難」的面向，而且他們發現「容易」議題例如從越南撤軍，中低政治知識的選民才可能瞭解候選人的立場，並且據以投票。他們的發現指出涉及到政策過程、技術的「困難議題」投票不易存在，除非選民的政治知識都提高。後續的學者根據政治態度、價值信念、意識形態、政黨認同等等變數的研究總體民意，例如 Stimson (1991)所提出的以左/右之意識形態為基礎建立的政策溫度計(Domestic Policy Mood)，使用 1956-1989 年之間各個調查單位的資料，而將最自由與最保守的比例相減得出一個自由主義的指標。Erikson, Wright 與 McIver (1993)，利用 1976-1988 年間的媒

體民調建構各州的平均意識形態。Jacoby 與 Schneider (2009) 更是利用 Poole (1984) 發展的條件式全域極小值分析，直接從 50 個州的 1982 年至 1995 年的 9 項預算資料，估計未觀察到的各州政策理想點，也就是跳脫民意調查，純粹以政府預算測量各州民眾的偏好。

這些過去的文獻提供議題投票的理論，以及測量個體與總體民意的的方法。俞振華與蔡佳泓 (2011) 參考 Peterson (1995) 將政策分為發展型以及重分配型。根據他的分類法，交通、教育、自然資源、安全、能源等等都是發展型政策。而重分配型政策有：年金、醫療保險、福利、住宅等等。他們試圖建構台灣民眾的預算偏好為『重分配型』與『發展型』政策意向，並且用以解釋投票的傾向。陳文學與羅清俊 (2011) 亦從中研院與選舉研究中心所進行的『公民意識』調查發展出『重分配型』與『發展型』的測量，並且用個體的態度及總體的政經環境加以解釋。以上這些研究提供了長期的指標以評估政策與民意互動的程度。這些研究幫助我們了解個體層次的民意調查轉換成總體民意的趨勢或是與政策之間的相關。

另一方面，國外學者已經發現政府預算與民意產生互動，Wlezien (1995) 提出「恆溫器」(Thermostat) 理論，以 1977 至 1991 年的預算資料，說明民眾對教育、環保、國防等政策的預算偏好一直上升之後，政府一開始維持預算不變，等到偏好越來越高之後，會跟著調高該項政策的支出，但是到達民眾所要求的水準之後，民眾反而會希望調降該項政策的預算，以免花在這個方面的錢過多。而民眾的預算偏好可能受到事件的影響，例如美蘇關係會影響到民眾對外交預算的偏好。Soroka 與 Wlezien (2004, 2005) 以及 Wlezien 與 Soroka (2010) 使用預算偏好的問題建構民眾的政策偏好，並且探討民眾的偏好與實際預算之間相互影響的程度為何。而蔡佳泓與俞振華 (2011) 分析台灣 23 個縣市政府的三個政策制定與民眾偏好之間的關係，以 2006 及 2007 年的預算資料以及民意調查資料為例進行分析，探索地方政府回應民眾偏好的方式與程度。

選舉課責

選舉課責(electoral accountability)，這個概念指的是透過選舉，公民要求在任者爲了其施政表現負起責任。而在實際操作上，本文定義選舉課責爲民眾根據現任者或其同黨前任者的施政滿意度決定其投票傾向。也就是說不管是有現任者競選連任的選區或是現任者即將卸任的開放選區，都包含在選舉課責的範圍。從規範性政治的角度而言，民主國家的統治正當性來自於定期選舉，由選舉產生的公職人物必須接受選民的檢驗。而從理性選擇的角度而言，現任的政治人物必定想要同時保有公職而且獲取利益，而選民必須評估現任者的表現，唯有當現任者通過檢驗—包括犧牲其部份利益—才能保住其職位，否則就會在選舉中失去支持，而選民也才能確定其利益獲得保障，甚至進一步提昇(Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes 1999)。而現任者競選連任或者其同一政黨所提名的候選人參選時，選民若根據其施政表現、從政紀錄、政策立場來評價候選人並且決定投票選擇，那麼選民便是表現出課責現任者的行爲。當然，課責不表示選民捨棄現任者，現任者有可能因其傑出表現而輕鬆連任。課責也並非選舉的全部，挑戰者對於未來的承諾也可能吸引選民進而捨棄現任者。不過，現任者對未來的承諾應該會建立在過去表現的基礎上，所以選舉課責的概念仍然適用(Miller and Wattenberg 1985:360)。

選舉課責是近年來相當受到重視的課題，早在 1957 年，Downs 便在其經濟投票理論之中討論在任者與挑戰者的區別。他認爲在任者的表現應該符合其當選時的承諾，但是在任者不一定要像挑戰者在競選時承諾未來要做什麼，因爲選民會檢視在任者的紀錄，由其所作所爲來驗證是不是可以從承諾來預測表現。而挑戰者因爲無紀錄可言，所以會被檢視對未來的承諾(Downs 1957)。

Key (1966) 則以調查資料強調選民會視政府的施政表現及議題立場決定投給誰，他認爲選民會因爲不滿共和黨政府表現而從投給共和黨轉投給民主黨。雖然他的論點是根據選民回憶更早一次選舉的投票行爲，可能並不正確，但是他的確發現是否滿意現任政府會影響目前的投票行爲。

Fiorina (1981)主張個人的政黨偏好基本上延續過去的偏好，但是會受到政府表現的影響，而且政府的表現有可能影響支持傾向而決定投票行爲。基本上投票行爲是由過去的表現決定，而非對於未來的展望。他的研究顯示政府表現變數是一個外生變數，理論上施政表現有可能是選民綜合過去幾年對於現任者及其政府的觀察，獨立於政黨認同或是候選人評價之外。

理論上，實施政黨政治的民主國家依循一定的意識形態施政，例如北歐國家實行社會民主，日本長久以來實行保守主義等等。那麼政府的意識形態與施政表現對於選民而言是否密不可分？施政表現的影響是否存在？Shanks and Miller (1990) 以 1980 與 1984 年的雷根勝選爲例分析指出，在 1980 年選舉之中選民放棄卡特而選擇雷根的原因是全國經濟的惡化，而 1984 年的選舉則是因爲雷根的表現加上民意支持他的保守政策，即便民主黨認同者較共和黨認同者來得多。

而在新興民主國家，張傳賢、張佑宗（2006）發現選舉課責的確存在。他們探討拉丁美洲國家自民主化以來的選舉結果，其混合模型與傳統模型的分析均顯示執政黨在國會選舉中的得票率會隨著經濟成長率或是失業率而升降，可見得選民會獎懲執政黨的表現，尤其是在總統制的國家。

此外，許多學者探討總體經濟與個人經濟狀況對於投票行爲的影響。¹ Kiewiet (1983)強調對選民而言，總體經濟與政府政策之間是分不開的，因此根據經濟狀況投票也就是根據在任者的表現投票。Markus (1988)把若干總體與個體的資料合併分析，以解釋 1956 至 1984 年的總統選舉結果，他發現好的總體經濟表現及個人感受都會有助於現任者的政黨所提名的總統候選人。Duch 與 Stevenson (2008) 則分析 146 個調查的跨國資料，證實選民會根據經濟好壞獎懲行政部門。Zielinski, Slomczynski與Shabad (2005) 發現在發展中的政黨體系如波蘭，民眾會根據失業率獎懲現任的國會議員，也就是執政黨的國會議員容易落選，反對黨的國會議員較易連任。Slomczynski, Shabad, 與Zielinski (2008)以烏克蘭的分析爲例顯示定期選舉已經成爲新興民主國家的課責機制。

¹ Kiewiet and Rivers (1984)對於 1970 年代有關總體經濟與個人經濟的作用的文獻有詳細的檢討。

因此，不論從一般的政策或是從特定的經濟狀況來分析投票行爲，皆可以確定選民的確會在選舉中課責政府，要求現任者爲其施政負起責任。這篇文章嘗試在地方選舉中測試選舉課責的理論，來補足過去文獻多集中在全國性選舉的缺憾。而且，本文強調台灣的案例研究具有比較政治的重要性。不過，此處所指涉的課責並非經濟表現，而是探討在任者在各項政策的表現。之所以探討施政表現而非經濟表現的選舉課責，第一個原因是經濟理性所帶動的選舉課責可能會有內生性的問題：甲政黨的支持者因爲甲黨執政而認爲甲黨政府改善了經濟，因而投票給甲黨，事實上他是根據政黨認同投票(Lewis-Beck et al. 2008: 387-388)。第二個原因是經濟好壞較屬於全國性的問題，地方政府的責任可能較不明確，尤其像台灣的領土範圍不大，地方政府的財政自主性相當有限，以經濟表現獎懲現任者的基礎並不強。此處的課責也非探討那一個政黨的議題立場受到較多的支持，例如照顧特定族群、推動特定政策等等。原因是地方選舉中候選人通常強調的是共識議題(valence issue)，而非位置議題(position issue)，而且民眾可能記不得太多政策的細節，因此候選人多半強調執行力與魄力，較少採取特定的議題立場，與其他民主國家可能有所不同。²

施政評價、地方政治知識與投票參與

解釋個體與總體投票參與的理論相當多，大致可以歸類爲兩個主要的模型，第一個是資源模型(Resource model)，這個模型強調人必須要有一定的社會地位、政治資訊、社會團體參與等經驗，才擁有足夠的資源進行投票(Verba and Nie 1972; Verba, Nie and Kim 1978; Wolfinger and Rosenstone 1980; Brady, Verba, and Schlozman 1995)。第二個模型是社會心理模型(Social-psychological model)，也就是說人會因爲公民責任感、政黨認同、社會動員等心理因素前去投票(Ashenfelter

² Stokes (1963) 曾討論共識與位置議題的區別，並指出理性投票模型建立在偏好可排列的建設，但是實際政治上有許多共識議題，例如反貪污或經濟變好，牽涉的不是政黨的位置而是誰可以執行，因此他批評 Downs 的理性投票模型若不排除共識議題則無法以理性解釋投票，但是若排除這一類議題那麼該模型的適用範圍便縮小。

and Kelly 1975; Abramson and Aldrich 1982; Blais 2000)。

這兩個模型均提供理論及實際政治的啟發，不僅讓學者得以解釋人為何去投票，而且可以從宏觀角度來解釋投票者屬於那些社會地位，又將會造成那些政治上的不平等。然而，這兩個模型比較缺乏政治課責的關懷，視投票只與個人的社會地位、經濟能力、公民責任感等客觀或主觀的感受有關，而少了對於政府表現的感受。

如前所述，理性投票理論假定民眾會視執政表現決定投票選擇。Downs (1957) 還認為，投票與否決定於候選人可能給予選民的相對利益，如果選民看不出候選人之間的差別，為了節省出席投票的成本，會選擇不出席投票。理性投票理論強調投票是達成獲得利益之工具，和社會心理、政治資源理論的假設有相當大的差異，因此 Achen (2006)、Achen 與 Sinnott (2007) 提出一個新的投票參與模型，稱之為學習模型(Learning model)。他們強調，投票是累積無數次的學習之後的行為，而且是一種表達內心對於人事物看法的行為。不投票者通常是較缺乏資訊、也不關心的一群選民。具體而言，選舉過程中的事件、長期的政黨認同、與他人的接觸，均是選民學習的管道。而瞭解候選人或政黨的政見、特質、紀錄越多，去投票表達對於候選人或政黨的支持或反對的機率也就越高。綜合來說，政治知識不僅代表政治技能，還代表政治興趣以及政治資訊。更重要的是它影響選民對於選舉結果所帶來的可能利益的認知。同時，他們的理論點出施政滿意度的重要性；越滿意或是越不滿意現任者的選民越可能去投票表達意見。

學習模型點出政治知識的重要性，而我們特別考慮民眾對於地方政治的瞭解程度，或稱為地方政治知識。地方的政治事務有其特殊性，民眾不見得瞭解國家大事，但是可能因為地方事務的範圍比較小、對象比較特定，受到一定的注意。

Bobo and Gilliam (1990) 探討非裔美國人的權利意識時，發現當有非裔市長時，這些民眾特別了解地方政治。Shaker (2011) 測量費城民眾的全國及地方政治知識，地方政治知識包含誰代表共和黨競選市長、誰當選市長等等，發現部份民眾對於地方事務的了解程度比對於全國政治的瞭解程度來得高。因此，本研究以所在縣

市的縣市長姓名、縣市政府所在地、縣市人口、那一個單位承辦社會福利等題目，測量受訪者地方政治知識，並且預期民眾的政治知識會影響其投票參與。

投票除了與民眾的學習、政治心理、利益考慮息息相關之外，從政治課責的角度，我們還應該考慮民主體制的作用。學者已經發現民主體制的支持來自於現實政治的感受，例如 Anderson 與 Guillory (1997) 指出選舉獲勝的政黨支持者對於民主體制的支持比落敗政黨的支持者來的高，此外經濟表現的評價越好，民主滿意度越高；Banducci 與 Karp (2003)也發現選舉贏家的支持者有比較高的政治信任感及效能感；Craig, Martinez, Gainous, 與 Kane (2006) 則呈現選舉中的落敗一方支持者的確有較低的民主滿意度、政治信任感等等，間接顯示選舉並不一定讓勝利的政黨獲得正當性，因為輸的一方會認為選舉不公。何以個人的民主評價會被選舉勝負所左右，而並非一個穩定的態度？從理論來說，一般民眾難以想像目前的生活若非民主的話會成什麼樣的景象，所以對於民主的滿意程度高低可能是來自於生活的經驗，也可能是民主此一概念本身的支持(Canache, Mondak and Seligson 2001)。因此在資料分析上不難看到民主評價與目前政府的支持有重疊之處，滿意目前的政府便會滿意民主體制。進一步而言，民主評價可以說是一種工具性的評價；選舉的勝負或是現任者的表現都可能構成對於民主的看法。

若施政滿意度與民主體制支持度密切相關，那麼選民有可能因為支持民主與滿意現任者而出席投票。某種程度來說這是一種公民責任感的表現，民眾越肯定政府與民主運作，越願意成為民主的一部份並且實踐公民的責任。另外也可以視為一種利益的考量，也就是越滿意政府與民主體制的產出，便越願意以投票表達支持以維持民主體制的運作。當然，因為後者的考量而投票的應該會投給現任者或是其繼任者，除非是其他參選人與剛卸任的政府有特殊的關係。綜合來說，政府的施政評價與民主滿意或是民主體制的支持息息相關，而民主體制的支持又可能會激發參與投票的意願。當選民對於現任者表現滿意，可能連帶地認同民主體制的產出，並且願意繼續花費時間去投票支持，而非只是坐等投票結果揭曉，或者是認為有沒有這一票對於結果沒有任何差別而缺席。Grönlund與Setälä (2007)

認為民主滿意度表示民眾認為政府滿足民主規範價值的的要求，而且民主滿意度與政治信任高度相關，因此愈滿意民主應該如同愈信任政治一樣，愈傾向出席投票。³ Grönlund與Setälä以歐洲 22 國的調查資料分析證實他們的論點。

有關國內的投票參與，可見Tsai (2001)、吳俊德、陳永福(2005)、林聰吉(2007)等。這些研究基本上肯定社會網路與投票參與的傾向相關，也強調選民會考慮投票的利益及成本，而選民的教育程度亦有正面的作用，但是缺乏對於政治課責的考量。囿於調查資料，本文不擬測試各種投票模型所提示的重要變數，而是聚焦在「施政評價」及「政治知識」及其交互作用。同時，調查資料為選前所收集，所以要解釋的不是投票行為而是投票的傾向。少了一些因為選舉結果揭曉而刻意回答投給當選者或是出席投票的可能性，投票意向可能更接近真實的投票結果。但是選前的投票意向畢竟不是實際行為，或許隱含測量誤差。不過Duch與Stevenson (2008: 110-111)已經指出，不論是選前或是選後的訪問，經濟投票的平均值差距不顯著。因此投票意向的分析結果應可推論到選舉結果。⁴

四、研究方法

由於我們的模型將納入五個縣市的所有觀察值，是否會得到較佳的估計結果是一個首要的問題。Bartels (1996) 證明，如果所有觀察值來自同一母體，也就是潛在的參數相似的母體，將這些觀察值放入單一模型估計所得的係數，可以會比分開在不同的模型進行估計的結果為佳。

Bafumi and Gelman (2006)則說明，多層次分析(Multilevel analysis)可以視為至少兩個迴歸模型，第一層模型分析個別觀察值之中的依變數與自變數之間的線性關係，第二層模型則是觀察值所屬群體（例如行政區）的線性方程式，如此可以避免觀察值與所屬群體之間的相關造成估計所得係數的偏誤。

同樣的，我們若要探討不同縣市的受訪者不僅因為自身的狀況，且因為所在

³ 有關政治信任與投票之間關係的研究可見(Franklin 2004, Hetherington 1998, 1999).

⁴ 調查所得的投票率為 45.2%，低於各縣市的平均投票率 63.4%。未來可能需要考慮以插補方式減少無反應的比例。

縣市差異而有不同的政策評價，即可借重多層次分析。它可視為線性模型的延伸，視個別觀察值為許多階層中的某一個體，當以線性模型估計個別觀察值中的自變數作用時，各個階層也可以視為個別模型加以估計，而不只是虛擬變數。因此，多層次模型允許研究者假設每一個階層代表一個線性模型的截距，而截距本身又得用線性模型加以估計。因此個別觀察值的變異數、各個階層的變異數、以及各種階層間的交互作用等均是多層次模型所考慮的參數。當某一階層中的觀察值越多，代表內含的資訊越豐富，則多層次模型的係數越接近該階層獨立於其他階層所估計的係數。反之，當某一階層中的觀察值越少，多層次模型的係數越接近所有資料合併且不具備階層虛擬變數所估計的係數。因此，多層次分析所得到的估計既保留各階層的資訊又涵蓋個別觀察值本身的變異數。即使某一層觀察值只能分成三群，例如高、中、低教育程度，所得到的估計仍然優於三群分別估計所得的係數，而且不必因為設定虛擬變數而少掉對照群的觀察值。

就本研究而言，在個體層次，我們可以利用調查資料解釋民眾對於政府表現的評價，例如教育程度以及年齡。再者，個人對於自身家庭過去一年來的經濟狀況評估有可能會影響其滿意度，經濟狀況越好，可能越不需要政府再多為其做任何事，也就傾向滿意政府的施政。而多層次分析模型可幫助我們評估民眾的態度是否有地域的差別？例如台北市的民眾和高雄縣民眾的施政滿意度是否不同？如果不同，是否可以用總體指標——相關政策的每人平均決算——加以解釋？

在國內，多層次分析已被認為相當適用於探討是否總體層次的因素會影響個體層次的反應或行為。蕭怡靖與黃紀（2010）即以多層模型評估選區的政黨勢力、候選人現任與否、產經結構等總體層次對於民眾在 2008 年投票選擇的影響。他們的發現是失業人口越高、農牧人口越多、在國民黨執政的縣市，選民投給國民黨立委的機率越高。黃信豪（2006）亦介紹多層模型的原理並估計 2004 年總統選舉的投票模型，他的發現是當選民所屬縣市平均對民進黨政府評價越高，則該縣市的民眾投票給泛綠的機率也愈高。蕭怡靖與黃紀（2010）及黃信豪（2006）

的研究確認選民所在的縣市環境的確有可能影響其行為。⁵

本研究的策略與黃信豪及蕭怡靖與黃紀略有不同；個體資料應該與總體資料相結合，透過迴歸模型的截距，可估計出不同特徵的民眾對於現任者的支持程度。而且根據學者將貝氏定理與多層次分析相結合的經驗(Gelman, Carlin, Stern, and Rubin 2004; Gelman and Hill 2007)，得以命參數服從一主觀機率，然後透過事前觀察到的資訊與主觀機率的乘積而得出事後機率。在實做中，透過WinBUGS不斷地將模擬過程中每一事後機率，當做事前資訊投入模擬再得到新的事後機率，並依據馬可夫鍊拆解複雜的條件機率。⁶

我們用多層次貝氏模型估計四項施政評價：

$$\begin{aligned} \Pr(y_i = 1) &= \beta^0 + \beta^{\text{家庭經濟評估}} \cdot \text{家庭經濟評估}_i + \beta^{\text{政策滿意度}} \cdot \text{政策滿意度}_i \\ &+ \beta^{\text{與現任者同一政黨}} \cdot \text{與現任者同一政黨}_i + \alpha_{k[i]}^{\text{學歷}} + \alpha_{l[i]}^{\text{年齡}} + \alpha_{m[i]}^{\text{縣市}} \\ \alpha_k^{\text{學歷}} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{學歷}}^2), \text{其中 } j = 1, \dots, 5 \\ \alpha_l^{\text{年齡}} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{年齡}}^2), \text{其中 } l = 1, \dots, 5 \\ \alpha_m^{\text{縣市}} &\sim N(\alpha_{o[m]}^{\text{區域}} + \beta^{\text{預算}} \cdot \text{預算}_j, \sigma_{\text{縣市}}^2), \text{其中 } m = 1, \dots, 5 \\ \alpha_o^{\text{區域}} &\sim N(0, \sigma_{\text{區域}}^2), \text{其中 } o = 1, \dots, 3 \end{aligned}$$

上述模型中的 α 及 β 均假設服從常態分佈，而其變異數則服從無資訊單一分佈(noninformative uniform distribution)。單一分佈的特色是每一個數值都有相同被抽到的機率。Gelman (2006) 證明，當分層內的團體數目不大時，仍然可以假設變異數服從單一分佈，所得到的估計比較合理。


上述的模型透過 R 及 WinBUGS 編寫的程式，命其模擬 8000 次之後，每一變數可獲得一定數目的估計值，再用估計所得的係數平均值預測每個民眾的四項施政評價，同時也模擬部份未回答的觀察值。

五、結果與討論

首先我們本計畫呈現收集到的五都決算資料：


⁵ 令人好奇的一點是黃信豪（2006：205）及蕭怡靖與黃紀（2010：28-29）的分析結果均未顯示觀察值數目。

⁶ 相關說明及例子可參考俞振華與蔡佳泓（2006）以及 Tsai, Chen, Lin, and Cheng (2011)。



圖一：2010年五個縣市的社福、交通、治安、環保等每人平均決算（千元）
資料來源：中華民國統計資訊網

在五個縣市民眾多半滿意或非常滿意社福、治安、交通、環保等政策的情況下，他們是否會在五都選舉中支持現任的縣市長？根據上述的多層次貝氏模型，我們可以估計出各個變數對於投票選擇的作用。




圖二：社會福利滿意度與是否投給現任者

說明：圖中圓點代表估計所得係數的平均值，虛線代表每個係數的正負 1.96 倍標準誤範圍，灰色線代表 0 的參考值，如果虛線不跨越 0 代表迴歸係數在統計上顯著不等於 0。N= 2898。

爲了讓估計係數易於瞭解，圖二以圓點標示多層次模型中每一個係數的數值，水平虛線代表其標準誤，可視爲 95%信心水準的區間估計。對應著 X 軸以及垂直的原點直線，可判斷該係數是否可能爲 0，若不爲 0 的話，又是否大於或小於 0。從圖三可以很快看出，當受訪者的政黨認同與現任者屬於同一政黨，以及滿意於社會福利的表現時，應該會投給現任者。但是每人社福預算的作用可能爲 0，而家庭經濟狀況係數加上 2 個標準誤的區間也有可能爲 0，其它的分層變

數包括年齡、教育、縣市、區域等等係數的區間也涵蓋 0。因此，受訪者的政黨認同與現任者相同以及社福滿意度越高，越可能投票給現任的縣市長。

同樣的，圖三以圓點及水平虛線代表以交通滿意度及其它變數預測是否投給現任者的 95%信心水準的區間估計。對應著 X 軸以及垂直的原點直線，可以很快看出，當受訪者的政黨認同與現任者屬於同一政黨，以及滿意於交通方面的現況時，應該會投給現任者。但是每人交通預算的作用雖然為負，但是部份區間涵蓋為 0。而家庭經濟狀況係數也有可能為 0。其它的分層變數包括年齡、教育的作用亦不顯著。縣市方面，雖然台北市、台中縣市的估計係數落在距離 0 較遠的位置，但是五個縣市的民眾並未特別不支持現任者。區域的影響亦不明顯。因此，受訪者的政黨認同與現任者相同以及交通滿意度越高，越可能投票給現任的縣市長。



圖三：交通滿意度與是否投給現任者

說明：圖中圓點代表估計所得係數的平均值，虛線代表每個係數的正負 1.96 倍標準誤範圍，灰色線代表 0 的參考值，如果虛線不跨越 0 代表迴歸係數在統計上顯著不等於 0。部份係數的虛線範圍與其他係數相差太大，僅能呈現這些係數的部份虛線。DIC=3435。N=3279。

在治安方面，圖四顯示當受訪者的政黨認同與現任者屬於同一政黨，以及滿意治安時，傾向應該會投給現任者。每人交通預算的作用雖然為負，但是部份區間涵蓋為 0。而家庭經濟狀況係數也有可能為 0。其它的分層變數包括年齡、教育的作用亦不顯著。縣市方面，雖然台北市、台中縣市的估計係數落在距離 0 較遠的位置，但是五個縣市的民眾並未特別不支持現任者。區域的影響亦不明顯。因此，受訪者的政黨認同與現任者相同以及交通滿意度越高，越可能投票給

現任的縣市長。




圖 四：治安滿意度與是否投給現任者

說明：圖中圓點代表估計所得係數的平均值，虛線代表每個係數的正負 1.96 倍標準誤範圍，灰色線代表 0 的參考值，如果虛線不跨越 0 代表迴歸係數在統計上顯著不等於 0。DIC=3437。N=3271。

在環保方面，圖五也以圓點及水平虛線代表以環保滿意度及其它變數預測是否投給現任者的 95%信心水準的區間估計。對應著 X 軸以及垂直的原點直線，可以很快看出，只有一個變數也就是每人分配到的環保預算的作用顯著不為 0；環保預算越高，縣市的環保表現可能越好，即使受訪者並未表達出滿意，或是受訪者的政黨認同與現任者不屬於同一政黨，受訪者仍然越可能投給現任者。其它

的分層變數包括年齡、教育、縣市的作用並不顯著。因此，環保的預算多寡，反映在縣市的整體環境，民眾的確會據此投票。這個結果與蔡佳泓、俞振華（2011）對於 23 個縣市的分析結果類似；民意的變動會受到預算多寡的影響，尤其是環保。這是因為環保預算規模並不大，而近年來民眾環保意識越來越高，主管的環保局不得不努力降低各種污染，以維持民眾的生活品質。因此地方政府反而比起在規模龐大的社福、交通方面，較會反映民意在環保預算上面。本研究則證實，如果環保預算不足以致於環境品質下降，民眾有可能課責地方政府，即使多數民眾不分縣市滿意現狀，環保預算本身仍然足以左右現任者受支持的程度。





圖 五：環保滿意度與是否投給現任者

說明：圖中圓點代表估計所得係數的平均值，虛線代表每個係數的正負 1.96 倍標準誤範圍，灰色線代表 0 的參考值，如果虛線不跨越 0 代表迴歸係數在統計上顯著不等於 0。N=3199。


根據這四個模型的估計結果，可以看出環保預算所影響的縣市總體環境，產生對於投票行為的影響。而多層次模型的優點為不像控制變數具有的對照組，分層內的每一群體的係數都加以估計，所以我們很容易地凸顯各個縣市本身具有的特質。而縣市的特質為何？根據天下雜誌在 2010 年 9 月所公布的 25 縣市幸福縣市大調查，每個縣市皆進行至少 500 個樣本的抽樣調查，並且邀請專家評比，加權比例為民眾 80%、專家 20%。25 縣市長滿意度排名之中，高雄縣與高雄市分列第一名與第三名，台北市列第 21 名，台中市與台中縣分別為第 18 名及第 23 名（天下雜誌，2010）。由此我們預期，相較於台北市、台中縣市，高雄縣市的民眾對於現任者應該有較高的支持度，不論其個別政策滿意度、政黨認同或是家庭經濟狀況，這是因為高雄縣市民眾所在的環境讓他們對於現狀有較高的滿意度。因此，在代入所有觀察值的係數與調查所得的自變數數值並計算乘積之後，再加上各個縣市的截距，而這個截距是各個縣市所在區域以及個別預算分配的函數，代表各個縣市的特色。圖七顯示，考慮社會福利政策滿意度，觀察代表中位數的粗線，台北市的郝龍斌市長支持機率分佈在 0.2 到 0.8，隨著自變數的變化而升高，代表國民黨競選台中縣、台中市合併後的台中市長的胡志強市長也有類似的支持程度，但是高雄縣長楊秋興以及高雄市長陳菊，其支持機率分別從 0.6 及 0.4 往上升高，特別注意到楊秋興的支持機率高於陳菊，符合天下雜誌的調查結果。



圖六：各縣市包含社會福利滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機率


說明：在 1000 多個模擬的係數之中，粗線代表自變數線性組合值之中位數對應的機率曲線，灰色的 20 條線代表其它模擬得出的自變數線性組合值對應的機率曲線。

圖七則是納入交通滿意程度之後，對於現任者支持機率的估計。台北市、台中縣市的圖中代表中位數的粗線從不到 0.2 一直升高到 0.8，而高雄縣從 0.4 一直升高到接近 1，高雄市則是從 0.2 上升到 1 左右。可見得高雄縣在交通方面受到肯定的程度與其他縣市之間的差距相當明顯。另外，高雄縣的支持機率模擬線也較其他縣市來得集中。




圖七：各縣市包含交通滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機率
 說明：同圖六。

治安方面，圖八同樣顯示高雄縣及高雄市的支持機率較其他三個縣市來得高，也較不受到自變數組合的影響，尤其是高雄縣從 0.5 開始上升到接近 1。



圖八：各縣市包含治安滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機率
說明：同圖六。

圖九則呈現環保施政表現及其他變數對於投給現任者機率的影響程度。除了高雄縣市與其他縣市的差異之外，我們發現模擬所得的機率曲線與代表中位數的曲線之間有很多空白，顯示 20 個模擬所得的機率值有一半與中位數相差甚多，這是因為個別縣市之間的差距不僅反應在截距上，而且加上其它自變數之後，使得自變數離散程度加大，對應的預測機率也隨之分散。



圖九：各縣市包含環保滿意度的自變數線性組合值所預測之投給現任者機率
說明：同圖六。

因此，雖然只有環保預算是唯一影響支持連任者程度的政府預算，社福、交通、治安等等個別政策滿意度加上其他自變數，在各個縣市影響支持連任者的機率仍然有所差異，不過差異似乎不比環保來得大。因此，即使各個縣市如同天下雜誌所報導的施政滿意度有所差異，環保方面的縣市差異仍然較為明顯。

我們再利用台灣選舉與民主化(TEDS 2010C)的調查資料，將受訪者分為台北市、台中縣、台中市、高雄縣、高雄市等五群，而且運用五都改制前的決算資料，評估每人政策支出加上受訪者對於這五個縣市的各方面評估—社會福利、治安、

交通、環保等 1 到 4 分滿意程度，在四個多層次模型之中對於選擇現任者與否的影響。結果發現在考慮受訪者的政黨認同之後，個別政策的施政滿意度顯著地影響投票行為，但是除了環保之外，政策的預算多寡並不影響投票行為。

表一呈現兩個模型，模型 1 估計地方施政評價、中央施政評價以及其它變數對於 2009 年縣市長選舉行為的影響，模型 2 則估計地方政府的各個政策評價、總統表現評價以及其它變數對於 2009 年縣市長選舉行為的影響。

以模型 1 而言，地方施政評價有正面的影響，增加 1 個滿意程度會增加 1.528 ($\exp(0.424)$) 倍投給現任者的機率。而總統表現的影響需配合是否為國民黨執政縣市這個變數來看。在非國民黨執政縣市，非常滿意馬英九的民眾相對於非常不滿意馬英九的民眾只增加 0.013 倍的機率會投給現任者或其政黨提名人，因此馬英九滿意度在非國民黨執政縣市幾乎沒有影響。但是在國民黨執政縣市，非常滿意馬英九的民眾相對於非常不滿意馬英九的民眾卻有 5.985 倍的機率會投給現任者或是國民黨提名人。⁷另一種分析方式為回到係數本身，代入馬總統表現滿意程度的平均值 2.21 之後，得到 $-1.349(-4.101+1.245*2.21)$ 。應用 Gelman 與 Hill (2007) 的係數除 4 法則，在馬總統表現為平均值的情況下，國民黨執政縣市的受訪者較非國民黨執政縣市的受訪者多了 33.73% ($1.349/4$) 的機率投給現任者。而在國民黨執政縣市的情況下，受訪者隨著馬總統表現滿意程度增加 1 個單位，多了 6% ($[-1.005+1.245]/4$) 的機率投給現任者。⁸相較於地方施政表現滿意的變數，其影響程度為 10.6% ($0.424/4$)，馬總統表現滿意程度的作用相去不遠。進一步的比較將在檢視其他變數之後詳述。

選舉課責的部份之外，長期的政治支持與過去投票行為的影響亦值得觀察。模型 1 的結果顯示，當政黨認同與現任者不同，投給現任者比起不投給現任者的機率為 0.381 倍 ($\exp(-0.938)=0.619$)，或者是說不投給現任者比投給現任者的機

⁷ 用 Stata 的 `display` 指令可列出兩個變項——馬英九滿意度與是否為國民黨執政縣市——的估計係數的 8 個對數值，加以相除後即得勝算比。

⁸ 因為勝算對數函數為一曲線，在該曲線中央處相切的切線有最大的斜率，而對應該點的函數方程式的值為 0 時，該斜率為 0.25，因此係數若除以 4，便可得到自變數每增加 1 單位，依變數的機率的變化百分比。詳見 Gelman and Hill (2007, 81-93)。

率是 2.55 倍。換句話說，政黨認同與現任者不同將會降低投票給現任者的意願。此外，上次投票給現任者的選民，有 3.031 倍的機率再投給同一人或是其政黨提名人 ($\exp(1.108)=3.031$)。這個結果似乎說明現任的縣市長具有一定的優勢。最後，截距係數的方向為正，表示受訪者傾向投給現任者或其政黨提名人，在其他變數都相同的情況下。⁹

而模型 2 移除地方政府的整體表現滿意程度此一變數，分析的結果顯示，環境保護的滿意程度會提高受訪者投給現任者或其政黨提名人的機率，而其他係數的方向及顯著水準與模型 1 幾乎一樣。環保的影響或許令人意外，但是近年來民眾環保意識升高，各地環保局接獲的檢舉或陳情案件數量不斷創新高紀錄。¹⁰而且相對於社福、教育、交通等政策需要中央補助，環保可能因為預算規模較小，縣市政府反而能夠依照民意調整，而使得民眾對於政府的期待較其他政策來得高。值得注意的是，因為部份受訪者未回答各項政策的滿意度，所以未納入分析，以致模型 2 較模型 1 少了 157 個觀察值。

表一：地方施政滿意程度、馬總統施政滿意程度與投票行為，2009 年縣市長選舉

	模型 1	模型 2
	β	β
	(s.e.)	(s.e.)
常數項	2.001*	2.187
	(0.886)	(1.239)
地方施政滿意程度	0.424***	---
	(0.148)	
社會福利滿意程度	---	0.168
		(0.203)
中小學教育滿意程度	---	-0.026
		(0.194)
社會治安滿意程度	---	0.094
		(0.174)
交通建設滿意程度	---	0.032
		(0.169)
醫療保健滿意程度	---	-0.091
		(0.194)


⁹ 因為部份模型中的自變數的最小值為 1，所以理論上不能代入 0 以評估截距的作用。若求出所有的自變數的平均值，再與自變數本身相減之後，便可以代入 0 來詮釋截距的影響。

¹⁰ 劉開元，2010，〈「吵死了」「臭死了」環保陳情創新高〉，《聯合晚報》，7 月 25 日：第 3 版。

環境保護滿意程度		0.377*
	---	(0.177)
馬總統表現滿意程度	-1.005**	-1.321***
	(0.348)	(0.411)
國民黨執政	-4.101***	-4.617***
	(0.828)	(1.048)
國民黨執政×馬總統表現滿意程度	1.245***	1.494***
	(0.366)	(0.445)
政黨認同與現任者政黨（不同=1）	-0.938***	-0.814*
	(0.278)	(0.321)
上次投票選擇（投給現任者=1）	1.108***	1.343***
	(0.212)	(0.256)
年齡（51 歲以上為對照組）		
20 至 35 歲	0.284	0.371
	(0.285)	(0.343)
36 至 50 歲	0.154	0.299
	(0.246)	(0.299)
教育程度（專科以上為對照組）		
國中及以下	-0.385	-0.380
	(0.292)	(0.357)
高中職	-0.422	-0.476
	(0.222)	(0.270)
Log Likelihood	-314.986	-224.680
Pseudo R ²	0.215	0.234
N	582	425

說明：*p≤0.05；**p≤0.01；***p≤0.001（雙尾檢定）。

進一步比較地方施政滿意程度、馬總統表現滿意程度兩個變數對於投給現任者的影響大小，須以 $p(y=1) = \frac{\exp(\alpha + \beta x)}{1 + \exp(\alpha + \beta x)}$ 來估計機率隨著自變項的值變化而變化的程度，並且控制其他的變數在平均值或是 0 或 1。在國民黨執政縣市、年齡設定為 36 至 50 歲，教育程度設定為高中職、政黨認同與現任者政黨相同、上次投票投給現任者的情況下，分別設定地方施政滿意程度、馬總統施政滿意程度為 1 到 4，填入自變數得值並與模型 1 的係數相乘後，圖十顯示，馬總統施政滿意程度的預測機率變化大約在 0.3 至 0.45 間，地方施政滿意程度的預測機率變化大約在 0.2 至 0.5 間，相差不大。需要注意的是，在未考慮預測機率的上下信賴區間前，這樣的比較僅供參考。而且一旦改變設定，也可能造成差異。



圖十：模型1的現任者投票之預測機率變化

說明：根據模型1的估計係數，方塊實線表示當馬總統施政滿意程度由1到4每隔0.5變化時，地方施政滿意程度設定為平均數，在國民黨執政縣市年齡設定為36至50歲，教育程度設定為高中職，其它變數設為1的情況下，投票給現任者之機率變化。圓形虛線表示當地方施政滿意程度由1到4每隔0.5變化時，馬總統施政滿意程度設定為平均數，在國民黨執政縣市，年齡設定為36至50歲，教育程度設定為高中職，其它變數設為1的情況下，投票給現任者之機率變化。

如果選民根據課責來決定是否投票給現任者，那麼地方施政評價是否會提高他們的投票參與？也就是說，愈滿意地方政府愈會去投票，不論要投給現任者或其他候選人。而愈具備政治知識的人，會不會愈因為學習了候選人的區別而去投票？此外，民眾是否愈會因為馬政府的表現好壞而去投票？為了回答這些問題，

表二呈現兩個二元勝算模型的估計結果。模型 3 內的自變數包括地方施政整體滿意程度、地方政治知識、地方事務關心程度、上次投票參與、年齡、教育程度。模型 4 則再納入馬總統表現滿意程度、國民黨執政縣市以及國民黨執政與馬總統表現滿意程度的交互作用。

表 二：地方施政滿意程度、政治知識、馬總統施政滿意程度與投票參與，2009 年縣市長選舉

	模型 3	模型 4
	β	β
	(s.e.)	(s.e.)
常數項	-3.126*** (0.445)	-1.782** (0.597)
地方施政整體滿意程度	0.472*** (0.085)	0.455*** (0.095)
地方政治知識	0.204** (0.077)	0.139\$ (0.081)
馬總統表現滿意程度	---	-0.587*** (0.168)
國民黨執政縣市	---	-0.929* (0.435)
國民黨執政×馬總統表現滿意程度	---	0.610** (0.192)
地方政治知識	0.195* (0.081)	0.149\$ (0.084)
上次投票參與（投票=1）	1.448*** (0.136)	1.402*** (0.140)
年齡（51 歲以上為對照組）		
20 至 35 歲	0.152 (0.204)	0.064 (0.211)
36 至 50 歲	-0.275 (0.169)	-0.374* (0.176)
教育程度（專科以上為對照組）		
國中及以下	-0.014 (0.195)	-0.020 (0.205)
高中職	0.440** (0.150)	0.440** (0.156)
Log Likelihood	-709.957	-661.249
Pseudo R ²	0.126	0.131
N	1173	1099

說明：\$p≤0.1；*p≤0.05；**p≤0.01；***p≤0.001（雙尾檢定）。

模型 3 顯示，愈滿意地方政府表現，愈可能會投票。地方政治知識愈高、關

心地方事務程度愈高，也愈會去投票。在其它變數相同的情況下，上次去投票的民眾這一次也打算投票。高中職教育程度的民眾比大專及以上教育程度民眾更傾向投票。在這些自變數之中，以上次投票行為的影響最大；上次投票的選民，有 4.254 倍的機率再投票（ $\exp(1.448)=4.254$ ），或者是增加 36.2% 的投票機率。

經過 Wald test 確定馬總統表現滿意程度、國民黨執政縣市及其交互作用項等變數明顯改善模型適合度後，決定納入這三個變數於模型 4。地方施政整體滿意程度的影響不變，地方政治知識的影響也達到 10% 的統計顯著水準。與投票選擇的分析結果類似的是馬總統表現滿意程度、國民黨執政縣市及其交互作用項等都具有顯著的影響，也就是說在國民黨執政縣市，馬總統表現滿意程度愈高，投票的意願愈高。地方事務關心程度、上次投票參與均有正面的顯著影響。同樣的，高中職教育程度的民眾比大專及以上教育程度民眾更可能去投票。

這些發現大致符合假設以及實際經驗。仿照圖十的繪圖方式，繪圖十一較馬總統表現滿意度及地方施政滿意程度的影響。前者變化所造成的機率變化約在 0.65 至 0.7 之間，僅有不到 0.05 的變化。後者所造成的變化則在 0.5 到 0.8 之間，變化幅度約為 0.3。可以看出馬總統表現滿意度對於投票參與的影響不及地方施政滿意程度。若按照 Gelman 與 Hill 的方法計算，馬總統表現滿意度每上升 1 個單位，在國民黨執政縣市的受訪者只增加 0.5% 的投票機率。但是當地方施政滿意程度每上升 1 個單位，受訪者可能增加 11.3% 的機率去投票。




圖 十一：現任者投票之預測機率變化

說明：根據模型 4 的估計係數，方塊實線表示當馬總統施政滿意程度由 1 到 4 每隔 0.5 變化時，地方施政滿意程度、地方事務關心程度、地方政治知識設定為平均數，在國民黨執政縣市，年齡設定為 36 至 50 歲，教育程度設定為高中職，其它變數設為 1 的情況下，投票給現任者之機率變化。圓形虛線表示當地方施政滿意程度由 1 到 4 每隔 0.5 變化時，馬總統施政滿意程度、地方事務關心程度、地方政治知識設定為平均數，在國民黨執政縣市，年齡設定為 36 至 50 歲，教育程度設定為高中職，其它變數設為 1 的情況下，投票給現任者之機率變化。

總結以上的分析，地方施政評價及總統表現評價如預期般影響 2009 年縣市長選舉的投票選擇及投票參與，可見得選舉課責涵蓋地方與中央政府表現，施政評價的重要性不言可喻，這一點與吳重禮、李世宏(2004)、Lim, Wu, 與 Yu (2010) 類似。更重要的是地方施政評價對於選舉參與亦有影響；執政表現若不好可能會

降低民眾參與政治的意願。政治知識對於投票參與的作用在不同模型中有些微差別，部份證實了 Achen (2006)、Achen 與 Sinnott 的學習投票理論，亦即選民對地方事務愈瞭解以及越關心，愈會出門投下選票。上次投票參與及選擇分別是投票行為及選擇的重要預測變數，顯示民眾的行為乃基於過去的經驗，而這也加強了過去的施政評價對於投票選擇及投票參與的影響機制。

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國科會補助專題研究計畫項下出席國際學術會議心得報告

日期：101 年 6 月 21 日

計畫編號	NSC 98-2410-H-004-069-MY3		
計畫名稱	台灣民眾之政策偏好與政策回應之研究		
出國人員姓名	蔡佳泓	服務機構及職稱	政大選舉研究中心研究員
會議時間	101 年 2 月 3 日至 101 年 2 月 6 日	會議地點	日本東京
會議名稱	(中文) (英文)「Candidate Selection in East Asia」工作坊 「Designing Governance for Civil Society」研討會		
發表論文題目	(中文) (英文)「Is “Polling Primary” the Best Way to Select Candidates? Analyzing an Innovation of Candidate Selection Mechanism in Taiwan」		

一、參加會議經過

此次到日本參加兩個研討會，分別是學習院大學東洋文化研究所舉辦的「Candidate Selection in East Asia」工作坊以及慶應大學市民社會治理中心舉辦的「Designing Governance for Civil Society」研討會。此行發表的文章為「Is “Polling Primary” the Best Way to Select Candidates? Analyzing an Innovation of Candidate Selection Mechanism in Taiwan」。

本文的重點為討論台灣的政黨如何透過提名，處理在混合選制下候選人之間競爭可能造成的衝突。

在台灣，國民黨早於 1990 年代在部分選區採用民調決定提名，而民進黨則多半使用黨員初選。不過，民調結果只佔全部分數一定的比例，黨員投票佔的比例通常較高。直到 2008 年，民進黨採用「排藍」過濾式民調，民調結果佔 70%，黨員投票佔 30%。因此，民進黨在 2012 年立委選舉，於有提名爭議的選區，採用完全民調的提名方式，可以說是前所未有的創舉。民進黨的作法是否能夠幫助更多候選人勝選？還是反而讓國民黨有機可趁？又如何解釋民進黨採用全民調的動機？在本研究中，我與共同作者嘗試從理性選擇的途徑解釋民進黨為了避免政黨內部衝突，以開放初選的方式引進民意。實際上，民進黨比起上次選舉獲得更多的席次，而且根據我們的調查，民眾多半肯定政黨採用民調選出的候選人素質，可見得政黨採取此一途徑，的確在總體上與個體上，都有不錯的成效。

候選人提名關係到政黨協調候選人以爭取最多選票。候選人代表政黨，因此政黨必須慎選候選人才能獲得多數的席位。然而，政黨是否能夠根據民意選出最受歡迎的候選人？還是基於黨意來挑選足以捍衛政黨立場的候選人？而政黨又如何制度化挑選候選人的方式？這些都是有趣而且需要深入探討的問題。

政黨做為反應民眾偏好的機制之一，其內部運作方式自然是需要關注的議題。政黨的功能雖然不見得直接與民眾相關，但是他們的運作結果影響深遠，包括候選人的來源、政黨的組織、甚至立法過程，都可能受到政黨提名方式的影響。

因此，雖然政黨提名與民眾偏好在概念上沒有直接的關聯，但是可以藉由瞭解政黨提名，觀察政黨以及民眾對於政黨如何決定未來走向的期待。如果政黨只想維持原

有的體制而非適應民眾的需求，那麼政黨影響民眾偏好的程度應該與日俱減。如果政黨透過嘗試新的提名方式，改進其政黨形象、候選人的素質、地方組織的生態，那麼政黨應該可以持續地影響民眾的偏好。

二、與會心得

參加這兩個研討會的目的在於與現場的學者交換意見，針對候選人提名的研究方法有更深入的了解。參與這兩場研討會的學者來自東京大學、學習院大學、慶應大學、神戶大學、高麗大學等學者。與會者提出的問題除了針對台灣的提名制度之外，還有政黨提名的候選人在國會的表現。針對這一點，我們的回答是透過初選出線的候選人目前相當受到政黨紀律的約束。當然，他們還是會規劃自身的選民服務以爭取更多超越政黨的支持者，或者稱之為「個人選票」(personal vote)。

三、考察參觀活動(無是項活動者略)

四、建議

透過此次到日本發表文章，我們可以觀察到日本及韓國學者在選舉行為、政黨政治、議題投票、社會分歧等各個領域的研究。雖然相較於歐美國家的研討會，亞洲為主的研討會規模不大，但是這種區域研討會所建立的平台，對於日後學術交流相當有幫助，有助台灣學界建立更多的國際合作關係。

五、攜回資料名稱及內容

會議論文集。

六、其他

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下赴國外(或大陸地區)出差或研習心得報告

日期：__年__月__日

計畫編號	NSC — — — — —		
計畫名稱			
出國人員 姓名		服務機構 及職稱	
出國時間	年 月 日至 年 月 日	出國地點	

一、國外(大陸)研究過程

二、研究成果

三、建議

四、其他

國科會補助專題研究計畫項下國際合作研究計畫國外研究報告

日期：__年__月__日

計畫編號	NSC — — — —		
計畫名稱			
出國人員 姓名		服務機構 及職稱	
合作國家		合作機構	
出國時間	年 月 日至 年 月 日	出國地點	

一、國際合作研究過程

二、研究成果

三、建議

四、其他

Is “Polling Primary” the Best Way to Select Candidates?
Analyzing an Innovation of Candidate Selection Mechanism in Taiwan

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I. Introduction

One of the fundamental functions of political parties is to select candidates to win elections. Different candidate selection methods tend to attract different types of candidates to vie for party nomination. Previous literature suggests that a party’s candidate selection process not only determines its prospect for winning elections, but also shapes its power structure.

Recently, Taiwan’s two major parties have adopted “polling primaries” to select candidates to run for elections. Specifically, political parties use numbers obtained by multiple public opinion polls to decide their nominations in almost every level of elections. There exist two major reasons to explain why both parties have used opinion polls as their primaries: first, both parties have a considerable number of “fake” party members who did not actually pay their dues to join the parties. Instead, local party leaders or cadres usually pay for rank-and-file party members’ dues. It was a common practice for them to nurture their bases within the parties. Yet, such practice is illegal now as it can be regarded as vote-buying if one uses the way to develop his/her own base and seeks for nomination by a closed party primary in which only party members are eligible to vote. In short, using polling primary becomes a safe way in the sense that there would be no concern regarding vote-buying as none of the party members would directly cast their votes in the primary. Second, in order to win the election in a single member district, a candidate must garner the plurality or even majority of votes. If a candidate has better popularity or name recognition, he or she is more likely to win. Thus, both parties believe that using opinion polls is the best way to select winnable candidate.

Yet, every rule or institution should have its pros and cons. This study analyzes the extent to which this type of candidate selection mechanism may affect both parties’ future developments. The following sections are constructed as follows: Section II provides an overview of Taiwan’s candidate selection from a historical perspective. Section III addresses key features of candidate selection mechanisms adopted by the two major parties. Section IV assesses the possible impact of polling

primary on electoral outcome. Section V concludes with major pros and cons of the current polling primary system.

II. **Candidate Nomination in Taiwan—A Historical Overview**

Mainstream literatures have long focused on distribution of power when analyzing a party's candidate nomination process. It is often seen that, for example, scholars use a dichotomous "centralized vs. de-centralized" scheme to compare candidate nomination among different political parties (Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Wu 2008). By examining the procedures of candidate nomination against certain criteria of power centralization, these studies have concluded various types of political parties with respect to internal democracy. Also, by extension, there are factors contributing to different shapes of candidate nomination. A party's candidate nomination processes might differ from its counterparts due to its distinct history or other political factors (e.g., leadership). Meanwhile, the distribution of power within a political party may also change over different periods. Consequently, the processes and outcomes of candidate nomination have evolved multifold in different political parties in different countries.

In Taiwan, political parties have experienced different formats of candidate nomination over the past decades. Some of them are common to other countries' experiences but some are unique. For one thing, candidate nomination in Taiwan has closely related to the distribution of power within a political party which resembles to other counter-part countries. Equally important, political parties in Taiwan have also adopted different procedures of candidate nomination over different periods. Yet, as a new democracy, the development of candidate nomination in Taiwan can be best understood under the perspective of political democratization. The implementation of candidate nomination can be regarded as a product of party competition along the process of democratization.

In the discussion of the origins of political party, Duverger (1954) had pointed out the distinction between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political parties. There are many differences between the two types of political party. Among these differences, Duverger indicated that, in a relatively term, the intra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power de-centralization while the extra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power centralization. The relationship between the origins and power distribution of political party is also applicable to the case of the KMT and the DPP in the process of candidate nomination.

The KMT's origin carries a strong component of extra-parliamentary political party. It was a revolutionary political party aiming at overthrowing the Qing dynasty by force before 1911. The distribution of power in the revolutionary group was more centralized than de-centralized then. It was not until the 1911 that the KMT began to transform itself from an armed force group into a political party to run a new Republic. Comparatively, the KMT has the longest experience of nominating candidate in elections. These experiences can be traced back to the founding periods of the Republic in mainland. The KMT had appointed various delegates to enact the Republic's constitution and form the parliament. Unfortunately, the new Republic did not sustain without difficulties since her establishment. The war between China and Japan and later the civil war between the KMT and the CCP had obstructed the new Republic from becoming a real democracy. The continuous warfare had also facilitated a centralized tendency of power within the KMT. It is difficult to have a complete picture of how the KMT selected its candidates due to the lack of historical materials. Yet, it is reasonable to argue that the selection process would tend to be less institutionalized and more contingent on political expediency.

Unlike the period in mainland China when elections were not able to put into practice, the KMT in Taiwan began to implement local elections since the early 1950s and provided opportunities for candidate nomination within the KMT. Plenty of studies pointed out that the main purpose of the KMT's implementation of local elections was to strengthen its grass-rooted support on the island. These local elections also served as a sharp contrast between the KMT's regime and the CCP's Communist China. The KMT regime was thus able to create a democratic image to garner international support. Yet, owing to enduring confrontations with the CCP, the KMT had maintained an authoritarian political system and a centralized party structure. Its process of candidate selection has less to do with democracy. Instead, candidate nomination in the KMT was no more than an expression of power of party leaders. Candidate was chosen by the KMT because of his/her loyalty to the party (or party leaders). The results of local elections were certainly unable to jeopardize the KMT's political dominance in Taiwan. To some degree, candidate nomination was an extension of political control over the society.

Other than the local elections, the KMT initiated a limited opening of legislative elections in the late 1960s (only a few seats were opened for election, but not total re-election of the legislators). Yet, the nomination of legislative candidates revealed similar pattern like the local elections. Candidates for legislative elections were

mainly decided by party leaders. The selection process of legislative candidate normally follow a basic format: both the local party branch and the central headquarter seemed to co-share the authority for nomination. For example, as indicated in Table 1, the three levels of party organization, local party branch, provincial party headquarter, and central party headquarter had participated in the decision of choosing legislative candidates. However, these regulations did not carry on significant implications. More often than not, legislative candidates were decided by higher level of party organizations, i.e., the provincial or central party headquarter rather than local party branches. In particular, the central party headquarter would provide a candidate list to local party branches before elections taken place. It was not unusual to find different task forces in the central party headquarter to take charge of candidate nomination. The members of task force were assigned either by the party leader or by the party's most power organization, the Central Standing Committee. In spite of opinions and reviews provided by the local party branch, the central headquarter had the final say in the candidate list. This pattern did not change until the late 1980s when party primary was adopted by the KMT.

Table 1: District Candidate Nomination of the KMT and the DPP

Year	KMT	DPP
1969	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1972	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1975	Same as 1972	NA
1980	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1983	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then	NA

	the provincial party headquarter doubled the number of nominee, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	
1986	Same as 1983	NA
1989	Candidates produced by party member primary (under one half block vote formula), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote
1992	Candidates produced by party member primary (under a plurality system) (50%), and reviews of local party officials (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote
1995	District candidates produced by opinion consultation of local party members, or by opinion polls, or by reviews of local party officials, then decided by the central party headquarter Party list candidates were decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (50%) and party official reviews (50%)
1998	Same as 1995	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (50%) and party official reviews (50%)
2001	Candidates produced by party member primary (50%), and opinion polls (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (30%) and opinion polls (70%)
2004	Candidates produced by party member primary (30%), and opinion polls (70%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Same as 2001
2008	Same as 2004	Same as 2001
2012	Candidates produced by opinion polls, then decided by the central party headquarter	Same as 2001

Note: The nomination of party list candidates is not included.

Source: Data before 2012 were adopted and revised from Wang (2008, 143-170).

The method of candidate selection in 1989 was notable in terms of party members were introduced formally to participate in the process of candidate selection. Local party members cast their votes in the primary under the block vote system (each member had one half of votes in the candidate list) then the final results would be decided by the central party headquarter. Unlike the previous processes of candidate selection that local party branch and members played only facial roles, the 1989 party member primary did provided a clear mechanism by which party member's opinions can be aggregated. Even though the central party headquarter continued to maintain the power for final decision, it was witnessed that, in general, the decisions of the party headquarter did echo to the results of party member primary. There was a shift of power between the local and center party organizations and the later did not monopoly the power of candidate nomination. Local party members or part officials were asked to participate more actively ever since. The balance of power between the local and central party organizations shifted again in 2001 when citizens were introduced into the party primary. In that year, both the local party members and citizens have an equal say in the decision of candidate selection. The final results of party member primary and citizen primary were combined and sent to the central party headquarter. It was the first time in the KMT that citizens played a significant role in the process of candidate nomination. The importance of citizen's participation continued to increase in 2004. In 2004, the result of citizen's opinion poll accounted for 70% as compared with 30% of the party member primary. This format continued to effect in 2008 and 2012.


Unlike the KMT's long experiences, the DPP did not engage in candidate nomination until its formal establishment in 1986. Moreover, the composition of the DPP's leadership did not come from a unified group but from various anti-KMT individuals or groups that occupied offices at the local representative bodies. This unique pre-party history makes the DPP a de-centralized pattern of power distribution. This de-centralized pattern also extended to the process of candidate selection. As indicated in Table 1, negotiations and compromises became the major ways to produce legislative candidates. If the party leaders were unable to reach a consensus, then party member would ask to cast a vote to decide the final candidate. In practice, leadership of the DPP would try to reach a consensus through compromises. It was rare to see party member votes in the 1980s.

The DPP's method of candidate nomination took a different shape in the 1990s. Previous process of consensus making remained, but if the process failed, the party official reviews were added to the party member votes as two equally methods to decide the candidate list. The introduction of party official reviews signaled an increasing political importance of local party branches. However, the importance of local party officials diminished in the early 2000s when the DPP emphasized the need for citizen's participation in the process of candidate nomination. In 2001, party member vote counted only 30% while the citizen's opinion poll 70%. Compared to the KMT counterpart, the DPP upheld even higher weight on citizen's opinion. From then on, citizen's opinion poll results become the main method of candidate selection.

It is obvious that the development of candidate nomination evolves along with the process of political opening in Taiwan. Top party leaders played decisive roles in the process of candidate nomination in early periods. Then, as the KMT regime began to initiate political liberalization in the 1970s, local party branches and members were allowed to participate and express their opinions of candidate selection. The expansion of participation by party members was resulted from a need to increase the KMT's social support at that time on the one hand and respond to the increasingly challenges by the opposition DPP. It is even clear that the candidate nomination methods adopted by the DPP have been more decentralized than the KMT. In recent elections, despite the parties' headquarters remain important in the process of candidate nomination, their decisions tend to be more ceremonial than before. Instead, the results from the district levels are more likely to take command. Moreover, both parties have begun to encourage citizens to join the decision of candidate nomination in their own districts. As more citizens participate in the nomination process, the results will carry more legitimacy that party headquarters find them difficult to ignore. The power of candidate nomination has thus more often resided at the local levels than at the central levels.

In a recent survey conducted by Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (Taiwan), voters were asked whether a close primary (vote by party members) or a polling primary can be regarded as a better way for a party to nominate candidates. Figure 1 suggests that about 65% of the respondents favor a polling primary while only 22% of them are in favor of a closed primary. It seems that Taiwanese voters do believe that polling primary is a way to engage more voter participation in the nomination process.

Figure 1: Is Close Primary or Polling Primary a Better Nomination System?



Finally, it is also noticeable that there are snowballing effects between the two major political parties. In particular, the expansion of citizen's participation in the selection process firstly initiated by the DPP was later imitated by the KMT. In other words, the implications of party competition also contribute to the change of nomination methods. Both the KMT and the DPP would not only consider candidate selection as an exercise of power but also a reality of internal democracy within the parties. Using citizen's opinion polls as a means of candidate selection can be easily applied to those difficult-to-settle nomination competition among competing candidates. This has been especially important when the original SNTV system was replaced by the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system since 2008. In most of the cases, the existence of multiple seats in one district under the SNTV system demands the political party to nominate an optimal number of candidates in one district. In other cases, the political party could flexibly over-nominate or under-nominate the number of candidates if the party was unable to convince all its competing candidates. Such flexibility does not continue to exist under the MMM system in which single member district is implemented in election. Among the total 113 seats, 73 seats are elected from single member districts, 34 seats are elected via proportional party lists, and 6 seats are reserved for two aboriginal districts. Due to the high proportion of single member districts (64.6%), it is important to nominate candidate who can compete one-on-one in each of the 73 districts. As the Duverger's

Law asserts that the plurality rule election system tends to favor a two-part competition, we do observed that once Taiwan switched from the SNTV to the current system, the number of effective number reduced dramatically from 3.26 to 1.75. With few exceptions, the two major parties normally compete against each other in most of the 73 single member districts. It is rare, if not impossible, for an independent or non-partisan candidate to win a plurality in a typical single member district. In the following sections, we will discuss the current candidate selection mechanism for both parties in details.

III. **Current Candidate Selection Mechanism**

As only one candidate can be elected in each of the 73 single member districts, **electability** indeed becomes the primary criteria for consideration when both parties select their candidates. According to its deputy secretary general, when the DPP decides whom it should nominate, it assesses the winning odds for every potential candidate. Such assessment is normally done by poll.¹ The KMT also did the same thing and even took one step further—that is, it did not nominate its candidates until the DPP had completed its selection process so that it could send someone to match up against the DPP’s nominee.² In short, for the 2012 Legislative Yuan elections, both parties used poll results to assess a candidate’s electability. In the following we will discuss how the two major parties used opinion polls extensively to gauge the electability of their nominees.

Phases of Candidate Selection

Both the KMT and DPP started their candidate selection procedure with candidate registration. In general, one who seeks for either the KMT or DPP nomination needs to register for nomination selection even he/she is an incumbent. Most of time an incumbent would not face any challenger from his/her party. Yet, even only one candidate registered for nomination, the party still assessed his/her electability by a poll result. The KMT’s rule stated that one needed to pass 30% threshold of support to become a KMT nominee even he/she was the only person who sought for nomination.

If more than two contenders registered for nomination selection, the process proceeded into the second phase—negotiation. It is a mechanism that aimed to solve conflicts within a party and to smooth the nomination process before heading toward any heated intra-party competition. Yet, negotiation usually takes time. During the

¹ Interviewed with the DPP’s deputy secretary general Hung Yao-fu, 2011/11/14.

² Interviewed with a member of the KMT’s Think Tank, Dr. Hsieh Hsian-chin, 2011/11/16.

negotiation period, parties may again use poll results to see who has a better chance to win. Additionally, the party headquarter may send a senior party officials (normally assigned by the party leader) to handle the negotiation process. In some cases, such negotiation process got through and the party successfully nominated a candidate without generating further intra-party competition (or conflict). For example, in the 4th district of New Taipei City, the KMT's incumbent candidate Lee Hung-jun faced a strong challenger Hsu Bing-kuan, who is a former city mayor of Hsin-chuan area (i.e., one of the big cities in New Taipei city metropolitan area). Lee and Hsu have known each other for 30 years and are really closed friends. In the beginning of the negotiation process, Lee intended to withdraw himself and let Hsu represent the KMT to join the general election. Yet, the KMT leadership really wanted Lee to stay in the Legislative Yuan. Thus, at the end of the day, Hsu agreed to withdraw from the competition and decided to wait on the sideline for future opportunities.³

However, the above situation may not be the case all the time. It is quite often that multiple contenders refuse to step down and break down the negotiation process. For example, in the 2nd district of New Taipei City, the DPP incumbent Lin Shu-Fen was challenged by Huang Chien-hue, a former Legislative Yuan member but lost to Lin in the 2008 DPP primary. Soon after the deadline for registration, the DPP headquarter sent a senior party leader to initiate the negotiation process. Yet, the negotiation was broken down quickly as Huang has been strongly supported by one of the DPP's major factions. It was clear that he would have never withdrawn from the competition.⁴ In short, although Lin seemed to be a very strong DPP incumbent candidate, a polling primary was still inevitable as some quality contender insisted to challenge her.

Having the negotiation process broken down, both parties' candidate selection procedures head into the third phrase—polling primary. As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of using polling primary instead of closed primary is to avoid the participation of “head (or phantom) party members”. Additionally, both parties believe that polling primary is the most scientific and efficient way to not only resolve conflicts but also select a candidate who is truly electable.

Obviously, the two major parties do not have equal strength in every district. It is perceivable that the intra-party competition for nomination would be severe within a party that consistently enjoys a favorable margin in the district. On the other hand, it

³ Interviewed with Lee Hung-jun, 2011/11/16.

⁴ Interviewed with Lin Shu-feng, 2011/11/16.

is not surprising that a party may have difficulty to recruit any quality candidate to run for a district contest that is almost always taken by its opponent. It seems that in a party's safe district, polling primary becomes an effective and acceptable tool for the party to determine who gets nomination; In contrast, as quality candidates do not have strong incentive to run in difficult districts, the party headquarter would directly recruit someone to join the election. Take DPP's case as an example. If the DPP obtained less than 42.5% of vote in a district in the last election, the party would regard such district as a difficult one. Then the party would directly recruit someone to run instead of opening it for competition.

As polling primary becomes the way for both parties if multiple contenders seek for nomination, how did it proceed? Some details are illustrated as follows and highlighted in Table 2:

KMT: potential candidates registered for the polling primary. The major questionnaires used in the polling primary include two parts: 1. intra-party support and 2. inter-party support. In the first part, potential candidates competed for the best supporting rate. This part will be consisted of 15% of the total score. In the second part, each candidate will compete against the DPP nominee to see who has the best winning odds. This part will be consisted of the remaining 85% of the total score.

Candidates would negotiate to decide the dates for the polling primary. And on the polling dates, normally two companies would conduct telephone surveys using random sample drew from the district. And in-house sampling needs to be implemented for every survey.

DPP: potential candidates also need to register for the polling primary. The default questionnaire used in the polling primary is to ask for inter-party support. But if KMT's candidate is not available or potential contenders agreed upon a different way (e.g., intra-party support), the DPP headquarter will accept it. The only thing that the headquarter wants to control is the primary date. In order to test conteders' ability to mobilize voters, the headquarter would not announce when the primary would take place until the morning of the primary date. Specifically, the DPP headquarter set up a period for the Legislative Yuan primaries. And in every morning during the primary period, the headquarter randomly selected one district for primary and immediately inform contenders around ten O'clock in the morning. Because DPP's survey did not adopt in-house sampling, who gets to answer the phone becomes an important factor to determine the results. Thus, once the primary date is announced, it is crucial for

contenders to mobilize their supporters to stay at home after six O'clock to wait for possible phone calls. The DPP believes that such method is the way to test which contender has the best campaign organization that can successfully mobilize his/her supporters by a very short notice.⁵ And each primary only takes one day with three companies conducting telephone surveys. Each one of them needs to complete 1,200 samples.

Table 2: Key Features of Polling Primary (KMT vs. DPP)


	KMT Polling Primary	DPP Polling Primary
Numbers	11	13
Organization	Local branch	Headquarter
Method	Telephone Survey: two companies for three days	Telephone Survey: three companies for one day
Questionnaire	Inter-party match up: 85% Intra-party match-up: 15%	Default: Inter-party match-up
Date	Pre-scheduled	Random pick
In-house sampling	Yes	No

In short, the two parties have adopted a very similar way to conduct polling primary. The most significant difference between the two is the use of in-house sampling. While the DPP cares more about contenders' ability to mobilize voters, the KMT obviously cares more about representation of the survey sample and tries to avoid possible manipulation.

Among those three different methods to choose candidate (i.e., direct recruitment, negotiation, and polling primary), which one voters prefer the most? Did the voters think that polling primary can really select better candidate? We use survey to see voters opinion on it. Figure 2 confirms the strength of the polling primary; voters do think that polling primary can obtain better candidates than parties' direct recruitment does (about 55% vs. 23%). Of course, parties will not have any primary in the districts if they failed in the previous election (like those "difficult" districts identified by the DPP). In short, Figure 2 seems to suggest that voters do trust the polling primary and prefer such open procedure.

⁵ Interview with deputy secretary general Hung Yao-fu, 2011/11/14.

Figure2: Whether Does Party Recruitment or Polling Primary Make Better Candidates?



IV. Possible Impact of Polling Primary

Does polling primary really choose someone who is more electable? To assess the impact of polling primary on the voting outcome, we propose an OLS model that includes the polling primary, election results in the 2008 legislative election, and election results in the 2012 presidential election as independent variables. The polling primary variable is coded 1 if the DPP chose the candidate in the district by polling. We assume that the 2008 legislative election result is a good proxy of the DPP's long-standing strength in each of the seventy three districts and that the 2012 presidential election result captures the current DPP support in each city and county⁶. We expect to find that all of the three variables contribute to the DPP's 2012 vote shares.

Table 3: OLS Model of the DPP's 2012 Vote Shares of the Legislative Election

D.V.= DPP's 2012 vote shares of the legislative election		
	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-1.054	4.757

⁶ To be sure, the 2012 presidential election outcome should be broken down to the district instead of the city or county level. Due to time constraint, however, we use a simpler indicator.

Polling primary	7.364**	2.232
DPP's 2008 legislative election results	31.244*	12.835
DPP's 2012 presidential election results	0.652***	0.152
R ²	0.6641	
Adjusted R ²	0.6495	

According to Table XXX, it is apparent that the second explanatory variable, the DPP's 2008 vote share, is the best predictor of the dependent variable. The current presidential election outcome is also a significant predictor. More importantly, the dummy variable for the polling primary explains the dependent variable, controlling for the two other variables. The DPP will gain by 7 percent of vote share if it held the polling primary in the district.

Considering the selection bias, we can revise the model by using the fitted values of a logistic regression model that predicts whether the district had the polling primary with the previous legislative election outcome. The result of the revised model is shown in Table XXX.

Table 4: Fitted-Value Model of the DPP's 2012 Vote Shares of the Legislative Election

	D.V.= DPP's 2012 vote shares of the legislative election	
	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	2.715	5.319
Predicted value of polling primary	19.908**	2.232
DPP's 2012 presidential election results	0.719***	0.145
R ²	0.625	
Adjusted R ²	0.614	

Table 4 shows that after using the DPP's vote shares in the 2008 legislative election to predict the polling primary, the fitted value from the selection model is a significant predictor of the DPP's performance in this election. The DPP's vote shares in the presidential election remains important.

V. **Pro and Cons of Polling Primacy**

The increasing popularity of citizen's opinion polls in the candidate nomination in recent years deserves further elaborations both positively and negatively. On the bright side, the emergence of citizen's opinion poll as a method of candidate selection represents a development of internal democracy within both parties. Here, the term "democracy" does not only mean an expansion of citizen's participation but also a demand for more transparent process in the process of candidate nomination. Typically, the task of candidate nomination has been seen as the "secret garden" where only very limited number of party leaders is able to participate. This is true in the KMT's history of candidate selection. The KMT had maintained a highly centralized characteristic in the early period. All the candidate selection issues were firstly decided in the party's central headquarter and then passed the decisions down to the local party branches. The opinions of local party branches and members would not count too much. Or, the opinions were no more than reflections assigned and mobilized by the central party headquarter. Therefore, there were often found "parachute candidates" who did not have close local connections but were nominated by the KMT in elections.

Additionally, citizen's opinion polls are also a compromised solution to power competition of internal factions within the political party. Both the KMT and the DPP experienced different degree of factional politics. Regardless of the tradition of power centralism, the KMT would take the opinion of local factions into account in the process of candidate nomination. Especially under the SNTV system where multiple seats were open for competition, the KMT's nomination of candidate tended to reach a compromise that important vital factions would have their won delegates in election. Similarly, factional politics have never absent form the internal politics of the DPP since 1986. The results of candidate nomination were products of compromises and conflictions among factions. Citizens or party members tend to be excluded from the nomination process. Even the method of party member vote was introduced, it was later criticized of being a malpractices of "pocket voters" of individual faction or politicians. The implementation of citizen opinion polls has thus designed to prevented factional politics within the party.

Furthermore, in addition to addressing to the problem of internal democracy and factional politics, the dynamics of citizen opinion polls would facilitate parties' electoral mobilization and enhance candidates' legitimacy in elections. As citizens participate in opinion poll, they are more likely to reach more political information, maintain higher political interests, and participate in election. Also, once the

candidates are decided by citizen's opinion polls, citizens have more opportunities to get to know the candidates much earlier. This is obvious in a district where there are only two major competing candidates in the district after 2008. Opinion polls thus serve as mechanism of political socialization and contribute to citizen's political participation.

On the dark side, the implementation of opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination is not without criticisms in Taiwan (Wu 2008, 115-145). One normative but popular argument indicates that candidate nomination is an undeniable mission of political party. It is the political party's responsibility to recruitment good person to represent the party in elections. This criticism is legitimate on a theoretical ground that candidate nomination is not doubt one of the party's key responsibilities. Yet, party's task to find the best candidate does not necessarily preclude the opinion polls from a proper method of candidate nomination like party member vote, reviews by party officials, or even by decisions of top party leaders.

The other criticism comes from the detail execution of opinion polls. Since opinion polls are products of professionalism, there are always rooms to be manipulated by political parties or politicians. It takes knowledge to realize the major components of scientific survey such as sampling technique, questionnaire wording and ordering, and data processing, etc. Each component is subject to manipulation. This criticism is understandable since opinion polls will produce specific number (percentage of candidate support in surveys) that decides which candidate wins. The worse scenario would emerge if the respondents of opinion polls are not representative in the district. The poll results are thus bias distorted. More specifically, the final result produced by the opinion polls is mainly probabilistic with statistical errors. It is essentially different from the real election result. Therefore, even there exists a set of fair and workable rules applied to the conduct of opinion polls, the result of opinion polls is not the result of election.

Still, there is criticism that using opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination is a waste of time and money because it essentially asks the political parties, candidates, and citizens jointly participated in election twice in a short period of time. Sometimes, in some districts, candidates will win the final election once they have won the opinion polls. Therefore, the process of candidate selection equals to the process of final election. Or, in some districts where there are no clear winners, individual candidate would take advantage of the opinion polls to increase his/her recognition or even attack his/her opponents. The argument of opinion polls bring in

high cost is reasonable. Yet, the process of opinion polls also brings in more information citizens need as described above.

In a nutshell, the predominance of citizen's opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination concurrently brings in advantages as well as disadvantages. In order to accomplish a more transparent, democratic and informative process of candidate selection, citizen's opinion polls are justifiable. Nonetheless, citizen's opinion poll is not panacea to solve the negatives of current dark-boxed candidate selection within the political party.

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Invitation

12th Jan 2011

To Whom It May Concern

We'd like to inform that Dr. Chia-Hung Tsai is invited as a participant to the workshop on February 3, 2012 at Gakushuin University in Tokyo, Japan. The workshop is organized as a part of the project called "Candidate Selection in East Asia," sponsored by Research Institute for Oriental Cultures Gakushuin University. All participants are expected to give presentation at the workshop. Research Institute for Oriental Cultures will subsidize, in part or in full, the air ticket and/or accommodation for the participants invited from abroad.

This letter may be used by the participant for the purpose of applying for an entry visa or obtaining funding for travel to the conference.

Thank you

Yours sincerely,



Professor Kaori Shoji

Coordinator of the project "Candidate Selection in East Asia" of Research Institute
for Oriental Cultures Gakushuin University

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Is “Polling Primary” the Best Way to Select Candidates?
Analyzing an Innovation of Candidate Selection Mechanism in Taiwan

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I. Introduction

One of the fundamental functions of political parties is to select candidates to win elections. Different candidate selection methods tend to attract different types of candidates to vie for party nomination. Previous literature suggests that a party’s candidate selection process not only determines its prospect for winning elections, but also shapes its power structure.

Recently, Taiwan’s two major parties have adopted “polling primaries” to select candidates to run for elections. Specifically, political parties use numbers obtained by multiple public opinion polls to decide their nominations in almost every level of elections. There exist two major reasons to explain why both parties have used opinion polls as their primaries: first, both parties have a considerable number of “fake” party members who did not actually pay their dues to join the parties. Instead, local party leaders or cadres usually pay for rank-and-file party members’ dues. It was a common practice for them to nurture their bases within the parties. Yet, such practice is illegal now as it can be regarded as vote-buying if one uses the way to develop his/her own base and seeks for nomination by a closed party primary in which only party members are eligible to vote. In short, using polling primary becomes a safe way in the sense that there would be no concern regarding vote-buying as none of the party members would directly cast their votes in the primary. Second, in order to win the election in a single member district, a candidate must garner the plurality or even majority of votes. If a candidate has better popularity or name recognition, he or she is more likely to win. Thus, both parties believe that using opinion polls is the best way to select winnable candidate.

Yet, every rule or institution should have its pros and cons. This study analyzes the extent to which this type of candidate selection mechanism may affect both parties’ future developments. The following sections are constructed as follows: Section II provides an overview of Taiwan’s candidate selection from a historical perspective. Section III addresses key features of candidate selection mechanisms adopted by the two major parties. Section IV assesses the possible impact of polling

primary on electoral outcome. Section V concludes with major pros and cons of the current polling primary system.

II. **Candidate Nomination in Taiwan—A Historical Overview**

Mainstream literatures have long focused on distribution of power when analyzing a party's candidate nomination process. It is often seen that, for example, scholars use a dichotomous "centralized vs. de-centralized" scheme to compare candidate nomination among different political parties (Ranney 1981; Gallagher and Marsh 1988; Wu 2008). By examining the procedures of candidate nomination against certain criteria of power centralization, these studies have concluded various types of political parties with respect to internal democracy. Also, by extension, there are factors contributing to different shapes of candidate nomination. A party's candidate nomination processes might differ from its counterparts due to its distinct history or other political factors (e.g., leadership). Meanwhile, the distribution of power within a political party may also change over different periods. Consequently, the processes and outcomes of candidate nomination have evolved multifold in different political parties in different countries.

In Taiwan, political parties have experienced different formats of candidate nomination over the past decades. Some of them are common to other countries' experiences but some are unique. For one thing, candidate nomination in Taiwan has closely related to the distribution of power within a political party which resembles to other counter-part countries. Equally important, political parties in Taiwan have also adopted different procedures of candidate nomination over different periods. Yet, as a new democracy, the development of candidate nomination in Taiwan can be best understood under the perspective of political democratization. The implementation of candidate nomination can be regarded as a product of party competition along the process of democratization.

In the discussion of the origins of political party, Duverger (1954) had pointed out the distinction between intra-parliamentary and extra-parliamentary political parties. There are many differences between the two types of political party. Among these differences, Duverger indicated that, in a relatively term, the intra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power de-centralization while the extra-parliamentary political party had a tendency of power centralization. The relationship between the origins and power distribution of political party is also applicable to the case of the KMT and the DPP in the process of candidate nomination.

The KMT's origin carries a strong component of extra-parliamentary political party. It was a revolutionary political party aiming at overthrowing the Qing dynasty by force before 1911. The distribution of power in the revolutionary group was more centralized than de-centralized then. It was not until the 1911 that the KMT began to transform itself from an armed force group into a political party to run a new Republic. Comparatively, the KMT has the longest experience of nominating candidate in elections. These experiences can be traced back to the founding periods of the Republic in mainland. The KMT had appointed various delegates to enact the Republic's constitution and form the parliament. Unfortunately, the new Republic did not sustain without difficulties since her establishment. The war between China and Japan and later the civil war between the KMT and the CCP had obstructed the new Republic from becoming a real democracy. The continuous warfare had also facilitated a centralized tendency of power within the KMT. It is difficult to have a complete picture of how the KMT selected its candidates due to the lack of historical materials. Yet, it is reasonable to argue that the selection process would tend to be less institutionalized and more contingent on political expediency.

Unlike the period in mainland China when elections were not able to put into practice, the KMT in Taiwan began to implement local elections since the early 1950s and provided opportunities for candidate nomination within the KMT. Plenty of studies pointed out that the main purpose of the KMT's implementation of local elections was to strengthen its grass-rooted support on the island. These local elections also served as a sharp contrast between the KMT's regime and the CCP's Communist China. The KMT regime was thus able to create a democratic image to garner international support. Yet, owing to enduring confrontations with the CCP, the KMT had maintained an authoritarian political system and a centralized party structure. Its process of candidate selection has less to do with democracy. Instead, candidate nomination in the KMT was no more than an expression of power of party leaders. Candidate was chosen by the KMT because of his/her loyalty to the party (or party leaders). The results of local elections were certainly unable to jeopardize the KMT's political dominance in Taiwan. To some degree, candidate nomination was an extension of political control over the society.

Other than the local elections, the KMT initiated a limited opening of legislative elections in the late 1960s (only a few seats were opened for election, but not total re-election of the legislators). Yet, the nomination of legislative candidates revealed similar pattern like the local elections. Candidates for legislative elections were

mainly decided by party leaders. The selection process of legislative candidate normally follow a basic format: both the local party branch and the central headquarter seemed to co-share the authority for nomination. For example, as indicated in Table 1, the three levels of party organization, local party branch, provincial party headquarter, and central party headquarter had participated in the decision of choosing legislative candidates. However, these regulations did not carry on significant implications. More often than not, legislative candidates were decided by higher level of party organizations, i.e., the provincial or central party headquarter rather than local party branches. In particular, the central party headquarter would provide a candidate list to local party branches before elections taken place. It was not unusual to find different task forces in the central party headquarter to take charge of candidate nomination. The members of task force were assigned either by the party leader or by the party's most power organization, the Central Standing Committee. In spite of opinions and reviews provided by the local party branch, the central headquarter had the final say in the candidate list. This pattern did not change until the late 1980s when party primary was adopted by the KMT.

Table 1: District Candidate Nomination of the KMT and the DPP

Year	KMT	DPP
1969	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1972	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members, then decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1975	Same as 1972	NA
1980	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then reviewed by the provincial party headquarter, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	NA
1983	Candidates produced by opinion consultations of local party members and reviews of local party officials, then	NA

	the provincial party headquarter doubled the number of nominee, and finally decided by the central party headquarter	
1986	Same as 1983	NA
1989	Candidates produced by party member primary (under one half block vote formula), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote
1992	Candidates produced by party member primary (under a plurality system) (50%), and reviews of local party officials (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote
1995	District candidates produced by opinion consultation of local party members, or by opinion polls, or by reviews of local party officials, then decided by the central party headquarter Party list candidates were decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (50%) and party official reviews (50%)
1998	Same as 1995	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (50%) and party official reviews (50%)
2001	Candidates produced by party member primary (50%), and opinion polls (50%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Candidates produced by compromises (consensus) otherwise by party member vote (30%) and opinion polls (70%)
2004	Candidates produced by party member primary (30%), and opinion polls (70%), then decided by the central party headquarter	Same as 2001
2008	Same as 2004	Same as 2001
2012	Candidates produced by opinion polls, then decided by the central party headquarter	Same as 2001

Note: The nomination of party list candidates is not included.

Source: Data before 2012 were adopted and revised from Wang (2008, 143-170).

The method of candidate selection in 1989 was notable in terms of party members were introduced formally to participate in the process of candidate selection. Local party members cast their votes in the primary under the block vote system (each member had one half of votes in the candidate list) then the final results would be decided by the central party headquarter. Unlike the previous processes of candidate selection that local party branch and members played only facial roles, the 1989 party member primary did provided a clear mechanism by which party member's opinions can be aggregated. Even though the central party headquarter continued to maintain the power for final decision, it was witnessed that, in general, the decisions of the party headquarter did echo to the results of party member primary. There was a shift of power between the local and center party organizations and the later did not monopoly the power of candidate nomination. Local party members or part officials were asked to participate more actively ever since. The balance of power between the local and central party organizations shifted again in 2001 when citizens were introduced into the party primary. In that year, both the local party members and citizens have an equal say in the decision of candidate selection. The final results of party member primary and citizen primary were combined and sent to the central party headquarter. It was the first time in the KMT that citizens played a significant role in the process of candidate nomination. The importance of citizen's participation continued to increase in 2004. In 2004, the result of citizen's opinion poll accounted for 70% as compared with 30% of the party member primary. This format continued to effect in 2008 and 2012.


Unlike the KMT's long experiences, the DPP did not engage in candidate nomination until its formal establishment in 1986. Moreover, the composition of the DPP's leadership did not come from a unified group but from various anti-KMT individuals or groups that occupied offices at the local representative bodies. This unique pre-party history makes the DPP a de-centralized pattern of power distribution. This de-centralized pattern also extended to the process of candidate selection. As indicated in Table 1, negotiations and compromises became the major ways to produce legislative candidates. If the party leaders were unable to reach a consensus, then party member would ask to cast a vote to decide the final candidate. In practice, leadership of the DPP would try to reach a consensus through compromises. It was rare to see party member votes in the 1980s.

The DPP's method of candidate nomination took a different shape in the 1990s. Previous process of consensus making remained, but if the process failed, the party official reviews were added to the party member votes as two equally methods to decide the candidate list. The introduction of party official reviews signaled an increasing political importance of local party branches. However, the importance of local party officials diminished in the early 2000s when the DPP emphasized the need for citizen's participation in the process of candidate nomination. In 2001, party member vote counted only 30% while the citizen's opinion poll 70%. Compared to the KMT counterpart, the DPP upheld even higher weight on citizen's opinion. From then on, citizen's opinion poll results become the main method of candidate selection.

It is obvious that the development of candidate nomination evolves along with the process of political opening in Taiwan. Top party leaders played decisive roles in the process of candidate nomination in early periods. Then, as the KMT regime began to initiate political liberalization in the 1970s, local party branches and members were allowed to participate and express their opinions of candidate selection. The expansion of participation by party members was resulted from a need to increase the KMT's social support at that time on the one hand and respond to the increasingly challenges by the opposition DPP. It is even clear that the candidate nomination methods adopted by the DPP have been more decentralized than the KMT. In recent elections, despite the parties' headquarters remain important in the process of candidate nomination, their decisions tend to be more ceremonial than before. Instead, the results from the district levels are more likely to take command. Moreover, both parties have begun to encourage citizens to join the decision of candidate nomination in their own districts. As more citizens participate in the nomination process, the results will carry more legitimacy that party headquarters find them difficult to ignore. The power of candidate nomination has thus more often resided at the local levels than at the central levels.

In a recent survey conducted by Election Study Center at National Chengchi University (Taiwan), voters were asked whether a close primary (vote by party members) or a polling primary can be regarded as a better way for a party to nominate candidates. Figure 1 suggests that about 65% of the respondents favor a polling primary while only 22% of them are in favor of a closed primary. It seems that Taiwanese voters do believe that polling primary is a way to engage more voter participation in the nomination process.

Figure 1: Is Close Primary or Polling Primary a Better Nomination System?



Finally, it is also noticeable that there are snowballing effects between the two major political parties. In particular, the expansion of citizen's participation in the selection process firstly initiated by the DPP was later imitated by the KMT. In other words, the implications of party competition also contribute to the change of nomination methods. Both the KMT and the DPP would not only consider candidate selection as an exercise of power but also a reality of internal democracy within the parties. Using citizen's opinion polls as a means of candidate selection can be easily applied to those difficult-to-settle nomination competition among competing candidates. This has been especially important when the original SNTV system was replaced by the Mixed Member Majoritarian (MMM) system since 2008. In most of the cases, the existence of multiple seats in one district under the SNTV system demands the political party to nominate an optimal number of candidates in one district. In other cases, the political party could flexibly over-nominate or under-nominate the number of candidates if the party was unable to convince all its competing candidates. Such flexibility does not continue to exist under the MMM system in which single member district is implemented in election. Among the total 113 seats, 73 seats are elected from single member districts, 34 seats are elected via proportional party lists, and 6 seats are reserved for two aboriginal districts. Due to the high proportion of single member districts (64.6%), it is important to nominate candidate who can compete one-on-one in each of the 73 districts. As the Duverger's

Law asserts that the plurality rule election system tends to favor a two-part competition, we do observed that once Taiwan switched from the SNTV to the current system, the number of effective number reduced dramatically from 3.26 to 1.75. With few exceptions, the two major parties normally compete against each other in most of the 73 single member districts. It is rare, if not impossible, for an independent or non-partisan candidate to win a plurality in a typical single member district. In the following sections, we will discuss the current candidate selection mechanism for both parties in details.

III. **Current Candidate Selection Mechanism**

As only one candidate can be elected in each of the 73 single member districts, **electability** indeed becomes the primary criteria for consideration when both parties select their candidates. According to its deputy secretary general, when the DPP decides whom it should nominate, it assesses the winning odds for every potential candidate. Such assessment is normally done by poll.¹ The KMT also did the same thing and even took one step further—that is, it did not nominate its candidates until the DPP had completed its selection process so that it could send someone to match up against the DPP’s nominee.² In short, for the 2012 Legislative Yuan elections, both parties used poll results to assess a candidate’s electability. In the following we will discuss how the two major parties used opinion polls extensively to gauge the electability of their nominees.

Phases of Candidate Selection

Both the KMT and DPP started their candidate selection procedure with candidate registration. In general, one who seeks for either the KMT or DPP nomination needs to register for nomination selection even he/she is an incumbent. Most of time an incumbent would not face any challenger from his/her party. Yet, even only one candidate registered for nomination, the party still assessed his/her electability by a poll result. The KMT’s rule stated that one needed to pass 30% threshold of support to become a KMT nominee even he/she was the only person who sought for nomination.

If more than two contenders registered for nomination selection, the process proceeded into the second phase—negotiation. It is a mechanism that aimed to solve conflicts within a party and to smooth the nomination process before heading toward any heated intra-party competition. Yet, negotiation usually takes time. During the

¹ Interviewed with the DPP’s deputy secretary general Hung Yao-fu, 2011/11/14.

² Interviewed with a member of the KMT’s Think Tank, Dr. Hsieh Hsian-chin, 2011/11/16.

negotiation period, parties may again use poll results to see who has a better chance to win. Additionally, the party headquarter may send a senior party officials (normally assigned by the party leader) to handle the negotiation process. In some cases, such negotiation process got through and the party successfully nominated a candidate without generating further intra-party competition (or conflict). For example, in the 4th district of New Taipei City, the KMT's incumbent candidate Lee Hung-jun faced a strong challenger Hsu Bing-kuan, who is a former city mayor of Hsin-chuan area (i.e., one of the big cities in New Taipei city metropolitan area). Lee and Hsu have known each other for 30 years and are really closed friends. In the beginning of the negotiation process, Lee intended to withdraw himself and let Hsu represent the KMT to join the general election. Yet, the KMT leadership really wanted Lee to stay in the Legislative Yuan. Thus, at the end of the day, Hsu agreed to withdraw from the competition and decided to wait on the sideline for future opportunities.³

However, the above situation may not be the case all the time. It is quite often that multiple contenders refuse to step down and break down the negotiation process. For example, in the 2nd district of New Taipei City, the DPP incumbent Lin Shu-Fen was challenged by Huang Chien-hue, a former Legislative Yuan member but lost to Lin in the 2008 DPP primary. Soon after the deadline for registration, the DPP headquarter sent a senior party leader to initiate the negotiation process. Yet, the negotiation was broken down quickly as Huang has been strongly supported by one of the DPP's major factions. It was clear that he would have never withdrawn from the competition.⁴ In short, although Lin seemed to be a very strong DPP incumbent candidate, a polling primary was still inevitable as some quality contender insisted to challenge her.

Having the negotiation process broken down, both parties' candidate selection procedures head into the third phrase—polling primary. As mentioned earlier, the main purpose of using polling primary instead of closed primary is to avoid the participation of “head (or phantom) party members”. Additionally, both parties believe that polling primary is the most scientific and efficient way to not only resolve conflicts but also select a candidate who is truly electable.

Obviously, the two major parties do not have equal strength in every district. It is perceivable that the intra-party competition for nomination would be severe within a party that consistently enjoys a favorable margin in the district. On the other hand, it

³ Interviewed with Lee Hung-jun, 2011/11/16.

⁴ Interviewed with Lin Shu-feng, 2011/11/16.

is not surprising that a party may have difficulty to recruit any quality candidate to run for a district contest that is almost always taken by its opponent. It seems that in a party's safe district, polling primary becomes an effective and acceptable tool for the party to determine who gets nomination; In contrast, as quality candidates do not have strong incentive to run in difficult districts, the party headquarter would directly recruit someone to join the election. Take DPP's case as an example. If the DPP obtained less than 42.5% of vote in a district in the last election, the party would regard such district as a difficult one. Then the party would directly recruit someone to run instead of opening it for competition.

As polling primary becomes the way for both parties if multiple contenders seek for nomination, how did it proceed? Some details are illustrated as follows and highlighted in Table 2:

KMT: potential candidates registered for the polling primary. The major questionnaires used in the polling primary include two parts: 1. intra-party support and 2. inter-party support. In the first part, potential candidates competed for the best supporting rate. This part will be consisted of 15% of the total score. In the second part, each candidate will compete against the DPP nominee to see who has the best winning odds. This part will be consisted of the remaining 85% of the total score.

Candidates would negotiate to decide the dates for the polling primary. And on the polling dates, normally two companies would conduct telephone surveys using random sample drew from the district. And in-house sampling needs to be implemented for every survey.

DPP: potential candidates also need to register for the polling primary. The default questionnaire used in the polling primary is to ask for inter-party support. But if KMT's candidate is not available or potential contenders agreed upon a different way (e.g., intra-party support), the DPP headquarter will accept it. The only thing that the headquarter wants to control is the primary date. In order to test conteders' ability to mobilize voters, the headquarter would not announce when the primary would take place until the morning of the primary date. Specifically, the DPP headquarter set up a period for the Legislative Yuan primaries. And in every morning during the primary period, the headquarter randomly selected one district for primary and immediately inform contenders around ten O'clock in the morning. Because DPP's survey did not adopt in-house sampling, who gets to answer the phone becomes an important factor to determine the results. Thus, once the primary date is announced, it is crucial for

contenders to mobilize their supporters to stay at home after six O'clock to wait for possible phone calls. The DPP believes that such method is the way to test which contender has the best campaign organization that can successfully mobilize his/her supporters by a very short notice.⁵ And each primary only takes one day with three companies conducting telephone surveys. Each one of them needs to complete 1,200 samples.

Table 2: Key Features of Polling Primary (KMT vs. DPP)


	KMT Polling Primary	DPP Polling Primary
Numbers	11	13
Organization	Local branch	Headquarter
Method	Telephone Survey: two companies for three days	Telephone Survey: three companies for one day
Questionnaire	Inter-party match up: 85% Intra-party match-up: 15%	Default: Inter-party match-up
Date	Pre-scheduled	Random pick
In-house sampling	Yes	No

In short, the two parties have adopted a very similar way to conduct polling primary. The most significant difference between the two is the use of in-house sampling. While the DPP cares more about contenders' ability to mobilize voters, the KMT obviously cares more about representation of the survey sample and tries to avoid possible manipulation.

Among those three different methods to choose candidate (i.e., direct recruitment, negotiation, and polling primary), which one voters prefer the most? Did the voters think that polling primary can really select better candidate? We use survey to see voters opinion on it. Figure 2 confirms the strength of the polling primary; voters do think that polling primary can obtain better candidates than parties' direct recruitment does (about 55% vs. 23%). Of course, parties will not have any primary in the districts if they failed in the previous election (like those "difficult" districts identified by the DPP). In short, Figure 2 seems to suggest that voters do trust the polling primary and prefer such open procedure.

⁵ Interview with deputy secretary general Hung Yao-fu, 2011/11/14.

Figure2: Whether Does Party Recruitment or Polling Primary Make Better Candidates?



IV. Possible Impact of Polling Primary

Does polling primary really choose someone who is more electable? To assess the impact of polling primary on the voting outcome, we propose an OLS model that includes the polling primary, election results in the 2008 legislative election, and election results in the 2012 presidential election as independent variables. The polling primary variable is coded 1 if the DPP chose the candidate in the district by polling. We assume that the 2008 legislative election result is a good proxy of the DPP's long-standing strength in each of the seventy three districts and that the 2012 presidential election result captures the current DPP support in each city and county⁶. We expect to find that all of the three variables contribute to the DPP's 2012 vote shares.

Table 3: OLS Model of the DPP's 2012 Vote Shares of the Legislative Election

	D.V.= DPP's 2012 vote shares of the legislative election	
	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	-1.054	4.757

⁶ To be sure, the 2012 presidential election outcome should be broken down to the district instead of the city or county level. Due to time constraint, however, we use a simpler indicator.

Polling primary	7.364**	2.232
DPP's 2008 legislative election results	31.244*	12.835
DPP's 2012 presidential election results	0.652***	0.152
R^2	0.6641	
Adjusted R^2	0.6495	

According to Table XXX, it is apparent that the second explanatory variable, the DPP's 2008 vote share, is the best predictor of the dependent variable. The current presidential election outcome is also a significant predictor. More importantly, the dummy variable for the polling primary explains the dependent variable, controlling for the two other variables. The DPP will gain by 7 percent of vote share if it held the polling primary in the district.

Considering the selection bias, we can revise the model by using the fitted values of a logistic regression model that predicts whether the district had the polling primary with the previous legislative election outcome. The result of the revised model is shown in Table XXX.

Table 4: Fitted-Value Model of the DPP's 2012 Vote Shares of the Legislative Election

	D.V.= DPP's 2012 vote shares of the legislative election	
	Coef.	S.E.
Constant	2.715	5.319
Predicted value of polling primary	19.908**	2.232
DPP's 2012 presidential election results	0.719***	0.145
R^2	0.625	
Adjusted R^2	0.614	

Table 4 shows that after using the DPP's vote shares in the 2008 legislative election to predict the polling primary, the fitted value from the selection model is a significant predictor of the DPP's performance in this election. The DPP's vote shares in the presidential election remains important.

V. **Pro and Cons of Polling Primacy**

The increasing popularity of citizen's opinion polls in the candidate nomination in recent years deserves further elaborations both positively and negatively. On the bright side, the emergence of citizen's opinion poll as a method of candidate selection represents a development of internal democracy within both parties. Here, the term "democracy" does not only mean an expansion of citizen's participation but also a demand for more transparent process in the process of candidate nomination. Typically, the task of candidate nomination has been seen as the "secret garden" where only very limited number of party leaders is able to participate. This is true in the KMT's history of candidate selection. The KMT had maintained a highly centralized characteristic in the early period. All the candidate selection issues were firstly decided in the party's central headquarter and then passed the decisions down to the local party branches. The opinions of local party branches and members would not count too much. Or, the opinions were no more than reflections assigned and mobilized by the central party headquarter. Therefore, there were often found "parachute candidates" who did not have close local connections but were nominated by the KMT in elections.

Additionally, citizen's opinion polls are also a compromised solution to power competition of internal factions within the political party. Both the KMT and the DPP experienced different degree of factional politics. Regardless of the tradition of power centralism, the KMT would take the opinion of local factions into account in the process of candidate nomination. Especially under the SNTV system where multiple seats were open for competition, the KMT's nomination of candidate tended to reach a compromise that important vital factions would have their won delegates in election. Similarly, factional politics have never absent form the internal politics of the DPP since 1986. The results of candidate nomination were products of compromises and conflictions among factions. Citizens or party members tend to be excluded from the nomination process. Even the method of party member vote was introduced, it was later criticized of being a malpractices of "pocket voters" of individual faction or politicians. The implementation of citizen opinion polls has thus designed to prevented factional politics within the party.

Furthermore, in addition to addressing to the problem of internal democracy and factional politics, the dynamics of citizen opinion polls would facilitate parties' electoral mobilization and enhance candidates' legitimacy in elections. As citizens participate in opinion poll, they are more likely to reach more political information, maintain higher political interests, and participate in election. Also, once the

candidates are decided by citizen's opinion polls, citizens have more opportunities to get to know the candidates much earlier. This is obvious in a district where there are only two major competing candidates in the district after 2008. Opinion polls thus serve as mechanism of political socialization and contribute to citizen's political participation.

On the dark side, the implementation of opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination is not without criticisms in Taiwan (Wu 2008, 115-145). One normative but popular argument indicates that candidate nomination is an undeniable mission of political party. It is the political party's responsibility to recruitment good person to represent the party in elections. This criticism is legitimate on a theoretical ground that candidate nomination is not doubt one of the party's key responsibilities. Yet, party's task to find the best candidate does not necessarily preclude the opinion polls from a proper method of candidate nomination like party member vote, reviews by party officials, or even by decisions of top party leaders.

The other criticism comes from the detail execution of opinion polls. Since opinion polls are products of professionalism, there are always rooms to be manipulated by political parties or politicians. It takes knowledge to realize the major components of scientific survey such as sampling technique, questionnaire wording and ordering, and data processing, etc. Each component is subject to manipulation. This criticism is understandable since opinion polls will produce specific number (percentage of candidate support in surveys) that decides which candidate wins. The worse scenario would emerge if the respondents of opinion polls are not representative in the district. The poll results are thus bias distorted. More specifically, the final result produced by the opinion polls is mainly probabilistic with statistical errors. It is essentially different from the real election result. Therefore, even there exists a set of fair and workable rules applied to the conduct of opinion polls, the result of opinion polls is not the result of election.

Still, there is criticism that using opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination is a waste of time and money because it essentially asks the political parties, candidates, and citizens jointly participated in election twice in a short period of time. Sometimes, in some districts, candidates will win the final election once they have won the opinion polls. Therefore, the process of candidate selection equals to the process of final election. Or, in some districts where there are no clear winners, individual candidate would take advantage of the opinion polls to increase his/her recognition or even attack his/her opponents. The argument of opinion polls bring in

high cost is reasonable. Yet, the process of opinion polls also brings in more information citizens need as described above.

In a nutshell, the predominance of citizen's opinion polls in the process of candidate nomination concurrently brings in advantages as well as disadvantages. In order to accomplish a more transparent, democratic and informative process of candidate selection, citizen's opinion polls are justifiable. Nonetheless, citizen's opinion poll is not panacea to solve the negatives of current dark-boxed candidate selection within the political party.

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Invitation

12th Jan 2011

To Whom It May Concern

We'd like to inform that Dr. Chia-Hung Tsai is invited as a participant to the workshop on February 3, 2012 at Gakushuin University in Tokyo, Japan. The workshop is organized as a part of the project called "Candidate Selection in East Asia," sponsored by Research Institute for Oriental Cultures Gakushuin University. All participants are expected to give presentation at the workshop. Research Institute for Oriental Cultures will subsidize, in part or in full, the air ticket and/or accommodation for the participants invited from abroad.

This letter may be used by the participant for the purpose of applying for an entry visa or obtaining funding for travel to the conference.

Thank you

Yours sincerely,



Professor Kaori Shoji



Coordinator of the project "Candidate Selection in East Asia" of Research Institute
for Oriental Cultures Gakushuin University

1-5-1 Mejiro, Toshima-ku, Tokyo 171-8588, Japan



Mita Campus Map

2-15-45 Mita, Minato-ku, Tokyo




International Symposium on

Designing Governance for Civil Society

February 5 (Sun) and 6 (Mon), 2012

Venue: East Building, Mita Campus, Keio University



INQUIRIES

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Day 1

February 5, 2012

Venue: East Building

	6th Floor	8th Floor	5th Floor
10:00		⬇️ Opening Ceremony	
10:30-12:30	Session 1: Electoral System	Session 2: Digital Divide in Asia Pacific	
13:30-15:30	Session 3: Voting Behavior	Session 4: Civil Society and Media Space	
16:00-18:00	Session 5: Power Transfer by Election		
18:30-20:30		Reception	

Day 2

February 6, 2012

Venue: East Building

	6th Floor	8th Floor	5th Floor
10:00-12:00	Session 6: International Affairs	Session 7: Family and Education in the Age of Civil Society	
13:30-15:30	Session 8: Democracy and Governance	Session 9: Multiculturalism and Immigration in the Asia Pacific	Session 10: Political Thought
16:00-1800	Session 11: Public Administration and Local Autonomy	Session 12: Minorities in the Age of Civil Society	Session 13: Global Antitrust and Trade Regulation

The program is also available on the website (<http://www.cgcs.keio.ac.jp/>).



Venue: East Building

◆ Opening Ceremony

10:00- 8th Floor

Toshiaki Makabe (Vice President, Keio University)

Toshiro Tanaka (Program Leader of GCOE-CGCS, Keio University)

◆ Session 1: Electoral System

10:30-12:30 6th Floor

Chair Yoshiaki Kobayashi (Professor, Keio University)

Paper Givers Naoko Taniguchi (Associate Professor, Tokyo Institute of Technology)

"The Reform of Electoral System and the Realignment of Party System in Japan"

Bokyeung Seo (Research Professor, Sogang University)

"The Trend in Electoral Reform: How Is MMM Being Reformed around the World?"

Amy Catalinac (Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University)

"Pork to Policy: The Rise of National Security in Elections in Japan"

Chia-hung Tsai (Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

Ching-hsin Yu (Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

Eric Chen-hua Yu (Assistant Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

Su-feng Cheng (Associate Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

"Is 'Polling Primary' the Best Way to Select Candidates? Analyzing an Innovation of Candidate Selection Mechanism in Taiwan"

Discussants Jin-Sook Ju (Assistant Professor, Pai Chai University)

Takeshi Iida (Assistant Professor, Kobe University)

Masahiko Iguchi (Research Fellow, Keio University)

◆ Session 2: Digital Divide in Asia Pacific

10:30-12:30 8th Floor

Chair Minoru Sugaya (Associate Director, Institute for Media and Communications Research, Keio University)

Paper Givers Siriwan Anantho (Assistant Professor, Sukhothai Thammathirat Open University)

"Digital Divide in Thailand"

Anjeela Jokhan (Dean, Faculty of Science, Technology and Environment, University of the South Pacific)

"Bridging Digital Divide in Fiji"

Christina Higa (Associate Director, Telecommunications And Social Informatics Research Program, Social Science Research Institute, University of Hawai'i at Mānoa)

"Equalizing Access to Information and Knowledge: A Focus on Universal and Public Service Telecommunications in the U.S. Territories and Affiliated Pacific Islands"

Bronwyn Howell (General Manager, New Zealand Institute for the Study of Competition and Regulation)

"Dimensions of the Digital Divide: Perspectives from New Zealand"

Discussant Yoshihisa Takada (Associate Professor, Keio University)

◆ Session 3: Voting Behavior

13:30-15:30 6th Floor

Chair Nam-Young Lee (Professor, Sejong University)

Paper Givers Ken' ichi Ikeda (Professor, University of Tokyo)

"A Latitude Theory of Political Party Support and Meaningful Choice: Analyses from Japanese Elections from 1996 to 2010"

Youngtae Kim (Professor, Mokpo National University)

Wook Kim (Professor, Pai Chai University)

"The Stability and Volatility of Partisan Support among Korean Voters"

Chung-li Wu (Research Fellow, Academia Sinica)

Hsiao-chien Tsui (Associate Professor, National Chengcheng University)

"Cross-Cutting Networks and Political Participation: Lessons of the 2010 City Mayoral Elections in Taiwan"

Chi Huang (Professor, National Chengchi University)

Hung-chung Wang (Post-doctoral Researcher, National Chengchi University)

Chang-chieh Lin (Post-doctoral Researcher, National Chengchi University)

"Knowledge of the Electoral System and Voting Behavior"

Discussants Chia-hung Tsai (Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

Takeshi Iida (Assistant Professor, Kobe University)

Sung Dai Cho (Associate Professor, Hanshin University)

Amy Catalinac (Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University)

◆ Session 4: Civil Society and Media Space

13:30-15:30 8th Floor

Chair Gwangho E (Professor, Keio University)

Paper Givers Clement So (Professor, Chinese University of Hong Kong)

"Changing Role of Journalism in the New Technological Environment: Views from Hong Kong Journalists"

Tae-Jin Yoon (Associate Professor, Yonsei University)

"Cultural Politics of 'I am a Ggomsu,' a Podcast in Korea: A Sign of Breakdown of 20th-century-style Politics, Journalism, and Communication"

Chang-de Liu (Associate Professor, National Chengchi University)

"From Consuming to Participating: Civic Engagement in Taiwanese News Media"

Discussant Nobuto Yamamoto (Director, Institute for Media and Communications Research, Keio University)

◆ Session 5: Power Transfer by Election

16:00-18:00 6th Floor

Chair Chi Huang (Professor, National Chengchi University)

Paper Givers Takeshi Iida (Assistant Professor, Kobe University)

"Why Does the LDP Remain Unpopular? A Condition for Power Transfer under the Two-party System in Japan"

Nam Young Lee (Professor, Sejong University)

"Local Election as an Extension of National Conflicts"

Nathan F. Batto (Assistant Research Fellow, Academia Sinica)

"Are Taiwanese Legislative Elections Becoming More Party-Centric?"

Discussants Amy Catalinac (Postdoctoral Fellow, Harvard University)

Shin Osawa (Assistant Professor, Keio University)

Ching-hsin Yu (Research Fellow, National Chengchi University)

◆ Reception

18:30-20:30 8th Floor

Venue: East Building

6 Session 6: International Affairs 10:00-12:00 6th Floor

Chair	Eui Kon Kim	(Professor, Inha University)
Paper Givers	Akira Igata	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Neither Great nor Small: Understanding ‘Middle Powers’ in International Politics”	
	Boxing Pan	(Ph.D. Student, Inha University)
	“Balancing or Bandwagoning? Alliance Formation of the Ancient Korean Kingdom”	
	Makoto Imai	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Pre-Electoral Coalition Formation under Authoritarian Single-Party Dominance”	
	Thakur Prasad Subedi	(Ph.D. Student, Inha University)
	“Politics of Migration: Is South Korea in a State of Limbo?”	
	Dongki Sung	(Research Professor, Inha University)
	“The Multicultural Policy and Good Governance in Kazakhstan - According to the Case of ANK -”	
Discussants	Toshiro Tanaka	(Professor Emeritus, Keio University)
	Hiroshi Tomita	(Professor, Keio University)
	Kyung Hee Kwon	(Professor, Tongwon College)
	Yohei Fruuchi	(Assistant Professor, Keio University)

7 Session 7: Family and Education in the Age of Civil Society 10:00-12:00 8th Floor

Chair	Hideki Watanabe	(Professor, Keio University)
	Hirohisa Takenoshita	(Associate Professor, Shizuoka University)
Paper Givers	Xue Yang	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Filial Piety in Urban China under Market Reform: From the Views of Both the Elderly and the Middle-aged Generation”	
	Yoh Murayama	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“The Effect of Intergenerational Programs for Primary School Students through Reading Picture Books”	
	Yuichiro Sakai	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Democratize and Decentralize the ‘Family’”	
	Masayuki Ozawa	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“The Analysis of the Youth’s Friendship and Educational Attainment in Japan and South Korea”	
	Kota Toma	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Sense of Introducing the Concept of ‘Familism’ to Study of Socialization of Children”	
	Ryan Seebruck	(Ph.D. Student, University of Arizona)
	“Educational Equality in the USA: An Exploratory Spatial Data Analysis (ESDA) of Teacher Quality Distribution in California School Districts”	
Discussants	Nobutaka Fukuda	(Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University)
	Christopher Bondy	(Assistant Professor, DePauw University)

8 Session 8: Democracy and Governance 13:30-15:30 6th Floor

Chair	Sangjoon Kim	(Professor, Yonsei University)
Paper Givers	Yuta Kamahara	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Bringing ‘Discussion’ into the Discussion: Innovation in the Calibration of Democracy”	
	Jinman Cho	(Research Professor, Inha University)
	“Generation is Matter in the Korean Elections?”	
	Seulki Choi	(Ph.D. Student, Seoul National University)
	“The Politics of Presidential Agendas in Korea: The Analysis of Presidential Speeches”	
	Tae-Hee Kim	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Socioeconomic Status, Political Systems, and Efficacy”	
	Greg Porumbescu	(Ph.D. Student, Seoul National University)
	“The Influence of Context on Participatory E-government Applications: A Comparison of E-government Adoption in Romania and South Korea”	
	Ziyi Qian	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Research on Government Efficiency under E-government: Focus on Administrative Evaluation and Citizens’ Consciousness”	
Discussants	Soon Eun Kim	(Professor, Dong-eui University)
	Takeshi Kohno	(Professor, Keio University)
	Wonho Jang	(Professor, University of Seoul)
	Hidekuni Washida	(Research Fellow, Keio University)

9 Session 9: Multiculturalism and Immigration in the Asia Pacific 13:30-15:30 8th Floor

Chair	Yoshikazu Shiobara	(Associate Professor, Keio University)
Paper Givers	Yoshikazu Shiobara	(Associate Professor, Keio University)
	“Neoliberalism and Multiculturalism: A Cosmopolitan Alternative?”	
	Takeshi Hamano	(Lecturer, University of Kitakyushu)
	“Japan to Become a Signatory to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction: Focus upon Gender Politics in the Debate”	
	Pedro Iacobelli	(Ph.D. Candidate, Australian National University)
	“Post-war Okinawan Migration Program to Bolivia: A Discussion on Theoretical Approaches”	
Discussant	Kohei Kawabata	(Research Fellow, Kyoto University)

10 Session 10: Political Thought 13:30-15:30 5th Floor

Chair	Ken Tsutsumibayashi	(Professor, Keio University)
Paper Givers	Douglas Hedley	(Reader, University of Cambridge)
	“The Cambridge Platonists and the Problem of Freedom”	
	Yoshiko Hayami	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Between East and West; Thomas Mann’s Quest for a German Community after World War I”	
	Takuya Furuta	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“On Perpetuity: From Jean Bodin to John Locke”	
Discussant	Douglas Hedley	(Reader, University of Cambridge)

11 Session 11: Public Administration and Local Autonomy 16:00-18:00 6th Floor

Chair	Kosuke Oyama	(Professor, Keio University)
Paper Givers	Soon Eun Kim	(Professor, Dong-eui University)
	“A Conceptual Model of Urban Governance Competitiveness”	
	Minhong Lee	(Professor, Dong-eui University)
	“Assessment of the Age-friendliness of the Busan City”	
	Tomoyuki Kano	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“For Whom Does Urban Planning Exist? Residents and Administration in Local Governance on Planning Process”	
	Hyunkuk Lee	(Ph.D. Student, Seoul National University)
	“The Relationship between Public Service Motivation and Corruption: Evidence from Korean Public Servants”	
	Jungwon Cho	(Research Professor, Inha University)
	“The Government Failure and Insufficient Environmental Governance in China: The Case of Baoding, Hebei Province”	
	Yuuki Oda	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“The Performance Impact of the Civil Service by the Appointment through Open Competition”	
Discussants	Jungmin Seo	(Professor, Yonsei University)
	Wonho Jang	(Professor, University of Seoul)
	Yasukuni Iwagami	(Professor, Heisei International University)

12 Session 12: Minorities in the Age of Civil Society 16:00-18:00 8th Floor

Chair	Masami Sekine	(Professor, Keio University)
Paper Givers	Tomoko Fujita	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Income Support for Sole Parents in Australia: Deviation from the ‘Parenthood’”	
	Maya Suzuki	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“When Caste Re-emerges as Cultural Identity: Of Affirmative Action in India”	
Discussants	Yoshikazu Shiobara	(Associate Professor, Keio University)
	Makiko Kimura	(Researcher, Meiji Gakuin University)
	Meta Sekar Puji Astuti	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)

13 Session 13: Global Antitrust and Trade Regulation 16:00-18:00 5th Floor

Chair	Jiro Tamura	(Professor, Keio University)
Paper Givers	Takemasa Sekine	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“Rebalancing’ under the WTO Safeguards Agreement: Its Retaliatory Nature and the Equivalence Standard”	
	Kazuhiko Fuchikawa	(Ph.D. Student, Keio University)
	“The Merger Regulations of Buyer Power under the Antitrust Law”	
Discussant	Naoki Okada	(Associate Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University)

國科會補助計畫衍生研發成果推廣資料表

日期:2012/06/15

國科會補助計畫	計畫名稱: 台灣民眾之政策偏好與政策回應之研究
	計畫主持人: 蔡佳泓
	計畫編號: 98-2410-H-004-069-MY3 學門領域: 政治理論
無研發成果推廣資料	

98 年度專題研究計畫研究成果彙整表

計畫主持人：蔡佳泓		計畫編號：98-2410-H-004-069-MY3				計畫名稱：台灣民眾之政策偏好與政策回應之研究	
成果項目		量化			單位	備註（質化說明：如數個計畫共同成果、成果列為該期刊之封面故事...等）	
		實際已達成數（被接受或已發表）	預期總達成數（含實際已達成數）	本計畫實際貢獻百分比			
國內	論文著作	期刊論文	1	2	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	2	3	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力 （本國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		
國外	論文著作	期刊論文	0	0	100%	篇	
		研究報告/技術報告	0	0	100%		
		研討會論文	0	0	100%		
		專書	0	0	100%		章/本
	專利	申請中件數	0	0	100%	件	
		已獲得件數	0	0	100%		
	技術移轉	件數	0	0	100%	件	
		權利金	0	0	100%	千元	
	參與計畫人力 （外國籍）	碩士生	0	0	100%	人次	
		博士生	0	0	100%		
		博士後研究員	0	0	100%		
		專任助理	0	0	100%		

<p>其他成果 (無法以量化表達之成果如辦理學術活動、獲得獎項、重要國際合作、研究成果國際影響力及其他協助產業技術發展之具體效益事項等，請以文字敘述填列。)</p>	<p>本計畫所規畫的地方政府政策評價題目，已經為台灣選舉與民主化調查 (TEDS) 採納，未來將可望成為固定的題組。</p>
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	成果項目	量化	名稱或內容性質簡述
科教處計畫加填項目	測驗工具(含質性與量性)	0	
	課程/模組	0	
	電腦及網路系統或工具	0	
	教材	0	
	舉辦之活動/競賽	0	
	研討會/工作坊	0	
	電子報、網站	0	
	計畫成果推廣之參與 (閱聽) 人數	0	

國科會補助專題研究計畫成果報告自評表

請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況、研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）、是否適合在學術期刊發表或申請專利、主要發現或其他有關價值等，作一綜合評估。

1. 請就研究內容與原計畫相符程度、達成預期目標情況作一綜合評估

達成目標

未達成目標（請說明，以 100 字為限）

實驗失敗

因故實驗中斷

其他原因

說明：

2. 研究成果在學術期刊發表或申請專利等情形：

論文： 已發表 未發表之文稿 撰寫中 無

專利： 已獲得 申請中 無

技轉： 已技轉 洽談中 無

其他：（以 100 字為限）

3. 請依學術成就、技術創新、社會影響等方面，評估研究成果之學術或應用價值（簡要敘述成果所代表之意義、價值、影響或進一步發展之可能性）（以 500 字為限）

本研究的成就主要在於開拓民眾對於政府預算分配的反應以及其行為，跳脫傳統的政黨認同、候選人評價等社會心理模型，以有系統地探討統獨意識形態之外的社會議題偏好，與近年來方興未艾的社會正義議題相呼應。本研究一方面將可延伸到地方選舉的探討，因為過去的研究較侷限在少數縣市，並未討論各個縣市在同一選舉中的課責情況。如果民眾在地方選舉也依據施政表現選擇在任者或是其它參選者，那麼選舉課責的概念或許已經深入到地方政治。另一方面將可建立長期的觀察指標，並且與其他國家的資料相互比較。