Political Consequences of the MMM Electoral Systems in Taiwan and Japan

(draft)

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Abstract

Since electoral systems structure how representation works, it is not surprising that changes in electoral rules and their consequences always attract close attention. This paper intends to explore how some differences in less-high-profile rules might have caused divergent speed and extent of reaching some theoretically expected political consequences.

We compare two East Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, because both of them abandoned the decades old single nontransferable vote multimember district (SNTV-MMD) system and endorsed the similar mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system. Focusing on three differences between Japan and Taiwan, including dual candidacy, regional PR constituency, and PR threshold, we tap their possible consequences on macro-level party systems and district-level strategic voting patterns. Further careful comparative studies and rigorous causal analyses are called for to study this topic.

Introduction

Electoral systems determine how votes cast in an election are translated into seats in the legislature, and thus to a large extent determine who wins and who loses in the political arena.   Changes in electoral systems and their consequences always deserve close examination.   A striking aspect of institutional reform in the recent two decades is the increasing prevalence of the 'mixed member' electoral systems. Despite their considerable differences in forms of government and political culture, congruent patterns are evident across the Asian democracies, with Japan, Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines adopting similar mixed-member majoritarian (MMM) system (see Table 1) and also heavily weighted in favor of the majoritarian element of the system while against the PR list (Reilly 2006; 2007).

（Table 1 about here）

Instead of reemphasizing the similarities of the MMM systems among these Asian countries, this paper focuses on the major differences in electoral rules.   It is meant to point out some interesting topics worth further comparative research.   We choose to compare two of these Asian countries, Japan and Taiwan, because they both shared the same old electoral system and then switched to the similar new one. Although far from an ideal "natural experiment", Japan and Taiwan may constitute a no less comparable pair of subjects than Giannetti and Grofman's (2011) choice of Italy and Japan.   A comparative study of these two East Asian countries can shed some light on the effects of seemingly "minor" differences in electoral rules on political consequences while "controlling" their similarities in electoral systems.

In January 1994, the parliament of Japan passed an electoral law reform bill that abolished the single nontransferable vote multimember district (SNTV-MMD) system and introduced the mixed-member majoritarian system[1].   The new electoral system consists of one tier of single member districts (SMD) of 300 seats and a proportional representation (PR) tier of 200 seats (reduced to 180 after the 1996 election).   Eleven year later in June 2005, the National Assembly of Taiwan ratified a constitutional amendment to change the electoral rules of the Legislative Yuan by cutting the number of legislative seats from 225 to 113, extending legislators' terms of office from three years to four, and adopting the MMM system to replace the SNTV system

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[1] Here we adopt the classification of two subtypes of mixed-member systems by Shugart and Wattenberg (2001, 13-14).   They call the mixed-member system "majoritarian" when there is no linkage between nominal and list tiers in the allocation of seats to parties.   On the other hand, mixed-member proportional (MMP) systems prioritize the list tier, i.e., the second ballot.

for legislative elections.   The new mixed-member system in Taiwan also consists of one tier of SMD of 73 seats and a PR tier of 34 seats.   In addition, there are 6 seats reserved for aboriginals.   The SNTV-MMD system was maintained for the aboriginals but the magnitudes were reduced from 4 to 3 for each highland and lowland aboriginals.

Differences in the MMM System between Japan and Taiwan

Despite the apparent similarities of the MMM systems between Japan and Taiwan, there are some subtle differences whose political consequences may deserve closer examination.

1. **Dual candidacy and the best loser provision.**   The MMM system in Japan allows lists ordered on the basis of which candidates prove to be the "best losers" in the nominal-tier single-member districts in which they are nominated. Best-loser lists provide candidates with the incentive to campaign hard within their districts so as to be elected in the list tier even if beaten in their districts. Parties may nominate candidates to compete for a PR seat by running hard in a losing SMD.   Table 2 shows that most parties in Japan, with the exception of the Communist Party, take full advantage of this double candidacy rule.   However, no dual candidacy of the kind is allowed in Taiwan and therefore it is strictly closed party list in the PR tier.

（Table 2 about here）

2. **PR constituencies.**   The 180 PR list seats (37.5% of the total 480 seats since year 2000 House election) are further distributed in 11 PR constituencies in Japan, ranging from 6 to 29 seats in each PR constituency.   Table 3 indicates the 11 PR constituencies in Japan and the number of list seats in each constituency.   Such institutional rule may be favorable to some smaller parties whose supporters tend to concentrate within certain PR constituencies.   By contrast, the 34 list seats (30.1% of the total 113 seats) in Taiwan are to be elected nationwide as a single PR constituency.

（Table 3 about here）

3. **Electoral threshold.**   In Japan, there is no formal electoral threshold for political

parties on the second ballot to be eligible to the allocation of list seats. In Taiwan, however, parties competing for party-list seats must attain at least 5% of the PR vote nationwide—a provision which discriminates against small parties. As a result, only two major parties, Kuomintang (KMT) and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), met this threshold requirement in the 2008 Legislative Yuan election, the first election in Taiwan under the new system. Although two small parties, the New Party (NP) and the Taiwan Solidarity Union (TSU), did receive 3.95% and 3.53% for the PR votes respectively, neither of them managed to reach the 5% threshold required for parties to be allocated PR seats.

Similarities and Differences in the Political Consequences

The above-mentioned differences in electoral rules might have divergent political consequences in Taiwan and Japan. We argue that they deserve some careful and detailed comparative analyses.

Macro-level Patterns of Party Competition

Researchers often return to Duverger's classic arguments on electoral systems and their political consequences. According to Duverger (1959, 217): "the simple-majority single ballot system favors the two-party system." He provides two factors to explain why third party can not survive in this electoral system. Duverger (1959, 224) argues that "the mechanical factor consist in the 'under-representation' of the third, i.e. the weakest party, its percentage of seats being inferior to its percentage of the poll." The second factor is a more ambiguous one. Because supporters of third party do not want to waste their votes, Duverger (1959, 226) argues that "their natural tendency to transfer their vote to the less evil of its two adversaries in order to prevent the success of the greater evil." Duverger (1959, 205) thus asserted that single-member district plurality would tend to generate two-party competition, and he also proposed that PR systems would encourage multiparty competition. Mixed-member electoral system is characterized by the hybrid of both SMD and PR tiers. Since the primary feature of the MMM system adopted by Japan and Taiwan is the lack of linkage between SMD and PR tiers, "the typical majoritarian boost received by a large party in the nominal tier is not likely to be wiped away by proportional allocation from the list tier." (Shugart and Wattenberg 2001, 13) Furthermore, the PR portion in Japan accounts for only 37.5% of the total 480 seats since 2000 and in Taiwan accounts for only 30.1% of the total 113 seats. It seems logical to argue that the gravity force of Duverger's law will exert pressure on small

parties and thus push down the number of parties.   Indeed macro-level data in Tables 4 and 5 seem to confirm Duverger's law and indicate that the impact of electoral reforms on party systems in the two countries is a movement toward two-camp competition, albeit in different speed.

（Tables 4 and 5 about here）

Figures 1 and 2 indicate the Laakso-Taagepera effective number of electoral parties (ENEP) and effective number of parliamentary parties (ENPP) for the two countries (Laakso and Taagepera 1979; Taagepera and Shugart 1989).   According to the Duverger's law, the number of parties in SMDs would shift toward two due to mechanical effects and strategic voting due to psychological effects.   But Duverger's hypothesis predicts that multiple parties remain in the PR tier of the system due to sincere voting.   This is indeed what we see in Figure 1 for Japan's House of Representative elections over time.   The ENEP in SMD fluctuated between the first two elections after the 1994 reform due to substantial realignment but than dropped more sharply below 3.0 since the third election in 2003 under the MMM system. The ENEP in the PR tier, although also declined somewhat over time, yet the trend is much less steep than its SMD counterpart and remained above 3.5 even after the 2003 election.   With more than 62% of the House seats allocated to the SMD tier, it is not surprising that the ENPP dropped even below the ENEP in SMD.   In short, throughout the period from the 1996 to the 2005 in Japan, partisan politics have been the contest between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the second-largest party. As Jou (2009; 2010) points out, during this decade party competition in Japan's SMD portion witnessed two distinct patterns: urban areas converging toward a two-party system while rural constituencies remaining dominated by the LDP (see also Wang 2011).   The landslide victory of the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) obtaining 64% of the seats in the 2009 House election and the formation of the DPJ-centered coalition government appear to usher in a new era of government by the alteration of two major parties (Arase 2010; Maeda 2010).

(Figure 1 about here)

Reed (2005, 282) argues that "the most appropriate time frame for evaluating structural reforms is decades not years."   Therefore, it is somewhat premature and risky to evaluate the effects of electoral system change in Taiwan since the new MMM system has been implemented only once in the January of 2008 since the ratification of the constitutional amendment in 2005.   However, by examining the

2008 legislative election results as well as the 13 by-elections held in the following three years under the new system we can still explore some possible consequences which can be compared not only with its neighboring country, Japan, but also with the coming Legislative Yuan election scheduled on January 14, 2012.

The reform of legislative electoral system in Taiwan might be partially motivated by the then ruling Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) to win the absolute majority in the Legislative Yuan.   However, the 2008 legislative election results fell far short from its expectation.   Actually, DPP received 38.0% of total district votes but only 13 (16.5%) out of 79 SMD/SNTV seats.   For the PR ballot, DPP received 36.9% of total votes and 14 (41.2%) of 34 party seats.   On the other hand, the Kuomintang (KMT, the Nationalist Party) garnered 53.5% of total district votes and 61 (77.2%) out of the 79 SMD/SNTV seats, as well as 51.2% of total at-large votes and 20 (58.8%) out of the 34 party seats (Huang and Hsiao 2009).   If we count in the 3 seats won by the NPSU, the KMT's close ally, the pan-blue indeed secured an overwhelming victory over the DPP in the 2008 legislative election.   As mentioned earlier, although the two small parties, NP and TSU, did receive 3.95% and 3.53% for the PR votes respectively, neither of them managed to reach the 5% threshold required for parties to be allocated PR seats.   Figure 2 clearly indicates that there was an immediate sharp drop in all the three indicators of the effective number of parties.   Not only the ENEP in the SMD tier reached 2.13 as Duverger's law would expect, but also its PR counterpart dropped to 2.48 from 3.70 under the previous SNTV-MMD system.   It seems that what takes Japan one and a half decades as well as five House elections to evolve realized almost immediately after changing the electoral system in Taiwan. Similar to Japan, with 70% of the seats in the Legislative Yuan allocated to the SMD tier and the landslide victory of the KMT, the ENPP took a stunning drop to 1.75 which is almost one-party dominance in parliament.

(Figure 2 about here)

This somewhat surprisingly fast convergence toward two-party competition was mainly caused by the contrasting alliance maneuvering results of the two camps in Taiwan.   Months before the 2008 Legislative election, KMT negotiated successfully with the People First Party (PFP) to nominate 6 former PFP legislators in 6 districts and also allowed PFP to share three seats on KMT's party list.   KMT also coordinated with the Non-partisan Solidarity Union (NPSU) to stand off 3 seats in SMD, and KMT promised not nominate candidate in the first district in Pingtung to allow an independent candidate, also affiliated with NPSU, to compete against the

DPP candidate. Apparently, the KMT, after losing the 2000 and 2004 presidential elections, was anxious to form a grand coalition aiming at the presidential election in the March of 2008 and thus was more willing to make compromises with its allies. In contrast to the coordination in the pan-blue camp, the DPP and the TSU squabbled with each other and eventually failed to reach any substantive agreement. The DPP seemed to believe that the TSU would simply back down and follow its lead. Yet the TSU eventually fielded 13 candidates in districts to fight its survival battle. It is interesting to note that the new electoral system facilitates the tacit merge of the KMT and PFP in the pan-blue camp and yet fuels tension between the DPP and TSU in the pan-green camp. These somewhat opposite effects on both camps are further magnified by the new electoral system since the SMD tier tends to favor the party capturing majority of popular votes.

District-level Strategic Voting and Exit

In Taiwan, there was an immediate drop in the effective number of parties in both the SMD and the PR tiers in the first election after the electoral system change. In Japan, by contrast, the sharp drop in the ENEP in the SMD tier did not occur until the third House election after the electoral reform while the ENEP in the PR tier remained above 3.50. These macro-level indexes should be further checked and tested at the district level.

In both Japan and Taiwan, changes at the district level are also congruent with the electoral system theories. In order to examine the differences between Japan and Taiwan in terms of the speed as well as the extent of change in two ballot tiers, we exploit the SF ratio patterns over time and across two tiers. Cox (1997, 85) uses SF ratio to test the "M+1 rule," a generalization of Duverger's law. The M+1 rule holds that, at the district level, the effective number of candidates will decline toward the district magnitude (M) plus one. SF ratios, which are the ratios of the votes won by the second loser to that of the first loser, demonstrate the extent to which the number of votes cast for less competitive candidates trailing behind M+1. Cox reasons that in Duvergerian equilibria when strategic voting by voters occurs, the $(M+2)^{th}$ candidate will be deserted and thus the SF ratio will be near zero. In non-Duvergerian equibria, however, the first and second losers receive nearly the same number of votes and thus the SF ratio will near one. Scheiner and Tronconi (2011), while comparing Italy[2] and Japan under the MMM system, further extends

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[2] In passing, Italy replaced its then-existing PR system with the MMM system in 1993 and used this system three times. In 2005, Italy switched from the MMM to a system which gives a seat bonus to the party or the coalition that gains a plurality of votes, whereas seat allocation to coalition partners

this SF ratio by computing the ratio of third-place to second-place votes for PR parties in PR ballots in each SMD district.   They find that in both Italy and Japan,

> "the SF ratio patterns shifted toward zero in the SMD tier but remained
> much farther to the right in PR.   In other words, the second- and
> third-place parties received vote total that were much closer to one another
> in the PR tier, where fewer strategic voting incentives existed, but moved
> apart in the SMD tier." (Scheiner and Tronconi 2011, 104)

SF ratios of legislative elections in Taiwan since 2004 are computed and then the resulting distribution plotted as Figures 3 to 5.   Figure 3 shows that the SF ratio histogram of 2004 legislative election under SNTV-MMD system is highly left-skewed.   Almost a third (nine out of 30) SNTV districts, including two aboriginal districts, fell in the extreme category with SF ratios greater than 0.9.   This SF ratio pattern is indeed consistent with Cox's (1997, 105) interpretation that large-magnitude system in general depresses the level of strategic voting, since more than half of Taiwan's SNTV districts had a magnitude of four or higher.

(Figure 3 about here)

The distribution pattern changed dramatically into right-skewed shape in the SMD tier, as Figure 4-1 indicates, in the 2008 legislative election under the MMM system.   Thirteen out of the 73 districts (17.8%) witnessed two-candidate competition and thus there were no second losers by definition, and 42 districts (57.5%) had SF ratios lower than 0.1.   The SF ratio pattern in Figure 4-1 seems to suggest that strategic voting was at work in Taiwan's SMD tier in 2008.   If we further examine the 13 by-elections held during 2009 to 2011, the SF ratio distribution in Figure 5 is even more right-skewed.   Almost half (6 out 13) of these districts had only two candidates running against each other, a strong indication of strategic exit by small parties and less competitive candidates.   The only district with an SF ratio of 0.78 was Yun-lin County where both losers were KMT members.   Meanwhile, the SF ratios of the two aboriginal districts under the SNTV system stayed around the middle, as Figure 4-3 shows.

(Figures 4-1, 4-3, and 5 about here)

What distinguishes Taiwan from Japan (and from Italy under the MMM system)

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follows a proportional rule.

is the PR tier.   The SF ratio in Figure 4-2, which shows the distribution of the PR tier, is again highly right-skewed.   With 12 parties listed on the second ballot in Taiwan's 2008 election, 60 out of the 73 single-member districts (82.2%) had party-ballot SF ratios lower than 0.2.   This pattern suggests that strategic voting was at work in Taiwan not only in the SMD but also in the PR tier.

(Figure 4-2 about here)

Differences between Japan and Taiwan discussed above poses an interesting question.   Why does it take Japan almost one and a half decades to gradually consolidate toward a two-party system and strategic voting pattern (see Scheiner and Tronconi 2011, 102) while in Taiwan the impact of the new electoral system seems to be immediate and more far reaching?   To what extent does this different pace contributed by the differences in electoral rules, i.e. dual candidacy, PR constituencies, and electoral threshold?   We speculate that all the three elements contribute to the divergent results.   In particular, the relatively high 5% threshold of the PR tier *might* have induced some small party supporters also to vote "strategically" for the major party in each camp and thus make futile the minor parties' campaigns.   The MMM electoral system in Taiwan seems to squeeze small parties from both SMD and PR ends and thus accelerates the process toward a two-party system on the island.

"Contamination Effect": Interaction between SMD and PR Ballots

A number of studies criticized the failure of the mainstream literature taking account the potential for interaction effect or contamination effect across the two ballots under mixed rule (Cox and Schoppa 2002; Herron and Nishikawa 2001; Moser and Scheiner 2004).   "Contamination is…when the behavior of voter, a party, a candidate, or a legislator in one tier of the election is demonstrably affected by the institutional riles employed in the other tier" (Ferrara, Herron, and Nishikawa 2005, 8).   In order to lift the PR votes, party elites may have strong incentive to field candidates in single-member districts to give the party label a human face, regardless of the chance of winning the district seat.   In other words, electoral incentives in one tier "contaminate" those in the other tier, complicating the insights from Duvergerian laws.

Now the interesting question is: Are voters in the two countries equally motivated to react to the maneuvers of political elites to maximize their parties' seats and votes in both SMD and PR tiers?   My speculation is probably not.   Despite some negative evidence (Maeda 2008), we suspect that in Japan with dual candidacy

and best loser provision, candidates who 'died' gloriously in their SMD can be 'revived' in the PR tier as 'zombie Diet members' and thus have strong incentive to cultivate local connections and campaign hard in their SMDs, the interaction mechanism is more likely to take effect.   Kuo, Huang, and Wang (2010) analyzed Japanese House elections from 1996 to 2009 and found that smaller parties such as Social Democratic Party (SDP) and losing major parties such as LDP in 2009 relied more on dual candidacy's lifting effects on PR votes.   In Taiwan, on the other hand, there is little mechanism exists for interactions between SMD and PR ballots to take effect since no dual candidacy is allowed.   Huang (2010) evaluated the effects of TSU's nomination of 13 district candidates on their PR vote shares in the 2008 election in Taiwan and indeed found no evidence of interaction between the SMD and PR tiers.

Also, the *combination of some seemingly "minor" differences* in electoral systems may generate significant divergent results.   For example, both theories and empirical evidence indicate that the larger the district magnitude, the higher the proportionality between votes shares and seat shares.   So we should expect Taiwan's MMM system to be more favorable to small parties since the whole country is treated as a single PR constituency for all the 34 list seats.   In reality, however, in Japan with 11 PR constituencies, smaller parties with supporters concentrated in an area are more likely to trade SMD votes in exchange of PR votes.   In Taiwan, on the other hand, geographical concentration of supporters makes no difference in a single nationwide PR constituency.   Thus small party supporters might still vote strategically for major-party SMD candidates and vote sincerely for PR lists, as Duverger's law predicts, or even turn to major party list in the PR tier due to the formidable 5% electoral threshold.   Had the island been divided into two, say, north and south PR constituencies, then the New Party would have exceeded the 5% threshold in the northern PR constituency and thus would have been allocated one seat in the Legislative Yuan.   Although a one-seat party makes little difference to the effective number of parliamentary parties, it may be a signal to small parties to linger on longer.

Concluding Remarks

Institutions do matter.   This may be even true for seemingly "minor" differences among many apparent similarities between two electoral rules.   This paper explores several such differences between Japan and Taiwan, including dual

candidacy, regional PR constituency, and PR threshold, as well as their possible consequences on party systems and district-level strategic voting patterns.   Whether and to what extent these differences produce the divergent consequences discussed above call for further careful comparative studies and rigorous causal analyses.

There is no doubt that other contextual factors not discussed in this paper may also play a role.   A significant difference between Japan and Taiwan is the constitutional structure.   That is, Japan has a two-chamber parliamentary system while Taiwan has a semi-presidential system.   The timing and sequence of staggering elections can influence voters' choices.   For example, voters in Taiwan's January 2008 legislative election were fully aware of and expected a high-profile presidential election two months later in March.   Such a close election sequence could have strengthened the strategic coordination at the national level and squeezed the smaller parties even further.   If this is the case, then the coming concurrent legislative and presidential elections in Taiwan scheduled on the same day of January 14, 2012, may make the small parties even more difficult to persuade voters to vote for them. Although it is too early at this moment to predict which of the two major parties will triumph, it is almost certain that this concurrent elections schedule is not beneficial to smaller parties.

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Table 1 Electoral Systems Changes in Five Asian Countries Since the 1990s

Countries	Government Form	Former Electoral System	New Electoral System （year of change）	District Seats	PR List Seats	Electoral Threshold
Japan	parliamentary	SNTV	MMM（1994）	300	180*	None
Korea	semi-presidential	modified plurality	MMM（2003）	243	56	3% or 5 district seats
Taiwan	semi-presidential	SNTV	MMM（2005）	73	34#	5%
Philippines	presidential	plurality-block	MMM （1987/98）	209	53	2% & 3-seat cap

Sources: Hicken and Kasuya (2003); Huang (2008); Nohlen, Grotz, and Hartmann（2001）; and Reilly (2006; 2007)

Notes: *200 list seats in the 1996 House election.

    # 6 seats for aboriginals under the SNTV system

Table 2 Dual Candidacy Rates of Political Parties in Japan

	LDP	DPJ	JCP	SDP	Kuomei
1996	90.3	--	10.4	100.0	--
2000	95.9	98.8	11.3	100.0	38.9
2003	92.1	98.9	10.3	100.0	0.0
2005	96.6	98.6	8.0	94.7	0.0
2009	93.1	98.9	39.5	100.0	0.0

Source: Japanese National Diet Library WARP Database (日本国立国会図書館インターネット情

報選択的蓄積事業): http://warp.ndl.go.jp/search/.

Table 3　Japan's PR Constituencies and Seats in House Elections: 1996-2009

PR Blocs	Areas	1996	2000	2003	2005	2009
Hokkaido (北海道)	Hokkaido(北海道)	9	8	8	8	8
Tohoku (東北)	Fukushima(福島縣), Miyagi (宮城縣), Iwate(岩手縣)	16	14	14	14	14
Kita-Kanto (北關東)	Ibaraki(茨城縣), Tochigi(栃木縣), Gunma(群馬縣), Saitama (埼玉縣)	21	20	20	20	20
Minami-Kanto (南關東)	Chiba(千葉縣), Kanagawa(神奈川縣), Yamanashi(山梨縣)	23	21	22	22	22
Tokyo(東京)	Tokyo City(東京都)	19	17	17	17	17
Hokuriku-Shinetsu (北陸信越)	Niigata(新潟縣), Nagano(長野縣), Toyama(富山縣)	13	11	11	11	11
Tokai (東海)	Shizuoka(靜岡縣), Aichi(愛知縣), Gifu(岐阜縣), Mie(三重縣)	23	21	21	21	21
Kinki (近畿)	Osaka(大阪府), Kyoto(京都府), Hyogo(兵庫縣)	33	30	29	29	29
Chugoku (中國)	Okayama(岡山縣), Hiroshima(廣島縣), Yamaguchi(山口縣)	13	11	11	11	11
Shikoku (四國)	Kagawa(香川縣), Tokushima (德島縣), Ehime(愛媛縣), Kochi(高知縣)	7	6	6	6	6
Kyushu (九州)	Hukuoka(福岡縣), Kumamoto (熊本縣), Kagoshima(鹿兒島縣)	23	21	21	21	21
	Total	200	180	180	180	180

1.　"Proportional Representation Districts and Seats of Japanese Lower House", Japanese Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications website: http://www.soumu.go.jp/senkyo/senkyo_s/news/senkyo/shu_teisu/index.html (〈眾議院比例代表選區與各選區席次數〉，日本總務省).

2.　Senkyoho Kenkyukai (Election Law Study Community) (ed). 1995. *The Guide of Japanese Electoral Law and Political Funds Control Law*. Nagoya: Shinnippon-Hoki Publishing Co. Ltd. (選舉法研究會編撰，1995，《選舉法、政治資金法手冊》，名古屋：新日本法規出版社).

Table 4　Effective Number of Parties in Japan: 1993-2009

		ENEP	ENPP
1986	(SNTV)	3.350	2.574
1990	(SNTV)	3.415	2.701
1993	(SNTV)	5.151	4.144
1996	(SMD)	3.856	2.934
	(PR)	4.277	
2000	(SMD)	3.773	3.159
	(PR)	5.154	
2003	(SMD)	2.970	2.591
	(PR)	3.420	
2005	(SMD)	2.710	2.263
	(PR)	3.721	
2009	(SMD)	2.639	2.101
	(PR)	3.657	

Source: Japanese National Diet Library WARP Database (日本国立国会図書館インターネット情報選択的蓄積事業): http://warp.ndl.go.jp/search/.

Table 5　Effective Number of Parties in Taiwan: 2004-2008

		ENEP	ENPP
1998	(SNTV)	3.14	2.48
2001	(SNTV)	4.13	3.47
2004	(SNTV)	3.70	3.26
2008	(SMD)	2.13	1.75
	(PR)	2.48	

Sources: Huang (2008); Huang, Chen, and Chou (2008); Huang and Hsiao (2009)

Figure 1   Effective Number of Parties in Japan: 1986-2009

Source: Japanese National Diet Library WARP Database (日本国立国会図書館インターネット情報選択的蓄
積事業): http://warp.ndl.go.jp/search/.

Figure 2   Effective Number of Parties in Taiwan: 1998-2008

Sources: Huang (2008); Huang, Chen, and Chou (2008); Huang and Hsiao (2009)

**SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2004 (SNTV)**

Figure 3   SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2004 (SNTV)

Note: *There was no second loser in Yilan County.
      **Including two aboriginal SNTV districts.
      ***Excluding Tainan County deu to Women Reserved
Seats.
Source: Election Results Database of Central Election Commis-
   sion, R.O.C. Website: http://117.56.211.222/.

SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2008 (MMM, SMD)

Figure 4-1　SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2008

(MMM, SMD)

SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2008 (MMM, PR)

Figure 4-2　SF Ratio of Legislative Election, 2008

(MMM, PR)

**SF Ratio of Aboriginal Legislative Election, 2008 (SNTV)**

Figure 4-3 SF Ratio of Aboriginal Legislative Election, 2008
(SNTV)

Note: *"2 candidates" means two-candidate competition districts and thus no second loser.

Source: Election Results Database of Central Election Commission, R.O.C. Website: http://117.56.211.222/.

SF Ratio of Legislative By-elections, 2009-2011 (MMM, SMD)

Figure 5 SF Ratio of Legislative By-elections, 2009-2011 (MMM, SMD)

Note: *"2 candidates" means two-candidate competition districts and thus no second loser.

Source: Election Results Database of Central Election Commission, R.O.C. Website: http://117.56.211.222/.