International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

College of Social Sciences

National Chengchi University

碩士論文

Master's Thesis

論文題目

A Parallel of Taiwanization and Democratization: from 1947 to Present Day

Student: Katherine Rose

Advisor: Wei Mei-Chuan

中華民國 102 年 7 月

July, 2013

論文題目

A Parallel of Taiwanization and Democratization: from 1947 to Present Day

研究生: 任凱蒂　　Student: Katherine Rose

指導教授 : 魏玫娟　　Advisor: Wei Mei-chuan

國立政治大學

亞太研究英語碩士學位學程

碩士論文

A Thesis

Submitted to International Master's Program in Asia-Pacific Studies

National Chengchi University

In partial fulfillment of the Requirement

For the degree of Master in Taiwan Studies

中華民國 102 年 7 月

July, 2013

Abstract

The island of Taiwan, located around 160 km east of China, has existed amongst contention and confusion for centuries, with a complex history of foreign occupation beginning in the mid-seventeenth century with the Dutch and only ending after the Nationalist Chinese Party's (the KMT's) relocation in the mid-twentieth century, at which point the desire of the people to rule and be free in their own country began shifting the notions of Taiwan and the Taiwanese. It was at this juncture that the processes of democratization and national identity formation collided and have since progressed as an influential parallel to the present day, in which Taiwan is now an established democratic nation with the majority of its citizens identifying as Taiwanese, distinct from the periods of foreign rule in the past and the present threat from across the Strait. An analysis of this paralleled progression through history is essential to fully comprehending the deeply embedded notions of democracy and national identity on the island which are currently influential factors shaping the domestic outlook towards the continuing cross-strait dilemma. Drawing on the academic literature and data from ESC (Election Study Center) and TEDS (Taiwan Election and Democracy Studies), a synthesis of agent- and process- oriented approaches, which emphasizes the roles of political elites, civil society and historical context, will be employed in this study to explore the parallel of democratization and Taiwanization in postwar Taiwan.

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1 Chapter One: Introduction……..……...……1

1.1 Background……1

1.2 Key concepts…….....…….……2

1.3 Research method and analytical framework …...…...……5

1.3.1 Qualitative research……...……...5

1.3.2 Analytical framework……...……8

1.3.2.1 A process and actor centered historical framework……..... 8

2 Chapter 2: 1947 – 1979: The collision of national identity and democratic ideals in post-war Taiwan…….……21

2.1 The early ignition of national identity ……..22

2.1.1 The 2-28 Incident……24

2.1.2 The formation of ethnic national identity in Taiwan ……...….... 26

2.2 A Partnership forms……..……29

2.2.1 The initial signs of the democratic movement alongside its revival of the movement for national identity ……..... 30

3 Chapter 3: 1980 – 1995: The first signs of democratic progress and a transition of national identity…….……..…….35

3.1 Democratization in Taiwan……...……36

3.2 Agents of change: civil and political society ....……,,…….38

3.2.1 Civil society……..……...……39

3.2.2 Political society……...…….……41

3.3 Civic national identity emerging in Taiwan ……52
3.4 Conclusion…….…….…….55

4 Chapter 4: 1996 – Present day: consolidated democracy, "Taiwanese" national identity and the return of the China factor…….……..57
4.1 Tracing the final chapter of development ……...58
4.2 The shifts in policy under the first Taiwanese, democratically elected president, Lee Deng-hui ……..…….……..60
4.2.1 The 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis……..…..61
4.2.2 "Special State-to-State Relations" and the "New Taiwanese" ….……..62
4.3 Growing tension under Chen Shui-bian…….…...…...65
4.4 Ma Ying-Jeou's transition in strategy…..……..…...…….67
4.4.1 "Chaiwan" forming under President Ma? ……..…….69

5 Chapter 5: *The voice of the people: a presentation of survey and focus group data*……76
5.1 Analysis of relevant quantitative data……..……76
5.2 Focus group data……...……..……..……87
5.3 Concluding remarks……..…….……...91

6 Chapter 6: Conclusion…….……....……..95
6.1 Recommendations for future studies…….....….98

References ……..100

List of Tables

Table 1. Changes in the Taiwanese/Chinese identity of Taiwanese…..…..79

Table 2. Changes in unification/independence stances of Taiwanese…..81

Table 3. Surveys on unification under similar level of political and economic development, 2004–2011 (in %)……...83

Table 4. How much of a democracy is Taiwan today? ……..…….85

Table 5. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan today? ……86

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1 Background

In an interview in 1994, the first native Taiwanese President of Taiwan Lee Deng-hui expressed with great resolution a sentiment which still resonates in Taiwan's society today: "the misery of being a Taiwanese." This statement is not a reflection of the daily life of people in Taiwan, but rather concerns the complicated historical struggles on the island which continue to echo in political and cultural discourse today.

From the arrival of the Dutch in 1642 to the relocation of the Chinese Nationalist Party in 1949, the island of Taiwan has been home to numerous foreign rulers, some more invasive and influential than others. As the native people were passed down the line between the Dutch, Spanish, Qing Dynasty, Japanese and finally the Nationalist Chinese Party, there lay little time or means to establish a unique national identity, let alone their own political system. Ernest Gellner's theory of nationalism states that "Nationalism is not a sentiment expressed by pre-existing nations; rather it creates nations where they did not previously exist" (2006, p. xxv). From this perspective, the onset of a rapid movement for national identity, which in Taiwan's case occurred closely alongside the transformation towards a democratic political system, can be argued as essential in creating the nation of Taiwan as it is perceived today. In fact, it is only in the last thirty years that being 'Taiwanese' has even become an option, and this could not have been possible without the rights and freedoms granted through democracy. The collision of these two processes, that which has been referred to here as 'Taiwanization,' and the other democratization, gives proof of the imperative interdependent relationship between national identity and democracy in Taiwan through their progression up to the present day.

So we now must ask, what has driven the relationship between the progression of national identity and the democratization on the island, and what impact does this relationship have on the current scenario in Taiwan? If these two processes are still

evolving, is it possible for the recent, or rather returning, "China Factor" to impede on the 'nation' which has been developed over the past 60 years?

An initial, detailed historical analysis of the mutual dependence of these two processes in their proper historical context will first be presented, focusing on key events and actors which have molded the unique relationship between democratization and national identity formation in Taiwan. This is not to say that the development of democracy and that of national identity will be treated as equal, nor will their development be seen as interchangeable, but this dissertation will rather argue the crucial influence which each process has had on the other throughout their distinct periods of development. As this study is brought into a more contemporary focus, it will turn to analyze the impact of the historical relationship between political and national identity development on Taiwan in light of recent shifts in cross-strait relations.

The "China Factor," which encompasses the growing economic relationship across the strait and its implications for Taiwan's political stance, over the past five years has raised a collection of questions among many local and international academics alike as to the negative impacts which this has already had and may in the future continue to have specifically on democracy and national identity in Taiwan. However, this thesis will also explore another point of view, in which the strong relationship between the progressions of democratic ideals alongside a growing confidence in a "Taiwanese" identity contrarily seem to show strength amongst the people of Taiwan, possibly posing a greater threat to the hopes of China to continue its pursuit of the "One China Principle". The continued discourse on the issues of democracy and national identity in Taiwan shows that these processes are still developing, and therefore now more than ever deserve greater attention in order to not only examine how China is affecting democracy and national identity in Taiwan, but also conversely to address how the state of these two processes is affecting cross-strait relations.

1.2 Key concepts

Before embarking on the main body of this dissertation, it is important to clarify the key and at times controversial concepts which are the base of this study: the terms 'Taiwanese,' national identity and the other democracy. These concepts will all be expanded on in further detail throughout the thesis; however this brief introduction will aim to first provide a clear definition as a guiding reference throughout the study.

The label 'Taiwanese' is a slightly deceptive classification of the people in Taiwan, since as is the case with many labels of nationalities such as Americans and Australians, the term Taiwanese actually neglects the first native people inhabiting the island, which are referred to as aboriginals, while the movement of the Taiwanese most commonly refers to those immigrants from China, mainly from Fujian province, who emigrated to Taiwan 400 to 600 years ago and constitute the majority ethnicity on the island. The "Taiwanese" are commonly differentiated from those who immigrated to Taiwan after 1949 who represent the mainland Chinese, or *waisheng ren.* However the meanings denoted by 'Taiwanese' and 'Chinese' have shifted through the island's recent history, and therefore varying more inclusive definitions of the terms will arise in this dissertation as they become relevant The term "Taiwanization" is a political concept construed by President Chiang Ching-kuo mainly in an effort to recruit Taiwanese elites into the party-state in order to retain the legitimacy of the KMT. This strategic directive from above cannot be said to have been directly formulated to promote a Taiwanese nationalism or identity, however in this dissertation, the term "Taiwanization" as is presented in the title of this study, is understood primarily as the formation and process of a growing Taiwanese identity on the island.

National identity has more recently began to attract a greater amount of attention from the academic community, however despite the rich research already conducted, this term is still very complicated and a clear definition of national identity remains unresolved. For the purpose of this dissertation, the definition of national identity as presented by Anthony D. Smith (2010) will be adapted, in which he defines national identity as:

> "the continuous reproduction and reinterpretation by the members of a national community of the pattern of symbols, values, myths, memories and traditions that

compose the distinctive heritage of nations, and the variable identification of individual members of that community with that heritage and its cultural elements" (p. 20).

Smith's definition gives credence to the influence of historical events shared by the people in Taiwan which have played a large role in helping to form the national identity developed amongst the Taiwanese to separate themselves from their previously enforced colonial rules. National identity can be either conceived as an 'ethnic', cultural identity, or as a 'civic', more politically derived identity[1], however the story and differentiation of these two forms of identity becomes more complicated in the case of Taiwan once we arrive at the discussion of the relationship between national identity and the choice of state[2]. This debate prompts a puzzling phenomenon in Taiwan. Even if a person identifies him/herself as Taiwanese, this does not infer that he/she subsequently supports Taiwan's independence. Greater specification must therefore first be clarified, stipulating that there is currently no positive link between national identity and stances on unification-independence, and this dissertation will focus mainly on national identity in order to avoid being wrapped up in the complexity of this contradictory predicament. This dilemma is often reasoned by scholars in part to break down to the people of Taiwan separating the realm of politics and economic relations with China, viewing 'politics as politics' and 'economics as economics', avoiding any interference between their identity beliefs with the complex issues of political and economic exchanges across the Strait (Cheng, 2009; Chow, 2008; Danielson, 2012). The existing literature on the subject (Wu, 1993, 2011, 2012; Cheng, 2009; Chu, 2004) however does show that those people of Taiwan who identify themselves as Taiwanese do tend to be more inclined to be biased in their support for Taiwan, even when this is not directly in the form of choosing or preferring Taiwan independence.

[1] The different types of national identity experienced by the people of Taiwan are addressed in this dissertation as 'ethnic national identity', which is a historical and cultural construct, and 'civic national identity' which derives from an attachment and support for a country's political as well as territorial dimensions (Brown, 1994). These terms will be elaborated on in more detail as they arise in the relevant chapters of this thesis.

[2] This refers largely to the ongoing dilemma of over the many different conceptions which have arisen aiming to define the state residing on Taiwan, for example whether it should be defined as the Republic Of China (ROC) on Taiwan, the ROC, One China under the ROC, or One China under the People's Republic of China (PRC).

The term democracy is also laden with definitions, of which a commonly agreed upon, basic definition is sufficient for the purpose of this dissertation. Samuel Huntington provides just such a definition, explaining that a democracy is reached when the "most powerful collective decision makers are selected through fair, honest, and periodic elections in which candidates freely compete for votes and in which virtually all the adult population is eligible to vote" (1991). This dissertation will analyze the process of democratization preceding the achievement of a democracy in Taiwan under Huntington's conditions, and then continue to analyze democratic consolidation on the island, which according to Shelley Rigger (2012) "is still underway." Although the current state of democracy in Taiwan fulfills the requirements of consolidation as outlined by Huntington and Diamond[3], to say a democracy is fully consolidated implies that the process of deepening democracy is complete, and it is clear in Taiwan's case that further growth of democracy on the island is still a prominent issue among the society as well as among political institutions.

1.3 Research method and analytical framework

1.3.1 Qualitative research

This dissertation will be predominately conducted as qualitative research, an inductive approach to research defined by Cynthia A. Hunt with the objective to "gain a deeper understanding of a person's or group's experience." According to Ross (1999), qualitative research takes a holistic approach which is in part based upon perceptions dependent on each person and differing over time, as well as emphasizing the contrasts in meaning dependent on the situational context. This approach varies from that of a quantitative method which is a more controlled study utilizing large data sets of numbers in order to solve a set problem (Ross, 1999). There are many different research methods within the

[3] Samuel Huntington confirms a consolidated democracy at the "second turnover," of an election in which political power changes hands for the second time. Larry Diamond offers a more detailed description stating that a "democracy can be consolidated only when no significant collective actors challenge the legitimacy of democratic institutions or regularly violate its constitutional norms, procedures, and laws" (1999).

realm of qualitative research and this dissertation will be conducted primarily as a historical analysis, relying predominately on the rich literary resources available to trace the key historical events, actors, and their influence on the processes of democratization and Taiwanization, the collision of these processes, and the historical background leading up to the present day scenario on the island.

Samuel L. Huntington defines a "good history" as one which "describes chronologically and analyzes convincingly a sequence of events and shows why one event led to another" (1991, p. xiii). This dissertation will strive to do just that, focusing on how key historical events and actors influenced and impacted the processes of democratization and national identity formation in their proper historical context. Extensive literature addressing these processes in Taiwan will be explored in order to present further insight and a deeper understanding of the relationship between the historical processes of democratization and national identity formation on the island. Further comparison will also be drawn from focus group data conducted by Professor Su-feng Cheng of National Chengchi University. Although this study remains that of a qualitative nature, survey data offered by the Election Study Center (ESC) and Taiwan Electoral and Democracy Study (TEDS) will also be examined when available in order to provide a more in-depth correlation between the historical lineage of events and the shifting perceptions of national identity and democracy in Taiwan.

There are a number of key actors and events in distinct time periods which will be focused on as turning points and deciding factors for the unique development and interaction of these two processes. This dissertation will separate the phases of national identity formation and democratic reform into three distinctive stages distinguished by time period, analyzing the key agents and historical events characterizing each stage and the resulting relationship developing between Taiwanization and democratization. The time periods selected to be analyzed are by no means meant to infer that the development of national identity and democratization in Taiwan have occurred synchronously. These sections of time will rather be implemented in order to create a structure and framework for a deeper analysis into the relationship of how each process is influenced and interconnected during their historical and shared periods of development.

For the purpose of this study, the historical analysis will be divided into three time periods, the first from 1947-1979, the second 1980-1995, and the final analysis from 1996-the present day. The first stage of research will account for the period of post-war Taiwan through to critical early political incidents which occurred in the 1970s, providing an essential base for the formation of and early relationship between the two processes. The second stage (1980 – 1995) will cover the period of rapid democratization, the formation and development of the opposition party, and the policies and shifts under former presidents Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui. Although this period in Taiwan's history is most reputable for its political transition, this dissertation will devote an equal amount of attention to both democratization and the shifts in national identity during this period. Since the key argument of this study remains committed to the close relationship between the two processes in their historical context, the political policies endorsed during this period promoting democratization will be proved to also be largely correlated with the paralleled transition of national identity.

The third and final stage will trace the progress of democratization and national identity in Taiwan from 1996 through to the present day, further analyzing the consolidation of democracy and national identity while depicting the current status of both political development and national identity on the island, as well as examining the effect of the recent "China factor" on the current developments. The latter period of analysis will be followed by a final chapter comparing the more recent conclusions and observations with quantitative data collected from the Election Study Center (ESC) and Taiwan Election and Democratization Study (TEDS), as well as 2009 focus group data from Professor Su-feng Cheng of TEDS, on the topics of national identity and political perspectives in Taiwan. Comparisons will be drawn to interconnect the historical patterns with the results of the available surveys and focus group responses, showing the popular views on national identity and Taiwan's political stance in response to historical events and political policies over the past twenty years. The results of this data will further clarify the parallel between these two processes and bring the study to a more contemporary focus in order to provide a deeper insight and more rounded picture of the development from the 1990s to the present day and its impact on cross-strait relations.

1.3.2 Analytical framework

A ‘synthesized’ analytical framework to guide this historical analysis in extracting a deeper knowledge of the key elements throughout history which have influenced the unique development of democracy and national identity in Taiwan has been configured by the author to best suit the case of Taiwan. Many prominent theories have been proposed in regards to both the studies of national identity as well as that of democratic transition, however for the purpose of this study, a theoretical framework to address these congruent developments in Taiwan has been formulated, focusing on the historical processes and the roles played by key actors, specifically the political elite, in shaping the development of these two processes. There are many factors and theories which have attempted to define both of these processes in general as well as specifically concerning the scenario as they have developed in Taiwan, and the theoretical perspective presented here is not limited to but has been largely inspired by the constructivist theory of national identity and the transition theory of democratization in order to most accurately and effectively address the case of Taiwan. This is not to completely negate other theories such as Lipset’s modernization theory, which has previously been commonly linked to Taiwan’s development and which will still be referenced in this dissertation. Rather the theoretical outline constructed here will incorporate the relevant and overlapping principles supported by the constructivist and political transition theories to best grasp the historical relationship and how this influenced and was influenced by the motivations and actions of the respective agents in Taiwan. It is imperative to first outline some key characteristics of the influential theories which are guiding this study, followed by addressing more specifically the key influence which these theories have shed on the guiding historical process and actor-centered analytical framework which will be applied specifically for the case of the development of national identity and democracy as experienced in Taiwan.

1.3.2.1 A process and actor centered historical framework

There are two pertinent theories which are responsible for the process- and actor-oriented theoretical framework which is guiding this dissertation, and those are the theory of political transition and the constructivist theory of national identity. Initially these theories may more commonly be viewed as methods to separately analyze the one democratic transition and the other, the formation of national identity. However, when treated together these theories prove not only to share many overlapping traits but also to support a comprehensive framework which is more effective than any single theory in explaining the development of and relationship between democracy and national identity in Taiwan. This section will begin by presenting a review of the common theoretical discourse on both transitional theories as well as constructivist notions regarding national identity, referring to the research of prominent scholars in their respective fields. The focus will then turn to examine the intersection of these theories as they will here be adapted to examine the processes of democratization and national identity formation as they have occurred in Taiwan.

The first theory introduced here which has provided a great influence for the framework of this dissertation is the theory of political transition. In regards to discussing democratization, there are three general types of theoretical approaches commonly applied: the modernization theory, structuralist theory and transition theory (Potter, 1997, p.12). The modernization approach, established by Martin Seymour Lipset in his 1963 work *The Political Man*, is a prominent theory which has previously attracted much attention as a popular model employed to support Taiwan's successful democratization. David Potter defines this school of thought as "emphasizing a number of social and economic requisites either associated with existing liberal democracies or necessary for successful democratization" (1997, p. 12). Lipset very clearly expresses the main theme of this theory, which is "The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance it will sustain democracy" (p.31). As one of the four "Asian tigers," the economic success of Taiwan beginning in the early 1960s preceding its political liberalization, created a frenzy of scholars viewing the island, along with its neighboring countries such as South Korea, as prime models for this "wealth theory" (Pye, 1985; Hing, 1997). However this model and its credibility in wholly explaining the successful transition of democracy in Taiwan has since been criticized and challenged.

The modernization theory began losing steam as exceptions to the concept of economic predisposition supporting democratic transitions began popping up around the world, such as in Singapore and Latin America (Potter, 1997, p. 12), and a reexamination of Taiwan's case proves that although socioeconomic influences continue to be important in discussing Taiwan's successful transition, this theory excludes many of the key factors essential to the island's political transition. Almond (1970) warns that "The movement of modernization might be in a liberal democratic direction, but it might with equal probability be in an authoritarian direction." Rustow succinctly expresses the discrepancy left behind by the modernization approach and filled in with the political transition approach, writing that "modernists ask 'what factors can best preserve or enhance the health and stability of a democracy', while transition theorists ponder 'how a democracy comes into being in the first place'" (Rustow, 1970, p. 340). This dissertation will not completely disregard the value of modernization principles in Taiwan's democratization process, and according to many prominent transitional theorists such as Rustow, O'Donnel and Linz, "economic development helps to trigger the actions of competing elites busy crafting the democratic compromise" (Potter, 1997, p. 24). The political transition theory will be adapted to the analytical framework of this thesis in order to fully account for the varied factors which have played essential roles in the process of democratic development on the island.

A common "reference point" of the political transition theory (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997; Potter, 1997) is linked to Dankwart A. Rustow's 1970 article "Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model." Rustow's article has largely served to "reject the 'functional'" approaches that focused on democracy's economic, sociopolitical, and psychological prerequisites and instead focus on agency, process, and bargaining in explaining democratic transitions" (Haggard & Kaufman, 1997, p. 263). Potter (1997) defines the transition approach as "emphasizing political processes and elite initiatives and choices that account for moves from authoritarian rule to liberal democracy" (p. 12). Under this school of thought, O'Donnel and Schmitter like Rustow break away from the earlier studies on political liberalization (Lipset, Dalh, etc.) and argue that democratization is understood as a complex historical process (Chu, 1992, p. 3). Potter goes further to argue that "Democracy is produced by the initiatives of human

beings" (p. 15), which will be discussed through this thesis in regards to the political elite, including those involved in the opposition, along with the greater social forces of civil society. Since Rustow's work on this theory, many more studies have arisen focusing on the process of transition from authoritarian rules to democracies, such as those from Guillermo O'Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, Adam Przeworski, Juan J. Linz, Giuseppe Di Palma, Michael Burton, Richard Gunther, and John Higley, and although these interpretations all differ slightly, there are a number of commonly shared principles which are highly relevant for Taiwan's scenario.

Rustow (1970) outlines four historical stages on the "route to democracy" which largely correlate with this historical analysis to accurately explain the process and key actors involved in Taiwan's transition. The first stage presented by Rustow is "a phase when national unity within a given territory is being established." Potter explains this preliminary phase as constituting a majority beginning to "share a political identity," such as "we are British, we are French," or in the case of Taiwan, 'we are not Mainland Chinese' (1997, p. 14). The second stage outlined is what Rustow refers to as that of "inconclusive political struggle," during which "new… elite (are) coming to prominence and demanding a significant place in the polity." Although this phase is markedly different for each country with varying historical paths, "there is always major conflict between opposed groups" (Potter, 1997, p. 14). The third phase in Rustow's outline marks "the first transition or decision phase, a 'historical moment' when the parties to the inconclusive political struggle decide to compromise and adopt democratic rules which gives each some share in the polity," and the final stage is labeled the "habituation phase," in which "The conscious adoption of democratic rules during the 'historical moment' may have been seen by the parties…as necessary rather than desirable due to compromises that had to be made; gradually, however, such rules, once made, become a habit" (Potter, 1997, p. 14). This historical analysis of Taiwan's progression of democracy and national identity will be shown to very closely progress as outlined by Rustow, along with the crucial actors involved in realizing the democratization as defined under the transition theory.

In addition to the general outline provided by Rustow, Stephan Haggard and Robert Kaufman's 1997 article "The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions," provides a number shared themes which are commonly promoted among the community of transitional theorists explaining democratization. One of these collective themes presented in this article is that "the key actors in the transition process," include the political elites in both the government as well as those involved in the opposition movements (p. 265). Shain and Linz advise that "Crucial to the outcome of democratic transitions is the question of who governs in the interim period and the way they use their power" (1995, p. 21). Under this theoretical perspective it is commonly believed that the actors play essential roles in instigating and promoting the political transition, as is outlined above by Rustow, towards democratic rule. Huntington argues this as "the nature of the process" which he defines as "the way democrats and anti-democrats interact and the strategies employed by both sides in the process" (1991, p. 108-110). Michael Burton (1987), Richard Gunther (1992), and John Higley (1987, 1992) have attributed democratic consolidation to "elite settlements" and "elite convergence," while Adam Przeworski (1991) also emphasizes the importance of the roles of the different actors involved alongside the process of democratic transition (Chu, 1992, p. 4). When discussing the vital role which the political elite play in political transition, the motivation and strategy which underlie the promotion of the transition is also a key concept under this theory.

Haggard and Kaufman outline a second common theme shared among theories of political transition, which is that "actors behave strategically; their actions are influenced by expectations concerning the behavior of allies and rivals" (1997, p. 265). This is to take into account the factors which motivate the relevant actors to guide political transition one way or another, which in the face of political struggle is often influenced by threats or possible gains to legitimacy of rule. This latter shared point is also closely connected to the final common feature explained by Haggard and Kaufman, which is that "democratization is the outcome of explicit or implicit negotiation; new institutions are 'bargains among self-interested politicians' (p. 265). Under this final point, the successful transition towards a democracy comes from successful political 'negotiation,' which therefore must have benefits for all of the actors involved in order for them to

consciously promote democratic transitions. The very actor and process-centered perspective underlying the political transition theories discussed above can be found to relate to and resonate within the historical and socially influenced constructivist theory of national identity.

The second theory which has provided great inspiration for the analytical framework applied in this dissertation, and which is well-suited to this theoretical adaptation in conjunction with the political transition theory, is the constructivist perspective of national identity formation. The field of constructivism has in recent times commonly been associated with the study of national identity. The constructivist theory of national identity has been presented by those such as Gellner, Anderson, Smith, Wendt and Peter Katzenstein, placing special emphasis on the historic role of the people creating nations, and "social factors" such as culture, norms and politics which may create, affect or shift trends in national identity. According to the constructivist reasoning, "the interests of states (nations) are shaped by their identities, while state identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subject to change in the process of interaction" (Alexandrov, 2003). Before delving into an analysis of the more recent constructivist discourse on national identity and its impact on 'the state', it is important to provide a brief overview introducing some of the earlier resources on primordialism (Smith and Armstrong) and constructivism (Gellner, Anderson, Deutch and Renan) which trace the study of national identity far back to its historical roots.

Primordialism according to John Armstrong, emphasizes "the belief that nations have usually existed from time immemorial" (1982, p. 9). This conception of the nation suggests that "nations are 'real' (not imagined) entities. Nations so defined differ from other territorially defined units of governance (such as city-states, empires, and states, which are not nation-states) because their inhabitants defines their identities in cultural terms exclusively" (Hass, 1997, p. 41). According to Anthony Smith, the continued existence of states may be viewed as proof of the 'primordiality' which the nation embodies. Smith notes these visions as "heavily influenced by an organic nationalism which posited the 'rebirth' of nations after centuries of somnolence, amnesia and silent invisibility" (2004, p. 53). This school of thought argues that national identity "is

immutable…(and) cannot be created or altered through social construction or through purposeful manipulation," with Smith presenting the failed efforts of nation-building such as from the communist elites, as a clear example of the "cultural and primordial limitation" on the purposeful efforts from above to construct a strategic identity (Dawisha, 2002, p. 4). Primordialism, however, has received much criticism, being argued by those in the constructivist school of thought as the "straw man of ethnic studies….for supposing that ethnic affiliations are given rather than chosen" (Horowitz, 2004, p. 72-73).

The constructivist perspective, on the other hand, such as stipulated by Ernest Gellner, attributes the formation of nations rather as a product of nationalism formed amongst the people: "Nations as a natural, God given way of classifying men are a myth. Nationalism…sometimes takes pre-existing cultures and turns them into nations, sometimes invents them" (1983, p. 48). Hugh Seton-Watson very plainly states that "all I can find to say is that a nation exists when a significant number of people in a community consider themselves to be a nation" (1977, p. 5). This school of thought differs from primordialism in that it understands national identity as being susceptible to change as social interactions change, viewing a nation as "wholly subjective" rather than 'immutable' (Dawisha, 2002, p. 5). Reaching further back to earlier studies of nationalism, Deutsch imparts great importance on the 'social mobilization' and the cohesion of a nation as in large part dependent on the "ability to communicate effectively, and over a wider range of subjects, with members of one large group more than with outsiders (1969, p. 97). Benedict Anderson takes the constructivist approach towards national identity, addressing the importance of a group's own "active involvement in the construction and reconstruction of identities, negotiating boundaries, asserting meanings, interpreting their own pasts, resisting the imposition of the present, and claiming the future" (1991, p. 8). The more classical literature as briefly discussed here is vital to the discussion of the constructivist theory of national identity, however the work of Alexander Wendt which is more commonly associated under the school of International Relations, is also relevant in the discussion of national identity as it will be related to the case of Taiwan.

According to Wendt, "Constructivists are interested in the construction of identities and interests and, as such, take a more sociological than economic approach…On this basis, they have argued that states are not structurally or exogenously given but constructed by historically contingent interactions" (Wendt, 1994, p. 385). Wendt presents the claim that "states are socially constructed," which infers both the importance of society in shaping the interests and actions of the state, but also the importance of states' strategies towards maintaining support from and leading the direction of society's interests (1994, p. 385). Yun-han Chu writes in 2004 that "Essentially, national identities are not inborn but are socially and politically constructed sentiments that are subject to change and manipulation, especially under the intensive mobilization of political elites at times of regime transition" (Chu, 2004, p. 498). In 2010, Cheng presents a clear definition of the impact of the state in molding national identity, explaining that "Through such socialization mechanisms as education and state policies, individuals are exposed to the cultures and norms of the society as well as the historical memories of the nation" (2010, p. 2). In regards to the role which national identities plays in influencing the actions and movements of states, Wendt emphasizes "the role of identity as a factor that shapes states' interests and behaviours and attaches a high degree of importance to the dynamic interplay between agents and structures" (p. 1999, p. 193). Wendt also argues that "interests (of state actors) are dependent on identities," signifying that motivations and changing structures of the state can consequently be at least in part contributed to the trends of national identity. This study of Taiwan in particular will take into account both the impact which shifting national identity has had on the policies of the political elite as well as the influence of the political elite through tracing the evolution and shifts of national identity on the island.

Under this constructivist framework for national identity, it is apparent that there are a broad range of social factors such as culture, religion, and language, political factors, and the common "shared historical memories" (Anderson, 1983) of the people which are responsible for contributing to the conception of different types of national identities. Benedict Anderson (1983) and Anthony Smith (1991) both argue against the 'Western' conception of national identity which tends to relate and limit national identities to their geographic territory. In Anderson's work *Imagined Communities*, he fights against

distinguishing nationalities along "East and West lines," but rather premises the formation of national identities on "ethnic, state, cultural and socioeconomic traits that emerge over time as a result of events" (White and Cheng, 1993, p. 162). With this multitude of influential factors, there are a variety of different forms of national identity which may form, however for the purpose of this paper, the author will focus on two forms of national identity which are relevant to the case of Taiwan, that of "ethnic" and "civic" national identity. These concepts will be expanded on and defined in more detail as they appear in the body of this dissertation, however the main contrast between the two distinct formations is neatly captured here by David Brown (1994):

> "The idea that a group of people might constitute a "nation" with some right to political autonomy sometimes rests mainly on the claim that they have common ethnic ancestry and similar ethnocultural attributes, and sometimes mainly on the claim that they occupy a particular territory and have a common pride in the public institutions and public way of life associated with that territory. These two bases for national identity are usually referred to, respectively, as cultural (or ethnocultural) nationalism and civic nationalism."(49)

The perception of national identity is therefore argued through this thesis as anything but a static concept, and these two forms of national identity are not simply argued to be mutually exclusive. National identity is rather explored here as a fluid and fluctuating belief which continuously 'reconstructs' itself alongside further historical events that create new and distinct "shared memories", shifting motivations from the state and changing the interests of the people. This will be the path explored by the historical timeline of this dissertation examining the development of national identity alongside democracy as they progressed in Taiwan.

The focus may now turn to the specific case of Taiwan and the many shared features from both the constructivist and political transition perspectives which are relevant in the discussion of the relationship between the formation of national identity and development of democracy on the island. This study begins in 1947, marking the conception of the analysis of these two processes under what Rustow prescribes as the first historical phase of "national unity." The 'national unity' designated by Rustow as the

formative stage of democratization is also seen in Taiwan's case as the initial explosion of national identity felt island-wide following the arrival of the KMT troops in 1947. This came as a result of the built up "shared memories" of the Taiwanese people from the numerous periods of colonial rule and oppression, and sparked the debate which continues to this day of "Taiwanese" vs. "Chinese" identity. This early formation of identity stems from the influence of "social forces" in creating these shared memories, as supported by the constructivist approach, and the role of national identity in "shaping states' interests and behaviours" as well as states' interests being "subject to change in the process of interaction" can be seen in turn to follow this initial burst of 'unity' which formed amongst the Taiwanese and influenced the fluctuating perceptions of the labels "Taiwanese" and "Chinese" as identities valued among the people.

The great shifts which have occurred in national identity and democratization from the post-war period to the present day have largely been influenced by the social movements provoked by the opposition and the responses of the political elite taken to promote their interests and maintain legitimacy, within which we can clearly see the application of Rustow's second and third historical stages to Taiwan. Rustow's second historical stage delineates "political struggle," where the growing opposition movement, which emerged in Taiwan in the late 1970s and expanded through the 1980s, act as the "new elite," in Taiwan's case demanding not only "a significant place in the polity" through democratic rule, but also continuing the movement for Taiwanese identity alongside this political struggle, further politicizing the notion of "Taiwanese" on the island towards a greater civic rather than ethnic identity. The late 1980s in Taiwan witness the 'historical moment' of Rustow's third stage towards democratization, at which point the ruling KMT party made democratic concessions to the opposition party while simultaneously, as explored by Wendt, shifting their interests due to the overwhelming support for a local identity different from that being forced by the government. The KMT preserved their legitimacy not only through compromising with the opposition party, but also through shifting their motivations in response to the national identity and interests of the people. Rustow's final proposed phase or "Second transition or habituation phase" will be analyzed here in regards to the consolidation of

democracy on the island, to examine the degree to which democracy and national identity are developed and supported by the elite and society up to their most current state.

During this period of study, the notions of 'Taiwanese' and 'Chinese' national identity have both been promoted under the political elite as well as by the people on the island, initially stemming from strong ethnic relations and then progressing through political objectives. The role of the political elite in promoting a 'Taiwanese' national identity arose while fighting a growing opposition and struggling to maintain legitimacy. One clear example is the policy of "Taiwanization," first initiated by President Chiang Ching-kuo and then continued by President Lee Deng-hui. Hung-Mao Tien claims that Ching-kuo's policy of Taiwanization was one of the key reasons for which the KMT was able to retain its power (1997, p.145). This policy was a response to the peoples' waning support of the government and growing social unrest, reflecting the changing interests of the political elite during this period in reaction to the frustration among the general public demanding their unique Taiwanese identity as opposed to the previously enforced Chinese identity. This sudden shift in attitude among the political elite to not only allow but also strongly support a Taiwanese identity is proof in Taiwan's case not only that "the interests of states (nations) are shaped by their identities," but also that "state identities (and therefore interests) themselves are subject to change in the process of interaction" (Alexandrov, 2003). The more current stages of development on the island will also see the return of the promotion of "Chinese" identity by the government as a response to their interests in forging better relations across the Strait, however it will be argued here that the peoples' continued escalating support of Taiwanese identity and democracy may again influence and shift the interests of the political elite.

This line of reasoning in regards to the interests and actions of the relevant actors being of great importance for the development of national identity is also strongly endorsed by the transitional theories in discussing the historical analysis of the political development in Taiwan. Taiwan's case strongly reflects Rustow's concepts of "agency, process, and bargaining." In regards to 'agency' or the role of the political elite, it is clear not only through policies such as former president Chiang Ching-kuo's above mentioned "Taiwanization" policy for national identity, but also the moves towards democratic

reforms made by both Chiang and Lee during their administration, such as ending martial law, legalizing opposition parties and holding popular presidential elections, that the elite played a major role in Taiwan's transition, not only of national identity but also democratization. Tien also argues the "elite theory," for the case of Taiwan, which he explains on the one hand emphasizes the choices of the political leadership, and on the other hand stresses the contribution of the political opposition (1993, p.103). Tien writes that "The DPP's birth and the KMT authorities' tolerance marked the beginning of democratic transition in the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC)" (1997, p.123) Thomas Gold (1997) argues that "Taiwan's experience most closely exemplifies "transformation" with the elites taking the lead to liberalize and then democratize the system" (p. 163). The strong role of agents of both the incumbent and opposition parties has continued through the first popular elections, the transition of power, great shifts in national identity, and continued consolidation and progression of both democracy and national identity on the island.

Rustow's emphasis of "process" of transition will also play a large role in the framework of this dissertation, as this will primarily be a historical analysis, and therefore the process of the national identity and democratic development on the island since the post-war period is essential to this study in order to best illustrate the background as to what motivated the decisions and policies of the political elite. In their 1997 article, Haggard and Kaufman express one critique of the above mentioned variations of the transition theory, stating that "They fail to address the factors that shape actors' preferences and capabilities in the first place and the conditions under which they might change over time" (1997, p. 265). This dissertation, however, will aim to present these factors through the in-depth historical study, attributing more importance to the socio-economic or "social factors" as discussed by the constructivist school as well as the influential events in discussing how they influenced the "strategies" of the political elite.

The final key concept iterated by Rustow and further concreted by successors in the field is the importance of "bargaining." For Taiwan's case, the leadership reverted to 'bargaining' due not only to the growing popularity of the opposition party, but also due to a growing restlessness amongst the society which was evident in the political uprisings

in the late 1970s through the 1980s and shifts in Taiwan's political position internationally in the early 1970s. This thesis will focus not only on the roles of the leadership in Taiwan's transitions of national identity and the island's political structure, but also on the importance of the opposition party in the early stages with the growing restlessness among the people which lead to the shifts in leaders' "strategies" in favor of rapidly democratizing and re-enforcing a local identity instead of further suppressing the people and forcing authoritarian rule. This examination will continue through to the most recent period in Taiwan's development of democracy and national identity to examine the continued factors, influences and key actors involved in the most recent trends of these processes. Analysis of the key events preceding and following the shifts in the leadership's policies will help to further clarify the motivations behind the transitions promoted by the elite and their prominent roles influencing the relationship between and development of national identity and democracy on the island throughout this historical timeline.

Chapter 2

1947 – 1979: The foundation of national identity and democratic ideals in post-war Taiwan

Taiwan's historical legacy of constant foreign rule beginning from the mid-seventeenth century does not easily lend the island to either democratization or the formation of a national identity (Haggard, 1992). One need not trace back hundreds of years to uncover the first signs of national identity and democracy in Taiwan, as studies have proven that the country was not even open to liberalization until the late 1980s. While commencing the discussion on the relationship between the formation of national identity and that of democracy, there are varied viewpoints about which process has activated or led to the other. In his work *Clash of Civilizations* (1996), Huntington rationalizes national identity as a product of drawing on politics to define oneself, therefore requiring politics to first inspire a unified national identity. Hans Stockton on the other hand in 2008 declared that "demands to open discussion of Taiwan's national identity gave rise to democratization" (p. 100).

It is evident that the concepts of national identity and democratic politics are in many cases strongly connected, despite conflicting views regarding which one is the initial dominant influence. The strong role of the political elites in promoting a localized Taiwanese identity national identity will be advocated as a dominant role in the development processes of national identity and democracy, however the historical events preceding and influencing the actions of the political elite are also key to this study. In the earliest collision of these two processes, it will be argued for Taiwan's case that an initial push for an independent national identity can be found stemming from one major historical event, the 2-28 Incident, after which the national identity movement became enveloped in the efforts for political transition on the island. This chapter will therefore begin by illustrating the scenario or historical process leading up to and resulting in the 2-28 Incident which will be argued here as establishing the initial sentiment of national identity in this context, followed by examining the origin of the democratic movement in

Taiwan and the earliest relationship between national identity and democracy on the island.

2.1 The early ignition of national identity

More recent studies of Taiwanese national identity since the year 2000 have reached further back in Taiwan's history than ever before, laying new emphasis on the period around the 1920s, under Japanese colonial rule, and extending even further back to the Qing Dynasty, as fostering the earliest signs of national identity on the island (Chang, 2000; R. Wu, 2003; Wang 2004, 2009). This dissertation does not wish to question the argument and evidence showing the earliest signs of national identity arising in Taiwan in response to the island's historical experiences under foreign rule. Rwei-ren Wu in 2004 defines modern Taiwanese nationalism as "a complicated case of peripheral nationalism that emerged, submerged, and re-emerged as a result of successive yet unfinished state-making and nation-building projects on the island by various imperial centers" (p. 16). The historical impacts of foreign rule on the island, both in regards to the formation of a state and the experience of the people, have undoubtedly provided a crucial framework and foundation for the future development of national identity on the island.

The impact of Taiwan's period of colonial rule under Japan has especially drawn attention from the academic community in recent years. Japan's efforts at "colonial nation-building" during their fifty years of rule on the island has been seen to have inadvertently gave way to an emergence of 'Taiwanese' national identity and nationalism among the people, differentiating themselves from their colonial rulers (Wu, 2004, p. 17). Wang (2009) discusses the early notion of "Formosa for Formosans…found in the debates among some Taiwanese cultural and political elites in the 1920s" (p. 13). However Wang also goes further to stipulate that "a political doctrine that openly propagates an independent Taiwan only emerged after the 2-28 Incident of 1947, when Taiwan was under Chinese rule" (2009, p. 13). Determining the earliest influences and appearances of national identity in Taiwan is a complex and controversial subject, which could alone suffice as a rich subject of study. The core of this thesis however is primarily

concerned with tracing the development of democratization alongside national identity formation. Given the base formation and promotion of a local national identity bubbling to the surface under Japanese colonial rule, democracy, understood as self-rule or self-government, was simply not yet possible during this historical period. The timeline of this historical analysis will therefore begin after the Japanese colonial era in order to better suit the main purpose of this dissertation and focus on the early formation not solely of national identity, but of the distinct relationship which formed between the movements for national identity and democracy following the arrival of the KMT.

Another motivation for beginning this study after Japanese colonial rule is that the national identity which arose alongside democratization, despite the groundwork laid by the growing unrest under the Japanese, is geared towards the continued controversy of differentiating between 'Taiwanese' and 'Chinese'. Scott Simon in 2005 writes that "The 'other' that spurred early Taiwanese nationalism was the regime that arrived with Chiang Kai-shek in 1945" (p.118). The nationalist sentiment amongst the Taiwanese political elites which developed under Japanese colonial rule has clearly played a role in creating and harboring the growing desire for a distinct national identity among the people of the island. Although the groundwork of formulating national identity preceded and influenced the sudden explosive movement for Taiwanese national identity which erupted in response to the arrival of and abuse from the Nationalist Chinese party, this movement became and continues to this day to be a means to differentiate the "Taiwanese" from their "Chinese" counterparts, or as Susan Henders (1994) wrote, "a dichotomy between Native Taiwanese and Mainlanders in Taiwan" (p.74). The surveys conducted by both the Election Study Center (1992-present) and Taiwan Electoral Democratic Study (2000-present) on national identity in Taiwan all ask whether people believe themselves to be Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese[4]. It could even be argued that the shock of the Chinese arrival and the great differences between their Japanese counterparts drew some animosity away from the Japanese only to then direct more towards the Chinese. Alan Wachman briefly touches on this idea, writing that:

[4] Election Study Center, National Chengchi University, http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/ ; Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study, http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/ptlist.phtml?Category=10

> "The first encounters with the mainlanders who arrived to replace the Japanese after the Second World War caused some Taiwanese to acknowledge, with chagrin, that in many ways the Japanese were superior to the Chinese. It also caused them to see themselves as different from the Mainlanders." (Wachman, 1994, p. 94)

The shock of witnessing the newly arrived mainland Chinese wearing no shoes and appearing less "civilized" than what the Taiwanese had become accustomed to under Japanese rule created a greater drift between the Taiwanese and their Chinese counterparts due to the connection or influence of the progress from 50 years of colonial rule under the Japanese.

This dissertation will therefore examine the historical process of the developments of national identity and democracy in Taiwan beginning with an analysis of the early period of national identity which developed in response to and alongside KMT rule. The people's long-felt experience under colonial rule and early activism specifically under Japanese rule have all in some shape or form influenced and sheltered a longing for a unique national identity, and can be linked to the velocity at which outbursts over national identity occurred following the arrival of the KMT. The repression from the newly arrived Chinese Nationalists was the last straw for the people of Taiwan and caused the eminent uprising for a unique Taiwanese identity as opposed to that being forced on them by the mainland Chinese, a movement which soon after coincided with the subsequent efforts towards democratization.

2.1.1 The 2-28 Incident

The constructivist perspective as well as the theoretical discourse on political transition such as that from O'Donnel and Schmitter both emphasize the importance of historical events and the historical process in influencing the formation national identity as well as democracy. In Taiwan's case the 2-28 Incident is one of the most influential events in this study, initiating Rustow's first stage of national unity among the local people to act as a notable foundation for the future development of national identity and

democracy on the island. Mark Harrison in 2006 writes of the 2-28 Incident as "the first in a series of events that contributed to the construction of a Taiwanese national identity during the five decades of Nationalist supremacy" (Dawley, 2009, p. 449). Wang and Liu (1997) comment that "By 1947, the animosity between the KMT government and Taiwan's residents culminated in an island-wide uprising, known as the '2/28 incident'" (p. 98).

Before discussing the great impact of the 2-28 Incident on the formation and movements of national identity and democracy in Taiwan it is important to begin by explaining the event in its historical setting. The 2-28 Incident occurred on February 28, 1947, and was "an island-wide uprising…during which thousands of local people were massacred by KMT troops" (Wang and Liu, 2004, p. 571). This incident was preceded by a growing frustration among the people of Taiwan at the immediate oppression by the newly arrived KMT troops. According to Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin (2001), "The new administration under the administrator general and garrison commander Chen Yi paid little attention to the aspiration for equality of the disoriented native elites" (p. 112). The local people were not only upset with the mainland Chinese filling the "voids" and government positions left by the Japanese, but the Nationalist party also brought their economic issues across the strait with them:

> "The economy deteriorated rapidly. Taiwan's resources were siphoned off to the mainland by the Nationalists to fuel their military struggle with the Communists and by corrupt carpetbaggers to enrich themselves. The transmission of hyper-inflation from the mainland to Taiwan had a devastating impact on the war-torn island economy" (Chu and Lin, 2001, p. 112).

According to Yun-han Chu and Jih-wen Lin, by late 1946 and early 1947, the island was already at "boiling point" (p. 112), and this is where the 2-28 Incident comes into play.

The aforementioned oppression and distress felt by the Taiwan locals during their transition from Japanese to Chinese rule resulted in the infamous 2-28 Incident. This uprising was sparked by the confrontation between agents of the Taiwanese Monopoly Bureau, a part of the Chinese Nationalist Government, and a 40-year old Taiwanese

woman selling illegal cigarettes, in which the Nationalist party agents hit the women with a pistol (Simon, 1997). This was the last straw for the people and this public abuse generated hatred and anger amongst the witnesses to this offense. The local people organized mass protests the following day, February 28 (2-28), in response to this act of violence, during which the police fired into the crowd, "inciting an uprising that spread across the island" (Simon, 1997). Li in 2001 remarked that "Local leaders took the opportunity to demand all-out reform, and because some areas were armed with military and police weapons, armed conflict ensued," leaving anywhere from 10,000-30,000 local Taiwanese people dead.

According to Chu and Cheng, "The tragic event had a profound and lasting effect on the Taiwanese people" (2001, p. 113). This outbreak of violence as described by Wang and Liu "solidified the local perception of the KMT as a new alien occupying force, and the ethnic cleavage between "mainlanders" (waishengren) and "Taiwanese" (ben-shengren) became the major division within society" (2004, p. 571). The 2-28 Incident, is described as a "lightening-rod event," proved to create an island-wide sentiment which played the role to constantly remind the people of Taiwan of their "common sorrow" (Chu & Cheng, 2001, p. 113). This incident was followed by a period in Taiwan known as the "White Terror," in which the local people on the island were ridden with fear and uncertainty as many elites were kidnapped, tortured and killed by the oppressive Chinese Nationalist regime. The atmosphere in Taiwan during the aggressive arrival of the KMT is displayed in the Taiwanese film *A City of Sadness* showing the frustration and anguish felt by the people with the immediate and turbulent transition from one repressive foreign regime to another. The violent oppression under General Chen Yi successfully suppressed the voices of dissent, if not largely destroying this generation of activists, however the events leading up to and resulting in the 2-28 Incident remained solidified as a common, traumatizing experience felt island-wide by the local people, and it is this "shared memory" which will be argued here as providing a substantial groundwork in creating a widespread sentiment of ethnic national identity among the people of Taiwan.

2.1.2 The formation of ethnic national identity in Taiwan

In his work *The New Nationalism*, expert in the field Louis L. Snyder (2009) remarks that "Nationalism reflects the chaos of history itself" (p.3). The effect of historical events, many of which are destructive and traumatic, as experienced by different nations, has been well-recorded by scholars such as Anthony Smith, TK Oommen, Benedict Anderson, and Louis Snyder as a key factor contributing to the conception of national identity. Although this is merely one of the many attributes which can affect national identity, which as explained by Anthony Smith is an ever-fluid process, this approach lends itself to the creation of a collective 'myth' of national identity as is relevant when discussing identity in Taiwan. Chang Maukuei (2004) reflects on Taiwan's case, writing that "the emergence of Taiwanese consciousness (and national identity) is a historical and conjunctural outcome, instead of a structural one." For the case of Taiwan, the 2-28 incident of 1947 instigated the first phase to be discussed here of national identity discovered in a widespread manner amongst the people of Taiwan which stemmed from the peoples' experiences and historical interpretations, and reflects what Anthony Smith refers to as a "cultural" or "ethnic" national identity.

Before delving into the particularities of the initial emergence of "ethnonationalism" in Taiwan, it is important to begin by outlining the characteristics of the term ethnic nationalism. According to Anthony Smith (1991), "An ethnic group is a type of cultural collectivity, one that emphasizes the role of myths of descent and historical memories, and that is recognized by one or more cultural differences like religion, customs, language or institutions" (p.20). Smith elaborates further on the importance of history to the creation and evolution of an ethnic group, writing that the "shared historical memories" are not only essential to the existence and continuance of an ethnic group, but also that each ethnic group in itself is a *product* of specific historical experiences. "It is the attachments and associations, rather than residence in or possession of the land that matters for ethnic identification" (Smith, 1991, p.23). Relation to an 'ethnic identity' is very different from many Western notions of national identity in that it is more of a cultural construct, as opposed to that of historic territory and political institutions and ideologies. This relates to Friedrich Meinecke's distinction in 1908 of the *Kulturnation*, the largely passive cultural community, from the *Staatsnation*, the active,

self-determining political nation. Yet it will be argued here in the case of Taiwan that the cultural community is by no means passive.

In addressing the formulation of ethnic identity, Smith, Wachman, Anderson and Bechhofer all attribute major events such as war and conquest, as providing ammunition for a community of people who've experienced the same trauma to unite under their shared suffrage. Anthony Smith (1991) writes of the "case of disruptive cultural change that nevertheless renewed rather than destroyed the sense of common ethnicity and its identity" (p.26). The long history of foreign rule experienced by the Taiwanese, culminating in the arrival of and mistreatment by the KMT represents the local peoples' 'shared sufferings,' and exemplifies Smith's reasoning for a sense of "common ethnicity and its identity" (Smith, 1991, p. 26) The repetitive waves of colonialism which swept over Taiwan, and most notably the final occupation of the Chinese Nationalist Party, can be noted as a "case of disruptive cultural change," in which the local people on the island found a common identity in the struggle under foreign rule. The 2-28 Incident triggered a local national identity among the people in Taiwan in response to the abuse and repression under General Chen Yi in 1947, and the great loss of life which resulted in a collective scar felt around the island did not destroy the desire amongst the native Taiwanese to hold their own national identity, but rather depleted that generation of activists and silenced the movement for national identity.

In Benedict Anderson's famous work "Imagined Communities" (1983), he groups Taiwan under a type of "creole nationalism," also attributed to North America, Australia, New Zealand, and Singapore. Anderson defines creole nationalism as "overseas settlers…who over time developed distinct traditions, symbolisms, historical experiences, and eventually moved towards political independence when they felt the imperial centre too oppressive or too remote" (34). In Taiwan, following centuries of authoritarianism, the oppression from the Kuomintang, especially as seen in the 2-28 Incident, accentuated the divergence between the mainland Chinese and Taiwanese, despite the fact that the ancestry of the Taiwanese lies in the mainland and the majority of the population originally migrated from China to Taiwan. This 'creole nationalism' however allowed the Taiwanese to interpret their "shared historical memories" as a common, cultural front

distinct from their Chinese oppressors, from which they strove to create a distinct identity. According to Wu (2002), "Ethnicity…which mainly differentiated the natives from the post-1949 immigrants from the Mainland China, became the most salient social cleavage and thus carried the highest potential for political mobilization" (p. 199).

The mistreatment of the native people by the Nationalist government quickly led to a clear divide between the new Chinese population and the local Taiwanese population, creating what Susan Henders (2004) describes as a "cultural nationalism." Henders elaborates on this "first wave" of nationalism in Taiwan as being of ethnic origin as opposed to state-related: "These older people represent only the first wave of Taiwanese nationalism, one based on a dichotomy between Native Taiwanese and Mainlanders in Taiwan" (p.74). At this stage in Taiwanese history, after escaping one colonial rule only to be passed on to another, the native people of the island began to build a strong "us" vs. "them" complex. Although local Taiwanese people have ancestral lines dating back to China at varied points in time, the difference between the mainlanders and Taiwanese at this juncture was as Smith noted not "an attachment to land," as the government tried to enforce, but rather a cultural bond which created the "Taiwanese" as distinct from the ruling mainland Chinese. This clash between ethnicities was clear in the 2-28 massacre, yet the activism of the Taiwanese was suppressed after the violent incident and the only way to reinvigorate the movement for national identity was with the freedom to speak and express different identities. The new generation of activists found soon enough the means in which to re-invoke the fight for national identity: democracy.

2.2 A partnership forms

Following the traumatic experience of the 2-28 Incident and the official declaration of Martial Law on the island on May 19, 1949, there existed no space to resume the fight for a unique national identity until nearly 30 years under martial law, when as A. Chin Hsiao writes, "Political suppression by the nationalist government had pushed the growth of Taiwanese nationalism and drive for independence."(2000, p.443) However it was not the movement for an independent national identity which led the revival of activism among the people, but rather political motivations demanding

democratic rights. This encompassed not only the desire of the people of Taiwan for political power and democratic rule, but also the aspiration that under a democracy, people could be granted the freedom to finally represent their own chosen national identity, a privilege which the people of Taiwan had been denied for centuries. The key international as well as domestic events first arising in the 1970s are essential factors which not only gave root to the successful democratic political movement in Taiwan, but also act as a background for the incentives of the future policies of the leadership which confirmed the 'marriage' of national identity and democracy in Taiwan.

2.2.1 The initial signs of the democratic movement alongside its revival of the movement for national identity

The 1970s represents a drastic period of transition for Taiwan in regards to the international as well as domestic shifts which greatly affected the political stability on the island. This section will discuss these historical events in detail, examining their causes as well as the effects of these experiences on the political elite and the consequent path of democratic development and its relationship with national identity. There were four key incidents which occurred in Taiwan in the 1970s, two of which were international and two of which were domestic, which all contributed to the political transition on the island. It is in large part as a reaction to these events that we can not only see the first glimmer of the true democratic movement, but also the reappearance of the movement for national identity alongside it.

The first major event to challenge the validity of the KMT's rule over the 'rightful China' occurred in 1971, when the ROC lost its seat in the UN to its rival, the People's Republic of China (PRC) (Henders, 2004). This decision held serious repercussions for Taiwan. Prior to this decision the ROC maintained to represent all of China, and the KMT's ability not only to uphold this claim internationally, but also the benefits which this provided the country economically were a large stimulus for the legitimacy of their rule. This transfer of recognition therefore left Taiwan's international status, as well as the government's capability, in question. Haggard and Cheng in 1992 acknowledged that although the people of Taiwan initially supported their country through this shock, many soon understood the domestic implications of such abandonment, and as Wachman noted

in 1994, the expulsion of the ROC from the UN carried significant weight for the necessity of a Taiwanese national identity (p.16).

The second formative experience under the latter period of martial law which occurred outside of Taiwan's borders was in December of 1978, when US president Jimmy Carter announced that the US was revoking diplomatic recognition of Taiwan in favor of the PRC (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). Since the early 1950s the US had been a strong supporter of the Republic of China, providing large funds to promote economic development as well as providing national security protection for the island against a possible invasion from the PRC. Although relations between the US and Taiwan continued under the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA)[5], which was signed on January 1st of the following year, the severed diplomatic ties were still viewed by many on the island as a frightening outcome (American Institute in Taiwan). This transformation of Taiwan's international environment further weakened the credibility of the authoritarian regime, providing greater incentive on the domestic front to strive for political progress and greater pressure for the ruling elite. Wachman makes it clear that the idea of 'Taiwan Independence' was still unheard of at this time, yet in true Cold War fashion the promotion of 'self-determination' as a basic democratic right entered into the ideology of the opposition (p.17). Taiwan's international status directly affected the citizens in Taiwan, yet possibly even more provocative on the shifts of Taiwanese society were two major rebellions which occurred on the domestic front.

A clear reaction on the part of the political leadership on the island already became visible during the early 1970s. As the son of the first president of the Republic of China Chiang Ching-kuo gained power in the party, the authority of the KMT was feeling an initial threat from international as well as domestic disappointment. As a response, Chiang implemented the first reforms 'relaxing' authoritarian control over society, holding great importance for the future progress of national identity and democracy on the island. The main campaign being described here is Chiang's "Taiwanization"

[5] The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA) was signed as an alternative form of agreement between the US and Taiwan following the transfer of diplomatic relations from the Republic of China (ROC) to the People's Republic of China (PRC). The TRA maintains that the US will "help maintain peace, security, and stability in the Western Pacific," which has continued to the present day to represent a vague security commitment to Taiwan should any attempts to unify the island with China using violence be attempted (American Institute in Taiwan, "Taiwan Relations Act," www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html)

campaign, which "on the one hand put Taiwanese KMT members into local party offices (and) on the other hand put young political elites who had been raised in Taiwan into leading party and government posts at the central level" (Dickson, 1996, p. 49-50). Local Taiwanese citizens were not supported to enter into the political sphere in Taiwan prior to Chiang's reforms, and this early liberalization of authority while still under martial law reflects not only the reaction of the leadership to the obstacles presenting the island and the civil unrest challenging the party's legitimacy, but also the important role which the leadership played in allowing and reinforcing political participation and recognition of the Taiwanese people.

The turning point in Taiwan's domestic political and social make-up became more evident in the latter half of the 1970's, as local unrest began to emerge in the form of political rebellion. Chu and Lin in 2001 write that "By the late 1970s, a new cohort of post-war generation political opposition emerged. Unlike most of the previous independent candidates…..the new opposition established political identity as well as built electoral support on a platform emphasizing democratic reform and Taiwanese identity" (p.120). Many scholars including I-chou Liu have contributed the following events to the elites in Taiwan, also known as the sizable "new" middle class which developed from the economic success on the island over the last forty years and compiled the majority of opposition leadership as well as their supporters (1992, p. 68). The year of 1977 is critical as it signifies the first violent political uprising since the onset of martial law, a shift in the KMT's political policy, as well as the role of the elite in organizing opposing political parties, by this time congregating into a single most prominent opposition party under the title *Tangwai*, meaning "outside the party" (Haggard and Cheng, 1992, p.12).

The Zhongli incident of 1977 arose from local voters in Taoyuan County fearing government tampering in the 1977 elections, in which non-partisan candidates were becoming increasingly popular and winning elections against KMT candidates. In order to send the government a message, the people involved protested and set fire to the police station in Zhongli. This event not only illustrates the transition in the attitude of the people of Taiwan, but also a crucial shift in the political environment on the island. Such rebellion would have previously drawn violent suppression from the authoritarian

government, however the leadership's approach here was surprisingly tolerant, as the police did not take severe or violent action against the local citizens of the city. It is clear through this movement in history that the political elite forming the opposition movement gained a form of political leverage or influence over the ruling party, shifting the strategy of those in power. According to Yun-han Chu, the 1977 Zhongli Incident for the first time since the declaration of martial law "tarnished" the seemingly invincible rule of the KMT, therefore setting into motion a new drive to form an "island wide alliance among the opposition candidates" (1992, p. 38). This incident was followed by the official naming of the opposition party as the Tangwai, the formation of the island-wide campaign organization the Taiwan Tangwai Campaign Corps (Lee, 1987, p. 130) and the creation of the *Formosa* magazine as well as its expansion to further circulate the opposition stances (Chu, 1992, p. 38-39). Hsiau (2000) credits the Zhongli Incident for bringing the Tangwai "the power of a mass movement," which provided impetus for the ruling elite to re-think their approach and objectives (p.89).

The final and possibly most influential event in the late 1970s was the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident. This controversial altercation between the opposition and ruling party arose on December 10th, 1979, when the political magazine *Formosa*, (*Mei-li-tao*), organized a rally in the southern city of Kaohsiung to promote human rights on the newly founded international Human Rights Day (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). The rally soon erupted into a confrontation between the opposition party and the police, leading to a number of civilians and policemen being injured, as well as a large number of main opposition leaders being arrested (Hsiau, 2000, p.89). Yet rather than damage the progress of the opposition party, the KMT crackdown resulted in public sympathy towards the jailed opposition and their families, further compromising the KMT's popularity as well as their ability to use violence in order to suppress political opposition (Haggard, 1992, p.13). It also resulted in the removal of hardliners in the KMT party such as General Wang Sheng, which set a precursor for the shift of the party towards political liberalization.

The success of these early political movements for democratic transition demonstrate the atmosphere surrounding the initial conception of the democratic movement, promoted through both opposition and changing political elite strategies in Taiwan, however equally significant, especially in regards to this study, is the inclusion

of national identity as a platform in the rebellion against authoritarian rule. A separate movement focused on a Taiwanese national identity would not have been possible at this period in history, not only due to the persistent fear from the painful memories still associated with the 2-28 Incident, but also the fact that any promotion of Taiwanese identity was still punishable by law up until 1992 (Henders, 2004). Henders however points out that the issue of national identity still remained very prominent among the political activity, and was "hidden" under many other issues, primarily the political push for democracy (2004, p. 83). Henders goes further to explain that "This made for two intertwined movements, one for democratization and the other for nationalism. Although closely allied with each other neither one has completely absorbed the other" (1994, p. 85). Chu and Lin also emphasize this relationship in 2001, in which they write that by the end of the 1970s, "the new opposition had established political identity as well as built electoral support on a platform emphasizing democratic reform and Taiwanese identity" (p.120).

These early stages of development after the arrival of the KMT to Taiwan, the initial yet brief outburst of national identity as seen in the 2-28 Incident followed by the political activism in the 1970s do not merely represent two individual developments, but the marriage of two key processes which remain interconnected to this day. It was as a result of the political activity during the late 1970s that two key concerns were able to join together as some of the most controversial issues on the island to the present day: the idea of an independent Taiwan and a Taiwanese national identity. The 2-28 Incident and the political events occurring in the 1970s, both international and domestic, brought about an initial connection between democratic progression and national identity in Taiwan. This period in Taiwan's history marks the early stages of development for both national identity and democratic progress, however we will see through the next chapter that the relationship formed here only continued to deepen through the following periods of the country's development.

Chapter 3

1980 – 1995: The first signs of democratic progress and a transition of national identity

The 1980s and early 1990s are infamous in Taiwan as a period of rapid democratization on the island, transforming the country from an authoritarian state under martial law to a transitioning democracy. This era is viewed by many to be one of the miracles of Taiwan, as successful transition from authoritarian regimes to democratic rule has been a controversial and much studied subject in recent years. Many academics such as Lucian Pye (1985) have even gone so far as to recommend Taiwan as a possible example for developing countries endeavoring on the same transition. However this period is not solely important for its political development. Aside from the progression of democracy during the 1980s and early 1990s, a remarkable shift of national identity is also evident as a result of democratization on the island, and therefore this period marks an important stage in the relationship between the processes of democratization and national identity formation in Taiwan.

Brown argues that in Taiwan's case, "…democratization should be understood as a transition in the character of national identity (2004, p. 43). Hsiao further endorses this theory, stressing that "the political movements of the 1980s and 1990s were fundamentally catalytic in creating Taiwanese nationalism" (2000, p. 449). Chu and Lin (2001) give a more detailed analysis, stating that "Recurring political participation under a democratic regime helped develop a sense of collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term "Taiwan" from a geographic unit to a political community and the term "Taiwanese" from an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic term for citizens of Taiwan" (p.123). As democratization progressed in Taiwan and democratic practices increased, the growing political roles developed by the people on the island had direct effects on peoples' national identity, shifting them from the previously felt "ethnic" identity which was mainly focused at differentiating Taiwanese people from their Chinese oppressors to a new sense of "civic" national identity, which as Alan Wachman explains (1994) "evinced a shared identity and feelings of affinity, transcending though

but rarely eliminating allegiances based on locality, ethnic group, religion, or class'" (p. 24). The civic identity which arose during this period of rapid democratization will be defined and discussed in great detail later in this chapter.

This chapter will maintain the agent- and structure-centered theoretical framework applied to this study, focusing on analyzing the historical events and key agents which impacted the process of democratization as well as how these events and actors also contributed to the shift in national identity felt around the island. In discussing the factors influencing the democratization process in Taiwan, this chapter will also present the shortcomings and continued relevance of theoretical remedies that have previously been attributed to Taiwan's political development. This theoretical overview will then lead into an in-depth analysis of the process of democratization as seen in Taiwan according to the key historical events and influence of the actors involved. The accumulation of these factors is argued here to have shaped the development of democracy, providing great influence on shifting trends in national identity towards a civic national identity, which then further reinforced the progression of democracy on the island.

3.1 Democratization in Taiwan

Many theories explaining democratization have popped up since the end of the Second World War. One of the earlier theories commonly associated with Taiwan's case was the modernization theory, famously coined by Martin Seymour Lipset originally in 1959 and then elaborated on in his 1963 work *The Political Man*. Lipset dates this theory back to Aristotle, asserting that "democracy is related to the state of economic development. The more well-to-do a nation, the greater the chance it will sustain democracy" (p.31). The main theme in Lipset's school of thought is that economic development creates socioeconomic conditions which are favorable to supporting democracies. A more recent advancement of the modernization theory known as the "correlation theory" continues to be one of the key theories used to explain Taiwan's liberalization and democratization. Lo describes this theory as progressing on similar themes as that of the modernization theory, focusing on the presence of "preconditions" such as "high literacy rate, rising per capita income, urbanization, the emergence of a

middle class, and the increasing popularity of the mass media" (1997, p.216). Lucian Pye (1985) has gone so far as insisting that "Taiwan is possibly the best working example of the theory that economic progress should bring in its wake democratic inclinations and a healthy surge of pluralism" (p.233).

The 'wealth theory,' however, has also been questioned by experts such as Hung-mao Tien, Gabriel Almond and Max Weber as to the validity that democratization is necessarily a product of economic progress, and with a closer look, this theory does not alone suffice in fully explaining Taiwan's democratization process. Almond (1970) warns that "The movement of modernization might be in a liberal democratic direction, but it might with equal probability be in an authoritarian direction." In this case, the question lies as to why Taiwan proceeded to a democracy as opposed to further enforcing the pre-existing authoritarian regime. This is where the role of the political elite, or as Chu labels the "agents of change" cannot be ignored as they have played a fundamental role in successfully transitioning Taiwan from authoritarian rule to a democratic political system (1992, p. 35).

Lucian Pye adapts Lipset's original theory to a more practical one, emphasizing the tendency of economic success to bring about "democratic inclinations" which may undermine an authoritarian regime, yet this leaves unanswered the other factors which influence where the political system proceeds once the authoritarian regime is questioned and this dissertation will argue the importance of the political leadership and opposition party as well as the relevant historical events which guided the actions of the political elite. Tien considers the "elite theory," which in one perspective places emphasis on the choices of the political leadership, and in the other sense stresses the contribution of the political opposition (1993, p.103). Also relevant are Huntington and Rustow's theories which analyze the effects that socioeconomic changes and the "new social forces" have on transitioning political institutions, which subsequently will decide what political system takes over the authoritarian rule (Myint, 1994, p.17).

More recent works such as the 1986 book "Transition from Authoritarian Rule: Prospects for Democracy," by O'Donnel and Schmitter break away from the earlier studies on political liberalization (Huntington, Lipset, Dalh, etc) and argue that democratization is understood as a complex historical process. Chu (1997) also leans

away from the earlier studies of democratization in favor of the more recent literature, such as the work of Adam Przeworski (1991) in which he analyzes the importance of the historical process of democratic transition alongside the different actors involved. Chu argues that "Regime transition is the collective outcome of the interactions among… a variety of actors" (p. 3). In this stage of development representing the years between 1980-1995, this dissertation will still acknowledge the influence of the more classical literature relevant to the case of Taiwan, however will on the grand scale adhere to the literature and theories on political transition focusing on the relevant actors and their motivations for implementing Taiwan's progression towards democratization, simultaneously incorporating a political dialogue promoting a fluctuating national identity.

3.2 Agents of change: civil and political society

As explained in the previous section, there are many factors in Taiwan, both pre-existing and developmental, which supported and influenced the political transition on the island. Furthermore, these factors are not merely significant for the process of democratization on the island, but also represent a shift in national identity which occurred alongside democratization. In discussing the 'democratic opening' in Taiwan, Yun-han Chu outlines the "variety of actors with different following, preferences, calculations, resources and time horizon (that) came to the fore during the transition from authoritarian rule" (1992, p. 35). Chu divides these "agents of change" into two groups of actors. The first is the "civil society," which he defines as the social movements and demonstrations instigated by the liberal elite along with the crucial role played by the mass media, which strongly affected and influenced the interests and decisions of the political elite in regards to both democratization and national identity (1992, p. 35). The other faction of "agents of change" is the political society, both in terms of the opposition as well as ruling elite, but also the influence resulting from the interaction between these competing camps of actors. Chu first takes into account the great importance of the political opposition in "bring(ing) about the decline of the authoritarian rule" (1992, p. 35). However the ruling political elite, in this period referring to Chiang Ching-kuo and

Lee Deng-hui, are also essential in respect to their compromises and shifts in policy resulting in their promotion of democracy in Taiwan while alongside the indirect effects of their political rhetoric promoting a "Taiwanese" national identity into the political atmosphere, all of which were essential in transitioning away from authoritarian rule and towards a democracy.

3.2.1 Civil society

According scholars such as Diamond, Linz and Lipset, "civil society in Taiwan has contributed significantly to democratic transition as well as to subsequent democratic consolidation" (1992, p. 7-15). In analyzing the roles of the civil society it is pertinent to direct attention to the viable weight of earlier theories applied to Taiwan's case of democratization during this time period. The modernization or "wealth" theory as depicted above, although having been largely discredited as a single viable explanation for the political transition, still holds an influential role in facilitating the successful period of democratization as will be seen here. The economic growth which Taiwan experienced in the 1960s created a burgeoning middle class. Between 1970 and 1980, the middle class increased from 21.9%-31.5%, and by the 1990s, over 50% of Taiwanese declared themselves as middle class (Sun, 1996). A large middle class as prescribed by Lipset entails a higher level of educated people and therefore a more liberal-thinking society. The economic success of the local Taiwanese allowed them to place pressure on the authoritarian rule by challenging the leadership on the political platform of democratic rule, for according to Chu, "wealth improved campaign efforts and 'security in professions enabled them to run the risk of political defeat," (Chu, 1993, p. 174). Due to the KMTs unique system in which the Taiwanese were mainly in control of the economy and the Mainland Chinese of the government, the growing Taiwanese middle class resulted in dwindling positive reviews of the authoritarian regime, which not only provided participants and followers for an opposition party but will also be argued here as a powerful motivation aiding to push the government to liberalize its policies in order to retain its power.

The rise in education level at this time also resulted in a large amount of Taiwanese receiving bachelors, masters and PhDs in democratic countries such as the

United States and Canada, allowing Taiwanese students to experience first-hand the possibilities for people in a democratic nation and desiring the same for the people in their home country. These educated and liberal citizens formed what Chu defines as the "liberal intellectual actors" in the civil society, who were key players in providing "ideological ammunition for the opposition party to challenge the ruling party" (1992, p. 35). Chu attributes these actors as responsible for the demonstrations and civic disobedience among the people as seen in the 1977 and 1979 incidents, which were some of the initial key events influencing the changing policies of the leadership. Chu ardently considers the strong influence of the political activism in the 1980s as a major factor promoting the transition towards democracy: "The social protests of the 1980s broke up the imposed social tranquility under martial law and loosened up the firm grip of the authoritarian state on the civil society at the grass-root level" (Chu, 1992, p. 99). Chu goes further to stress the impact which the movements of the civil society in the 1980s had on the relationship between the state and society in Taiwan, restructuring it in a "fundamental way" (p. 99).

This collection of activists varied from those in the earlier period of authoritarian rule in that many of these Taiwanese were now Western-educated and had received higher degrees from universities in democratic countries, many with degrees in political science, law and sociology (Chen, 1989, p.13). The post-WWII "Wilsonian Principles" of self-determination had penetrated the elite framework, creating modern, liberal political motivations distinct from the previous efforts in the late 1940s to the 1960s, yet still with similar underlying goals (Brown, 2004). This produced political activists who were able to carry-on the original fight for a local Taiwanese identity against the authoritative Nationalist Chinese regime, yet doing so with more political strategy and under a new cause of democratic rights as well as an accepted "Taiwanese" identity for the people. In 2004 Laliberté noted that in regards to Taiwan, "the historical circumstances there…have given ethnic identity a political salience" (157).

Mass media, especially newspapers and political magazines, also played an essential role among the civil society during this period, without which the influence of the liberal intellectuals "would not have been felt and amplified" (Chu, 1992, p. 35). This includes moderate journals such as *The Eighties* (*ba shi nian dai*) which was forged by

Ning-hsiang K'ang, as well as the more extreme and controversial magazines like the previously mentioned *Formosa* (*mei li tao*)[6], which was published by the opposition Legislative Yuan member Hsin-chieh Huang (Taylor, 2000, p. 348-349). The Chinese-language newspapers *China Times* and *United Daily News* also began publishing articles around this time supporting democratic and electoral reforms in Taiwan (Taylor, 2000, p. 350). Potter discusses the rise and effectiveness of media in propelling democratic transition, explaining that "Such growth of civil society frequently involves the mobilization of independent media which can bring pressure to bear on authoritarian states," which he asserts "…increases the potential for protests that can challenge authoritarian regimes" (1997, p. 28). Chu clarifies that "the social movements in the civic society and the opposition movement in the political society were not organizationally linked nor coordinated in terms of political strategizing in most cases and in most of the times. The two, nevertheless, reinforced each other" (1992, p. 99-100). The social movements therefore gave the political elite of the opposition movement the "strategic opening" for stating their claim and putting pressure on the KMT to pursue democratic reform (Chu, 1992, p. 100).

3.2.2 Political society

By this time in history, the KMT regime had already began losing momentum with the forced secession of the ROC from the UN, followed by the split of diplomatic ties with many countries including the US resulting in growing resentment on the domestic front. The opposition party, or the "social force" as described by Huntington and Rustow, consequently gained momentum and this new generation of activists developed their own "political identity," giving them more leverage to insist on political reforms (Chu, 2001). Tien supports the claim that "National-identity issues were paramount to regime transformation and were linked directly to the rise of the opposition movement" (1997, p.136). By analyzing the growth of the opposition movement alongside the weakening and ever-more tolerant ruling government, it seems possible that the "The DPP's birth and the KMT authorities' tolerance marked the beginning of

[6] The journal *Formosa* soon developed into the *Formosa* Group, which acted as a "proto-party organization" and was responsible for organizing the opposition event celebrating World Human Rights Day in 1979, where the Kaohsiung Incident emerged (Taylor, 2000, p. 350).

democratic transition in the Republic of China on Taiwan (ROC)" (Tien, 1997, p.123) The *Tangwai*, or 'outside party' which in 1986 officially became the main opposition party under the title Democratic People's Party (DPP), clearly played a crucial role in exciting dissonance among the people of Taiwan and pressuring the government, without which the leaders may have had no need to concede to democratic progress.

Since authoritarian regimes rarely voluntarily surrender their power and are more inclined to yield and compromise for the purpose of "political expediency" and retaining legitimacy, rather than "democratic values," the influence of the political opposition as is seen during this period is essential in justifying a great incentive for political transition in Taiwan (Cheng, 1989, p. 474). For one, the rise of the opposition provided an alternative political party which began gaining influence and popularity among the people through its campaign for democratic reform and Taiwanese identity, playing an essential role in challenging the authoritarian leadership and motivating the shift in policy as seen beginning under Chiang Ching-kuo (Chu, 1992). The KMT's continued commitment to Chinese nationalism and restrictions on democratic reforms helped facilitate the opposition movement's liberal ideology and strengthen its efforts and support in promoting real changes towards democracy (Chen & Lin, 2001, p. 121). The establishment of the Democratic People's Party (DPP) in 1986, during which time forming opposing political parties was described by Domes as "definitely illegal", was a blatant defiance of the KMT's authority, but at this point in time received no repercussions from the authoritarian government. In fact, this rebellion actually prompted an interview between President Chiang Ching-kuo and the owner of the *Washington Post* in the following month, in which Chiang declared that "the state of emergency in force since 1949 and the ban on new political parties would be lifted in the near future" (1999, p. 50).

While the KMT at this time was emphasizing harmony, order and stability among society, the DPP campaigned for political reform, an "immediate" end to the state of emergency and popular elections of the president, governor and mayors of the major cities (Domes, 1999, p. 51). Following the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident, the opposition movement strategically attempted to present itself as a unified, credible political force,

focusing on 'electoral coordination'[7], the demand for political liberalization and the end of martial law, the reelection of the three main national bodies, and direct elections of the president and provincial governors (Cheng, 1989, p. 487). This platform created a meaningful and competitive alternative threatening the support for the KMTs continued restrictive authoritarian rule. The reaction of the ruling elite to the rising influence of the opposition is clear in their subsequent actualization of all of the DPP's demands, including the legalization of opposition parties in 1986, the end of martial law in 1987, and the growing increase of popular elections leading up to the popular presidential election in 1996. It seems clear that the growing pressure from the opposition and weakening of the KMT led this period to be described by Cheng as "one of intensive bargaining between the two sides" (1989, p. 485). This can be described as realizing the "transition phase" outlined by Rustow, in which the political struggle between the opposition and incumbent elite led to the "compromise," between parties, allowing many of the opposition demands to be realized by a ruling party struggling to sustain its legitimacy.

Despite the immediate unification of the opposition movement beginning in 1980, the party soon became gripped with internal divisiveness between the "moderates" and the "lesser leaders," or young opposition who witnessed but did not take part in the radical opposition movement, and were less accepting of bargaining with the ruling elite (Cheng, 1989, p. 488). According to Cheng, this "disunity" within the opposition movement helps to explain the weak performance of the party in the 1983 national election, and hence the inability of the DPP to electorally or credibly overthrow the ruling KMT. In an effort to revamp and re-unify the party, the moderates organized the Association for Political Policy, which not only helped to uniform the knowledge and demands of the opposition, for example a more agreed upon promotion of 'self-determination' as opposed to the overly controversial 'independence,' but also again hindered the KMT's efforts to "splinter the opposition movement" (Cheng, 1989, p. 489). The opposition movement, even before officially establishing itself as the DPP, clearly

[7] During this period, Taiwan's electoral system was a "single-vote, multi-member district system," which according to Cheng (1989) "tends to intensify competition among candidates of the same party," making the opposition party's unity especially important in any attempt to challenge the KMT electorally (1989, p. 487).

gained a great and growing influence on the society as well as on the ruling party, with its demands for localized identity, democracy, and self-determination, however its lack of overall skill and unity in the political sphere still left the opposition unable to take the control away from the ruling party.

The growing public support of the opposition's initiatives as a threatening factor for the ruling elite is especially clear in the early success of the DPP in the polls such as the elections of the Legislative Yuan in 1986 in which the DPP secured almost 72% of the non-KMT votes, winning 12 seats. By 1989, the opposition party increased their number of seats to a total of 21, proving to be a growing threat to the dominance previously held by the KMT (Domes, 1999, p. 51). By this time, the growing popular support for opposition candidates had become increasingly evident, such as that support shown for the opposition magistrate of Taoyuan county Hsin-liang Hsu who attracted nearly 20,000 followers to his 'birthday' celebrations to hear both moderate and radical political speeches, which was noted by Hsu as "the largest unapproved peaceful political gathering in Taiwan's history" (Taylor, 2000, p. 348). The legalization of opposition parties, which was sparked by the growing force of the opposition, continued to challenge the KMT's authority with escalating participation and electoral successes, such as in the 1992 Legislative elections in which the DPP received an increasing number of votes and secured 51 seats (Dome, 1999, p. 51).

It is apparent that the growing threat of opposition which evolved from the early *Tangwai* movement into the official campaigns under the DPP, was a powerful element impacting the democratization movement on the island. Although the opposition party was not strong enough at this time to overtake the KMT (Rigger, 2011; Dome, 1999; Wu, 2002), the challenge presented by the political elite under the opposition movement and the support which their campaign received, especially in regards to democratic reform and the localization of identity and politics, was a strong enough incentive for the incumbent political elite to shift their focus and interest towards that of the majority, which in this case meant democratic opening and promotion of Taiwanese identity. The focus may now turn to the particular concessions made by the leadership in response to the civic and opposition pressures.

During this period of growing opposition and the KMT's loosening control, many changes occurring within the ruling party, plus the pressure from the growing opposition, were factors in the subsequent policy changes from both leaders Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui, facilitating the island's democratization and re-shaping the Nationalist Party. At the time of the opposition's growing development in the early to mid-1980s, the KMT was facing serious internal dilemmas which would have great impacts on the future survival of the party. While the opposition movement was taking advantage of every opportunity to preach for democracy and self-determination, the KMT was not only struggling with the notion of Chiang Ching-kuo's succession[8], but the party was also further distracted and damaged by the external troubles implicating Chiang himself and other high-up KMT officials in the killing of several Chinese-Americans (Taylor, 2000). This negative press on top of the growing competition with the political opposition and the party's already fleeting public support prompted a great shift in the strategy of the ruling elite, beginning with Chiang Ching-kuo's earlier gradual policy of Taiwanization and culminating in the drastic concessions made by the leader in 1986 to "deflect public attention from the issues of self-determination, political succession, and the tarnished international image of the regime" (Cheng, 1989, p. 489).

President Chiang Ching-kuo who was politically influential during the 1970s and officially stepped up as president in 1978 played an initial, crucial role in transitioning the authoritarian rule towards liberal reform and also creating and implementing a policy which resulted in the promotion a local "Taiwanese identity" (Potter, 1997, p.125). Following Chiang's strict crackdown of the 1979 Kaohsiung incident, his early realization of necessary reforms to sustain the KMT's rule is evident in a recording of the leader informing the KMT electoral team of the shift which the party would be making towards "clean and democratic" electoral reform, saying that the KMT "is pursuing reform not for the sake of winning an election, but is holding an election during the course of reform" (Taylor, 2000, p. 361). According to research provided by Nathan, Chou and Ho (1987, 1990), "there were strong evidences that Chiang Ching-kuo was behind all major decisions on regime opening" (Chu, 1992, p. 36), which allowed the

[8] The president's declining health was already a troubling issue at this time, and provided for much stipulation and anxiety especially amongst the KMT's 'old guard' as to the fate of the party and Chiang's pick for his successor (Taylor, 2000).

leader to not only shape but also in ways direct the island's political transition in favor of the ruling party. Many authors have explored Chiang's role in liberalizing the country and although no one can know for certain the exact motivations for the drastic shifts in Chiang's policy, it appears clear from an examination comparing the timeline of historical events alongside the political reforms promoted by the president that Chiang Ching-kuo's policies for transition were a strategic effort to maintain the legitimacy and rule of the KMT in light of the shift in the political and social atmosphere on the island.

One of the key policies which was initiated in the 1970s but burgeoned through the 1980s is the campaign of 'Taiwanization'. Bruce J. Dickson attributes the Taiwanization movement as Chiang's strategy to recruit dedicated and loyal supporters amongst the majority population as well as 'appear' considerate of the requests and needs of the local people (1992, p. 54). In regards to the first effort to appoint Taiwanese politicians to higher positions inside the government hierarchy, Dickson remarks that this 'commitment' on the part of the KMT did not actually result in a substantial increase in native-born Taiwanese as top party members, but rather "benefited those born on the mainland who spent most of their lives on Taiwan" (1992, p. 54). However the visible impact of Chiang's early Taiwanization movement is evident in the increase in local positions being held by Taiwanese as opposed to the previous mainland majority. According to statistics from 1971, in 1955 mainlanders dominated the lowest levels of party hierarchy with Taiwanese only holding 21% of the district secretaries and 43% of district level cadres, however due to the Taiwanization policy, statistics show that the proportion of Taiwanese among district cadres rose to 73.3% in 1985 (Yang, 1985). This not only created an arena for broader influence into the political environment on the island, but it also created a point of entry for the local people to be active as "Taiwanese" participants in the system, as opposed to the previously enforced "Chinese" identity, and for the people to electorally support local leaders who could truly represent their identity and needs.

Succession is commonly viewed as a great challenge to the peace and success of a democratic transition, and in the case of President Chiang Ching-kuo, who himself succeeded his father to continue authoritarian rule in Taiwan, succession was a delicate subject early on in his presidency as his health was already deteriorating by the early

1980s (Taylor, 2000, p. 375). According to interviews, Taylor writes that Chiang had already decided before 1983 that his successor should be a native Taiwanese, escalating his "Taiwanization" policy, and the leader in 1984 surprised the public and media by announcing Lee Deng-hui as his vice president, and therefore likely successor (Taylor, 2000, p. 380). Jacobs and Liu (2007) note that despite the fact that Lee was not the first Taiwanese to serve on the island as vice president, his appointment to this position was actually a great shift from the previous Taiwanese vice president Hsieh Tung-min, who "during the Japanese colonial period…spent considerable time on the mainland working with the Nationalists and thus was a "half mountain" or 'half-mainlander' Taiwanese" (p. 377). Taylor's (2000) comments that Chiang's worsening illness prompted the leader to increase Lee Deng-hui's preparation for succession by holding frequent meetings, and further involving the vice president in military and foreign affairs where Chiang ensured Lee made "close relationships with the right people" (p. 398). However it is in the final years of Chiang Ching-kuo's life that his strategic shift in policy clearly veered in the direction of democratizing the island.

The reforms endorsed by President Chiang Ching-kuo beginning in 1986 represent a drastic turning point for the island's political structure, leaving the authoritarian model for the path towards a democratic system. Hu writes that "At the KMT's third plenum in March 1986, CCK announced that a new political reform committee of 24 people, divided into two task forces of 12 each, would study three major issues: the ending of martial law, parliamentary reform, and the legalization of opposition parties" (2005, p. 41). In the last days before Chiang Ching-kuo's death, he hastily sanctioned monumental legal changes which ended the nearly forty years of authoritarian rule and laid the groundwork for democracy on the island:

> "On July 15, 1987, martial law was formally lifted. On November 2, the government opened up legal travel, mainly family visits, to the mainland; on January 1, 1988, bans related to the organization of political parties and the freedom of the press were lifted. Taiwan was on its way to a true democracy. Twelve days later, on January 13, CCK passed away" (Hu, 2005, p.43).

Chiang's final days also include the end of restrictions on the number of and length of newspapers, resulting in 200 new publications registered by the government, and a final

proposal of parliamentary reform drafted by Ma Ying-jeou to end the era of "mainlander control of Taiwan's political process" (Taylor, 2000, p. 421). In the end of his life Chiang Ching-kuo destroyed the most prolific obstacles standing in the way of the island's political liberalization, and after naming his successor Lee Deng-hui as the first native Taiwanese president to rule the island, it seems evident that Chiang had a clear vision for the future path of Taiwan and the Nationalist party.

Chu and Li describe Chiang's final reforms as the impetus that "…essentially pushed the process of authoritarian breakdown over the point of no return" (2001, p. 121). During this period of rapid democratization and shifting identity, the ruling party maintained a great amount of power and authority, allowing it to influence the transition of political liberalization while conceding to many of the opposition demands. The KMT, although facing challenges of opposition, still operated and was treated as the main authority over the media and civil society, and therefore had a certain "flexibility" in its response to the opposition and peoples' plea for democratic reform, allowing the leadership in Taiwan to retain its power by actively and strategically directing the political transition (Lin, 1999). As mentioned previously, the opposition party was at this point in time not strong enough to overthrow the authoritarian regime and enact democratic reform on its own, and this process of shifts on both the opposition and ruling end indicate the "continuous bargaining" which drove much of the democratization process on the island. Just as the DPP experienced difficulty pleasing both their radical and moderate members, so did the KMT have a similar dichotomy of "hardliners" and "softliners" which although was an overall hindrance to the party's smooth progression, is described as Cheng as "tending to correspond with the alteration of moderate and radical elements in the opposition" (1989, p. 490). The bargaining which took place between the two parties and the compromises made by both the more moderate opposition and ruling elite clearly influenced the direction which both democratization and national identity progressed through and following this era.

Although the shifts in the political parties and measures put in place leading up to the death of President Chiang Ching-kuo are vital to the ending of martial law, many academics as well as local people in Taiwan attribute the achievement of democracy on the island to former President Lee Deng-hui (Chia-lung Lin, 2002; Wu, 2002). Lee

succeeded Chiang Ching-kuo as the first native Taiwanese president of the island in 1988, and not only continued and elaborated on the early Taiwanization efforts of Chiang, but went further to "transform the KMT into a genuine democratic party" (Tsang, 1999, p. 14). While the great strides taken during Chiang Ching-kuo's period as president in transitioning the political system away from authoritarian rule have already been discussed, Lin and Tedards (2002) clarify that following Chiang's rule, Taiwan was still only in the very infantile stages of democratization. When Lee took over power, the 'Temporary Provisions' which went into effect during the Communist Rebellion on the mainland still prevailed over the Constitution, there were no direct presidential or parliamentary elections, cross-strait relations were still under the label of "civil war" and it continued to be illegal to openly discuss Taiwanese independence (Lin and Tedards, 2002, p. 80). While the opposition party and civil society are promoted by scholars such as Steve Tsang (1999) as the "most important force" pushing the country towards democracy, the efforts of Lee Deng-hui, just as many initiatives of his predecessor, along with the interaction between the opposite camps will be shown here as also being vital in peacefully and successfully transitioning Taiwan into an official democratic nation.

Chu and Lin painted a vivid picture of the scenario of the state of the nationalist party following the death of Chiang Ching-kuo and its direct implications on further political as well as national identity development:

> "The intra-party power struggle between the so-called mainstream and non-mainstream factions inadvertently accelerated the trend of Taiwanization, provided the impetus for abandoning the KMT's core commitment to Chinese nationalism, partially checked the natural tendency of the entrenched incumbent elite to restrict the scope of democratic reform, and facilitated ideological accommodation with the opposition on the issue of democratic reform and national identity" (Chu and Li, 2001, p. 121).

Wu also acknowledges that the "highly politicized ethnic cleavage created by the KMT's minority rule gave the title "the first native president," no matter who assumed it, a high degree of legitimacy" (2002, p. 201). Lee's promotion of "Taiwanization" and democratization along with his reaction to the opposition efforts were all essential in building Lee's "shrewd "political-ideological leadership" that enabled…the so-called

Taiwanese KMT, to exploit the favorable conditions effectively…and dominate the course of democratization" (Wu, 2002, p. 203).

The Taiwanization movement under Lee Deng-hui could be argued to have promoted more of an intended shift towards a "Taiwanese consciousness," intended to foster further integrated with the mainland and Taiwanese under a more political, 'civic' umbrella, in an effort to diminish the ethnic gap which was the initial focus of the fight for a Taiwanese, as opposed to a Chinese, national identity. Lee accomplished this largely through his political platform promoting the island's 'sovereignty,' which will be analyzed in greater detail in the next chapter. At this stage in history, the process of "Taiwanization" and the label "Taiwanese" were no longer just used by the local people to differentiate themselves from their colonizers, but were rather expanding in meaning as employed by politicians to gain unilateral support in the interest of Taiwan, and the political structure under which everyone was now a part of. Mengin states that "The far-reaching consequences of the democratization process for the crystallization of an identity commensurate with the polity is epitomized by the formula 'popular sovereignty' put forward by President Lee Teng-hui" (1999, p. 121). Lee Deng-hui "refocused the polity on Taiwan" (Mengin, 1999, p. 121), further enacting political policies which deepened the democratic reforms as well as the notion of the "Taiwanese" people on the island.

The list of early political reforms promoted by President Lee and the continued emergent democratic developments under his period of rule were clearly essential in opening up the island towards greater electoral freedom on the path to democracy. In 1990, Lee convened a National Affairs Council (NAC) to repeal the temporary provisions that had suspended constitutionalism and civil liberties in 1949, retire the 'old crooks' in three national representative bodies, incorporate some proportional representation (PR) seats in the Legislative Yuan and hold popular elections for the presidency (Tien and Cheng, 1999, p. 26). Lee also convened a Constitutional revision group and completely opened the electoral space in the 1990s. One of the landmark elections in this period was the December 1992 Legislative election, which for the first time brought a new parliament into power which was completely elected by the people of Taiwan (Chu and Li, 2001, p. 122). Following this were the first ever gubernatorial elections in 1994,

followed by the key turning point of the first popular presidential elections in 1996, which will commence the next historical stage in this dissertation, but marks the true sign of successfully transitioning to a democratic system.

One of the great feats which Lee is credited during this period was his ability to balance the challenge of the opposition party and the desire of the polity while reforming the KMT into a democratic party which could maintain its power and support through the island's democratic transition. According to Wu (2002), "Lee tackled the challenge of the DPP mainly by appropriating most of the latter's central platforms, such as democracy, nativism, and social welfare" (p. 204). In fact, scholars such as Grant Holly (2006) argue that Lee Deng-hui was actually more effective in his dealing with the opposition party than his predecessor (p. 43). Soon after beginning his first term as President, Lee convened a national affairs council, inviting thirteen DDP delegates, to discuss and debate the various options for the island's democratic reform (Holly, 2006, p. 43). Lee's efforts to actualize rather than refute the opposition directives under the KMT reforms not only appeased many of the moderate members, but also in the end resulted in frustrating and marginalizing many DPP members through the democratic process. Grant writes that "Tactics that helped the *Tangwai* gain support in the 1970s proved less effective in the 1990s with the KMT's increased willingness to engage in democratic politics" (2006, p. 45). By adapting and realizing the demands of the opposition party, the KMT actually took over the efforts to democratize the island and support a more local identity, taking away the most effective platforms of the opposition party.

Taiwan, during this period of political development, seems to exemplify what Shain and Linz define as "incumbent-led caretaker governments," in which "such governments are the products of transitions in which the outgoing authoritarian regime…initiates a transition in the face of growing economic deterioration or a severe rupture within the ruling elite or a threat of opposition and even revolt" (1995, p. 52). Since Lee, "was doing what those in the opposition had been longing to do" (Wu, 2002, p. 204), and appeared to be more credible in doing it as the first Taiwanese president, Lee as seen through this early historical delineation was able to fully reform the previously authoritarian party into a reformed democratic party. This list of accomplishments supporting Lee's efforts towards democratization on the island, along with the roles of

the previously discussed actors involved, can also be analyzed in regards to the influence which political policies and the opposition movements during this period had on the trend towards a new, 'civic' national identity on the island. The next section of this chapter will therefore turn its focus to the transition of national identity which occurred in reaction to as well as in support of the democratization movement, analyzing the characteristics of the evolving "civic" national identity and its influence on and relationship with the democratization of Taiwan.

3.3 Civic national identity emerging in Taiwan

Hans Stockton in 2008 discusses the Constructivist perspective in analyzing national identity, explaining how it differs from the Realist and Liberalist perspectives which take for granted the "actor-identity construction and the subsequent effect of that construction on state interests" (p. 100). Smith in 2010 states that "change is built into the definition of national identity" (p. 22), and according to Ronald Jepperson, Alexander Wendt and Peter J. Katzenstein, when identities change, so do the political interests, state interactions and national security policies (1996, p. 33 – 75). According Anderson, a nation is an "imagined community" defined by their own conceptualized boundlessness (1991), and Stockton describes the movement of democratization as an "appropriate and embraced expression of Taiwan's civic nationalism" (2008, p. 100). Many argue that during the period of rapid democratization, national identity in Taiwan changed towards what Brown labels as "civic national identity." According to Brown, the base for civic national identity is not concerned with ethnicity, but rather creates a community heavily joined by their shared nation-state and their equal treatment under the state's political system, which only occurred in Taiwan through democratization. "The civic nationalist vision stresses that all citizens are granted equal status irrespective of ethnic attributes, on the sole condition that they grant loyalty to the public institutions to the territorial community" (Brown, 2004, p. 52).

It has also been argued by many scholars (Kohn 1944; Landa 1995; Knack & Keefer 1997; Gibson & Gouws 2000; Alesina & La Ferarra 2002) that "civic nationalism promotes tolerant and inclusive attitudes," and according to Holley E. Hansen and Vicki L. Hesli (2009), many "Democratic theorists have also emphasized the value of tolerant

citizens as crucial for a stable democratic state" (p. 3). There is actually an extensive amount of literature discussing the relationship between a "civil society" and a successful democracy (Almond and Verba 1963, 1989; Inglehart 1988, 1990; Barry 1978; Smitter and Karl 1991), and Edward N. Muller and Mitchell A. Seligson (1994) actually argue for the mutual influence of a "civic culture" among the people of a nation leading to democratization and democratization influencing civic culture. This dissertation will not address the argument of which process instigates the other, but will rather utilize such discourse to highlight the continued and deepening parallel which has persisted between national identity formation and democratization in Taiwan. Returning to the statement made by Ernest Gellner in 1964, if "Nationalism…invents nations where they do not exist" (p.168), it may be fair to assume that the politicization of nationalism as instigated alongside democratic progress, for the first time in history truly distinguished Taiwan from its colonial rulers.

Chang Maukuei (2004) recounts that "In fact, I did not hear the term "Taiwanese nation" (*Taiwan minzu*) until the 1979 Kaohsiung Incident" (p.70). Stockton in 2008 stated that "In the case of Taiwan, democratization and localization have allowed for public consideration of what defines the nation-state of the Republic of China on Taiwan (p.104)." If it were not for the liberalization afforded society through democratization, a civic identity would not have been able to form. Therefore the return of the Taiwanese identity movement as strongly promoted by the political elite under the growing opposition followed by the 'localization' efforts conceded by the authoritarian leadership all assisted in the transition of national identity on the island. Tien has contended that "Taiwan's experience suggests that civil culture tends to evolve synchronously with democratic transition and to mature during democratic consolidation" (1995, p. 46). Once the legitimacy of the authoritarian leadership began faltering, pressures from the opposition motivated the political elite not only to focus on democratization but also on promoting a "Taiwanese" identity in order to gain support from the majority of people on the island and create an atmosphere to support peaceful political reform. It was still illegal in Taiwan to openly discuss national identity or infer Taiwan independence until 1992 when the treason article under the Criminal Act was officially revoked (Henders, 2004, p.85), yet Chiang Ching-kuo's introduction of the Taiwanization movement while

martial law was still in place, and President Lee Deng-hui's continued promotion of a local identity, displayed a clear effort on the part of the political elite to promote national political unity and invoke a sense of "cultural identity" disregarding place of origin (Stockton, 2008, p.105).

Hansen and Hesli (2009), argue that merely presenting a dichotomy of ethnic and civic national identity is not fairly representative of the forms of identity felt throughout a nation. This dissertation does not wish to argue this transition of national identity in Taiwan as a simple and clear shift from ethnic to civic identity, for the concept of national identity in itself is nothing near simple. According to Anthony Smith, "it is very difficult to differentiate civic and ethnic identity as the two not only are in constant flux and can shift at any time, but also, as it is simply difficult to separate the two" (2010, p.44). It would rather be argued here that the experiences of the people during this rapid period of democratization and the role of political discourse during this period prompted a trend towards a civic national identity of the people on the island which did not exist during colonial periods. In Naiteh Wu's 1993 paper on provincial origin, political support and national identity, he acknowledged that "now that Taiwan independence is a clear and important topic for society … (we are) unable to distinguish adequately between ethnic identity and national identity" (p. 34). It is understood here that the civic national identity which emerged through the process of democratization on the island did not do away with ethnic national identity, as the politics in Taiwan and people to this day still draw upon the island's different ethnicities. However under a democratic political system people openly have the right to proclaim their unique ethnic identities alongside a similar civic identity, and according to Almond and Verba (1963, p. 8), "civic culture" is defined as "a culture of consensus and diversity." It is therefore argued here that a greater civic national identity arose during democratization, encompassing a larger portion of the island under their shared relation to their home territory and experience living in Taiwan and their democratic political system, despite differing ethnic identities. This has in turn maintained and strengthened the interconnected relationship between national identity and democracy on the island.

Just as in the formation of an ethnic-based identity when Taiwanese viewed themselves in stark contrast to the Mainland Chinese oppressing them, so in the more recent shift of national identity did the focus of people's national identity become 'redefined' in terms of differences in their democratic political and social system (Chow, p.104). Civil society, according to Yun-han Chu, between 1983 and 1988 emerged as a trend by which there was a steady growth in social protest on all kinds of issues, affirming that "once democratization had gathered momentum the development of social movements quickly followed suit" (Shiau, 1999, p. 107-108). The evolution of social and political change in Taiwan shows a tremendous interdependence connecting the two processes. There appears to be a sort of 'give and take' tendency in Taiwanese progress in which a political reformation spurred by social unrest subsequently configured a new spirit of nationalism which then supported the democratic political system. In their famous research on *Civic Culture*, Almond and Verba (1989) stipulate that a "civic culture" is crucial to sustaining a stable democracy. It can therefore be argued that for Taiwan's case, democracy opened the door for a civic identity to form and this new identity in turn helped guarantee the successful achievement of democracy.

3.4 Conclusion

This period in Taiwan's history from 1980 – 1995 represents a drastic and rapid shift in the political and cultural setting on the island. Aside from the apparent political liberalization and promotion of the "Taiwanization movement" during these fifteen years, it is clear that it is difficult to discuss democratization during this period without also discussing national identity, and vice versa. The effect of democratization on the ideology of the Taiwanese as promoted by the civic society and opposition party and then developed under Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui, is well expressed by Chu and Lin, in which they comment that "Recurring political participation under a democratic regime helped develop a sense of collective consciousness among the people, transforming the term "Taiwan" from a geographic unit to a political community and the term "Taiwanese" from an ethnic term for native Taiwanese to a civic term for citizens of Taiwan" (p.123). As seen here, the commencement of a democratic transition in Taiwan also marks the shift from ethnic identity to a politicized 'state'- centered national identity for Taiwanese.

David Brown (2004) poses the dilemma of whether ethnic conflict promotes or inhibits democratization (p.43). The analysis of this historical period seems to prove that for the case of Taiwan, "ethnic conflict," if the island's dilemma of ethnic identity may be labeled as such, fell on the optimistic side of the equation, in the end promoting and aligning with democratization. As professor Wang of Academia Sinica testified in 2009, the period between 1980 and 1991 was "the first open and organized campaign of which Taiwanese identity began to emerge along the process of democratic transition in Taiwan" (p.17). Wang's statement along with the analysis provided throughout this chapter portrays the relative parallel between the process of Taiwanization and democratization that continues through this stage in Taiwan's history. Not only was Taiwanese identity representing an alternative national identity to that previously being imposed by the Chinese, and which in the past had been imposed by previous colonial rulers, but so did democracy propose an alternate form of government to that imposed by the KMT. The roles of the educated middle class, opposition party and KMT leaders all played a part in the onset of this crucial political transition, and this political transition then played a large role in the evolution of a civic national identity while this new form of identity helped support the success of democracy on the island. The subsequent chapter will continue the historical analysis of this relationship in Taiwan bringing this study up to the most recent advancements.

Chapter 4

1996 – Present day: consolidating democracy, "Taiwanese" identity, and the return of the China factor

This final period of analysis witnesses the achievement and consolidation of democracy alongside a growing trend of Taiwanese national identity on the island, however with one distinct feature differentiating the development in this stage from those previously examined, and that is the China factor. In the concluding words of the 2001 work "Political Development in 20th Century Taiwan," Yu-han Chu and T.J. Cheng provided an anecdote predicting the issues which they perceived would be prominent for Taiwan in the 21st century. Although this statement precedes first-hand knowledge of Taiwan's imminent predicament, the authors provide a very succinct and accurate illustration of the transition of key influences which have affected the development of and relationship between democracy and national identity in the most recent era in Taiwan:

> "Into the next century, the people of Taiwan will continue to wrestle with competing claims to their political allegiance and cultural identity. The deepening of economic interdependence between Taiwan and mainland China, the settlement of an increasingly larger number of Taiwanese businessmen and migrants in the mainland, and the emergence of a Mandarin-based media industry across the Straits will certainly complicate the consolidation of Taiwanese identity" (p.129).

The last decade has been filled with works by both domestic and international scholars such as Stéphane Corcuff (2012), Peter C.Y. Chow (2008, 2012), Yun-han Chu (2004), Naiteh Wu (2012) and Michael Danielsen (2012) discussing the most recent challenges confronting democracy and national identity on the island, including anxiety specifically towards the influence of the "China factor". Danielson expresses concern that growing economic interdependence across the strait has already caused "A continued deterioration in Taiwan's democracy" (2012, p. 135). Shelley Rigger in 2011 considered two impending challenges to the deepening of democracy on the island, "First, the rate of progress toward democratic deepening has slowed, both in the institutional sense and in the popular views of democracy. Second, Taiwan's democracy faces significant external

threat: Beijing's determination to integrate Taiwan into the People's Republic of China (PRC)" (p. 5).

Matsuda however also gives credence to the influence which democracy and national identity in Taiwan have on cross-strait relations, in 2004 stating that "Political changes in the Taiwan Strait have been mainly initiated by Taiwan's democratization and localization" (p. 11). This could suggest a differing viewpoint that the democratic ideals and growing Taiwanese identity which have developed over the years may actually affect China's ability to coerce unification across the strait. The "China factor" plays a prominent and influential role throughout this final period of analysis, with differing policies under each of the three leaders of this era drastically shifting the relations across the strait and directly impacting both national identity and the continued process of democratic consolidation. The influence of cross-strait relations will therefore be treated here as a strong factor affecting the discussion of the continued development of these two processes, but the relationship of these two processes as promoted under Taiwan's political elite will also prove to act as influential and dynamic factors impacting the continued progression of cross-strait relations.

To clarify, this is not to say that the mainland was not an important issue to Taiwan's political elite previous to the 1990s. Since the relocation of the KMT to Taiwan in 1949, the contention across the strait never fully dissipated, and the issue of reunification, as pressed by the authoritarian KMT rule and fought by the opposition. However Taiwan's democratization and growing discussion of the island's sovereignty sparked a renewed interest from China resulting in a transition in cross-strait relations. Just as the strong policies and decisions of the political elite were essential in influencing the paths towards democracy and a localized and civic identity in the 1980s to early 1990s, so will this most recent period trace the roles of the recent political figures and their influence on the consolidation of democracy and increasing shifts in national identity as can be largely seen in their response to cross-strait relations.

4.1 Tracing the final chapter of development

The major themes evoked through this final phase of analysis for the parallel of democracy and national identity in Taiwan can be largely symbolized through the divergent scenario surrounding the first year of this section of study. The year 1996 on the one hand marks the first popular presidential election, which is endorsed by many political scientists as the "clear and definitive" realization of democracy (Rigger, 2011, p. 1). On the other hand, 1996 also marks the third Taiwan Missile Crisis, representing a huge shift in cross-strait issues, which as prescribed above, have proved greatly influential to political policies and domestic sentiments leading up to the present day. These two major instances are representative of the transitioning and conflicting characteristics present in this latter stage of study which have become prominent factors rendering the changes in strategies of the political elite. As Chu asserts, "In the end, the state became the arena. The competing forces strove to gain control of the governing apparatus and use its power to steer cross-strait relations, erect a distinct cultural hegemony, and impose their own vision of nation-building…" (2004, p. 499).

York Chen in 2012 outlines three different paradigms of strategies towards the further development of democracy and national identity on the island in response to the threats from cross-strait relations, differentiating from "Two- Chiang, Lee-Chen, and Ma—and their constitutive elements, values, beliefs, and methods" (Chow, 2012, p. 10). The latter two paradigms, "Lee-Chen" and "Ma", refer to the leadership in this final period of analysis, which can refer to the interaction between these leaders and opposition during their rule, as well as the interaction and shifting trends within each political party. Aside from the domestic factors of competition and changing political interests during this period, many of the shifts in political policy during this time were "shaped by particular conceptualizations of the relationship between Taiwan and China." (Chow, 2012, p. 10). This historical analysis will follow Chen's paradigm to examine these "particular conceptualizations" of the leaders of this period, and in particular explore how these projections have influenced and altered the continuing processes of democratic consolidation and national identity formation in Taiwan.

4.2 The shifts in policy under the first Taiwanese, democratically elected president, Lee Deng-hui

As introduced above the year of 1996, which is the opening juncture of this third and final stage of analysis, is viewed by many as a "landmark in Taiwan's democratization" (The Atlantic Council of the United States, 2003, p. 2). Lee's re-election through a democratic process is not only a milestone for the success of the island's transition to a democracy, but is also major for the Taiwanese on the island as the first popularly elected president was a native Taiwanese. This in its own right is monumental and exemplifies the strong bond filled through the achievements up to this point in both politics and national identity on the island. According to Francoise Mengin (1999, p. 120), "The fact that the result obtained by Lee was higher than that of his party – both at the elections of the National Assembly (49.68%) held the same day, and at the Legislative Yuan elections (46.06 %) held a few months earlier – is significant of the link uniting national identity with political changes, in this case the democratization process." As discussed in the former chapter, Lee Deng-hui, prior to being popularly elected had already established a strong stance promoting democracy and "Taiwanization" on the island. Lee's approach leading up to and following his election, although maintaining and furthering its localization efforts, also shifted towards reconfiguring the island's policies towards cross-strait relations. According to Lin and Tedards, "Lee clearly understood that he must obtain and keep the support of the Taiwanese people. His use of democracy and public opinion to resist the pressure from China also ensured his easy victory in the first direct presidential election" (2002, p. 96).

In the midst of Lee's election and this great transition for democracy, the Taiwan Missile Crisis was altering not only cross-strait relations but also the national identity and the domestic outlook towards the Mainland. With the reaction that was triggered from the general population on the island and the growing demands of the opposition party, Lee opened up the discussion of a policy unlike the previous "One China" framework, instead promoting concepts of "Taiwan sovereignty," demonstrating a new era of KMT discourse and influence on the people of Taiwan. The slogans promoted under Lee Deng-hui during this period and his effort to shift the notion of sovereignty in Taiwan reflect Lee's

determination to "distance the country" from the previous colonial governments, which Lee called "a regime that came [to Taiwan] from the outside (*wailai zhengquan*)" (Jacobs, 2008, p. 50). The following section will therefore deliver an in-depth examination of the events which affected Lee's second term of presidency from 1996-2000 along with the leader's political rhetoric and efforts in respect to cross-strait relations, the effects of his policies on the early stages of democratic consolidation, as well as the more drastic manipulation of national identity on the island framed against mainland China.

4.2.1 The 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis

In order to fully comprehend the impact which the 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis had on the future cross-strait policies as well as on the shifting domestic environment of the island, it is imperative to first elaborate on the details of the incident. This missile testing was a strategy of the PRC to use force to intimidate the island of Taiwan, and also evoke response from the United States, by conducting a series of missile tests and military exercises across the strait. China's People's Liberation Army (PLA) first launched ballistic missiles over the strait in July 1995, initially in response to President Lee Deng-hui's visit to his alma-mater Cornell University in the United States which was viewed by China as "a display of independence-minded sentiments" (Project on National Security Reform). The missile testing then advanced closer to Taiwan and continued through to March 1996 in anticipation of the first democratic elections on the island (Matsuda, 2004, p. 4). Scobell suggests a greater overall message from the mainland through this "show of force", which was "to deter Taiwan from pursuing independence from China" (1999, p. 5). This incident is not only significant for its threat against Taiwan, but it is also the first 'show of force' from China towards Taiwan since the years of the civil war (Scobell, 1999, p. 6), signifying a sudden and drastic shift in a new era of cross-strait relations. Unfortunately for the Beijing government, these aggressive tactics resulted in an unfavorable outcome for the PRC, most likely contrary to the intended effect.

China's threatening strategy resulted in negative responses from both the United States as well as from the domestic population of Taiwan. First, the United States responded to the 1995-1996 Missile Crisis by sending a severe and clear message to China, dispatching two aircraft carrier battle groups to the Strait to protect Taiwan from

any further military force. Second, aside from the implications of the stern stance taken by the United States, China's efforts to intimidate the people of Taiwan also seemed to fail. Not only did people on the island continue to follow through with their first popular presidential elections to re-elect President Lee Deng-hui, but the missile threat from the mainland also seemed to push popular sentiment away from relating to China and further towards Lee's promoted 'Taiwanese' identity. Shen and Wu (2008) attribute a considerable rise in Taiwanese identity from 1994 to 1996 as an effect of the PRC missile exercises and the survey data presented in the following chapter further supports this theory (p. 123). This coercion tactic therefore instigated a contradictory reaction to that intended, which in part with affecting the future political rhetoric on the island, also created a larger drift in the minds of the people between China and Taiwan, inducing a greater shift towards a pro-Taiwan attitude and Taiwanese national identity which will be clearly seen in the policies promoted by President Lee from 1995-2000.

4.2.2 "Special State- to-State" relations and the "New Taiwanese"

Following the 1995-1996 Missile Crisis, Lee Deng-hui's policies can be viewed as clearly representing a diverging trend in respect to cross-strait relations, with his signature programs clearly promoting a very localized and pro-Taiwan approach stimulated by deepening democratic ideals and a reflection of the changes in national identity. There are a strong set of themes visible in Lee's latter term as president that can be viewed as arising from the tensions across the Strait. The newfound policy objectives clearly shifted towards appeasing the people and protecting Taiwan from an ominous China by raising the strength of the people's local identity as well as increasing concentration on the country's sovereign stability. The major guiding principle of cross-strait relations throughout Lee's second term as president was fostered under his tenet "Go Slow, Be Patient," which despite growing discontent among Taiwan's business community, ensured a distance to be retained between China and Taiwan and "strengthened the view in Beijing that economic carrots were not enough" (Chu, 2004, p. 488).

During the 1998 Taipei city mayoral elections, President Lee Deng-hui began campaigning for his concept of the "New Taiwanese" identity, which according to Hans

Stockton represents the leader's "effort to find a vehicle for national political unity on the island with which to induce people to localize their sense of cultural identity regardless of place of origin" (Stockton, 2008, p. 105). Even prior to implementing this policy, Lee preaches the necessity of building this connection between an island-wide, civic national identity, or "consciousness", for which the people could attach themselves specifically to their common place of residence under a common democratic government:

> "Among the 21 million people in Taiwan, there are aboriginals, and there are the compatriots who have come from the mainland over several hundred years. Between us, there should be no argument about ethnic division…Only identify with Taiwan, give your heart to preserving and developing Taiwan, no matter what ethnic group, no matter whether you came to Taiwan early or late, then all are Taiwanese."[9]

Not only did the policy of "New Taiwanese" as described above aim to use the newly achieved democratic political system to create a more unified "Taiwanese" identity detached from ethnic roots, but it also encompassed the objective of forming a larger "Taiwanese" identity which could help promote political unity under the new democratic system and support the elected leadership.

In the same party speech mentioned above, President Lee promotes the concept of the 'sovereignty' among the people of Taiwan's grounded on the island's newfound practices:

> "The establishment of the ideal of sovereignty in the people is to stir up every citizen to use his consciousness of being master of his own country [*guojia*], contributing his wisdom and strength, realizing the respect that should be given to a complete individual…to mutually integrate the free will of the individual with the whole wealth and good of society, to establish a civilized society with individual freedom, social harmony and prosperity."

[9] This quote from Lee Deng-hui is cited from C.R. Hughes' 2011 work "Negotiating National Identity in Taiwan," in Robert Ash, John w. Garver and Penelope B. Prime (Eds.) *Taiwan's Democracy: Economic and Political Challenges,* and was originally cited from *China Times* on December 31st, 1994

Stockton goes further to note that "As 'New Taiwanese,' citizens would seek to define and construct, not the nation-state of Imperial China or the ROC founded on the mainland almost a century ago, but that of contemporary ROC on Taiwan" (Stockton, 2008, p. 105). It seems therefore clear that Lee's political incentives for his "New Taiwanese" policy not only aimed to further promote a growing shift away from a "Chinese" identity, but also to strengthen an intertwined discourse in which being Taiwanese could also reflect the communal support of the people for the democratic political system and the elected leaders in that system. This is in contrast from the previous attachment to what Lee voices as the "foreign" rule of China which no longer impedes on the island of Taiwan. With the clear shift in cross-strait relations and growing political autonomy sparked by successful democratization, Lee's political policies only continued to further distinguish between the countries across the Strait.

As a response to China's outward policies denunciating any shifts of Taiwan towards independence,[10] Lee embarked on his most controversial political program in 1999, announcing a new definition of the cross-strait relations, away from the "One China" principle which is insisted upon by China, formulating a "two states theory" (Matsuda, 2004), or that of "special state-to-state relations" (p. 96). According to Matsuda (2004), "…this gave Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui an opportunity to exploit the PRC's fickleness and denounce it as merely new propaganda, and not seriously deal with it" (2004, p. 3). This also represents the idea of sovereignty for Taiwan which emerged from Lee's latter term in power and joined with the dilemma of national identity to form two of the most controversial issues which still plague the island today. Although Lee's "special state-to-state relations" concept is described by Yun-han Chu in 2004 to have "pushed the envelope too hard" (507) and displeased many people both domestically and internationally, Lee's efforts still advanced the notions of a separate Taiwanese identity along with forging a closer merger between the overlap of national identity and democratic progression on the island, while also influencing a placement of national identity and the island's political stance as distinctive and at odds with their

[10] In reference to Beijing's "Three no's" policy towards Taiwan, which was endorsed in 1998 by US President Bill Clinton, and outlines no independence, no two China's or one Taiwan – one China, and no membership in any international organizations for which statehood is a requirement (Kau, 1999, p. 16).

neighboring giant. Lee's cross-strait policies and shifting aspirations for Taiwan were carried out and further polarized by his successor Chen Shui-bian.

4.3 Growing tension under Chen Shui-bian

The election of Chen Shui-bian in the year 2000 marked a new phase of democratic progress and further shifts of national identity in Taiwan. This year is viewed by many as what Dafydd Fell (2012) declares a "democratic milestone" for the consolidation of democracy on the island for two key reasons (p. 75). Not only did this election represent a peaceful democratic transition of leaders, but also the first ever turnover of political parties since the arrival of the KMT to the island in 1949. The 2000 elections marked the beginning of two terms under the opposition Democratic Progressive Party President Chen Shui-bian, who like Lee, maintained a very controversial policy towards cross-strait relations and placed increasing prominence on the Taiwanization movement and the idea of sovereignty for the newly democratic Taiwan. Chu considers that with the "electoral victory of the DPP, the long-time opposition party that has adhered to a pro-independence platform since its founding years, the March 2000 presidential election dashed Beijing's lingering hope that its leaders might put the genie back into the "One China bottle" in the post-Lee Teng-hui era" (2004, p. 488). In spite of the most controversial aspects of Chen's leadership, of which there are many, this section will focus specifically on the effects which Chen's policies, especially relating to cross-strait issues, had on further democratization and national identity development in Taiwan, for as Lee states in 2010, the initial victorious response towards Chen's success at the polls "did not last very long" (p. 1). National identity and democracy experienced transitional shifts, both re-enforcing and compromising, through Chen's period of rule.

The Taiwanization movement which was initially promoted through Chiang Ching-kuo and Lee Deng-hui received an even greater thrust under the Chen administration. According to Jacobs in 2008, "The Taiwanization of politics reached a new climax in March 2000 when Chen Shui-bian, the candidate of the DPP, defeated the two main candidates of the divided Nationalist party and won presidency with a plurality

of votes (Jacobs, 2008, p. 50). During his time as President, Chen further deepened the cultural and historical concepts related to Taiwan, with policies integrating "Taiwanese" shifts into society to replace any previously taught and enforced Chinese practices: "The election of Chen Shui-bian in 2000 initiated new state efforts to promote a Taiwan identity. National funds have been redirected to support Taiwanese history and language education. Efforts to replace some China-oriented classes or class modules with Taiwan-based curriculum in public schools have caused quite a stir" (Stockton, 2008, p. 105).

Matsuda (2004) even relishes that Chen only managed to win his re-election through his support for Taiwanese identity and goes further to implore that "Chen Shui-bian has experienced, and his potential successors and opponents also witnessed, that Taiwanese identity was the ultimate weapon to win the election." (2004, p. 12). Stockton in 2008 records the larger strategy of Chen in his final term, in which the President vocally announced his promotion of policies promoting Taiwanese identity, or what he refers to as "Taiwanese consciousness," and democracy in his 2006 New Year address, stating that "democracy and Taiwan consciousness were vital to the country's security" (p. 106). Despite Chen's supposed commitment to democracy as "vital" to the country, the President's overbearing focus on ethnic identity, as well as other undemocratic practices are actually viewed by many as interfering with the process of consolidating democracy on the island.

Just as Chen in his eight years of rule went to great ends to promote the further integration of a local, "Taiwanese identity," so is this emphasis on Taiwanese ethnic identity, focusing on culture, history and language, argued to have alienated the ethnic issue and created friction which is believed to have slowed or obstructed the further democratic consolidation on the island, proof of negative effects which have also arisen from the deeply integrated relationship between national identity and democracy on the island. The Atlantic Bulletin discusses some of the negative effects of the Taiwanese identity movement on the political elite's promotion of democracy in Taiwan, writing that "The embedding into the political party system of conflicting perspectives on national identity and the broadening of public debate have made it harder to forge a consensus on national goals and policy, especially vis-à-vis the Mainland" (2003, p. 4)

It is clear that at this point in Taiwan's history, national identity and the democratic political system were already interdependent enough that issues and conflict of national identity during Chen's presidency came to be viewed as a threatening factor for the island's newly developing democracy. Aside from the very liberal views towards independent national identity, Chen's era of presidency is also believed to have dampened the consolidation phase of democracy with excessive corruption, among which includes vote-buying. This alone violates many of the core principles of democracy, beginning with the essential "free and fair elections." According to the American Bulletin (2003), although the buying of votes originally stemmed from the KMT, (it) began under Chen's rule to extend to the DPP (2003, p. 2). The American Bullet goes further to express that "Not only does electoral corruption and vote buying subvert the democratic process, it also fosters links between politicians and organized crime syndicates" (p. 2).

In the end, Chen's election as the first alternate political power to serve as president of Taiwan, although initially representing the further integration of democracy and Taiwanese consciousness on the island, appears to rather have presented an obstacle towards both the progression of national identity and democracy. The growing tension under Chen's rule caused by the intensity of the Taiwanization movement in light of growing cross-strait tensions not only failed to solidify a larger conception of national identity on the island, but is also believed by many scholars to have threatened the effectiveness and progress of democracy. It is clear at this point in Taiwan's recent history that by the year 2008, the notions of national identity and democracy were not only both equally engraved into political discourse, but also deeply resonated as important issues for the general population, and by the end of Chen's period had far from reached their full potential of development. The cycle of the intertwined relationship of democracy and national identity in Taiwan has consequently continued to progress through the latest President Ma Ying-jeou's first term and first half of his second term, arguably becoming even more clearly attached in response to the rising threat of China from increasing economic integration across the Strait.

4.4 Ma Ying-jeou's great transition in strategy

As current President Ma Ying-jeou stepped up to succeed the opposition party's two terms of rule, it became visible very early on that this transition of power represented a rapid reversal of policies in regards to cross-strait relations. Since his inauguration in 2008, Ma's administration has strongly shifted its strategy of national identity and democracy away from the trends previously promoted by his predecessors. In doing so, this leadership has managed to further highlight the distinct parallel which has developed between these two processes throughout history, especially in contrast to the growing economic investment across the Strait. Unlike the previous success of the political elite in guiding the development of democracy and national identity based on political strategies, the recent changes can be argued to be somewhat unexpected and divergent from the aspirations of the current political elite, which could be argued here in part to be due to the depth of this interdependent relationship that has been evolving for the past nearly fifty years. Ma's presidency and this latter period of development is predominately characterized by the growing economic integration which has rapidly risen across the Strait, and this growing economic dependence on the Mainland will be shown to be separate, and arguably contradictory, to the latest trends in the relationship among democracy and national identity.

Before investigating the effects of specific policies and incidents under Ma's period of rule, it is essential to outline the main motivation behind the drastic shift in cross-strait relations by providing a general illustration of the degree of economic exchange which had built up and then quickly progressed under the current administration. Despite the tense and at times hostile relationship with China under the Chen Shui-bian era, increasing economic exchanges across the Strait had already been expanding through Chen's presidency and soared in the past five years. Yun-han Chu writes that by 2003, "China accounted for about 27% of Taiwan's total exports, a historic record. Beyond this, Taiwanese companies held a total investment of at least US$70 billion in China, operating more than 60,000 projects and with more than half a million Taiwanese expatriates minding business on the mainland" (2004, 493). These numbers have been nearly doubled under Ma's China centered policy. As of 2010, over 40% of Taiwan's exports were directed to China along with 70% of Taiwan's FDI, and over a million Taiwanese businessmen, known as *taishang,* relocating there for business

opportunities (Muyard, 2012, p. 169). The increase in economic exchanges luring Taiwan closer to its giant neighbor across the Strait have raised many questions concerning the effects which this may have on the island, such as those posed here by Stéphane Corcuff in 2012:

> "To what extent will economic interests of Taiwanese businessmen override the Taiwanese national identities? Or will Taiwanese national identity dictate the path of economic integration with China? What is the role of the rising national identity in Taiwan in the emerging economic integration between China and Taiwan? Will economic integration lead to political unification?" (2012, p. 5).

In response to this line of questioning, Chow (2012) writes that "Democracy appears to reinforce a common Taiwanese identity… (and) although most Taiwanese support closer economic relations with China, they distinguish such policies from their Taiwanese identity" (p. 8-9). This section will therefore present the development of these processes throughout Ma's pro-China period of rule up to their current state, presenting the different voices expressing concern over China's growing influence while also contemplating the validity of these fears alongside the actual trends apparent on the island.

4.4.1 "Chaiwan"[11] forming under President Ma?

Ma Ying-jeou's "landslide" victory in 2008 of 58.45% of the popular vote (USC US-China Institute, 2011), aside from representing what Huntington refers to as the "second turnover" of power[12], a milestone in democratic consolidation (Rigger, 2011, p. 3), also

[11] The term "Chaiwan" has been suggested by those such as by Johnny Neihu of *The Taipei Times* to have been coined in 2007 by a South Korean paper called The Chosun Ilbo. "Chaiwan," although originally referred to in South Korea for the impending challenges which the growing relationship of China and Taiwan has on their competitive edge, this term has been adopted by many news agencies in Taiwan as well as both local and international scholars to represent the growing economic integration and its consequences to the future outcome of cross-strait relations in light of Taiwan's increasing economic dependence on the mainland. (schott.blogs.nytimes.com/2009/07/27/chaiwan/)

[12] The first turnover of power occurred in 2000, when the political opposition party the DPP, won the election for the first time since the KMT took rule in 1949. In 2008, the KMT reclaimed the political power

showed a shift in the response to the years of tension with China from Lee Deng-hui all the way through the two terms under Chen Shui-bian. According to Hwang (2012), the China policy was a top priority of President Ma Ying-jeou's agenda beginning from his official inauguration into office on May 20, 2008. Seeing that Ma received such an impressive proportion of the majority vote, it seems fair to assume that Ma's cross-strait policy was at this time also desired by the people as an alternative to the previous policies of the political elite from both parties (KMT and DPP) which resulted in tension across the Strait, however this interest has more recently appeared to have been overshadowed by the growing concern at the speed at which cross-strait relations have progressed. The rapid shift towards relations with China can be seen in Chow's (2012) breakdown of the island's cross-strait policy following Ma's inauguration:

> "After President Ma Ying-jeou took power as the president of Taiwan in May 2008, his party, the Nationalists or the Kuomintang, pursued rapprochement with Beijing by adopting a series of pro-China policies meant to enhance the relations across the Taiwan Strait. Direct flights were organized between China and Taiwan, investment ceilings were lifted to further liberalize Taiwan's trade with and investment in China, and fifteen trade pacts with China were signed…Among the latter, the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) of June 2010" (p. 99).

Although this can be regarded as a list of accomplishments in terms of Ma's rapprochement strategy with Beijing, it is viewed by many academics and citizens alike as a threat to Taiwan's established autonomy and growing distinct national identity.

Since Ma Ying-jeou first took office, the issue of regressing or declining democratic practices due to the growing influence of the "China Factor" in Taiwan has arisen, with the earliest critique coming during Ma's first year in office in the course of a visit from top Beijing officials. Scholars such as Rigger (2011) and Corcuff (2012) have written about the questionable actions during this official visit which impeded on Taiwanese peoples' democratic rights in order to consent to and appease the Beijing

---

of the island through Ma Ying-jeou's election, concluding the second official turnover of ruling political parties on the island.

government. Shelley Rigger in 2011 discusses the reaction of Ma's mentor, Cohen, from the president's studies in the United States. Cohen characterized some police actions towards the demonstrators as "brutality" and discussed the limitation of people's speech at this time. Cohen criticized authorities not allowing Taiwan or Tibetan flags to be shown in order to avoid offending the Chinese as going "beyond the limits of a free society."

Corcuff in 2012 described the incident as a "serious attack of the freedom of speech in Taiwan" (p. 99). Corcuff goes further to pronounce the political elites' handling of the situation as "self-renouncement to sovereignty" (2012, p. 99), which not only had been a strongly pursued principle under previous presidents in this era but is also in ways strongly connected to the democratic political system in Taiwan, especially as it is distinct from the PRC's government and communist rule. This confrontation between Ma's extreme pro-China policy, which was clearly immediately implemented, and the progress of democratic consolidation on the island seemed to exhibit conflicting interests, and as Chow in 2012 writes, "Though détente with a regime that had been denying Taiwan's sovereignty reduced tensions on the Taiwan Strait, many observers concerned the sustainability of a self-governing Taiwan recklessly integrating and normalizing relation with its neighbor across the strait had caused much apprehension among the Taiwanese people" (Chow, 2012, p. 4).

The greatest of initiatives increasing cross-strait interaction which has occurred under Ma's presidency, and which has attracted great international attention, is the signing of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA) in July 2010, which Peter C.Y. Chow labels as the "the most significant in the drive toward economic integration between the two economies" (2012, p. 4). The ECFA can be best described as a framework agreement for limited free trade and investment across the Strait, "with tariff cuts for the "early harvest" list of products starting in January 2011" (Muyard, 2012, p. 175). With Taiwan's inability to embark on FTAs with other countries and this risk of being "left behind" in the increasing global trend of FTAs, President Ma's ruling party promoted this strategy as essential to the island's economic recovery (Corcuff, 2012). Although the signing of this initial framework agreement between Taiwan and China, the

first of its kind, can be viewed as a highlight of Ma's Beijing rapprochement strategy, the details and processes underlying the 2010 signing have been criticized by many scholars as to the validity of its democratic procedure, questioning Ma's influence on further democratic consolidation of institutions and political practices during his presidency and therefore also leaving open the question as to whether Taiwan's democratic system is at risk.

Many works and articles published in the last few years such as those by Wu (2012), Rigger (2010, 2011), Danielson (2012), Muyard (2012), have all disclosed anxiety towards the political motivation behind the signing of the ECFA, and more worryingly, the democratic validity of the document. According to a report published by the Taiwan News in 2010, "On the democracy front, the public and the opposition party, DPP, had not been informed about the ECFA negotiations until it was signed." Danielson comments that "The negotiations between SEF and the ARATS ran in parallel with private meetings between the KMT and the Chinese Communist party, which included cross-strait policy topics" (2012, p. 144). Danielson goes further to write that "Two attempts to hold a referendum on ECFA have been blocked by the KMT-controlled Referendum Review Committee, despite the fact that a majority of the population supports a referendum," and it seems that the secrecy and monopolization over the signing process and discussions controlled by the KMT "run(s) counter to normal procedures in a democratic society where openness and debate are pivotal for the development of policymaking" (2012, p. 144). Jau-yuan Hwang in 2012 remarks on the legality concerning the democratic management of the ECFA, explaining that "in the formal sense, the ECFA was the first such agreement to be deliberated and approved by Taiwan's Legislative Yuan before entering into force. However, the current legal mechanism governing legislative supervision over the cross-straits agreements has been incomplete and ineffective" (Chow, 2012, p. 6).

Although Ma has been very successful in his pledge to rapidly appease and normalize cross-strait relations, the institution of the ECFA in 2010 followed by its means of regulation seem to have strayed away from further embedding democratic institutionalization on the island. This is not to say that the recent discrepancies in

democratic procedures will result in the island reverting back to authoritarian rule, however fear has been expressed over the most recent mistreatment of the democratic political system by the political elite of both the KMT and DPP and the impact which this could have not only on the island's current sovereignty, but also on national identity, especially in light of the island's increasing economic dependence on the mainland. Danielson expresses just such anxiety in his excerpt in Peter Chow's 2012 book, writing that "…a continued deterioration in Taiwan's democracy may have a significant impact on Taiwan's identity by limiting plurality in debate, dialogue, and education, which was the catalyst for the democracy in the first place" (Danielson, 2012, p. 136). Ma's policy towards national identity has also run counter to the previously promoted localization of Taiwanese identity, rather returning to the KMT's earlier strategy of instigating a greater Chinese consciousness in order to help implement his pro-China policies.

The recent dilemma caused by Ma's active "pro-China" policies and the great consequences which it could have on Taiwan's future seem to accentuate the corresponding relationship which over the years has developed between democracy and national identity development on the island and have left these two processes now more mutually interdependent than ever. Chow in 2012 writes that "Democracy appears to reinforce a common Taiwanese identity because the democratic debate in Taiwan is focused on concrete political issues in Taiwan that require Taiwanese solutions. Although most Taiwanese support closer economic relations with China, they distinguish such policies from their Taiwanese identity" (Chow, 2012, p. 8). It is reported that while campaigning for president, Ma was noted to have stuck to the "Taiwan centered" identity which had been promoted over the past two decades, however once in office, Ma switched to advocating "ROC Chinese Nationalism" (Muyard, 2012, p. 174). If one merely analyzes the policies which Ma Ying-jeou has enacted in regards to shifting national identity on the island, the motivations are clearly aligned with his strong China policies.

President Ma Ying-jeou signaled the direction of his national identity policy when he in his inaugural speech in 2008, chose to address the people of Taiwan as *zhonghwa minzu* which translates to "ethnic Chinese," instead of the more all-encompassing term

huaren (Danielson, 2012, p. 143). Further signs of President Ma's clear shift in promoting a return to peoples' Chinese roots can be seen in the events which he has highlighted during his presidency as well as changes which he has made to areas such as school curriculum and official government titles. One event which triggered a shift in policy came with the president "presiding over a ceremony honoring the Yellow Emperor, the mythical ancestor of all Han Chinese, moving focus from the Taiwan-centric traditions to pan-Chinese practices" (Turton, 2009). Michael Danielson (2012) reports that the KMT not only "suggested an increased focus on Chinese culture by doubling the teaching time for Chinese history (Focus Taiwan, 2010)," but following Ma's election, they also "initiated the reversal of many of President Chen's concrete achievements by altering the name of the postal service to China Post, and by renaming the National Democratic Memorial back to Chiang Kai-shek's Memorial Hall" (p. 642). The policies under the current President Ma Ying-jeou related to both Taiwan's democracy and national identity have been more focused on the larger goal of achieving rapprochement with China through economic integration. On paper, this most recent development seems to be detrimental to the progression of the two essential processes outlined in this thesis. It is valid that the drastic changes in political strategy have alarmed enough people to promote a number of concerned articles and books addressing the matter, however the actual scenario proves contradictory to the economic parallel of cross-strait relations.

Danielson (2012) very plainly states, "Taiwan appears to be moving toward a common Taiwan identity despite the rapid rapprochement between Taiwan and China through cross-strait trade agreements and a closer relationship between China's Communist party and Taiwan's government party, the KMT" (Danielson, 2012, p. 135). Although the warning signs all lead one to believe that the national identity on the island is heading towards a more Sinicized, Chinese identity and a possible absorption of democracy under the Mainland's communist rule, the general consensus speaks otherwise. According to Danielson, "Democracy appears to strengthen a common Taiwanese identity because the democratic debate in Taiwan is focused on concrete political issues that require Taiwanese solutions" (2012, p. 36). Muyard writes that "Neither Ma's return to the old ROC and KMT Chinese ideology nor the PRC propaganda have much traction among the majority of the Taiwanese" (2012, p. 176).

Danielson discusses the paradoxical relationship which has developed between national identity and the democratic political ideals alongside the increasing economic exchange with China, allowing for the contradictions between the two: “The rise of the Taiwanese identity may be explained by a trend that is largely independent of economic and political initiatives of the current government, and rather as argued above is reinforced by Taiwan’s democracy” (Danielson, 2012, p. 144). The development of national identity and democracy seem to have, through their historical lineage as represented here, maintained a mutually influential relationship which in the current cross-strait scenario presents a significant challenge to the pressures from China. The next chapter will provide a more in-depth and complete representation through survey and focus group data to further support the analysis of the recent progress and status of Taiwanese national identity and democracy on the island and their continued and influential connection.

Chapter 5

The voice of the people: a presentation of survey and focus group data

5.1 Analysis of relevant quantitative data

Since the studies of national identity and democracy gained greater popularity amongst the domestic scholarly community in Taiwan, multiple organizations have arisen alongside individual projects largely focusing on recording the development of these processes through the means of survey data. These institutions have provided valuable resources in regards to comparing the political and social transformations through defining moments in Taiwan's history through to the present. The Election Study Center (ESC) of National Chengchi University in Taipei Taiwan was officially established in January of 1989 by Professors Lei and Chen (National Chengchi University, 2006). The data gathered through these surveys tracking the distribution of important political attitudes on the island has served as the research base for many scholars exploring the topic. Also crucial for tying together this study of democratization and Taiwanization in the more recent phase is the research gathered by Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS). This election survey data system was launched in the year 2000 and has since promoted academic cooperation on the island as well as provided large-scale data based on face-to-face election surveys (Taiwan Elections and Democratization Study).

These resources along with other more minor projects on the topic will be referenced not only to display the historic relationship between democratization and Taiwanization, but also to analyze the most recent trends which emphasize the continuing changes occurring in the field. The general trends which are visible from these sets of quantitative data include the growth in Taiwanese national identity, the desire of the population to maintain their status quo as opposed to unification or independence, and the decreasing satisfaction of the general population towards the country's maturing democracy. These trends in data will be analyzed in connection with their linkage to the historical discussion above and the different events and policies promoted by the political elite influencing these shifts in society and politics on the island.

In regards to the recent trend of national identity progression in Taiwan as viewed by the individuals on the island, the ESC has conducted survey data over the past twenty one years which gives tremendous insight into the drastic development of national identity leading up to the present day. Table 1 below is the ESC study recording the changes in Taiwanese and Chinese identity in Taiwan since 1992 based on people's responses to the following question: "In our society, there are some people who call themselves 'Taiwanese,' some who call themselves 'Chinese,' and some who call themselves both. Do you consider yourself to be 'Taiwanese,' 'Chinese,' or both?" (Core Political Attitudes Trend Chart, Election Study Center, National Cheng Chi University) The interviewees were given the choice to respond Taiwanese, Chinese, or both Taiwanese and Chinese[13], and the responses for the year 2011 vary drastically from those in the early to mid-1990s.

At the start of this study, prior to the island's official achievement of democracy, 46% of the population chose dual identity, relating to being both Taiwanese and Chinese, while 25% of the people related to being Chinese and only 17% of the population viewed themselves as Taiwanese. The immediate effects of the early cross-strait policies and incidents on the general public are undeniable in Table 1, the first of which can be seen following the Taiwan Missile Crisis of 1995-1996. The percentage of people defining themselves as Taiwanese rose 5% from 1994 to 1995 and a total of nearly 17% from 1992 to 1997 reaching 34% of the population. Taiwanese identity in response to the 1995-1996 Taiwan Missile Crisis surpassed the number of people who defined themselves as Chinese which in 1997 only amounted to 19% of the population. The number of those choosing dual identity even experienced a sharp drop from 1996 to 1997 of almost 10%. This witnesses the first time Taiwanese identity was seen surpassing Chinese identity, and this trend has only continued through to the present, showing the strong, effect which China's threatening tactic had on further distinguishing Taiwanese people apart from their Chinese counterparts. The year 1996 also marks the year during which Taiwan officially transitioned to a democratic political system, with the popular presidential election of President Lee Deng-hui. This milestone can also be viewed as

[13] The concept of dual identity, being both Taiwanese and Chinese, became a popular choice in regards to national identity on Taiwan in the late 1990s and through the early 21st century (Chang and Wang, 2005).

promoting the freedom to choose a national identity and no longer being legally bound to claim Chinese national identity, as well as a factor politically differentiating the two sides of the Strait. The policies of President Lee through the late 1990s with his promotion of Taiwanization and his "New Taiwan movement" beginning in 1998 can be attributed as factors influencing the continued rise in Taiwanese national identity from 36% in 1998 to 39% in 1999.

The rapid period of democratization culminating in the successful achievement of democracy on the island can be clearly viewed amid a decreasing Chinese identity and increasing Taiwanese identity, which continued through Chen Shui-bian's very pro-Taiwan eight years in office. However despite the efforts towards greater Taiwanization of the island, the majority of Taiwan's first DPP President Chen Shui-bian's two terms as president witnesses only a very gradual rise in Taiwanese identity, with the majority consensus on identity for the most part continuing to lean towards dual identity. Chen's period as president exhibits an equal proportion of declining Chinese and rising Taiwanese identity. It seems that under President Chen's government, as discussed in the historical analysis, the focus on ethnic identity and friction across the Strait was more detrimental than it was beneficial to both the quality of democracy and the localization of identity. However alongside the differing ethnic identities remained the civic identity which had emerged in the 1980s. The people on the island were therefore able to, although defining themselves as ethnically different, still be able to relate politically to their territory Taiwan, governed under a democratic political system. This allows everyone the right to express their multiple, diverging identities, leading to the continued majority of the population relating to dual identity during this period.

One of the most interesting transitions which can be viewed in Table 1 is the shift in national identity following the 2008 election of current President Ma Ying-jeou. Ma's election represented not only the return of the KMT to power but also the restoration of a pro-China leadership, in which Cross-strait relations as elaborated in the above section very quickly and overtly shifted in favor of befriending the island's giant neighbor. As the economic exchange and integration across the strait rapidly increased it was assumed by many scholars that logically, so would the national identity and political disposition on the island veer towards China and unification. Wu (2010) refers in this light to the

"integration and spillover paradigm," which predicts that the strategy of economic integration should gradually lead to a "'spill over' effect, manipulating other facets of society including, in Taiwan's case, national identity and political sovereignty" (p. 7). However one glance at the results in Table 1 shows that the integration and spillover paradigm clearly does not apply, at least not yet, to Taiwan's case. The year 2008 actually marked a drastic shift favoring Taiwanese identity over dual identity, in which Taiwanese national identity rose nearly 5% to a majority of the population while dual identity declined to 43% and Chinese identity remained at a low 4%. Since then, through Ma's increasing efforts to promote Chinese culture on the island, Taiwanese identity has continued to increase to nearly 60% of the population, with Chinese identity having continued its decline to now represent fewer than 4% of the population.

Table 1



This data is distinctly contradictory to earlier assumptions that under a KMT government, especially alongside such pro-China policies as have been implemented over the past five years, the majority of the population would revert back to the previously imposed Chinese identity. This visual representation of the identity sentiment on the island throughout this recent historical period reiterates the previously mentioned conjecture that in the case of Taiwan, the strong complementary development of democracy and Taiwanese national identity seem to run contrary to the economic integration across the Strait. It therefore seems that at this present moment in time, there is little indication that national identity will veer towards a Chinese identity in the immediate future. The status of national identity, with a majority of the population strongly viewing themselves as Taiwanese and 40% still viewing themselves as both Taiwanese and Chinese indicates that the current status of national identity, although ethnically still varying, has recently achieved a type of harmony or common understanding under the majority of the population's desire to preserve their sovereignty and control their democratic political system. Danielson in 2012 writes that, "Despite this difference in the perception of the two groups' identity in a possible future Taiwanese common identity, both groups agree that a decision about Taiwan's future has to be decided by the Taiwanese themselves" (Danielson, 2012, p. 146). This democratic motivation which unites the Taiwanese people despite their differing ethnic national identities is further clarified in the second ESC survey presented below.

In their survey study on *Changes in the Unification-Independent Stances of Taiwanese*, which can be seen in Table 2, the ESC offers seven options for those being interviewed, including 'unification as soon as possible,' 'independence as soon as possible,' and 'maintain the status quo' either indefinitely, to decide at a later date, or to eventually lead to either unification or independence. This dissertation will not aim to address the complex controversy of independence vs. unification, however will analyze this data in regards to the implications that it has towards democratic practices and changing national identities on the island. In terms of Taiwan's democracy and national identity, independence would offer the people on the island the means to maintain their political sovereignty and Taiwanese identity, whereas unification would threaten both the people's freedom in expressing any identity aside from Chinese identity as well as their

current democratic system and rights. For the most part, the majority of Taiwanese have responded that they prefer to 'maintain the status quo, decide at a later date,' which Chow analyzes as showing that the people in Taiwan "prefer to maintain the "status quo" so as to enjoy their freedom and democracy rather than be annexed with China and its authoritarian regime" (p. 5). Under Chen Shui-bian's early years of presidency, there was an increase in Taiwanese wishing to maintain the status quo and decide at a later date and a decrease in those wishing to maintain the status quo indefinitely, however this trend gradually reversed during his two terms as president and the most unexpected shift, just as in the identity survey, can be witnessed in the most recent transition to and throughout Ma's presidency.

Table 2



One of the very noticeable trends visible in Table 2 occurs between 2007 and 2008, continuing to the present day, in which an overall shift in the peoples' preferences towards Taiwan's future is visible, and again emphasizes the reality which challenges the

expected shift towards unification. In fact, the number of Taiwanese expressing an interest in immediate unification has remained below 2% since Chen Shui-bian's second term as president. The most dramatic change however which takes place following 2007, leading up to Ma's election, is the steep incline of participants wishing to 'maintain the status quo indefinitely," and a gradual increase in those wanting to 'maintain the status quo, move towards independence' alongside a steady decrease in the majority view to 'maintain the status quo, decide at a later date.' The percentage of Taiwanese choosing the option to 'maintain the status quo indefinitely' increased from 18.4% to 26.2% between 2007 and 2009, and despite a nearly 1% decline in 2010, the year in which ECFA was signed, this option has since then continued to rise approaching the falling majority choice to 'maintain status quo, decide at a later date.' This shifting resolution to maintain Taiwan's "status quo" can be seen at least in part to be a product of the political sovereignty which has become ingrained in the political culture following the island's ascent to democracy, resulting in less willingness among the people to give this freedom up.

In interviews of Taiwanese college students in 2010, Rodgers recorded that "87.8% reject Taiwan as a part of China and 91.6% of the Chinese group[14] supports that only citizens of the Republic of China should decide Taiwan's future" (Danielson, 2012, p. 147). A recent trend in survey data has attempted to take away the difficult polarity in the independence vs. unification debate by asking participants under the best of circumstances, which they would prefer. For example, in the data set presented in Table 3 collected from the Global Views Survey Research Center between 2004-2011, Muyard (2012) presents the responses of Taiwanese citizens to unification if the political and social differences were less significant, with participants choosing either "No Need to Unify if both sides have similar conditions" or "Agree to Unification if both sides have similar conditions." The results show an overall increase of nearly 29% with 67% of respondents now believing that even with similar conditions on both sides of the strait, unification is not wanted. This is paired alongside a simultaneous decrease in agreement

[14] In his working paper, Rodgers separates his study into analyzing the different political responses from students claiming Taiwanese ethnic national identity and Chinese ethnic national identity, showing that despite claiming a Chinese ethnic identity, most college-aged students are still against unification with mainland China.

to the latter question, with the most recent poll showing only 12.8% of people agreeing to unification under the best of cirucmstances. Therefore it is not only the deeply developed national identity, but also the strong attachment to democratic sovereignty which creates obstacles for the KMT and Beijing in promoting cross-strait relations towards any form of unification.

Table 3. Surveys on Unification under Similar Level of Political and Economic Development, 2004–2011 (in %)

	No need to unify if both sides have similar conditions	**Agree to unification if both sides have similar conditions**
2004 May	38.2	35.9
2005 March	50.3	24.7
2006 February	51.6	25.6
2008 September	66.3	16.2
2009 May	69.9	12.0
2009 October	68.3	11.7
2010 March	65.5	15.3
2010 July	66.1	12.1
2010 December	67.8	12.1
2011 April	67.1	12.8

Table © F. Muyard 2011. Source: Global Views Survey Research Center, "Survey on President Ma Ying jeou's Approval Rating and People's Views on the Unification-Independence Issue," April 25, 2011. http://www.gvm.com.tw/gvsrc/eng/index.asp.

Despite the survey results from ESC, Rodgers, and Muyard that suggest that the democratic base remains strong in Taiwanese society as an influential factor guiding peoples' views towards the future political status of the island, the literature review under the historical analysis shows an increasing amount of anxiety which has recently grown over a believed decline in democratic consolidation in Taiwan. Though a greater "civic consciousness" or "civic identity" has been attributed as a predominant identity which flourished through and supported the democratization process, and is also seen by Almond and Verba as essential to sustaining democracy, it is feared by many scholars that the recent development of civic society in Taiwan has weakened. This alongside the slowing of democratic consolidation as promoted among the recent leadership can lead one to conclude that Taiwan's democracy is clearly not fully consolidated and is possibly in danger. J.W. Garver remarks that "It is too easy for people raised and living in stable democracies to forget that history is littered with democracies that proved incapable of

meeting the challenges confronting them" (2011, p. 5). To verify and discount some of these fears and their viability it is important to acknowledge relevant data such as that presented by TEDS which helps to review the efficiency and recent status of democracy on the island. TEDS has conducted surveys asking a variety of questions surrounding the issue of democracy as it functions in Taiwan today and the general affinity which people on the island hold towards a democratic political system, which help to better determine the current status of democracy on the island today.

According to Almond and Verba's theoretical discourse on civic culture, citizens hold either a "parochial," "subject," or "participant" role in society, depending on their level of political involvement, and these roles are viewed as essential in analyzing the efficiency of a democratic political system. The people in Taiwan have shown to have a high "subject competence," in which the citizen understands his/her rights under the rules, and a fairly low participant or "citizen competence," meaning confidence in his/her ability to influence politics (p.169). TEDS data shows that in 2008, while 46% of voters believed that they 'have a say' in government decisions, 40% of voters also believed that 'public officials don't care much about what people like me think." In addition, 59% of voters agreed that politics are 'too complicated' for them to understand, showing that the majority of Taiwanese voters don't believe themselves to be 'participants' in the political system, yet rather sit comfortably in the seat of the 'subject'.

The data in Table 4 poses the question "How much of a democracy is Taiwan today?" and illustrates the discontent which the people of Taiwan have most recently felt towards the status of their country's democracy. Despite Taiwan fulfilling the requirements of a fully consolidated democracy as previously outlined by the theories of Huntington and Diamond, as of 2008, only 7.9% of the population believed Taiwan to be a full democracy. Table 4 shows that 37.4% of respondents believe Taiwan to be a democracy with minor problems while 41.2% believe Taiwan's democracy to still have major problems. These statistics initially seem quite worrying, however below 4% of the people deny that Taiwan is a democracy, therefore despite peoples' discontent with the recent political leadership, they still believe that the system is democratic enough to be called a democracy. Diamond's definition (1999) for what constitutes a consolidated democracy emphasizes that a democracy is successfully consolidated once there is no

political rhetoric strongly preaching against it, which is currently and has been for some time, the case for Taiwan. Despite the issues which people have with the way in which the democratic system is functioning in their country today, the mass majority of the Taiwanese people still believe that Taiwan is a democracy and people would not care so deeply about the functions of their democracy unless they had strong feelings towards their democracy. Therefore the general populations' discontent with Taiwan's democratic system can actually be viewed to be a strong influence over peoples' assessments.

Table 4. How much of a democracy is Taiwan today?

A full democracy	7.2 %
A democracy with minor problems	37.4%
A democracy with major problems	41.2%
Not a democracy	3.9%

Note: Percentages do not total to 100 because "Don't know" and "Refuse to answer" are not included.
Source: ETDS 2008. N=1,238

In another TEDS survey found in Table 5, participants were asked "Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan today?" and the results are actually very similar to the peoples' general review of democracy in Taiwan, in which 34.8% responded that they are "fairly satisfied" with the current status of democracy on the island, comparable to the 37.4% from the previous survey believing Taiwan's democracy has minor problems, and then 42.4% stated that they are "not very satisfied" with the island's current democracy, which one can link to the 41.2% who view Taiwan's democracy as having 'major problems'. However peoples' frustration with the current status of democracy on the island is not necessarily a sign of the deterioration of a democratic political system. Shelley Rigger (2011) argues that "Dissatisfaction with the performance of one's democratic government could indicate a desire for a better democracy, not an inclination to backslide toward authoritarianism" (p. 13). J.W. Garver also writes in 2011 of the intense pride which the people of Taiwan have felt and continue to feel towards their democratic political system (p. 4). However Shelley also warns that "If the government's performance does not improve, support for democracy in principle could deteriorate even further" (Rigger, 2011, p. 14).

Table 5. Overall, how satisfied are you with the way democracy works in Taiwan today?

Very satisfied	3.4%
Fairly satisfied	34.8%
Not very satisfied	42.4%
Not at all satisfied	6.9%

Note: Percentages do not total to 100 because "Don't know" and "Refuse to answer" are not included
Source: TEDS 2008. N=1,238

With the majority of the population desiring to maintain a democracy[15] and the statistics provided above which support the claims of the importance which democratic sovereignty has in peoples' views towards their own identities, it appears that despite the slowing of democratic consolidation in Taiwan in the recent years, the notion of democracy continues to be supported by the people of the island: "Still, many indicators suggest democratic values are strong in Taiwan. Turnout for elections routinely exceeds 75 percent of eligible voters; the percentage of Taiwanese who favor a political party is also increasing" (Rigger, 2011, p. 14). It appears at the moment that despite the roles which the political elite has played in recently slowing the process of democratic consolidation, the strength of the democratic principles absorbed in society through the years of democratization in the 1980s and 1990s have been retained amid peoples' identities. It can also be argued here that the means in which democracy allows the people of Taiwan to identify themselves on the island despite ethnic differences is currently proving to be an obstacle to pressures both domestically and internationally to unite with China.

This data more clearly presents and further emphasizes the connections between the most recent historical events and their influence on the relationship between democratization and development of a 'civic' national identity. The above survey data is also useful in that it traces the aforementioned interdependent processes to their current status, and analysis of these charts clearly shows that both the state of democratization and national identity are not static, but rather are still fluid and interconnected with one

[15] TEDS, 2008

another. Democratization seems to be consolidated in Taiwan as there exists "a vibrant political system, complete with freedom of speech, association and assembly, rule of law, and a competitive and fair multiparty elections that enable the island's citizens to choose and change their rulers" (Garver, 2011, p. 4). Yet at the same time, the government's promotion of the peoples' freedom has come under questioning due to the recent shifts in policy aiming to appease China. 'Ethnic issues' in Taiwan are also still a subject of concern as confusion over national identity seems to still be looming over Taiwanese society and impacting the efficiency of the democratic system. Although the majority of citizens in Taiwan are now able to label themselves as Taiwanese, what it is to be *Taiwanese* is still unclear. People seem to still be torn between their ethnic ancestry and their current culture and citizenship, and therefore an agreed upon desire for Taiwan's future status alongside the mainland also remains unclear.

The selection of quantitative data provided above has served to offer a basic comparison between the literature addressing the issues of democracy and national identity and the recorded perspectives from the people on the island as the two processes have developed in Taiwan in the last eighteen years. In order to further subsidize this statistical data and provide greater understanding behind the responses of the individuals in the surveys, this thesis will now turn to qualitative data gathered from Professor Su-feng Cheng in her focus group data which was collected in 2009. This will return the dissertation to its qualitative approach, in which evidence from a small portion of personal interviews conducted by Professor Cheng will aid in clarifying the rationale behind responses to more sensitive questions such as those about national identity and the relationship which innately exists between national identity and democracy and how this guides peoples' responses to the sensitive issues regarding cross-strait relations.

5.2 Focus group data

This dissertation will now turn to examine in greater detail the reasoning underlying the responses to similar questions and concerns addressed in the quantitative data above, however with a deeper insight into the motivations behind participants' responses. For example, whether people view themselves as Taiwanese, Chinese or both, followed by

what exactly is implied by these different nationalities. This data also presents the similar inquiry as to whether people would prefer independence, unification, or status quo and how democracy currently stands on the island. The responses found here will more comprehensively clarify the current views in Taiwan in regards to national identity and democracy as well as verifying the influence which these issues have on one another. The data presented in this paper is from Professor Su-feng Cheng's focus group project in 2009 on *Taiwan Identity: Its Formation, Typology and Political Implications (I*[1617]*).* The four focus groups analyzed in this study were separated based on political party and city of residence, however since this dissertation is not addressing the complex issue regarding party politics on the island, party allegiance will be mentioned alongside certain responses, however this will not be a significant focus of the analysis. The responses gathered from this venture come from participants ranging from mid-40 to mid-70 years old, and will aid in providing greater detail into the motivations behind the perspectives of the local participants.

The first topic addressed in Cheng's focus group has to do with the issue of identity, first asking how the participants view not only 'our nationality,' 'Chinese nationality,' and 'Taiwanese nationality,' but then asking if they believe themselves to be Chinese, Taiwanese, or both Chinese and Taiwanese. The survey data from Table 1 demonstrates the increase in 'dual identity' seen throughout the 1990s, with its continued high percentage only paralleled with the now majority Taiwanese identity, and this focus group data helps clarify the reasons behind peoples' decision to choose both Taiwanese and Chinese identity. To begin with, no participants, from either the KMT or DPP political parties, chose to identify themselves as Chinese. While a small portion of the respondents identified themselves as Taiwanese, the majority of the people whose responses are being interpreted here claimed dual identity, largely in order to separate these two identities towards different facets of their lives.

The reasoning given by the respondents specifically in regards to the questions of identity relates heavily to the discussion in the second chapter on ethnicity being a factor in the earlier years of national identity formation, and political, civic tendencies taking

[16] The original data is all recorded in Chinese, so the references used in this paper were personally translated.

[17] Only a portion of the total available data is being analyzed for the purpose of this dissertation

over in the more recent progression, resulting in the prominence of both of these forms of identity. The majority of participants, despite how strongly they leaned towards being Taiwanese or both Taiwanese and Chinese, admitted to having 'Chinese blood.' One female respondent stated that as she believed the ROC to have disappeared with Taiwan in its place, the 'bloodline' is what connects Taiwan to China (p.6). Another female contributor of sixty years of age described here her belief in the relationship between Taiwanese and Chinese: "Although we come from the same root, we are separated into different branches." This same participant explains that when young, "we learned how to introduce ourselves based on ethnicity – Han (Chinese) / Minnan (Taiwanese) – but that is very different from now." Although some participants from the KMT group placed less emphasis on grand differences between being Taiwanese and Chinese, all seven members of this group referred to a historical relation with the idea of being 'Chinese,' either due to ancestry, current involvement with business in China, or actually being born there, while at the same time making a distinction between a more current status as Taiwanese, since Taiwan is where they live and have grown up. One interviewee reflected on the change within himself, saying that 'before I thought I was Chinese, but now I'm thinking more that I'm Taiwanese.'

One section of the interview asked the participants to describe the differences between 'Chinese people' and 'Taiwanese people,' and many interesting distinctions were elaborated on by the participants from all groups, in a large part stemming from political and cultural differences, as well as blatant territorial reasoning. A number of people from both the DPP and KMT groups, such as Mr. Lin (林先生), mentioned the difference in passports issued by the different countries, and how these passports, that of the PRC and the ROC, are treated differently in different countries, representing an internationally recognized distinction between the two nationalities. Others commented on the different economies of the two countries, arguing that Taiwan's economy progressed earlier and under different circumstances and obstacles, resulting in key differences across the strait. Also in regards to *taishang* (台商) and their business experiences with the Chinese, one participant noted the disparity between the quality of Taiwanese and Chinese products, as well as the different ways in which the people across the Strait conduct business as clear signals of cultural distinctions between the

nationalities. One female participant also expressed that politically, "the Taiwanese are more proactive, while the Chinese depend on the communist party." Although democracy is not directly mentioned here, it appears clear that she is differentiating between the varied political systems on either side of the Strait, preferring the democratic culture and ideals which differentiate the Taiwanese from the Chinese. This leads us into the distinction made by many respondents between the two countries separated politically and territorially, most relevant since the ROC and PRC went their separate ways.

A common and most basic response seen by most of the attendees to the question of the difference between 'Chinese' and 'Taiwanese' was simply that "Taiwanese are people from Taiwan, (and) Chinese are people from China". In the group of DPP members, a clear distinction was made by one member stating that 'ethnicity and country' are not the same, and as she then went on to identify with her country, Taiwan, it seems clear that she values her country as the overwhelming factor in defining her nationality, despite ethnic ties to China. Furthermore, a number of participants described the distinct factor differentiating between Chinese and Taiwanese on a historic level, using the arrival of the ROC to Taiwan in 1949 as their divide between 'then' and 'now.' One of the men in a DPP group even stressed the difference between two different words used to describe Chinese people, making a distinction between '*dalu ren*,' which literally translates to 'big land people' and refers to the people living in China as the PRC, and '*zhongguo ren*,' translating to 'middle country people,' which as implied by this participant refers to the people living in China as the historical and ethnic origin from which Taiwanese peoples' ancestors emigrated to Taiwan. This again emphasizes the historical and cultural relationship which Taiwanese may feel towards their Chinese heritage, yet the new political differences which seem to further separate the two nationalities.

In an interview with Professor Su-feng Cheng, she expressed that from her experience in interviewing Taiwanese on the subject of national identity she has seen a pattern of a distinguished separation among people between cultural and political views towards 'Taiwanese' and 'Chinese'. In the 2009 focus group, most of the DPP supporters expectedly expressed distrust towards unification with China. A male in the group mentioned the amount of missiles aimed at Taiwan, while a female expressed her concern that if Taiwan were to unify with China, the people and government as they exist today

would lose everything, again emphasizing the importance of the democratic sovereignty as reason alone for the people on the island to object to unification. Another of the female group members even explained that she recognized the transformation in China's strategy towards Taiwan, from aggressive pressure to the 'soft power' seen today, and although many of these participants voiced an ideal desire for independence under the condition that they could retain peaceful, friendly relations with Beijing, they all recognized the complexity of the political relations with China and therefore for the most part, the participants chose 'maintain status quo'.

The qualitative data gathered for this research has provided an expansive and detailed representation of the status of national identity and its relationship with democracy in Taiwan today. It is clear through the charts prepared by the ESC that national identity in Taiwan is consistently changing and that politics on the island are still evolving. Professor Cheng's interviews further support this claim as people have shown to be aware of their own transformations during Taiwan and China's recent progressions. There does not yet seem to be a consensus on Taiwan's future and a solution to the issue of unification and independence is too complex for citizens to believe they have the power to affect it. Yet underlying the incertitude of Taiwanese on a solution to the country's status seems to be an overwhelming belief in the peoples' separation from Chinese, as one participant in Cheng's research stated, "On the outside we don't address the issue of country, but in our hearts, we are independent."

5.3 Concluding remarks

The most recent period of democratic and national identity development in Taiwan has resulted in great shifts throughout the different periods of leadership and changing relations across the Strait. Following the official achievement of democracy on the island, the priorities of the political elite have greatly shifted due to the China factor and each president's strategy towards the impending pressure from across the Strait. Each of the political transitions which occurred during this final era of Taiwan's history represents a breakthrough for Taiwan's democracy and democratic consolidation, from the first popular presidential elections to the first peaceful turnover of political parties, followed by the second peaceful political turnover returning power to the KMT. Amid

these phases of democratic consolidation, much of which persisted with the promotion of "Taiwanese" national identity, this timeline displays the effects of Cross-Strait relations on the political elites' policies and how the different strategies of handling the "China factor" played large roles in influencing the paths of the continued development of democracy and national identity to the present day, providing greater overall obstacles to the continued progression of these processes, leading to a final assessment in regards to the current status of these two processes, which is that they are not complete or static, but remain to be further developed and strengthened.

The overall trends under President Lee and Chen seemed in large part to continue to spring from the groundwork laid by the former leader Chiang Ching-kuo, with the issues of democracy and national identity and their relationship being magnified down the line in contrast to the actions of and pressures from the mainland. It appears that as economic integration and reliance across the Taiwan Strait increased, the growing economic ties with China diverged away from the domestic paths of democratic progress and national identity formation, creating a contradictory parallel between the primarily economic cross-strait relations and the intertwined domestic factors pertaining to political democratic sovereignty and national identity embraced by the people of the island. Naiteh Wu acknowledges that "the rising trend of Taiwanese identity has not been impeded by economic integration" (Chow, 2012, p. 9). According to Chow (2012), "People may not agree on the name the state in Taiwan should have, and they may have differing views on whether or not there is a new Taiwanese nation. But there is emerging consensus among the general public that Taiwan should remain an independent political community" (p. 9). The statistical and focus group data presented makes clear that despite persistent imperfections of both democracy and national identity on the island, the established attachment of people towards democracy, the rights that this allows in regards to the freedom of choosing different national identities, and the continued effect of a shared civic national identity which relates people under the shared struggle for and achievement of democracy, create a strong barrier against the most recent domestic and external pressures regarding the China Factor.

Ma Ying-jeou's presidency is clearly an evident shift in both domestic and international policy returning towards the earlier guidelines of the KMT which were more

closely geared towards Taiwan's inherent relations with and return to the Mainland. Ma's cross-strait policies have rapidly brought about rapprochement with Beijing, while raising many fears in regards to the focal processes of this dissertation and their sustainability under such pressures. Following a detailed analysis of the available literature discussing the threats across the Strait and the domestic and international anxiety alongside the statistical data and even more specific focus group data, it appears clear that the current status of national identity and democracy are not so easily swayed by either China's soft power or the current political elite's subtle coaxing towards a China-centric policy. Muyard (2012) declares that "As attested by all past and current polls, the Taiwanese identity and support for independence are also here to stay and keep on rising with or without close integration with the Chinese economy" (Muyard, 2012, p. 182).

In fact, just as China is viewed as a threat to Taiwan's identity and sovereignty, so may the strength and connection between democracy and national identity on the island be argued as obstacles to the 'China factor'. Yun-han Chu explores the threats which these two processes pose to China's policy and therefore also to the pro-China policies currently in place:

> "During Taiwan's democratic transition, two interrelated developments have frightened Beijing. The first was stepped-up efforts by Taiwan leaders to cultivate popular aspirations for separate nationhood at home and push for independent sovereign status abroad. The second was rising support for Taiwan independence and the corresponding decline of Chinese identity among the Taiwanese population. These trends both have serious consequences for Beijing's Taiwan policy" (2004, p. 488).

Despite the undeniable power, size and military strength which China has over Taiwan, the domestic strength which the Taiwanese people attach to their identities and pride in their democratic system are strong factors which can impact China's effectiveness in attaining their "One China" strategy over the island. Naiteh Wu (2012) argues that "the national identity of the general populace…will largely decide the future relationship between the two countries" (Chow, 2012, p. 9). Therefore the twelve years of Lee and Chen's Cross-Strait policies reinforcing greater pride in Taiwan's political and social environment as well as the growing threats from across the Strait can be seen through

statistical data to at this point in history be strong deterrents affecting the island's probability of peaceful unification with China anytime in the near future. This study cannot speak for the future path of cross-strait relations, however the results of the most recent data along with the historical trends of the relationship between national identity and democracy on the island show the importance of this study in gathering a thorough idea of the true "threat" which China poses to Taiwan's democracy and national identity and the threat which the established correlation between democracy and national identity in Taiwan pose to China.

Chapter 6

Conclusion

As the island of Taiwan has progressed beyond its tumultuous past, beyond the reigns of foreign rule, and cultivated the nation which can be seen today, democracy and a truly localized national identity are two of the prolific advancements which now distinguish the island from its colonial past and Sino-pressured present. The birth of these two movements, that of democratization and Taiwanization, have since their conception shared a common goal to expel the forces which for centuries weighed heavily on the shoulders of the community of people, all joined through the same repression, relentlessly lacking the fundamental rights to lead their own country, let alone ascribe to a willfully accepted national identity. It has been seen in this dissertation that in the earliest years of manifestation in the post-war period, a campaign for national identity could not stay afloat without the support of the democratic movement to provide the freedom to protect such expression. The democratic movement in turn arose from the ashes of a desperate desire for an identity unique from that forced upon the people by colonial oppressors. Since this partnership materialized, democratization and national identity have progressed and effectively matured to the strength apparent today in which these deep-set values provide a barrier to the returned threat of 'foreign' conquest by the powerful giant waiting across the Strait.

The historical sequencing guided under the agent- and structure- oriented analytical framework presented through this dissertation has illuminated in-depth the means in which the particular domestic and international series of events shaping the island's progression and the reactions of and policies of the political elite have consecutively consolidated and reinforced the mutually interdependent linkage developing over time between democracy and national identity on the island. Since the powerful impact of President Chiang Ching-kuo's liberalizing policies beginning in the 1970s, the principles of democracy and a local, "Taiwanese" national identity have sustained indisputable prominence in political discourse on the island, including the frequent accentuation of the linkage between the two. In his 2004 second inaugural speech, DPP President Chen Shui-bian lightly addresses the Cross-Strait dilemma while

emphasizing the unity which can be embraced by the people of Taiwan through their mutual experience of Taiwan's history and democracy: "A half century of toil and labor by the people of this land has culminated in what is now known as the "Taiwan experience," the fruits of which…have become the proud assets not only of the peoples on both sides of the Taiwan Strait, but of all Chinese societies…Taiwan is a completely free and democratic society" (Garver, 2011, p. 5). It is no wonder that such a strong connection between national identity and democracy has formed through decades of passionate endorsement in the island's political rhetoric. This dissertation however has not argued that this path of progression has been painless or without obstacles, and the most recent period of analysis confirms that neither the consolidation of democracy nor the development of national identity have been fully realized, however this has not lessened their connection to one another.

As this study has leaned into a contemporary focus, it is evident through the relevant literature, statistical data and focus group interviews that the status of democracy and national identity remain controversial and fluid topics in Taiwan, viewed as unresolved by both the scholarly and local population, predominantly in response to the tensions amid growing economic integration across the Strait. However the most intriguing observation lies in the continued trends towards greater Taiwanese identity and a deepening attachment to the ideals of political sovereignty despite political pressures emanating domestically and internationally. The current administration under President Ma Ying-jeou represents the first reappearance of the strong 'Sinicization' and pro-China policies since the early KMT rule under which such principles were violently enforced, and has therefore led to great concern over the possible shift which this could incur upon the general populace and political autonomy, especially paired with the exuberant economic interests and influences of China.

However this study shows that in reality, the current fears of the Taiwanese people desiring unification and yielding their democratic political ideals on the basis of economic interest is speculative at best. Despite the historical effectiveness of the political elite swaying the trends and interests of the general society towards democratization and Taiwanization, the same attempts by current administration to now

revert the domestic medium towards interest in growing cultural and political association with China have simply not been grasped. Studies have shown that a contradictory analogy exists on the island between the economic gain from China and the sovereign rule and unique identity which are viewed as clearly differentiating factors defining the people and governments on the mainland and in Taiwan. It is argued by this dissertation that the decades of cultivating such an interdependent association between the island's democratic base and preferred national identities now poses a profound obstacle for any immediate efforts towards peaceful unification across the Strait, whether attempted from inside or outside of the island.

The great importance which lies in excavating the historical linkages between the processes of democratization and national identity formation and following these developments to the present day is to be able to now accurately portray how deeply embedded and overlapping the notions of democracy and national identity are on the island today. Despite a slowing of democratic consolidation and the disagreements which nonetheless remain in respect to identity, the relationship between the pride in democratic ideals and at the very least a shared identity emanating from the political autonomous lifestyle experienced by the people on the island, for the time being, are proving to be strong deterrents against China's obstinate 'One China' Policy, the threat of economic integration seeping into other realms of life and any threats to the current 'status quo.' Danielson in 2012 writes that "The democracy acts as a melting pot and facilitates the move toward a multifaceted Taiwan identity containing several identities including Chinese, Taiwanese, and aboriginal identities with Taiwan as its home" (Danielson, 2012, p. 135). It is futile to attempt any prediction of the future of such complex issues as Taiwan's democracy, national identity or autonomy, especially with the unpredictable variable of China, however democracy and national identity can be concluded to in their most current state to remain intertwined in mutual influence: "The rising Taiwanese identity is, therefore, not a mere remnant of old Taiwan, be it pre-1945 or dating from the repressive dictatorship era, but a contemporary construct of the democratic Taiwanese society fully embraced by the new generations" (Muyard, 2012, p. 163).

6.1 Recommendations for future studies

The proliferation of recent works addressing the controversy of Taiwan's growing economic relations with China, the continued political tension across the Strait, and the increasing trends towards Taiwanese identity on the island (Shelley Rigger 2011, 2012; Ash, Garver, Prime (Eds.) 2011; Chow (Ed.) 2001, 2012) are proof to the current and continued importance of this study, especially in light of continuing economic integration across the Strait, possible progressions of the ECFA, future elections in Taiwan and changing domestic factors in China. There are clearly many factors which can be closely followed and which will directly affect the continued deepening or eroding of democracy and national identity on the island and the potential for the continued efficacy of these influences on society in light of contradictory economic pressures. Taiwan's democratic success and national identity dilemma have been stimulating subject matters which have been researched throughout their development. Seeing as a resolution has yet to be achieved and surrounding circumstances are ever-changing, it is only right to pursue the study of these processes as they continue to develop through Taiwan's fragile geo-political environment.

While conducting this study it has also been brought to light that aside from the interviews conducted by Donald Rodgers in his 2010 working paper *Ethnic and National Identity Survey of Taiwan's College Students*, there are limited materials focusing on the perspectives of the younger generation in Taiwan towards democracy and national identity and the impact which this has on their views towards future developments in Cross-Strait relations. This generation of younger Taiwanese will hold very different attachments behind their chosen national identities as most of them will have been born and raised in Taiwan and know nothing outside of the democratic political system which they have grown up in. This generation is also believed to be less passionate about political issues and more focused on economic gain, making Taiwan's heavily dependent economy and increasing numbers of Taiwanese immigrants to the mainland increasingly vulnerable to persuasions towards unification. Therefore, studies focusing largely on the attitudes of the younger generations and the implications of growing integration with China upon their views towards their status quo or unification will provide greater insight

into possible future trends and shifts in democratic practices and national identity preferences if economic assimilation across the Strait continues.

References

Alexandrov, M. (2003). *The Concept of State Identity in International Relations: A Theoretical Analysis.* Retrieved from Hiroshima University: http://ir.lib.hiroshima-u.ac.jp/metadb/up/74007022/JIDC_10_01_03_Alexandrov.pdf

American Institute in Taiwan. (n.d.). *Taiwan Relations Act*. Retrieved June 14, 2013, from www.ait.org.tw/en/taiwan-relations-act.html

Anderson, B. (1991). *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism.* London: Verso.

Anderson, B. (2001, May). Western Nationalism and Eastern Nationalism: Is there a difference that matters? *New Left Review*, 31-42.

Armstrong, J. A. (1982). *Nations before Nationalism.* University of North Carolina Press.

Baogang He, Y. G. (2000). *Nationalism, National Identity and Democratization in China.* England: Ashgate Publishing Ltd.

Berman, S. (2009). What to Read on Modernization Theory. *Foreign Affairs*. Retrieved from http://www.foreignaffairs.com/features/readinglists/what-to-read-on-modernization-theory

Boerner, P. (Ed.). (1986). *Concepts of National Identity: An Interdisciplinary Dialogue.* Baden-Baden, Germany: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft.

Brown, D. (2004). Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East and Southeast Asia. In S. Henders, *Democratization and Identity* (pp. 43-66). Oxford: Lexington Books.

Chang, G. A., & Wang, T.-Y. (2005). Taiwanese or Chinese? Independence or Unification? : An Analysis of Generational Differences in Taiwan. *Journal of Aisan and African Studies, 40*(25), 29-49. doi:10.1177/0021909605052938

Checkel, J. T. (2008). Constructivism and Foreign Policy. In S. Smith, A. Hadfield, & T. Dunne (Eds.), *Foreign Policy: Theories. Actors. Cases* (p. 73). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Cheng, S. F. (2009). *Taiwan Identity: Its Formation, Typology and Political Implications (I).* NSC-98-2414-H-004-086.

Cheng, S. F., & Wang, T. Y. (2010). Taiwanese Identity: Formation, Typology and Political Implications. *Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association*, (pp. 1-15). Washington D.C.

Cheng, T. J. (2008). Democratizing the Quasi-Leninist Regime in Taiwan. In D. F. (Ed.) (Ed.), *The Politics in Modern Taiwan II* (pp. 3-29). NY: Routeledge.

Chow, P. (2008). An Overview on the dilemma of "One China": Myth Versus Reality. In P. C. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma* (pp. 3-16). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Chu, Y. H. (1992). *Crafting Democracy in Taiwan.* Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research.

Chu, Y. H. (2004). Taiwan's National Identity Politics and the Prospect of Cross-Strait Relations. *Asian Survey, 44*(4), 484-512.

Chu, Y. H., & Lin , J. W. (2001, March). Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity. *The China Quarterly*(165), 102-129. Retrieved May 2012, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451108

Corcuff, S. (2012). Ma Ying-jeou's China Leaning Policy and the 1683 Fall of the Zheng in Taiwan: A Cross-Centuries Geopolitical Comparison. In P. C. Chow (Ed.), *National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan's Competing Options and Their Implications for Regional Stability* (pp. 93-132). New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Dawisha, A. (2002). Nation and Nationalism: Historical Antecedents to Contemporary Debates. *International Studies Review*, 3-22.

Dawley, E. N. (2009). The Question of Identity in Recent Scholarship on the History of Taiwan. *The China Quarterly*, 443-452. doi:http://dz.doi.org/10.1017/S030574100900040X

Deutsch, K. (1963). Nation-building and national development: Some issues for political research. In K. Deutsch, & W. J. Foltz (Eds.), *Nation-Building.* New York: Atherton Press.

Diamond, L., Linz, J. J., & Lipset , S. M. (Eds.). (1992). *The Democratic Revolution, Struggles For Freedom and Pluralism in the Developing World.* New York: Freedom House.

Diamond, L., Linz, J., & Lipset, S. M. (1990). Introduction: Comparing Experiences with Democracy. In L. Diamond, J. Linz, & S. M. Lipset (Eds.), *Politics in Developing Countries Comparing Experiences with Democracy* (pp. 11-13). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Diamond, L., Plattner, M. F., Chu, Y. H., & Tien, H. M. (Eds.). (1997). *Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies: Regional Challenges.* Baltimore, Maryland: The Johns Hopkins University Press.

Domes, J. (1999). Electoral and Party Politics in Democratization. In S. Tsang, & H.-M. Tien (Eds.), *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (pp. 49-66). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Election Study Center. (1992/06-2011/12). *Taiwan Independence vs. Unification with the Mainland Trend Distribution in Taiwan*. Retrieved 2012, from Data Archives - Trends in

Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/index.php?id=6

Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. (1992/06-2011/12). *Taiwanese / Chinese Identification Trend Distribution in Taiwan*. Retrieved 2012, from Data Archives - Trends in Core Political Attitudes among Taiwanese: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd2/content/TaiwanChineseID.htm

Election Study Center, National Chengchi University. (n.d.). *About Us - The Purpose of the ESC*. Retrieved 2012, from Election Study Center, National Chengchi University: http://esc.nccu.edu.tw/english/modules/tinyd0/

Friedman, E. (Ed.). (1994). *The Politics of Democratization: Generalizing East Asian Experiences.* Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, Inc.

Garver, J. W. (2011). Introduction: Taiwan's democratic consolidation. In R. Ash, J. W. Garver, & P. B. Prime (Eds.), *Taiwan's Democracy: Economic and Political Challenges* (pp. 1-34). New York, New York: Routledge.

Gellner, E. (1983). *Nations and Nationalism.* Oxford: Blackwell.

Gold, T. (1995). Factors in Taiwan's Democratic Transition. *An International Conference on Consolidating the Third Wave Democracies* (pp. 1-24). Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research.

Haas, H. D. (2007). Migration and Development: A Theoretical Perspective. *Transnationalism and Development (s): Towards a North-South Perspective.* Bielefeld: COMCAD Arbeitspapiere.

Haggard, S., & Cheng, T. J. (Eds.). (1992). *Political Change in Taiwan.* Boulder: Lynne Rienner.

Haggard, S., & Kaufman, R. R. (1997). The Political Economy of Democratic Transitions. *Comparative Politics, 29*(3), 263-283.

Hejazi, O. (2009). *National Identity and Cultural Rights: Evaluating Nationalism in the Liberal Framework.* USA: VDM & Co.

Henders, S. J. (Ed.). (2004). *Democratization and Identity: Regimes and Ethnicity in East Asia and Southeast Asia.* Maryland: Lexington Books.

Holly, G. (2006). *Outside the Party: The Tangwai, Democratic Progressive Party (DPP) and the Democratization of Taiwan.* Ontario: Queen's University Centre for the Study of Democracy. Retrieved from www.queensu.ca/csd/publications/Outside_the_Party.pdf

Hou, H. H. (Director). (1989). *A City of Sadness* [Motion Picture].

Hsiao, A. C. (2000). *Contemporary Taiwanese Cultural Nationalism.* London: Routeledge.

Hunt, C. A. (n.d.). *Qualitative and Quantitative Concepts in Proposal Writing: Similarities, Differences and Controversy.* Retrieved from University of North Dakota: www.und.nodak.edu/instruct/wstevens/PROPOSALCLASS/Huntpaper.htm

Jacobs, B. J. (2008). Taiwan's Colonial History and Postcolonial Nationalism. In P. C. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma* (pp. 37-56). NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Kau, M. (1999). Clinton's "Three No's" Policy: A Critical Assessment. *The Brown Journal of World Affairs, VI*(2), 15-22.

King, A. Y. (1993). A Nonparadigmatic Search for Democracy in a Post-Confucian Culture: The Case of Taiwan, R.O.C. In (. L. Diamond, *Political Culture and Democracy in Developing Countries* (pp. 139-161). Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

Laothamatas, A. (Ed.). (1997). *Democratization in Southeast and East Asia.* N.Y.: St. Martin's Press Inc.

Lee, W. C. (2010). Taiwan's Politics in the 2000s: An Introduction. In W.-C. Lee (Ed.), *Taiwan's Politics in the 21st Century: Changes and challenges* (pp. 1-24). Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co.

Leoussi, A. S. (Ed.). (2001). *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism.* London: Transaction Publishers.

Lin , J. W., & Chu, Y. H. (2001, March). Political Development in 20th-century Taiwan: State-Building, Regime Transformation and the Construction of National Identity. *The China Quarterly*(165), 102-129. Retrieved May 2012, from http://www.jstor.org/stable/3451108

Lin, K. S. (2007). *Cross-Strait Economic Intergration and its Impacts on Taiwan's Society.* (I. Yuan, Ed.) Taipei: Institute of International Relations.

Liu, I. C. (1999). The Development of the Opposition. In S. Tsang, & H.-M. Tien (Eds.), *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (pp. 67-84). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Matsuda, Y. (2004). PRC-Taiwan Relations under Chen Shui-bian's Government: Continuity and Change between the First and Second Terms. *Taipei-Washington-Beijing Relations after the Presidential Election.* Taipei: Brookings-FICS .

Maukuei, C. (2004). Understanding Contending Nationalist Identities: Reading Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson from Taiwan. In (. S. Henders, *Democratization and Identity* (pp. 67-94). Oxford: Lexington Books.

McCrone, D., & Bechofer, F. (Eds.). (2012). *National Identity, Nationalism, and Constitutional Change.* Palgrave Macmillan. doi:10.1057/9780230234147

Meinecke, F. (1970). *Cosmopolitanism and the Nationstate: Studies in the Beginning of the German Nationstates.* (R. B. Kimber, Trans.) Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Mengin, F. (1999). State and Identity. In S. Tsang, & H.-M. Tien (Eds.), *Democratization in Taiwan: Implications for China* (pp. 116-129). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Mint, Y. (1994). *Democratic Transition in Taiwan.* Illinois State University, Department of Political Science. Retrieved from http://www.yemyint88.net/Democratic_Transition_Taiwan.pdf

Muller, E. N., & Seligson, M. A. (1994). Civic Culture and Democracy: the Question of Causal Relationships. *American Political Science Review, 88*(3), 635-652.

Myint, Y. (1994). Democratic Transition in Taiwan. Illinois. Retrieved from www.yemyint88.net/Democratic_Transition_Taiwan.pdf

Oomen, T. (Ed.). (1997). *Citizenship and National Identity: From Colonialism to Globalism.* New Delhi: Sage Publications.

Potter, D. (1997). Democratization at the same time in South Korea and Taiwan. In D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh, & P. Lewis (Eds.), *Democratization* (pp. 219-239). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Potter, D. (1997). Explaining democratization. In D. Potter, D. Goldblatt, M. Kiloh, & P. Lewis (Eds.), *Democratization* (pp. 1-40). Cambridge: Polity Press.

Pye, L. (1985). *Asian Power and Politics.* Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press.

Rigger, S. (2002). Political Science and Taiwan's Domestic Politics: The State of the Field. *Issues and Studies*, 49-92.

Rigger, S. (2011). Democratic Transition and Consolidation in Taiwan. *Taiwan's Future in the Asian Century: Toward a Strong, Prospoerous and Enduring Democracy Conference*, (pp. 1-17). Washington, DC.

Rustow, D. A. (1970). Transitions to Democracy: Toward a Dynamic Model. *Comparative Politics, 2*(3), 337-363.

Scobell, A. (1999). *Show of Force: The PLA and the 1995-1996 Taiwan Strait Crisis*. Retrieved from http:iis-db.stanford.edu/pubs/10091/Scobell.pdf

Seton-Watson, H. (1977). *Nations and STates: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism* . Boulder: Westview Press.

Shen, S.-c., & Wu, N. (2008). Ethnic and Civic Nationalisms: Two Roads to the Formation of a Taiwanese Nation. In P. C. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma* (pp. 117-143). NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Simon, S. (2005). *Tanners of Taiwan: Life Strategies and National Culture.* U.S.: Westview Press.

Smith, A. D. (1991). *National Identity.* London: Penguin Books.

Snyder, L. L. (2009). *The New Nationalism.* New Jersey: Transaction Publishers.

Stockton, H. (2008). National Identity, International Image, and a Security Dilemma: the Case of Taiwan. In P. C. Chow (Ed.), *The "One China" Dilemma* (pp. 99-116). New York: Palgrave.

Sun, Y. S. (1986). *A Preliminary Analysis of the Class Structure in Taiwan.* University of Hawaii.

Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study. (2004). *The Survey of Presidential Election in 2004.* Retrieved 2012, from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study: www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/ptdetail.phtml?Part=Query2004P_ind&Category=45

Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study. (2008). *The Survey of Presidential Elections in 2008.* Retrieved 2012, from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study: http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/ptlist.phtml?Category=42

Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study. (2009). *Telephone Interview of Yunlin County Legislative By-Elections in 2009.* Retrieved 2012, from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study: http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/cglist.phtml?Category=70

Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study. (2010). *The Survey of Mayoral Elections in 2010.* Retrieved 2012, from Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study: http://www.tedsnet.org/cubekm2/front/bin/cglist.phtml?Category=76

Taylor, J. (2000). *The Generalissimo's Son.* Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Tedards, B., & Lin, C. L. (2002). Lee Teng-hui: Transformational Leadership in Taiwan's Transition. *American Asian Review, XX*(2).

The Atlantic Council of the United States. (2003). Chen Shui-bian and Building Democracy in Taiwan. *XIV*(1).

The European Values Study Foundation. (1981-2004). *European and World Values Surveys Four Wave Integrated Data File.*

Tien, H. M. (1995). Prospects for Democratic Consolidation in Taiwan. *An International Conference on Consolidating Third Wave Democracies: Trends and Challenges* (pp. 1-63). Taipei: Institute for National Policy Research.

Tien, H. M., & Tien , T. J. (1999). Crafting Democratic Institutions. In *Democratization in Taiwan* (S. Tsang, & H.-M. Tien, Trans., pp. 23-48). London: Macmillan Press Ltd.

Todd, J., Bottos, L. C., & Rougier, N. (Eds.). (2008). *Political Transformation and National Identity Change.* New York: Routeledge.

Tsang, S. (2001). Chiang Ching-kuo, the Nature of the Kuomintang and the Democratic Breakthrough in Taiwan. In *Change of an Authoritarian Regime: Taiwan in the Post-Martial Law Era* (pp. 119-149). Taipei: Institute of Taiwan History (Prepatory Office), Academia Sinica.

USC US-China Institute. (2008, March 31). *USCI Symposium Explores the Taiwan Vote.* Retrieved from www.china.usc.edu/ShowArticle.aspx?articleID=986

Verba, S., & Almond, G. A. (1989). *Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations.* Newbury Park, California, U.S.A.: Sage Publications.

Wachman, A. (1994). *Taiwan: National Identity and Democratization.* Armonk, N.Y.: M.E. Sharpe.

Wang, F. C. (2009). *History, Ethnicity and National Identity: the Development of Taiwanese National Identity.* Academia Sinica, Asiatic Research Institute.

Wendt, A. (1994). Collective Identity Formation and the International State. *The American Political Science Review, 88*(2), 384-396.

Wendt, A. (1999). *Social Theory of International Politics.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

White, L., & Cheng, L. (1993). China Coast Identities: Regional, National, and Global. In L. Dittmer, & S. S. Kim (Eds.), *China's Quest for National Identity* (pp. 154-193). Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

Wu, N. (1993). Democratic Consensus and Social Cleavage: The role of the Middle Class in Political Liberalization in Taiwan. In M. Hsiao (Ed.), *In Discovery of the Middle Classes in East Asia.* Taipei, Taiwan: Institute of Ethnology, Academia Sinica.

Wu, N. (2012). Will Economic Integration Lead to Political Assimilation? In P. Chow (Ed.), *National Identity and Economic Interest: Taiwan's Competing Options and their Implication for Regional Stability* (pp. 187-202). New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.

Wu, N., & Cheng, T. J. (2011). Democratization as a Legitimacy Formula: the KMT and Political Change in Taiwan. In H. P. J. Kane (Ed.), *Political Legitimacy in Asia: Challenges for Leaders* (pp. 59-87). New York: Palgrave.

Wu, R. R. (2002). Toward a Pragmatic Nationalism. In S. Corcuff (Ed.), *Memories of the Future: National Identity Issues and the Search for a New Taiwan* (pp. 196-218). Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe Inc.

Wu, R. R. (2004). Fragment of/f Empires: The Peripheral Formation of Taiwanese Nationalism. *Newsletter of the Institute of Social Science, University of Tokyo,* 14-16.

Wu, Y. S. (2007). Taiwan's Domestic Politics and Cross-Strait Relations. *The China Journal*, 35-60.