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中國中亞政策之研究：以911事件對中國之戰略意涵
A Study on China's Central Asia Policy—The Strategic
Implication of the September 11 Event for China

Student: Tseng Yinglun

Advisor: Professor Wang Dingshu

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研究生：曾英倫

Student: Tseng Yinglun

指導教授：王定士教授

Advisor: Professor Wang Dingshu



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
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Abstract

The September 11 Event has turned Central Asia into a complex geo-strategic position, creating a status of new balance of power. At the same time, great powers also have tried to dominate the region by establishing diplomatic relationships with the Central Asian states, which is highly challenged to China's traditional interests and strategic calculations in Central Asia. While China continues to play a crucial role in terms of its intention and approach toward future Central Asia development, the other two great powers, Russia and the United States, will certainly exert influence in this region as well. Especially, the U.S.-led War on Terrorism has immediately changed the original strategic landscape of Central Asia, compressing China's strategic space created since post-Cold War. Consequently, China has taken flexible foreign policies in response to U.S. containment. Also, China and Russia have formed a strategic partnership to balance U.S. influence. Therefore, China's strategic considerations of Central Asian states are based on four aspects as follows: (1) Xinjiang independence issue; (2) maintaining stability of its western borders; (3) energy need; and (4) the balance of power in Central Asia. With well management of Shanghai Corporation Organization (SCO) as a platform, China has successfully maneuvered its strategic calculations in Central Asia, creating a truly multi-polar world system best served to its national development in the long run.

Key words: September 11 Event, War on Terrorism, China's Strategic

Calculation, Central Asia, Shanghai Cooperation Organization

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List of abbreviations

ABM	Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
BTC	Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan
EURASEC	Eurasian Economic Community
SLOC	Sea Lines of Communication
CIS	Commonwealth of Independent States
CSTO	Collective Security Treaty Organization
CNPC	China National Petroleum Corporation
ETIM	East Turkestan Islamic Movement
GWOT	Global War on Terrorism
ICBM	International Continental Ballistic Missile
IMU	Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
NATCG	National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC	New Security Concept
PRC	People's Republic of China
SCO	Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SF	Shanghai Five
TAP	Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan
UN	United Nations
USEUCOM	United States European Command
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WMD	Weapons of Mass Destruction
WOT	War on Terrorism
XUAR	Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region

Chapter 1

Introduction

1.1. Motivation and Purpose of the Study

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, there were five new independent states have emerged, namely, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan, which is the most commonly defined as “Central Asian region” where is a landlocked region encapsulated by Russia in the north, Iran and Afghanistan in the south and China in the east. The Central Asian region is also an age-old east-west and north-south trade and transport crossroads.¹ With the decline of Soviet Union influence in Central Asia, this region has become an attractive share for many neighboring countries, including Russia, Turkey, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Iran, and China, to compete for economic interests and political influences, making this region an arena for regional great powers.²

At the same time, China changes its national strategy toward Central Asia, and draws up new plans for building relations with Central Asian states. In 1994, the Chinese premier Li Peng, made a twelve-day visit to the four Central Asian states, during which he gave a new impetus to China’s Central Asia policy in four points:

1. China and Central Asian states are close neighbors sharing common borders. So maintaining good-neighborly relations on peaceful co-existence is seen by China as an important policy objectives for securing a stable, long term, and peaceful

¹ 孫壯志，「國際新格局中的中亞五國」，*東歐中亞研究* 4 (北京: 1999): 60。[Sun Zhuangzhi, *Guoji Xingejuzhong De Zhongyawuguo* (Five Central Asian States in the New International Pattern) *Dongou Zhongyu Yanjiu* (East European Russian and Central Asia Studies) 4 (Beijing: 1999): 60]

² Dianne L. Smith, *Central Asia: A New Great Game?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 1996), pp. 3-7.

- external environment.
2. Developing economic cooperation and trade is seen as mutually beneficial and will contribute to common prosperity.
 3. Respecting the independent choice of the Central Asian peoples and non-interference in their internal affairs.
 4. Respect for other countries' independency and sovereignty and promoting peace and regional stability.³

Those principles mentioned above illustrate the basic pattern of China's attitude toward Central Asian affairs. It is in this direction that Beijing can eliminate threatening powers from the region and maintain the security of its western frontline. Moreover, Beijing not only hopes to access to the abundant resources in Central Asia so as to accelerate prosperity of its western region, but puts emphasis on "non-interference in other countries' internal affairs" in order to exclude the Central Asian states from being influenced by the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR); Beijing's priority is to block the influence of the United States in Central Asia, especially after the terrorist attack on the U.S. territory on September 11, 2001, and its consequence operational success in Afghanistan war when the U.S. has expanded its influence in the region. To sum up, China's strategy toward Central Asia is very clear: (1) maintaining political stability in Central Asia; (2) exploring Central Asia's natural resources, (3) blocking the influence of the United States in Central Asia;⁴ and (4) finally to maintain the balance of power in the region.

As we all know, Central Asian region has been China's strategic backyard since ancient times. While China's national power is now ascending, it is likely to have the potential of becoming a regional hegemony, and of course it also has the ambition to

³ Kulbhushan Warikoo, "Central Asia and China: the Changing Equation," *Central Asia on Display: Proceedings of the XII Conference of the European Society for Central Asian Studies*, ed. Gabriele Rasuly-Palczek and Juila Katsching (Vienna: Lit Verlag, 2004): 472.

⁴ 林麗香, 「中亞地區: 中共、美國的新勢力範圍」, *共黨問題研究* 1 (台北: 2002): 20-21。
[Lin Lixiang, *Zhongya Diqu: Zhonggong、Meiguo De Xinshilifanwei* (Central Asia: China and the New Influence Scope of the United States) *Gongdang Wenti Yanjiu* (Studies in Communism) 1 (Taipei: 2002): 20-21.]

become one; however, after the September 11 Event, 2001, China saw the U.S. military presence in Central Asia as a threat of its prosperous economy established since 1978. Therefore, Beijing needs to find counter measures to rebalance the dynamic of Central Asia status changed by the United States. In order to find out how China can achieve the strategies mentioned above, the following questions will be answered:

1. What role does Central Asia play to China?
2. What is China's intention to dominate Central Asian states?
3. What is China's strategy after September 11 after the U.S. deployed military and expanded its influence in Central Asia?
4. How do other great powers respond to China's peacefully developed influence in Central Asia?

1.2. Hypothesized Proposition and Framework of the Study

However, the answers to the questions mentioned above are likely that although China's national power is ascending with the extraordinary economic growth for the past three decades, yet it still cannot surpass the U.S. due to the reality of domestically weak political and military status. That is why China decides to adapt to the U.S. military power projecting into Central Asia. On the one hand, Beijing intends to take this chance to fight the "East Turkestan" in its Xinjiang province, and to stabilize its western region. On the other hand, Beijing also intends to prevent the rollback of Moscow's power from getting into Central Asia again.

Although the course of China's strategy toward Central Asia seems more stable than in other areas of Chinese foreign relations, there are significant uncertainties clouding the longer term outlook. For one thing, perspectives divided on China's long term goals in the region and how these goals could lead to a major change in Beijing's approach to the region. Some emphasize strongly that the prevailing Chinese interests

in regional stability and energy trade will remain core determinants of China's Central Asia policy, and will reinforce continuity in Beijing's behavior we see today. However, others argue that recent accommodating and moderate Chinese policies and behaviors presage the creation of an emerging Central Asian order dominated by Beijing that will be reminiscent of the Sino-Central Asian states relationship during the strong dynasties in Chinese history.

Furthermore, China's influence in Central Asia depends heavily on the power and policy of Russia. Russian weakness in the 1990s provided the opportunity for China's expanding influence in Central Asia and the foundation of Russian inclination to cooperate closely with the rising China on trade, including arms trade, and a variety of international issues. Under the leadership of Vladimir Putin, Russia has endeavored to rebuild elements of national strength and to use them to reassert its interests in Central Asian region. Thus far, the Russian relationship with China generally has remained cordial and cooperative, even the Sino-Russia competition for influence in Central Asia over other issues continues. If China were to be seen to seek regional dominance in Central Asia, Russia might adopt more competitive and perhaps confrontational policies that would have major impacts on China's existing policies to the region. Interestingly, if Russia successfully pursues a more assertive leadership role in the region, Chinese leaders presumably would be forced to choose between accommodating the rollback of Russian power and possibly losing Chinese equities and influence, or resisting the Russians from advancing on this region.

Since 1991, political cooperation between China and the Central Asian states has been improved and has been very positive and beneficial for both sides. Historically speaking, similar relations were established during the tributary relations shared by China and Central Asia when China was very generous with money and gifts in

exchange for regional stability and trade from both sides. However, China's expansion of influence in Central Asia slowed down somewhat after September 11 Event, 2001, when the Washington became a competitor to Beijing in the region. Politically and militarily relations between China and the Central Asian states have, however, not changed that much since 2001, yet after 2002 the economic interactions between Central Asia and China have increased immensely. Despite the fact that Washington has a great deal to offer and that most states in the region would rather not to cooperate with Russia or China, many states are also aware of the fact that the U.S. will eventually leave and China will always be present due to the geographical proximity and economic interdependence. This makes China a crucial player to counter balance against Russia in the long term.

1.3. Framework of the Study

This study is designed based on the above mentioned logical related sub-propositions and its outlines will be derived as the following logical related chapters including an introduction and a conclusion. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the study for the readers. Especially, I will focus on literature reviews absorbed from different grounds held by different specialists or authors to find out China's calculations of interest and national strategy toward Central Asia.

Chapter 2 explains the theory I will apply in this study, including a comparison of two most prominent sets of competing assumptions about behaviors of states in the international system. One is realism, and the other is China's New Security Concept (NSC) theory. Therefore, we shall briefly outline the core assumptions of the two approaches to do comparisons and contrast, particularly in terms of where they lead us

in the strategic analyses.

Chapter 3 catalogues China's strategic interests in Central Asia. I will start from the historical relations between China and Central Asia. In addition to China, there are also other great powers changing their Central Asia policies at the time when the Soviet Union collapsed. Before the September 11, 2001, China's interests were focused on stability, energy, and commercial activities in Central Asia. After the September 11 Event occurred, the international situation entered the era of terrorism. When the United States decided to found the "coalition of anti-terrorism" and to launch war on Afghanistan in 2002, the Central Asia's geo-politics and economy had also been changed ever since. Meanwhile, China has tried to cooperate with Russia and the United States to counter terrorism. Beijing finally seeks to SCO as a platform by which is deemed as the best way to counter terrorism.

Chapter 4 discusses China's strategic considerations after September 11, 2001, toward Central Asia. During this time, the War on Terrorism (WOT) makes Central Asian region become an arena for great powers competition in the international society. From the development of those events mentioned above, it makes the scenario more complicated for those great powers to compete with one another in this region. Secondly, the great powers, like China, Russia, and the United States, have the most influences in the region based on each player's interests of geo-strategy. Then, the competitions among China, Russia, and the United States after the "September 11 Event" will also be analyzed in this chapter. Finally, chapter 5 will be my conclusion.

1.4. Literature Review

Since the disintegration of Soviet Union, all five Central Asian states have

became independent, which makes China to change its Central Asia strategy and create new ways to deal with Central Asian states. In the context of the state, strategy is the employment of specific instruments of power (political/diplomatic, economic, military, and informational) to achieve the political objectives of the state in cooperation or in competition with other actors pursuing their own—possibly conflicting—objectives.⁵ The purpose of the study is to provide an analysis of China's strategic foreign policy toward Central Asia using three of the four elements of national power (Diplomatic, Economic, and Military) as a model. The fourth element of national power (Informational) is not presented in this study and goes beyond the scope of this monograph.⁶

Hu Yuanjai, in his article “China’s Strategic Foreign Policy toward Central Asia,” explains that Central Asia is the so called “Silk Road” in ancient times, and it is also a gateway to the Western world from Chinese perspective. The history of interaction between China and Central Asia could be traced back to Chinese Tang Dynasty. Although China has culture exchange with Central Asia, the confrontations never stops due to culture differences. Therefore, China called this region as “border trouble” (Ben Huan) to which China ever since pays close attention on the basis of national defense. Second, Central Asia is one of the land bridge connecting Asia and Europe. The internal challenge for china to manage in Central Asia is to blockade the expansion of the so called “East Turkmenistan” movement in its Xinjiang province. Therefore China’s strategic goals in Central Asia can be concluded as follows: (1) to avoid instability in Central Asia, (2) to strike separatism movement, (3) to make sure

⁵ Harry R. Yarger, *Strategic Theory for the 21st Century: The Little Book on Big Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2006), p. 5.

⁶ Harry R. Yarger, p. 5.

the accessibility of energy; and (4) to maintain its economic growth. However, Beijing has utilized the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as the platform to realize those strategic goals.

Mark Burles in his book, *Chinese Policy Toward Russia and The Central Asia Republics*, states that there are four considerations provide the foundation for China's policies to the Central Asian states in the post-Cold War: (1) the desire for stability on China's frontier and border provinces, (2) the desire to enhance the economic development of specific inland regions, (3) the desire of growing energy needs; and (4) the concerns over China's relative positioning the post-Cold War strategic environment.⁷ The importance of each of these factors varies according to China's perception of each state's economic prospects, potential to affect China's domestic stability, energy endorsement, and relative strategic significance. The four elements mentioned above provide a basic framework for understanding China's potential future policies toward Central Asia states. However, it is possible that as China's economic political and military power grows, its priorities in Central Asia might change as well.

Charlie L. Pelham in his thesis, *US and China Competition for Influence in Central Asia—A Comparative Analysis*, he shares the same view with Mark Burles in terms of China's interests in Central Asia after the collapse of Soviet Union in 1991. Further, he indicates the evolution of China's grand strategy in Central Asia, which can be traced back to the development of the "Five Principle of Peaceful Coexistence" between China and India in the 1950s.⁸ With the guiding principles articulated by

⁷ Mark Burles, *Chinese Policy toward Russia and the Central Asian Republics* (Santa Monica: RAND, ISBN: 0-8330-2731-X MR-1045-AF, 1999), p. 5.

⁸ The "Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence" are: 1) mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial

Chinese former Premier Li Peng,⁹ China's development of grand strategy began to take form beginning with settling border disputes, security issues and establishing economic ties with its border states. In 1996, Russia, China, Kyrgyzstan, Kazakhstan, and Tajikistan formed the Shanghai Five (SF) and sign a series of treaties that also applied the five principles of peaceful coexistence in maintaining trust and confidence among them. By 2001, the Shanghai Five evolved into the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) due to the increasing terrorism, separatism, and extremism activities in this region. The main goals presented in the founding declaration of the SCO in 2001 are also based on China's five principles of peaceful coexistence to facilitate its function as a multinational and regional security organization.¹⁰ Therefore, China's economic strategy is to focus on stability in the region and energy development.¹¹

Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski in their article, *Chinese Security Interests in Central Asia*, also illustrates that the sudden change in the geo-political configuration in and around Central Asia caused by the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) surprised China. Not only does China regard the situation as a new opportunity, but also as a set of potential threats to its own security.

integrity; 2) mutual non-aggression; 3) non-interference in each other's internal affairs; 4) equality and mutual benefit and; 5) peaceful coexistence.

⁹ Lee Peng's speech of his vision of bilateral relation between China and Central Asia are: (1) Unswerving commitment to good-neighbor relations and peaceful coexistence; (2) Development of mutually beneficial cooperation and promotion of common prosperity; (3) Respect for the choice of the people of each country and nonintervention in the internal affairs of the other party; and (4) Respect for the sovereignty of each state and the promotion of regional stability.

¹⁰ The declaration of the SCO in 2001 are: (1) Strengthening mutual trust and good-neighborliness and friendship among member states; (2) Developing their effective cooperation in political affairs, the economy, and trade, science and technology, culture, education, energy, transportation, environmental protection and other fields; (3) Working together to maintain regional peace, security and stability; and (4) Promoting the creation of a new international political and economic order featuring democracy, justice and rationality.

¹¹ Maj. Charlie L Pelham, *US and China Competition for Influence in Central Asia—A Comparative Analysis* (Fort Leavenworth, Kansas: United States Army Command and General Staff College, School of Advanced Military Studies, 2007), pp. 27-54.

Therefore, China is making constant adjustments to the assessment criteria with respect to the threats to its interests in the region and, accordingly, to the calculations of reactions to them. Therefore, there are three key factors that can be identified as China's potential threats in Central Asia by looking at the development of the situation in and around this region: (1) collapse of the USSR; (2) instability in Afghanistan; and (3) strengthened U.S. presence. First, in the realm of collapse of the USSR, Vladimir and Oleg extended three sub-problems faced by China: (1) intractability of border and territory questions; (2) high level of military presence in border districts; and (3) increasing manifestation of Uighur separatism. In order to solve the problem left by collapse of the USSR, China needs to concentrate on resolving problems inherited from the Chinese-Soviet era.

Second, in the realm of instability in Afghanistan, China faces new threats in the forefront: (1) international terrorism; (2) Islamic radicalism and extremism; and (3) drugs trafficking. However, in the late 1990s, Beijing carried out even more active cooperation with the Central Asian states. Further, China made strategic partnerships with Russia on the basis of its historic presence in the region. Third, in the realm of the strengthened U.S. presence, China gave priority to the threats resulting in one way or another from the scales of the U.S. presence. Those threats are as follows: (1) the appearance of a large U.S. military contingent in the region; (2) the veiled U.S. political interference; and (3) the expansion of U.S. economic presence. Finally, with the support of the SCO and close partnership with Russia, China is able to use its strategy of involvement in the resolutions of all security problems, attempting to develop close relations with the Central Asian states and achieving its strategic goals which mainly relate to preventing the further strengthening of the presence of U.S.

and its allies, and opening up the rich natural resources of Central Asia.¹²

In the article, *Tensions in Sino-Central Asian Relations and their Implications for Regional Security*, Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun illustrate China's new strategy toward Central Asia. However, China's engagement with Central Asia can be broken into four broad and overlapping categories. First, China recognizes the strategic importance of Central Asia and its potential impact on global events. Second, on the economic side, China understands the important role Central Asia can play in its future economic development, especially as a supplier of vital energy resources. Third, China has a security and political interests in making sure the individual states of Central Asia develop in a way that does not threaten China, such as through the establishment of radical governments. Finally, China recognizes that a multilateral approach to cooperation, in addition to stable bilateral relations, can help both China and the region as a whole achieve their shared interests.¹³

For Richard Weitz in her article, *China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?*, she has expressed some specific opinions about China's goals in Central Asia. First, in the realm of politics Chinese authorities worry most about the spread of hostile ideologies such as liberal democracy and Islamic fundamentalism in Central Asia, both for their direct local effects and for their potential threats over consequences for China's territory, especially the ethnic separatism concern in China's Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR). Consequently, China has relied on diplomatic initiatives and

¹² Vladimir Paramonov and Oleg Stolpovski, *Chinese Security Interests in Central Asia* (England: Shrivenham, Block D, JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., May 2008), pp. 1-11.

¹³ Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun, *Tensions in Sino-Central Asian Relations and their Implications for Regional Security* (England: Shrivenham, Block D, JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., January 2006), pp. 4-5.

security and other assistance to induce Central Asian governments to curb separatist activities by Uighur or “East Turkestan” activists. Secondly, China’s growing energy needs represent another force driving its increased interest and involvement in Central Asia. A combination of a booming economy and declining domestic energy production has resulted in China’s importation of an increasingly large percentage of its oil and natural gas. Although China still acquires the bulk of its oil imports from the Persian Gulf and Africa, Chinese policymakers have sought to enhance their access to energy resources from Central Asia as well as Russia. Thirdly, besides securing access to the region’s energy resources, Chinese officials also desire to enhance commerce between its relatively impoverished northwestern regions and their Central Asian neighbors.¹⁴

Also in the Elizabeth Wishnick’s article, *Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia: Prospects for Great power competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis*, she notes that firstly, China views Central Asia as a test case for its aim to create a multi-polar world based on a “democratic” vision of international affairs in which a variety of states wield influence and counter-balance U.S. power. Secondly, China places a priority on stability over democratic change and upholds the priority of noninterference in domestic affairs of SCO member states and proclaims the right for sovereign states to choose their own model of development free of external pressures. Thirdly, China is committed to combating what the Chinese term the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism, and extremism. It is worth remembering that the Shanghai Five began meeting at a time when Russia was

¹⁴ Richard Weitz, *China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2008), pp. 51-64.

focused on threats related to Chechnya, while some separatists in Xinjiang used violence in the 1990s to pursue their goals. Fourth, China sees the goals of economic and security cooperation in the SCO as interconnected and places a priority on the economic cooperation, especially focusing on energy sector. Finally, China has pursuing a “Go West” strategy to develop its western provinces, including Xinjiang. Beijing also has alleged that Uighur terrorists were fighting in Afghanistan and Chechnya. After the Chinese contended that the leader of one Uighur group, the East Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM), had ties to Osama Bin Laden, both the United States and the United Nations (UN) listed it as a terrorist organization in 2002. By conflating separatism and terrorism in Xinjiang, the Chinese government is to limit activities by Uighur groups in their countries, as well as to crack down on legitimate religious activity within Xinjiang. Beijing’s effort to develop Xinjiang’s energy industry, coming at a time of mounting concern about energy security, has let Chinese energy companies to seek out new projects for exploration and pipeline delivery in Central Asia.¹⁵

Alexander G. Larin in his article “Russia Plus China: Removing The U.S. Superpower From Central Asia?” he supposed that the China’s strategy in Central Asia and within SCO has three objectives: (1) in the economic sphere: to get access to raw materials and energy resources of the region and to promote its commodities on the regional markets; (2) in the security sphere: to eradicated or at least to minimize separatism and other current threats; to counter the possible growth of U.S. political and military presence in the vicinity of north-western borders of the People’s Republic

¹⁵ Elizabeth Wishnick, *Russia, China, and the United States in Central Asia : Prospects for Great Power Competition and Cooperation in the Shadow of the Georgian Crisis* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2009), pp. 27-35.

of China (PRC); and (3) as a precondition for, and concomitantly as an implication of economic and security objectives to strengthen China's political influence.¹⁶

In Richard Giragosian's article "The Strategic Central Asian Arena," he believes that since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Central Asia has been an important element in China's security consideration. Structurally, there are three pillars to China's security with regard to Central Asia. The first, rooted in Chinese history, is the recognition of the pivotal role of Central Asia for security along China's western borders. Second, the economic implications of an open Central Asian region posed several new considerations for Chinese security. Third, it is the linkage for Central Asia to the ever-expanding Chinese sense of its role as an important player in global security.¹⁷

Lowell Dittmer in the article "Central Asia and the Regional Powers," says that China's interests in Central Asia stems from the dawn of the post-Soviet era. The first concern is border dispute which was culminated in the summit meeting in April 1996 among the five states to ratify and consolidate their shared borders, and the "agreement on mutual reduction of military forces in the border region" at a second summit the following year in Moscow. Secondly, China's continued interest in the aftermath border settlement was stimulated by the emergence of separatist agitation on behalf of an independent Xinjiang, or "Eastern Turkistan." Especially after the September 11 Event, Beijing set up a National Anti-Terrorism Coordination Group (NATCG) with a secretariat led by Hu Jintao to lead a campaign against the "three forces" of national separatism, religious extremism, and international terrorism in

¹⁶ Alexander G. Larin, *Russia plus China: Removing the U.S. Superpower from Central Asia* (Taipei, Tamkang Journal of International Affairs): 88.

¹⁷ Richard Giragosian, "The Strategic Central Asian Arena," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 1 (Washington: Spring 2006): 133-153.

connection with which began to solicit cooperation from neighboring governments to control their ethnic minorities more effectively. Finally, China has also expressed a lively economic interest in Central Asia, partly as an economic incentive to China's backward, landlocked western provinces corresponding to the lucrative opening of the east coast to foreign trade but mainly as an avenue for China's recently accelerated pursuit of sources of energy.¹⁸

However, Robert Sutter in his article "Durability in China's Strategy toward Central Asia-Reasons for Optimism," he says that the varied Chinese interests and goals in Central Asia have involved. First, on the border and security issues, China has sought to demarcate, demilitarize and stabilize borders with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. Border stability has been a key issue to Chinese development plans and foreign policy priorities. China also has sought to curb outside supports to separatists in Xinjiang province. It sees a common ground with regional governments in working against terrorist and criminal elements. Second, in the economic sphere, China's main economic interest in the region is energy. China has sought growing amounts of oil and gas abroad and Central Asia—especially Kazakhstan appeared as a promising partner. Third, in the regional position, China's engagement with Central Asia, and specifically the SCO, is part of China's overall effort to foster a stable and productive international environment around China's periphery while fostering a more widely accepted Chinese leadership role. Therefore, Beijing's relations with Central Asia also aim to legitimate Chinese positions on major international issues, strengthen relations with Russia, and serve as a counter to U.S.

¹⁸ Lowell Dittmer, "Central Asia and the Regional Powers," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4 (Washington: Winter 2007): 7-22.

power and influence. China's diplomacy in Central Asia aims to prevent the region from becoming a distraction from China's internal development and more important foreign policy goals.¹⁹

Ramakant Dwivedi in his article "China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times," also emphasizes that while China has been contiguous to Central Asia since the disintegration of the former Soviet Union, it has a great opportunity to influence developments in this region. He says that China's interests in Central Asia have widened from stability at the borders to encompass energy security, geo-politics and combating extremists, terrorists, as well as separatist forces.²⁰ Further, China's Central Asia policy is to rest upon on countering terrorism, religious extremism, and Uighurs' independence, bilateral and regional economic cooperation, military cooperation, and countering the influence of major powers inimical to China and Central Asia's multilateral security arrangement. Finally, China has taken major initiatives in order to secure its core geo-political and geo-economical interests. These include border dispute resolutions, reduction of military forces in the border regions, deepening military trust, good neighborliness, friendship cooperation agreements, and the SF initiative which later became the SCO which plays in balancing the role of major power in Central Asia.²¹

Yitzhak Shichor in his article "China's Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection: Predicaments and Medicaments in a Contemporary Perspective," interpreted China's strategic objectives and performance in Central Asia on two

¹⁹ Robert Sutter, "Durability in China's Strategy toward Central Asia-Reasons for Optimism," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 1 (Washington: Winter 2008): 3-10.

²⁰ Ramakant Dwivedi, "China's Central Asia Policy in Recent Times," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 4 (Washington: Winter 2006): 145.

²¹ Ramakant Dwivedi, p. 146.

different levels: the official and explicit; and the unofficial and implicit. On the one hand, China's official and explicit objectives are: (1) the struggle against terrorism, separatism and religious extremism, that became known as the "three evils"—all directly related to Xinjiang and reflected Beijing's perceptions of Xinjiang's potential or actual problems; and (2) not directly associated with the three evils the fourth objectives introduced the struggle against hegemony in Central Asia – namely against the penetration of U.S. influence and presence. On the other hand, China's unofficial and implicit strategy in Central Asia is positively aimed at gaining political influence, security guarantees, economic presence and energy resources.²²

Michael Clarke in his article "China's Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia: Securing a "Silk Road" to Great Power Status?" he illustrates that China's integration of Xinjiang not only serves core internal functions but also increasingly is seen to contribute to China's strategic position in international affairs. In particular, he suggests the integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia grants China significant security, economic and strategic benefits that serve two purposes—the consolidation of China's control of Xinjiang and the expansion of Chinese power in Central Asia—which contribute to Beijing's quest for a "peaceful rise" to great power status.²³

Ablat Khodzhaev in the article "The Central Asia Policy of the People's Republic of China," emphasizes that China considers Central Asia to be a vital zone on which its own internal security in Xinjiang depends, but also as a source of income and of

²² Yitzhak Shichor, "China's Central Asian Strategy and the Xinjiang Connection: Predicaments and Medicaments in a Contemporary Perspective," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Summer 2008): 64.

²³ Michael Clarke, "China's Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia" Securing a "Silk Road" to Great Power?" *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Summer 2008): 89-111.

low-cost raw materials, a market for its goods, and a corridor to Europe and the Middle East. As a result, China's strategy in Central Asia is framed around the concept of turning Central Asia into an accessible and safe region for the People's Republic of China (PRC), as well as strengthening its presence in the region without eliciting opposition from Russia. Furthermore, the SCO can be a guarantor of a balance of interests in Central Asia only if its activities involve all countries interested in developing relations with the Central Asian region.²⁴ Other Chinese scholars characterize the establishment of the SCO as a success of China's diplomacy and a means to promote its Central Asian strategy. It creates a balance between Russia and China in the region, and is considered to be a Chinese channel for participation in the Central Asian state's affairs. Implementation of economic ties based on bilateral agreements cannot satisfy all of China's economic needs, especially in the delivery of goods and energy; however, such issues can be solved within the framework of the SCO. On this basis, Beijing also aims to use the SCO to control the process of isolating Xinjiang from the influences of Central Asia. The notion of security for the region is thus very far-reaching and multifaceted.²⁵

1.5. Research Method

1.5.1. Content Analysis

In this article, content analysis is applied to collect relative research data, and put emphasis on Chinese and English periodical and literature according to the topic. In

²⁴ Ablat Khodzhaev, "The Central Asia Policy of the People's Republic of China," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 1 (Washington: Spring 2009): 9-28

²⁵ Ablat Khodzhaev, p. 21.

order to analyze and research on relative literature of China and Central Asian states relationships, this study seeks to provide relevant evidence from different resources available in the libraries and on the Internet, namely, journal articles, news articles and published books related to Central Asia affairs, especially taking the U.S. War College publications as the basis of geo-political calculations. In addition, journals from the Republic of China (ROC) Army publishers are also included as an important reference of Taiwanese perspective in terms of China's strategic calculations after September 11, 2001. Of course, much of the materials are focused on comparisons among China, Russia, and the United States competitions and cooperation in Central Asia.

1.5.2. Historical Comparative Research

We can observe and analyze a certain period of time or event, and compare the causes and effects comparative research: before and after an event, which means we use an event as main idea of a research. In this article, I would discuss the regional security of Central Asia and to discuss the cause and effects of September 11 Event in terms of China, Central Asia, and the United States, finally to analyze and compare the interactions between China and the Central Asian states.

Besides, in an attempt to analyze the questions about how China faces the situation after September 11, 2001 and the following U.S. presence in Central Asia, the thesis needs to apply in-depth studies of critical literature and a comparative and an analytical case study to guide and support the construction of hypotheses. Because this study is a non-experimental research, the qualitative method is adopted in order to support the construction of hypotheses. The method involves literature readings and the results are descriptive rather than predictive. In other words, this study aims to

analyze the rising Chinese influence in Central Asia, and how the United States and Russia maintain their hegemonies over this region. From the perspectives of realism and structuralism theories, there will be an analysis of how China reacts to the U.S. presence in Central Asian region, especially after September 11, 2001.



Chapter 2

Theoretical Overview

Before we get to understand China's interests toward Central Asia, we have to know what China's national strategy is. According to David Jablonsky, national strategy involves all elements of national power. Those elements can be horizontally broken down into four categories: political, economic, psychological, and military.²⁶ Furthermore, national strategy is based on national interests with specific national goals, and then we will know national policy under the guidelines of national strategy concept. The following paragraphs will help to clarify the definitions among theories applied in this study. There are four elements consist of the concern in this study: classical realism, neo-realism, neo-liberalism and their relation with security concepts.

2.1. Classical Realism

According to Ole R. Holsti, classical realism is the most venerable and persisting theory of international relations, it provides a starting point and baseline for comparison with competing models. While "power" plays an important role in classical realism, the correlation between relative power balances and political outcomes is often less than compelling, suggesting the need to enrich analyses with other variables where three assumptions are derived as follows: (1) state is the center

²⁶ David Jablonsky, J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., "Theory of War and Strategy," *U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, June 2008), pp. 8-9.

of nation state behavior. The research of international affairs takes nation state as a “unit,” other units like individual, group, and international organizations are the secondary units;²⁷ (2) there are practical options. The interactions between nations in the international system are considered on the basis of national interest; therefore one nation will carefully assess the costs from various options, in order to gain the maximum interests; and (3) power is capability. The system basically relies on self-help by the individual states because the world is anarchy. The more power one has, the more the state is able to achieve its goals and objectives; the less power one has, the more that state may be subject to the whip of other states.²⁸

The classical realism scholar, Hans Morgenthau argues that human natural is the key explanation of nation-state behavior. In his view, human natural is fixed and unchangeable, and it is inherently focused on the quest for even more power. Consequently, conflict among people competing for power is inevitable. Since states are simply aggregations of individual humans and statesmen are the leaders of those groups, nation-state will exhibit this same lust for power in their behavior with one another. No matter what one does, this lust for power anchored in human natural will lead to some inevitable conflicts.²⁹

From the basic theories of classical realism discussed above, we can understand that classical realism is expanded from the perspective of “altruism,” and tends to view the world based on conditions of competitions, conflicts, and anarchy status in the international system. As a result, the research of international relations will focus

²⁷ Hans J. Morgenthau, *Politics among Nations: Struggle for Power and Peace* (New York Knopf, 1978), p. 8.; Kenneth Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (Mass.: Addison-Wesley Publishing Company, 1979), p 94.; Stephen Krasner, *Structural Conflict* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985), p. 28.

²⁸ Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 25.

²⁹ Hans J. Morgenthau, p. 25.

on power and interest as the core elements, the concepts of “altruism” and “moral” will make state suffer from big loses.

However, the main characteristics of structural realism are assumed identical to realism, admitting the international situation is anarchy, and the international relations are in state centric status. It also puts emphasis on order, restriction, and cooperation in the international system, focusing on the function of economy in the international relations. Kenneth Waltz's *Theory of International Politics*, published in 1979, has for the first time put forward the theory of “structural” theory and later became the original theory of structural realism. Waltz's structural realism is using the framework of international system and power distribution, including nation-state, power, and interest from classical realism, as the basis of analyzing the external behaviors of nation-state. Although structural realism respects the power, it also values power as a tool by which to reach the goal of national security. As a result, there produces two essentials in the international system, one is unity and the other is the system itself.³⁰

2.2. The Development of Waltz's Structural Realism

Waltz's theory of structural realism is likely to serve to raise consciousness about the importance of the systematic context within which international relations take place. Accordingly, how structural realism defines the international system will be analyzed from four dimensions.

The first dimension is system structure theory. Waltz thinks there are two

³⁰ Robert Keohane, “*Reflections on Theory of International Politics: A Response to My Critics*,” *Neo-realism and its Critics* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986), pp. 322-345.

variables in the system, one is structure, and the other is unit.³¹ In the structure of the international system, the behavioral body of many nation states uses their own “power” to determine the order in the system. However, in the international system, the structure is consisted of each unit; formally speaking, every nation state has its power of sovereignty and is equal to each other, and there is also no need to obey the arrangements of other states. The international system is anarchic and decentralized, but in the anarchy international system, the structure is defined by the capabilities among units, the distribution of capabilities is a form of power distribution, which indirectly leads to the variation of system structure according to the variation of power distribution. In brief, the power distribution determines the structure of international system, and the order of each unit makes up structure, the change of order will lead to variation of structure.³² In fact, the variable determines the international structure is power distribution in the international system, and different power distribution will produce different international structure, however, different international structure and state will determine the external behaviors of states.

Second, there are three key elements that construct system structure: (1) the international system is anarchic rather than hierarchical; (2) the international system is composed of sovereign units, each unit is formally equal and therefore the functions that they perform are also similar; and (3) the distribution of capabilities is among units in the international system. Waltz thinks that the former two elements are constant, but the third one is in a changing state, because the functions of units are similar as long as the system remains anarchic. Therefore the structure of the international system is not in static status but dynamic, the structure can change the

³¹ Kenneth Waltz, p. 79.

³² Kenneth Waltz, p. 80.

behavior of units, therefore change the result of interactions among units in the international system.

Third, the biggest difference between classical realism and structure realism is the definition of power and security.³³ Classical realism regards pursuing power between states as the purpose of each member in the international system. Morgenthau even proposes power is equal to interests, and power is equal to purpose.³⁴ On the other hand, Waltz thinks that the final goal of state is to acquire security by power which is only one method of gaining security. Waltz proposes new power concept different from classical realism, also he gives it new function and concept. He regards the structure is formed according to power extent in system which changes the structure. Furthermore, the variation of power and power distribution among states will help both structure forming and the variation of structure.³⁵

Finally, Waltz thinks balance of power theory is one of the important components of structural realism while power is only a method rather than the purpose. It is not the purpose of nation state to seek for maximum power, rather, it seeks the equally power distribution. If we scrutinize the true meaning is to the equally power distribution among big states. He even thinks the distribution of power under a bipolar system will lead to the equilibrium and stabilization of the international system.³⁶

2.3. The Value of Waltz's Structural Realism

³³ Kenneth Waltz, pp. 112-121.

³⁴ Kenneth Waltz, p. 8.

³⁵ Kenneth Waltz, pp. 123-128.

³⁶ Kenneth Waltz, pp. 161-170.

The biggest difference between classical realism and structural realism is first, classical realism is to scrutinize the operation of international powers from the point of state and human nature without discussing the levels within the system. Second, classical realism does not discuss issue of power distribution in the international system, but it focuses on the operation of power equilibrium in the international society. However, Scholar Stanley Hoffmann points to three main distinctions between classical realism and Waltz's structural realism. First, classical realism focuses on nation state level, stressing that the world is anarchic, however structural realism focuses on system level, thinking that the international relation is interdependent on the interactions of international politics and economy. Second, classical realism focuses on the research of national interest and power, but structural realism puts emphasis on the distribution of power among states, advocating the analysis of structure. Third, classical realism emphasizes the possibilities of national conflict instead of the possibility of international cooperation, and ignores the cooperation of international institutions; structural realism, on the contrary, advocates the combination of international conflict and international cooperation, putting emphasis on the possibility of international cooperation, and paying attention to the function of cooperation facilitated by international mechanism.³⁷

Waltz's structural realism has been the leading model which provides a useful framework for understanding the collapse of the post-World War I international order, the World War II, and the Cold War. It is also applied by international scholars who study international relations.

³⁷ Stanley Hoffmann, *Primacy or World Order-American Foreign Policy since the Cold War* (Montreal: McGraw-Hall Book Company, 1980), p. 188.

2.4. The International Relations Theory and Security Concept

Peace and security have been the core issues in the international relation studies. From the West point of view, three perspectives shall be discussed in order to understand international security theory, they are as the follows: (1) there is analysis of security theory in the study of International Relations; (2) the issue of security will not disappear; on the contrary, it becomes more and more important in the future; and (3) security policy should be established on the basis of theoretical analysis in the long run.

In other words, the issue about peace and security has been a critical issue in the international relation theory. The international relation theory has been evolved from classical realism to many types which also intrigue the evolvement of “security concepts.” Therefore, by looking into the variations of the security concepts within the frame of the development of international relation theory, it is helpful to know the causes of the evolvement of security concept and the thesis of different security concept, which provides a wider view for us to further discuss security theory after the end of Cold War.³⁸

Realism and Traditional Security Concept

“Security” is the primary condition of survival and development in human society, and is one of the main issues in the international relation theory. Further, it

³⁸ 倪世雄，「冷戰後國際關係理論的新發展」，*當代國際關係理論*（台北：五南出版社，2003年），頁 564。[Ni Shixiong, *Lengzhanhou Guojiguanxi De Xinfazhan* (The Post Cold War International Relation Theory and Development), *DangDai Guojiguanxi Lilun* (International Relation Theory) (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2003), p. 564.]

also represents national security in the international relation studies. On the other hand, classical realism argues that all nations pursue power, and the national interests are defined by power which is the guarantee of acquiring national interest. However, realism presumes that anarchy is the feature in the international system, the international system is a self-help system because anarchy, and self-help will necessarily lead to power politics resulting in military competition, balance of power, and global wars. In other words, the military power is the main element that affects national security. The traditional national security is military security, a zero-sum game, which means one country's security is the insecurity of the others. As a result, the other country's security is another country's insecurity.³⁹

Neo-Realism and Its Security Concept

Kenneth Waltz developed theory of neo-realism (defined as structural realism) on the basis of realism theory, shifting human nature from self-interest to the international structure formed by state to state interactions. The biggest difference between neo-realism and classical realism is that classical realism defines power as a goal followed by nations; however, neo-realism uses power as a tool in international relations. For example, all states possess some level of military power, and each state has the option of threatening or using the power. To some extent, each state must be concerned with the power capabilities of other states. Therefore, what concerns the states is security instead of power. To neo-realists, the characteristic of the international politics is not necessary be endless conflicts and wars, rather, there exists

³⁹倪世雄，「冷戰後國際關係理論的新發展」，*當代國際關係理論*（台北：五南出版社，2003年），頁 564。[Ni Shixiong, *Lengzhanhou Guojiguanxi De Xinfazhan* (The Post Cold War International Relation Theory and Development), *Dangdai Guojiguanxi Lilun* (International Relation Theory) (Taipei: Wunan Publisher, 2003), p. 564.]

limited cooperation among all nations.

What really concerns the neo-realist is the issue of relative gain. From the perspective of neo-realist, what worries neo-realists is the distrust among nations during the process of cooperation. As a result, both realism and neo-realism hold the speculation that it is not only lack of trust, but also full of misunderstandings in the international system.

Neo-Liberalism and Independence with Neo-Realism

Both neo-realism and neo-liberalism share some assumptions, particularly on the perspective of the security concept. Neo-liberalism pointed out the function of Institution among nation behaviors in the anarchy international system, and the absolute gain of security cooperation within the system. Not only does neo-liberalism assure the existence of mutual interest, but also the share of group interest in the long term. Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye are neo-liberalism scholars who argue that realism ignores the fact of international cooperation in the international system, explaining that realism not only ignores the function of institution but also the development of institutionalized society in the international system. Specifically, the extent of interdependence among politics and economics, mutual conflicts, mutual competitions, and regional cooperation are constantly increasing, contributing huge efforts to the international system.⁴⁰ In addition, the domestic affairs are internationalized, making it harder for classical realism to meet the requirement of international cooperation.

⁴⁰ Robert O. Keohane, Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence* (New York: Addison-Wesley Publishing, 2000), p. 12.

To sum up, the biggest difference between neo-realism and neo-liberalism is that the former precludes the possibilities of cooperation between states based on the distrustful relations of states, resulting the norm of zero-sum game; however the latter ensures the existence of cooperation based on the marginal costs and benefits, and under this circumstances, non-zero-sum game is normalized, therefore the international security can be gained by nations in the international system.

2.5. New Security Concept and Structural Realism

Why does China put forward New Security Concept? (NSC) From the end of last century, China combines both of its foreign and security policy in response to the rapid growth of comprehensive national power. China's NSC puts emphasis on economy, technology, society, culture, and environment protection which become the core of this idea. The new security concept especially focuses on the importance of economic security while China also thinks that all countries have to cooperate with each other in order to reach the goal of mutual prosperity. Furthermore, under the framework of NSC each and every country should strive for “mutual interests” which means on the basis of one country's national interests and economic security, there will be more and more mutual interests through the process of combining two countries' interests in the international society.⁴¹ Meanwhile, it is the main consideration of security cooperation, maintaining the regional stabilization, and global prosperity and peace. As a result, the NSC holds a position of enhancing

⁴¹ 黃財官，「中共『新安全觀』戰略研析與作為」，*陸軍學術雙月刊* 491 (桃園：2007)：46。
[Huang Caiguan, Zhonggong “Xinanguan” Zhanlveyanxi Yu Zuowei (The Strategic Analysis of China's New Security Concept), *Lujun Xueshushuangyuekan* (Army Bimonthly) 491 (Taoyuan: 2007): 46.]

regional cooperation with the other countries without against the third party, under the basic principles of equality and peace including multilateral security mechanisms, multilateral security dialogues, mutual security negotiations, nonofficial security dialogues, and to accelerate economic security cooperation.⁴²

2.6. The Basic Theory of China's New Security Concept

China brought up the strategic concept of “New Security Concept” after the cold war in the international politics. The international framework after the Cold War is like “one superpower and many big powers” which equals the multi-polarity system, in which the relationship between superpowers is the main framework of analyzing international politics that have two elements:

First, multi-polarity can be used as a route or a method to analyze questions. In other words, every country has to cooperate with each other in order to achieve common goals. They put emphasis on dialogues and negotiations so as to show the importance of international regulations. Therefore, the new security concept has a synthesis color of neo-realism and neo-liberalism. On the one hand, the neo-realism highlights the priority of security in the international affairs, and to obtain power is to ensure security. On the other hand, the neo-liberalism lays emphasis on the importance of regulation and cooperation in international politics, so that each country would achieve the goals of “security” and “cooperation” by following international regulations, rules, and hierarchy. Thus, not only does China constantly pursue the goal

⁴² 邱坤玄，「中共對冷戰後美日安全關係的認知與新安全觀的形成」，*東亞研究* 2 (2004): 22。
[Qiu Kunxuan, Zhonggon Dui Lengzhanhou Meirianquanguanxi De Renzhi Yu Xinquanguan de Xingcheng (China's Understanding of US-Japan Relation after Cold War and its Formation of New Security Concept) *Dongya Yanjiu* (East Asia Study) 2 (2004): 22.]

of power on the basis of its new security concept as a core, but also place emphasis on the new security issues including economy, technology, society, culture, and environment. Therefore, China's NSC is a combination of neo-realism and neo-liberalism.

Second, the motive of NSC is to build relationships among great powers. The international politics of neo-realism is to show both the capability and intention of each country, by doing so to enable great powers to have special interests and status in the great power politics. China has been making much of building “strategic partners” with great powers in the international society by the extension of NSC. So, the essence of China's NSC is based on its national interests with much more realism characters.

To sum up, from the two international theses mentioned above, we know that NSC is not just a new theory, but also a synthesis of “cooperative” and “competitive” international theory which is derived from the consideration of national “security” and “interest.” Thus, the NSC enhances every country's cooperation and security in the regional and international community on the basis of peace and equality.

2.7. New Security Concept in Structural Realism

2.7.1. The Concept of Cooperative Security

Former Secretary General Javier Solanna describes the process of restructuring a new North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) as a root and branch transformation

aimed to create a new alliance inspired by the premise of “Cooperative Security.”⁴³ It is necessary for nations to cooperate with each other, have dialogues, and build a security mechanism on the basis of cooperation in order to solve the security problems existing among themselves. “Cooperative Security” is built on the basis of mutual cooperation, especially putting emphasis on one nation's military preparation, strategic deployment, and hostile assessment of the enemy, etc., so as to interact with each other to solve existing problem of “security dilemma.”⁴⁴ Meanwhile, it is also critical to accentuate the importance of presentation diplomacy, which is to take necessary measures to relief a crisis before the confrontation occurs instead of aggravating the security situation to become unsolvable. Moreover, no country can solve its security problem on its own without help from other nations under the circumstances of the threat of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD), but cooperation with each and every country in the international society. In fact, cooperation security is a form of collective security, but is more practical than and easier to be realized compared to “balance of power” or building a cooperative world order.⁴⁵

Structural realism concentrates on the structure of the international system.⁴⁶ Waltz thinks that firstly, the contemporary system is anarchic and decentralized rather than hierarchical; despite of the difference in many aspects, each unit (state) is formally equal. Secondly, the character of the units in the anarchic system is similar to

⁴³ R. Crag Nation, J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. ed., “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” *U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy* (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2004), p. 61.

⁴⁴ Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” *U.S. War College Guide to National Security Policy and Strategy*, ed. J.Boone Bartholomees, Jr. (Carlisle Barracks, PA.: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2004), p. 9.

⁴⁵ Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” *op. cit.*, p. 9.

⁴⁶ Robert H. Dorff, “Some Basic Concepts and Approaches in the Study of International Relations,” *op. cit.*, p. 3.

each other because they are composed of sovereign units; thirdly, there is power distribution among units in the international system in which the variety of combination determines the variation of structure. Finally, the function of international system is composed of homogeneous states by interactive behaviors. Therefore, we can understand that the NSC of structural realism is a concept of combining system and power, especially emphasizes the international affairs for the purpose of pursuing “security.” To sum up, the security concept of structural realism is composed of the concepts of system, power, and cooperation.

If we carefully examine and scrutinize China's NSC, it is easier to perceive that in fact, it also has the concept of realism. For example, China always emphasizes that security is obtained by means of cooperation, and emphasizes that security will be obtained by following the rules of equilibration of each country, and therefore each side should cooperate with one another in order to reach security on the basis of mutual benefit. Although China's NSC is not exactly like realism, it especially puts emphasis on the impacts of system and power, which is the realm the NSC should reach.

2.7.2. The NSC is the Extension of “Five Peaceful Principles”

Talking about China's status in the international system, China's leaders, from all periods, are following the “Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence” which is put forward by Chou Enlai in 1955. The five principles are:

1. Mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity;
2. Mutual non-aggression;
3. Non-interference in each other's internal affairs;
4. Equality and mutual benefit and;
5. Peaceful coexistence.

Since 1990s, all Chinese leaders including Deng Xiaoping, Jiang Zemin and Hu

Jintao have also followed the five principles as the basic claims of diplomacy or national security. China's "five principles of peaceful coexistence," in fact, is a concept of "comprehensive" security.⁴⁷

Because firstly, the three principles of "mutual non-aggression," "non-interference in each other's internal affairs," and "mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial integrity" emphasize that each country has an independent characteristic and each country should have both independent sovereignty and inviolable characteristic as well. The direction of neo-realism is to execute the individual doctrine of every country, considering the interconnection of the international affairs depends on individual realm, multi-level negotiations, foundation of international regulations and institutions, which greatly help them to realize the possibility of cooperation. In fact, China's five principles of peaceful coexistence are put forward based on the trend of international development, hoping to maintain the rights of independence and sovereignty under international pressures, which is similar to the theory of neo-realism or the classical realism--the only analysis unit that the countries concerned is the international politics.

Secondly, the principles of "mutual benefit" and "peaceful coexistence" are the claims of liberalism based on the direction of individualism, thinking that the establishment of international affairs is conducted among states, furthermore the establishment of international institutions and norms can also be reached through different levels of negotiations and competitions, especially by the interdependence among nations, which helps it easier to realize the possibility of cooperation. The

⁴⁷ 黃財官，「中共『新安全觀』戰略研析與作為」，*陸軍學術雙月刊* 491 (桃園：2007)：42。
[Huang Caiguan, Zhonggong "Xinanguan" Zhanlveyanxi Yu Zuowei (The Strategic Analysis of China's New Security Concept), *Lujun Xueshushuangyuekan* (Army Bimonthly) 491 (Taoyuan: 2007): 42.]

incarnation of liberalism is the so called “strategic benefit,” so as to focus on cooperation under the framework of “institutionalization.”⁴⁸

Finally, China's five principles of peaceful coexistence are the synthesis of realism and idealism. However, the primary concerns of the five principles of peaceful coexistence are “independent country” and “national security” as premises, and then referring to “cooperation” and “mutual benefit.” In addition, both “cooperation” and “mutual benefit” are the preconditions of one country's consideration of interest. Therefore, the neo-realism still covers most of China's five principles of peaceful coexistence. So as to say, that China's NSC is inherited by the five principles of peaceful coexistence, and is a synthesis security concept. The cooperative atmosphere in the theory still regards national interest as its prerequisite. So, the background of strategic new security concept is derived from the view point of structural realism. ■

Therefore, China's engagement with Central Asian states is a part of its NSC diplomacy which is focused on issues of internal security against the “three evils” and economic growth, in order to build a peaceful and steady surrounding. With the decline of Russian influence in this region, China also employs the five principles of peaceful coexistence to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian states in order to consolidate its foothold in this area. This initial foothold resulted in the developments of both China's grand strategy and a regional security organization that have caught the attention of Western observers. In brief, China's intension to pursue interests of stability, security, economic development, and energy in Central Asia will

⁴⁸ David A. Baldwin, ed., *Neorealism and Neoliberalism* (Zhejiang: People University Publisher, March 2001), pp. 85-114.

balance U.S. influence in order to maintain a geo-strategic advantage in this region.



Chapter 3

China and Central Asia

Since the Central Asian states have become independent in 1991, the great powers have changed their Central Asia policies because of the special geography and the abundant energy resources in this region. When the September 11 Event occurred in 2001, the international situation entered the era of “terrorism” and “war on terrorism.” At the same time, the United States founded the coalition of anti-terrorism through Eurasia continent and later entered Afghanistan in 2002, which affects the Central Asian geo-politics and economy. The War on Terrorism (WOT) makes the Central Asian region to become an arena for great powers in the international stage. Especially, on July 5, 2005, the SCO summit was held in Kazakhstan during which many representatives encouraged Uzbekistan to expel the U.S. military forces from its territory due to the Andijan riot.⁴⁹ From the development of those events mentioned above, it makes the scenario more complicated for those great powers to compete with each other in this region. In particular for the great powers, like China, Russia, and the United States have the most influences in the region in terms of interests of geo-strategy. In this chapter, I would discuss the interactions among China, Russia, and the United States after the September 11 Event. Should the power interactions among the three powers be confrontational and restrictive, or should it be cooperative to reach mutual benefits? We will find the answers in this section.

⁴⁹ Elizabeth Wishnick, p. 18.

3.1. China's Security Concern in Central Asia

China's influence and culture have been a part of Central Asia since ancient times. This chapter begins with China's historical presence in Central Asia in order to establish a framework of its strategic interests within the region. The elements of security and stability, economic development, energy, and a new strategic environment after 1991, provide the foundation for China's development of its "grand strategy" which produced a regional multilateral organization that has allowed China to currently maintain significant influence in the region. The topic presented in this chapter is to provide a clear understanding of Chinese influence in Central Asia and the strategic importance of this region. The aforementioned infers to China's Xinjiang province which represents the gateway of great power competitions in Central Asia.

3.1.1. China's Historical Presence in Central Asia

China's presence in Central Asia began over 2,000 years ago in the Chinese Han Dynasty. Officially, Xinjiang is said to have been a part of China since it was first incorporated into the Han Dynasty (202 BC- 220AD) during the reign of Han Wudi (147 BC- 87 BC).⁵⁰ Seen as a gateway to the west, China secured land routes and established trade with the Roman Empire. Known as the "Silk Road," this route allowed Chinese products—primarily silk—land access to Western and Middle Eastern countries. The development of the Silk Road coincided with the Han's western empire expansion and encountered with a Turkic nomadic tribe in Central Asia known as the Xiongnu—a people who had ties with the Huns. Encountering with the Xiongnu to secure the Silk Road led to Chinese expanding its control further into

⁵⁰ Hasan Haider Karrar, *The New Silk Road Diplomacy: A Regional Analysis of China's Central Asia Foreign Policy, 1991-2005* (Montreal: McGill University, 2006), p. 9

Central Asia in order to maintain a gateway to the west. The Han Empire eventually collapsed due to internal conflicts and led to China's loss of Central Asia in 220 A.D.⁵¹

The reunification of China under the Tang Dynasty (581-902 A.D.) brought Central Asia into the forefront as a potential source of economic and cultural trade. During this period, China began to expand its influence deeper into Central Asia than the Han Dynasty, eventually coming into direct contact with the Muslim people of greater Turkmen—a diverse Islamic group consisting of Arab, Tibetan and Uighur.⁵² A battle between the Muslims and China in 751 A.D.—the battle of Talas—led to Tang Dynasty's defeat and increased Arab control of the region. China's defeat in the battle and the subsequent instability led to the fall of the Tang Empire and the control of Central Asia.⁵³

By the time the Ming Dynasty replaced its Mongol Yuan predecessor in the late fourteenth century, however, the futility of demarcating a stable frontier along the boundless steppes and deserts of Central Asia was recognized by Beijing. If Central Asia could not provide China with the desired buffer, then the vast lands beyond them would. As a result of this realization, the policy shifted under the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), eventually alternating between aggressive military campaigns against the Mongol and Turkic tribes as well as ambitious government-sponsored commercial efforts—the latter aimed primarily at exchanging a relatively abundant Chinese commodity, tea, for a much-needed natural resource that Chinese historically proved

⁵¹ 孫壯志，「國際新格局中的中亞五國」，p. 60.

⁵² 于海波，*後冷戰時期俄美中三國中亞政策比較研究*，(北京中國中央黨校：2007)，頁 14。[Yu Haibo, *Hou Lengzhan Shiqi Er Mei Zhong Sanguo Zhongya Zhengce Bijiaoyanjiu* (Russia, U.S., and China's Central Asia policy after Cold War) Zhongguo Zhongyangdangxiao (Beijing: China's Communist Party School, June 2007): 14.]

⁵³ 于海波，p. 15.

incapable of producing internally, cavalry horses—both of which were attempts to impose order along the border areas. In addition, the Ming rulers, especially the Yongle Emperor (1402–1424), set about systematically to ward off the threat of any unified Mongol resurgence or other encroachment from the steppes against the security of their empire by carefully balancing the forces of the various tribes against one another in a rather sophisticated framework.⁵⁴

China's internal stability during the Qing Dynasty (1644-1911) led to a territorial expansion campaign into Central Asia. After gaining control of Taiwan and Tibet, Qing seized control of "Chinese Central Asia" in 1757 after defeating the Mongol and Uighur army.⁵⁵ Qing rule was minimal as she allowed religious and local leaders to maintain relative control of the region. The expansionist campaign by the Qing coincided with Russian expansion into Central Asia and led to a series of battles from 1751-1881 that resulted in a treaty with Russia over disputed territory.⁵⁶ In 1884 Xinjiang, translated to new territory, was formally incorporated into Qing Empire but the Manchu Dynasty was weakening and it subsequently collapsed in 1911.⁵⁷

The successor republican government was not strong either; under this circumstance, the Soviet Union seized the opportunity to back the Uighurs of Xinjiang in establishing a Kazakh and Uighur East Turkestan Republic in 1933. This attempt was suppressed by the Chinese government, only to be re-established in 1944 and the Soviets managed to control the Ili region until 1946. Xinjiang finally reverted to Chinese rule toward the end of the Chinese Civil War and was constituted as the

⁵⁴ J. Peter Pham, "Beijing's Great Game: Understanding Chinese Strategy in Central Eurasia," *American Foreign Policy Interests* 28 (2006): 53-55.

⁵⁵ Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 11.

⁵⁶ Hasan Haider Karrar, p. 10.

⁵⁷ Russell Ong, "China's Security Interests in Central Asia," *Central Asian Survey* 4 (December 2005): 426.

Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region (XUAR) of the People's Republic of China (PRC) after the Communist Party took power in 1949.⁵⁸

With the decline of Russian influence in Central Asia in the late 1980's and the eventual independence of Central Asian states in 1991, China's interest in this region began to reemerge after 80 years of limited contact.

3.1.2. The Overview of Central Asia's Geo-strategy

Central Asia has been a heartland in Eurasia continent which does not only connect the Eurasia and the Middle East, but also connect China and its west land. After the Cold War, the United States brought both the European and its power influences into this area, moreover it turned Central Asia into a strategic position in terms of geo-politics and geo-economic as well. In fact, the geopolitical expert Mackinder indicates that:

“Who rules the Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island controls the world.”⁵⁹

In the early 20th century, the Tsarist Russia and British empires were struggling for supremacy in Central Asian region, especially to include Afghan region. It was at the time, the Afghanistan was of primary interest for the two empires, which was firstly called the “great game.”⁶⁰ Nowadays, the geo-political importance of Central Asia has been highly evaluated again, not only because of its importance of the natural resources but also because of the great potential it will cause in the

⁵⁸ Russell Ong, p. 426.

⁵⁹ Halford John Mackinder, “The Geographical Pivot of History,” Wikipedia.org, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/The_Geographical_Pivot_of_History], (accessed: 20101201)

⁶⁰ Farrukh Irnazarov, *Strategic Importance of Central Asia: The New Great Game between the United States and Russia* (Copenhagen NIAS, April 2006), p. 8.

international politics and economical effects in the future. Therefore, to Central Asian peripherals, controlling the business route and fortune in Central Asia means controlling the convenience of doing business and the abundant energy supplies. On the contrary, the abundant natural resources in this region is the capital for Central Asian states to fight for, and so do other great powers in terms of keeping their interferences on political, economy, and sovereignty issues which become the source of contradictory and power imbalance. We know that when talking about developing or seizing natural resources, we often think of the competitions in geo-political and international politics, especially in Central Asia, the petroleum and natural gas have the geo-strategic importance that makes itself the heartland within international environment. On the other hand, the natural resources in Central Asia will become a focus under regional competition and geo-political strategy.⁶¹ So, there are scholars claim that under the realm of geo-politics, Central Asia is located in the “heartland” in regards of oil and natural gas, whoever controls Central Asia's natural resources will gain the leading position in the international geo-strategy.⁶²

To sum up, the domination of Central Asia's natural resources in the 21th century is related to the competitions among the great powers from Europe, America, and Asia. Therefore the energy issue has become the key element in redefining the international political status in the post-Cold War era. What is different from the past is the competitions for Central Asia's energy might change the international status among China, Russia, and the United States in the foreseeable future.

⁶¹ 孫壯志，「中亞五國的地緣戰略地位」，*東歐中亞研究* 4 (北京: 2000): 65。[Sun Zhuangzhi, *Zhongyawuguo De Diyuanzhanlvediwei* (The Geo-strategic Status of Five Central Asian States) *Dongou Zhongyu Yanjiu* (East European Russian and Central Asia Studies) 4 (Beijing: 2000): 65.]

⁶² 徐小杰，*新世界的油氣地緣政治* (北京: 社會科學文獻出版社, 1998年4月), 頁34-35。[Xu Xiaojie, *Xinshijie De Youqidiyuanzhengzhi* (The Oil Geo-politics in the New World) *Shehuikexuewenxianchubanshe* (Beijing: Social Science Literature Publisher, April 1998), pp. 34-35.]

3.1.3. China's Security Issues toward Central Asia

China's western region is adjacent to Central Asia within which the security issues are in connection with China's economic development and national security. For a long time, Beijing has felt threatened by the terrorism development in Central Asia especially in its XUAR. In order to keep economic growth, energy and strategic interests, Beijing needs to obtain the preconditions of realizing its strategic and energy objectives in Central Asia, which is based on the internal stability in XUAR. Thus, I will put emphasis on three dimensions including politics, economy, and ethical problems in this section.

Political Security

China had territorial disputes with the USSR before it collapsed, and both sides had fought a few wars. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the main concern for China's security issues toward Central Asian states was the border dispute between XUAR and Central Asia. Beijing's main concern here lies in territorial security issue which has become annoying for both China and Russia. In this context, Beijing wanted to grasp this opportunity to build good relationships with its peripherals including Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to make the border issue more peaceful.⁶³ In 1996, two important agreements were signed to deepen military trust in their border regions, and also to reduce military forces deployed in the border areas. These agreements provided that each side was to refrain from staging military exercises directly against the other. By doing so, Beijing has demilitarized and stabilized border with Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan. It is obvious

⁶³ Lowell Dittmer, pp. 14-15.

for Beijing to know that border stability has been the center of its economic development plans and foreign policy priorities. In addition, China's diplomacy in Central Asia aims to prevent the region from becoming a distraction from its internal development and more importantly foreign policy goals. Just like Ramakant Dwivedi says "there is a major emphasis given to the periphery in Chinese strategic thinking. Its peripheral security has the following two goals: (1) to maintain stability within its territory adjoining the boundary and to ensure the security and economic welfare of its people; and (2) to ensure peace and stability on the border by promoting a belt of good neighborliness and friendship."⁶⁴

Economic Security

China's fast economic growth has been pushing itself to seek for more petroleum with stable reserves. Yet Central Asia happened to meet this requirement of being rich in mineral wealth, especially in oil reserve. In other words, China's main economic interest in the region is energy. China has evolved into an oil importer ever since 1993, importing about 40 to 45 percent of its oil needs.⁶⁵ Furthermore, it is the world has become the second largest oil importer and consumer of energy since 2003, accounting for 40 percent of the increase in world oil demand since 2000. As about 60 percent of China's current oil import is from the Middle East, and roughly 80 percent of them passes through the 600-mile long Straits of Malacca, whose security depends on the U.S. Navy based on consideration of the constrains of Sea Lines Of Communication (SLOC), and the potential conflicts across Taiwan Straits, the SLOC between China and the Middle East show maritime vulnerability to potential

⁶⁴ Ramakant Dwivedi, pp. 140-141

⁶⁵ 張錫模，「新世紀能源支配權爭奪戰的基本構圖」，*能源季刊* 1 (台北: 1997): 6。[Chang Ximou, *Xinshiji Nengyuan Zhipequan Zhengduozhan De Jibengouto* (The Basic Picture of Energy Domination in New Century) *Nengyuan Jikan* (Energy Quarterly) 1 (Taipei: 1997): 6.]

disruption of supplies. In this context, the westward pipelines to Central Asia represent the strategic need to replace China's heavily dependence on maritime oil imports. In a border context, Beijing needs to put efforts on forging an environment which is less susceptible to external interferences or disruptions. Only further elevating the necessity of security along China's western borders, including XUAR, can this platform be enhanced by a complementary trend of increasing oil production from Central Asian states.⁶⁶ Consequently, Beijing wants to secure the diversity of oil supplies from the land routes, particularly from Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. As a result, it is Beijing's primary focus to develop its western region in order to resolve the poverty problem and to secure its economic security.

The Ethical Problem

China has focused on security issue of Central Asian region due to the concern of minority independent movements on its western borders. There are two kinds of ethical issues exist in Central Asia: firstly, there is frictions between local people and the Russians that cause many local people to migrate to the Russian Federation. From Beijing's perspective, the Central Asian states could potentially affect the ethnic situation of Xinjiang province to a huge extent. This possibility stems from the demographic similarities between the Central Asian states and XUAR. About 60 percent of Xinjiang's population is composed of ethnic minorities, which is the region's largest single ethnic group—the Uighur, and the number is over 7 million. Han Chinese is Xinjiang's second largest ethnic group, with a population of approximately 6 million. Recently, XUAR's independent movement relates to East

⁶⁶ Richard Giragosian, pp. 136-137.

Turkmenistan which aggregates China's worry, particularly following the collapse of the Soviet Union.⁶⁷ Beijing worried that transnational Islamic or ethnic Turkic forces operating outside of newly dependent Central Asian states would either directly, or indirectly encourage and support the separatist activities of minority groups on XUAR borders. For example, the rising powers of Islamic extremist in Central Asia and the reviving Islamic organizations in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan have been attacking and molesting the local governments, which has huge effect on Central Asia's internal security. Thus, how to prevent the minority independent on China's western region has been Beijing's priority in accordance with national security.

3.1.4. Opportunity and Predicament for Central Asian States

Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, Central Asia has become an important region in terms of China's western territory. In the wake of the September 11 Event, Central Asian states accentuate their importance in the international society. These five newly founded Central Asian states have presented a different degree of requirements of security and stability political environment in order to manage to run their countries well. However, the influences caused by three major factors of geo-politics, strategic resources, and war on terrorism have caused international powers to change as well as to make Central Asia become the arena of great power competitions, especially the U.S. military presence in Central Asia, changing the balance of power in this region. Under this circumstance, the foreign policies of Central Asian states are moving toward pluralism and practical routes with which are influenced and restrained by the following factors:

⁶⁷ Adiljan Umarov and Dmitriy Pashkun, pp.11-12.

The first factor is Central Asia's geographical position, Central Asian states are located in the hinterland of Asia, and they are all landlocked countries without sea ports which increases the difficulty to do businesses with other countries due to traffic inconvenience. In order to create passages for themselves, it is particularly important for Central Asian states to keep good relationships with its neighbors like China, Russia, Iran, Turkey, Pakistan, and India.⁶⁸

Second, most people in Central Asia believe in Islamism. In the former Soviet Union period, the religious freedom was controlled in Central Asia, but the foundation of common religion was rapidly built up in close relationships with its peripheral Islamic countries such as Turkey, Pakistan, and Iran after the independence.⁶⁹

Third, Central Asian states had used to be a province of tsarist Russia for a long time, and then became the joint republics of former Soviet Union. As a result, the Central Asian states are deeply influenced by Russia in aspects of politics, economy, and culture. Other than that, they are all members of Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), taking Russia as the leading role in the organization. In addition, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan are members of Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), taking Russia as the leading role as well. The above mentioned history and political facts will inevitably embody the Central Asian states' foreign policies to date.⁷⁰

Finally, all Central Asian states are rich in natural resources, but their economies

⁶⁸ 張延廷，「中亞發展現況與中國大陸在該區的區域戰略」，*空軍學術雙月刊* 623 (台北: 2010): 8。 [Zhang Yanting, Zhongya Fazanxiankuang yu Zongguodaluzhigaiyidiqu di Quyuozhanlve (Central Asia status and China's Regional Strategy Within) *Kongjunxueshushuangyuekan* (Air Force Academic Bimonthly) 623 (Taipei: 2010): 8.]

⁶⁹ 張延廷，「中亞發展現況與中國大陸在該區的區域戰略」， p. 11.

⁷⁰ 張延廷，「中亞發展現況與中國大陸在該區的區域戰略」， p. 10.

were suffered from the disintegration of the Soviet Union, which forces them to resume the economic links with Russia in order to resolve their economic difficulties. Meanwhile, in order to have independent economy bodies, they must look for new methods of building new economic relationships with other countries, attracting foreign investments, obtaining loans, and providing the natural resources they have.⁷¹

Because the foreign policies of Central Asian states have restricted by the above mentioned factors and hampered by the status of internal and external environments, they may face some possibilities predicted as the followings:

First, Central Asian states are rich in natural resources, but are lack of technology and capital. As a result, they need economic aids from the international community to help them break away from the economic predicaments. Politically speaking, Central Asian states are willing to establish democratic regimes, but due to the lack of political elites in the current political system, and the political powers are controlled by a small group of people, which makes the domestic political situations become worse. Furthermore, the external powers attempts to interfere in Central Asian states' domestic politics, causing the antithesis of different interests and increasing the uncertainty of political situations in Central Asia. The emerging external powers are influencing the stability and balance of status of Central Asian region in terms of economic and political issues, meanwhile there are uncertainties between “pro-American regime” and “Islamic forces” caused by external factors, which leads to the dilemma of decision-making within Central Asian states.⁷²

Second, the “strategic balance of power” and “strategic partnership” are two

⁷¹ Lowell Dittmer, “Central Asia and the Regional Powers,” pp. 8-13.

⁷² Stephen Blank, “Rethinking Central Asian Security,” *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Winter 2008): 38-39.

results of the great power competitions within Central Asia. Under the international circumstances, the small countries under the competition of big powers should take advantage of the contradiction among great powers so as to use their specialties such as issues of geo-graphical, petroleum, and anti-terrorism to draw protection from other great powers. Therefore, on the basis of national interests, Central Asian states should cooperate with great powers in order to obtain the balance point among the great powers, and to ensure the their maximum national interests.⁷³

To sum up, the future of Central Asian states depends on how the three great powers (China, Russia, and the United States) deal with Central Asian affairs and the ways they choose. There are four possibilities for Central Asia to develop in the future: (1) it may become Russia's buffer zone; (2) it may become the U.S. power projection of competition with China and Russia; (3) it may become China's springboard of accessing to Persia and Europe; and (4) it may become an independent power center. However, the best choice for Central Asian states is to become independent from other outside powers for the sake of their national interests without any doubt. In order to accomplish this goal, Central Asian states need to neglect some little disputes among them, and to integrate themselves to expand the effectiveness in the international community.

3.2. The SCO Role for the Security of Central Asia

After the end of the Cold War, there appeared 5 new independent states in Central Asia. However, the conflicts on Sino-Russia borders had evolved into China's

⁷³ Stephen Blank, "Rethinking Central Asian Security," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Winter 2008): 38-39.

multilateral relations with Russia and Central Asian states such as Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan. The SF is formed under the interactions of China, Russia, and Central Asian states that evolved from a regional forum in 1997 into a mechanism of regional cooperation and development, driving the five states to build up a new regional security system. After the SCO was founded on July 15, 2001, “Security” and “Economy” have become the axes of regional cooperation in SCO.⁷⁴

3.2.1. Background of SCO

During the Cold War, the international politics was influenced by the competitions between the U.S. and the USSR, which represents the theory and fulfillment of geo-politics. China's role has changed in accordance with the rise and decline of the U.S. and USSR. After the end of the Cold War, the following disintegration of the Soviet Union, and the collapse of the East Europe, China has insisted on developing the Socialism with Chinese characteristics based on the five principles of peaceful coexistence, while actively cooperating and competing with other countries around the world. Under this circumstance, China gradually expands the interactions of politics, economy, and cultural exchanges following its rapid economic development. Consequently, the resource-rich Central Asian states became the arena of great power competitions after the disintegration of the Soviet Union.

The Shanghai Five (SF) is a forum for China, Russia, and Central Asian states, including Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan to solve boarder issues including downsizing the border guards and starting military confidence building measures. On

⁷⁴ Richard Weitz, *China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?* op. cit., pp. 65-66.

April 26, 1996, at leadership summit in Shanghai, “Agreement on Strengthening Military Confidence in Border Areas” was signed by the countries bordering their land with the west part of China to enhance a zone of 100-km. depth from the border of member countries. There were Russia, China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, which came to be known as the SF. Then they also signed the “Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions” on the purpose of reducing military forces and promoting security on borders.⁷⁵ Because Central Asian states were suffered from the threats of three evils of religious extremism, separatism, and terrorism at the beginning of their independence, the SF is gradually evolved from a regional forum to a regional security cooperation mechanism which became Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) after Uzbekistan was admitted as the sixth member in 2001.⁷⁶

From 2004 to 2005, the SCO had consecutively accepted countries like Mongolia, Pakistan, India, and Iran as observers, greatly expanded the range of cooperation to the Northeast Asia, South Asia, and West Asia. Not only does this situation cause China face multilateral competitions in SCO, but also because the U.S. actively involved in Central Asian affairs by variety means, as a result, the Central Asia became a chess board in which there are more players with different powers.⁷⁷

3.2.2. Sino-Russia-Central Asian States Interactions in SCO

Within the framework of SCO, China and Russia are regional great powers while Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan are big states in Central Asia; Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are

⁷⁵ Richard Weitz, *China-Russia Security Relations: Strategic Parallelism without Partnership or Passion?*, p. 64.

⁷⁶ Richard Weitz, p. 64.

⁷⁷ Brzezinski Zbigniew, *The Grand Chessboard* (NY: Perseus Book Group, 1997), p. 38

small ones. Each and every country hopes to improve the organization on the issues of security and economy. In order to understand the competitions and developments among China and Central Asian states, factors of history, security, economy, and humanity will be analyzed as following:

History Factor

During the later periods of 1950s, the essential feature of Sino-U.S. international relations was still a situation of struggling between the major two camps of imperialism and socialism. Under this circumstance, China's socialism build-up was influenced by both of the confrontation of Russia and the United States and their policies toward China.⁷⁸ Strategically speaking, China was pro Russia during this period of time, which made the United States unsatisfied with Beijing who did not trust the United States either.

The SCO emerged from a series of border security negotiations begun in November 1992 between Beijing and the former Soviet states located along China's western border. Starting from 1996, the five states began to hold annual summit meetings as the SF. At the first leadership summit meeting in Shanghai on April 26, 1996, the governments signed a "Treaty on Deepening Military Trust in Border Regions," which established a set of military confidence-building measures along their shared borders. During the second meeting of the five nations under this framework, which occurred in Moscow on April 25, 1997, they signed a "Treaty on Reduction of Military Forces in Border Regions" that restricted conventional military

⁷⁸ 黃安余，*新中國外交史*（上海：人民出版社，2005年3月），頁39。[Huang Anyu, *Xinzhongguo Waijiaoshi* (New History of China's Diplomacy) (Shanghai: People's Publisher, March 2005), p. 9.]

deployments and activities within a hundred kilometer-wide demilitarized zone along these common borders.⁷⁹

The subsequent SF summits began to discuss economic and other nonmilitary issues, including how to cope with regional terrorism, narcotics trafficking, and other transnational threats of concern to all the participating states. By 2001, the governments involved decided they needed a more permanent mechanism to address their expanding multilateral agenda. In particular, they sought more frequent meetings than the annual leadership summits and to extend the range from government agencies to issues of encompass security, law enforcement, and economic cooperation. At their June 2001 meeting, the SF joined with Uzbekistan, whose president had attended the July 2000 summit in Dushanbe as an observer, to institutionalize their interactions by establishing the SCO and to replace the SF.⁸⁰

Building on the arms control achievements of the SF as discussed above, the SCO has sponsored extensive, senior-level consultations on several issues, including crime, narcotics trafficking, economic development, transportation, communications, energy, the war in Afghanistan, and anti-terrorism. The latter topic had become the most important issue of concern for its members. The parties are establishing concrete mechanisms to facilitate such cooperation—including annual meetings of their defense ministers, foreign ministers, and prime ministers—as well as formal structures to interact with non-member governments and other international institutions.

Security Factor

⁷⁹ Ramakant Dwivedi, “China’s Central Asia Policy in Recent Times”, op. cit., pp. 150-151.

⁸⁰ Ramakant Dwivedi, p. 150.

Within the framework of the SCO, the security factor has been the key factor on issues of border security and military mutual trust; it highlights the importance of taking precaution against terrorism, after the September 11 Event in 2001. Among China, Russia, and Central Asian states, there are religious extremism and ethical separatism caused by religious and ethical factors, furthermore, there are several threats including crimes, narcotics trafficking, illegal immigrants, and illegal weapons trading, which forms the so called “the four powers” or the threats of non-conventional security.⁸¹ In order to counter those threats mentioned above, China uses NSC to develop good relations with Russia and Central Asian states, and practically carries out coalition anti-terrorism military exercises to stop these non-conventional threats from spreading. Except for traditional conflicts happened from one country to another, it is more important to highlight the importance of non-traditional security which is to interact with other countries on the fields of national development, non-military, and foreign policies.⁸²

Under the framework of SCO, we can firstly discuss the ethical problem which is effected by geography before non-traditional problem is formed, including China and Russia. In the 19th century, the Tsarist Russia expanded toward its peripherals in which there was no natural obstacle, especially to the Central Asian region in which Russia considered as a critical base of invading India and a route to enter China. After Central Asia was swallowed by Russia, the people from Central Asia were anxious

⁸¹ 傅仁坤、張益銘，「中亞區域安全與上海合作組織的發展」，第四屆「恐怖主義與國家安全」學術研討會論文集（龜山：警察大學，2008年），頁300-301。[Fu Renkun and Chang Yiming, Zhongyaquyuanquan Yu Shanghaihezuo-zuzhi De Fazhan (Central Asia Regional Security and the Development of SCO) *Di Si Jie “Kongbuzhuyi Yu Goujiaanquan” Xueshuyantaohui Lunwenji* (The 4th Terrorism and National Security Symposium) (Guishan: Police University of Technology, 2008), pp. 300-301.]

⁸² Kevin Sheives, “China Turns West: Beijing’s Contemporary Strategy towards Central Asia,” *Pacific Affairs* 2 (Summer 2006): 205.

about Moscow's thorough Russification policy, moreover, the Central Asian ethical structure was changed by policies, such as collectivization of agriculture, compulsive emigration, and ethnic discrimination, carried out by Russians. Furthermore, after the disintegration of Soviet Union, the domestic ethnical problem had evolved into ethnical problem among Central Asian states.⁸³

Being independent, the people from Central Asian states feel the uneasy and difficulty caused by the social anxious and economic crisis.⁸⁴ At the same time, the Islam, an inherent religious in Central Asian states, has took advantage of social turbulence to expand and develop itself to become a religious extremism, and to build a national level of Islam system.⁸⁵ In order to achieve this goal, the extremists have also planned horrific violent operations such as assassinations and suicide bombings in Central Asia where the original problem of nationality is complicated, which became a combination of religious extremism, ethnical separatism, and international terrorism. In addition, the loosen border management and inherent social problems of poverty and corruption also create conditions for the inflows of illegal drugs, which makes it the main capital source for the “three evils,” becoming a multinational operation.⁸⁶ Therefore, each member of SF actively strikes on cross-border crime

⁸³ 李淑雲，「地緣政治與中亞五國民族問題」，*俄羅斯中亞東歐研究* 4 (2005): 20-22。[Lee Shuyun, *Diyuanzhengzhi Yu Zhongyawuguo Minzuwenti* (Geopolitics and the Ethical Problems of Five Central Asian States) *Elosizhoyadonou Yanjiu* (The Russian Central Asia and East European Studies) 4 (2005): 20-22.]

⁸⁴ 趙常慶，「論中亞形勢與非傳統安全問題的相互作用」，*俄羅斯中亞東歐研究* 2 (2006): 49。[Zhao Zhangqing, *Lun Zhongyaxingshi Yu Feichuantong Anquanwenti De Xianhuzuoyong* (A Study on the Interaction of Central Asia Status and Non-Traditional Security Problem) *Elosizhoyadonou Yanjiu* (The Russian Central Asia and East European Studies) 2 (2006): 49.]

⁸⁵ 巨克毅，「當前恐怖主義與極端主義結合趨勢之探討」，*非傳統安全威脅研究報告* (台北: 國家安全叢書, 2007年)。[Ju Keyi, *Danchankonbuzuyi Yu Jidwanzuyi Jaihozitantao* (A Study on the Trend of Combination of Contemporary Terrorism and Extremism), *Faichuantongweixei Yenjoubaogao* (Non-Traditional Security Threat Report) (Taipei: National Security Series, 2007), p. 42.]

⁸⁶ 史崇理，「毒品貿易和上海合作組織: 前景與矛盾」，*俄羅斯研究* 3 (2007): 52。[Shi Zhonglee, *Dupinmaoyi Han Shanghai Hezuozuzhi Qianjing Yu Maodun* (Narcotics Trafficking and SCO) *Elousi Yanjiu* (Russian Studies) 3 (2007): 52.]

activities. In 2001, all six members of SCO signed “Shanghai Pact” on combating the three evils of terrorism, separatism, and extremism, which was provided as a basis of law.⁸⁷ After the September 11 Event happened, the U.S. had gained opportunity to stay in Central Asia for a long period of time, though a part of the U.S. military forces has withdrawn from Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan after “SCO leadership summit” in 2005. So the United States still makes use of the Afghan anti-terrorism military operations as a long term strategy to stay in Central Asia which is an irrefutable fact.⁸⁸

In order to ensure the security of Central Asian region, the SCO actively promotes transnational cooperation and multilateral mechanisms among its members, including security and executive department cooperation, anti-terrorism mechanism in Tashkent, and joint anti-terrorism military exercises, making SCO a tool to prevent the “three evils” from expanding.

Economic Factor

China has been focusing on developing its southwest provinces since the open door policy was implemented in 1979, and its economy has been rapidly developing in recent years. On the other hand, China's western region, borders with Russia, have provided natural resources needed by the development of the east region, resulting a disparity gap between the eastern and the western parts of China. At present, the characteristic of industry of China's western region has been evolved from agriculture

⁸⁷ 余建華，「中亞的民族問題及其影響論析」，*俄羅斯研究* 1 (2002): 73-74。[Yu Jianhua, Zhongya De Minzuwenti Jiqi Yinxiang Lunxi (The Analysis of Central Asia Ethnic Problem and its Effective) *Elousi Yanjiu* (Russia Studies) 1 (2002): 73-74.]

⁸⁸ 余學會、李韜等著，「美國軍事力量進入中亞及其影響」，*東歐中亞研究* 3 (2002): 39。[Yu Xuehui and Xu Tao ed, Meiquo Junshililiang Jinru Zhongya Jiqi Yingxiang (The U.S. Military In Central Asia and Its Effective) *Donou Zongya Yanjiu* (East Europe and Central Asia Studies) 3 (2002): 39.]

and livestock industry into agriculture and industrial divisions. Although the Central Asian states have been independent from the Soviet Union for more than 10 years, their economies still remain the same structure which mainly produces raw materials and has exporting-oriented feature. Because of industry divisions, Central Asian states are often not self-sufficient in food, and replaced planned economy after independence. With the existing social market economic system, they now have a goal to build a free market.⁸⁹ After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, Russia has become Central Asian states legal inheritor, and the economic situation has been stable under Putin's administration. Both of the domestic economy and currency status depend on the equilibrium of government budget which mainly comes from the foreign currency created from exporting energy, which is the so-called “petrodollars”.⁹⁰ As a result, Russia is eager to dominate the energy of Central Asia in order to suit its energy strategy.

Within the framework of SCO, economic cooperation is divided into two major areas including negotiation from government departments and non-governmental exchanges. On the one hand, the leaders meeting, premier's meeting, the minister's meeting, high officials meetings, and professional working groups are part of governmental department exchanges; on the other hand, the committee of entrepreneur from member states, bank associations from member states, and SCO forum are part of non-governmental exchanges.⁹¹

⁸⁹ 趙常慶等編著，*中亞五國與中國西部大開發*（北京：崑崙出版社，2004年12月），頁91-113。[Zhao Zhangqing, *Zhongyawuquo Yu Zhongquoxibudakaiifa* (The Five Central Asia States and China's Go West Development) (Beijing: Kunlun Publisher, December 2004), pp. 91-113.]

⁹⁰ 馮紹雷等著，*轉型中的俄羅斯對外戰略*（上海：人民出版社，2005年4月），頁94-95。[Feng Shaolei ed., *Zhuanxingzhong De Elousi Duiwai Zhanlve* (Russia's Foreign Strategy in Transition) (Shanghai: Renmin Publisher, April 2005), pp. 94-95.]

⁹¹ Take reference to SCO Official Website at <http://www.sectsco.org/EN/shownews>

During the leadership meeting in 2006 and 2007, the priority of cooperation included energy issue, information technology cooperation, and traffic issue. Therefore, the energy cooperation is on mutual-lateral cooperation phase under the framework of SCO. Because Russia, Kazakhstan, and Uzbekistan are rich in energy reserves, they have a huge potential to reach a consensus to cooperate with each other under common energy demands in order to reach a suitable consensus.

It is a critical element for China to keep the rapid increasingly economic development, which determines whether China can maintain its remarkable economic growth rates. The global energy-consuming growth rate was 2.4 % in 2007, which was a slightly drop compared to 2.7% in 2006, but it remained a continuous growth over the past 5 years while China's growth rate was as much as 7.7%, though it was the lowest growth rate since 2002, it was still higher than the average growth rate over the past 10 years, which accounted for half of the global energy-consuming growth rate.

In order to avoid overly depending on the sea-lane for the transportation of energy resources from the Middle East which potentially has Malacca Dilemma, China has to develop toward the pluralistic oil sources in accordance with its energy strategy.⁹²

As to Central Asian states, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are devoted themselves to explore the oil and gas fields, and to develop petrochemical industry while

⁹² 龐國強，「從『中國崛起』探究中美、中俄關係與中亞能源發展之戰略意涵」，*陸軍學術雙月刊*（龍潭：2009）：89。[Pang Guochang, Cong “Zhongquojieqi” Tanjiu ZhongMei ZhongE Guanxi Yu Zhongyanenyanfazan Zhi Zhanlveyihan (A Study of on the Relationship between Sino-U.S. and Sino-Russia Based on China’s Peaceful Rising and the Strategic Implication of Central Asia’s Energy Development) *Lujun Xueshushuangyuekan* (Army Bimonthly) (Longtan: 2009): 89.]

Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are focusing on developing hydropower system and building power grids. Although the “Outline of Multilateral Economic and Trade Cooperation” had been signed in the SCO leadership summit in 2006 and 2007, declaring the exploitation of oil and gas, construction of oil and gas pipelines, and construction of hydro-power plants are concluded in the collaborative items, all of those constructions need capital and time for development, it also needs the further cooperation of governments and civilians of the member states to become practicable.

Russia today is a energy exporting giant, not only does Russia take it as a key element to maintain its economic status but also a critical maneuver to resume its status in the world, especially when Putin came into power in 2000, regarding energy diplomacy as an important project of its foreign policy.

First of all, it is important for Russia to dominate the energy of Caspian Sea as well as its transport oil pipelines; secondly to monopolize the abundant energy of Central Asia. After the setback of “An-Da Line,” later became the “An-Na Line,” which illustrates that under the framework of SCO, Russia not only intended to maintain the strategic partnerships with China, but also to dominate the oil pipelines instead of being controlled by China on the basis of Russian national interests.⁹³

At the heads of member states of SCO summit meeting in June 2006, the Russian president Putin put forward the idea of “energy club” under the framework of SCO, trying to safeguard its energy security with concerted effort.

⁹³ 姜書益，「中哈管線的興建及其面臨的挑戰」，*大國及中亞能源政策學術會議*（中壢：清雲科技大學，2007年9月），頁5-6。[Jiang Xuyi, Zhongha Guanxianxingjian Jiqi Mianlin De Tiaozhan (The Establishment and Challenges of China-Kazakastan Oil Pipeline) *Darquo Ji Zhongya Nengyuanzhangce Xueshuhuiyi* (Great Powers and Energy Policy toward Central Asia Academic Conference) (Zhonlee: Ching Yun University, September 2007): 5-6.]

Cultural Factor

“Mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and collaboration, respecting different civilizations, and mutual developments” are the basic ideas of Shanghai Spirit, following the developments of security and economic cooperation, the mechanisms of cultural cooperation has also been developing under the framework of SCO; humanity and culture cooperation is a kind of cultural exchanges compared to the security and economic cooperation, which is regarded as the foundation of “soft power” that is different from military affairs, politics, and interest struggle. On the contrary, the soft power has the abilities of offering amnesty and enlistment to one's adversary and makes them obey the orders instead of suppressing people in order to achieve the purpose by itself. As long as one country's policy and culture are favored by its people, the soft power will be rising at the same time.⁹⁴

As to the SCO member states, it is essential for them to strengthen mutual cultural exchanges, increase people to people mutual understandings; on the one hand to eliminate ethical contradictions and promote the harmonious among the nationalities, on the other hand to form cultural characteristics and promote the cohesiveness and centripetal force of SCO. The three basic functions of cultural cooperation in SCO are as follows:⁹⁵

1. All member states should strengthen culture exchanges and promote mutual understanding through dialogue and cooperation, and enhance the cohesiveness of SCO through reducing misunderstandings caused by cultural difference of member states.
2. All member states should coordinate the existing cultural and traditional differences in order to reach a consensus on the basis of common regulations.

⁹⁴ Joseph, Nye Jr., *Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics* (New York: Public Affairs, 2004), p. 5.

⁹⁵ 刑廣程、孫壯志編，*上海合作組織研究*（吉林：長春出版社，2007年4月），頁121-122。[Xing Guangcheng, and Sun Zhuangzhi ed., *Shanghaihezuo-zuzhi Yanjiu* (Study on Shanghai Cooperation Organization) (Jilin: Changchun Publisher, April 2007), pp. 121-122.]

3. All member states should promote economic and trading development through cooperation of culture, education, environmental protection, and tourism. By constantly expanding cooperative fields to finally reach the final goal of regional stability within SCO.

After the establishment of SCO, the first minister of cultural meeting was held in 2002, during which the “SCO joint statement of minister of culture” was signed and agreed to hold a minister of culture meeting every two years thereafter, focusing on concrete measures of the cultural cooperation.

The cultural exchanges of member states include holding cultural activity, the exchanges of foreign students, the foundations of language institution, and the establishments of Confucius institution, etc.

The non-governmental human and culture exchanges are not frequent enough because most of those exchanges are carried out by the government institutions, and because Central Asian states usually focus on domestic economic development, using limited funds to enhance national modernization so as to improve comprehensive national power. Because these reasons mention above, most of the Central Asian states are lack of passions in terms of building the “soft power,” not to mention using extra funds to build a sound basis of national soft power.⁹⁶

3.2.3. The Future Prospect of SCO

After the end of Cold War, the international status has become “one superpower and many big powers.” The United States has always paid close attentions to Chinese and Russia's developments in terms of the global strategy. Washington thought it is

⁹⁶ 朱新光，「中亞國家軟實力探略」，*俄羅斯中亞東歐研究* 2 (2008): 47。[Zhu Xinguang, *Zhongyaguojia Ruanshili Tanlve (Soft Power Analysis of Central Asian States) Elosizhoyadonou Yanjiu (The Russian Central Asia and East European Studies) 2 (2008): 47.*]

very important for Beijing to not only being regionally but also being globally developed which it is an essential element in today's international strategic environment, especially China is eager to maintain its rapid economic growth rate and also to keep its economic power caused by the fast economic and political growth. Meanwhile, the United States also encourages China to become a responsible country in the international system.⁹⁷

The U.S. strategic interests in Central Asia can be divided into three aspects as follows: (1) to prevent Russia and China from monopolizing Central Asia. Central Asian region was under Russia's influence in the former Soviet Union period. At present, Russia not only wants to monopolize the abundant natural resources in this region by using the framework of SCO, but also to unilaterally occupy the natural gas and petroleum in Central in order to monopolize the supply market of the European Union (EU). Meanwhile, China also wants to become the economic and trading dominator in Central Asia by using the institutional structure of SCO.⁹⁸ The Eurasia continent is undoubtedly a key strategic point for the United States. Thus, while the U.S. troops stationed in this region at the time when the September 11 Event occurred, it also protracting its influence into Central Asian states in the fields of political and economy by all means, in order to change Russia and China's advantage influences in the region, and to compress their scope of influence. Finally to increase the U.S. influence as a leading force led by the West; (2) to secure interest of energy. The U.S. interests toward Central Asia are quite obvious. The U.S. would like to keep down the rising of international oil price, and to secure its energy security through American

⁹⁷ Daren Adam Epstein, *The Impact of the September 11, 2001 Terrorist Attacks on U.S.-China Relations* (CA: Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, 2003), pp. 45.

⁹⁸ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, *The New Great Game: The Competition for the Energy Resources of Central Asia* (Zonli: Chingyun University, 2010), pp. 108.

private investments and plural supplies to ensure sufficient needs of both the United States and the Western countries.⁹⁹ In order to prevent the same incident of Russia's cutting off Ukraine's oil supply in January, 2006 from happening again, the United States has to have not only plural oil and gas supply channels, but also to have substitute channels for export, which will prevent oil price from rising caused by pipeline damage during the refinery process.¹⁰⁰ In addition, the interests gained by the U.S. oil companies in Central Asia will not only facilitate industry developments which make Americans rich, but also make the U.S. actively involved in dominating natural resources in the Central Asia region; and (3) to prevent Central Asia from Iran's influence. The U.S. applied to become the observer of the SCO in July, 2005, and being refused by SCO, because it does not belong to either Central Asia or South Asia. Meanwhile, Iran had joined in the SCO in the same year of 2005, which makes the U.S. suspicious about the future development of the organization.¹⁰¹ Furthermore, the Iran's president was invited to participate in the SCO leader summit 2006 in Shanghai, which made the U.S. uneasy and worry. Therefore, the U.S. claims to cooperate with other countries in the region and to prevent Iran from influencing on the government or political parties in this area, and also to prevent Iran from being member state of SCO by all means.¹⁰²

As to the United States, Iran has Muslim background, strong military strength, and strong intentions of getting involved in Central Asian affairs, except influencing

⁹⁹ Nichol, Jim, *Central Asia: Regional Developments and Implications for U.S. Interests*, RL33458, U.S. Congressional Research Service, 14 December 2007, p. 6

¹⁰⁰ Gene Germanovich, "The Shanghai Cooperation Organization: A Threat to American Interests in Central Asia?," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 1 (Washington: Winter 2008): 19-38.

¹⁰¹ 張如倫, 「上海合作組織的再發展與影響因素」, *陸軍學術雙月刊* 492 (桃園: 2007): 160。
[Chang Rulun, Sanhaihotautsuzi De Zaifazhan YuYingxanyinsu (The SCO Future Development and Influence), *Lujunxueshu Shuangyuekan* (Army Bimonthly) 492 (Taoyuan: 2007): 160.]

¹⁰² Michael Vail, "U.S. Irked by Iran's Joining SCO", *IntelliBriefs*, April 9, 2008, available at: <http://intellibriefs.blogspot.com/2008/04/us-irked-by-irans-joining-sco.html>, (accessed: 20110220)

the military and political affairs of Central Asia, it may become an Islam alliance with Central Asian states, which has abundant strategic natural resources like oil and gas, to connect to the Caspian Sea, therefore endangers the U.S. strategic energy interests in this region. As a result, one of the U.S. strategic objectives is to suppress Iran from becoming a great power in Central Asian region.¹⁰³

3.3. China's Central Asia policy before September 11

Following the collapse of the Soviet Union in the early 1990s, China had to redefine its strategic and foreign policy objectives in Central Asia. Structurally speaking, there are three aspects of China's strategic considerations regarding to stability and security, economic development, and especially the energy requirement.

3.3.1. Stability and Security

For China, the stability of Central Asian states is a key factor after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, which means a pivotal role of Central Asia for security along China's western borders is showed up again, due to Beijing's perception of vulnerability along its remote western borders is further exacerbated by the emergence of an open Central Asian frontier. But the main driver for China's emphasis on security along its western borders is the concern over instability in Xinjiang. From this point, Beijing's foreign regional policy focuses on three Central Asian states that border the Xinjiang province—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. In order to maintain stability and security within Xinjiang, China realized that their top priority is to contain the influence of Islamic fundamentalism and ethnic-Turkic activities in

¹⁰³ 張延廷，「中亞發展現況與中國大陸在該區的區域戰略」，p. 7.

China through the support of Central Asian states.¹⁰⁴ There are two actions China has applied in order to meet this primary objective, the first action taken by China was to settle border disputes with all three states that shared 3,000 km. of its western border. China and Kazakhstan signed a protocol to demarcate and delimit 1,740 km. boundary between the two countries; The Kyrgyz signed two protocols in 1996 and 1999 to settle their boundary disputes; Tajikistan and China signed an agreement in May 2002. Under this agreement, Tajikistan ceded 1,000 sq. km. of territory to China in return of China's withdrawal of 28,000 sq. km of Tajik territory.¹⁰⁵

Since incorporating Xinjiang in 1759, the Uighur minorities have resisted China's control because Central Asia much closer to the over 7 million Muslim, ethnic-Turkic Uighur than the ethnic Han Chinese. Therefore, Beijing sees the XUAR as especially vulnerable to separatism and anti-Chinese influences. The second action taken by China is to begin a migration program of its Han Chinese population in order to establish and maintain government control in the 1950s. The migration of Han Chinese into Xinjiang intrigued tensions between the Uighur minority and Beijing in 1970's. During this period, the spread of Islam led to the region having the highest number of mosque in the world in the mid 1980's.¹⁰⁶

With this religious change, radical Islamic ideology begins to emerge with the opening of schools and practices of religious activities not supported by Chinese. Radical Islamic ideology eventually led to the unification of Uighur separatist and terrorist organizations, such as the East Turkistan Islamic Movement (ETIM) and Islamic Organization of Turkistan that took actions against Beijing government by

¹⁰⁴ Boris Z Rummer., ed., *Central Asia—A Gathering Storm* (Armonk, NY: ME Sharpe, 2003), p. 178.

¹⁰⁵ Ramakant Dwivedi, pp. 146-147.

¹⁰⁶ Roy Allison and Lena Johnson, ed., *Central Asian Security—The New International Context* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institute Press, 2001), p. 161.

conducting a series of booming in Xinjiang from 1997 to present.¹⁰⁷

Therefore, Islam is tightly controlled both in Central Asia and China. Although China established harsh military and governmental actions against these organizations, the fact is the radical Islam is still rising by external support like Afghanistan and Pakistan (training and economic assistance) rather than from Central Asian states. Beijing is less concerned about the religious extremism as it is concerned by separatist nationalism due to many Uighur nationalist leaders outside China is by no means religiously radical. Thus, China has put emphasis on the struggle against separatism and terrorism, and the religious extremism is only a part of its strategy.

In this context, gaining the Central Asian states', especially with Kazakhstan, Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, cooperation in the struggle against terrorism, separatism and extremism within Xinjiang is China's Central Asia strategy prior September 11, 2001.

3.3.2. Economic Development

The independence of Central Asian states in 1991 caused China to extend its hands into this region. Beijing views its western region as a hard issue to be overcome on the basis of Xinjiang's historical background with Central Asian states. In order to solve the separatism issue, Beijing had to apply economic reform in this region while maintaining the stability and unity at the same time. Because Xinjiang is connected with Central Asia as a "Eurasia continental bridge," the economy shall be developed by direct trade relations with neighboring Central Asian states, increasing an opportunity to fully develop the preserved oil and gas resources in the region.

¹⁰⁷ Richard Giragosian, "The Strategic Central Asian Arena," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 1 (Washington: Spring 2006): 133-153.

In this context, economic interaction offered China a significant leverage to induce Central Asian states against religious or ethnic based groups who supported anti-government organizations in Xinjiang.¹⁰⁸ Beijing's long-standing state-building policies in Central Asia is one part of its Great Western Development Project which is an attempt to simultaneously integrate Xinjiang with Central Asian states in economic terms, while establishing security and cooperation with its Central Asian neighbors.¹⁰⁹ In 1992, the Xinjiang local government was allowed to open its borders for economic activities. The internal manifestation of this strategy is focusing on expanded Central Asian trade and economic developments resulting in a majority of all business activities conducted in Xinjiang while increasing the region's dependency on Xinjiang as the trading center for Central Asia, increasing investment for the exploitation of Xinjiang's potential energy resources, encouragement of cotton cultivation and primary products (including food), increasing trade and economic investments in Central Asia are focused toward Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, opening borders to trade with Central Asian states, and to invest in infrastructure linking to Central Asian states.

On the other hand, the external manifestation of this approach is to maintain an economic presence in Central Asia through trade by the extension incentives for border trade and improvement of infrastructural links. Beijing views Investments in infrastructure (railways and roads) have allowed itself to maintain trade with Central Asian states that include a potential rail between Xinjiang and Uzbekistan passing Kyrgyzstan.¹¹⁰ Furthermore, loans to Central Asian states such as Kyrgyzstan and

¹⁰⁸ Mark Burles, p.14.

¹⁰⁹ Gaye Christofferson, "Xinjiang and the Great Islamic Circle: The Impact of Transnational Forces on Chinese Regional Economic Planning," *The China Quarterly* 133 (March 1993): 130-151.

¹¹⁰ Bates, Gill, *China's New Journey to the West: China's Emergence in Central Asia and Implication*

Tajikistan to purchase Chinese commercial goods are on the purpose of supporting Beijing's policy against the "three evils" in Xinjiang. Although trading volume is relatively low for China compared to other regions, China views economic developments of Xinjiang and Central Asia as an imperative linkage to stabilize the region against Islamic fundamentalism.

3.3.3. Energy Requirement

China, being the world's second largest oil consumer after the United States, has been attaching high priority to accessing oil and gas reserves in the Central Asian states since exceeding its energy self-sufficiency in 1993. Because 85 percent of China's imported oil passes through the Indian Ocean, Malacca Strait, and the South China Sea. Thus, any interference in this "strategic passageway" by nations trying to contain China or by pirates or terrorists intent on disrupting the global market could halt nearly all of China's energy supply. Consequently, Beijing has to diversify its energy imports to lower dependence on the Middle East. However, most of the domestic energy resources in China are located in the northern and northwest province (Xinjiang Region) which has made stability/security of these areas vital to China's economic prosperity.

There are several methods to be taken in consideration in order to diversify the sources of energy imports and increase the share of oil and gas imports from Russia and Central Asia. After the Central Asian states gained their independence, China began economic and trade negotiations with energy rich states along the Caspian basin in order to establish a foothold in the energy market. Needless to say, Beijing's priority in Central Asia is to cooperate with energy-rich states including Kazakhstan

and Turkmenistan. Beginning in 1997, China's National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) purchased 60.3 percent of the shares in the Akyubinsk project in Kazakhstan increasing to 85.6 percent in 2003.¹¹¹ China and Kazakhstan also agree to establish an oil pipeline from the Caspian Sea into Xinjiang with further distribution into eastern China. China established similar energy deals with Turkmenistan to establish a natural gas pipeline into Xinjiang, and the CNPC brokered deal to construct oil pipelines connecting into Kazakhstan line from Turkmenistan. In addition, Beijing is planning on construction of a rail way line linking Uzbekistan and Xinjiang province via Kyrgyzstan, which clearly demonstrates Beijing's political and economic commitments to ensure oil and gas supply from the Central Asian states.

3.4. China's Central Asia Policy after September 11

The September 11 Event is a key issue in the landscape of global security, especially for the U.S. military projection and presence in this region that highlighted the importance of Central Asia. Consequently, both the U.S. military projection and its political influence in Central Asia have greatly affected China's Central Asia policy. Followed by last section mentioned above, the changing of China's Central Asia policy should be analyzed by the following three aspects.

3.4.1. Sino-U.S. Cooperation

In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, the bad relations between China and the U.S. caused by the collision between a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft and a Chinese

¹¹¹ Charles Hawkins and Robert R. Love. ed., *The New Great Game—Chinese Views on Central Asia* (Fort Leavenworth, KS: Foreign Military Studies Office, 2006), p. 152.

interceptor fighter aircraft on April 1, 2001 became a less important for the United States. Moreover, the U.S. WOT in reaction to the September 11 attacks changed the focus of China's strategy in Central Asian region. In this context, China would like to seek cooperation with the United States, which came as a result of the two nations benefiting from mutual assistance in certain areas instead of changing the good relationship.¹¹²

China views the U.S. WOT in Central Asia as both an opportunity for cooperation and a potential loss over which relations with the U.S. might become strained. The balance of power in Central Asia is shifted by the Bush administration's focus on defeating the Taliban regime and undermining al-Qaeda control in Afghanistan. Consequentially, Beijing viewed the increased U.S. presence and influence in Central Asia as a strategic loss. Because Beijing has had intent on gaining greater influence and economic advantage through SCO in Central by the time the Soviet collapsed, the increased U.S. presence created by the WOT put a halt to this effort. However, Beijing sought to utilize the potential strategic gain by using the result of U.S. WOT in Central Asia as a mechanism to facilitate greater crackdowns on separatist groups in the XAUR. Cooperation between China and the U.S. in the WOT therefore become complicated because of the U.S. desire for China's assistance, balanced against U.S. concern about human rights in China.¹¹³

The United States did not overtly agree with China on cracking down on the minority populations in the XUAR as terrorist threats. Although the U.S. put the ETIM on the list of terrorist organizations in 2002, Washington recognized that there

¹¹² Matthew Oresman, "Reassessing the Fleeting Potential for U.S.-China Cooperation in Central Asia," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 6 (Washington: Winter 2008): 5.

¹¹³ Daren Adam Epstein, pp. 43-47.

were organizations that could be condemned for using violence in pursuit of their goals and others that were legitimate political entities.¹¹⁴

The U.S. WOT did not merely create an opportunity for greater cooperation with China, but also reduce tensions between the two countries by treating China as a strategic competitor to fight terrorism. Concerning the increased U.S. influence in Central Asia as a result of the WOT, Beijing continues to act as a balance against U.S. hegemony. China's strategy is concentrated on maintaining good relations with the United States, avoiding conflicts, and enhancing trade relations, but also sought to limit U.S. strategic advances in Central Asia. Keeping with this strategy, Beijing has been uncooperative in assisting Washington in efforts on WOT. Rather, both nations subordinated the more contentious aspects of their relationship to achieve relative strategic gains from the WOT.¹¹⁵

Many Chinese argued that Beijing should take advantage of U.S. eagerness for support to shore up its own often troubled relationship with the United States and thereby benefit from pursuing China's own version of an engagement strategy to keep U.S. power in check. Others said that the conflict between China and the United States was no longer the most important confrontation in the world as the "three forces—national separatism, religious extremism, and terrorism have become the focus of international strife especially in Xinjiang where is in the neighbor of Central Asia. Therefore, some Chinese officials have made it a point to emphasize that the U.S. military presence in the region contributes to peace and stability. There is no denying the fact that a dramatic shift in China's priority after September 11, 2001,

¹¹⁴ Daren Adam Epstein, pp. 43-47.

¹¹⁵ Daren Adam Epstein, pp. 43-47.

contributed to an improvement in the overall atmospherics and tone of the Sino-U.S. relationship.¹¹⁶ In short, behind Beijing's solidarity with the anti-terrorism coalition lay great expectations of finding a common enemy once again to reconstruct a cooperative and strategic partnership with the U.S. after more than a decade of drift, distrust, and acrimony following the Soviet collapse.

On the other hand, maintaining a good, stable, and predictable relationship with the United States is considered practically important to China's continued economic growth, as the U.S. is the largest source of investment, capital, and technology and provides the largest market for Chinese goods. Furthermore, China hopes that the U.S. Global War on Terrorism (GWOT) could be used internally to strengthen the hand of the Chinese regime against its opponents. From Beijing's perspective, an underlying aspect of the American campaign is that its thrust, throughout the world, will be to favor the cause of order and stability over chaos and instability. And this also serves to China's interest. Knowing well that the case for Xinjiang to exercise self-determination historically is much stronger than that of Kashmir or Chechnya, China has always been very sensitive to territory integrity issue. China's support assumption that its success would help Beijing solve the oldest problems faced by the Chinese empire: how to pacify, control and purify its newly acquired territory in Xinjiang which accounted one sixth of China's landmass and are rich in mineral resources, oil and gas. Within days after September 11, 2001, China sought to link the worldwide campaign against terrorism with its efforts against "separatism" in Xinjiang and Tibet. Cloaking its actions in the rhetoric of counterterrorism, Beijing seized this opportunity to enhance its efforts to crush various opposition and separatist groups,

¹¹⁶ Dan Burghart, "The New Nomads? The American Military Presence in Central Asia", *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Summer 2007):15.

curtail religious freedom, and silence the voice of a restive ethnic minority because “it could now cast its support of the anti-terrorism campaign as morally correct, not merely politically expedient, also without worrying too much about human rights violations.” Nearly 4 months after al-Qaeda was implicated in relation with the September 11 terrorist attacks, China’s State Council Information Office issued a document on January 21, 2002, entitled “East Turkistan’s terrorist forces cannot get away without impunity,” which marked by far the most direct attempt by the Chinese government to link—and thereby justify—its crackdown on Uighurs in Xinjiang, with the American campaign against Bin Laden’s al-Qaeda.

3.4.2. Sino-Russia Cooperation

Both China and Russia view the United States political and strategic presence in Central Asia with vital alarm. Indeed, Beijing and Moscow suspect U.S. desire for bases there. In fact, Beijing and Moscow wish to exclude U.S. power from the area and fear that it means either to stay there militarily or by other ways. In this context, China and Russia also have waged an unrelenting campaign since 2002 to impose limits on the duration and scope of U.S. presence on Central Asian bases and more generally in the region. For example, because of Washington’s misconceived policies in Uzbekistan, it failed to counter Sino-Russia propaganda, at both the presidential and public levels, that the United States was behind the revolutions of 2003-04 in Georgia, Ukraine, and Kyrgyzstan and also behind the Andizhan uprising in 2005.¹¹⁷ Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow also constantly are bringing enormous pressure on Kyrgyzstan to force the United States out of Manas base.

¹¹⁷ Stephan Blank, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, Mar 2007), pp. 12-15.

Therefore, Beijing and Moscow have utilized the SCO as a platform for a collective security operation in Central Asia to sponsor exercises with local regimes and with each other annually since 2003 (peace mission exercises). Furthermore, while significant difference exist between China and Russia as to whether the SCO should be mainly a promoter of trade and economic development, or a military alliance, or another energy forum, it cleanly has considered by China and Russia as a forum for unifying Central Asia states in an anti-U.S. regional security organization.¹¹⁸

China's policy toward Central Asia after the September 11 Event is to exemplify the process by which Beijing hopes to build a prosperous neighborhood under its lead and thus shelter its ascending economic development from both internal and external threats within the framework of SCO.

Finally, Beijing and Moscow have cooperated comprehensively and systematically to undermine the U.S. presence in Central Asia due to the support for democratic reform including rehearsal of counter-revolutionary military operations. Beijing and Moscow have worked together on issues relating to the region through the auspices of the SCO, which has proved to be the most successful of a number of regional security organizations. While Washington needs to ensure that both Beijing and Moscow clearly understand U.S. intensions, so they are not misunderstood and used to bolster domestic opposition o U.S. efforts in the region.¹¹⁹

Moreover, China and Russia consider that regime stability is essential for regional stability in Central Asia. Consequently, they both uphold the priority of

¹¹⁸ Richard Weitz, pp. 67-68.

¹¹⁹ Dan Burghart, p.18.

noninterference in domestic affairs of SCO members and proclaim the right for sovereign states to choose their own model of development free of external pressures, especially from the United States.¹²⁰ Nevertheless, any sign of differences among the two powers would have an impact on the workings of the SCO and Central Asia.¹²¹

3.4.3. China Uses SCO as A Platform of anti-Terrorism

After the 1990s, the Central Asia is threatened by terrorism while China, Russia, and Central Asia states formed leader summit in SF to solve the security problem on boarder disputes. In 1998, the Shanghai Five Almaty summit took note of principles of combating terrorism, and then in 2001, when the SCO was established, all member states signed “The pact to battle three forces” which clearly stated the consensus of combating international terrorism. After the September 11 Event, the member states of SCO signed “the declaration by the heads of the SCO member states” also stated that the members would cooperate in the combat against terrorism, ethnic separatism and religious extremism (also called the “three forces”), furthermore to include issues of illegal drug trafficking, weapons trading, and illegal immigrations at the same time. In addition, the leaders signed the “SCO agreement on the regional anti-terrorism organization,” and then to create an executive council to govern the anti-terrorism center in Tashkent.

China's Intention of Joint Military Exercise

Under the framework of SCO, the military cooperation of every member state is regarded as the most concrete operation of anti-terrorism. China and Tajikistan held

¹²⁰ Elizabeth Wishnick, p. 29.

¹²¹ Ramakant Dwivedi, p.154

the military exercise called “Code One” in 2002, and then China held another 7 bilateral and multilateral military exercises with the member states of the SCO such as Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan for the following years. Especially, the largest joint anti terrorism military exercise is “Peace Mission 2007.”

From “September 11” to the present, terrorist activities occurred in Central Asia, we find out that the characteristics of terrorism are including exploding, assassination, kidnapping, hijacking, and suicide car or human bombings etc., which are small scale, invisible, and lethal. The purpose of China's participating in the anti-terrorism military exercise under the framework of the SCO is to utilize the opportunity to train joint exercise ability with other member states of SCO, and invest in a large scale of weapons and personnel in order to use simulation and experience of military exercise to try to gain the scenario of a real war.

Generally speaking, there are four strategies behind China’s military mindset: (1) strategy of threatening. In order to achieve the political goals, China needs to use military exercises to show its military strength to the outside world, and to reach a consensus domestically; (2) the experience of having scenarios of “real war.” The best way to prepare a war is to simulate one in order to realize what situations should be faced during real wars; (3) military exchanges. Through military exercise and military diplomacy, it is easier for two countries to understand each other, friendship, cooperation, and mutual development, especially by warship interview which is on the basis of military exchanges; and (4) military transformation. We can amend combat guidance, combat data sheet, and tactical guidance during the military

exercises.¹²²

For example, Peace Mission 2007, carried out during the period of August 8 to 17, 2007, which was the largest SCO joint exercise in the organization's six-year history. By analyzing China's military structure during the exercise, we see the China mobilized its Army Combat Groups and Air Force Combat Groups to join the anti-terrorism exercise within Peace Mission 2007. China's Army is consisted mainly of mechanized infantry brigades carrying out anti-terrorism mission instead of using Companies as combating units, like they did in the past. As to the Air Force, China sent out its new combat fighter jets like J-7 and FC-1, and the training objects include counter air operations, close air support for the ground forces to counter terrorism, bombing operation, air dropping forces, and heliborne operations, etc., the exercise is deemed as a perfect Joint Ground Forces Operation.¹²³

As for China, the biggest problems are issues of Tibet turmoil, Xinjiang independence, and Taiwan Strait issue. On the one hand, China wants to show its military strength by carrying out anti-terrorism exercises. On the other hand, Beijing also shows its determination of taking the responsibility of anti-terrorism in the international community. Therefore, in order to understand China's strategic intention behind the anti-terrorism military exercise under the framework of SCO, we have to pay close attention to its direction of future development.

¹²² "Pay Attention to China's Strategic Implication of Maneuvering SCO Joint Military Exercise," Military News, August 1, 2007, available at: http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/newsgpwb_2009/news.php?css=2&rtype=1&nid=21630. (accessed:20110220).

¹²³ "We have to pay attention to China's Strategic Intention in case of Anti-Terrorism," Military News, August 13, 2007, available at: http://news.gpwb.gov.tw/newsgpwb_2009/news.php?css=2&rtype=2&nid=22557. (accessed:20110220)

Summary

China's strategy in Central Asia is to consolidate its legitimate possession of peripheral territory expansion and to maintain the regional stability at the same time. For Beijing, the key questions are whether political stability will prevail in Central Asia and whether its rapid growth can be sustained. Therefore, Beijing has focused on the issues of strengthening its political, security, economic and energy cooperation with Central Asian states, in order to meet the goals of securing its national interest, and further to peacefully rise as a regional power. In this context, China especially puts efforts on counter Uighur separatist and terrorism organizations such as the ETIM and Islamic Organizations of Turkistan who have conducted a series of bombing in China's Xinjiang province since 1997. In addition, with Russian influence decreasing in this region, Beijing simultaneously shifted its policy to establish bilateral relations with the Central Asian states based on its five principles in order to consolidate its position in this region.

After September 11, 2001, however, the penetration of the U.S. influence into Central Asia not only prevents China from expanding its influence, but also traps China from going out, thus effectively containing China's rising. In this perspective, Beijing is making emphasis on the developments of political, economic, and infrastructural links among Central Asian states, so as to strategically control Central Asian region and its Xinjiang province. Because Beijing is concerned about its peaceful rise under a security environment on its western flank, the SCO is used by China as embodiment of regional cooperation focusing on both economy and security. Beijing has endeavored to establish multiple regional and global relationships in order to counter U.S. primacy in the international system. Subsequently, China and Russia have successfully coexisted under the framework of SCO, and they also cooperate

with Central Asian states to curb the “three evils,” trying to integrate regional military powers and to cooperate on security issues. Moreover, China and Russia have further their cooperation on regional security issues of economy, energy, and infrastructure of Central Asian states, which best illustrate China’s Central Asia foreign policy.

In sum, China’s strategic considerations of maintaining regional stability, economic development, and getting access to energy continue to drive the goals of decreasing U.S. influence in order to maintain geo-strategic advantages in the region.



Chapter 4

China's Strategic Calculations after September 11

in Central Asia

After September 11, 2001, China's interests in Central Asia also changed depending on the interaction with the United States and Russia while three major players pursue different strategic considerations in this region. For China, security has been an important consideration ever since September 11, 2001, and the Chinese saw an advantage of U.S. presence in the region to counter terrorism. Furthermore, Beijing also perceives the importance of this region in terms of providing access to energy, and contributing to Beijing's maritime strategy.

For the United States, the importance of Central Asia is growing, focusing on GWTO, ensuring energy security, and promoting democratic reform. Finally, Russia views Central Asia as its backyard due to its former Soviet historical status, considering reestablishing itself to become a global power again.

4.1. The U.S.-China-Russia's Counter Terrorism in Central Asia

The U.S. has successfully accessed to Central Asia by WOT. After the U.S. got the decisive victory in Afghanistan War, it tended to squeeze its greatest competitors--China and Russia, out of this region. Today the U.S. is still the only super power in the world, and in order to counter the U.S. threat, China has to cooperate with Russia while competing with each other at the same time. Yet for both

China and Russia, the relationship will be relatively cooperative than competitive.

4.1.1. U.S.-China anti-Terrorism

Even before September 11, 2001, the U.S. interests in Central Asia were growing. But the subsequent wars in Afghanistan and Iraq have however dramatically increased U.S. security interests in this region. As the former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld stated that it is important that U.S. forces be located in places where they are wanted, welcomed, and needed. Building new relationship with states, including Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, Georgia and Azerbaijan as logistical forwarding area, are vital to the war against terrorism.¹²⁴ When the U.S. approaches each Central Asian states to initiate security cooperation on the issue of countering terrorism, there is no explicit objection for either Russia or China. Today, the U.S. influence in Central is decreasing while China's influence in the region has dramatically increased as its ties with the Central Asian states have deepened. It appears that the United States may need China's help to achieve its goals in Central Asia over the long-term more on the issue of Global War on Terrorism.¹²⁵

On the one hand, the United States needs to stabilize Afghanistan and combat terrorism of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. Furthermore, Washington hopes to use Central Asian region as a permanent base for the use of Afghanistan destabilization. In the context of the GWOT, certain missions become priorities insofar as work with their armed forces are concerned, including counter-terrorism as a vital objective. On the other hand, China would like to stabilize its borders with Central Asia and Russia without being annoyed by outer sources of instability, which leads to crushing outside

¹²⁴ Stephen J. Blank, *After Two Wars: Reflections on the American Strategic Revolution in Central Asia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, July 2005), pp. 1-2.

¹²⁵ Lowell Dittmer, pp. 16-18.

support for Uighur separatism within its Xinjiang province. Under this circumstance, it is evident that both China and the U.S. share the same strategic goals of security and stability in Central Asia, particularly on the issue of counter-terrorism. On August 25th 2002, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of State, Armitage, publicly claimed the ETIM is a terrorist organization while paying his visit to China; it is obvious that the U.S. intended to exchange strategic interests with China. In other words, Washington is asking Beijing to share international affairs such as the “Six Party Talks,” and “anti-terrorism,” meanwhile Beijing intended to fight and reduce the threats of separatism in its west region by cooperating with the United States.¹²⁶

However, there are still some areas where China and the United States are not aligned on the issue of anti-terrorism. For the United State, it wanted to take the leading role in Central Asia for the expansion of “coalition of anti-terrorism,” indeed, the United States has already got deeper involvement with Central Asian region under the U.S. European Command (USEUCOM). After September 11, 2001, the United States intensified its concern for gaining access to distant theaters, and therefore a quest for basing and logistics in Central Asian region entails a growing search for allies or at least robust strategic partnerships with like-minded states. Meanwhile, China aggressively enhanced SCO as a counter-terrorism center to cut off the sources of external threats to China, and cooperating with Russia and Central Asian states to strike the forces of terrorism, separatism, and extremism. Even though the SCO has upgraded China’s military profile considerable through combined exercises, its platform remains an openly anti-American one, and China’s perception of the U.S. military presence in Central Asia is openly hostile, taking it as a real threat and

¹²⁶林麗香, p. 23.

opposing its continuation.

The intension of China is to exclude the U.S. from SCO led by China and Russia, and to enhance both of its military support and arms sales to Central Asian states.¹²⁷ By conducting joint military exercises with the members of SCO, China will suppress internal threats within Central Asia and combating outside support for rebellious Uighurs within its Xinjiang province.¹²⁸

4.1.2. U.S.-Russia Anti-Terrorism

The U.S. military presence in Central Asia in pursuit of its GWOT has created frictions in relations with Russia and China. For Russia, such friction is inevitable, but it can be combined with prudent cooperation in areas of shared interests. In this case, it does not necessarily reflect fundamental disagreements about the nature of the war against terrorism or the pursuit of security interest in Central Asia. Russia is closely aligned with the U.S. definition of the terrorist threat. She understands the complex security challenges associated with the phenomenon of Islamism. In this context, Russia confronts a major threat of jihadist terrorism in areas adjacent to and within its borders which it is in the U.S interests to help it contain. Therefore, Washington and Russia have opportunities to coordinate their Central Asian policies on the basis of their common strategic interests.¹²⁹

On the other hand, by joining the ally of anti-terrorism, Moscow gets the

¹²⁷ 張如倫，「美國圖謀中亞之戰略意涵」，*國防雜誌* 1 (龍潭: 2002): 37。[Chang Rulun, Meiguo Tumou Zhongya Zhi Zhanlvveyihan (The U.S. Strategic Intentions toward Central Asia) *Guofan Zazhi* (Defense Journal) 1 (Lontan: 2002): 37.]

¹²⁸ 蔡忠誠，「九一一事件後美『中』俄在中亞的競逐」，*國立政治大學碩士論文* (台北: 2005年 4月)，頁 105。[Tsai Zhongcheng, Jiuyiyishijianhou Mei "Zhong" E Zai Zhongya De Jingzhu (The Competition among U.S., China, and Russia in Central Asia after the 911 Event), *GuoLi Cheng Chi DarXue Lunwen* (NCCU thesis), (Taipei: March 2005), p. 105.]

¹²⁹ R. Craig Nation, *U.S. Interests in the New Eurasia* (Carlisle Barracks, P.A.: US Army War College, Mar, 2007): 113-115.

leverage on the issues of anti-missile, expansion of NATO, and obtains financial assistants from the West, while curbing Caucasian region, Central Asia, and its southern regions to improve relationship with the United States.¹³⁰ Consequently, because Russia joins the allies of anti-terrorism, the United States and western countries will not criticize Russia on the issue of Chechnya for violating human rights.¹³¹

In addition, there are some issues remained to be considered in terms of the cooperation between Russia and the U.S. on anti-terrorism because the United States challenged Russia's status in Central Asia by projecting its power in the region. In 2004, the Bush administration was resumed, and reiterated its determination on anti-terrorism which was deemed as a long-term war, and all aspects show that the United States will station in Central Asia for a long period of time. For example, after the Afghanistan war started, in 2004 Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage told Central Asian states that “stability in this region is of paramount importance and vital to national interest.”¹³² In other words, the United States will have long term interests in Central Asia and the magnitude is too big to be imagined. We can easily tell the U.S. intensions and calculations by seeing the decision-making officials in Washington emphasizing the importance of Central Asia since its presence in the region. It would also lead to a sharp political division, even alienation between Moscow and Washington, for beyond where the Russians would feel it safe to go.

Yet a much more threatening possibility would be destabilization of Central Asia.

¹³⁰ 于海波, p.137.

¹³¹ Mao Huei-Ming, “The U.S.-China-Russia Strategic Triangle Relationship-Since the Beginning of the Bush Administration,” *Tamkang Journal of International Affairs*, p. 94, available at: <http://www2.tku.edu.tw/~ti/Journal/8-3/834.pdf>. (accessed: 20110227)

¹³² Stephan J. Blank, “U.S. Interests in Central Asia and The Challenges to Them,” p.1.

This could result from an Islamist-led domestic uprising in the Central Asian states against the authorities. In Moscow's perspective of view, the reason might be caused by the United States sponsored democracy promotion, undermines the legitimacy of the authoritarians of each Central Asian states. Another danger of a deteriorating war in Iraq led by the United States lies in the prospect of thousands of experienced jihadists finding their ways into north Caucasus and into Central Asia threatening the status quo there.¹³³ From Moscow's perspective, such a war would have the tremendous destabilization in its southern neighborhood. It would lead to a fissure between Moscow and Washington, not to mention the Russians would feel it safe to cooperate with the United States.

4.1.3. Sino-Russia Anti-Terrorism

After the independence of the Central Asian states, China and Russia not only shared a new strategic buffer zone but also had the same interests in the region because both Beijing and Moscow faced the threats from terrorism, religious extremism, and separatism. Therefore, it is necessary for China, Russia, and Central Asian states to cooperate to fight against the "three evils" in order to safeguard the security for themselves and to gain the stabilization in Central Asia. However, the influence caused by the "three evils" has been increasing in China and Russia's backyard, which seriously threatened China and Russia. Furthermore, Beijing and Moscow especially fear of restive minorities and ethnic separatism in their border territories supposed by Islamic fundamentalist movements in Central Asia. Indeed, China has Xinjiang independent issue and Russia has Chechnya independent issue as

¹³³ Dmitri Trenin, pp. 40-41.

well. In this respect, Beijing and Moscow had come to share similar views regarding stabilization on Central Asian region, which also makes Beijing recognize that it is beyond one country's power to deal with issues like terrorism and separatism. Thus, China's strategy is to put emphasis on common interests in economic development, security, stability and anti-terrorism through its bilateral relations with Central Asian states, which correspond to the principle of "non-interference" in other states' internal affairs, making Beijing appear as a reliable partner from the perspective of the region's remaining authoritarian leaders.

Consequently, China and Russia share similar views not only regarding separatism issues in Central Asia, but also of the terrorism issue in contemporary international systems. Therefore, these shared interests led to contribute to the establishment of a Sino-Russian strategic partnership announced by Jiang and Yeltsin in 1996.¹³⁴ For example, China declared that Chechnya was a "domestic affair of Russia" while Moscow stated Xinjiang is an "inseparable" part for Beijing. In this context, the strategic partnership is developed on the basis of common security interest between Beijing and Moscow and led to the formation of SF as a regional multilateral forum.¹³⁵

However, after the September 11 Event, the Central Asian states became close to the United States, forcing China to develop new bilateral security agreements and cooperation with Central Asian states. Thus Beijing has applied SCO as a tool to strike and blockade the expansion of the "three evils" and to conduct joint military exercises with its members to counter U.S. "anti-terrorism coalition."

¹³⁴ Michael Clarke, "China's Integration of Xinjiang with Central Asia" Securing a "Silk Road" to Great Power?," *China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly* 2 (Washington: Summer 2008): 98.

¹³⁵ Michael Clarke, p. 99.

4.2. US-China-Russia's Geo-Strategic Deployment in Central Asia

After the September 11 Event, the strategic competition among the U.S., China, and Russia had arisen in Central Asia. Facing China's peaceful rising and Russia's reviving on the one side, and the United States on the other, each of these big players is pursuing a different strategic goal based on different strategic calculations, while each of them is afraid of losing the strategic game.

4.2.1. U.S. Strategic Interests in Central Asia after 911

In the post-Cold War era, the U.S. had the opportunity to get involved in Central Asia due to Russia's unstable political situation, financial difficulty, and improper Central Asia policy, which caused the power vacuum in this region and made the U.S. to actively try to squeeze Russia's influence out of Central Asia in order to establish its influence in the region. However, the United States is relatively weak in the geographical realm, and it is hard for the United States to become the leading role in Central Asia in a short time, instead, the United States tries to get involved by means such as politics, military affairs, education, and economy, etc..

After the September 11 Event, the influence of the United States in Central Asia has been growing with the expansion of the WOT, the most obvious difference is the U.S. construction of military base and military presence in this region. The foremost U.S. strategic interest in Central Asia is the concern of geo-strategy. Thinking whoever controls this region can prevent Russia's influence from the North, block China's expanding from the East, and take pre-auction against Iran from the South.¹³⁶

¹³⁶ 孟根方，「美軍欲長期留駐中亞企圖以擠壓中俄牽制印巴」，中安網，2005年8月15日。[Mong Genfang, Meijun Yu Changqiliuzhu Zhongya Qitu Yi Jiya Zhongge Qianzhi Yinba (The U.S. Military Intends to Stay in Central Asia in order to Squeeze China and Russia) Zong An Net, August 15, 2005, available at

Secondly, the U.S. interest is to obtain oil in Central Asia. According to the statistics of the EIA, the petroleum reserve of the Caspian Sea is about 270 billion barrels, which is an important plan for the U.S. to substitute the petroleum from the Middle East. After the September 11 Event, the U.S. garrison had set up in the Central Asia, in which is the backyards of China and Russia. Although the United States takes anti-terrorism as an excuse, the real purpose is to safeguard oil exploitation and the pipeline construction in Central Asia, in order to let the petroleum in the Caspian Sea flow to the west to the Western countries instead of to the East to flow to China.¹³⁷ As a result, the Central Asia is considered as the “strategic energy base” in the 21th Century by the United States.

Thirdly, the U.S. focuses on anti-terrorism operations. After September 11, 2001, the United States had promoted the military presence in Central Asia on the demand of anti-terrorism. Furthermore, Washington considers the anti-terrorism as a long term war, therefore infers that the U.S. military presence in Central Asia is also a long term mission.¹³⁸

In sum, the U.S. has been striving to occupy Central Asia as the “area of strategic interests,” in order to safeguard the U.S. energy security in the future, not only the U.S. intends to maintain its hegemony status in the international geo-politics, but also actively involved in Central Asia in the field of politics, economy, and military etc..

First of all, the U.S. has actively established political relations with Central Asian states by interaction of high level officials, and signs a series of political agreements

<http://news.anhuinews.com/system/2005/08/15/001326693.shtml>, (accessed: 20110207)

¹³⁷ Sharif Shuja, “China’s Energy Needs and Central Asia,” *National Observer* 67 (Summer 2006): 57-58.

¹³⁸ Olga Oliker, David A. Shlapak, U.S. Interests in Central Asia: Policy Priorities and Military Roles (PA.: RAND Publisher, 2005), p. 20.

in order to instill U.S. democratic and value ideas into Central Asian states.

Second, economically speaking, the United States has been providing “humanitarian rescue” and “political reform” funds to Central Asian states, which accounts around 30 percent of the foreign investment every year, further the U.S. even raises the amount of aids to this region after September 11, 2001.¹³⁹ For example, the United States provided Kazakhstan 52 million dollars as financial aids in 2002 while raising the total amount of financial aids from the original agreements signed by Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. According to a recent published statistics, the U.S. provides Kazakhstan with 28 million dollars, Uzbekistan with 28.5 million dollars, Tajikistan with 25 million, and Kyrgyzstan with 35 million dollars.¹⁴⁰

In addition, the U.S. mainly strengthens investments on oil and gas industries in terms of cooperation of economy and trade, except the large amount of funds investing oil field in Central Asia, the U.S. also actively builds oil pipelines without passing through Russia, and finds an open sea to India Ocean for the oil from the Caspian Sea.

Furthermore, the U.S. has been investing in military aids on a large scale, including providing Central Asia states with direct military mortgage, military exchanges, constructing military bases, and enhancing military cooperation with each other, which makes the U.S. as an important role in Central Asia in terms of military security.¹⁴¹

¹³⁹ 閻巨錄，「美國的中亞戰略及對中國安全的影響」，*現代國際關係* 12 (北京: 1999) : 22-24。
[Yan Geulu, Meiguo De Zhongya Zhanlve Jidui Zhongguo Anquan De Yianxiang (The U.S. Strategic Central Asia Policy and the Influence to China's Security) *Xiandai Guojiguanxi* (Contemporary International Relation) 12 (Beijing: 1999): 22-24.]

¹⁴⁰ Elizabeth Wishnick, pp. 9-10.

¹⁴¹ Olga Oliker, p. 41.

The U.S. occupied the bridgehead of Central Asia after the September 11 Event, which is a method to prevent the influences of China, Russia, and Iran from getting in, so as to curb the subcontinent of India and Pakistan, where the U.S. deems as a strategic “Grand Chess Board” in the strategic international society. As a result, the U.S. has to take every resolute to consolidate its military strength in Central Asia, in order to control this strategic area.

In sum, the United States has three strategic objectives in Central Asia, they are as follows: First, the United States continuously tries to control the domination of development and communication of oil from the Caspian Sea. Secondly, the United States tries to make Central Asia go joint the international world which matches Washington’s strategic link. Thirdly, the United States has tried to make Central Asia states rely on Washington’s support in the fields of military, political, and economy.

U.S. Military Presence in Central Asia

The United States military steps in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan and provide economic aids to make Central Asian states rapidly lean to its side. The United States has included Central Asia Region to its power coverage intending to squeeze Russia and China out of this region.¹⁴² Under the U.S. strategic superiority, the SCO, led by China and Russia, has been shocked and the CSTO, led by Russia, has been challenged, therefore, the strategic equilibration in Central Asia has been broken.¹⁴³

¹⁴² 余莓莓，「九一一後中共在中亞國際關係中的戰略選擇」，*中共研究* 8 (台北: 2003): 108-109。[Yu Maymay, Jiuyiyihou Zhonggong Zai Zhongyaguojiguanxizhong De Zhanlvexunze (China’s Strategic Calculations to Central Asia in the International Relations after 911 Event), *Zhonggong Yanjiu* (China Studies) 8 (Taipei: 2002): 108-109.]

¹⁴³ 黃虹堯，「九一一事件對中共與中亞政經關係的影響」，*展望與探索* 4 (台北: 2003): 11。[Huang Hongyao, Jiuyiyishijian Dui Zhonggong Yu Zhongyazhengzingguanxi De Yingxiang (China’s

4.2.2. China's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11

China and Central Asian states share a border of more than 3,000 km. long. Therefore the political situations of the states will definitely influence China's national interests.

Security Interest

The turmoil and separation movement occurred in Xinjiang are considered to having relations with ETIM, al-Qaeda organization, and Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU), which has influenced China's national security situation and its western region. For example, Tajikistan's civil war and Uzbekistan's terrorist movement not only damaged the economy interactions with other countries but also made China's west region feels unrest. At present, the U.S. garrisons stationed in Central Asia have threatened Chinese government because Xinjiang is adjacent to the region, which threatens China's traditional security on its western region.

Economic Relationship

China has imported a great amount of natural resources, are lack in domestic, from Central Asia because of its abundant strategic resources, we can predict that the amount of oil and gas imported by China will increase in a large amount in the future, which will help to solve China's difficulty of acquiring natural resources in the long run. So, China hopes that Central Asia can become a regional partner of economic cooperation as well as become one of its pluralistic sources of energy in order to ensure sufficient energy needed by China's economic development and to realize the

strategic goal of pluralistic energy supply.¹⁴⁴

Geographic Interest

Central Asia is the second land bridge of Asia-European continents, which is the only road leads to Europe and China's western region. It is necessary for China to cooperate with Central Asia so as to develop its west region and to consolidate China's rear part. China's priority is to stabilize its strategic rear region, which meet China strategic interests.

In a word, Central Asia's security situation will directly influence China's northwest security situation, therefore Beijing enacted several practical laws to counter strategic interests of Central Asia, they are as the followings: (1) to strike terrorism, separatist, and extremism; (2) to maintain the regional stability; (3) to promote the prosperity in the region; (4) to guarantee the good relation of both sides; (5) to prevent Central Asia states from being affected in the fields of economy, politics, security, and foreign affairs by other powers; (6) to make military alliance with Central Asia states without hostiles in military affairs; and (7) to control the supply of energy in Central Asia.¹⁴⁵

Therefore, China is willing to set up regional security mechanism with Central Asian states and Russia, which is beneficial to the national security of Central Asian states and to China's national security as well. So China uses SCO as a regional organization to deal with Central Asian states, and takes it as a practical method to

¹⁴⁴ 趙華勝，「中俄美在中亞能否合作？」，*戰略與管理* 2 (北京: 2004): 94。[Zhao Huasheng, Zhong E Mei Zaizhongya Nengfou Hezuo (Can the U.S., China, and Russia Cooperate in Central Asia?) *Zhanlve Yu Guanli* (Strategy and Management) 2 (Beijing: 2004): 94.]

¹⁴⁵ 趙華勝，p. 96.

realize its Central Asia policy. By doing so, Beijing can accomplish the following goals: (1) to utilize SCO as a tool to effectively maintain Central Asia security, (2) further expand economic cooperation, which is the function of consolidating good relation, (3) to strengthen and develop civilian cooperation, cultural exchanges, and to enhance mutual trust, eliminate misunderstanding and doubt caused by each other, (4) to unite all members of SCO, and oppose to any big powers from sabotaging China's realization of strategic interest in the region; and (5) to prevent the un-conventional Central Asia powers from harassing China, damaging the relationship between China and Central Asia states, and hampering China's modernization progress.

China's Geo-Strategic Consideration in Central Asia

Russia's leaning to the West has caused the strategic triangle relation between the U.S., China, and Russia to change, on the one hand, the U.S. strengthens the military alliance with Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan while using their military bases to extend its military power to China's backyard, which leads to the strategy of squeezing China and changes China's surrounding environment against China's interest. On the other hand, China carries out high-level reciprocal visits, and anti-terrorism joint military exercises through SCO to expand the cooperation aspects including economy, politics, technology, and military. And security with the purpose of containing the U.S. influence in Central Asia. Therefore, it is temporary for China and the U.S. to hide the contradictions of both sides on the issue of anti-terrorism, but for the long-term national interest, those contradictions will surface eventually for both sides.

4.2.3. Russia's Strategic Interests in Central Asia after September 11

Russia considers Central Asia as its backyard in which any turbulence in this region will endanger its national security.

Following the September 11 Event, the U.S. forces entered Central Asia, which challenges and squeezes Russia's strategic space in Central Asia, this makes the competition of Central Asia competitive. But in competition for Central Asia, Russia has three advantages of culture, geography, and humanity, further, it is easier for Russia to protect and maintain its interests with the privilege of economic maneuver compared with other big powers. As a result, Russian interests in Central Asia are all-around, and embodied in the fields such as economy, security, nationality, and military affairs.

Security interest

First of all, Central Asia is a natural fortification for Russia to prevent the expansion of western powers, and to stop the NATO from getting in. It is not only one of the main pass ways for international terrorist and extremism to filtrate in Russia, but also a buffer zone where Russia takes precautions against the expansion of Islamic extremists. Especially, Russia sees China as a “strategic partner” because of Russia's intension to enhance its influence to Central Asia. In addition, Central Asia is very close to the so called “Golden Crescent” where is one of the world's main drug factories. These drugs enter Russia through Central Russia, causing a serious threat to Russia's security interests, and Russia takes Central Asian states as a “firewall” to blocking the drug expansion.

Economic Benefits

Central Asian states are rich in strategic natural resources, and the proportion of raw materials in the export from the Central Asian states to Russia was about 70

percent,¹⁴⁶ especially, mineral products (like iron, copper, and lead) and agricultural products (like cotton and wool), which are the critical material sources needed by Russian enterprises that are helpful for Russia to create employment opportunities, while Central Asian states are main consumer markets of Russian industrial products. The mutual commercial benefits are interdependent by both sides and are helpful to stabilize the economy. Russia's economy which has been weak and tottering over the past ten years,¹⁴⁷ and it hasn't collapsed completely because of the strong support from its energy. Although Central Asian states are rich in natural resources, and its routes of pipeline has been controlled by Russia. However, Central Asian states have created diversified routes of pipeline to export its energy over the past years, which not only caused Russia losing money but also become a competitor to Russia on the international energy market. So, Russia started to change its energy policies and to cooperate with Central Asian states instead of resistance. Participating in exploiting and transferring the energy from Caspian Sea, Russia has found new economic interests in this region again.

Ethical Concerns

The Russian-speaking people who live in the CIS countries will be regarded as Russian citizens by Russia. It is because Russia pays much attention to the legitimate rights and interests of external Russian citizens. There are around 10 million Russian citizens live in five Central Asian states, and these people were cherished in the past,

¹⁴⁶ Vladimir Paramonov and Aleksey Stokov, *Russia and Central Asia: Current and Future Economics Relations* (England: Shrivenham, Block D., JSCSC, Defense Academy of the U.K., July 2006), p. 5.

¹⁴⁷ 何衛剛，「俄羅斯外交政策的新焦點—中亞戰略利益」，*中華戰略學刊* 4 (台北: 2004): 102-103。[He Wei Gang, Eluosi Waijiaozhengce De Xinjiaodian—Zhongya Zhanlvliy (The New Focus of Russia's Foreign Policy—Central Asia Strategic Interest) *Zhonghuazhanlv Xuekan* (Chinese Strategy Journal) 4 (Taipei: 2004): 102-103.]

now they are dominated and antagonized by Muslims. Therefore, Central Asia accentuated its value in terms of Russia's concerns over its citizens within this region.

Military Interests

The Baikonur base in Kazakhstan was once Russia's largest space center and launching site. Russia's first ICBM, the SS-6, and the first satellite were first launched on the base. After Russia's "pro-West" policy has been obstructed, Russia became aware of the crisis of disappearing of its Central Asian interests, and dropped the defensive Central Asia policy which was formed after September 11, 2001, and then resume and develop the impact on the region. Russia not only changes its attitudes to Central Asia, but also sees them as foreign countries. Besides, Russia has also expanded the scope of cooperation and strengthened the intensity of relations with Central Asian states, making obvious progress so far.

In political cooperation, Russia seeks to establish close strategy alliance and cooperation with Central Asian states: (1) to strengthen multilateral political cooperation with Central Asian states within CIS system; and (2) to promote the development of bilateral relations with Central Asian states by frequent bilateral visits with the leaders of Central Asian states. Russia makes Central Asian states turn back to it by means of economic interests and equally treating methods.

In economic cooperation, in May 2005, Russia and some Central Asian states constituted Eurasian Economic Community (EURASEC), which shows the economic integration of Russia and Central Asian states is making progress. In light of the positive attitude on SCO, Russia not only resumes its influence on Central Asia, but also makes it an important channel for Russia to communicate with Central Asian states.

In the military cooperation, the CSTO members including Russia, Kazakhstan, Tajikistan, and Kyrgyzstan made a decision to build up Rapid Reaction Forces of Central Asia to combat terrorism in May, 2001, which shows Russia, Central Asia states, and other CIS members have made progress on military cooperation. Building up a new military base in Kyrgyzstan in October, 2003, Russia dispatched fighter jets to station in the base, which is a indication of Russia geo-politics maneuvering to prevent other great powers from gaining strategic dominance in this region.

Russia Consolidates its Traditional Power in Central Asia

After the September 11 Event, Putin, president of Russia, rapidly joined the alliance of anti-terrorism led by the United States, and admitted the U.S. military to enter Central Asia in order to exchange interests with Washington. Moscow hopes to prevent the Washington from withdrawing Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM) to access to WTO with assistance from the U.S., to delay NATO from expanding eastward, to rearrange the debt plan which pays Paris Club in arrears of former Soviet Union, and to loosen U.S. criticism to Russia on the issue of Chechnya.¹⁴⁸

But those issues have caused Russia and the United States to compete with each other in Central Asia while greatly impacting Russia's traditional Central Asian interests which include the pro U.S. inclination of all five Central Asian states, the U.S. involvement in the development and transportation of Central Asian energy, and the change of political democratization in Central Asian states, making it harder for Russia to regenerate the status as a big country from the past, and making Russia's

¹⁴⁸ 范軍，「美國：從中亞到南高加索」，*國際政治*（北京：2002）：95。[Fan Jun, Meiguo: Congzhongya Dao Nangaojiasuo (The United States: From Central Asia to South Caucasus) *Guojizhengzi* (International Politics) (Beijing: 2002): 95.]

strategic space became smaller and smaller.¹⁴⁹ The competition between Russia and the U.S. has been evolving from halting and contenting at the beginning to restricting and equalizing various outside forces in Central Asia.

Although it is difficult for Russia to avoid the U.S. deployment of power from getting in Central Asia on the basis of its power, Moscow has continuously strengthened the traditional relation with Central Asia states to expand the presence of military and politics as a key method to encounter the U.S. military presence in Central Asia. Russia reinstated Kant military base which is in Kyrgyzstan in 2003, on 16th October, 2003, Putin took a visit in Tajikistan and signed an agreement to build a military base in Tajikistan capital Dushanbe, which is Russia's largest military overseas at present.¹⁵⁰ We can see that Russia is aggressively to do its best to consolidate the traditional relations and effectiveness in Central Asia. The declaration of SCO leaders led by China had been passed on July 25, 2005, which required the specific time table of U.S. withdrawing from Central Asia. On November 21, 2005, the last U.S. Army withdrew from Khanabad Air Base of Uzbekistan. Russia and Uzbekistan formally signed the “Treaty of Russia-Uzbekistan Alliance” one week before the withdrawal of U.S. Army, which not only shows the relation between Russia and Uzbekistan has been upgraded from “strategic partners” to “strategic alliances,” but also shows Russia can't wait to fill the vacancy left by the U.S. Army departure.¹⁵¹ If the U.S. Army evacuation from Uzbekistan is the case of Domino Effect, the threat to Russian back door will be removed. But the United States has

¹⁴⁹ 何衛剛，「美俄在中亞的戰略競爭」，*中華戰略學刊* (台北: 2004): 84。[He Weigang, Mei E Zaizhongya De Zhanlvejingzheng (The US Strategic Competition in Central Asia) Zhonghuazhanlve Xuekan (Chinese Strategic Journal) (Taipei: 2004): 84.]

¹⁵⁰ Dan Brughart, p. 4.

¹⁵¹ Stephen Blank, “Rethinking Central Asia Security,” p. 34.

coveted for Central Asia for a long time, how could Washington easily give up its strategic plan of Central Asia? The best interest serves the U.S. is to maintain its military presence in Central Asia, whether on the basis of dealing with China and Russia or from the perspective of global hegemony. In sum, the struggle of both sides will still be sustained, and the subsequent result is worth observing.

4.3. US-Sino-Russia's Energy Consideration in Central Asia

After the Central Asian states achieved independent, the abundant oil and gas reserves have become the focus of international community at one time. As shown of competition of natural resources have been disclosed in Central Asia.

The petroleum resource in Central Asia is widely spread, especially in the Caspian Sea where is called by “the Second Middle East,” the oil reserve is estimated to be about 200 billion barrels, accounts for 8 percent of the total reserves in the world. After the independence of Central Asia states, the unique geo-politics and geo-economics factors in the Caspian Sea area have been becoming the new focus of great powers' benefits and international capital competition all the time.¹⁵²

Because the pipelines of oil and gas were totally monopolized by Moscow in the former Soviet Union era, Central Asian states still heavily rely on Russian oil routes and still have to pay a great amount of transit tax. Therefore, the western countries led by the U.S. advocate to build pipelines winding Russian territory while China suggests building a pipeline to open a new route which starts western wards from

¹⁵² Chen Jeou-Lin, “The World Oil Competition and Future Direction,” China Network, August 29, 2002, available at: <http://big5.china.com.cn/chinese/jingji/224719.htm>, (accessed: 20110227).

China to Kazakhstan. Actually, the construction of Sino-Kazakhstan pipeline had been accomplished at the end of 2005, which puts into production reaching 10 million tons every year and brings great benefit to the development of China's West Region. While the competition of the exit of energy pipelines among the U.S., China, and Russia has reached the climax, Russia endeavors to safeguard its traditional influence in Central Asia based on geographical reason. Russia doesn't want to suffer economic losses caused by diverting the pipelines from the original route where in Russia's territory. On the other hand, the U.S. does not want the pipelines totally monopolized by Russia, damaging its energy security. As a result, the U.S. has actively intervened by the competition of oil and gas at the end of the 20th century.¹⁵³

4.3.1. China's Energy Strategy in Central Asia

It is only a beginning that the United States obtains the right to explore the oil and gas from the Caspian Sea, and the key is to participate in the competition of oil pipelines from within. During the Soviet Union period, the only pipeline to transport Central Asia energy is by the oil and gas pipelines within Russia's territory to the north, commonly called "the Russia Route." After the disintegration of the Soviet Union, there produced the competitions of countries, such as Russia, China, Iran, and Turkey, etc., it is mainly in three directions (westward, southwards, and eastward).

On the other hand, the U.S. oil strategy in Central Asia is to send the oil resource of Central Asia to the world market via pipelines, and protect the pipelines from damaged while passing through other countries.¹⁵⁴ If the U.S. obtains the authority

¹⁵³ 胡元傑，「中共在中亞之外交戰略」，*陸軍月刊* 483 (龍潭: 2005): 29。[Hu Yuanjai, Zhonggong Zai Zhongya Zhi Waijiaozhanlve (China's Foreign Strategy toward Central Asia) *Lujunyuekan* (Army Review) 483 (Longtan: 2005): 29.]

¹⁵⁴ 龍舒甲，「從石油利益論九一一事件後的中亞地區與其周邊情勢」，*問題與研究* 6 (台北:

of oil from Central Asia and the Caspian Sea, it can restrict Russia, China, South Asia, and Iran by its energy strategy. At present, the pipeline starts from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey, called “Baku-Ceyhan Line” has been dominated by the U.S. and other western countries and has been in operation in May 2005. The U.S. hopes to utilize this new route to break the Russian monopoly of oil export of the Caspian Sea, while strengthen its influence in South Caucasian and Central Asia at the same time.¹⁵⁵

As to China, Beijing plans to build new oil pipelines connected to Kazakhstan in order to avoid the U.S. totally controlling the oil SLOCs. The plan of building China-Kazakhstan oil pipeline has been hindered by the U.S., Russia, and other countries, for example, the United States opposes the construction of oil pipeline starts from Kazakhstan to China, instead, the U.S. persuaded Kazakhstan into building underground oil pipeline passes through the Caspian Sea to connect “Baku-Ceyhan Line” supported by the U.S. while Russia is opposing the idea put forwarded by the U.S., claiming that there is possibility for the underground oil pipelines to be damaged during the earthquake, causing serious pollution of the environment. Instead, Russia hopes to expand the capacity of oil pipelines passing through Russia territory, however, these obstacles have settled down following the completion of the Baku-Ceyhan Line.¹⁵⁶ According to the Victor News on 15th 5ecember 2005, Nazarbayev, the president of the republic of Kazakhstan, announces: “Today the oil pipeline leading to western China is completed, which is more than 1,000 km. in

2002): 112。 [Long Shujia, Cong Shiyouliyi Lun Jiuyiyishijianhou De Zhongyadiqu Yuqizhoubianqingshi (The Situation of Central Asia and its Peripheral after 911 Incident from Perspective of Oil Interest) *Wenti Yu Yanjiu* (Issues and Studies) 6 (Taipei: 2002): 112.]

¹⁵⁵ 胡元傑, p. 29.

¹⁵⁶ 胡元傑, p. 42.

length and will start to transport the oil to the western China formally,” in the general headquarters of Kazakhstan National Petroleum and Natural Gas Company. The BBC reported that: “the production of oil pipeline which connect from the Caspian Sea to China's Ala Mountain is estimated to transport 140 million barrels of crude oil to China every year.” This oil pipeline had already begun to transport in the middle of 2007, expecting the Chinese influence to Kazakhstan will increase with the quantity of oil imported from Kazakhstan.

Facing the active competition from China and the U.S., Russia founded CIS free trade zone in September 2002, after the foundation of “Eurasia Energy Alliance” and Eurasia Economic Community (EEC). Although the Central Asia states are hoping for assistance from the Western countries, Russia is still the main market for the Central Asian states to sell their products. Besides, the routes of natural resources exported from Central Asian states are under control of Russia, for example, Turkmenistan's natural gas and Kazakhstan's oil have to use Russia's pipelines to export to the international market. Following the completion of China-Kazakhstan pipeline, it makes Kazakhstan the first country to export oil without passing Russia's territory, and it is also a challenge for Russia to rethink its strategy of controlling natural resources exported from Central Asian states.

4.3.2. US Energy Strategy in Central Asia

The United States is the largest energy consumer in the world, and most of its energy supplies are from Persian Gulf. So, how to get access to energy resources and to secure them becomes a critical issue to the United States. Before September 11, 2001, the United States estimated that Caspian's oil potential reached 240 billion barrels, indicating this region to be considered as an alternative energy supply

source.¹⁵⁷ Therefore, commitments to opening up the region to western influence and reducing dependency on Moscow have been a goal of U.S. interest, making Caspian resources an important strategic goal to Washington.¹⁵⁸ After September 11, 2001, Washington had to secure its vital interest of access to energy resources from other places. And Central Asia provides the United States with an alternative energy supply. However, the energy resources of Central Asian states are mostly controlled by Russia in terms of oil and pipelines. Furthermore, it is hard for Central Asian states to independently implement economic activities or foreign policies. Hence, the United States has been trying to get greater access to Central Asian energy resources while safeguarding these states' independence, sovereignty, and prospect for securing development. Consequently, the U.S. energy policy has been to foster the development of diversification of pipelines which link to outsider consumers, reducing the dependency on Russia.¹⁵⁹ In this context, Washington needs to control energy pipelines over Central Asia while having harmony with Central Asian states in this area.

In addition, Washington is trying to isolate Iran from Central Asian energy and to keep Russia from monopoly over energy resources. Therefore, the U.S. is planning on constructing new oil and gas pipeline routes bypassing Russia and Iran.¹⁶⁰ For example, the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline is one of the U.S. strategies in Central Asia. Washington has tried to urge Kazakhstan to join the project and to participate in the construction of a pipeline in order to let Kazakhstan's oil flow to

¹⁵⁷ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, *The New Great Game: The Competition for the Energy Resources of Central Asia* (Zonli: Ching Yun University, 2010), p. 99.

¹⁵⁸ R. Craig Nation, p. 10.

¹⁵⁹ Stephen J. Blank, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia and the Challenges to Them*, p. 4.

¹⁶⁰ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 49.

BTC, which challenged Russia's position of domination in this region;¹⁶¹ another case is U.S. showing interest in a Turkmenistan-Afghanistan-Pakistan (TAP) natural gas from Central Asian Caspian Sea to the possible south Asia, including India and Pakistan. The purpose of TAP is to draw natural gas resources onto world markets without reliance on Russia. However, this project has been terminated in 1998 because of cruise missiles fired by the U.S. in pursuit of al-Qaeda network. After the U.S. led forces ousted the Taliban regime in Afghan, this project has been revived by U.S. strongly support in 2007, Turkmenistan and Afghanistan signed a joint communiqué and three bilateral documents, and came to a conclusion that both countries were keen to promote trans-Afghan pipeline project that has been delayed due to the unrest in Afghanistan. Indeed, Washington has been successfully gained control over pipelines in this region, and assured access to the energy resources of Central Asia, which makes a critical mass of available global reserves. Yet, energy access on equal terms to the U.S. relates very strongly to the larger objective of safeguarding Central Asian states' independence, sovereignty and projects for secure development.¹⁶²

After the September 11 Event, the U.S. had improved its relation with Central Asian states. Therefore the Central Asian states not only supported the U.S. anti-terrorism but also provided Washington with military bases on the purpose of GWOT.¹⁶³ The relations between the U.S. and Central Asian states are changed by September 11 Event, making the Central Asian states support U.S. anti-terrorism.¹⁶⁴

4.3.3. Russia's Energy Strategy in Central Asia

¹⁶¹ Stephen J. Blank, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia and The Challenges to Them*, p. 7.

¹⁶² Stephen J. Blank, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia and The Challenges to Them*, p. 4-5.

¹⁶³ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 45.

¹⁶⁴ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 99.

Russia has played a critical role in Central Asia on the basis of assuring her energy security. Because most of Central Asian states are still using Russian pipelines for transporting oil and gas, Russia has supported and encouraged her oil and gas companies to invest in Central Asia in order to extend the period of controlling the oil and gas resources. Furthermore, Central Asia's natural resources are heavily relied on Russian companies and business groups. Until now most of Central Asia's oil, gas and electricity are controlled by Russian companies or business groups. Therefore, Moscow is able to use energy as a "weapon" to impose political conditions, suborn foreign political leaders and institutions, and punish states and governments that do not follow its desires. Since September 11, 2001, Russia has been searching for a way to successfully establish a gas cartel (mechanism) under its leadership. This idea has been brought up in 2002, while Moscow has been moving steadily to achieve this goal of establishing an energy club.¹⁶⁵ Putin, Russian President, even reiterated the idea of energy club in the summit of SCO.¹⁶⁶

Consequently, on the one hand, Central Asian energy resources are very important to Russia which is the main energy supplier of European states. In this situation Russia is able to put pressure on European states for economic, political, and strategic gains at the expense of the U.S. influence. Russia's intention is not only to maintain the status of monopoly over Central Asian resources in order to leverage over Central Asia states but also to keep Europe under its influence by conserving Central Asian resources in other words, Central Asian energy market is an important issue to European states' energy security. When the extent of influence is increasing

¹⁶⁵ Stephan J. Blank, *Challenges and Opportunities for the Obama Administration in Central Asia* (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, June 2009), pp. 6-7.

¹⁶⁶ Stephen J. Blank, *U.S. Interests in Central Asia and The Challenges to Them*, p. 6.

which highlights the already important and obvious consequences of energy club in SCO.

On the other hand, the U.S. factor is Russian main concern on energy issue in Central Asia. Accordingly, Moscow curbs Kazakhstan from supporting the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan pipeline while the US is urging Kazakhstan to join this project. Russia even signed an accord with Bulgaria and Greece to construct a Burgas-Alexandropolis pipeline as a rival to counter BTC while the U.S. purpose is to promote the idea of pipelines bypassing Russian territory.¹⁶⁷

Under this circumstance, Moscow has been actively providing cooperation with energy rich Central Asian states, like Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, as partners to build a new natural gas pipeline along Caspian shore from Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan to Russia's support to consolidate their authoritarian government in power, while Russia needs to steadily maintain the present regime by dominating Central Asian gas and oil. Therefore, Russia needs to preserve control of transportation routes of Central Asian energy resources, so as to influence this region.¹⁶⁸ Players in this region are interested in getting access to Central Asian energy resources and try to break Russian monopoly. Therefore, Moscow always takes into consideration the U.S. factor.

4.4. Summary

The interests of Central Asia among the United States, China, and Russia can be

¹⁶⁷ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 58.

¹⁶⁸ Aitmakhanov Nurzhan, p. 61.

divided into three aspects: (1) anti-terrorism, (2) geo-strategy; and (3) competition for energy resources. On the issue of cooperation on counter terrorism, the war on terrorism is the focus of the U.S. at present, while China and Russia are taking this chance to strike Xinjiang's independence and Chechnya problem. Therefore, there are common interests among the U.S., China, and Russia on the issue of cooperation to counter terrorism, by different calculations and different methods. On the aspect of geo-strategy, all of the U.S., China, and Russia have actively plotted to take the leading role in dominating Central Asia according to strategic situation after September 11, 2001.

The leading role of Central Asia has been exchanged between Russia and the U.S. for many times. At the time of "Color Revolution," the U.S. has swift and fierce offensive to which Russia has barely reacted. After SCO asked the U.S. Army to leave Central Asia, China and Russia shifted their strategies from defensive to offensive. Since the end of July 2004, the U.S. frequently sent Minister of Defense Rumsfeld to visit Central Asia to persuade Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan into cooperation with the United States. But before the U.S. Secretary of State Rice visited Central Asia, the Central Asian states draw nearer to Russia in the SCO summit meeting, because of both China and Russia basically have the same policy toward Central Asia, while Russia puts more emphasis on military cooperation with Central Asian states on the prerequisite of non-interference of the domestic affairs of Central Asian states. At present, in order to develop relations with Russia, it is a trend for Central Asian states to be alliance with Russia, which shows that Russia has recaptured the leading right of Central Asian affairs.

The United States has been promoting democracy, freedom, and human rights values in Central Asian states, which benefit the people in Central Asia; it not only

produces potential threats and challenges to the regimes of Central Asian states, but also makes the leaders of Central Asian states become vigilant about the direct threat to the vital interest of the regime of Central Asian states directly. As a result, facing the U.S. challenges, China and Russia temporarily occupy the leading position in the competition of Central Asia. All Central Asian states are willing to get benefits from the competitions among the U.S., China, and Russia. Moreover, the U.S. has strong military and economic powers and the superiority of political influence, which makes Central Asian states impressive and greatly benefit from energy investments, economic aids, and military build-up provided by western countries. In other words, the situation of political turbulence has been normal in Central Asia. In the long run, the competition combinations of the U.S., China, and Russia will still go on.

Another important issue we should pay attention to is that China's strategy in Central Asia has been defined as diversifying its source of energy, seeking access to energy resources through Central Asian states. Beijing has sought to achieve this strategic consideration through the extension of modern infrastructure throughout Central Asian states with connection of the possible Pakistan's Gawdar port located in the Indian Ocean without passing through the Malacca Strait, taking risks enforced by the United States. However this strategy has been significantly affected by the implications of the September 11 terrorist attack in 2001, and the subsequent U.S. military projection and political influence in Central Asia. The United States has taken further steps to build a strategic ring of encirclement in China's neighboring regions. By establishing forward military bases in Central Asia, the United States is to contain China in the name of counterterrorism. Why China picks up Central Asia as its strategic competition arena? It is because the U.S. policies of maintaining its worldwide military presence as efforts to control the energy lifeblood of a rising

China, which serves U.S. national interests regarding the energy issue and the vulnerability of the other country as “energy weapon.” This vulnerability has made China to actively pursue energy security. In order to prevent the possibility of other great power’s using the energy as a weapon to counter China’s further rise, Beijing must thwart some countries’ attempts to contain on the energy issue and hinder China’s rise. Consequently, Beijing has to unfold effective bilateral or multilateral cooperation on energy sources. Further, it has to develop new markets, promote energy cooperation and find new transportation routes. In other words, Beijing wants to have stability, prosperity, and development with energy supply countries, so as to diversify sources of energy, build a strategic reserve, and build naval or air capacity so it has the capability to project power in the Malacca Strait. In this case, getting access to Pakistan’s Gwader port is the best solution. In order to do so, China needs to stabilize Central Asian region.

Therefore, both China and Russia have common interests in reducing U.S. influence in Central Asia. In this perspective, the SCO provides a mechanism within which Beijing can pursue those interests shared with Russia and the Central Asian states, in particular, with regard to securing access to energy resources, and ensuring a stable political-security environment.

In sum, since the September 11 Event occurred in 2001, Central Asia’s importance has evolved one step further, and become significant as a pivotal arena of international security in which great powers like China, Russia, and the United States are competing for the energy resources. This is primarily because of the enhanced strategic importance that has superseded the Central Asian geographic isolation which has become a point of attraction for many big powers’ national interests. With regard to China, since the September 11 terrorist attacks, it has steadily been expanding its

security links with Central Asia. It is also worth taking note of the fact that despite Beijing's effort to encourage increased economic interaction with the region, the dynamics of the local powers in the region compel China to increase its security and military maneuvers in the region as a priority. In economic terms, this increasing security perception makes China to look at Central Asia as a region of great opportunities of diverting its energy routes. Therefore, in the given context, it is necessary for many around the globe to understand the dynamics of Central Asian politics carefully and proceed accordingly.



Chapter 5

Conclusion

In order to find the answers of China's strategic considerations in Central Asia after the September 11 Event, there are three questions needed to be answered. 1. What role does Central Asia play to China? 2. What are China's intentions to dominate Central Asia? 3. What is China's strategy after September 11 after the U.S. deployed military and expanded its influence in Central Asia?

Central Asia has been at the crossroads of the East and the West for a long time, where is also China's western back door next to its Xinjiang province. Normally, we call it as a bridge linking China to the South Asia, the Middle East, and Europe. In this regard, Central Asia has become the grounds for a clash of great powers, including China, Russia, and the United States. Therefore, Beijing has tried very hard to control Central Asia while exerting other powers out of this region. Beijing's strategy is to use Central Asia as a supporting element to ensure national interests, especially to improve energy security and national security by countering the three evils in its Xinjiang province. Economically, Beijing could reduce its dependency on vulnerable maritime supplies of energy and countering the three evils in its Xinjiang province. In order to achieve these goals, China has developed a cooperative relationship with Russia and Central Asian states within the framework of SCO, enhancing security and influence in its western region and further to achieve its "peaceful rising."

In addition, Central Asia also plays a platform where China and Russia have common interests in reducing the U.S. influence in Central Asia. Although there are

competitive elements existing between the two great powers, each considers its best interests in order to enhance the capacity of influencing Central Asia. For China cooperation with Russia serves its benefit by using SCO as a platform to enhance China's military security in Central Asia as one of the elements of peaceful rise in the long run.

For China, Central Asia provides with a platform of pursuing its strategy of peaceful rise while calculating the security of its western flank. As aforementioned, China is in a stronger position in the region for the time being, and attempts to strengthen its influence both in Central Asia and Xinjiang. The purpose of Beijing's engagement in Central Asia is to take this place as an energy hub. Although China has succeeded in resolving long standing border disputes, it also focuses on the military cooperation and curbs separatist movements within its Xinjiang province. Increasing politico-strategic-economic cooperation between Central Asian states and China has enormous implications for Beijing itself. Beijing considers Central Asia as its important western flank with a high importance given to its geo-political and geo-economic interests. Besides, Central Asian oil and gas reserves also provide an attractive energy diversification option for China.

In the longer term, China's security interests will be using Xinjiang as a springboard to defend its interests in Central Asia. After the September 11 Event, the U.S. military presence in Central Asia had provided Beijing with an opportunity to further its wider military strategic planning to extend its influence from Central Asia to Indian Ocean. Firstly, China has prioritized economic cooperation with Central Asian states in order to maintain its balance of power with Russia and the United States. Secondly, China's geo-political calculation is to contain India's rising in the future by facilitating the linkages between Pakistan and Central Asian states. While

absorbing the interaction with the United States, China also learned how to obtain a beneficial position within Central Asia. In this context, Beijing would consider development extra regional capacities to enhance its position. Thus, SCO has become a framework of improving bilateral political, economic and military relations with Central Asian states and diversifying its access to the region's energy resources. Thus, China's priority in Central Asia is to maintain its economic stability and to avoid damaging its peaceful rise. Finally, China's strategy in Central Asia has been defined by the endeavor to assure and achieve its national security while sovereignty and territorial integrity are significant national priorities, continuing economic and social development and maintaining its status on the world stage are also strategic priorities. Therefore, any causes to undermine China's economy inhibit its flow of strategic natural resources, provoke it's public, or even undermine its international influence are considered threatening to China's national security. This strategy has been significantly affected by the implication of the September 11 Event, and the subsequent projection of U.S. military and political influence into Central Asia.


Since September 11, 2001, the great powers in the world have taken anti-terrorism as an excuse to deploy military bases around the world. In Central Asia, each great power has excuses to establish policies needed to ensure its national interests. In fact, the competitions among Sino-U.S.-Russia in Central Asia have apparently emerged. Meanwhile, each player has sought to either bilateral or multilateral mechanism to cooperate or to curb each. Indeed, the competitions between China and the U.S. remain the same, except for issue of anti-terrorism. Both China and U.S. practically handle the issue of anti-terrorism. The U.S. cooperated with Pakistan in order to invade Afghanistan, while China accepted the fact that U.S. military deployment in Central Asia. Beijing's practical behavior may earn chances to

cooperate with the U.S. to exchange with U.S. position on Taiwan issue, and earn its reputation as a responsible power in the world community, while suppressing the terrorism. In sum, Beijing tries to enhance its international influence by cooperating with Central Asian states, thus to maintain political stability and share economic interest, and blocking military powers from getting into the region.

To sum up, the rise of China is the primary factor for changes in Central Asia security environment. After September 11, 2001, China's core objective was to sustain economic development and enhance comprehensive national power. Driven by the rapid growth of its comprehensive national power in recent years, China has been actively engaged in Central Asia regional affairs and provided countries in the region with assistance in order to extend its influence.

A realist perspective can be employed to understand Sino-Russia-U.S. strategic competitions and cooperation. According to both classical and neo-realist theories, a uni-polar world order is inherently unstable, and the emergence of a sole dominant power will lead other powers to oppose the hegemony. Since the September 11 Event has occurred, however, China's fear of U.S. presence has intrigued Beijing's response to become a major influence in Central Asia as soon as possible based on this region's proximity and the potential for Beijing's strategic needs. Thus at this time, Beijing's goals for its influence in the region has been summarized as sustainable policies to promote national security and regional stability, and further to compete for influence of the region and its resources, which are keys for its peaceful rise. When the United States shifted its strategy of gravity from the Middle East to the Southeast Asia and East Asia, to enhance its influence in economic, political, and military focuses, China, on the contrary, is enhancing its political influence in Middle East and Central Asia because Beijing wants to occupy the economic vacuum left by the United States. The

purpose of China's strategic consideration is "Energy." It needs huge amount of oil, and natural resources to support its thriving economy. Therefore, China's strategic calculation in Central Asia is focusing on oil and gas which increased Moscow's anxiety over the future development shared with Russia countering the United States. In order to sustainably keep Beijing's influence in Central Asia, China's strategic plan is to enhance the infrastructure in Central Asian states to meet the "New Silk Road" plan. The eventual goal is to connect Iran and Turkey, making China directly getting access to the Middle without passing Malacca Strait. In the foreseeable future, Beijing's political and military power will continue to grow, gradually changing the status quo of geo-strategic situation and regional security in Central Asia.



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