Globalization, Christianity and Confucianism: A Dynamics of Philosophical and Religious Dialogue

全球化、基督教與儒家：一種哲學與宗教對話的動力學

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摘　　要

　　本論文將在當前的全球化脈絡中討論基儒交談，並以此來例釋本人對於不同宗教與哲學傳統相互交談的動力學的一般看法。從哲學上看來，全球化歷程可視為實現人性不斷跨越任何界域的動力的一個歷史過程。在本文中，我將論證全球化雖有其在人性發展淵遠流長的歷史背景，可視為是人性不斷外推歷程的當前歷史階段，也是對於人應朝向多元他者發揮原初慷慨的進一步邀請。本文所謂「外推」是一走出自我，邁向多元他者，由自己熟悉的範圍走向外人、走向陌生人的行動。外推假定了自我走出的原初慷慨，並且須獲取他者的語言或他者能懂的語言。就此而言，不同哲學與宗教的傳統彼此之間的交談，可以視為是它們相互外推的動態過程。本文將在對於全球化與外推的一般性討論之後，簡要展示相互外推的方法與動力。

　　基於此，對於基儒交談的討論也將集中在他們的外推精神與原初慷慨。本文將探討基督宗教最精粹的意義在其原初慷慨與外推精神，這不但顯示在其教義上，也落實在其歷史上傳播至全世界各角落的歷程。筆者認為，可以將基督宗教來華傳教視為是西方世界對於華人的一項珍貴禮物，並討論其歷史上來華的三大階段中的外推策略所隱含的問題。

　　關於儒家，本文將從外推角度討論其恕道，並檢視其慷慨之德，認為對於當前的全球化世界仍甚具啟發性。不過，虛心檢討起來，儒家由於過度強調相互性，也因而有其局限，需要進一步發展在相互性之前自然湧現的原初慷慨，才能進一步成立相互性。例如儒家「禮尚往來」的相互性與「禮聞來學，不聞往教」的精神，或許便阻礙了它發揮不斷外推的精神，以至迄今仍無法像基督宗教那樣外推至全世界各角落，這點或許是儒家可以向基督宗教學習的。

關鍵字：全球化、儒家、外推、宗教交談、基督宗教

1. Globalization, Strangification and Generosity to Multiple Others

Today, all countries in the world are facing the challenge of globalization. Some people would understand this as the last resort of capitalism to dominate the world, but I prefer to understand it more deeply as a process of deterritorialization or cross-bordering, involving all humankind on the globe as a whole, that happens now in every domain of human activities: health care, technology, environment, economics, politics, education, culture, religion, etc. "Deterritorialization" here should be understood in a broader sense, as a process of crossing borders, or going beyond oneself to the other. I will argue in this paper that globalization is the present historical stage of realizing human beings' unceasing process of strangification and a further invitation to human generosity to the other.

Institutionally speaking, the process of globalization starts with modernity, but goes beyond it. Modernity has produced, on the economic level, the ever-expanding free market; and on the political level, the Nation-States and their sovereignty. Beyond these, post-modernity is now producing, on its negative side, the de-constructional critique of modernity's principles, such as subjectivity, representations, rationality, and domination; and, on its positive side, the global information society. In the process of globalization, we see on the one hand the extension of market economy into global market, global politics playing beyond the limit of nation-state together with its concept of sovereignty, and finally the global culture in contrast and in dialectic with self-awakening local cultures.

Taking all these into account, I would define globalization as "a historical process of deterritorialization or cross-bordering, by which human desire, human universalizability and interconnectedness are to be realized on the planet as a whole, and to be concretized now as global free market, trans-national political order and cultural globalism."

Since globalization is a process that concerns humankind as a whole, it should have some foundation in the nature of human beings. Philosophically speaking, it should be based in the human desire always to go beyond and its nature to be longing for universality or better, universalizability. Globalization as a technological, economical and cultural process should be seen as the material implementation of human nature's universalizing dynamism of always going beyond. Since humanity is historical in its essence, there should be no universality pure and simple but only the potentiality to become universalizable, or the process of universalization in time. This is to say "universality" is only an abstract ideal existing in an ever-retreating horizon. The real historical process unceasingly goes beyond and towards higher levels of universalizability.

Anthropologically speaking, this could be traced back to the moment when a human being picked up the first chopping stone and came to use a utensil or instrument. In this way, human beings went beyond the determinism of physical nature and established thereby a free relationship with the material world. Since then human beings stepped into the stage of hominization. But, *homo faber*, though beyond the determination of the material world in using them as instruments, still depended on them, and therefore were not totally human. When human beings were able to communicate with others through language, a system of signs structuring human experiences and revealing the intelligibility of things in communication with others, they started to exist on a new level of universalizability. Moreover, when human beings came to engage themselves in disinterested activities, such as playing, sacrificing and artistic creativities . . . , there emerged higher levels of freedom, even to the point of fusion with things and people. Just imagine that human beings got easily tired after a whole day's labor, but they would continue day and night dancing, playing and engaging in ritual activity of sacrifice without any boredom or fatigue. This shows human beings seemed to be more human in these free playful and creative activities.

Therefore, *homo loquutus* and *homo ludens* are more human, more universalizable and therefore more humanized than merely hominized. Born together with humanization, there is the universalizable dynamism in human nature that came on the scene of the human historical process.

Probably this is why philosophers East and West in the axial age, which happened between the eighth and the second centuries BCE, in the time of philosophical breakthrough, would understand "reason" as the most essential function of the human mind. In ancient Greek philosophy, a human being was defined as "to on logon exon," later translated into Latin as "animal rationale," the proper function of which was *theoria*, which produced knowledge for knowledge's own sake, in looking for the theoretically universalizable. In ancient China, with the emergence of Confucianism and Daoism, the concern was more with the impartial or the universal in human praxis, that is, the practically universalizable.

It is clear that having the idea and tendency of universalizablility is not yet the process of globalization. This needs the whole technological, institutional and historical development through modern times to implement the universalizable in the form of globalization, even if that which has been implemented here is merely part of the universalizable. Globalization concerns the globe or the earth as a whole, though still in reality but a tiny planet in the immense universe. The day when we are ready not only for a global ethics, but also a universalizable ethics in term of the universe, we humans would be qualified then to go beyond the global era to enter into the universal era.

Now, we should consider this: globalization brings with it the contrast with localization, unity in contrast with diversification. This is a moment of human history that people in the word feel so close to each other on the one hand, and so vulnerable and susceptible of conflict of all kinds on the other. Now it is the critical historical moment of opening toward the other instead of keeping within one's own self-enclosure. In responding to today's urgent situation full of conflicts created by self-enclosure of different parts such as different disciplines, economic interests, cultures, ethnic, political and religious groups, etc., we human beings should be more concerned with each other and the possibility of mutual enrichment. In order to overcome antagonism by appealing to effective dialogue, I have proposed in recent years "strangification"[1] and

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[1] The idea of strangification was first proposed by F. Wallner, University of Vienna, as an epistemological strategy for interdisciplinary research. This concept was later developed by myself to the domains of intercultural interaction and religious dialogue.

"language appropriation" as viable strategies. The term "strangification," a neologism that might appear strange in English, yet is much more understandable in Chinese—*waitui* 外推, means etymologically the act of going outside of oneself to multiple others, or going outside of one's familiarity to strangeness, to the strangers. This act presupposes the appropriation of language by which we learn to express our ideas or values in languages understandable to others. In their turn, "strangification" and "language appropriation" presuppose an original generosity toward multiple others, without limiting oneself to the claim of reciprocity, quite often presupposed in social relationships and ethical golden rules.

I use the term "multiple others" to replace the post-modern concept of "the Other" proposed by Emmanuel Lévinas, Jacques Derrida, and Giles Deleuze. For me the Other is a mere philosophical abstraction. In no moment of our life were we facing purely and simply "the Other." We are all born into the multiple others and we grow up among multiple others. It is better for our life of sanity that we keep in our mind the existence of multiple others and our relation with multiple others.

For me, three approaches of strangification could be put into practice. The first is "linguistic strangification," by which we translate a proposition of one particular discipline, research program or an expression or value in one specific culture, social group or even a belief system of one's own religion, into the language/cultural expression/religious belief under-standable to other discipline/culture/social group/religion, to see whether it works or becomes absurd thereby. If it does work after the translation, then it means this proposition, expression, language, value or religious belief is commonly sharable to that extent. If it becomes absurd thereby, then limit should be recognized for that reason and reflection must be made accordingly upon its principle and validity.

The second is "pragmatic strangification," by which we draw a proposition, a supposed truth or a cultural expression/value or a religious belief out from one's own social, organizational and religious contexts, to put it into another social, organizational and religious context. If it is still valuable there, then it is commonly sharable to that extent. Otherwise reflection and self-critique must be made on one's own proposition,

supposed truth, cultural expression/value or religious belief. This is also the process by which one could test and extend their validity in other pragmatic contexts.

The third is "ontological strangification," which, for me, is the act by which we enter into others' scientific micro-world or cultural world or religious world through the detour of experience with the Reality Itself, such as a person, a social group, Nature, or Ultimate Reality.[2]

Religious or philosophical dialogue should be conceived as based on a mutual act of strangification or mutual *waitui*. In the dialogue between A and B, on the level of linguistic strangification, A should translate his propositions or ideas/values/belief system in to the language of B or a language understandable to B. In the meanwhile, B should translate his propositions or ideas/values/belief system in the language of A or understandable to A. On the level of pragmatic strangification, A should draw his proposition(s), supposed truth(s)/cultural expression/value/ religious belief out from his own social, organizational contexts and put it into the social, organizational context of B. In the meantime, B should draw his proposition(s), supposed truth(s)/cultural expression/value/ religious belief out from his own social, organizational context and put it into the social, organizational context of A. On the level of ontological strangification, A should make an effort to enter into B's micro-world, cultural world or religious world through the detour of his experience with Reality Itself, such as a person, a social group, Nature, or Ultimate Reality. In the meantime, B should also make effort to enter into A's micro-world, cultural world or religious world through the detour of his experience with Reality Itself.

This is to say that comparison, communication and dialogue will never be conducted within one's self-enclosure. On the contrary, it starts with a mutual act of going outside of one's self-enclosure to the other that I call "a process of mutual *waitui*." I go outside of myself to you and you go outside of yourself to me, so as to form a dialogue leading to mutual

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2 Vincent Shen, *Confucianism, Taoism and Constructive Realism*, Cognitive Science 5 (Vienna: WUV-Universitätsverlag, 1994), 126–29. By different ways of experiencing Ultimate Reality I mean for example, *ren* (humanity) and *cheng* (sincerity) in Confucianism, the *Dao* and *de* in Daoism, or the emptiness in Buddhism, God in Christianity, Allah in Islam, etc.

enrichment. When we conduct mutual *waitui*, we make our own scientific/cultural/religious/life world understandable to each other by translating our languages into the language of each other or under-standable to each other, by putting it into others' pragmatic context or by going through the detour of Reality Itself or the other's life-world. This process of mutual *waitui* is to be conducted not only in everyday life, in scientific research, in cultural and religious life, but also in economic and political life, where different political parties, interest groups, government and people, etc., should always commit themselves in the process of communication leading to mutual enrichment rather than conflict or war.

The original generosity implied in this act of going outside of oneself should be seen as the condition sine qua non of all situations of reciprocal relationship. Philosophically speaking, before we can establish a sort of reciprocity, emphasized for example in Marcel Mauss' *Essai sur le don*, as the principle of human society, there must be previously a generous act of going outside of oneself to the other, so that there can be established accordingly a relation of reciprocity. If in the classical world, golden rules are so much emphasized and reciprocity was seen as the basic principle of sociability, now in the post-modern world and in the world of globalization, we need a principle more than that of reciprocity. The new principles for society and ethics that we are looking for should base themselves on original generosity and strangification as the act of going outside of oneself to multiple others.

In this paper, I will take the comparison and communication between Christianity and Confucianism as an example for showing my idea of religious dialogue as mutual *waitui* and the problems involved in the historical and doctrinal interaction between these two systems of ideas and beliefs, especially in regard to the dynamic energy of strangification and generosity involved in these two traditions.

2. Christianity, a religion of generosity and strangification

According to my understanding, Christianity has brought with it a message for the original generosity and strangification to multiple others.

Christianity is a religion of strangification par excellence.[3] By Christianity I mean those religious doctrines and institutional organizations, such as the Catholic, Protestant, Orthodox, based on their faith in Jesus Christ. This spirit of generosity to the other not only exists in its doctrine, but also in its historical impetus of expansion.

On the level of theology, the Christian doctrine that God has created the universe could be seen as God's generosity, God's originally generous act of producing creatures out of his infinitely powerful and immensely abundant creativity. Therefore the emergence of myriad forms of existence in the universe and their successive evolution are supposed in Christianity to be produced by this original act of generosity and successive acts of transformation. In the first version of Genesis, concerning what He has created, God says, "it was good."[4] The ontology of goodness is therefore the outcome of divine generosity. After creation, God lives also in the universe by the laws of nature that not only regulate all creatures' movement and life but also bring them to go outside of themselves, to better perfection, to the emergence of higher forms of being. A human being, created in the image of God (Gen. 1:27 NJB), according to his inner nature and dynamism, should also go beyond him/herself for better perfection, in the meantime, because of his/her free will, he is also able to choose to stay in his/her self-enclosure in imagined subjectivity, without caring about his/her relation with others, and bound miserably to self-enclosure, that is what actually meant by original sin. The incarnation of Christ is an act of generosity, that God becomes human and takes the form of a human body, and sacrifices his own life for the benefit of human beings and the whole world. Redemption should be understood in the sense of being saved from one's finite self-enclosure and being open again to the Other, both horizontally to other people and Nature, and vertically to the Ultimate Other, God. Christ, being the core of the faith of all forms of Christianity, serves as the paradigm of strangification and generosity, that all humankind and all beings in the

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3 Concerning the strangification in Buddhism, see Vincent Shen, "Appropriation of the Other and Transformation of Consciousness into Wisdom, Some Philosophical Reflections on Chinese Buddhism," *Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy* 3, no. 1 (2003): 43–62.

4 Gen. 1:10, 12, 18, 21, 25, NJB.

universe should go outside of their finite self-enclosure and go to multiple others, so as to return eventually to the infinite perfection.

This Christian generosity and strangification to multiple others are also founded in the Christian doctrine of human nature that sees a human being as *Imago Dei*, and therefore the goodness of human nature. There has been a misunderstanding among Christians and Confucians based on the stereotyped contrast of original sin in Christianity with the original human goodness in Confucianism. In fact the theology of *Imago Dei* indicates some essential similarity between them.

For some theologians, original sin represents the original darkness in human nature inherited from Adam and Eve after they acted voluntarily against the prohibitive rule of God. However, if we take into account the biblical context in which the narrative of "the Fall" appears, we would better interpret it as a fall of human nature originally created by God as good. The narrative in Genesis shows human nature as originally created good, given the ontology of goodness and theology of *Imago Dei*. First, the environment of human existence is constituted by all things which, after each was created by God, were proclaimed by Him as good. This is the ontological foundation of the world from which human beings emerge. Second, human beings are created by God according to his Image. "God created man in the image of himself, in the image of God he created him, male and female he created them." (Gen. 1:27 NJB) Since God is the Supreme Good, his likeness should also be good, not evil. Third, human beings are created with cognitive ability and free will and thereby are responsible for their own action. These capacities are the transcendental foundation of human moral good and evil.

The so called "evil" or "fall" happens when human beings abused their free will and interrupted arrogantly their relationship with the Ultimate Other, God, a relationship which was represented by a covenant or an agreed rule of action. By this interruption of relationship, human beings were enclosed in their own subjectivity, cutting themselves off from their relationship with God. Right after this interruption, human beings began to suffer. Evil and suffering were then the consequences of the fall of human nature as *Imago Dei* and the refusal of one's relation with God.

Here is something comparable with Confucianism. In Christianity, human nature, created in the image of God, is originally good, but in the actual exercise of his/her free will, a human being could choose to be self-enclosed, to the point of denying his/her good relationship with God and others, and falls thereby. In Confucianism, Mencius asserts that human nature is transcendentally good because of the four sprouts (or four beginnings) of feeling of commiseration, feeling of shame and dislike, feeling of deference and compliance, feeling of right and wrong, etc., whereas the naturalist Confucian Xunzi would say that human nature is evil. Contextually speaking, in the *Xin E (Human Nature is Evil)* Chapter, Xunzi's position is to be understood as saying that a human being is born with desires, which, without education and cultivation, will develop into conflict and violence against each other, and thereby create disorder. Evil is therefore understood as social and political disorder rather than as the darkness of the human soul. Also, in Chapter thirty-eight of the *Laozi*, the degeneration process from *ren* (humaneness) to *yi* (rightness), and from *yi* to *li* (propriety), it is shown clearly because of human negligence and forgetfulness of the *Dao* and *de*.[5] Altogether, these philosophical reflections show us also a more complete image of the originally good human nature with its actual process of degeneration or falling.

For Christians, human beings are born with free will by which they can make free decisions and are thereby responsible for their actions. Because of their free will, human beings could also indulge in their own subjectivity and seclude themselves from all others, even to the point of rejecting God. By this we understand the Christian doctrine of hell. The so-called "hell" is in fact the state of existence of absolute self-enclosure, in which an individual refuses God and cuts him/herself totally from all relation with multiple others, and in totally excluding him/herself from God and multiple others, he/she excludes him/herself also from his/her own possibility of perfection, his/her salvation. That is where human beings suffer the most. According to the *Catéchisme de l'église catholique*, "C'est cette état d'auto-exclusion définitive de la communion

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5 "Therefore, when *Dao* is lost, there comes *de* (creative power). When *de* is lost, there comes *ren* (humaneness). When *ren* is lost, there comes *yi* (rightness). When *yi* is lost, there comes *li* (propriety)." (*Daodejing*, chap. 38, English translation mine)

avec Dieu et avec les bienheureux qu'on désigne par le mot 'enfer.'" [6] (The word "hell" indicates this definitive state of self-exclusion from the communion with God and with the blessed.) But even if a human being would arrogantly exclude him/herself from God, the love of God is infinitely immense, so that such a state of existence could not refuse the penetration of God's love. St. Augustine, who sustained most strongly the doctrine of hell, said that, "Even if I were in hell, You would be there *for if I go down into hell, Thou art there also*."[7] These words of St. Augustine's suggest to me the idea that God's love would penetrate also into hell. I tend to think that, even if human beings could arrogantly refuse God, as finite beings, their refusal of God, no matter how arrogant it is, is still a finite refusal and therefore there will always be possibilities of penetration by God's infinite love. The generosity of God's love will never abandon any being whatsoever.

In short, God is Love and Generosity. God's act of creation is His act of strangification and generosity in their absolute original initiative; human nature, as *Imago Dei*, is invited to act also as generously as possible in the unceasing process of strangification.

3. A Gift from the West: Christianity's strangification to China

In its historical dynamism of expansion, Christianity is also a religion of strangification par excellence. The fact that Christianity has extended from the Sea of Galilee to the whole of Judea, then to Rome and Greece, to Europe and Africa, to Asia and China and the whole world, could be seen also as an unceasing act of strangification and religious generosity. This is the essence implied in the complex history of Christianity that has entered into diverse civilizations and cultures in the world, to become one of their internal dynamic factors and again push them to go outside of themselves and move beyond. In short, Christianity is a religion of strangification and incarnation: it has been incarnated in diverse forms of

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6 Catholic Church, *Catechisme de l'église catholique* (Paris: Mame/Plon, 1992), 271.

7 Augustine, *Confessions*, trans. R. S. Pine-Coffin (London: Penguin Classics, 1961), 4.

spiritual and material civilizations and then urged them each in its own way to go beyond itself to multiple others, eventually to the Ultimate Other. As I see it, the message that Christianity has brought to Confucian China, a message it is still urging upon us today, is purely and simply this generosity to multiple others by way of strangification, in a way that makes us Chinese people more balanced in the dynamic contrast of immanence and transcendence, love and justice, meaningful construction and further strangification. In the following, I will examine Christianity's strategies of strangification in China to see whether they could match up with Christianity's essential message of strangification and original generosity. Roughly speaking, we can divide of Christianity's strangification in China into three phases.

First Phase

Christianity came to China, first in the form of Nestorianism, in the glorious days of the Tang Dynasty. A Nestorian priest, Alopen, bringing with him Christian scriptures, entered the City of Chang An in AD 635, was welcomed by Fang Xuanling (房玄齡) the Chinese prime minister and was placed in the royal court to translate his scriptures, then received by the Emperor Taizong (唐太宗) in the royal office. This should be the most favorable condition of which all later Christian missionaries would be most envious. Nestorianism had enjoyed quite a flourishing period till it was banned in AD 846 when Buddhism was persecuted by Emperor Wuzong (唐 武 宗). At the same time the Nestorians suffered and missionaries were expelled from China. Nevertheless, the translated scriptures such as the *Xuting Mishishuo Jing* (序聽迷詩所經 *The Sutra of Jesus the Messiah*), *Yishen Lun* (一神論 *On One God*), and other texts, were in fact the first introduction of Monotheism into China, for good or for bad, therefore their importance should not be neglected in the intellectual and religious history of China. Although a bit later, in the Yuan Dynasty, the Nestorians did return to China, they did not make much significant contribution to philosophical and theological dialogue, therefore not be dealt with as an important independent phase here.

When we examine the strategies of strangification by the Nestorians in China, we have to say, first, as to linguistic strangification, the

Nestorians had not appropriated the Chinese language well before they started to translate their scriptures into Chinese. That is why the earlier translations were either misleading or too coarse to appeal to Chinese religious faith. For example, the term Jesus was translated as *yishu* (移鼠), a moving mouse, Maria as *moyan* (末艷), the least fair, John as *ruohun* (若昏), the seemingly confused. Not only were such translations without any aesthetic sense of belle lettre, they also provoked disdain. Later, Nestorian translations had over appropriated Daoist and Buddhist terms, such as using Buddha, *Dao*, Marvelous *Dao*, to translate God, which, not only misinterpreted Christian message, but also made itself indistinguishable from Buddhism or Daoism. The fact that the Nestorian texts such as the *Xuting Mishishuo Jing* (序聽迷詩所經 *The Sutra of Jesus the Messiah*), *Jingjiao Sanwei Mengdu Zan* (景教三威蒙度讚 *Nestorian Hymn to the Trinity*), and the *Jingjiao Liuxing Zhongguo Bei* (景教流行中國碑頌 *The Nestorian Inscription in China*) were included in the Buddhist *Tripitaka* (The *Taisho shinshiu daizokyo* edition) is evidence that at least it was perceived as something closely related to Buddhism.

Second, as to pragmatic strangification, even if Nestorianism had made an effort to adapt itself to Confucian ethics such as loyalty to political leaders and filial piety, as evidenced by the *Messiah Sutra* saying that "The most important three things: The first to serve God, the second to serve Emperor, the third to serve parents (一種先事天尊，第二事聖上，第三事父母)," it still faced a difficulty. It could not avoid being used and abused by the political manipulation of Tang Dynasty before suffering seriously from persecution in AD 845 together with Buddhism. After the persecution, Nestorians could survive only in the form of Christian Daoists, as evidenced by some archeological findings and some texts such as the *Complete Works of Patriarchal Lu Dongbin*, in which we find some Daoist chants were in fact Chinese phonetic translations of Christian prayers originally written in Syriac or Sanskrit.[8]

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8 For example, in the *Tianwei* chapter (天微章 On the Profoundness of Heaven) of *Luzu Quanshu* 呂祖全書[Complete Works of Patriarchal Lu Dongbin] 22.7, we read first, "With the head on the ground, Oh Lord of Heaven, we pray thee! Thy original peace pervadeth everywhere. We pray thee, the God of Great Mercy and Sympathy, to save us from all the miseries of life," followed by a line of Chinese phonetic translation of texts, read

Third, as to the ontological strangification, the mixture with Daoist terms such as *Dao*, Marvelous *Dao*, *wu* (無 non-being), *xuan* (玄), *benwu* (本無 original non-being), was misleading in confusing the Christian Ultimate Reality with that of Daoist. This confusion was not only unhelpful in religious dialogue, it could be misleading also in its own self-understanding.

Second Phase

The second phase of Christianity in China began with Matteo Ricci's arrival in China in 1583. He brought with him Christianity, together with European science and philosophy. This did indeed open up a most remarkable page in the history of cultural interaction between China and the West. As to their linguistic strangification, the Jesuits had appropriated the Chinese language and Chinese classics well, especially Confucian classics, and they had excellent assistance from great Chinese literati like Xu Guanqi (徐光啟), Yang Tingyun (楊廷筠) and Li Zhizhao (李之藻), the so-called "three pillars of Christianity in China." Not only had they written their own works in elegant Chinese, most importantly, they had also translated Western philosophers works, especially those of Aristotle, into Chinese.

For better understanding philosophy East and West,[9] it should be noted that in works such as Matteo Ricci's *Tianzhu Shiyi* (天主實義 *The*

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phonetically as "*An cha na li la niu ma sha ho*," which, if in Sanskrit, would mean "Oh Three Spirits, May we be awakened to cut ourselves of the momentary pleasure and be saved," but, if in Syriac, would mean "Indeed, Christ is he who goes up to the highest." English translation from P. Yoshio Saeki, *The Nestorian Documents and Relics in China*, 2nd ed. (Tokyo: Maruzen, 1951), 402–3 (my correction in bold). Similar cases exist in the rest of this chapter and the following three chapters.

[9] For me this challenge from the West started a new period in Chinese Philosophy. I have divided the history of Chinese philosophy into four major periods: First, the pre-Qin and early Han period (sixth to first centuries BCE), in which emerged and developed Confucianism, Daoism, Mohism, Legalism, School of Names, etc. Second, the late Han and Wei-Jin, Sui-Tang period (first century to tenth century CE), of the introduction of Indian Buddhism and the development of divers schools of Chinese Mahayana Buddhism such as Sanlun School, Weishi School, Tiantai School, Huayan School, Chan Buddhism. Third, the emergence and development of Neo-Confucianism from early Song to late Ming/early Qing (eleventh to sixteenth century). Fourth, the period of facing the challenge of and integrating with Western philosophy, after the introduction of Western science, philosophy and

True Meaning of the Lord of Heaven), Francisco Furdato's *Mingli Tan* (名理探 *Investigation of Names and Principles*), and Julius Aleni's *Xixuefan* (西學凡 *Introduction to Western Sciences*), we find names and ideas of Western philosophers such as Socrates, Plato, Aristotle, St. Augustine, St. Bernard, St. Thomas. These could be seen therefore as the first Western philosophers known by Chinese people. Aristotle was the first Western philosopher to be introduced and translated, or better, reinterpreted, into Chinese. In fact, systematic introduction of Christian interpretation of Aristotle's works was one of the missionary projects undertaken by Ricci and his colleagues in China, supposed by them to be a country of philosophers or one run by philosophers.

According to Rev. Fang Hao, four Aristotelian books in the form of commentaries published by the Jesuit Coimbra College were "translated" into Chinese in the late Ming period. They were the *Mingli Tan*, the *Huanyou Quan* (寰有詮), the *Lingyan Lishao* (靈言蠡勺), and Alphonsus Vagnoni's *Xiushen Xixue* (修身西學) . . . .[10] But, when I checked them with the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu*, [11] I discovered that they were not "translations" at all. In fact, three of them were freely abridged texts rewritten for the Chinese people with Christian interpretation of Aristotelian works based on Aristotle's discourses in *De Categoriae, De Caelo, and De Anima* as well as their commentaries by Coimbra College. In fact, the *Mingli Tan* was signed as *yiyi* (translated as to "meaning") by Francisco Furdato and *daci* (expressed in literary Chinese) by Li Zhizao;[12] the same case pertains with

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Christianity by Matteo Ricci and other Christian missionaries (since late sixteenth century to the present). I believe this periodization can, among others, render more justice to Ricci, his Jesuit colleagues and early Chinese Christians' contribution to Chinese philosophy.

[10] Maurus Fang Hao 方豪, *Li Zhizao Yanjiou* 李之藻研究 [A Study on Li Chih-tsao (1565–1630)] (Taipei: Taiwan Commercial Press, 1966), 103.

[11] I appreciate the Thomas Fisher Rare Book Library, University of Toronto, to have allowed me the access to the precious *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu* it possesses.

[12] *Mingli Tan* should have been based on the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis e Societatis Jesu: In Universam Dialecticam Aristotelis Stagiritae*, Nunc Primùm in Germania in lucem editi. (Coloniae Agrippinae: Apud Bernardum Gualtherium, 1611). It is also not a translation in the exact sense. Some comparisons on this part have been done by Robert Wardy in the second chapter of his *Aristotle in China: Language, Categories and Translation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2000). Apart from the published

the *Huanyou quan*, which was based on the Coimbra commentary on Aristotle's *De Coelo*. The *Lingyan Lishao*, based on the Coimbra commentary on Aristotle's *De Anima*, also with much free abridgment, was signed as "orally narrated" by Franciscus Sambiasci and transcribed into literary Chinese by Xu Guanqi. Besides, Alphonsus Vagnoni's work titled *Xiushen Xixue*, together with his *Qijia Xixue*(齊家西學), *Zhiguo Xixue* (治國西學), constitute a series of treatises in Chinese on ethics and political philosophy based on Aristotle and St. Thomas' works and his understanding of European practices.

When checking with the *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis Societatis Jesu*, we should add to the list the *Suida* (*Dialogue on Sleeping*) by Francescus Sambiasci, which contains texts that are in fact a Chinese rewriting in the form of dialogue, not to say "translation," of Aristotle's *De Somno et Vigilia and De Somniis*. Part of *De Somno et Vigilia* and *De Divinatione per Somnium* could also be found in Aleni's *Xingxue cushu*, always based on their Coimbra commentaries but with more Chinese references.[13] Also, the *Kongji Gezhi (Investigation of Heavenly Phenomena)*, signed as *zhuan* (authored) by Alphonsus Vagnoni, contains in fact, in its first volume, part of Coimbra's commentary on Aristotle's *De Generatione et Corruptione*, especially that on four elements, and in its second volume, a lot of materials from Aristotle's *Meteorology*, based on the Coimbra's commentary on it in the *Parva Naturalia*. The basic idea in their enterprise of translation is the "harmonious synthesis" of Western philosophy with Chinese wisdom through the project of translating Aristotle's works. As Julius Aleni in his *Xixuefan (Introduction to Western Sciences)* says,

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volumes of the *De Categoriae*, there are still other translated volumes yet unpublished because of lack of financial support as well as positive response from Chinese readers, such as *De Interpretatione, De Syllogismo* (Analytica Priora) and *De Demonstratione* (Analytica posteriora).

13 *Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis, Societatis Iesv, in qvatvor libros De Coelo, Meteorologicos & Parua naturalia, Aristotelis Stagirita,* Hac qvinta in Germania editione, partim Graci contextus Latino è regione respondentis accessione auctiores, partim per omnia correctiores in studiosorum gratiam editi (Coloniae: Impensis Lazari Zetzneri, 1604), 3:19–36, 36–48, 48–54.

> We who travel from as far as ninety thousand *li* are willing to translate into Chinese all the previous mentioned treatises. We will be able to finish translating them by using more than ten some years, so that those in their younger days with good talent start to learn them progressively with their innocent heart. . . . in order that the sciences of sages in the Eastern sea and Western sea will be able to meet in one thread leading to harmonious synthesis.[14]

    As to pragmatic strangification, Jesuit missionaries adapted their ethical ideas and practices to the Confucian context and in fact were quite close to Chinese ethics of the time, even quite admired by many Chinese intellectuals. Matteo Ricci appreciated Confucian virtue of filial piety and allowed understandingly popular cult of ancestry and intellectual's cult of Confucius. Also they made friend with high officers and respect political authority. On the level of ethics, Matteo Ricci and his followers sustained a Christian ethics that emphasized ascetic values, quite similar to Neo-Confucianism of that time. Neo-Confucianism replaced pre-Qin Confucianism's creative and harmonious attitude towards human feeling and desire with a dualistic and repressive world vision, such as "discard human desire and conserve heavenly principle." As I see it, both Neo-Confucians and Christians understood a "repressive concept of virtue," rather than a "creative concept of virtue," which, for Aristotle, means mainly the excellence of one's natural abilities; and, for classical Confucianism, means mainly harmonization of human relationships.

    In the *Qi Ke* (七克 *On Overcoming Seven Capital Sins*) of Didacus de Pantoja (龐迪我), "virtue" was considered also as the overcoming of seven capital sins: humility as overcoming pride, benevolence as overcoming jealousy, generosity as overcoming misery, patience as overcoming anger, simplicity or frugality as overcoming gluttony, chastity as overcoming lust, and diligence as overcoming laziness. Under their influence, Christian Chinese intellectuals also understood virtue in its

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14 Li Zhizhao 李之藻, ed., *Tianxue Cuhan* 天學初函 (Taipei: Students Bookstore, 1985), 1:59. (English translation mine)

repressive sense. For example, Chen Liancai (陳亮采) wrote in his preface to *Qi Ke*,

> By using the method of keeping oneself on guard and in dread (jiesheng konju 戒慎恐懼) one could lead one's human nature endowed by heaven so as to follow the law of heaven. This is the true learning of our Confucians. Yet being afraid of ordinary people not knowing what is heaven and who see it merely as the surface of the sky, they say for the reason of expediency that "Heaven is in my own mind/heart." Thereafter scholars would go further to understand "my mind/heart is heaven" and run wild and uncultivated, shaking off all rules in believing that truth is on my side and I should enjoy my happy freedom. Then they become thereby a base person without any scruple. How could this be the teaching of the Duke of Zhou and Confucius? [15]

This remark shows a repressive idea of virtue by focusing on the method of keeping oneself on guard and in dread, in the sense of Christians checking their conscience; on the other hand, it proposed a crucial critique of Neo-Confucianism's too humanistic understanding of the human heart as heaven, which absolutized the human heart and encouraged self-contentment and self-enclosure of subjectivity by radically affirming that "all men on the street are already sages." This debate between Christian Confucians and Neo-Confucians is still going on today, where the main point of debate is to say that while humans can be in union with Heaven, still the human heart is not Heaven Itself.

Besides, Jesuits' introduction of Western science and technology, such as astronomy, geometry and mathematics, logic, phonetics, cartography, clockwork, just to mention a few, were considered by the Chinese intellectuals and political authorities as of great pragmatic use. The Jesuits' introduction of Western mathematics, logic and scientific method had influenced the scientific method of philological studies in the Qianjia school (乾嘉學派), inspired the Yan-Li school (顏李學派) towards more pragmatic ways of learning (such as organizing their school

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[15] Ibid., 2:704–705. (English translation mine)

into four halls of learning: classics and history, literary matters, military craft, and practical arts). It also influenced the development of philosophy, philology, investigation by evidence and other methods of learning in the Qing Dynasty.

As to ontological strangification, even if Matteo Ricci and his Jesuit colleagues had made an effort to compare the friendly Christian God with the Confucian Heaven, their rational arguments for God's existence, and their understanding of God as first cause, first substance, and pure act was strange to the Chinese mind. Also their use of the Aristotelian concept of substance to criticize the Buddhist concept of *kong* (空 emptiness), Daoist concept of *wu* (無 non-being) and the Neo-Confucian concept of *li* (principle, reason), showed their difficulty in establishing a mutual understanding with these different concepts of Ultimate Reality. Not only did their onto-ousio-theological conceptual scheme keep the Jesuits' understanding on the ontic level, and incapable of understanding the spiritual and ontological meanings of Buddhist *kong* and Daoist *wu*, but also, with their attachment to Aristotle's philosophy of substance, they were not well equipped conceptually to understand the non-substantialist Ultimate Reality in these Chinese traditions.

Third Phase

The third phase of Christianity in China started in the mid 19th century and extends till the present time. In this period, the most important feature is the institutionalization of the linguistic and ethical levels of strangification, although not much progress has been done yet as to ontological strangification. Strangification now takes the form of institutionalization: the establishment of a network of charity and social work and, most importantly, the establishment of different levels of educational institutions, especially institutions of higher education such as colleges and universities, first by Protestants, then by Catholics. More advanced Western science and technology have been introduced to China. But, unfortunately, with their inextricable ties with Western colonial powers, Christian churches were misunderstood, and even became the target of anti-Christian movements because of their inherent relationship with the Western Imperialist countries whose aggressive acts

hurt Chinese collective subjectivity. Being short of space, I will not enter into more detailed historical discussion here.

As I see it now, Western science and technology have become one of the inner dynamic factors of modern Chinese culture, and for this, we should be grateful to Christianity's effort in bringing Western science and technology to China. Both sciences and techniques brought to China by the Jesuits in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and more modern and advanced science and technology introduced later and more recently by the Protestant and Catholic missionaries, have helped to develop scientific rationality in China. They have contributed in a certain sense to develop Chinese instrumental rationality and material civilization. Therefore, even if they have helped develop a new cultural dynamism in China, by staying merely on the level of instrumental rationality and material civilization, without any further philosophical reflections and religious enhancement, this new cultural dynamism could not be shown, on the ethical and spiritual levels, as exhibiting generosity towards multiple others, and eventually as openness to the Ultimate Other.

Let me conclude this section. It has been more than thirteen centuries since Alopen appeared in the City of Chang An, or at least four centuries since Matteo Ricci's arrival at Zhaoqing. Unfortunately Christianity has not become one of the major constitutive elements in Chinese culture. Christianity itself might be responsible for not having made clear its true message in the context of Chinese culture. On the other hand, Chinese culture under the major influence of Confucianism, though compatible with Christianity, nevertheless might have something inherent in it that limited its grasping of that truly Christian spirit. The invitation to further strangification and generosity to multiple others in the era of globalization may be a good historical occasion for both sides to move towards a deeper mutual understanding.

4. Confucian *shu* 恕 and generosity to multiple others

Let me return now to Confucianism and examine its dynamism of strangification and generosity, in regard to its possible contribution in the era of globalization. Any historical process and social institution should always be lived existentially and ethically with meaningfulness by human

beings. This is also the case with the process of globalization, which, developed by today's communication technology and implemented on economic, political and cultural levels, is bringing humankind into more and more systematic networks. This situation of living in networks existentially exemplifies the ontology of dynamic relationship affirmed long since by classical Confucianism. The Confucian concept of *ren* (仁) denotes somehow the interconnectedness between human beings and all things existing in the universe (Heaven and earth). Because of *ren*, human beings can be affected by and respond to one another, and by the act of *shu*, they can extend their existence to larger realms of the human world, from oneself to family, to social community, to the state, to all Under Heaven, now interpreted by the term "globalization." The networks of this dynamic relationship cannot be said to exist in the form of substance, neither can they be said not to exist, as nothingness. They are always there, dynamically developing, not only on the ontological level, but also on the ethical level.

Basically, Confucianism will be able to contribute to this process of globalization by its view of life as a process of ethical extension, especially by Confucian virtues and values such as *ren* (humanness), *shu* (altruism), *yi* (義 rightness), *zhi* (智 wisdom), *cheng* (誠 sincerity), *xin* (信 faithfulness). In the networks developed by globalization, human beings, if they want to live up to human dignity, should always deal with each other with sincerity and especially with the virtue of shu.

Waitui (strangification) and generosity to multiple others are supposed to be the most needed virtues in the process of globalization. In Confucianism, *shu* could be seen as such a basic virtue. Although quite often translated as "altruism,"[16] or "putting oneself in other's place,"[17] or even as "using oneself as a measure to gauge others"[18] or empathy (a psychological interpretation insufficient today when our life is mediated now by symbolic languages and technical objects), it is best understood and interpreted now in terms of strangification, in the sense that "he who

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[16] Wing-tsit Chan, comp. and trans. *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1963), 44.

[17] Roger T. Ames and Henry Rosemont, Jr., trans. *The Analects of Confucius: A Philosophical Translation* (New York: Ballantine Books, 1998), 92.

[18] D. C. Lau, trans. *Mencius* (New York: Penguin Books. 1970), 74.

practices *shu* knows how to strangify" (*shuzhe shantui* 恕者善推) and "extend from oneself to the other" (*tuiji jiren* 推己及人). In the *Analects*, not much was said about *shu*, though it was said by Confucius himself to be the expression to act upon till the end of one's life.

> When Zigong asked, "Is there one expression that can be acted upon till the end of one's days?" The master replied, "There is *shu*: do not impose on others what you yourself do not want."[19]

Here *shu* was understood in the spirit of the negative version of the golden rule, "do not impose on others what you yourself do not want." The same negative golden rule was repeated by Confucius when answering Zhonggong's question about ren.[20] From this repetition we can see a very close relationship between *ren* and *shu*, given the fact that they have the same definition. On the other hand, a positive version of the golden rule was given as an answer to the question about the concept of *ren* (humanity), asked by Zigong, "A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes others, wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others."[21]

As we can see, both negative and positive versions of golden rules are, in Confucian terms, based on a reciprocity between self and other. With *shu*, one extends one's existence to larger and larger circles. It is the act of going always beyond oneself to the other, from self to family, from family to community, from community to the state, and from the state to all under heaven. This is the act of "extending or strangifying from oneself to the other" (*tuiji jiren*). A Confucian existence is an ever-expanding life based on self-cultivation. In this process, authenticity and perfection of self have priority over dependence on others. That is why Confucius emphasized learning for perfecting oneself and more emphasis was placed by him on the side of self-perfection or self-preparation than on others.[22]

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19 *Analects* 15:24, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

20 *Analects* 12:2, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

21 *Analects.* 6:28, trans. *Chan, Source Book.*

22 For example: "Don't worry about not being recognized by others; worry about not having any reason for them to recognize you," (*Analects* 14:30); "Exemplary persons are

So it seems that self-cultivation and self-perfection are to be achieved the individualistically, while harmonious relation with multiple others should be achieved only in the social context. The Confucian way of life is a continuous extension of one's existence in the context of larger and larger circles of life based on the perfection of one's self. Even if self-cultivation has priority over others in the order of moral perfection, strangification or *shu* is always necessary in the order of ethical and political implementation. That is why Mencius says, "Hence one who extends his bounty can bring peace to the Four Seas; one who does not cannot bring peace even to his own family. There is just one thing in which the ancients greatly surpassed others, and that is the way they extended what they did."[23] But, on the other hand, self-reflection and self-cultivation are always important for a deeper understanding of one's true self and potentiality, for the exploitation of the treasure accumulated in one's own tradition. That is why Mencius would speak of "unfolding one's heart" "knowing one's own self-nature," besides the process of "extension." I would emphasize here that, without self-reflection, self-awareness and self-cultivation, strangification might become self-alienation. In Mencius we find already this dynamic contrast between strangification and self-awareness.

In Confucianism, the tension between self and other is solved by golden rules, both negative and positive, based ultimately on the principle of reciprocity. In this sense, we can say that, in the Confucian world, in which human behaviors have to be regulated by *li*, even the act of going outside of oneself to multiple others launched by *shu*, and the original generosity it implied, have to be regulated by reciprocity.

The principle of reciprocity becomes a guiding principle of social and political philosophy in the *Great Learning*, where it is called the principle of measuring square (*Jiejuzhidao* 絜矩之道). The *Great Learning* provides first a positive version of the principle which is

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distressed by their own lack of ability, not by the failure of others to acknowledge him," (*Analects* 15:19); "Exemplary persons (*junzi*) make demands on themselves, while petty persons make demands on others," (*Analects* 15:21). Translation from Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*.

23 *Mencius* 1:7, trans. D. C. Lau, *Mencius*.

followed by a negative version of it. They are put in the context of explaining the extension from governing the state to making peace for all under heaven. The positive version reads,

> What is meant by saying that the peace of the world depends on the order of the state is: When the ruler treats the elders with respect, then the people will be aroused towards filial piety. When the ruler treats the aged with respect, then the people will be aroused towards brotherly respect. When the ruler treats compassionately the young and the helpless, then the common people will not follow the opposite course. Therefore the ruler has a principle with which, as with a measuring square, he may regulate his conduct.[24]

The major point here is the governance by *ren* (humanity): when the ruler governs his people with respect and humanity, people will respond with peace and harmony, in the form of filial piety, brotherly respect and submissiveness. The positive reciprocity is here expressed in terms of filial piety, brotherly respect and compassion for the young and the helpless, etc., initiated by a political leader. On the other hand, there is also the negative version of the measure of square:

> What a man dislikes in his superiors, let him not show it in dealing with his inferiors. What he dislikes in those in front of him, let him not show it in preceding those who are behind; what he dislikes in those behind him, let him not show it in following those in front of him; what he dislikes in those on the right, let him not apply it to those on the left; and what he dislikes in those on the left, let him not apply it to those on the right. This is the principle of the measuring square.[25]

As is clear, the reciprocity here is enlarged analogically from one side to the opposite side: from superior to inferior, from inferior to superior; from right to left, from left to right; from front to behind, from behind

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24 Chan, *Source Book*, 92.
25 Ibid.

to front, thereby forming a cubic relationship, not merely a square, of reciprocity, though always taken in a negative sense. Within this cubic structure of reciprocal relationship, more attention has been paid to the horizontal, that is, from right to left, from left to right; from front to behind, from behind to front, than the vertical relation between superior and inferior, mentioned only once. Nevertheless, the concept of "extended reciprocity" plays a major role in this largest extension of human relation—from the state to all under heaven.

5. Confucian Generosity to the Other

Now, let us examine the Confucian virtue of generosity. I agree with Aristotle that generosity could be understood as liberality as well as magnanimity.[26] When we look for Confucian virtue of generosity in the sense of liberality or generosity as to the giving or sharing of one's material goods, we might first think of Zilu. When assisting Confucius with Yan Hui, asked by Confucius as to what they would like most to do, Zilu said, "I would like to share my horses and carriages, my clothing and furs, with my friend, and if they damage them, to bear them no ill will."[27] This text shows Zilu has a virtue of liberality. Even if it concerns sharing and not an unconditional gift, nevertheless it expresses his non-possessiveness and generosity in sharing with others as friends. Zilu did not say "share with any other in general," but "share with my friends," who were equal one with another and reciprocal in being good to each other. So it seems that Zilu cherished friendship more than material goods.

But Zilu's generosity in terms of liberality regarding material goods, and his ambition to govern well a state of thousand chariots, were not highly valued in Confucius' eyes, when compared with another's. When Zilu, Zengxi, Ranyou and Gong Xihua were asked by Confucius about what they would do if someone did recognize their talents, among all the answers, Confucius would say only "I am with Zengxi."—Confucius was

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26 Aristotle *Nicomachean Ethics* 1123b 1–30, in *Complete Works of Aristotle*, ed. J. Barnes, Bollingen Series (Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1983), 2:1773.

27 *Analects* 5:26, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius*.

more in praise of Zengxi's free life style in union with Heaven and earth: "At the end of spring, with the spring clothes having already been finished, I would like, says Zengxi, in the company of five or six young men or six or seven children, to cleanse ourselves in the Yi River, to revel in the cool breezes at the Altar for Rain, and then return home singing."[28]

From this we understand Confucius put emphasis on human existential feeling as a whole and the spiritual horizon that comes closer to the rhythm of nature. This shows the cosmic breadth of Confucius' mind in the sense of magnanimity. In general Confucius would emphasize generosity that is genuine, and blame the false liberality. That is probably the meaning of Confucius' blaming of Wei Shengao in saying "Who said that Wei Shengao is upright? When someone begged vinegar from him, he in turn begged it from his neighbors and then presented it to the person who has asked him for it."[29]

Indeed, Confucius' mind was so great that his virtue of generosity is not limited to liberality, but much closer to what Aristotle said as "magnanimity." On the one hand, Confucius did not care much about the gain or loss in material goods, his spiritual horizon was much loftier than any desire for fortune and position, as shown when he said, "To eat coarse food, drink plain water, and pillow oneself on a bent arm—there is pleasure to be found in these things. But wealth and position gained through inappropriate means—these are to me like floating clouds."[30] Confucius' own ambition was much higher, which, according to his own words, was "to bring peace and contentment to the aged, to share relationship of trust and confidence with my friends, and to love and protect the young."[31] This means he was concerned with the existential comfort of all people at all ages, a concern out from his universalization of the virtue of *ren* (humaneness).

We should point out here that Confucius understood generosity mostly in the sense of reciprocity. He said, when answering to Zizhang's question about *ren*, "One who can practice five things wherever he may

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28 *Analects* 11:26, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

29 *Analects* 5:24, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

30 *Analects* 7:16, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

31 *Analects* 5:26, trans. Ames and Rosemont, *The Analects of Confucius.*

be is a man of humanity: earnestness, liberality, truthfulness, diligence, and generosity." Among the five virtues, *kuan* (寬 liberality) and *hui* (惠 generosity) are related to generosity, when all five are related to reciprocal virtues, as Confucius himself explained, "If one is earnest, one will not be treated with disrespect; If one is liberal, one will win the heart of all, If one is trustful, one will be trusted. If one is diligent, one will be successful. And if one is generous, one will be able to enjoy the service of others."[32] Note that Confucius said all of this in the context of consequences, that you will not be treated with disrespect, you will win the heart of all, you will be trusted, you will be successful, you will be able to enjoy the service of others, and so forth. Which means Confucius considered moral matters also from the consequentialist, not only from the intentionalist, point of view. Liberality and generosity in the Confucian sense, as to the consequences they invite, still stand on reciprocity.

I understand Confucian virtues in two senses, "relational virtues" defined as harmonization of relationship; and "aptitudinal virtue" defined as excellence in one's natural ability. Reciprocity is the basis on which was built Confucian relational virtues and social relationships in general. It is clear that all relational virtues refer to the other(s) and receive response from the other(s), relation always being measured by reciprocity. This is much clearer when we come to relational virtues in the five relationships, consisting always in their harmonization, whether it concerns relation between husband and wife, or parents and children, or brothers and sisters, or friends and lovers, or individual and society. The meaning of virtue such as filial piety, fidelity, trustfulness, and royalty, etc., could be interpreted differently according to the historical context, but their essence as the harmonization of relationship always remains valid.

The process of harmonization of relationship should be a process of extension from reciprocity to universalizability. Reciprocity is essential for human relationships according to Confucianism. But the good human relationship comes to its fulfillment when enlarged from reciprocity to universalizability. This might be in Confucius' mind, when asked by Zilu concerning how an exemplary person behaves, he answered first by the

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32 *Analects* 17:6, trans. Chan, *Source Book.*

cultivation of oneself for one's dignity, then cultivation of oneself for the happiness of others', finally cultivation of oneself for the happiness of all people. From reciprocity to universalizability, this means human beings should transcend the limit of special relationships to universalizable relationship, even to the point of seeing all people within four seas as brothers. With *ren*, one can treat other fellowmen, despite their difference in family, profession, company, race and nation, with *ren*, a universalizable love. With *shu*, one may go outside of one's self through language appropriation to strangify from one's self to multiple others, till one reaches all Under Heaven. This is the way by which Confucianism extends the harmonization of human relationships, the full unfolding of which is the process of the formation of the virtuous life, not merely a life of observing stringent rules of obligation.

Ideally speaking, there must be such a dynamic energy inside Confucianism to strangify, to universalize, to extend to all Under Heaven. Nevertheless, historically speaking, Confucianism itself did not take the initiative to expand itself to all Under Heaven to the extent of including the Western world, like the Christians Alopen in the 7th century and Matteo Ricci in the 16th century did, who took a generous initiative to come to China despite the difficult, long and dangerous voyages. It was also Matteo Ricci and other Jesuit fathers who had taken the initiative to introduce Confucianism to Europe. The *Liji* (Book of Rites) might have synthesized the Confucian minds, all in emphasizing the reciprocity of *li*.[33] It says, "I have heard [in accordance with li] that scholars come to learn; I have not heard of [the master] go to teach," though the emphasis was put on the value of truth and dignity of the master, unfortunately the original generosity was quite often forgotten.[34] The lesson of this historical fact should allow us Confucians to rethink the limit of

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[33] "What the rules of propriety values is that of reciprocity. If I give a gift and nothing comes in return, that is contrary to propriety; if the thing come to me and I give nothing in return, that also is contrary to propriety." James Legge, trans., *Li Chi [Liji], Book of Rites Part I* (1885; repr. Whitefish, MT: Kessinger Publishing, 1974), 65.

[34] The sentence in the *Liji* "In the highest [antiquity] they prized simply conferring good," right before the secondary reciprocity, may be talking about this original generosity that is quite often forgotten. Ibid.

reciprocity and understand that, without the original generosity to take the first step, there would be no reciprocity in a Confucian sense.

6. Conclusions

Chinese culture, under the overwhelming and long term influence of Confucianism, has indeed something to learn from the true spirit of Christianity. It should not indulge in looking only at the negative sides of Christianity in the past in a self-defensive manner.

From the point of view of interaction between self and other, Western civilization has been, since the sixteenth century, the Other of Chinese culture. From the beginning of this complicated history of China's interaction with the West, there was already the involvement of Christianity, serving as one of the deep structural constituents of Western civilization. For it or against it, one should understand it in depth. Even Nietzsche's radical attitude of anti-Christ and his claim that "God is Dead" were deeply rooted in his understanding of Christianity as the background to his life experience.

Fundamentally speaking, modernity could be characterized by the principle of subjectivity, culture of representation, rationality and domination. The historical complexity in which Christian missionaries came to China, inextricably connected with European colonial expansion in the spirit of modernity under the pretext of civilizing others, has made Christian missionaries misunderstood as serving as religious instrument of European imperialism. Nevertheless, those Christian missionaries, bringing generously with them European science, philosophy, Christianity, charity, social works and educational networks to China despite long and dangerous voyages, should be seen as representing an act of generosity. Not to mention that Christianity has its own long history before the dawn of modernity. The primitive Christians lived as a community of *agape* (unselfish love) that emphasized a life of devotion and generosity to the other. Unselfish love and generosity to the other are indeed the true spirit of Christianity, always urging Christians and others to take a generous initiative before any reciprocity. This is something that Confucianism and Daoism did not do in the past.

Let me conclude. From a philosophical point of view, the process of globalization should be seen as a historical process of realizing the ever-universalizing human nature going beyond borders of any kind. The dynamism behind this is the unversalizability and perfectibility of human intelligence and desire, developed since humankind's humanization with language and culture, and further developed in a self-aware manner after the philosophical breakthrough. In modernity, human beings have been searching for the resource in their own subjectivity and the rational construction of this world by way of representations. Some contemporary Neo-Confucians have adopted the philosophy of subjectivity to reconstruct Confucianism. I am wondering whether this is something we should go beyond or something we should attach to in order to have a future. Yes, we human should explore what is inside our self and our spiritual resources. But, this would not become clear unless we strangify and meet multiple others for mutual enrichment.

Now, in entering the process of globalization, we need a new ethics fundamentally based on the generosity to the other through unceasing strangification. Without globalization, it would not be possible for human universalizability to be realized and implemented on a higher and global level. On the other hand, globalization itself should pay respect to and bring its resources from different cultural traditions. It should be an invitation, not an imposition. In this context, the Confucian concept of *shu* and virtue of generosity will still be a resource of inspiration, even if they have some limit as to their emphasis on reciprocity. They need further development so as to find a deeper layer of resources for an original generosity. It is especially on this point that Confucianism could learn from Christianity. All things considered, if we human beings are not ready for further strangification and greater generosity to multiple others, we will not be ready, not even worthy, of a real globalization, not to mention entering into a higher form of universalization in terms of the universe.

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Abstract

This paper will put the dialogue between Christianity and Confucianism in the context of globalization and use this dialogue as an illustration of my broader vision of the dynamics of dialogue among different philosophical and religious traditions. From a philosophical point of view, the process of globalization should be seen as a historical process of realizing the ever-universalizing human nature going beyond borders of any kind. This paper will argue that globalization, though based on a long process of human development, is the present historical stage of realizing human beings' unceasing process of strangification and a further invitation to human generosity to multiple others. By strangification I mean the act of going outside of oneself to multiple others, from one's familiarity to outsiders, to strangers. It presupposes an original generosity and appropriation of language of others or understandable to others. Religious or philosophical dialogue should be conceived as a process of mutual strangification (*waitui*), the methods and dynamics of which will be explored after a general discussion of globalization and strangification.

Based on this, my discussion of Christianity-Confucianism dialogue will focus on their ideas of strangification and generosity to the other. I will explore what is best in Christianity in terms of its original generosity and strangification on the doctrinal level as well as in its process of historical expansion to all corners of the world. I consider Christianity's mission to China as a gift from the West, and I will discuss the historical problems involved in the three major phases of its strangification to China.

Also, This paper will discuss the Confucian concept of *shu* in terms of strangification and Confucian virtue of generosity to the Other. Both are still very inspiring today for a world in process of globalization. But, under self-reflection, we should see the limit of Confucianism as to its emphasis on reciprocity, and its need to develop an original generosity

that could establish reciprocity on a deeper dynamism. For example, the Confucian concept of *li* (ritual) that puts emphasis on reciprocity and the idea that, in accordance with *li*, "scholars should come to learn, not the master goes to teach," might have hindered Confucianism from further extending itself to the whole world. It is especially on this point that Confucianism could learn from Christianity.

Keywords: Globalization, Confucianism, strangification (*waitui*)
religious dialogue, Christianity