Hsiung Shih-li's Hermeneutics of Self：Making a Confucian Identity in Buddhist Words

Chen-kuo Lin

National Chengchi University

Abstract

This essay attempts to explore through discourse analysis the making of Hsiung Shih-li's identity as a Neo-Confucianist. Four levels of hermeneutical analysis, i.e., historical-narrative, semantic, philosophical, and existential, are taken as a methodical guide. My analysis leads to the following conclusions: (1) On the existential level, as Tu Wei-ming points out, Hsiung considered as his own ultimate concern "the quest for true self" or "the search for the truth in which life can abide". (2) On the philosophical level, such existential quest resulted in a holistic, creative, and dynamic ontology of transformation. (3) On the semantic level, a chain of metonymic replacement can clearly be seen in Hsiung's usages of "transformation" and "mind-volition-consciousness", based on the

various semantic contexts of the Indian and Chinese Yogàcàra, Mādhyamika, Hua-yen, Ch'an, Taoism, Neo-Confucianism, and *The Book of Changes*. Like Indra's net, these multivocal meanings were woven into a seemingly consistent discourse. (4) On the historical-narrative level, Hsiung's autobiographical self-portrait in the genre of "recorded sayings" can be regarded as the most significant element in his hermeneutics of self, as it serves as a guide in reading Hsiung's philosophy as directed toward the searching for self. In this essay, I emphasize the last two levels of analysis in order to demonstrate that there is no such thing as "identity" *per se* in a Confucian philosopher and his philosophy. In the case of Hsiung Shih-li, we found that his Confucian identity is constructed through mirrors of language among which Buddhist language plays the most significant role.

We define our identity always in dialogue with, sometimes in struggle against, the things our significant others want to see in us.

Charles Taylor (1994:32-33)

It is because of différance that the movement of signification is possible only if each so-called "present" element, each element appearing on the scene of presence, is related to something other than itself, thereby keeping within itself the mark of the past element...

Jacques Derrida (1982:13)

Hermeneutics of Self in Modern Confucianism

Any attempt to define "Modern Confucianism" and describe its identity is always controversial. We cannot help but feeling puzzled when confronted with recent terms such as Marxist Confucianism, Kantian Confucianism, Boston Confucianism, or even Postmodern Confucianism, and their diverging self-definitions and claims to legitimacy. What *is* Modern Confucianism? Does the label "Modern Confucianism" as a "school" stand for anything meaningful? Or are we dealing with a mere battle of shadows? These questions are especially intriguing since we are told that Confucianism has entered into a new stage of revitalization. In this essay, I will focus on the case of Hsiung Shih-li (1885-1968) only, particularly his hermeneutical relation to Buddhism, and examine how he constructed a Confucian identity through appropriating Buddhist words and concepts.

Hsiung is regarded as one of leading Confucian philosophers in twentieth century China. In Wing-tsit Chan's *A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy* (1963), he stands as the last creative Chinese

philosopher. It was thanks to Chan's effort in *Religious Trends in Modern China* of 1953 that Hsiung was introduced to the Western intellectual world. In Chan's account, Hsiung's identity as a Neo-Confucianist, both in an existential and philosophical sense, was never questioned, although he was also discussed in the chapter on Buddhism. Chan points out that "[Hsiung's] philosophy is a part of Buddhist thought only in a negative sense, for it turns from Buddhism".(Wing-tsit Chan, 1978:126) Chan is correct that Hsiung's "turn" in 1923-1926 was a critical point for him, as it was then that he became an authentic Confucianist.

However, the problem of Hsiung's identity is more complex than suggested by his widely accepted characterization as a Neo-Confucianist, because the notion of "identity" is taken to mean an unchangeable "core" or "sameness" underlying a thing or person. Many people believe that without presupposing such a metaphysical notion of "identity" as "sameness", the idea of "personhood", particularly in the Confucian tradition, will easily risk the loss of moral integrity. It is my point that, however, such a metaphysical notion of "identity" needs to be critically examined.

To begin with, I will adopt Paul Ricoeur's distinction between "*idem*-identity" and "*ipse*-identity". The former means "sameness" while the latter refers to selfhood without asserting an unchanging core. The Hegelian notion of "*ipse*-identity" is helpful since Ricoeur suggests that "the selfhood of oneself implies otherness to such an intimate degree that one cannot be thought of without the other".(Paul Ricoeur, 1992:2-3) In light of the notion of self-in-other, we will see that in the case of Hsiung, Buddhism is a significant "other" through which a Confucian self is mirrored and constituted. Conversely, the traces of other indigenous Chinese thought, such as Confucianism and Taoism, were already discernible in Hsiung's early writings on Buddhism before the "turn". The aim of this essay is therefore to explore how the dialectics of self and other contribute to the formation and development of Hsiung's thought.

Methodologically, as Paul Ricoeur suggests, the hermeneutics strategically used to deal with the writing of self can be divided

into four levels: historical-narrative, semantic, philosophical, and existential. First, historical-narrative investigation provides us with the basic knowledge and materials about the subject matter, such as autobiographical documents and manuscripts. Only by drawing on this preliminary investigation can one proceed with the other inquiries. Second, semantic analysis is used to elucidate the multivocal or symbolic meaning of language, which is often ignored in reading a philosophical text. Tracing the shifting routes of meaning-constitution thus becomes indispensable for our understanding of a thinker's "self". However, hermeneutics does not stop at the level of semantics, because rational reflection is still considered as the cornerstone of a thinker's philosophical system. Only when one has passed through philosophical reflection can one hope for the full disclosure of the meaning of existence, as most envisioned by Oriental thinkers.(Paul Ricoeur, 1974:11-24)

The four levels of hermeneutical investigation form, according to Ricoeur, a teleologically ascending path of thinking. Ricoeur intends to place the hermeneutics of faith above the hermeneutics of suspicion. In this essay, however, I will rather put more weight on the practice of the hermeneutics of suspicion, because it is often neglected in the scholarship on Confucianism.[1] In the following, I

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[1] Since this essay was prepared for the panel "Charles W. H. Fu and Chinese Hermeneutics" at the "10th International Conference for Chinese Philosophy" (Seoul, July 23-28, 1997), I want to point out that Professor Charles Fu's celebrated method of "creative hermeneutics" can be characterized as a kind of "constructive hermeneutics", while I am inclined to practice "de-constructive hermeneutics" roughly in parallel to the first half of Fu's "five steps". In the other words, I intentionally reverse Fu's methodical procedure. In the case of Hsiung Shih-li, who can be regarded as one of the most outstanding "creative hermeneuticians" in modern Chinese philosophy, the last two of Fu's five steps deserves more attention. Professor Fu's "five steps" are guided by a series of questions: (1) "What *exactly* did the original thinker or text say?" (2) "What did the original thinker *intend* or *mean* to say?" (3) "What *could* the original thinker have said?" (4) "What *should* the original thinker have said?" or "What *should* the creative hermeneutician say on behalf of the original thinker?" (5) "What *must* the original thinker say now*?"* or "What *must* the creative hermeneutician do now, in

will begin with a historical-narrative investigation into how Hsiung depicts his own philosophical journey. Then I will proceed to a semantic analysis in the hope of making the latent hermeneutic strategy in Hsiung's turn explicit. I will not deal with the problem of interfaith dialogue between Confucianism and Buddhism, which is left open for the time being.

Crisis, Conversion, and the True Self

Hsiung's religio-philosophical conversion from Buddhism to Confucianism in 1920s marks a turning point in his lifelong intellectual career. In 1920-22, Hsiung studied Buddhism, particularly the Yogàcàra doctrine of consciousness-only, with Ou-yang Ching-wu (1871-1943) at the Nanking Institute of Buddhism. This resulted in his first systematic work, the *Introduction to the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only,* written in 1921-22 and published in 1923. Generally speaking, Hsiung's doctrinal position in the *Introduction* was rather faithful to the Yogàcàra heritage from Asaïga, Vasubandhu, Dharmapāla down to Hsüan-tsang, K'uei-chi and Ou-yang Ching-wu.

However, Hsiung experienced a tremendous existential-philosophical crisis in 1923, when he taught a course on Yogàcàra Idealism at Peiking University. He recollected this critical experience a decade later(*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1932:11a):

> I suddenly cast my own learning into great doubt during the middle of the course of the second year. I was very uneasy about my theory and faith. Therefore, I abandoned my previous draft and started to work on the *New Treatise*.

Hsiung did not explain what he meant by "great doubt", but it surely referred to spiritual experience of the kind shared by many

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order to carry out the unfinished philosophical task of the original thinker?" For more details, see Charles W. H. Fu, "Creative Hermeneutics: Taoist Metaphysics and Heidegger", in *Journal of Chinese Philosophy*, 3.2 (1976), pp. 115-143.

religious person.(Rodney L. Taylor, 1990:55)[2] Later, in the 1944 version of *New Treatise on Conciousness-Only*, Hsiung pointed out that his awakening was not realized through book learning, but through a kind of "existential attestation" from within (*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1944: 82b-83a):

> Someone criticized my philosophy for crafting Confucianism into Buddhism. This comment sounds correct. However, they are not able to truly understand the efforts and pain I have gone through. Previously I was inclined to Indian Buddhist thought. In that period, I learned Buddhism not for the sake of scholarship and reputation, but for the sake of seeking the truth by which life can abide. I studied the [Yogàcàra] system of Asaïga and Vasubandhu with Master Ou-yang and was thoroughly converted. Later on, I gradually kept in distance from all systems. Putting aside Buddhism as well as other schools of thought, including Confucianism, I searched from within. I believed that truth is not far from us...After a long period, I suddenly awoke to the fact that what I found inwardly agrees entirely with the Confucian classic, *The Book of Changes*. Thereupon I destroyed the *Treatise on Consciousness-Only* that had been written on the basis of Asaïga and Vasubandhu and avowed to write *New Treatise on Consciousness-Only* in order to correct my previous error.[3]

On the basis of this autobiographical account, Tu Wei-ming characterizes Hsiung's philosophical journey as "an agonizing quest for authentic existence."(Tu Wei-ming, 1976: 254) According to Tu's interpretation, Hsiung's "conversion" or "turn" can

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[2] In his study on Confucian religious autobiography, Rodney L. Taylor points out that moments of doubt and crisis are often encountered in the process of self-cultivation towards enlightenment and self-transformation.

[3] English translation, see Wing-tsit Chan, *Religious Trends*, pp. 126-127 and Tu Wei-ming, "Hsiung Shih-li's Quest for Authentic Existence", in Charlotte Furth, ed., *The Limits of Change: Essays on Conservative Alternatives in Republican China* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1976), pp. 266-267.

only be understood as a religio-existential experience. The crisis he encountered was the loss of the self as the ontological ground of existence. Therefore he considered the search for the true self as the measure to determine which religio-philosophical tradition, the Buddhist or the Confucian, can offer "the truth by which life can abide". Hsiung finally chose Confucianism instead of Buddhism, because he found that the Confucian understanding of self is more dynamic and creative than the Buddhist one.(Tu Wei-ming, 1976:256-7)

The decisive reason for Hsiung's conversion is also described in *Tsun-wen lu*, recorded in 1924-28 and later published as the last volume of *Shih-li yü-yao*.(*Shih-li yü-yao,* 1947: IV.1-7) Around 1924, Hsiung began to doubt the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration (*lun-hui*) and finally abandoned it. What puzzled him was the metaphysical conflict of monism versus pluralism. According to Hsiung's account, the Buddhist doctrine of transmigration is predicated on a kind of metaphysical pluralism that every sentient being is said to exist and pass into next life by its own "individual soul-consciousness (*shen-shih*)". Hence no concept of final cause or creator needs to be presupposed. However in the end Hsiung rejected such speculative metaphysics because he found that the concept of "individual soul-consciousness" is equally untenable as the onto-theological notion of "final cause" or "creator". Hsiung described how he searched inwardly and realized that all beings are grounded in the One Origin. This Origin, in regard to human being, is called "original mind" or "*jen* mind", while it is also the universal ground of all beings. By quoting Wang Yang-ming as testimony, Hsiung confirmed the Confucian wisdom that human beings are identical with the myriad beings in Heaven and Earth. All beings are ontologically one body. This Origin is called "Great Self" or "True Self". Only when one witnesses and recovers the Great Self within oneself can one be liberated from the bondage of self-centeredness.

Hsiung's quest for the true self was very vivid, as shown in his "recorded sayings". Hsiung's choice of this literary genre was certainly not accidental. Hsiung and Neo-Confucianists often used the genre of "recorded sayings" in order to avoid futile specula-

tion.[4] In *Tsun-wen lu* one can clearly observe the process of self-conversion as Hsiung severely suffered from physical illness and pain. Philosophical discourse was woven into biographical narrative. The writing of philosophy became inseparable from the writing of self. Although we cannot be sure whether or not Hsiung chose this kind of writing style and rhetoric on purpose, the continuity between Hsiung and the tradition of Sung-Ming Neo-Confucianism in this respect is obvious. If we neglect the self-image depicted in his biographical narrative, we would not be able to disclose the full meaning of Hsiung's thought.

The Chain of Metonymy

Of course, I do not mean to say that Hsiung was not a systematic philosopher. In fact, Hsiung is often considered as one of the most systematic thinkers in modern China. The fundamental structure of Hsiung's system was based on his early study of Yogàcàra-Vij¤aptimàtra philosophy. After the *Introduction* was published in 1923, Hsiung revised it twice, in 1926 and 1930. In the 1930 edition, Hsiung began to criticize Yogàcàra, since by then he had become more appreciate than before of Madhyamaka, T'ien-tai, Hua-yen, and Ch'an. Meanwhile, Hsiung was also deeply attracted to the idea of "evolution" in *The Book of Changes,* and it was this idea that finally lead him to reject Yogàcàra and established his own philosophy in the *New Treatise* (*Hsin wei-shih lun*) of 1932.

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[4] In his investigation of the use of "recorded sayings" in Sung Confucianism, Daniel K. Gardner points out that "Neo-Confucians of the Sung were beginning to manifest a novel self-confidence as they gave themselves more freedom from the authority of the canonical tradition". Gardner does not, however, mention the relation between narrative and the formation of self in the "recorded sayings" genre. See Daniel K. Gardner, "Modes of Thinking and Modes of Discourse in the Sung: Some Thoughts on the *Yü-lu* ("Recorded Conversations") Texts", *The Journal of Asian Studies* 50.3, (August 1991): 574-603.

In the *New Treatise*, Hsiung applied himself fully to the elaboration of a dynamic ontology in which the reality of beings is said to be transformation only. In accordance with the Mahàyàna Buddhist conception of emptiness, Hsiung also claimed that reality (*t'i*) is empty by nature, or lacks self-nature. However, Hsiung was dissatisfied with Buddhist quietism, emphasizing the creative dynamism (*yung*) of reality-as-emptiness. He said: "Because reality is empty and vigorously dynamic, it is always in the process of ceaseless creation and transformation. This process of ceaseless creation and transformation is called 'running current' or 'functioning'.".(*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1944: II.85.b) Ultimately, reality (*t'i*) and function (*yung*) are non-dual.(Wing-tsit Chan, 1963: 769-772) Strikingly, Hsiung's conception of reality as dynamic emptiness echoed *The Awakening of Faith* and the Hua-yen School, which were totally rejected by Ou-yang Ching-wu, Hsiung's Yogàcàra master.(Wing-tsit Chan, 1953:105-118)

As mentioned above, Hsiung's conception of "ceaseless creation" was also indebted to *The Book of Changes*. It is in this syncretic context that, implicitly or explicitly, Hsiung engaged in a strong misreading of Yogàcàra doctrine of "transformation of consciousness" (*vij¤àna-pariõàm*a) as an ontological-cosmogonical principle. The rhetoric underlying Hsiung's ontological reading is decisive for our understanding of his philosophical "turn". In the following I will track the semantic replacement in Hsiung's conceptions of "transformation" in the *New Treatise* of 1932 and the *Introduction* of 1923, which need to be examined in the context of Chinese and Indian Yogàcàra.

The doctrine of "transformation of consciousness" is used by Vasubandhu in *Triü÷ikà* (*Thirty Verses*) to justify Yogàcàra's main thesis that "everything is representation of consciousness only (*sarvam vij¤aptimàtrakam*)". In the first, second, and seventeenth verses of *Tri§÷ikà*, it is briefly stated:

> The usages of the terms *àtman* and *dharma* are manifold, but these terms just refer to the transformations of consciousness. Threefold is this transformation: maturing, thinking, and representations (*vij¤apti*) of objects (*visaya*).... This threefold

transformation of consciousness is cognitive construction (*vikalpa*). What is cognitively constructed, therefore, does not exist. Consequently, everything is a representation of consciousness only.[5]

The purport of Vasubandhu is to explain the structure of the world through an analysis of the structure of consciousness. The consciousness is structured by the polarity of "cognitive construction" (*vikalpa*) and "that which is cognitively constructed" (*vikalpyate*), or of "consciousness" (*vij¤àna*) and "that which is conscious of" (*vij¤apti*). Vasubandhu adapted from the Sà§khya and Sautrantika schools the notion of "transformation" (*pariõàma*) to explain the inner structure of this polarity. Namely, *vikalpyate/vij¤apti* is nothing but the transformation of *vikalpa/vij¤àna*. In other words, what we perceive are not the representations of external objects independent of consciousness, but the representations of consciousness itself only.

Consciousness is divided into three kinds: storehouse-consciousness, ego-consciousness, and six sensory and apperceptive consciousnesses, in which the storehouse-consciousness is the depository of the "seeds" of the other seven consciousnesses. In the threefold consciousness, there is the reciprocal relation between the storehouse-consciousness and the other seven consciousnesses. The idea of "transformation" is employed by Vasubandhu to explain the fundamental feature of consciousness that all objects in consciousness are transformations of "seeds", while "seeds" are formed through the perfumation of the previous moment of consciousness.[6]

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[5] I have consulted several English translations, such as Thomas A. Kochumuttom, *A Buddhist Doctrine of Experience* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1982), pp. 128, 134, 146; Stefan Anacker, *Seven Works of Vasubandhu* (Delhi: Motilal Banarsidass, 1984), pp. 186-187; David J. Kalupahana, *The Principles of Buddhist Psychology* (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1987), pp. 192-203.

[6] A comprehensive research on the development of the concept of "transformation of consciousness" can be found in Yokoyama Koitsu, "Seshin no shiki-teinpein"

The meaning of *vij¤àna-pariõàma* was slightly altered when in *Ch'eng wei-shih lun* Hsüan-tsang translated *neng-pien* ("that which is able to transform") in opposition to *so-pien* ("that which is transformed").(*Ch'eng wei-shih lun*, T.31.1, 38) *So-pien* is further divided into the polarity of noesis (*chien-fen*) and noema (*hsiang-fen*). As often noted, the semantic change in Hsüan-tsang's translation, which seems to put more emphasis on the subjective, active aspect of consciousness, had a great influence on the reception of Yogàcàra Buddhism in China.

This influence is also seen in Hsiung's first work on Yogàcàra philosophy. In the 1923 *Introduction*, despite the fact that Hsiung's exposition is in general faithful to the doctrinal lineage of Dharmapàla, Hsüan-tsang, K'uei-chi, and Ou-yang Ching-wu, he seems to be obsessed by the idea of "transformation" (*pien*) in a peculiarly Sinitic way. In the "*Neng-pien*" Chapter, Hsiung began with an explanation of how "*neng-pien*" (the active aspect of consciousness) is grounded in "*pu-pien*" (literally, "non-transformable", i.e., *tathatà*) parallel to the relation of "function" (*yung*) to "substance" (*t'i*). Hsiung went on to elaborate the connotations of the usage of "transformation" to the extent that its focus was radically changed. First, Hsiung listed three meanings of "transformation": (1) "Transformation" does not refer to "movement". (2) "Transformation" means "liveliness". (3) "Transformation" is conceptually inconceivable.(*Wei-shih hsüeh kai-lun,* 1923: 7a-8b) [7] In this exposition, Hsiung reinterpreted "transformation" as dynamic emptiness without presupposing the existence of actor, action, and object. To characterize "transformation" as "liveliness"

(On Vasubandhu's "transformation of consciousness"), in Hirakawa Akira and Takasaki Jikido, eds., *Koza Daijobukkyo, VIII, Yuishiki Shiso* (Studies in Mahàyàna Buddhism, Vol. VIII, Yogàcàra Thought) (Tokyo: Shunjusha, 1982), pp. 113-144.

[7] Introduction to the Doctrine of Consciousness-Only,. This text was found in Hsiung's house in Shanghai by Kuo Ch'i-yung and Ching Hai-feng in 1984. For the 1926 and 1930 versions of *Wei-shih hsüeh kai-lun*, see Ching Hai-feng, *Hsiung Shih-li* (Taipei: Tung-ta, 1991), pp. 50-74.

is tantamount to characterizing it as "dependent arising". It is quite clear that, philosophically and semantically, Hsiung took a step of Mādhyamika "shift" to prevent his idea from conceptual hypostatization, a deconstructive strategy that is often seen in his discourse.

But Hsiung did not stop at changing the meaning of philosophical keywords. He also appropriated various symbolisms, particularly those from Hua-yen Buddhism, into his interpretation of the Yogàcàra notion of transformation, playing a game of metonymy and metaphors. In characterizing "transformation" as "liveliness", Hsiung continued to explain its connotations (*Wei-shih hsüeh kai-lun*, 7b-8a):

> "Liveliness" means "dependent arising". Although [transformation] does not function, it possesses energy. Like a cloud, it is empty and unreal. Just like turbulent wind, it arises under conditions. Only the "liveliness" is able to produce and cease instantly similar to the way in which a cloud is capable of transforming into the shape of a mountain. Also like the power of the wind to move ocean and mountain, the "liveliness" has great force.

> "Liveliness" means "comprehensiveness". All meanings are contained in one word. All meanings are expressed in one name. An instant consists of hundred billions of *kalpa*. An atom encompasses infinite units. It is not incomplete and thus not dividable. Discrimination will cease when this potentiality of liveliness is realized.

> "Liveliness" means "interpenetration". Although all dharmas are manifold, they exist as they are in themselves. Thus it is said, "All dharmas are in suchness." They are self-sufficient, in no need of discrimination. They are unlike many horses that cannot stand at the same spot. They are rather like the light of lamps penetrating each other.

Surprisingly, Hsiung employed in his exposition of *vij¤àna-pariõàma* many Hua-yen and Taoist metaphors, such as

"liveliness", "turbulent storm", "interpenetration", and "all-in-one", in such a way that the notion of "transformation" in Vasubandhu's philosophy of consciousness is radically turned into a holistic metaphysical principle. Obviously, a conceptual discrepancy or *différance* occurs. Whether the economy of *différance* in this context suggests the deferring of "the fulfillment of desire or will" or "compensation of the loss of meaning" is an interesting question.(Jacques Derrida, 1982:8) At least, in contrast to Vasubandhu's use of *vij¤àna-pariõàma* as the "cool truth" of *saüsàra*, Hsiung regarded it rather as a glorious metaphysical principle. He finally abandoned negative theology, replacing it with a new faith in a transformative force.

In the 1932 *New Treatise*, Hsiung began to elaborate explicitly his interpretation of "transformation" as an onto-cosmogonical ultimate principle. As he said, (*Hsin wei-shih lun*, 1932: 25b-27a)

> I have heard that all things are empty in themselves. They are seen as real things by those who are still stuck in traces. However, they are provisionally designated as "transformation" (*chuan-pien*) by those who see the truth.

> "Transformation" refers to that which is unpredictably mysterious and irresistibly moves forward. Who is able to transform? What is this transformation? Transformation does not arise from eternality, because eternality is not able to change; transformation does not arise from nihility, because nihility is not able to change either.

> There is a Great Being named "Transformation". It is groundless and unconditioned, profound and beyond time. It stands in a low place and does not dominate things. It stays in quietude and does not decay. Is it not qualified as "that which is able to transform" (*neng-pien*)?

> What is this Transformation? It is closing and opening. The movement of "perpetual evolution" is always continuous. Because this continuous movement does not drift without aim, it

always consolidates. Due to consolidation, it develops numberless "physical points". This tendency of consolidation is called "closing" (*hsi*, contraction). As soon as it closes, it goes against the tendency of change and wanders away from its origin. Therefore, insofar as it is closing, a kind of dynamic, vigorous force comes up to resist the tendency of closing, because of the nature of "perpetual evolution". Hence, we know that "perpetual evolution" *seems* to function as master, showing its image of conqueror when it manifests dynamism in the movement of closing. That which manifests dynamism in the movement of closing is called "opening" (*p'i*, unfolding). Transformation is thus formed in the seemingly contradictory movement of closing and opening. The "closing" is provisionally designated as "matter" because of its tendency of consolidation, while the "opening" is provisionally designated as "mind" because of its profound dynamism. Matter is not real, neither is mind. Only transformation is real.

In our reading of the above quotation a few points need to be addressed. First, Hsiung employed a great deal of Taoist phrasing and syntax, especially from *Tao-te Ching*, to attune the meaning of "Transformation" (*pien*). For those who are familiar with Taoist texts, it is not difficult to identify the sources Hsiung used. Chapters four, fourteen, and sixteen of *Tao-te Ching* are only a few examples. Second, and more significantly, Hsiung obviously borrowed the language of *The Book of Changes*. "Transformation" is re-defined as the dialectical evolution of "closing" and "opening", a pair of metaphysical principles mentioned in the *Appended Remarks* of *The Book of Changes*.(Wing-tsit Chan, 1963: 267; Hullmut Wilhelm, 1977:318)

Thus we see a chain of words from various sources used to define the key term "transformation" (*pien*) from Yogàcàra, Mādhyamika, Hua-yen, and *The Book of Changes*. Hsiung concludes this metonymic chain with his existential-philosophical commitment to metaphysical evolutionism. However, the story does not end here. In returning to the archaic Chinese philosophy of change, Hsiung took an another detour through Yen Fu (1853-1921). As pointed out by Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, Hsiung was

clearly indebted to Yen Fu, who translated Thomas Henry Hux-ley's *Evolution and Ethics* in terms derived from the *Appended Remarks* of *The Book of Changes*:

> There is contraction (*hsi*), and matter is drawn together. There is unfolding (*p'i*), and force is released. In the beginning there is the Simple. It changes and turns into the variegated and mixed.[8]

Yen Fu's motivation to assimilate Social Darwinism by using ancient Chinese philosophical terms was based on his "search for wealth and power"[9]. Moved by the same nationalist pathos, Hsiung shifted the meaning of 'transformation" to adapt it to the context of *The Book of Changes*. Of course, Hsiung's philosophy is not the same as evolutionism, as he once explicitly emphasized. Hsiung rejected Darwinism and empirical science in general for its igno-rance of ontological dynamism.

Semantics of "Bodily Attestation"

As soon as Hsiung had firmly established his ontology of creative transformation, he proceeded to reinterpret other philoso-phical key terms with the same method. His reinterpretation of "mind", "volition", and "consciousness" deserves special notice. As a scholar of Yogàcàra Buddhism, Hsiung had extensive knowl-edge of Buddhist epistemology, particularly in regard to these no-tions. However, in the *New Treatise* he rejected Dharmapàla's the-ory of eightfold consciousness because in his view it made the

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[8] Ts'ai Yuan-p'ei, "Hsin wei-shih lun hsü", in *Hsüan-p'u lun-hsüeh-chi* (Beijing: San-lien, 1990), p. 12.

[9] For Yen Fu's translation and interpretation of Huxley and Spencer, see Benja-min Schwartz, *In Search of Wealth and Power: Yen Fu and the West* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1964), pp. 52-53.

mistake of "radical pluralism", "aggregationism", and "mechanism".(*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1932:67b) According to Hsiung, Yogàcàra masters reduced the mind to bits of "seeds" in the same way that the Realists reduced matter to atoms. Both the Idealist (e.g., Yogàcàra-Vij¤ànavàdin) and the Realist (e.g., Sarvastivàdin) were guilty of reductionism. For this reason, Hsiung argued that "mind" can not be understood either as "sensory activity" or as "accumulation". In other words, Hsiung criticized the psycho-epistemological theory of mind, a view which was regarded as valid by the mainstream of Indian Buddhism.(*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1932:64b-65a)

In contrast to the reductionist approach, Hsiung claimed that mind can be known only through the practice of "bodily witness" (*t'i-cheng*). Only through the intuitionist holistic approach can the ontological truth of mind as the ultimate reality be fully disclosed.(*Hsin wei-shih lun,* 1932:68b-69b) Hsiung's methodical distinction between reductionist analysis and intuitionist introspection is absolutely essential to his hermeneutics of conversion.

Why did Hsiung redefine "mind-volition-consciousness"? And how did he redefine it? Let us quote Hsiung's words in *Hsin wei-shih lun* (*Hsin wei-shih lun*, 1932:71.a-72a):

Mind is Nature (*hsing*). It is named "mind" in relation to "body" because mind is the master of our body. However, mind is not confined to body for it is the universal ground of all beings. That is, mind exists in the particular self as well as in the myriad things. The definite hidden intention of mind as witnessed in our inward intuition is called "volition" (*i*). What is this definite intention? It refers to the evolution of mind in accordance with the nature of ceaseless production and de-materialization. For this reason, that which possesses this definite intention is life, or "solitariness" (*tu-t'i*). Thus it is also named "Self" in the sense that it acts like a master who is the single center of all various manifestations. It is called "[fivefold] sensory consciousness" when it is effected through [external] stimulation and oriented towards the object through sense faculties. It is called "volition" when it evolves outward

dynamically for conception and judgment without depending on the senses. Therefore, "mind", "volition", and "consciousness" have a different meaning in each case. Among these, the notion of mind is essential to all three. The notion of volition refers to the particular subject, while the notion of consciousness is defined by the cognition of the object. All three are differentiated in name but identical in essence. For the mystery of mind is unfathomable and cannot be comprehended by mere partial knowledge.

In this passage, Hsiung successfully redefined "mind-volition-consciousness" within the Neo-Confucianist context, particularly that of the *Great Learning*. The triad is ontologically identical. The only distinction is that mind and volition are subsumed under the category of *t'i* (reality/substance), while consciousness is subsumed under the category of *yung* (manifestation/function). Again, *t'i* and *yung* are ontologically non-dual. It should be noted that the categories of *t'i/yung* are essential to Hsiung's hermeneutics, in the same way as in Chinese traditional philosophy.

It is clear at this point that Hsiung would not have achieved such a religio-philosophical realization if he had merely relied on the practice of "bodily witness". The reason is that language plays an important role in practice. Since Hsiung was educated in the Neo-Confucian tradition, his mode of thinking and world-view was embedded in the kind of language and discourse most familiar and available to him. These language and discourse were suppressed when he turned to Yogàcàra Buddhism. But they could not be completely erased. Some linguistic traces necessarily remained.

Concluding Remarks

This essay attempts to explore through discourse analysis the making of Hsiung Shih-li's identity as a Neo-Confucianist. Four levels of hermeneutical analysis, i.e., historical-narrative, semantic, philosophical, and existential, are taken as a methical guide. Our analysis leads to the following conclusions: (1) On the existential

level, as Tu Wei-ming points out, Hsiung considered as his own ultimate concern "the quest for true self" or "the search for the truth in which life can abide". (2) On the philosophical level, such existential quest resulted in a holistic, creative, and dynamic ontology of transformation. (3) On the semantic level, a chain of metonymic replacement can clearly be seen in Hsiung's usages of "transformation" and "mind-volition-consciousness", based on the various semantic contexts of the Indian and Chinese Yogàcàra, Madhyamika, Hua-yen, Ch'an, Taoism, Neo-Confucianism, and *The Book of Changes*. Like Indra's net, these multivocal meanings were woven into a seemingly consistent discourse. (4) On the historical-narrative level, Hsiung's autobiographical self-portrait in the genre of "recorded sayings" can be regarded as the most significant element in his hermeneutics of self, as it serves as a guide in reading Hsiung's philosophy as directed toward the searching for self.

Methodologically, however, Hsiung's discourse as a whole cannot be reduced to any of the above mentioned four levels. In this essay, we emphasize the last two levels of analysis in order to demonstrate that there is no such thing as "identity" *per se* in a person and his philosophy. In the case of Hsiung Shih-li, we found that his Confucian identity is constructed through mirrors of language among which Buddhist language plays the most significant role.

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熊十力的自我詮釋學：
析論在佛教名相中的儒家身分

林鎮國

政治大學哲學系

摘要

　　本文以熊十力(1885-1968)的個案來探討現代儒家如何從其他的思想與宗教傳統尋找其形構自我身分的資源。熊氏儒家身分的形成和佛學有密切的關係，此不獨同時代的梁漱溟，稍後的唐君毅、牟宗三如此，宋明以降的新儒學皆是如此。本文除了重建思想史的脈絡，指陳熊氏在其哲學與宗教轉向時所遭遇的實存危機之外，著重分析其哲學論述，特別是從《唯識學概論》到《新唯識論》的階段，如何藉由語意的轉換達到哲學立場的轉向與宗教信仰的改宗。本文追溯熊氏哲學的核心概念「轉變」如何在歷經世親的《唯識三十頌》意識哲學的用法、玄奘漢譯的唯心論傾向，到華嚴「交光相網，圓滿無礙」的玄義，最後歸宗大易「翕闢成變」的語意遞變過程。本文也分析熊氏將佛教的「心、意、識」概念重置於儒家心性論的脈絡來詮釋的效應。最後，本文呼應呂格爾的觀點，指出儒家的自我並非基於某種超越的同一性，而是與他者不斷辯證的結果。

關鍵詞：熊十力、儒家、唯識、自我、詮釋學