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# Dimensions of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and National Identity in Taiwan

## A Latent Class Analysis

Chi Huang

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### ABSTRACT

*This study explores the most fundamental issue of identity politics in Taiwan, namely, the dimensionality of and the delicate relationship between ethnic identity and national identity. By applying latent class (LC) factor analysis to 12 items of the Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) 2001 survey, we first confirm that Taiwanese/Chinese identity and national identity are two analytically different dimensions. We then employ LC cluster analysis to determine the number of latent classes in each of these two dimensions. We find that the so-called 'objective' measure of the 'four major ethnic groups' based on respondents' fathers' ethnicity does not correspond very well with either of the two dimensions of identity. Furthermore, the distribution of national identity among ethnic groups displays much greater variation than only a Taiwanese/Chinese identity does. More specifically, mainlanders show the highest degree of homogeneity in national identity, whereas native Taiwanese show substantial heterogeneity. Although our findings do not defy the common practice of using a fathers' ethnicity as an 'objective' indicator of ethnicity, they do remind us that identity politics in Taiwan are multidimensional in nature and deserve more careful study.*

**Keywords:** China; ethnic identity; independence; national identity; Taiwan; unification

The 'Taiwanese versus Chinese complex controversy' has long been a source of social cleavage in Taiwan (Nai-Teh Wu, 1993, 2002; Chang, 1994; Liu and Ho, 1999; Shyu, 2002; Wang, 1998a, 1998b, 2002; Yu-Shan Wu, 2001; Ho and Liu, 2002). This is true particularly during electoral campaigns, since politicians know only too well that ethnic identity is a powerful tool for mobilization. Things become even more complicated when ethnic identity issues are entangled with the debate over Taiwan's current and future relationship with China (Wachman, 1994; Hughes, 1997).

This article focuses on the dimensionality issue of ethnic and national identities in Taiwan. By exploring the attitudes of people on the island toward their own and other ethnic groups, as well as their expectations for Taiwan's

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relationship with China, we hope to construct a typology of identities not based on vague impressions, but rather on a solid empirical foundation.

### **The concept of identity**

There has been an ongoing debate in the field of identity politics concerning the origin and nature of ethnicity. Some scholars argue that there is a primordial basis to ethnic identity, whereas others would rather explain ethnicity in instrumental terms. To the former, ethnic identities are characteristics deeply-rooted in blood, culture, and languages, and so on. To the latter, ethnic identities are pragmatic choices or even opportunistic constructions by political entrepreneurs. However, despite substantial differences between the two perspectives, both share the view that identity is not an individual affair, but something that must be understood within its social context.

It is our view that the very concept of 'identity' consists not only of an individual's demographical characteristics, but also their sense and choice of belonging to *groups* with similar attitudes and beliefs. More recent literature has challenged the once-dominant primordialism explanation of ethnic identity (Eller and Coughlan, 1993; Hardin, 1995; Barth, 1998[1969]). Although scholars still disagree with each other on the roles of culture and instrumental rationality in the formation and shift of identities, most of them now agree that identities are socially constructed (Anderson, 1991; Laitin, 1998; Alcoff, 2003). Calvert (2002) states this view succinctly: '[P]eople do not merely *have* identity; they also accrue, obtain, or even choose it. . .' (p. 588).

We, therefore, define identities as *socially constructed categories of membership*. There are many possibilities for forming such memberships in a society, and ethnic identity is but one of them. As Esman (1994) puts it, '[e]thnic identity is the set of meanings that individuals impute to their membership in an ethnic community, including those attributes that bind them to that collectivity and that distinguish it from others in their relevant environment' (p. 27). Thus, the best way of understanding ethnicity in a society is through studying residents' attitudes towards their own and other ethnic groups, as well as towards ethnicity in general.

National identity, conversely, implies a political agenda of statehood that reaches well beyond the idea of ethnic community. It involves the identification with, and choice of, sovereignty, territorial jurisdiction, and citizenship. Whether ethnic identity will extend to the inclusion of a separate statehood agenda, however, varies from case to case.

### **The salience of identity studies in Taiwan**

A quick review of the literature on ethnic and national identity in Taiwan reveals that it concentrates heavily on historical construction, cultural explanation, and

ideological accounts. Empirical studies in political science, however, either treat ethnicity as an exogenous variable that determines national identity and political behavior, or at best trace the differences among the various political generations of mainlanders and Taiwanese on the identity issue. This 'primordialist' perspective itself, however, has not been rigorously tested.

Indeed one frequently raised question on this research topic in Taiwan is: are the Taiwanese/Chinese and national identities (the latter measured by the respondent's stand on the issue of independence or reunification) actually the same thing? Before we can answer this question we need to tackle an even more fundamental question: how best can we measure these deeply-rooted and yet unobservable (latent) attitudes?

The purpose of this article is twofold. First of all, we attempt to address the previously mentioned questions by determining the number of dimensions underlying a dozen items included in the 2001 Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS)<sup>1</sup> probing respondents' identities (Huang, 2002; 2003). We take the *person-centered approach* by identifying the underlying group profiles of individuals in terms of both ethnic and national identities, and then examine the relationship between identity group membership and the background variable of parents' ethnicity. Secondly, we employ multiple items in each dimension to measure the latent attitude of identities. Because of the implicit nature of ethnic and national identities, we adopt the latent variable model to identify heterogeneous groups through multiple manifest indicators.

### **Methodology: latent class analysis**

Factor analysis seems to be a natural choice among statistical methods for studying the dimensionality of a set of indicators. However, traditional factor analysis posits continuous observed and latent variables (Bartholomew and Knott, 1999), which are often difficult to justify for survey data. Most survey items are discrete in nature and the underlying variables they intend to measure can also be considered as categorical. Factor analysis becomes inappropriate under such circumstances.

The methodology most suitable for achieving our goals is latent class (LC) analysis. In contrast to traditional factor analysis, LC models assume that both manifest and latent variables are categorical. LC modeling was initially introduced by Lazarsfeld and Henry (1968) as a way of identifying and measuring latent attitudinal variables from survey items. Observed associations among multiple indicators are perceived not as causal relations, but as the results of latent (or unobserved) variables. By analyzing the association patterns among discrete indicators, researchers are able to identify unobserved subgroups. These subgroups form the classes of a latent variable, hence the name 'latent class' analysis. This approach has been extended by Goodman (1974a, 1974b) as well among other scholars since then (see Clogg [1995] and Bartholomew

[2002] for overviews). In the past decade, LC analysis has become a widely used technique in the social sciences for studying classifications (e.g., Johnson, 1990; Vermunt and Magidson, 2003a) and constructing typologies (Vermunt and Magidson, 2002, 2004). Its applications range from role conflict in sociology and partisan identification in political science to brand loyalty of consumers in marketing, to name just a few (McCutcheon, 2002).

In this study, we first apply Magidson and Vermunt's (2001) latent class factor model to explore the number of dimensions of twelve indicators included in the TEDS 2001 survey. After clarifying the dimensionality issue of ethnic and national identity we adopt the latent class cluster model (Vermunt and Magidson, 2002, 2003a), a person-centered approach, to identify the number of classes in each dimension and to classify subjects into clusters. Finally, we examine the relationship between cluster membership of identities and the subjects' 'objective' ethnicity (i.e., father's ethnicity) and present our conclusions.

### **How many dimensions? An LC factor analysis**

Taiwanese/Chinese identity in Taiwan is almost always intertwined with the national identity issue, which in turn is inevitably related to the current and future relationship between Taiwan and China. These identity issues are so closely related that sometimes it is doubtful if they can be separately analyzed. In order to tap into this complex, the TEDS 2001 investigators designed a dozen questions (as listed in Table 1) to probe the nature of the respondents' ethnic/national identity.

Although these questions are juxtaposed in section K (ranging from K1 to K5H) of the questionnaire, they do differ in emphasis based on their wordings:

#### ***Items emphasizing Taiwanese/Chinese identity (abbreviated as TCID):***

1. K1 (and its follow-up K1A): self-identified ethnicity
2. K5A: proud Chinese
3. K5B: Taiwanese rice and water
4. K5C: not Chinese unforgivable
5. K5D: cut ties with China
6. K5H: Taiwan's own history

#### ***Items emphasizing independence/unification issue (abbreviated as NAID):***

1. K2: independence/unification stand
2. K3: conditional independence
3. K4: conditional unification

**Table 1**  
**List of TEDS 2001 Questionnaire Items of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity and National Identity**

Item number	Abbreviation	Questionnaire wording
K1	Self-identified ethnicity	In Taiwan, some people think they are Taiwanese. There are also some people who think that they are Chinese. Do you think you are Taiwanese, Chinese or both Taiwanese and Chinese? (Taiwanese, both, Chinese) *If answered 'both' then probe K1A:
K1A		Do you think that you are 'Taiwanese and also Chinese,' 'Chinese and also Taiwanese,' or both? (Taiwanese and also Chinese, both, Chinese and also Taiwanese)
K2	Independence/Unification stand	Concerning the relationship between Taiwan and mainland China, which of these six positions do you agree with: 1) immediate unification, 2) immediate independence, 3) maintain the status quo, in the future move toward unification, 4) maintain the status quo, in the future move toward independence, 5) maintain the status quo, in the future decide either unification or independence, 6) maintain the status quo forever
K3	Conditional independence	If, after declaring independence, Taiwan could maintain peaceful relations with the PRC, then Taiwan should establish a new, independent country. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K4	Conditional unification	If economic, social, and political conditions were about the same in both the mainland and Taiwan, then the two sides should unify. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5A	Proud Chinese	Regardless of how backward China is, I believe that being Chinese is something to be extremely proud of. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5B	Taiwanese rice and water	Mainlanders eat Taiwanese rice and drink Taiwanese water. If they don't identify with Taiwan, they should go back to China. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5C	Not Chinese unforgivable	'Taiwanese are not Chinese.' This kind of attitude is unforgivable. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5D	Cut ties with China	In order to control Taiwan's destiny, we must cut all ties with China and build a society of 23 million people with one common fate. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5E	Patience to unification	No matter how much difference there is in the standard of living between Taiwan and China, we must have patience and try to overcome it so that our country can be unified. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5F	China has no right	China is China; Taiwan is Taiwan. If Taiwan wants to seek autonomy and independence, China has no right to get involved. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5G	Unification the only future	Taiwan only has a future if it unifies with China. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)
K5H	Taiwan's own history	China's history belongs to China. We want to create a history which belongs to Taiwan. (strongly agree, agree, disagree, strongly disagree)

4. K5E: patience to unification
5. K5F: China has no right
6. K5G: unification the only future

To determine if the 12 items are unidimensional or, if not, how many dimensions they consist of, we conduct an LC factor analysis (Vermunt and Magidson, 2003b). Due to the large number of indicators, we recode them into either a trichotomy (K1 and K2) or a dichotomy (all other 10 items), with the numeral of 1 always assigned to the Taiwanese identity/pro-independence category and higher numerals of 2 or 3 to the Chinese identity/pro-unification category. The goodness-of-fit statistics of various LC factor models are shown in Table 2. Based on the minimum Bayesian information criterion (BIC) (Magidson and Vermunt, 2003), we choose the two-factor model and present its two dimensional plot (called 'bi-plot') in Figure 1. An inspection of Figure 1 indicates that K1, K5B, K5D, and K5H are associated with Factor 1 (the horizontal axis), whereas K2, K3, K4, K5A, K5C, K5E, K5F, and K5G are more closely associated with Factor 2 (the vertical axis).


A moment's reflection immediately reveals that Factor 1 refers to the Taiwanese/Chinese identity (with higher decimals indicate higher probabilities of Taiwanese identity), whereas Factor 2 reflects attitudes towards Taiwan independence/unification with China (with higher decimals indicating higher probabilities of favoring unification). This result confirms the distinction between ethnic identity and national identity. It also tells us which items correspond with each of these two dimensions. We found, contrary to expectations, that the wording of K5A and K5C were actually interpreted by TEDS respondents as probing national identity instead of Taiwanese/Chinese identity. These two items are, therefore, moved to the national identity dimension in the following sections. Also, interestingly enough, items K4, K5E, and K5G align almost exactly on the same line in Figure 1, which means that they overlap with each other.

In the literature of ethnic identity in Taiwan, it is often found (Liu and Ho, 1999; Ho and Liu, 2002) that four demographic variables including age, sex,

**Table 2**  
The Results from Various LC Factor Models Fitted to the 12 Identity Items

Model description	BIC	L <sup>2</sup>	DF	Bootstrap P-value	n
1-factor	15832.50	3177.99	9186	P < .001	1008
2-factor	15353.40*	2560.57	9166	P = .040	1008
3-factor	15405.10	2543.12	9156	P = .036	1008
4-factor	15429.92	2464.20	9141	P = .052	1008
2-factor with 3 covariates	15192.94	6407.05	221099	P = .144	1003

\* minimum BIC.



**Figure 1**  
**The Latent Class Factor Analysis of 12 Identity Indicators**


father’s ethnicity, and education are strongly related to ethnic identity. That is, older people, women and the Taiwanese descendents tend to have a Taiwanese identity, whereas the better educated tend to identify themselves as being both Taiwanese and Chinese. It is possible that these background variables might confound our previous finding, namely, that ethnic and national identity are analytically separable. To see whether our finding remains intact after taking these demographic variables into account, we run a two-factor LC model with the four covariates. All of the covariates except age are found to be statistically significant and so we deleted the age variable and reran the two-factor LC model. The estimated probabilities (or ‘factor loadings’) of having a Taiwanese identity for Factor 1 and also leaning toward unification for Factor 2 are listed in Table 3. Again, the results confirm that our earlier finding of ‘two dimensions’ is robust even after controlling for these potentially confounding factors. The relative positions of the three covariates are now added to the two-dimensional bi-plot and are illustrated by Figure 2, with the horizontal axis representing the Chinese-Taiwanese dimension and the vertical axis the independence-unification dimension. Indeed, Figure 2 looks quite similar to Figure 1, except that items K4, K5E, and K5G now align even more perfectly. K5E and K5G



**Table 3**  
**The Conditional Membership Probability of Being in Level 2 of the Two-Factor Latent Class Model with Covariates**

	Two-factor LC model	
	Factor 1 (level 2= Taiwanese)	Factor 2 (level 2 = unification)
<b>INDICATORS</b>		
K1: Self-identified ethnicity		
Taiwanese (t)	0.7219	0.3093
Both (both)	0.2167	0.4917
Chinese (c)	0.1097	0.8123
K2: Independence/Unification stand		
Independence (i)	0.8900	0.1594
Status Quo (sq)	0.3223	0.3408
Unification (u)	0.1544	0.8282
K3: Conditional independence		
Agree (1)	0.5730	0.3426
Disagree (2)	0.1528	0.6095
K4: Conditional unification		
Disagree (1)	0.5421	0.1513
Agree (2)	0.2702	0.6978
K5A: Proud Chinese		
Disagree (1)	0.5802	0.3130
Agree (2)	0.2743	0.5473
K5B: Taiwanese rice and water		
Agree (1)	0.6413	0.4546
Disagree (2)	0.1677	0.4642
K5C: Not Chinese unforgivable		
Disagree (1)	0.4743	0.3404
Agree (2)	0.2707	0.6240
K5D: Cut ties with China		
Agree (1)	0.8609	0.3426
Disagree (2)	0.1793	0.5116
K5E: Patience to unification		
Disagree (1)	0.5161	0.1966
Agree (2)	0.2886	0.6662
K5F: China has no right		
Agree (1)	0.5188	0.3589
Disagree (2)	0.0671	0.7088
K5G: Unification the only future		
Disagree (1)	0.4976	0.2495
Agree (2)	0.2264	0.7726
K5H: Taiwan's own history		
Agree (1)	0.7090	0.3668
Disagree (2)	0.1205	0.5374
<b>COVARIATES</b>		
Education		
Low	0.5971	0.5642
Median	0.3748	0.4527
High	0.3155	0.4230
Sex		
Male (1)	0.4036	0.5433
Female (2)	0.3693	0.3510
Father's ethnicity		
Taiwanese (T)	0.4691	0.4274
Hakka (H)	0.2844	0.4095
Aborigine (A)	0.3638	0.4127
Mainlander (M)	0.0519	0.6878

Note: Letters and numbers included in parentheses correspond to those appearing in Figures 1 and 2.



**Figure 2**  
**The Latent Class Factor Analysis of 12 Identity Indicators with Three Covariates**

are, therefore, dropped in the following LC cluster analysis as they are redundant.

While the above LC factor analysis clarifies the dimensionality issue, it is variable-centered in the sense that the results tell us only which items belong to which dimension. The following LC cluster analysis, on the other hand, further groups individuals along each dimension.

**Taiwanese/Chinese identity**

The four items (K1, K5B, K5D, and K5H) identified as representing the ‘Taiwanese/Chinese identity dimension’ are further analyzed with their original coding shown in Table 1. A goal of LC *cluster* analysis is to determine the smallest number of latent classes (i.e., unobserved categories) that is sufficient to account for the associations among manifest indicators. To achieve this objective, LC cluster models take a person-centered approach by grouping individuals into clusters based on their response patterns (Muthén and Muthén, 2000). Each cluster contains individuals who are similar to each other and

different from those in other clusters. This person-centered focus is useful in that the latent classes describe clusters of individuals who are homogeneous within a given class and heterogeneous across classes.

We follow the same model selection strategy used in the previous section, namely, the minimum BIC, and choose a four-class LC model with three covariates of age, education, and father's ethnic group.<sup>2</sup> The marginal profile of this four-class LC cluster model is listed in Table 4 and is interpreted as follows:

Cluster 1, which accounts for approximately 58 percent of our sample, represents those who sit in the middle of the Taiwanese/Chinese identity. This can be seen by the fact that highest probabilities in this column of Table 4 are concentrated in the middle categories of each of the four items: identify with both Chinese and Taiwanese, disagree that those who do not identify with Taiwan should go back to China, disagree that Taiwan should cut ties with China, and disagree Taiwan should create its own history. We thus call cluster 1 'dual (Chinese and Taiwanese) identifier'.

Cluster 2, which accounts for 21.8 percent, leans somewhat toward Taiwanese identity. We label cluster 2 'soft Taiwanese identifier'.

Cluster 3, which accounts for 11.7 percent, represents Chinese identifiers. It is designated as 'Chinese identifier'.


Cluster 4, which accounts for 8.5 percent, consists of staunch Taiwanese identifiers and it is labeled 'hard Taiwanese identifier'.

Because of the difficulties of displaying a four-dimensional graph, we combine clusters 2 and 4 into 'Taiwanese identifier' (labeled 'Others' on the very top of Figure 3) and then draw a three-dimensional tri-plot of conditional membership probabilities. As Figure 3 shows, the down-left vertex of dual identifier (cluster 1) consists of those who sit in the middle of almost all the items and are relatively young in age. In contrast, senior citizens are more likely to be divided between the Taiwanese identification (clusters 2 and 4) and Chinese identification (cluster 3). In order to see how a father's ethnicity is related to the four latent classes, we first classify individuals according to their modal membership probability based on the above LC model and then cross-tabulate the results with 'objective' ethnic group as measured by a father's ethnicity. As shown in Table 5, the majority of the four ethnic groups fall in the dual identification or cluster 1 column. They do differ in that native Taiwanese are more likely to fall in cluster 4 (hard Taiwanese identifier) while mainlanders are more likely to belong to cluster 3 (Chinese identifier). This result underscores the potential danger of the common practice of using a father's ethnicity alone as the proxy of ethnic *identity*.

**Table 4**  
**The Marginal Profile of the Four-Class LC Cluster Model of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity**

	<b>Cluster 1 Dual identifier</b>	<b>Cluster 2 Soft Taiwanese identifier</b>	<b>Cluster 3 Chinese identifier</b>	<b>Cluster 4 Hard Taiwanese identifier</b>
Cluster size	0.5797	0.2184	0.1170	0.0848
<b>INDICATORS</b>				
<b>K1+K1A: Self-identified ethnicity</b>				
Taiwanese (t)	0.2136	0.6973	0.0422	0.8118
Taiwanese and also Chinese (t-c)	0.2129	0.1135	0.0932	0.0974
Both (both)	0.4140	0.1433	0.3600	0.0640
Chinese and also Taiwanese (c-t)	0.0693	0.0260	0.1735	0.0108
Chinese (c)	0.0901	0.0199	0.3310	0.0160
<b>K5B: Taiwanese rice and water</b>				
Strongly agree (1)	0.0464	0.2039	0.0398	0.7445
Agree (2)	0.3145	0.5801	0.0303	0.1174
Disagree (3)	0.5869	0.2008	0.3474	0.0278
Strongly disagree (4)	0.0521	0.0152	0.5825	0.1103
<b>K5D: Cut ties with China</b>				
Strongly agree (1)	0.0121	0.0002	0.0248	0.5802
Agree (2)	0.0941	0.7224	0.0298	0.2543
Disagree (3)	0.8560	0.2767	0.4181	0.0821
Strongly disagree (4)	0.0379	0.0007	0.5273	0.0834
<b>K5H: Taiwan's own history</b>				
Strongly agree (1)	0.0083	0.0608	0.0354	0.6817
Agree (2)	0.2634	0.8637	0.0345	0.2834
Disagree (3)	0.7207	0.0690	0.4927	0.0346
Strongly disagree (4)	0.0075	0.0064	0.4374	0.0003
<b>COVARIATES</b>				
<b>Age</b>				
20–29	0.2923	0.2563	0.1130	0.1204
30–39	0.2971	0.1689	0.3492	0.1917
40–49	0.2010	0.2604	0.2420	0.3016
50–59	0.1194	0.1312	0.0460	0.2291
60–69	0.0408	0.1293	0.0576	0.1083
above 70	0.0495	0.0540	0.1922	0.0489
<b>Education</b>				
low	0.1348	0.3784	0.1251	0.2797
median	0.4624	0.3964	0.4326	0.4447
high	0.4028	0.2252	0.4423	0.2755
<b>Father's ethnicity</b>				
Taiwanese (T)	0.7279	0.8294	0.3534	0.9081
Hakka (H)	0.1321	0.1320	0.1099	0.0519
Aborigine (A)	0.0197	0.0259	0.0137	0.0006
Mainlander (M)	0.1203	0.0127	0.5229	0.0395

*Note:* Letters and numbers included in parentheses correspond to those found in Figure 3.



**Figure 3**  
Tri-plot of the LC Cluster Analysis of Taiwanese/Chinese Identity

**Table 5**  
The Relationship between Ethnic Groups and Taiwanese/Chinese Identity Latent Classes

Father's ethnicity	Taiwanese/Chinese identity clusters				Total
	Cluster 1 Dual identifier	Cluster 2 Soft Taiwanese identifier	Cluster 3 Chinese identifier	Cluster 4 Hard Taiwanese identifier	
Taiwanese	610 61.0%	249 24.9%	46 4.6%	95 9.5%	1000 100.0%
Hakka	110 64.7%	39 22.9%	15 8.8%	6 3.5%	170 100.0%
Aboriginal	17 65.4%	7 26.9%	2 7.7%	0 0.0%	26 100.0%
Mainlander	110 57.9%	3 1.6%	73 38.4%	4 2.1%	190 100.0%
Total	847 61.1%	298 21.5%	136 9.8%	105 7.6%	1386 100.0%

## National identity

The six items (K2, K3, K4, K5A, K5C, and K5F) identified as representing the 'national identity dimension' are also further analyzed with their original coding shown in Table 1. Again, the minimum BIC criterion leads to a four-cluster latent class model with three covariates of sex, age, and ethnic group.<sup>3</sup>

The marginal profile of this four-class LC cluster model is listed in Table 6. The proportional distribution of the four clusters of national identity displays greater variation than that of Taiwanese/Chinese identity:

Cluster 1, which accounts for about 41.1 percent of our sample, represents those who sit in the middle of the national identity, that is, they prefer maintaining the status quo and perhaps leaving the decision of independence or unification to the future. This can be seen by the fact that highest probabilities in the first column of Table 6 concentrate on the middle categories of all the six items, such as maintaining the status quo and deciding independence or unification in the future. We thus call cluster 1 'status quo favorer'.

Cluster 2, which accounts for 33 percent, still prefers maintaining status quo but leans slightly toward unification in the future when economic, social and political conditions become mature. We may call cluster 2 'weak unification favorer'.

Cluster 3, which accounts for 14.4 percent, is the group that shows little attachment to China and would prefer immediate independence if such an act poses no security threat to Taiwan. This group may be called 'independence favorer'.

Cluster 4, which accounts for 11.6 percent, shows even stronger attachment to unification and opposition to Taiwan independence even if such an act poses no threat to Taiwan's security. Cluster 4 is labeled as 'strong unification favorer'.


The tri-plot of the four-class LC model of national identity is displayed as Figure 4 with clusters 2 and 4 combined into 'unification favorer' (labeled 'Others' on the very top of Figure 4). It should be noted that, despite the similarities in vertex labels between the last two figures, the down-left vertex of Figure 4 now represents 'status quo favorer' (cluster 1), whereas the down-right vertex stands for 'independent favorer' (cluster 3). As can be seen, younger generations are more likely to prefer maintaining status quo than is the older generation and in a somewhat surprising finding, males seem to be somewhat more likely to favor future unification than females.

In order to examine the relationship between ethnic groups and national identity, we again classify individuals according to their modal membership probability based on the LC model and then cross-tabulate the

**Table 6**  
**The Marginal Profile of the Four-Class LC Cluster Model of National Identity**

	<b>Cluster 1 Status quo favorer</b>	<b>Cluster 2 Weak unification favorer</b>	<b>Cluster 3 Independence favorer</b>	<b>Cluster 4 Strong unification favorer</b>
Cluster Size	0.4106	0.3296	0.1442	0.1156
<b>INDICATORS</b>				
<b>K2: Independence/Unification stand</b>				
Immediate independence (ii)	0.0478	0.0052	0.2501	0.0006
Status quo, independence in the future (si)	0.2093	0.0005	0.4710	0.0004
Status quo, independence or unification In the future (siu)	0.5275	0.3305	0.2182	0.2180
Status quo forever (ss)	0.1392	0.0789	0.0601	0.0845
Status quo, unification in the future (su)	0.0762	0.5031	0.0005	0.6063
Immediate unification (uu)	0.0000	0.0819	0.0001	0.0903
<b>K3: Conditional independence</b>				
Strongly agree (1)	0.0526	0.0128	0.6500	0.1473
Agree (2)	0.6486	0.3665	0.2840	0.1289
Disagree (3)	0.2838	0.5002	0.0415	0.2436
Strongly disagree (4)	0.0150	0.1205	0.0245	0.4802
<b>K4: Conditional unification</b>				
Strongly disagree (1)	0.0004	0.0124	0.3605	0.1043
Disagree (2)	0.6152	0.1752	0.3879	0.0225
Agree (3)	0.3690	0.7859	0.1983	0.3280
Strongly agree (4)	0.0154	0.0265	0.0532	0.5452
<b>K5A: Proud Chinese</b>				
Strongly disagree (1)	0.0187	0.0078	0.2726	0.0754
Disagree (2)	0.4319	0.1980	0.4214	0.1204
Agree (3)	0.5315	0.7510	0.1831	0.2944
Strongly agree (4)	0.0179	0.0432	0.1229	0.5099
<b>K5C: Not Chinese unforgivable</b>				
Strongly disagree (1)	0.0304	0.0102	0.2809	0.1248
Disagree (2)	0.6665	0.3743	0.5227	0.2784
Agree (3)	0.3029	0.5721	0.1195	0.2338
Strongly agree (4)	0.0002	0.0434	0.0769	0.3630
<b>K5F: China has no right</b>				
Strongly agree (1)	0.0743	0.0209	0.6904	0.1698
Agree (2)	0.8234	0.4632	0.2965	0.2827
Disagree (3)	0.1023	0.4909	0.0020	0.3303
Strongly disagree (4)	0.0001	0.0250	0.0111	0.2172
<b>COVARIATES</b>				
<b>Sex</b>				
Male (1)	0.4539	0.6087	0.6240	0.6998
Female (2)	0.5461	0.3913	0.3760	0.3002
<b>Age</b>				
20–29	0.3152	0.2427	0.2028	0.1610
30–39	0.2631	0.2993	0.1669	0.3015
40–49	0.2037	0.2031	0.2512	0.2496
50–59	0.1200	0.1128	0.2095	0.1363
60–69	0.0649	0.0610	0.1184	0.0314
above 70	0.0331	0.0812	0.0512	0.1202
<b>Father's ethnicity</b>				
Taiwanese (T)	0.7971	0.6446	0.9349	0.4959
Hakka (H)	0.1344	0.1353	0.0399	0.1314
Aborigine (A)	0.0174	0.0235	0.0061	0.0221
Mainlander (M)	0.0512	0.1966	0.0190	0.3507

*Note:* Letters and numbers included in parentheses correspond to those found in Figure 4.



**Figure 4**  
Tri-plot of the LC Cluster Analysis of National Identity

**Table 7**  
The Relationship between Ethnic Groups and National Identity Latent Classes

Father's ethnicity	National Identity Clusters				Total
	Cluster 1 Status quo favorer	Cluster 2 Weak unification favorer	Cluster 3 Independence favorer	Cluster 4 Strong unification favorer	
Taiwanese	410 46.6%	248 28.2%	155 17.6%	66 7.5%	879 100.0%
Hakka	70 48.3%	54 37.2%	6 4.1%	15 10.3%	145 100.0%
Aboriginal	10 45.5%	8 36.4%	1 4.5%	3 13.6%	22 100.0%
Mainlander	21 13.5%	85 54.8%	3 1.9%	46 29.7%	155 100.0%
Total	511 42.5%	395 32.9%	165 13.7%	130 10.8%	1201 100.0%



results with 'objective' ethnic groups. As Table 7 indicates, the distribution of national identity among father's ethnicity displays much greater diversity than does Taiwanese/Chinese identity. Although all the four ethnic groups prefer the status quo, not surprisingly, mainlanders are the most willing to take advantage of favorable conditions, if present, to unify with China, whereas Hakka are the next and, as one might expect, the Taiwanese are the least. It is worth noticing that mainlanders show the highest degree of homogeneity in national identity, while the native Taiwanese show substantial heterogeneity. Again, this latter result contradicts the 'primordialist' view of identity.

### **Conclusion**

This study explores the dimensionality of the fundamental issue of identity politics in Taiwan. By applying LC factor analysis to the 12 relevant items of the TEDS 2001 survey, we confirm that the Taiwanese/Chinese and national identities are two analytically different dimensions. We then employ LC cluster analysis to determine the number of latent classes in each of these two dimensions. We find that the so-called 'objective' measure of the 'four major ethnic groups' that is based solely on a respondent's father's ethnicity corresponds rather poorly with either of the two dimensions of identity. Furthermore, the distribution of national identity categories among ethnic groups displays much greater variation than the Taiwanese/Chinese identity does. More specifically, mainlanders show the highest degree of homogeneity in national identity whereas the native Taiwanese show substantial heterogeneity.

The results of our analysis seem to point out that the people of Taiwan lack consensus on the national identity issue. Since most people wish to postpone their decision on the independence/unification to the future, they also tend to be quite sensitive to the current and future interaction between Taiwan and China. If the trend of an increasing proportion of Taiwanese identifiers is true, as some survey studies have indicated, then we may speculate that the people of Taiwan could become even more divided in terms of national identity in the near future. Policy makers in both Taipei and Beijing need to take this possible trend into account.

These findings are, of course, rather modest due to the exploratory nature of this study. However, future studies could build upon the latent variable analysis shown here and move toward constructing modified LISREL models (Hagenaars, 1993) for describing the interactions among groups and explain their attitudinal similarities and differences.

## NOTES

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1. Taiwan's Election and Democratization Study (TEDS) is funded by the National Science Council and its Social Science Research Center of the Republic of China. This long-term project consists of a series of island-wide face-to-face annual survey interviews whose implementation is supervised by a nine-member TEDS Planning Committee chaired by this author. TEDS 2001, the first one among this series of large-scale surveys, was conducted during the period from late January to early April of 2002 immediately after the Fifth Legislative Yuan election held in December of 2001. This post-election study includes about 220 questions in its questionnaire, probing respondents' political attitudes and voting behavior, as well as demographic characteristics. There are 2022 completed interviews in the TEDS 2001 survey.
2. Gender is found to be statistically insignificant ( $p > 0.05$ ) and thus is dropped from the model.
3. Education level is found to be statistically insignificant ( $p > 0.05$ ) and is, therefore, dropped from the model.

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