

國立政治大學外交學系

**Department of Diplomacy, National Chengchi University**

碩士論文

**Master Thesis**

論阿拉伯之春期間內戰是否發生：以阿爾及利亞  
和利比亞為例

**Whether Civil War Happened During the Arab  
Spring: Exemplified by Algeria and Libya**

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# Abbreviations

AIS: *Armée islamique du salut* / Islamic Army of Salvation

ALN: *Armée de libération nationale* / Army of National Liberation

AQAP: Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula

BPCs: Basic Peoples Congresses

C-H: Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed and Grievance in Civil War”

CNCD: *Coordination nationale pour le changement et la démocratie* / National Coordination for Change and Democracy

COW: Correlates of War

CWP: Civil-War-Prone

FFS: *Front des Forces socialistes* / Socialist Forces Front

FIS: *Front Islamique du Salut* / Islamic Salvation Front

F-L: Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity, Insurgency, and Civil War”

FLN: *Front de Libération Nationale* / National Liberation Front

FSA: Free Syrian Army

GCC: Gulf Cooperation Council

ICG: International Crisis Group

ISIL / ISIS: Islamic State of Iraq and Levant / Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham

LIFG: Libyan Islamic Fighting Group

MENA: Middle East and North Africa

MRI: *Mouvement de la Renaissance Islamique* / Islamic Renaissance Movement (also known as Ennahda)

MRN: *Mouvement pour la réforme nationale* / Movement for National Reform (also known as al-Islah)

MSP: *Mouvement de la société pour la paix* / Movement of Society for Peace (also known as Hamas)

NTC: National Transitional Council

PDRY: People’s Democratic Republic of Yemen

PSL: Popular Social Leadership

RC: Revolutionary Committee

RCC: Revolutionary Command Council

RCD: *Rassemblement pour la Culture et la Démocratie* / Rally for Culture and Democracy

RND: *Rassemblement National Démocratique* / National Democratic Rally

YAR: Yemen Arab Republic



# Abstracts

The main concern of this study lies in what is the cause behind whether civil war broke out during the Arab Spring (2011). By evaluating civil war theories by Boix, Collier and Hoeffler, and Fearon and Laitin, I find that applying the theory by Collier and Hoeffler alone can effectively and parsimoniously explain the situation during the Arab Spring. In addition, I identify two variables: “peace duration” and “anocracy”, which might be the necessary conditions behind the civil wars during the Arab Spring. To further assure the explanatory power of theories, I switch the focus to explore the reasons why there are exceptions, such as Algeria and Libya, out of the theoretical prediction. Finally, I present some recommendations for theoretical development and policy.

Key words: civil war, Arab Spring, peace duration, anocracy, Algeria, Libya

## 摘要：

本文主要關注：何種原因造成 2011 年阿拉伯之春期間的內戰發生與否。在評估由 Boix、Collier 和 Hoeffler，以及 Fearon 和 Laitin 所提出的內戰理論後，我發現單獨適用 Collier 和 Hoeffler 即可有效又簡約地解釋阿拉伯之春期間的情況。此外，我認為「和平持續期」(peace duration)和「半民主」(anocracy)可能是內戰的必要條件。為了進一步確認理論的解釋力，我將焦點轉移至探索造成理論預測例外（如阿爾及利亞和利比亞）的原因。最後，我提出對理論發展和政策的一些建議。

關鍵字：內戰、阿拉伯之春、和平持續期、半民主、阿爾及利亞、利比亞

# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Research Goals

The political violence/mobilization<sup>1</sup> starting from Tunisia in 2010 inspired a series of corresponding political violence/mobilization sweeping other countries within the Middle East and North Africa (MENA), and most analysts and media gave the wave of events a name: Arab Spring. Its significant impacts in political, social, and economic aspects had attracted intensive academic attention.

At first glance, difference in the form and level of political violence/mobilization among different states in the MENA is evident. For instance, in Syria and Libya, the fights between people and the regime were violent, which only in 2011 caused 5,000 and about 12,700 to 25,000 deaths respectively. However, in Algeria and Egypt, the political violence/mobilization appeared in the form of demonstration, which cause relatively less death tolls: 5 and 846 (“Algerian Protesters”; “Egypt Unrest”). The question is: why such significant differences between Arab states in 2011?

Existed literature on the Arab Spring seems to pay less attention to it, though the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization is so explicit. As Part 1.2.1 and 1.2.2 present, literature on the Arab Spring can be roughly divided into two types: (1) literature taking Arab Spring as a general phenomenon; (2) literature focusing on the situation of a single country. The former has two main concerns: Firstly, why the Arab Spring happened? Secondly, why some regimes survived the Arab Spring, but others could not? Or why political violence/mobilization succeeded in certain countries, but failed in other countries? The latter focuses on more specific problems: why things in a single case proceeded in the way as being observed. For instance, why Hosni Mubarak in Egypt lost his throne during the Arab Spring? Why monarchies in

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<sup>1</sup> Most scholars did not discreetly use specific terms to describe different situations in different states. For the convenience of discussing, I used a ill-defined and extensive phrase, “political violence/mobilization,” to refer to events across the MENA during the Arab Spring. However, the main topic of my research is one well-defined form of the comprehensive “political violence/mobilization”: civil war.

Jordan and Morocco experienced relatively slight opposition? Why the situation in Syria went in this way? In sum, the former basically ignore the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization. As to the latter, though it emphasizes the distinctiveness of certain country's situation, there is no systematic comparison made among different countries.

After reviewing the literature on the Arab Spring, I find two gaps need to be filled. As the first type of literature, the first gap is: the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization between countries does not receive enough attention. The second gap is lack of discussion on the Arab Spring within frameworks of existed theory. Exemplified by the second type of literature, the discussion does not proceed in a systematic comparison. The first gap implies me that I need criteria to distinguish cases with high level of political violence/mobilization from that with low level of political violence/mobilization; the second gap implies that the discussion should not proceed in aimless way, that is, I need to conduct a case comparison with the guidance of theory.

There are two justifications for me to apply civil war theories. First, they provide me a standard for distinguishing the cases with more intensive political violence/mobilization from the cases with less intensive political violence/mobilization, which is essential for further case comparison.<sup>2</sup> Second, they provide several potential causal factors, which allow me to conduct case comparison within the theoretical frameworks.

Actually, the situation across the MENA in 2011 is quite suitable for a controlled comparison to test the predictive power of civil war theory. All states in this region are with temporal and spatial similarities to some extent and, important of all, under the influence of situation in Tunisia. Holding historical context and Tunisian impacts constant, we can explore: what are the causes behind the higher level of political violence/mobilization, that is, civil war, in some cases during the Arab Spring.

Holding “what are the causes behind happening of civil war during the Arab Spring” as my central question, this study is expected to make some contributions. For theoretical development, I want to assure the explanatory power of civil war theory, and identifying the key variable behind civil war in 2011. Then, through precisely discussing the cases diverting from the theoretical prediction, I want to strengthen and deepen the existed theories. For policy recommendation, by

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<sup>2</sup> For further details about the definition of civil war, see Section 3.1.

investigating into the causes behind the difference in level of political violence/mobilization, I might make some recommendations to avoid the happening of such a destructive event like civil war.

To sum up, the main goal of this study lies on exploring the causes behind the difference in level of political violence/mobilization between cases, and I will apply three theories about civil war to the fifteen cases when explaining the difference. I expect my study to make two contributions: (1) improving the existed theories; (2) making some policy recommendation.

## **1.2. Literature Review**

The literature reviewed here includes three types: literature taking the Arab Spring as a general phenomenon in Part 1.2.1; literature focusing on the 2011 situation in a single state in Part 1.2.2; and literature about civil war theory in Part 1.2.3.

After reviewing the former two types, I find that the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization did not receive enough attention and that few literature discussing the Arab Spring within existed theories. The final types of literature provide me opportunity to fill the two gaps above.

### ***1.2.1. Arab Spring in General***

Now, I will review literature treating the Arab Spring as a general social phenomenon by its two main concerns: (1) literature pursuing the causes behind the Arab Spring; (2) literature discussing the success of certain political violence/mobilization or the survival of certain regimes during the Arab Spring.

#### ***Why the Arab Spring Happened?***

To review systematically the plausible causal paths proposed by literature about the first concern, I borrow the precipitant/precondition distinction from Eckstein. To analyze internal war, an inclusive concept containing every form of political violence/mobilization including civil war, Eckstein distinguishes precipitant, an event

which actually starts the conflict, from precondition leading to the environment which make it possible for precipitant to bring about the conflict. This distinction singles out the aspects of internal war amenable to be systematic analysis (precondition) from those happening simply by accident and hard to be analyzed.

About the precipitant, the self-immolation of Mohamed Bouazizi in December 2010 is commonly taken as the start point of the following sequence of events. This event might inspire the sympathy among population in other Arab states or might reveal the perceived political opportunities for the dissatisfied to toppling down authoritarians across the MENA. So, in my research, I set the influence from Tunisia as constant to the fifteen cases under discussion.

Concerning the preconditions behind the Arab Spring, scholars suggest various grievances in political, economic, and social aspects (J. Ismael and S. Ismael; Dalacoura; Salih). However, grievance is always more widespread than more intensive political violence/mobilization like civil war.

Some scholars mention the importance of Arab satellite channel, such as al-Jazeera, and social networking websites, including Twitter and Facebook (J. Ismael and S. Ismael; Dalacoura). A debate between Gladwell and Shirky reminds us of the fact that though social media changed the rules of competitions between people and the regime, such as increasing the spread of information, easing citizens' public speeches, and elevating speed and scale of people's coordination, we should not overestimate its importance in making a mobilization viable or deciding winner and loser.

In the MENA, a region where authoritarianism oppresses civil society and restricts traditional media, social media creates a social space not only for social mobilization but also for competition of different interest groups. Khondker warns that it is dangerous to overestimate the role of social media, and the conditions providing motivation and opportunity for rebelling in real world should not be ignored. Actually, social media is not only used by oppositions to mobilization but also used by the government to repression. In addition, Khondker thinks that there should be complementary rather than competitive relation between social media and traditional media, such as broadcast and print media.

Howard and Hussain suggest that the importance of social media during the Arab Spring lies on strengthening the capabilities of oppositions to mobilization, that is, though social media is a powerful tool, the actors using it is indispensable. And, it is hard to ignore the factor in real world politics, such various grievances among people

and corruption by the government. Although the government also learns to repression through the Internet, it cannot follow the rapid step of oppositions. In addition, Howard and Hussain think that traditional media is in the weak position this time. To Howard and Hussain, the fact that social media is a necessary condition for the Arab Spring is still in doubt.

To some scholars, the existed group established on various origins, such as political preference, economic class, ethnicity, and family, might play an important role in political violence/mobilization during 2011. Dalacoura argues that pre-existing civil society and political opposition, for example, Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, play some important role in the Arab Spring. Similarly, J. Ismael and S. Ismael are also aware of the impacts of existed divisions and coherence within a society. However, they argued that the impact of the existed groups was not fixed. Take the impacts of social division as an example, the Sunni-Shiite division was used by the Saudi regime to dissolve opposition based on a wide swath of population, but the East-West division in Libya deepened the domestic contradictions.

### ***The Regime Survival and the Success of Political Violence/Mobilization***

The regime survival and the success of political violence/mobilization is the second concern of literature treating the Arab Spring as a general social phenomenon. It is noteworthy that during the Arab Spring more intensive political violence/mobilization did not represent the happening of regime change. For example, there were large casualties in both Libya and Syria; however, the regime only appeared in Libya. Similarly, milder political violence was not equal to regime survival. For instance, both Jordan and Egypt experienced less intensive political violence/mobilization, but only the former survived the Arab Spring.

Dalacoura presents three factors to explain regime's survival: political leaders' responses to domestic riots, relation between regime and army (or security forces), regime's allies in society.

Some scholars argue that it is regime type deciding regime's survival or not. Monarchy might have some extra advantages than other types of regime to survive the domestic conflict. According to Brumberg, the survival advantages of monarchy lays on the fact that the king kept an appropriate distance from the political institution with bad impression to the society, so the king could serve as an neutral arbitrator and

manipulate “protection rackets”: protecting specific groups and building their feeling of under threat once total democratization bringing equal opportunities for every social group. By playing protection racket, the king could escape from pressure of further democratization. However, to other types of regime, the political leader deeply sticks into the corrupt institution so that cannot serve as an arbitrator and play protection racket, especially when the common grievance among people in the Arab Spring invoking the solidarity between different groups.

There are other survival advantages for monarchy. For instance, Herb thinks that the monarchies can survive the Arab Spring due to their capability to make promises to political reforms and the zeitgeist perceiving the better life under the monarchy than under the republics. Furthermore, Gause points out, the survival advantage for monarchy lays in the social presence of the royal family members by filling key positions of government and army. These members might be the most loyal agents to control the whole society (“Why Reform”).

Goldstone argues in a reverse direction by demonstrating the weakness of non-monarchy originating from the characteristics coming from the survival strategies of “sultanistic regime”.<sup>3</sup> The rule of “sultanistic regime” is based on concentrating power at expense of formal institution and lack of ideological or religious as legitimate bases. As a result, “sultanistic regime” tends to co-opt people and reward its cronies by materials; in addition, it tends to keep army divided for fear of coup d'état. These characteristics led to obstacles for the survival of “sultanistic regime”. Comparing to monarchy, it was difficult for “sultanistic regime” to shift people’s anger from itself to formal institution; without other source of legitimacy, the succession question of “sultanistic regime” is usually controversial and served as the focus for political struggles alienating other political elites. In addition, the cost to co-opt other elites and people would not stop to enhance until the leader cannot afford. Finally, army tends to defect due to divide-and-rule strategy taken by the leader in normal time. So, it is not that monarchy is so strong to survive but that non-monarchy is too weak to maintain.

Some scholars disagree the advantages for monarchy, and they think that it is oil that helps the monarchy to stand its people’s anger rather than the monarchy *per se*. In other words, the real reason behind why monarchy seems to be more tenable than

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<sup>3</sup> In Goldstone’s definition, “sultanistic regimes” in the MENA includes Bashar al-Assad’s regime in Syria, Omar al-Bashir’s regime in Sudan, Zine el-Abidine Ben Ali’s regime in Tunisia, Hosni Mubarak’s regime in Egypt, Muammar Gaddafi’s regime in Libya, and Ali Abdullah Saleh’s regime in Yemen. See Goldstone 8-16.

non-monarchy is the oil resources, whose distribution coincidentally overlaps with the distribution of monarchies in MENA (Hertog; Lynch; Yom). Ross further elaborates the benefit to survival brought by abundant oil endowment: Evidently, oil endowment provides regimes abundant resource to repress or co-opt people. With low taxes and generous subsidies, people's attention might be diverted from corruption and government incompetence. In addition, with oil wealth as a financial source independent from the people, it would be easier for the leader to keep its country's finance opaque, so that the leader could hide the evidence for corruption from his people ("Will Oil Drown").

Also, less demanding international allies and its supports due to the geopolitical significance of those monarchies might be another important pillar for their survival (Lynch; Yom). In addition, powerful media asset to maintain monarchies' legitimacy also explains the tenacity of monarchies (Lynch).

In sum, the reason for the Arab Spring, the survival of regime and the success of political violence/mobilization is the main concern to this type of literature rather than the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization.

### ***1.2.2. Situation in Different Country before or During the Arab Spring***

As I mentioned in previous part, there are consensus among literature on single case: the event happening in Tunisia as the precipitant of the political violence/mobilization across the MENA during the Arab Spring. So, I will shift my reviewing focus to the preconditions behind each case in below. This part is composed of two steps: (1) reviewing literature on cases with the occurrence of civil war and (2) reviewing literature on cases without the occurrence of civil war.<sup>4</sup>

#### ***Cases with the occurrence of civil wars***

##### ***Libya***

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<sup>4</sup> For how the situation of these cases fit the definition of civil war, see Section 3.1.

Ahmida lists several structural factors causing grievance among Libyan people during the Arab Spring. In political aspects, the excessive centralization of power deviates Muammar Gaddafi from its popular base. Also, the constant repression of the Gaddafi regime against the dissidents through security forces, such as 1996 massacre in Abu Salim prison, accumulates hatred against the regime. In economic aspects, oil wealth provides the Gaddafi regime resources to deal with economic problems, however; the international sanction due to the connection between the regime and terrorism and increasing corruption still harm the Libyan economy and weaken its capability to provide subsidies, which alienates middle and low class in the society. In addition, relative high education level of Libyan people and their accessibility to social media not only prompts the social changes but also exposes the incompatibility between the regime's obsolete governing way based on tribalism and the modern society.

Ahmida also presents the opportunities for the potential rebels in Libya. The constantly political exclusion and repression by the regime deepens the opposition tradition in eastern Libya, which serves as an important territorial base for the rebellion and generates diaspora, about 100,000 exiled people by 1990, which serving as potential supporters for the rebellion. In addition, the violent repression against the peaceful protestors by Gaddafi regime alienates its own elites and invites foreign intervention, which is beneficial to the survival of the rebels.

In terms of foreign intervention, in addition to the intervention from the NATO and the Arab League, De Waal mentions the role of African Union and Sudanese military support in the Libyan situation during the Arab Spring.

Lacher provides an elaborate analysis on the various identities among Libyans and its impacts on Libyan situation. The identities, such as families, tribes, and regions, might result in the disintegration of Libyan state institution, that is, the mass defection from the Gaddafi regime. Furthermore, not only the consolidation of the division between pro-regime side and anti-regime side in the Libyan civil war but also the inner division between the former elites of the Gaddafi regime and of the past monarchy within the oppositions might be explained by Gaddafi's favoritism to certain identical groups.

Similar to Lacher, Brahimi also mentioned the importance of tribalism and regionalism in Libyan civil war. In addition, Brahimi suggests another factor: personalized politics of Gaddafi regime, which leads to the situation that all the failure in economic and political aspects will be attribute to Gaddafi on the one hand,

and Gaddafi cannot accept any challenge to his authority on the other hand. As a result, serious conflict between the oppositions and the regime become inevitable.

## *Syria*

Haddad made an evaluation on the political, economic, and social situation in Syria by the Arab Spring and points out some disadvantages. Politically, corruption, favoritism, and lack of rule of law prevent the conducting of effective economic policies and make Syria a less attractive environment for investment. Economically, the Assad regime could not strike a balance between private sectors and public sectors. The private sectors controlled by capitalist connecting with the regime and the reduction of the public sectors cause unemployment and reduce subsidies. Also, the Syrian development focuses on service sector, which is not helpful for long-term development and not beneficial to ordinary people. The development of agriculture is obstructed by bad policies and lack of water, and the depletion of oil wealth, the weak demand, and the limited investment constitute the obstacles to the development of industry. In short, the Syrian economy could not provide enough necessities and jobs for most Syrians. Socially, the economic inequality might turn the inherent ethnic and religious fragmented society into the economic polarization society, which was prone to civil unrests (“The Political Economy”).

Haddad also provides explanations for the conflicts between the regime and the opposition. The grievance of Syrian people comes from the new coalition between the Assad regime and Sunni business community. The coalition basing on network of favoritism and privilege caused the resources’ concentration on the urban area and the reduction on state subsidies, so most of people felt neglected by the regime and migrated toward the urban area, especially after the drought since 2003. The economic inequality generated grievance. Furthermore, the foreign intervention and the support from diaspora provide the opportunities for the potential rebels (“Syria’s Stalemate”).

Hinnebusch provides a comprehensive explanation for the situation in Syria. To adapt to the new international environment after the Cold War, the Assad regime needs to reform, even partially abandon, the past survival strategy. The main challenge for the Assad regime is its fragmented society within which the core of the regime, the Alawites, is in face of the oppositions from the wide spectrum of social divisions. To alleviate this problem, in the past the regime resorted to two strategies:

the first is try to establish coalition with peasants and workers through providing subsidies by its oil revenue, and the second is adopting nationalistic foreign policy to generate nationalist legitimacy. In the post Cold War period, the Assad regime lost the most important political and economical patron, the Soviet; as a result, Assad regime has no choice but to develop relation with the West. This leads to two difficulties for Assad regime: First, the regime needs to conduct economic liberation, which may be in conflict with its socialist policy providing subsidies. Second, the regime needs to transform its nationalist foreign policy, which is the source of its legitimacy but has made it under the international isolation for a long time. In short, to adjust the new world order after the Cold War, the Assad regime needs to abandon subsidy policy and nationalist foreign policy, which it had depended on for a long time.

According to Hinnebusch, during the process of adjusting its survive strategies, the Assad regime sowed seeds of the Syrian civil war in 2011. The grievance among Syrian people came from the reforms conducted by the Assad regime. Economically, to pursue the Syrian integration into international market, the Assad regime weakened the public sector and strengthened the private sector. Due to favoritism and corruption, capitalist with strong connection with the regime controlled most of benefits. To ordinary people, the reduction of public sectors led to the loss of the social protection, but the developmental focuses of private sectors on the trade, tourism, and banking (rather manufacture) could not fill the gap caused by reduction of public works. As a result, the grievance generate from economic inequality. Politically, the Assad regime could not satisfied nationalist constituencies through conducting nationalist foreign policies, and tried to expand its social base by giving some freedom and resources to Islamist groups and middle class but not enough opportunity for political participation. So, the political grievance generated.

Not only grievance prompting rebellion but also opportunity favoring rebellion comes from the pursuing of reforms. To conduct reforms, Bashar al-Assad consolidates power by weakening the party apparatus, the worker and peasant unions, and the army serving as the administration tools and the bridges between the regime and the society in the past. As a result, the regime's capabilities for control are weakened. In addition, the diaspora and the western encouragement played a role in prompting the opposition against the regime.

To complement the explanations like those by Haddad and Hinnebusch emphasizing on the structural causes, Leenders switches his focus towards the early mobilization in Syrian. Taking Daraa as a case, where was one of the very early place

for the Syrian mobilization, Leenders argues that the social network connected with four factors that could explain some aspects of the social mobilization in Syria in 2011: (1) the family clan structure; (2) the labor migration to Lebanon, the Gulf States, and Jordan; (3) cross-border linkage to Jordan; (4) the criminal activities. The social network connecting with the first factor provided trust, plus relative less surveillance of the Assad regime due to the peripheral location of Daraa, so that there was a social space for people to share their grievances as the established repertoires for defiance in 2011. In addition, the clan value embedding in the social work made the regime's violence as a cause of defiant mobilization rather than submission. The social network connecting with the second and the third factors provide people access to external resources and information, which not only introduce the encouragement from the success of mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt but also external resources to sustain the mobilization in Daraa. The fourth factor provided necessary skills, such as smuggling, for mobilization in Daraa to access to external world even under the containment of the Assad regime. Leenders further argues that the social network in several Syrian cities had similar characteristics. Many cities share the same mechanism of mobilization, so the process of mobilization across Syria is not in the way of diffusion but in the way of simultaneously occurring in different places. The development from the local mobilization to the national mobilization and the overcome of collective action dilemma, is caused by cross-referencing protest and increasingly regime violence.

Álvarez-Ossorio and Talhamy discusses the roles playing by two important social groups in Syria during the Arab Spring. The former is the role of Syrian intellectuals in the forming of the opposition against the Assad regime. The latter is the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood, whose political position swayed between the Assad regime and the opposition against the regime after 1982 Hama massacre.

## ***Yemen***

Fattah provides a list of potential causal factors behind the Yemeni situation during the Arab Spring. Fattah raises several structural factors leading to the grievance among Yemeni people. For example, the growing population pressure, and the following food insecurity, poverty, and unemployment, which President Ali Abdullah Saleh has dealt with these problems by oil revenue that is gradually exhaust. Also, corruption, the lack of water resource, the bad public facilities, such as road and

electricity supplying networks, might add the dissatisfaction among Yemeni people. In addition, there was another source of grievance from the hatred of previous civil unrests, such as hostility between the Saleh regime and the Houthi movement, Shiites in the north, or the Hiraak movement, secessionists in south.

Fattah also points out factors providing opportunities for the potential rebels. For instance, the continuing civil unrests were gradually weakening the regime's capabilities for control. Mass defection, resulting from the inherent network of families, clans, and tribes within the state apparatus or the brutal repression against the peaceful protestors, also provided the support and the protection for the opposition. Also, the foreign interventions, such as Saudi Arab's connection with the significant tribes within Yemen and the drone attacks conducted by the US in the name of preventing Al-Qaeda in Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) from seizing the power, are mentioned. In addition, the analysis on the composition of the opposition groups resulting from the fragmented Yemeni society might reveal how the potential rebels overcame the collective action dilemma.

Winter traces the long history of the conflict between the Saleh's regime and the Houthi movement. His study reminds me of how the Houthi movement weakened Saleh regime's capabilities since 2003, which probably resulted in insufficient state capability and reveal the political opportunity for the rebels during the Arab Spring.

## ***Cases without the occurrence of civil wars***

### ***Egypt***

In 2011, Egypt experienced a mass mobilization between January 25 and February 11, and the events ended the rule of Husni Mubarak. Concerning the precipitant of the 18-day event, most scholars agree that the topple-down of Tunisian regime plays an important role (Lesch 46; Saikal 530-531; Shehata; Shahin). Also, the role of social media on political violence/mobilization during 2011 was widely acknowledged (Lesch 45-46; Shehata; Shahin 60-62).

One of preconditions behind the event mainly comes from cumulative grievances among Egyptian people. In political aspects, most part of life in Egypt, such as the activities of labor union and political party, media, cultural expression, and university life, was under strict supervision by Mubarak regime (Lesch 36-37, 40; Shehata; Shahin 51-52). As a result, Egyptian people only had little freedom during the reign of

Mubarak. In addition, Mubarak's foreign policy sticking to maintain peace with Israel and ally with the US also incited some grievance among Egyptians (Saikal 533-534). Also, Husni Gamal, the son of Mubarak, kept trying to build his own power bases for his future succession, and it led to two results: On the one hand, through blatant rigging, Gamal-led National Democratic Party monopolized power in November 2010 parliament elections. This excluded main oppositions, such as the Wafd party and Muslim Brotherhood, from the parliament and made them the potential participators in future extra-parliamentary activities (Lesch 38-40; Saikal 532; Shehata; Shahin 53). On the other hand, Gamal, without military background, built his own civilian faction undermining the power of the military, and it alienated the military, the most important ally of the regime, from the regime (Shahin 59). In sum, in politics Mubarak regime had displeased three sides: mass, opposition parties, and the military, which produced grievance against it.

The neoliberal economic policies reducing public expense and promoting privatization taken by Mubarak regime since 1990s deepens the economic polarization within Egyptian society. To ordinary people, decreasing subsidies increases the life pressure of ordinary people. In addition, the Egyptian economic growth mostly comes from rent-seeking activities, such as worker remittances and the operation of Suez Canal, rather than from productive activities, such as the competitive industry. As it failed to provide enough jobs for the quickly increasing population, the number of unemployed young soared. However, the same policies benefited specific capitalists due to their close relation with the regime, for example, Ahmed Ezz (Lesch 37-38; Saikal 532-533; Shehata; Shahin 50-51). Besides, the process of privatization provided some officers opportunities to appropriate public funds for increasing their private wealth (Lesch 40-43; Shehata). As economic gap between poor majority and privileged minority expanded, it paved the way for the future political violence/mobilization.

Deserving to be mentioned, the political violence/mobilization in 2011 is not the first time during the reign of Mubarak, and the previous opposition against Mubarak regime served as the bases for the mobilization in 2011. The demonstration trend in Egypt has started from 2003, and the mobilization in 2011 extracted experience and technologies from the precedents. Even, some members of existed opposition took part in 2011 mobilization, such as the April 6 Movement, the Campaign for (Mohamed) ElBaradei, the Muslim Brotherhood, the Tomorrow Party, the Justice and Freedom Party, and Labor Union (Lesch 43-45; Shehata; Shahin 55-59). Although

there were complicate division within opposition, the mobilization in 2011 achieved some level of organizational cohesion in two ways: emphasizing non-violent characteristics for fear of scaring moderate composition and temporarily giving up each sides' political positions (Shahin 47-49, 62-63).

In 2011 Mubarak regime was under huge pressure due to successful political violence/mobilization. The responses taken by the regime, partial and slow concession and massive repression between January 25 and February 2, were not helpful to solving the problems, and even radicalized the demonstration. During the period the Egyptian army kept neutral at first, and in the end forced Mubarak to resign.

## ***Jordan***

The success of mobilizations in Tunisia and Egypt did have some impact on the situation in Jordan during 2011; however, the situation still under the control of King Abdullah II.

Scholars are interested in the peaceful and orderly demonstration starting from January 28, 2011 and tried to explain the situation in Jordan. Generally speaking, there are five explanatory factors: two of them are relevant to the society governed by the regime, including less grievance towards the regime and the relatively mild division within the Jordanian society, other two are relevant to the regime, including the maintenance of enough deterrence toward the protesters and the measures taken by the King to distract people's hatred, and the final one is about the tacit agreement about protest between the regime and the society built since 1989.

Concerning the Jordanian society, there were division and grievance; however, both of them were of relatively low level. Jordanians shared the same grievance as people in other Arab countries, such as lack of political freedom and unequal economic distribution. However, the unpopular government still provides public services: education, subsidies, medical care for its people, so that the regime could keep its legitimacy in 2011. The Jordanian police are also unpopular among people, but they provided secure and orderly environment for the people. Important of all, in contrast to Libya, Iraq, or Syria, they barely use massive violence against the people (Seeley 32).

There were several kinds of division within Jordanian society, but they were relatively mild. The main ethnic division was between Palestinians and Jordanians, the former accounted for about 50% of the whole population, and the latter accounted

for 30% to 35% of the population. It might be reasonable to argue that the Palestinians within Jordan may be the potential objective for mobilizing. Tobin tries to explain why there was no Palestinian riot in 2011 in two ways: first, some of Palestinians think that, identifying themselves as aliens, the protest against the King should be Jordanian business. Second, even if they overcame the regime, they would not want to build their own state in Jordan, because this implies that they give up their right in Palestine, which benefits Israel (Tobin 96-98). Besides, Seeley suggests that Jordanian government has been tactful in resolving tribal disputes (34). In sum, these might explain why the ethnic or tribal factor did not foment the mobilization in 2011.

Although there is economic division between poor majority and wealthy minority in Jordanian society, the new kind of “imagined community” among people blunts the sharpness of conflicts. The wealthier and globalized West Amman attracts people from poorer and traditional East Amman for work and leisure. Under the impacts of such an environment that the new pattern of work and leisure combined with accesses to commercial space and service-sector employment, people imagine themselves as “middle class” and “aspiring cosmopolitans”. The new “imagined community” basing on these symbolic and social affiliations overcomes the division from unequal economic distribution and even religious/ethnic/tribal origins (Tobin 98-100). This kind of cohesion might be a buffer against the explosion of domestic conflicts in Jordan.

Concerning the role Jordanian government played during the Arab Spring, it took two strategies to control the domestic situation. The first is to keep its deterrence against any rash actions by its qualified and loyal army. Also, comparing to Libya and Syria, Jordan’s relatively good relation with other great power eliminated the political opportunity perceived by potential opposition for fear of external intervention (Seeley 33; Tobin 103).

In addition to the deterrence, the King also took strategy to distract the focus from the regime. For example, the King distracted people’s focus from the regime’s core: the royal family by making trivial political concessions, such as firing prime minister after prime minister, passing temporary laws, holding improvised elections (Tobin 104-106). Besides, taking advantage of the fear among Jordanians for losing the secure and stable domestic environment, the King distracted people’s attention from domestic difficulties by publicly making a comparison between the mild situation in Jordan to the extreme situation in other countries, such as Egypt and

Syria. It might let people reconsider if it is worthy to sacrifice the orderly life for pursuing more political and economic rights (Seeley 33; Tobin 106-107).

The tradition of protest also made the Jordanian situation during 2011 modest. The Jordanian government requests protestors provide information about the aim, the form, and the spot of demonstration, and the government would permit or block a demonstration after evaluating the demonstration basing on the information. This process constituted an informal negotiation between the regime and the society in advance, and in the process both sides exchange opinions and even constrain their actions: the regime respond its people in peaceful way by constraining the use of violence and the counter-protestors; the protestors keeps their activities disciplined and prioritized the consideration of security and non-violence (Seeley 32-33; Tobin 100-104).

## ***Morocco***

In 2011, the situation in Morocco was relative constrained, though Morocco shared the similar problems to other Arab countries, including corruption, poverty, and unemployment, unequal economic distribution, and lack of democracy.

Maddy-Weitzman thinks that there were two kinds of reasons behind why Morocco could escape from uncontrollable political violence/mobilization. The first is the relative high level of political freedom. For instance, Mohammed VI of Morocco allows certain extent of Islamic and liberal activities, and the regime is more tolerant to Amazigh (Berber) cultural movement within Morocco. The second is the response taken by Mohammed VI to the protest in 2011. Although he did not give up taking some intimidation against some protestors, to mollify grievance of people, he immediately proclaimed development on the right of peaceful protests and provided some economic concessions, including salaries raise and provision of jobs and subsidies. Also, Mohammed VI established new constitution which, according the observation of Maddy-Weitzman, superficially elevates the power of parliament and prime minister but still keeps the real power for himself. Although many parts of the new constitution are only lib service; one thing might has virtual influence is recognizing Tamazight, Berber's language ("Is Morocco").

The viewpoint of Daadaoui about 2011 situation in Morocco was different. He thinks that both the problems Mohammed VI facing and the candy-and-stick strategies taken by Mohammed were similar to other leaders in the Arab world. As a

result, the factors making things different comes from the regime type. In other words, monarchy is not easy to be challenged due to its mixed bases on rational-temporal authority and symbolic-religious authority. In addition, monarchy also provides Mohammed VI extra traditional, tribal, and religious capital when governing.

## ***Saudi Arabia***

Generally speaking, the domestic situation was principally quiet in Saudi Arabia during Arab Spring except for its eastern province, where the Shiite minority flocked. In fact, Saudi Arabia shared similar domestic problems with other Arab countries, such as young unemployment and unequal economic distribution. In addition, the Saudi regime continuously neglected people's demand for more political rights, such as establishment of an elected consultative assembly, and suffered from scandals of the royal family undermining its impression among its people (Al-Rasheed 21-22). However, Saudi Arabia still could avoid comprehensive demonstration.

Saudi regime's oil wealth used to co-opt its people might explain why the regime escaped the surge of Arab Spring. However, the rising oil revenue since 2003 and the increase of public investment in education, infrastructure, and welfare enlarged the economic desires among Saudi people. The economic concession became more and more difficult to satisfy the increasing desire of its people (Al-Rasheed 21-23). The oil wealth still had its influence this time, but it might lose its power in the future.

In addition to oil wealth, the support of religious groups was the other pillar for Saudi regime. Wahhabism was the most important ally of the Saudi regime. Also, according to Lacroix, the Sahwa, whose ideas is a mixture of Wahhabism in religion and Muslim Brotherhood in politics, was with a huge political mobilizing ability among Saudi people. The good relation with the Sahwa maintained by the Saudi regime might be a reason why there was no massive political violence/mobilization in Saudi Arabia during Arab Spring.

As to why minor protests in the eastern province could not inspire huge reaction among the whole population, the answer might lie in the strategy taken by Saudi regime. The riot in Shiite region came from the systematic discrimination by the Saudi regime toward Shiite population and the inspiration from Bahrain's Shiite riots. However, the Saudi regime prevented Shiite protestors to strike a coalition with the Sunni majority by resorting to sectarianism (Al-Rasheed 23-24; Mathiesen, "Saudi Arabia's Shiite Problem"; Matthiesen, "A 'Saudi Spring'").

## ***Bahrain***

In 2011, Bahrain experienced serious demonstration, and it even invited the external intervention from Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). Despite the inspiration of the situation in other countries during Arab Spring, the regime's systematic discrimination to Shiite majority might be the main reason for demonstration. Mass violence taken by the regime and the intervention of GCC might further radicalize the protests (Zunes).

## ***Oman***

Under the impact of social media and the success of mobilization in Tunisia and Egypt, Oman experienced only minor and relatively peaceful protests during Arab Spring and the Omani protests seldom aimed at Sultan Qaboos. Similar to other Arab countries, the list of grievance among Omani people was so long: in economic aspect, unequal economic distribution, unemployment, low salaries and subsidies, and complaint about roles played by foreign workers, mainly Indians and Pakistanis, in Omani economy. In social aspect, lack of educational opportunities, Islamic finance issues, and alcohol license issues were the focus of protests. In political aspect, the main sources for grievance were corruption and neglecting of people's demand for free press, independent legislative, and judiciary section (Al-Jamali 30; Worrall).

Besides, some of protests in Oman during 2011 involved past hatred from previous domestic conflicts, including the sentiment from the past insurgencies of Islamists in 1994 and 2004 and Dhofar war in 1970s (Worrall).

The reasons behind why Sultan Qaboos regime stayed intact might be generous and immediate concession to the demand from Omani people and limited use of violence (Al-Jamali 30; Worrall).

## ***Algeria***

Under the economic and political grievance similar to other Arab countries, President Abdelaziz Bouteflika's reign did not face as serious challenges as some regimes did during the Arab Spring. To tackle the protests within Algeria, Bouteflika regime took the same strategies as other regimes did, such as economic concession, lifting the state of emergency, and promising political reforms. Also, Bouteflika regime took some violent repression. The carrot-and-stick measure might be the

reasons behind the relative quiet situation. However, there were another explanation: the terrible experience from 1954 independence war and 1991 civil war still haunted in Algerians' minds and hence prevented the comprehensive mobilization among people. As a result, Bouteflika regime was only in face of relatively weak and divided opposition (Zoubir and Aghrout).

Volpi explains why Algeria avoided vital challenge during the Arab Spring by three factors. First, being pseudo-democracy, the Bouteflika regime can not only co-opt and divide the opposition but also receive international recognition. Second, the regime use oil wealth to buy off their people. Last, the regime has both intention and capabilities to repression people.

In sum, some literatures on single case still make some cases comparisons, including literature on Libya (Lacher 141; Ahmida 75); Syria (Haddad, "Syria's Stalemate" 88); Yemen (Fattah 81); Jordan (Seeley 32); Morocco (Maddy-Weitzman, "Is Morocco"); Saudi Arabia (Al-Rasheed 21; Lacroix 25); Oman (Worrall 108); Algeria (Zoubir and Aghrout 66, 69-70). However, they are not comprehensive and systematic enough. As a result, in this study I decide to conduct comparison among cases within the frameworks of theory.

### ***1.2.3. Theories for the Onset of Civil War***

With the help of the concise literature review by Levy and Thompson, I can have a basic understanding about the bulky body of literature on civil war within a limited period. This helpful article included two main parts: the first part briefly reviews the process of debating on civil war; the second part presents the recent development of civil war study.

There are mainly three stages for the debate on civil war theory. Analytical attention paid on civil war started between 1960s and 1980s, but, at that time, most scholars dealt with issues about civil wars within the framework of explaining political violence/mobilization in general. In the next stage, some scholars thought it is greed, for example, making money from diamond during wartime, that initiates civil wars, but other scholars argues it is grievance, such as socioeconomic inequality and ethnic discrimination, that fuels civil wars. Finding that: it is hard to tell greed from the intention to acquire financial source for maintaining resistance against governments, and grievance is too widespread to predict the onset of civil war, in the

third stage, scholars transferred their attention from motivation, including greed and grievance, to opportunity, that is, preconditions making rebels more possible.

Among the theories on civil war, my study selects three theories under discussion, including: Boix, F-L (Fearon and Laitin), and C-H (Collier and Hoeffler) (“Ethnicity”; “Greed”). Though all the three articles took sides between motivation, by Boix, and opportunity, by F-L and C-H, they still put the other side into consideration.

Concerning the reasons why I choose these three theories, there are mainly two reasons. First, all of them have importance to the academia. There were widespread debates and intensive reference following the publishing of F-L and C-H. And the importance of Boix lays on its effort to appeal academic focus from opportunities to motivations behind civil war. Second, each of them represented a typical interpretation of civil war. F-L is prone to emphasize viable opportunity while C-h tends to suggest the importance of profitable opportunity. As to Boix, it tries to capture the elusive motivation.

There are three other representative theories worthy to be noted here, including theories by Stewart, Reno, and Ayoob. However, I will not include them for further discussion.

According to Stewart, horizontal inequality might be the main factor leading to the onset of civil war.<sup>5</sup> Simply speaking, horizontal inequality means the inequality among different groups defined by different group identities, such region, ethnicity, class, or religion, while vertical inequality refers to unfair distribution of individual’s income. The sources of horizontal inequality come from inequality in political, economic, social, and cultural aspects.<sup>6</sup>

The reason why horizontal inequality is the main cause of civil war rests on that civil war is a kind of organized group activity, and those group identities are so powerful in group mobilization. Although the group identity might be a ideal tool to invoke the passion of population within a specific group, it might be insufficient to

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<sup>5</sup> Actually, in Stewart’s study conflicts caused by horizontal inequality include several types of serious violence with political objectives, that is, not only civil war but also separatist conflict and communal conflicts (conflicts without involvement of the incumbent government as a significant party), see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 18.

<sup>6</sup> This is the newer typology of horizontal inequality’s sources, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 13. The old one includes political participation, economic assets, incomes and employment, and social aspects, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities as a Source of Conflict” 110-111.

mobilize people to take part in so risky an activity like rebellion without the common dissatisfaction about the wide difference between their group and other group.<sup>7</sup>

Reno points out an economically motivated causal path to the onset of civil war occurring in so-called “shadow state”. “Shadow state” is “a concept that explains the relationship between corruption and politics” (Reno 45). A typical example for this might be Somalia, which superficially bears de jure sovereignty just like other states but cannot practically govern its people and territory due to its weak formal institution. With weak institution, “shadow state” cannot protect productive population, so that the latter cannot serve as regime’s taxable bases. In contrast, dependency on foreign supports and/or valuable natural resources (and the foreign enclave investment incurred by the natural resources) is the main reason why “shadow state” can be sustained.

Under such a situation, the political leader conducts political control through the networks of personal ties. With foreign supports and/or natural resources as his governing bases, the leader has little incentive to enhance the legitimacy and strength of its institution. Instead, he conserves resources and acquires people’s royalty by providing payouts, including material, that is, bestowing subsidies or privileges and/or discretionary exercise of power, that is, selective exemption from regulations. To assure the viability of such political controls, the leader tends to make population less secure and more materially poor for creating a situation that each individual pursues his personal favor to escape from the miserable life caused deliberately by the leader. The leader eliminates institutions providing public goods which may threaten his own rein and sells private protection to favored societal frictions.

According to Reno, civil war tends to happen in “shadow state” when its leader “fails to control free-riding risks” and then lose “the loyalty of followers who comply in return for payouts” (48). Without the provision of public goods, not only state’s agent but also challengers to the state tend to maximize the use of violence in pursuit of their private economic interest (54-55).

Ayoob tries to explain why it is so frequently for us to observe that domestic conflicts bother the Third World. Unsuccessful process of state making, namely, building a political authority with enough legitimacy, might be the main cause behind those conflicts. The aims of state making are within specific territory: (1)

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<sup>7</sup> In other words, what Stewart means is self-perceived inequalities. However, when practically measuring, Stewart still focused on observed inequalities because of the assumption that perception broadly reflect the observed reality, see Stewart, “Horizontal Inequalities and Conflict” 18.

consolidating political authority; (2) extracting resources; (3) maintaining political order. Most important, the monopoly on violence instruments serves as the precondition for the above three aims, and, drawing experience from the state making in Western Europe and North America, the process of monopoly usually brings large costs, including high death toll, forceful expropriation, etc. It takes a large amount of time and needs some coercive means for completing state making.

For states in the Third World, the environment for state making is even more rigorous. States in the Third World, as the late-comers of the international community, have endured pressure from state system during the period of state making. During the Cold War, superpower intensively intervened the Third World through financial provision, arm transfers, and even military interfering. In the post-Cold War, the influence of the existed international norms enhanced, especially the norms about human rights, ethno-national self-determination, and judicial sovereignty. On the one hand, norms on human rights, protecting individual civil and political right, limited the choices of means for state making, especially coercive power. On the other hand, self-determination inspired ethnic separation within states, particularly those with weak capability and legitimacy. Furthermore, emphasizing on judicial sovereignty made the boundary and existence of a state nearly unchangeable, even for one with serious internal incongruity.

A variety of difficulties waiting on the road to state making usually led to state failure. A collapsing state naturally results in internal conflicts, and in turn continuous conflicts weaken the capability and the legitimacy of this state once again.

The reason why I decide not to include Stewart, Reno, and Ayoob for discussion below is out of operational difficulties. For Reno and Ayoob, their theories are not specific enough. For example, Reno does not provide detailed and measurable concept for his “shadow state” and “the moment when the leader in shadow state lose control”; Ayoob presents causal factors too abstract to be measured, such as the legitimacy of a state and the effect from international norms, which will be the obstacle for me to observe the variant between cases in the two aspects. As to Stewart, though horizontal inequality has a detailed definition for measurement, the data requested is too detailed to be collected, especially for states in MENA with opaque economy (Mancini, Stewart, and Brown). Though the literature on civil war is so comprehensive, in below I will focus on three chosen theories of this study, that is, C-H, F-L, and Boix.

# 1.3. Research Design

## 1.3.1. Research Questions

My main concern in this study is: why there was the difference on the level and form of political movement/violence between Arab states during the Arab Spring? Or, when focus on more intensive political violence/mobilization, whether civil war happened? The study tries to assure whether certain existed civil war theories can explain the difference. The theories under discussion, as I will mention in Part 1.2.3, include Boix, C-H, and F-L. And, I will use the fifteen cases, specifically speaking, 2011 situation in fifteen Arab states,<sup>8</sup> as touchstone for them to judge their ability to explain.

In Chapter 3, I focus on the question: how do the existed theories perform while explaining the difference? And it brings me two further questions: (1) how to effectively and parsimoniously apply the three theories in explaining and (2) what is the key factor presented by the theories in explaining.

In Part 3.4.1, what is the best way to effectively and parsimoniously apply the theories when explaining? With three theories at hand, should I take them all at the same time? Or I should only choose one or two among them? I use the explanatory ability, that is, if most cases fit the theoretical prediction, as a standard to make such a judgment. Specifically speaking, I would ask: within which theory or which combination of theories, the cases really experiencing civil war are expected to be cases with civil war. After assuring the way to apply, I would turn to evaluate each individual causal factors mentioned by the theories.

Among so many factors presented by the theories, which one might be the necessary condition for the outbreak of the civil war, especially under the context of the Arab Spring? To judge whether an independent variable is necessary for the happening of civil war, in Part 3.4.2 I prepare two questions for each independent variables. First, I would ask if most cases experiencing civil war have value prone to civil war in a specific independent variable? If yes, then I can include it into the possible group of necessary condition. Furthermore, I would ask if most cases without

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<sup>8</sup> These Arab states includes Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Syria, UAE, and Yemen.

experiencing civil war present no value prone to civil war in the same independent variable? If yes, then this variable maybe powerful in explaining, because with it or not does effect our prediction of civil war.<sup>9</sup>

In Part 3.5, I will ask if “peace duration” and “anocracy” hypotheses can be held in two cases fitting the theoretical predication: Iraq and Yemen. Specifically, whether there is old hatred and exclusive political institution? After answering above questions, I temporarily identify two variables “peace duration” and “anocracy” as some key factors behind the difference between case with civil war and case without civil war.

In Chapter 4, I focus on the impacts of “peace duration” and “anocracy” on civil war in the two outliers, Algeria and Libya, which cannot be explained by the existed theories, and I ask the following questions. Concerning “peace duration”, whether the experience of conflicts unavoidably leads to new civil war? Do only previous conflicts accommodating to the definition of civil war cause the happening of latter civil war? As to “anocracy”, whether the used indicators a suitable indicator to capture elements about political institution leading to civil war? Does praetorian polity, the theoretical base of “anocracy” hypothesis, predict the happening of civil war? By discussing in this way, I will identify the weakness of existed theories and make some policy advice to lower the possibility of the civil war.

### **1.3.2. Research Methods**

The main task of my study is to assure the causal mechanisms<sup>10</sup> behind the onset of civil war during the Arab Spring. As mentioned in Section 2.3, there are several deniable hypotheses proposed in different theories, and each hypothesis represents a potential causal factor to the happening of civil war. And two of methods mentioned by George and Bennet: congruence method and process tracing are helpful to evaluate predictive power of theories and posit the casual mechanism behind the difference between civil war and no civil war.

Starting from the theories for civil war built by other scholars, the first task of this research is to assess if the situation goes as the theories predicted. Congruence

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<sup>9</sup> For more details about the necessity of the independent variable, see George and Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development* 189-192.

<sup>10</sup> For the definition of “casual mechanism”, see Bennett and George, "Case Studies and Process Tracing" 139-140.

method can ascertain the performance of each case on independent variables and dependent variable; by doing this, we could understand if these cases under discussion are congruent with the prediction of the hypotheses (George and Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development* ch. 9). After that, I move my attention to two deviate cases that is against the prediction of theories.

The second task is to trace the causal mechanism behind the two abnormal cases. The congruence method only tells the observation on the cause end and effect end, but there is still gap between them: how independent variables precisely influence dependent variable? To fill the gap, I plan to take process tracing in my research (George and Bennet, *Case Studies and Theory Development* ch. 10).

### **1.3.3. Research Limitations**

The limitations on my study can be divided into three kinds: (1) limitations relevant to the research question; (2) limitations relevant to the research method; (3) limitations relevant to the data.

First, my focus is the onset of civil war rather than the type, form, or duration of civil war, which are also the hotspots for scholars. Although it is not easy to distinguish the potential causes behind the onset of civil war from the counterparts behind the type, form, or duration of civil war.

Second, my study is based on small number of case in short temporal span, and this characteristic brings some limitations. For example, my study might not serve as a disproof against any of three theories above, because all of them were developed from larger number of cases in longer temporal span, in other words, the three theories are closer to “covering law,” but my study is relatively similar to “contingent generalization”.<sup>11</sup> Also, my study is not qualified to take part in the greater debates on civil war, such as: Which one is the main reason for civil war? Is it greed or grievance? Is it motivation or opportunity? Or this study cannot resolve the controversies as mentioned in Section 2.3, such as: If factors about ethnicity really have no impact on civil war? Both hatred from past experience and cheap weapons available result from shorter “peace duration”, and which one’s effect is more important during civil war? If having “noncontiguous territory” has significant impact

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<sup>11</sup> For detailed discussion on “covering law” and “contingent generalization”, see Bennett and George, “Case Studies and Process Tracing” 138 and 146.

on civil war? What is the meaning of the connection between the huge “population” and the outbreak of civil war? How to interpret the effect of education level on civil war? Is there casual relation between dependency on primary commodities and civil war? In sum, cases discussed in my research only represent the tendency in the MENA during the Arab Spring rather than a general tendency in a long period.

Third, without doing field research, almost all of evident used in this research comes from second-handed material, such as the information collected by other scholars and the news media. It might cause two risks to my study: (1) limited information might be not enough to effectively eliminate the number of potential causal paths, because as we all know process tracing needs a larger amount of data; (2) the topic of my research is about domestic riots; under such a confrontational situation during 2011, information, such as the number of army and the number of casualties, might be seriously distorted.

#### ***1.3.4. Research Frameworks***

The rest of my research will be composed of following four chapters. The logics to organize Chapter 2 to 4 can be visualized in Appendix I. Chapter 2 lists several potential causal factors by the three statistical models about civil war. In Chapter 3, I apply congruence method, the first research method, to assesses each case’s performance on dependent variable and independent variables, and I evaluate the explanatory power of theories and identify key factors resulting in civil war or not. In Chapter 4, I shift my attention to find the reasons behind two theoretical exceptions, Algeria and Libya by sketching the causal mechanisms behind the two exceptions. Finally, I summarize the research results and make some recommendation about theoretical development and policy in Chapter 5.

## **2. The Existed Potential Causal Factors behind the Onset of Civil War**

As mentioned in Part 1.2.3, the three civil war theories under discussion included Boix, C-H, and F-L. In this Chapter 2, I would like to make a brief introduction about three aspects of the three theories, including analysis unit, dependent variable, and independent variables.

### **2.1. Unit of Analysis**

The unit of analysis refers to “the what or whom being studied” (Babbie 347, G12). On the one hand, the analysis unit in both Boix and F-L is country-year, which means they take the per year situation of a case (i.e. a country) as a single observing object. On the other hand, the counterpart in C-H is the situation of a case in every five-year interval starting from 1960 to 1995. In this research, I will adopt the former, because my interest is in the onset of civil war in a single year: 2011.

### **2.2. Dependent Variable**

About the dependent variable: civil war happens or not, there are some differences between definitions for civil war proposed by different theories. Based on definition by Correlates of War (COW), F-L adds some key criteria that are helpful when encountering difficulties in the process of measuring. Boix also follows the definition proposed in F-L. As to the definition held by C-H, it is similar to but simpler than the counterpart in F-L.<sup>12</sup>

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<sup>12</sup> The civil wars definition by C-H is composed of 2 criteria: first, at least 1,000 combat-related deaths per year; second, to distinguish civil wars from massacres, both government forces and an identifiable rebel organization must suffer at least 5% of these fatalities, see Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 565.

I decide to take the definition of civil war built by F-L for two reasons. First, the relatively detailed definition by F-L is more effective to clarify some ambiguous situation during the measurement. Second, the definition in F-L is stricter than the counterpart in C-H, so if a case passes the threshold of the former, it also passes that of the latter.

Here, I only simply introduce the dependent variable, and for the operational definition and measurement of this variable, see Section 3.1.<sup>13</sup>

## 2.3. Independent Variable

As to independent variables, although the independent variables proposed by Boix, C-H, and F-L are comprehensive, but this research only chooses certain ones among them under discussion. There are two standards for filtering independent variables: (1) statistically significant or not; (2) suitable to this research or not.

In the first step, I choose variables basing on the statistical test result of these three articles. If a variable is statistically significant, it means that these variables have observable independent impact on the onset of civil war. Thus these variables deserve further discussion.

In the second step, I excluded three variables, which are statistically significant but are not suitable to be discussed in this study. Firstly, the variable, whether the regime is a democracy, is excluded. Because there is not too much obvious variant among the performance of fifteen cases on this variable, I courageously set this as constant. Also, the variable, whether it is the first or second year of the country's independence, was excluded, because in observatory time point (i.e. 2010) all these fifteen cases were not newly independent. Finally, the variable, the percent of Muslim accounting for the whole population, is excluded, and there are two reasons for this: the first reason is that there is not too much obvious variant among the performance of fifteen cases on this variable. The second reason is that the variable cannot manifest the division within Muslim, i.e. the Sunni-Shiite division, which might be one of key factor behind the political violence/mobilization in some countries during the Arab Spring.

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<sup>13</sup> The operational definition means “the concrete and specific definition of something in terms of the operations by which observations are to be categorized,” see Babbie 47.

After the filtering of variables, I categorize independent variables into two main types: motivation for rebelling and opportunity for rebelling as in Appendix II. In Part 2.3.1 and 2.3.2 I simply introduce each variable; for the operational definition and measurement of every independent variables, see Section 3.2.

### ***2.3.1. Motivation for Rebelling***

Motivation refers to the reason why people implement rebellion, and as Appendix II shows, it includes four types of hypotheses: economic grievance, political grievance, greed, and conflict-incurring hatred.

#### ***Economic Grievance***

The first type is economic grievance. In order to bring back the academic attention, which has focused on opportunity factors in recent years, to the motivation factors behind the onset of civil war, Boix created a more complex variable to operationalize economic grievance based on five assumptions below.

Boix's first assumption is that economic inequality, which is one of most common social phenomena, exists in every country. Formally speaking, economic inequality means that average income in a country is higher than median income in this country, that is, at least 50 % of people have income lower than the average income (200-201).

The second assumption is that it is under linear income tax (everyone with constant tax rate), and all tax revenue will be redistributed to every people in an equal amount (i.e. the total tax revenue are divided by the number of whole population). According to the two assumptions above, the larger the gap between the median income and the average income, the larger the difference between the tax the median individual pays and the distribution he receives (Boix 201).

The third assumption is that, under the one-person-one-vote rule and the median voter theorem, the policy adopted is the one preferred by the median voter (Boix 201-202).

In addition, the fourth assumption excludes the situation that the median individual set "the tax rate equal to one and hence expropriate from individuals with an income equal to or larger than the average income" (Boix 202).

Overall, under the first two assumptions, the median individual should receive more net distribution (distribution received minus tax paid) in more unequal situation. And, according the third assumption, the opinion of the median individual is crucial to the adaptation of a policy. As a result, the more serious economic inequality in a country, the stronger support of median individual to policy demanding to increase tax rate, that is, pressure for redistribution.

Boix's fifth assumption is about the characteristics of asset. The mobility of an asset reveals how easily it "can be moved abroad to obtain a return equal to the domestic return", and the taxability of an asset represent if it "can be easily hidden from the state or it becomes of a kind that can only be used by its owner" (Boix 202). If an asset is with high mobility and/or low taxability, the incentive to confiscate this kind of asset declined. In contrast, asset with lower mobility and higher taxability, such as agricultural product, will cause incentive to be imposed higher tax rate, in other words, pressure for redistribution.

Based on assumptions above, Boix argues that civil war tend to occur in a country simultaneously with two factors leading to high pressure for redistribution: higher economic inequality and highly dependency on agrarian economy. Generally speaking, political elites decide the voting rule after taking the economic condition of the country into account: under democracy there is cost of tax payment highly depending on the demand for redistribution; in contrast, authoritarianism is accompanied with cost of repression, though elites could exclude most of the oppressed people from participating the policy formation. In highly unequal agrarian economy, the pressure of redistribution (i.e. higher tax rate) is so high that the cost of repression might be relatively low; therefore, elites will tend to favor authoritarianism and repression, which help them put exclusive control on policy making and ease the pressure for redistribution. In short, when the pressure for redistribution from people is quite high, then the occurrence of authoritarianism and repression highly associating with the happening of civil war will increase (202-203).

To catch economic inequality and dependency on agrarian economy which are the premises for civil war happening, Boix borrows two variables from Vanhanen: "Index of occupational diversification" (IOD) as a proxy for the level of dependency on agrarian economy and "the percentage of family farms" (FF) as a proxy for the economic inequality (Vanhanen 43-45, 47-51, 55-57). Statistically, the product of IOD and FF negatively associates with the onset of civil wars (Boix 207-209, 212-213).

## ***Political Grievance***

The second type is political grievance, and it originates from “ethnic dominance” which is connected to the happening of civil war. Assuming that political royalty is rooted in ethnicity, the larger the ethnic minority, the higher the incentive to exploit them the majority has. As a result, if the largest ethnic group in a case could not include most of population, the minority may be most vulnerable (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 571-572, 594).

There is controversy on the association between factors about ethnicity and civil war. F-L suggests that factors about ethnicity have no evident impact on the onset of civil war.<sup>14</sup> In contrast, C-H agrees that if a country is under the “ethnic dominance” situation, the country-year tends to have the onset of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 581). However, this study is not able and intent to deal with that controversy.

## ***Greed***

The third type is greed incurred by the prize after controlling state power: the higher the prize, the stronger impetus behind replacing the incumbent regime. A variable “oil exporter” is used to as a proxy of oil wealth serving as the lure for people to rebel. Statistically, if a country-year is considered as “oil exporter”, this country-year tends to be the onset of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>10h</sub> in 81, 85-86).

## ***Conflict-Incurring Hatred***

The forth type is hatred originating from the previous conflict. C-H creates a variable “peace duration” to grasp the hatred based on an assumption that the conflict-incurred hatred will fade away through the passing of time. Simply speaking, “peace duration” means how long the domestic situation maintains stable or peace since the end of the most recent civil war. As a result, the longer the “peace duration,” the thinner the hatred. And the possibility of civil war happening will decline as the hatred weakening (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 589, 595).

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<sup>14</sup> In F-L, when income under control, the effects of ethnic factors on civil wars are substantively and statistically insignificant, though they uses different variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, the proportion of the largest ethnic group, and the log of the number of languages spoken by at least 1% of population, to capture ethnic factors rather than “ethnic domination” by C-H, see Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” 83-84.

C-H also argues that the number of diaspora from domestic conflicts would slow the fading away of the hatred. As a result, the correlation between “peace duration” and civil wars is accounted less by the hatred interpretation but more by the other causal factors: the more recent the happening of civil war, the more cheap military equipment available (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569, 581, 589). However, this study is not able and intent to deal with such a controversy, so I determine to include both of them into discussion.

### ***2.3.2. Opportunity for Rebellling***

Opportunity means several kinds of conditions in a case, which make insurgency or rebellion more viable or profitable. As Appendix II shows, there are also four types of hypotheses leading to civil war: terrain favoring rebels, weak governmental capability, low costs for participating rebellion, and conditions favoring mobilization.

#### ***Terrain Favoring Rebellling***

The first type of opportunity originates from the terrain that favors rebels. There are three ways to measure it: the first way is to use “mountainous area percent” based on the study of a geographer A. J. Gerard (Fearon and Laitin, “Additional Tables” 3-4). Mountainous area is suitable for rebels to survive attacks by usually superior government forces. As a result, the higher “mountainous area percent,” the higher possibility of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>8a</sub> in 80, 85).

“GDP per capita” is another way to measure the terrain that favors rebels. With higher “GDP per capita”, the government is more financed to build more roads making the terrain more “disciplined” and to extend its power penetrating rural region. As a result, higher “GDP per capita” will decrease the possibility of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>9b</sub> in 80).

The other way to measure terrain that favors rebellion is to use “noncontiguous territory”, which means that a case has territory far away and even isolated from the control of the capital. Such a territory is easier to become the cradle or the asylum of rebel groups. One thing deserving to be mentioned is that this variable’s is not statistically significant in F-L (“Ethnicity” H<sub>10e</sub> in 81, note 20), but it is significant associated with civil war according to Boix (213-214).

## ***Weak Governmental Capability***

The second type of opportunity results from weak governmental capability to control or repress opposition. There six variables serving as proxies: (1) “GDP per capita”; (2) “population”; (3) “anocracy”; (4) “political instability”; (5) “oil exporter”; and (6) “population Gini coefficient”.

A case with higher “GDP per capita”, a large amount of financial resources, could maintain higher administrative, policy and military ability. It is intuitively reasonable to associate higher “GDP per capita” with better government’s ability to maintain domestic order, and higher order-keeping ability could prevent civil war from happening (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>9a</sub> in 80, 83).

Larger “population” weakens the controlling ability of the government. The government needs to depend on multiple layers of governance to control the country with huge “population”, and the districts far from the control of the government might be the cradles for rebels. In short, the higher “population” may increase the possibility of civil war (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>10d</sub> in 81, 85). However, the other statistical models in this study take the significant positive association between high “population” and civil wars as being endogenous, that is, it might be the collinearity between “population” and other independent variables, or a country with large “population” is naturally accompanied with higher risk of civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 572, 581; Boix 213-214). However, this study is not able and intent to deal with such a controversy.

Under “anocracy”, which is defined as a regime between pure democracy and pure dictatorship, civil war are more likely to happen. The reason for this is that unlike democracy “anocracy” allows only partial political contestation; however, also unlike dictatorship it is with too limited power to control political contestation successfully (“Ethnicity” H<sub>10c</sub> in 81, 84-85).

However, Vreeland provided some critical reflections over the “anocracy” hypothesis by both Hegre et al. and F-L (“Ethnicity”). There are two main weaknesses of this hypothesis: first, two of five components of the Polity score explicitly refer to civil war; as a result, the “anocracy” hypothesis might become a kind of tautology: because there is civil war, civil war is more likely. Secondly, according to the coding rule of Polity score, under some political violence/mobilization prone situations, such as “interregnum” or “anarchy” and “regime transition”, the regime value will be coded as the value within the middle interval of Polity score referring to “anocracy”.

Here comes a similar tautology. According to criticisms above, Vreeland proves that the “anocracy” hypothesis might be untenable by the same data used in Hegre et al. and F-L (“Ethnicity”).

Something deserving to be mentioned, what Vreeland proved was that the middle interval of Polity score is incompetent to represent “anocracy” rather than that there is totally no correlation between civil war and “anocracy” *per se*.<sup>15</sup> So, in my study, I decide to put under discussion Vreeland’s modified Polity score whose contaminated components had been eliminated.

“Political instability” means that the central government is incapable to control effectively so that there is opportunity for rebellion. Polity score is also used to capture “political instability”. “Political instability” is positively associated with the possibility of civil wars (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>10b</sub> in 81, 85).

“Oil exporter” represents the weakness of a country, which might provide opportunity for rebels (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>10h</sub> in 81), and Chaudhry and Wantchekon provide the theoretical foundation for this hypothesis. Take Saudi Arabia as an example, Chaudhry argues that during the initial stage of state building and national integration the highly central-controlled oil rent undermines the extractive capability of the Saudi government and awarded the Saudi government financial autonomy. The financially autonomous Saudi government creates “new private sector that mirrored the tribal and regional composition of the bureaucracy”. The complex business-government relations reflecting overlapped interest between bureaucracy and private sector obstructed the implement of economic policy and reform during economic crisis during 1983 to 1984.

Wantchekon assumes that the only thing voter in a rentier state care is the distribution of oil rent, so voters prefer the candidate making the best promise. If the law enforcement of the government is weak and results in an opaque and discretionary budget procedure, the incumbent would have more advantage than his challengers in the elections due to their informative advantage over oil rent or through the politicization of the budget. Therefore, the challengers cannot defeat the incumbent through the constitutional means and the one party dominance is assured. If the challengers attempt to grasp power through the illegal means, it might cause the

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<sup>15</sup> In addition to Polity score, Vreeland also proves that there is no correlation between the happening of civil war and other indicators capturing “anocracy”, see Vreeland “The Effect” 414-415. However, we should not simply equal these indicators for “anocracy” to “anocracy” *per se*.

establishment of authoritarian government after the successful repression or political unrests which highly relevant to the happening of civil war.

The population dispersion, captured by “population Gini coefficient”, also provides opportunity to rebel, because: the more dispersed the population, the weaker the governmental control (i.e. the possibility of civil war increases). Analogous to Gini coefficient of income, “population Gini coefficient” become high, if the population is concentrated. There is a negative correlation between Gini coefficient of population and the possibility of civil wars (“Greed” 570, 581).

### ***Low Cost for Rebellling***

The third type of opportunity comes from the situation that costs for taking part in rebellion is quite low, including (1) low income and (2) low educational level. Both F-L and C-H proposed proxies for this hypothesis. About lower income, lower “GDP per capita” represents that the economic alternative to participate rebel groups is much worst than rebelling. Similarly, the latter argued that the costs for taking part in a rebellion are decided by the economic income before being recruited as rebels. Thus, both higher “GDP per capita” and higher “GDP growth rate” mean higher opportunity costs for participating rebellion. Both associations pass statistical tests (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity”  $H_{9c}$  in 80, 83; Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569, 581).

Also, the negative association between the level of education, captured by “male secondary schooling”, and the risk of civil war passed the statistical tests (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569, 581).

In spite of the empirical evidence by C-H (“Greed”), we could not ignore other opinions about the impacts from the education on civil war. Although more education may make people more practical and conservative toward the costs for participating rebellions, higher level of education may also make people more critical to their government and increase the strength of resistance against their government. For instance, Davidson mentioned that, during Arab Spring, well-educated population more tends to oppose the old rules and express their dissatisfaction with the present situation. Even C-H acknowledges that there is still space open to other interpretation of this variable and its association with civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569). In short, there is an ambiguity of the connection between education and civil war; however, this study is not able and intent to deal with such an ambiguity.

## ***Condition Favoring Mobilization***

The fourth type of opportunity originates from certain conditions beneficial to the forming and sustaining of rebel groups. F-L and C-H proposed proxies for the hypotheses, including (1) larger “population” as recruiting sources for rebels, (2) primary commodities and oil financing rebels, (3) lower “social fractionalization” alleviating trust problem among the would-be rebels, and (4) accessible cheap military equipment (“Ethnicity”; “Greed”).

A larger amount of “population” may be the source for recruiting rebels. In their study, there is positive correlation between “population” and the probability of civil war happening (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” 81, 85).

Concerning financial sources for the rebellion, the natural resources may be the main financial source for rebels. C-H used two variables as proxies for the financial sources for rebels: “primary commodities dependency” and “oil exporter”. According to them, the natural resources provide maximum opportunity for rebellion when the ratio primary commodity exports to GDP reaching around one third (33%), in other words, the natural resources are abundant enough for sustaining the function of the rebel group but are still not enough for the incumbent government to acquire absolute advantages in repressing or co-opting rebels. In addition, oil wealth also has positive impact on civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 565-567, 580).

The measurement of “primary commodities dependency” and the negative association between it and economic development are widely accepted. The ratio of primary product exports to GDP is usually used to measure the natural resources endowment of a country in academia. The negative correlation between the ratio of primary product exports to GDP and economic growth (or level of GDP) is quite robust despite redefining the “natural resources” and taking previous economic growth, geography, climate, and different historic context into account. To many scholars, abundant natural resources and primary product export has bad impacts on the competitiveness of manufacture sector, incentive to obtain education, and governance, which obstacles economic development (Sachs and Warner 828-837; Meier and Rauch 140). The “resources curse” is a widely accepted term referring to the linkage between the dependency on natural resources and economic development.

In contrast, the influence of “primary commodities dependency” on the initiation of civil wars is more doubtful. Some scholars had different opinions on the non-monotonic correlation between primary commodity exports and civil wars

proposed by C-H (“Greed”). For Ross, the correlation may be reversed or spurious; in addition, the concept of “natural resources” is so extensive that needs to be analyzed further (“What Do We Know”). Furthermore, Ross tries to clarify the ambiguity appearing on both the causal and resultant ends of the correlation by conducting categorization on both natural resources and civil war, and Ross proposes seven hypotheses (“Oil”).

Similarly, F-L points out the problems of using the over-broad concept: natural resources. They suggest that primary commodities include too much kind of resources to serve as an unsuitable measure of potential financial source for rebellion. For example, oil wealth, one kind of primary commodities, is less possibly used as capital for rebels, because it is “hard to exploit without control of a national distribution system and ports” (“Ethnicity” 87). Despite of the controversies about the association between moderate “primary commodities dependency” and civil war, this study is not able and intent to deal with such controversies.

Lower “social fractionalization” is another condition benefiting the formation of the rebel group. If there were high ethnic or religious diversities, it would cause obstacles on the forming of the rebelling organization, such as trust problem. As a result, rebels tend to recruit new members from a single ethnic or religious group. In other words, a society with too fractionalized composition may be a bad environment for rebellion organizations to establish, so the possibility of civil war is prone to be lower.

Assuming that ethnic and religious divisions are cross-cutting, C-H used the product of “ethno-linguistic fractionalization” and “religious fractionalization” to reflect the maximum potential for diversity.<sup>16</sup> To avoid an extreme situation that one of two fractionalizations is zero, they added the highest one from the two fractionalizations to the product of the two, so that the non-zero fractionalization will not be ignored. This variable is called as “social fractionalization” (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 570). Though F-L suggests that the influence of ethnic factor will be insignificant when income under control,<sup>17</sup> C-H proves that “social


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<sup>16</sup> “Fractionalization” reflects the possibility that two randomly drawn individuals from a given case do not belong to the same ethno-linguistic or religious group. The higher the value of “fractionalization”, the higher the level of group division within a society. See Alesina et al. 158-159; Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 594.

<sup>17</sup> In spite of not testing the same variable as what C-H presented, one of variables they F-L is the ethnic-linguistic fractionalization, which is a crucial component of “social cohesion” (“Ethnicity” 78-79, 83-84).

fractionalization” negatively associates with civil war (“Greed” 581). But this study is not able and intent to deal with such controversies.

The cheap military equipment available is also beneficial to the forming of rebel groups. As time passing, the legacy of weapon stocks, skills, and organizational capital from the previous domestic conflict will gradually diminish, resulting in higher cost of rebellion, in other words, lower possibility of civil wars. C-H uses “peace duration” representing for the passing of time to capture the extent to which cheap equipment is available. There are two interpretations for the negative association between “peace duration” and civil war: the conflict-incurring hatred fading away as time passing and the available cheap weapons due to recent conflicts, but according to their study the latter interpretation is more convincing than the former one due to the existence of the diaspora factors (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569, 589).



## 3. Can Theory Explain the Cases?

I will firstly use congruence method to assure the performance of the fifteen cases on dependent variable in Section 3.1 and independent variables in Section 3.2. In Section 3.3, because the study does not take the large-N method, some variables need to be adjusted before starting to interpret their impacts.

In Section 3.4, I will decide the best way to apply theories when explaining the happening of civil war: to pursue explanatory effectiveness and theoretical parsimony at the same time, should I apply all of three or take the combination of two from them or just use one among them? In addition, I will try to identify the key causal factors behind the difference between cases with civil war and without civil war.

In Section 3.5, I will assure the explanatory power of the key causal factors identified in Section 3.4 by revealing their impact on Iraq and Yemen, the two cases consistent with the theoretical prediction.

### 3.1. Whether Civil War Occurred?

As I mentioned in Section 2.2, F-L presents nine conditions defining civil war. Among them, Condition A, B, and C are primary and the rest conditions are complementary. For the convenience of discussion I re-number them as below:

Condition A: The conflict involved fighting between agents of or claimants to a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies.

Condition B: The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with yearly average of at least 100.

Condition C: At least 100 were killed on both sides, including civilians attacked by rebels. This condition is to rule out the massacre situation that is without organized or effective opposition.

Condition D: The start year is the first year in which 100 were killed or in which a violent event occurred that was followed by a sequence of actions that came to satisfy the primary criteria.

Condition E: If main party to the conflict drops out, we code a new war start if the fighting continues.

Condition F: War ends are coded by observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace.

Condition G: Involvement by foreign troops does not disqualify a case as a civil war for us, provided the other criteria are satisfied.

Condition H: The conflict was coded as multiple wars in a country when distinct rebel groups with distinct objectives are fighting a coherent central state on distinct fronts with little or no explicit coordination.

Condition I: If a state seeks to incorporate and govern territory that is not a recognized state, we consider it a “civil war” only if the fighting continues after the state begins to govern the territory (“Ethnicity” 76).

In this study, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are taken as cases with civil war, because their situations fit the above conditions.

About Libya, there are conflicts between government and organized, non-state groups, such as National Transitional Council (NTC), which fits Condition A. Being consistent with Condition B, the casualties in Libya is between 12,700 to 25,000 deaths in 2011. Fitting Condition C, the death of rebels is between 5,500 and 7,500; the counterpart of governmental agents is between 2,200 and 3,300 in Libya (“Libya (2011 – First Combat Deaths)”).

In Syria, there are non-governmental sides, such as Free Syrian Army (FSA) fighting against the regime, which fits Condition A. In 2011, there are 5,000 deaths in Syria, which passes the threshold set by Condition B. Being consistent with Condition C, there are: about 3,000 rebel deaths and 2,000 governmental force deaths in 2011 (“Syria (2011 – First Combat Deaths)”).

As to Yemen, the Houthi movement is one of several oppositions fighting against the government in Yemen, which is consistent with Condition A. Fitting Condition B, the 2011 casualties in Yemen is about 2,000, which doubtlessly overpasses the 1,000

deaths threshold in Condition B. About Condition C, there is no separated information about the deaths of rebels and government available to me. However, based on the purpose behind Condition C: assuring the effective and organized resistance, it is not unreasonable to count Yemen as case with civil war, because the escape of the incumbent leader implies the fact that the government is not capable of controlling domestic situation. Overall, Libya, Syria, and Yemen are evidently three cases with civil war among the fifteen cases in question (“Yemen (2004 – First Combat Deaths)”).

There two controversial cases: the riots in Iraq after the withdrawal of the US troop in December 2011 and the prolonged unrest in Bahrain since February 2011.

About Iraq case, it was a continuous unrest there since the US invasion in 2003, so I believe that we need to take the complete period from 2003 to 2013 into consideration when deciding whether Iraq was under civil war or not in 2011. First of all, we need to put our focus on Iraq in 2013 when the situation was quite fit the above civil war conditions. In 2013, Shiite-dominated government set after December 2005 represented the “state side” which constitutes one of indispensable components for Condition A, and the Shiite-dominated government fought against the “non-state side”: anti-government Sunni groups plus Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant (ISIL), which is satisfied the other component for Condition A. The 2013 death toll, 7,818, goes across the Condition B’s threshold: 1,000 (“UN Casualty Figures for December, 2013”). About Condition C, there is only information about the separated estimations for civilian deaths and government forces’ death from January to November: 7,157 and 952 respectively (“UN Casualty Figures for November 2013”). Although they are not estimation for the whole year, they already pass through the Condition C’s threshold. After assuring the 2013 situation as civil war, according to Condition D, it is not unreasonable to argue that the spillover effect of the Arab Spring, especially the consequent political disorders in Iraq providing opportunities for mobilizing and Syrian civil war since 2011, and the power vacancy after the US withdrawal in December 2011 as “a sequence of actions” led to the observable civil war in 2013. Finally, despite the presence of the US troops from 2003 to 2011, according to Condition G, it cannot exclude the possibility to count Iraqi situation during this period as civil war. Overall, I tend to count Iraq in 2011 as a case with civil war, though it is not an undoubted categorization.

In Bahrain case, though the riots had not been put down completely from February 2011 to at least April 2014, the situation there dose not fit even Condition A

to C for calling it as “civil war”. Concerning Condition A, based on the International Crisis Group (ICG) report, I cannot observe non-state groups “organized” enough to compete with the government.<sup>18</sup> About Condition B, the protest pursuing democracy and the end of discrimination against the Shiites killed less than 100 during the three-year-period from 2011 to 2014<sup>19</sup>, and it does not pass through the 1,000 deaths threshold. As to Condition C, both of government and opposition does not lose at least 100 deaths. Most of deaths are civilians; in other words, the situation in Bahrain seems more like a unilateral repression mainly conducted by the government’s troops and troops from GCC. As a result, I take the situation of Bahrain in 2011 as without civil war.

Except for the above five cases, situation in the rest ten cases does not fit the above definition of civil war, and hence I count them as cases without civil war.

In sum, there are four cases with civil war, including Libya, Syria, Yemen, and Iraq. On the other hand, the other eleven cases would be considered as cases without civil war.

## 3.2. Potential Causes Behind Civil War

### *FF\*IOD*

Unequal economic distribution and lack of industrial transformation may cause economic grievance, and “FF” and “IOD” proposed by Vanhanen are used to catch them. FF is “the area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of holdings”, and Vanhanen judges family farms or not by three criteria: (1) providing the employment for not more than four people; (2) owned by the cultivator family or held in owner-like possession; (3) below upper hectare limit (47-51).

IOD is the mean of two things: (1) Urban Population (UP): the ratio of urban population to total population; (2) Non Agricultural Population (NAP): the ratio of non-agricultural population. The computation of NAP needs to be elaborated here. I only have access to data about the ratio of agricultural population (AP), so I use the formula: 1-AP to derive NAP (Vanhanen 43-45, 55-57).

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<sup>18</sup> For details about political opposition groups in Bahrain, see ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (III)”.

<sup>19</sup> The demonstration since 2011 has claimed more than 80 civilian’s lives and 13 policemen, see “Bahrain Courts”; “Bomb Blast”.

There is no access to new data about FF, so I continue to use data collected by Vanhanen (appendix 3 in 251-273). The data about AP and UP of each case in 2010 comes from the World Bank.

About the measurement of IOD, there are seven cases have missing value on AP in 2010. I replace the missing value of Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, and UAE by the mean of their performance during 2001 to 2009. As to Libya and Oman, cases even without data about AP during 2001 to 2009, I take AP in 1986 for Libya and AP in 2000 for Oman. Lebanon is completely without data on AP, so I take the performance of Lebanon as missing value.

### ***Ethnic Domination***

“Ethnic domination” may produce political grievance. The definition of “ethnic domination” as below: in a case, the ratio of one single ethno-linguistic group to the total population is within the interval between 45% and 90% (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 594).

The data about each case’s ethnic composition in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from the Central Intelligence Agency.

About the measurement, I divide fifteen cases in two groups: “ethnic domination” and non-“ethnic domination”, and the latter includes two situations: highly fragmented (no single ethnic group’s ratio over 45%) and highly homogenous (a single ethnic group’s ratio over 90%). The “ethnic domination” includes Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Oman, Saudi Arabia, and UAE, and the non-“ethnic domination” includes Algeria, Egypt, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Qatar, Syria, and Yemen.

### ***Oil Exporter***

“Oil exporter” represents not only the prize incurring greed but also the weak governmental capability. If in a case the “fuels exports (% of “merchandise exports”)” accounts for over 33% of its “merchandise exports (current US\$)”, the case will be considers as “oil exporter” (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” 81; Meier and Rauch 139).

Data about “merchandise exports” and “fuels exports” comes from the World Bank.

During process of computing, there are some missing values existed. Iraq, Kuwait, and UAE all have missing values on “fuels exports”. For Kuwait and UAE, I replace missing values in 2010 by the mean of their “fuels exports” from 2001 to

2009. For Iraq, I use the mean of its “fuels exports” during the post-invasion period, from 2004 to 2009, to replace the 2010 missing value.

### ***Peace duration***

Shorter “peace duration” captures both conflict-incurring hatred and condition favoring mobilization. The definition of “peace duration” as below: The length of the peace period (in months) since the end of the previous civil war. If the case date has never experienced a civil war since the end of World War II (September 1945), the “peace duration” is counted since the end of World War II (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 595).

Determining the previous civil war is the precondition for measuring “peace duration”, and the previous civil war needs to be discerned by the definition of “civil war”. For the consistency, I use the definition of “civil war” by F-L. Practically, I need to identify the ending month of the most recent civil war of the case in question, and then calculate the length from the ending month of the previous civil war and December 2010. Fortunately, Sarkees and Wayman (also Correlates of War online) already finished the measurement until December 31, 2007, so all I need to fill the gap between December 2007 and December 2010.

Concerning the performance of each case, seven cases experience civil war before December 2010, and the ending month of most recent civil war as below: Algeria (June 1999), Iraq (August 2007),<sup>20</sup> Jordan (September 1970), Lebanon (January 1990), Oman (December 1975), Syria (February 1982), and Yemen (In

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<sup>20</sup> According to Sarkees and Wayman, the most recent civil war experienced by Iraq ended in January 1996. In fact, during the period between 2006 and 2007, Iraq experienced a situation very close to civil war between the Sunnis and Shiites; after the surge of the US troops, one of conflicting sides: Sadrist movement and its military wing Mahdi army unilaterally declared ceasefire in August 2007 (ICG, “Iraq’s Civil War”). In terms of qualification of civil war, the situation fits Condition A (There were conflicts between governmental side and non-governmental sides) and Condition B (For casualties, see Cordesman and Khazai figure 17); furthermore, according to Condition G, the presence of the US army cannot exclude that we call the situation in Iraq as civil war. In terms of the ending of the 2006-2007 event, because the August 2007 unilateral civil war evidently keep the violence down until the withdrawal of the US army in 2011, which had maintained relative peace for more than two years, according to Condition F, I take August 2007 as the ending of this previous civil war.

progress).<sup>21</sup> In contrast, the other cases under discussion have never experience civil war since September 1945, so the value of this variable is 783 months.<sup>22</sup>

### ***Mountainous Area Percent***

Higher “mountainous area percent” implies terrain favoring rebelling. Simply speaking, it is the percentage of mountainous terrain of each case. I continue to use the data by F-L, because, normally speaking, terrain is constant. The definition and data come from the geographer Gerard and are complemented by F-L (“Replication Data”).

Qatar has missing value on this variable, because F-L does not list Qatar as a case in question.

### ***GDP per capita (current US\$)***

“GDP per capita” is used to capture terrain favoring rebelling, weak governmental capability, and low cost for rebelling. The data about each case’s “GDP per capita” in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from the World Bank.

Concerning the performance of each on this variable, Libya has missing value on “GDP per capita” in 2010, and I use the product of its “GDP per capita” in 2009 and the mean of its “GDP per capita” growth between 2004 and 2009 as a replacement. There is a reason behind why I choose the temporal span starting from 2004 as the period for observation: The international economic sanction imposed on Libya was lifted in 2003, so I assume that Libyan economic situation after 2004 is different from that before 2003.

### ***Noncontiguous territory***

“Noncontiguous territory” represents terrain favoring rebelling. This variable means that a case with “territory holding at least 10,000 people and separated from

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<sup>21</sup> Though there was a truce achieved in February 2010 after the six rounds of war between the government and the Houthi movement since 2004, it did not bring an end to the circle of the violence, see Dorlian 190, note 26.

<sup>22</sup> According to Condition E for “civil war”, I judge the Yemen situation as civil war in progress due to lack of “observation of a victory, wholesale demobilization, truce, or peace agreement followed by at least two years of peace”.

the land area containing the capital city either by land or by 100 km of water” (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” note 20; Fearon and Laitin, “Additional Tables” 4).

And due to the relative constant characteristics of this variable, I continue to use the data collected by F-L (“Replication Data”).

Qatar has missing value on this variable, because F-L does not list Qatar as a case in question.

## ***Population***

Larger “population” is used to capture weak governmental capability and condition favoring mobilization. The data about each case’s “population” in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from the World Bank.

## ***Anocracy***

“Anocracy” implies weak governmental capability. The original definition of “anocracy” means a case is within the interval between -5 and 5 on its value of Polity score (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” 81).

As what Vreeland said, in terms of “anocracy” hypothesis, the Polity score is contaminated by two of five its components: PARREG and PARCOMP, which have explicitly reference to political violence/mobilization. So, I take the X-POLITY refined by Vreeland, which is composed of only three rest components: XRCOMP, XROPEN, and XCONST. When taking X-POLITY, The full range diminishes into interval between -6 and 7, and the new range for “anocracy” is between -2 and 3. The modification of “anocracy” based on Vreeland (“The Effect” 401-425; “The Web Appendix” table W2).

The data of each case about “anocracy” in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers (“Polity IV Country Report 2010”).

## ***Political Instability***

“Political Instability” causes weak governmental capability. “Political instability” means that a case has a three-interval change or more on its value of Polity score within the three-year-period prior to the observation time point (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” 81).

The data of each case about “political instability” in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers (“Polity IV Country Report 2010”).

### ***Population Gini Coefficient***

Lower “population Gini coefficient” is used to capture weak governmental capability. The operationalization of “population Gini coefficient” as below: this variable was built to measure the geographic dispersion of the population basing on the population data per 400 km<sup>2</sup>. Similar to income Gini coefficient, the higher the value of “population Gini coefficient” is, the higher the level of the population concentration is (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” note 8).

This study continue to use data collected by C-H because of two reasons: first, there is no alternative source for newer or better data to update each case’s performance on this variable; second, in terms of characteristics, this variable is relative constant, so I assume there is not too much difference in the performance of each case (“Data”).

Concerning the performance of each on this variable, there are two cases with missing value: Bahrain and Libya.

### ***GDP Growth Rate (annual %)***

Lower “GDP growth rate” implies low cost for rebelling. The data about “GDP growth rate” of each case in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from the World Bank.

### ***Male Secondary Schooling***

Lower “male secondary schooling” lowers cost for rebelling. The definition of “male secondary schooling” is that the total male enrollment in secondary education, regardless of age, divided by the male population of official secondary education age (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 594).

The data about each case’s “male secondary schooling” in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, comes from the World Bank.

Concerning the performance of each on this variable, our aim is to find the performance in 2010, a time point just before the Arab Spring, but there are six cases

with missing value on this variable, including Bahrain, Iraq, Kuwait, Libya, Oman, and UAE. I replace the missing value by the mean of the performance of each case between 2001 and 2009.

### ***Primary Commodities Dependency***

Moderate “primary commodities dependency” provides condition favoring mobilization. C-H considers the ratio of primary commodities exports to GDP being around 33% as moderate “primary commodities dependency” which a case tends to experience civil war (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 595; Meier and Rauch 139).

To compute the ratio of primary commodities exports to GDP, firstly, I get the value of primary commodities exports (current US\$) through summing up the four subcategories of primary commodities exports respectively multiplied by “merchandise exports”. The formula as below: (ME=“merchandise exports”; FE<sub>1</sub>=“food exports (% of “merchandise exports”)”; ARME=“agricultural raw materials exports (% of “merchandise exports”)”; FE<sub>2</sub>=“fuels exports”; OAME= “ores and metals exports (% of “merchandise exports”)”)

$$(FE_1 + ARME + FE_2 + OAME) * ME = \text{primary commodities exports}$$

Then, I divide the value of primary commodities exports by GDP (Meier and Rauch 139).

The data about “food exports”, “agricultural raw materials exports”, “fuels exports”, “ores and metals exports”, “merchandise exports”, and GDP in 2010 comes from the World Bank.

During process of computing, there are some missing value existed. Firstly, there is no data about GDP of Libya in 2010, and I fill it by computing the product of its GDP in 2009 and 100% plus the average “GDP growth rate” within the period between 2004 and 2009, after 2003 lifting of economic sanction on Libya. Secondly, Iraq, Kuwait, and UAE all have missing value on “food exports”, “agricultural raw materials exports”, “fuels exports”, and “ores and metals exports”. I replace these missing values of Kuwait and UAE by the mean of each subcategory during 2001 to 2009, but I replace Iraq’s missing value by computing the mean of each subcategory from 2004 to 2009 due to the huge change after the US invasion to Iraq in 2003.

### ***Social Fractionalization***

Lower “social fractionalization” lessening trust problem is the condition favoring mobilization. The original definition of “social fractionalization” is the product of the “ethno-linguistic fractionalization” and the “religious fractionalization” adding the higher one from the two fractionalizations (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 595). The formula as below:

$$(ELF*RF)+\max (ELF, RF)$$

The limitation of data makes C-H cannot tell fractionalization on ethnicity from fractionalization on language, so they have no choice but to compute the mixed index: ethno-linguistic fractionalization.

Fortunately, there is a dataset available distinguishing ethnic fractionalization from linguistic fractionalization (Alesina et al.). So, the new formula, derived from the original formula, as below:

$$(EF*LF*RF)+\max (EF, LF, RF)$$

As a result, I will take the new dataset and definition in this study.

Concerning the measurement, because the ethnic fractionalization of Yemen is missing value, so we cannot measure the “social fractionalization” of Yemen.

### 3.3. Modification for Interpretation

This study involves various kinds of independent variables, principally including nominal, ordinal, and numerical variables.<sup>23</sup> Some of them are easy to be interpreted, for example, dummy variable, because it only involves an either/or question. The dummy variables here include “ethnic domination”, “oil exporter”, and “anocracy”.

I encounter difficulties when interpreting impact of a numerical variable, because; without using large-N method, it is hard to tell what is the difference made by a slight change in the value of a numerical variable. In other words, this study could not answer question like is there any effect on the probability of civil war outburst done by a 1,000 increasing in the population. To deal with such an

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<sup>23</sup> Dummy variable, only with two possible outcomes: with or without the characteristics we are interested in, is a typical example for nominal variable, and numerical variable includes other two sub-kinds: interval and ratio variable, see Babbie 143-145.

interpretation problem, I decide to discuss the influence of numerical variables roughly.

Instead of sticking to numerical nuance, I change the numerical variables into the ordinal variables through a transforming process. This transforming process including two stages: ranking and categorizing. In ranking stage, I rank the fifteen cases according to their value in a variable from low to high. In the categorizing stage, based on the rank above, I categorizing the fifteen cases into three sub-groups: the first to fifth into “low”, the sixth to tenth into “middle”, and the eleventh to fifteenth into “high”. (i.e. there are five cases falling into each sub-group) After the ranking and categorizing stages, if a variable is without missing value<sup>24</sup>, including “GDP per capita”, “population”, “GDP growth rate”, “male secondary schooling”, and “primary commodities dependency”, their transforming process is completed here.

In the two stages above, there is the problem about missing value. The occurrence of missing value decreases the number of case to be ranked and categorized, and the transforming process needs to make some adaptations. Particularly speaking, if there is one missing value in a variable, only fourteen cases wait for being ranked. Instead of categorizing five cases into each sub-group, I put the top five cases and the bottom five cases into “low” and “high” respectively and put the four cases in the central position into “middle”. Variables with one missing value include “mountainous area percent”, “social fractionalization”, and “FF\*IOD”.

Similarly, if there are two missing value in a variable, only thirteen values need to be ranked. And the categorization will be: the top four cases as “low”, the middle five as “middle”, and the bottom four as “high”. In this study, only “population Gini coefficient” has two missing value.

For convenience to discuss, I create civil-war-prone (CWP) index and apply it to each independent variables. CWP index is a signal for the appearing of certain value in a variable, which leads us to expect that a case will experience civil war in the future. Concerning dummy variable, CWP index means that a case is with the characteristics prone to civil war. For variable positively associating with civil war, I consider that a case gains a CWP index when observing the case belong to the “high” group of a variable. Similarly, for variable with negative correlation with civil war, if I find a case belong to the “low” group of a variable, I think that the case gets a CWP

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<sup>24</sup> If data about the performance of a case on a variable is unavailable, we will set its performance on the variable as “missing value”. In this study, if there is missing value in a cell, I will fill it by calculating the mean of the case’s performance during a relatively long period before the observatory time point. If this means to fill still cannot work, I will remain it as missing value.

index. As to “primary commodities dependency”, with non-linear relation with civil war, a case has a CWP index when the case in the “middle” group.<sup>25</sup>

It is natural to assume that CWP index is accumulative. In other words, a case tends to encounter civil war, when the case has higher number of CWP index. Based on the assumption, my standard for a theory or a combination of theories with better explanatory ability is: within the theory or the combination, most cases with high number of CWP index certainly encounter civil war.

## 3.4. How Cases Performed?

In this part, I would like to assess the explanatory ability of the theories. There are mainly two parts: (1) deciding which way is better to apply theories, that is, I will make a choice by taking certain combination of theories or just choosing one of them into further discussion; (2) judging which independent variable might be the necessary conditions behind the difference on the level of political violence/movement during the Arab Spring.

### 3.4.1. How to Apply Theories?

As mentioned in Section 3.3, my standard to assess the explanatory ability is: (1) how successfully certain one or combination of theories predicts that cases with more CWP indexes will be struck by civil war; (2) parsimoniousness, that is, explaining by less variables.

Firstly, I will evaluate the predictive ability of the combination of those three theories in two situations: including and excluding independent variables with missing value.<sup>26</sup> As Appendix III show, the tendency presented is roughly fit the

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<sup>25</sup> According to the theoretical base, there is non-monotonic correlation between primary commodities dependency and civil war. In other words, when a case's value on the variable is around 33%, the possibility of civil war will be the largest. The cases fell within “middle” group include Yemen with around 25.9%, Iraq with around 33.9%, Algeria with 34.6 %, Saudi Arabia with 42.3 % and Qatar with 46.1%, and they are close to typical case with 33%. As a result, I choose “middle” on primary commodities dependency as CWP index.

<sup>26</sup> By excluding independent variables with missing value, we can make a comparison based on relatively consistent criteria. Specifically speaking, we can avoid the extreme situation that: a case, in fact, might have a lot of CWP indexes, but, due to the unavailability of relevant data, most of its performance on independent variables are set as missing value.

prediction of civil theories, that is, cases with more CWP indexes tend to have civil war. The four cases with the highest index number include Algeria (9), Iraq (9), Yemen (9), and Syria (7), and almost all of them went through civil war in the Arab Spring, with Algeria as the only exception. Similarly, most cases out of the top four did not experience civil war in 2011, and the only exception was Libya (2). Excluding independent variables with missing value from discussion, we can even get a similar result. Cases experiencing civil war have larger number of CWP indexes, for example Iraq has 8, and both Syria and Yemen have 6. Two exceptions are: Algeria has 6 indexes but did not encounter civil war during 2011; Libya has only 2 indexes but went through a harsh civil war. To some extent, the combination of the three theories has predictive power for the difference among the level of political violence/mobilization during the Arab Spring, though with two outliers: Algeria and Libya.

Secondly, I will evaluate if it remain enough ability to explain the differential level of political violence/mobilization by using only two of three theories; similarly, under both situations including and excluding variables with missing value. Under the framework of Boix plus F-L, as Appendix IV show, in terms of CWP index number, the top four are Algeria (6), Yemen (6), Iraq (5), and Egypt (4), and other cases has less than 4 indexes. It causes more outliers, that is, Syria, with only 3 indexes, drops out from the group predicted to have civil war by theories, and Egypt, with 4 indexes, seems to participate in the group with high risk of civil war. The two abnormal cases in Appendix III, Algeria and Libya, still exist. Excluding variables with missing value, it leads to a more problematic result: both Algeria and Iraq has 4 indexes, so it is natural to rank them as the top two. However, it is hard to decide the third and fourth based on the prediction of the two theories, because Egypt, Syria, and Yemen all have 3 indexes. In short, the combination of Boix and F-L does not work better at explaining than the three theories combination.

By the withdrawal of F-L, under the combination of Boix and C-H, the top four among fifteen cases are Yemen (7), Algeria (6), Iraq (6), and Syria (6) in Appendix V. There is no increase or decrease on the number of outlier, which means no evident change in predictive power. Yemen, Syria, and Iraq, with, real happening of civil war, are predicted to have civil war. Still, Algeria and Libya are out of expectation of theories. Given taking away variables with missing value, the top four are Iraq (5), Syria (5), Yemen (5), and Algeria (4). To sum up, the combination of Boix and C-H works not worse than the three theories combination, and it is more parsimonious.

Within the combination of C-H and F-L by pulling out Boix, the group predicted to experience civil war, the top four, includes Algeria (8), Iraq (8), Syria (7), and Yemen (7) in Appendix VI. Most cases with 5 CWP indexes and below did not encounter civil war in 2011, except for Libya (1). In other words, there is also no change of the abnormal cases' number. Excluding the variable with missing value, Iraq (8), Algeria (6), Syria (6), and Yemen (6) still fall into the CWP group. As a result, the combination of C-H and F-L works not worse than the combination of all theories but is more parsimonious.

Basically, the combination of all theories, both the combinations of Boix and C-H and of Boix and F-L have great explanatory power for the difference in the level of political violence/mobilization. However, for the pursuit of parsimoniousness, the last two combinations prevail against the former. Now, the question is: between the other two combinations, which one is better?

Then, we need to evaluate the predictive power of two combinations' components, that is, test Boix, C-H, and F-L respectively. About F-L, as in Appendix VII, the boundary between high CWP group and low CWP group is ambiguous. According to my criterion selecting the top four among fifteen cases, The top three are clearly: Algeria (5), Iraq (4), and Yemen (4), but the fourth is indeterminate, because there are three cases with 3 indexes, that is, Egypt, Syria, and Morocco. The problem still exists after deleting variable with missing value. The top two are cases with 4 indexes: Algeria and Iraq. But there are three cases with 3 indexes competing for the two vacancies left. When we only take F-L into account, the predictive power is not better than the above two combination.

In Appendix VIII, under the framework of Boix, there is no evident trend. The case with most CWP indexes is Yemen (2), and there are four cases with 1 index for the three vacancies left: Algeria, Egypt, Iraq, and UAE. In general, there are five outliers: Libya and Syria, with the onset of civil war in 2011, fall out of the group expected to have civil war; Algeria, Egypt, and UAE, without experiencing civil war during the Arab Spring, are predicted to have civil war. In short, the predictive power of Boix is worse.

Under C-H, as Appendix IX show, Syria (6), Yemen (6), Iraq (5), and Algeria (5) are expected to have civil war, and after withdrawing variable with missing value, the top four includes Yemen (6), Iraq (5), Syria (5), and Algeria (4). Similar to the two theories' combination, in the prediction of only C-H the outlier are Algeria, with more CWP indexes but without truly happening civil war, and Libya, with less indexes but

suffering from civil war during the Arab Spring. In sum, C-H, alone, has good predictive power and is more parsimonious than the two above-mentioned combinations: Boix plus C-H and C-H plus F-L.

After evaluation of the predictive power of each theories or combination of theories, I decide to exclude Boix and to keep C-H and the combination of F-L and C-H for further discussion. Boix has not good explanatory ability for the situation during the Arab Spring, so that we can withdraw it. With the same reason, we can also exclude the combination of Boix and C-H. In contrast, C-H has good predictive power and is parsimonious, that is, C-H might be the best choice to interpreting the differential level of political violence/mobilization during the Arab Spring. However, I still keep the combination of C-H and F-L, though less parsimonious, because it has some variables deserving deeper discussion.

### ***3.4.2. Which Independent Variables Might be Necessary?***

In this stage, I will decide which independent variables are closer to necessary conditions for the happening of civil war during the Arab Spring. To judge those variables necessary or not, I use two criteria as below: (1) if the CWP index frequently appears among cases experiencing civil war in 2011; (2) if the CWP index only appear in cases encountering civil war. Given an independent variable fits these two standards, it might be the necessary condition.

The object for judging includes variables within the combination of C-H and F-L, and I only take variables without missing value into account here.<sup>27</sup> That is, the independent variables under scrutiny are listed as below: “anocracy”, “ethnic domination”, “GDP growth rate”, “GDP per capita”, “middle secondary schooling”, “oil exporter”, “population”, “primary commodities dependency”, “peace duration”, and “political instability”. All of them are within the combination of C-H plus F-L and without missing value.

#### ***The frequency of indexes' appearance in civil war***

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<sup>27</sup> The reason for this, see note 26 of this study.

If an index highly frequently occurred in past civil wars, we are more confident to expect that the civil war will happen once the index appearing. In contrast, if a factor only occurring in a civil war, we might argue that it is only a causal factor behind a specific civil war rather than a cause for the general phenomenon: civil war.

The higher the frequency of an index's appearance in civil wars, the higher necessity of it I assume. In Appendix X, "oil exporter" is the most common factor among civil war cases. "Anocracy", low "male secondary schooling", short "peace duration" appears in three of the four civil war cases, and all of them present in Iraq, Syria, and Yemen. Indexes emerging in only two of the four civil cases include low "GDP per capita", low "GDP growth rate", and middle "primary commodities dependency". Finally, "ethnic domination", large "population", and "political instability" only appear in Iraq. As a result, "oil exporter", "anocracy", low "male secondary schooling", short "peace duration" that have higher frequency might be our concern when explaining the happening of civil war.

### ***The specificity of indexes to civil war***

Given that a factor only appears in cases with civil war, it is more confident for us to argue that the factor is the necessary condition for civil war. In contrast, if a factor occurs both in cases with and without civil war, its importance in predicting is undermined, because we cannot make a prediction based on its occurrence. As a result, indexes' specificity to case with civil war is one of important standard to judge the necessity of a casual factor to the civil war.

To calculate the specificity of an index to civil war, I divided the frequency of the index appearing in four civil war cases by the counterpart in all fifteen cases. The result is in Appendix XI. Among the specificity of each index, the mode is 40%, such as the specificities of "GDP growth rate", "GDP per capita", and "primary commodities dependency", and I use 40% as a threshold.

Three of indexes have specificity lower than 40%, including "oil exporter", "population", and "ethnic domination". Eleven cases are "oil exporter", and only four of them experienced civil war in 2011 (36%). Among five cases with larger "population", only Iraq experienced civil war (20%). There is "ethnic domination" in six cases, and during the Arab Spring only Iraq faced civil war (17%).

Four among indexes have specificity higher than 40%, including "political instability", "anocracy", "male secondary schooling", and "peace duration". Before

2011 Iraq was the only case under “political instability”, and it experienced civil war (With 100% specificity). Five cases are “anocracy”, and three of them, Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, experienced civil war during the Arab Spring. Five cases had low “male secondary schooling”, and in 2011 three among them faced civil war, including Iraq, Syria, and Yemen (Both “anocracy” and low “male secondary schooling” with 60%). Before the Arab Spring, since September 1945, seven cases had experienced civil war, and Iraq, Syria, and Yemen, three of the seven cases, encountered civil war in the Arab Spring (43%).

### ***The possible necessary condition for civil war in the Arab***

#### ***Spring***

The index that might be qualified to be called as necessary condition for civil war has to fit two conditions: higher frequency and higher specificity. Among the four indexes with higher frequency, including “anocracy”, “male secondary schooling”, “peace duration”, and “oil exporter”, and only the former three simultaneously has higher specificity. That is, “anocracy”, “male secondary schooling”, and “peace duration” is highly possible to be the necessary condition for the civil war during the Arab Spring.

Furthermore, despite of the fact that political instability only appears in civil war case, it cannot be observed in civil war cases other than Iraq. So, political instability might be a causal factor only behind Iraqi civil war. As to “oil exporter”, though it frequently emerges in civil war cases, it can also be easily observed in cases in cases without civil war. One explanation for this is that the MENA is a hydrocarbon resources abundant region, so most of countries in the MENA are “oil exporter”. That is, the predictive power of “oil exporter” is undermined in the context of the MENA.

In Chapter 4, I will only focus on “anocracy” and “peace duration”, though “male secondary schooling” also qualified to be a possible necessary condition for the civil wars in 2011. The main reason for this is that I cannot find direct proof for discussing the relationship between “male secondary schooling” and civil war.

## **3.5. Normal Cases**

In order to support the argument that shorter “peace duration” and “anocracy” might be the necessary conditions for civil war during the Arab Spring, in Section 3.5 I decide to test “peace duration” and “anocracy” hypotheses in Iraq and Yemen, two cases fitting the prediction of civil war theories, by asking two questions: For “peace duration” hypothesis, did the civil war during the Arab Spring break out along the fault line among the society caused by previous civil war? For “anocracy” hypothesis, is there phenomenon that some social forces were excluded from the formal politics?<sup>28</sup>

### ***3.5.1. Iraq as a Case***

In Iraq, after the withdrawal of the US troops in December 2011 the situation became risky; according to Cordesman and Khazai, the number of casualties rose from about 4,200, the average between 2010 and 2012, to 9,475 in 2013 (figure 17; ch. 4). In June 2014, ISIL, an jihad organization deriving from al-Qaeda in Iraq and the breaking up with al-Qaeda in February 2014, swept from its stronghold in Anbar Province to a city Mosul in the northwestern Iraq.

The process of forming the hatred between the Sunni and Shiite was slow and protracted due to the circle of reprisal. Since the overthrow of Saddam Hussein in 2003, Iraq has suffered from a certain level of attacks aiming as civilians and conflicts between the Sunnis, including al-Qaeda in Iraq and the other anti-government Sunni groups, and the Shiites, governmental forces and the other Shiite militias (ICG, “The Next Iraqi War?” 1).<sup>29</sup> From 2006 to 2007, the casualties past through 25,000 and even moved close to 30,000. (Cordesman and Khazai, figure 17) The increasingly violent tendency was prevented by the surge of the US troops and the cooperation with some Sunni fighters, through Sunni Aweakening and Sons of Iraq program, to fighting against al-Qaeda, and after that, the situation seems to be under control, at least from 2008 to 2011 (Cordesman and Khazai, 158-159).

From the Iraqi situation, the functioning of old hatred can be explicitly observed. After the pulling out of the US troops in late 2011, the vacuum left by the US provided the opportunity for expression of old hatred and new grievance, which made

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<sup>28</sup> This question is derived from the theoretical basis of “anocracy” hypothesis: praetorian polity presented by Huntington, see Section 4.2.1 of my study.

<sup>29</sup> Actually, there is also Arab-Kurd tension, but it not our focus here. As a result, I exclude it from discussion.

the Iraqi situation radically exacerbate. Also, the Syrian civil war pushed up the level of conflict. The fighting between Assad's Alawite forces, a branch of the Shiite, and the Sunnis and the moderate support of Nouri al-Maliki for Assad, emphasized the sectarian dimension of the conflicts and inspired the shared hatred against the Shiite among Iraqi and Syrian Sunnis. Furthermore, the erosion of border between Syria and Iraq provided the route for communication and smuggling, and the resources given by Turkey and Gulf monarchies for the Sunni opposition to fight against the Assad's forces also benefited the Sunni oppositions in Iraq (ICG, "Make or Break" 12-14). The hatred gradually forming since 2003 and once being oppressed in 2008 revived after 2011.

The exclusion of the Sunni from political institution is because of the harmful political arrangement for Iraqi reconstruction by the US. After the regime change in 2003, Shiites and Kurds dominated Iraqi political institution; in contrast, Sunnis, once occupying most senior political positions, was gradually marginalized from the politics. Actually, sectarianism, especially the Shiite/Sunni division, was less significant before 2003, that is, most of Iraqi population had suffered from the Hussein's rule (ICG, "The Next Iraqi War?" 6-8). However, Coalition Provisional Authority, the administration led by the US from April 2003 to June 2004, made two vital mistakes in the post-Hussein political arrangements: disbanding of old security forces and de-Baathification. Although both of them did not originally aim at Sunnis, the Iraqi army and Baath party were equated to the Sunni in a reductionist way while implementing the policies. As a result, the policy disbanding army made 350,000 people lost their job, who became ideal objects for the recruitment of rebels, and the policy excluding former the members of Baath party, the polar of Hussein's regime, from politics significantly weakened the power of the Sunnis (ICG, "The Next Iraqi War?" 8-12; Yaphé 139-140). The wrong policy for Iraqi reconstruction by the US consequently led to the surge of sectarianism in Iraqi politics and the further unbalance in the distribution of power, which increased the difficulties in forming an inclusive political community.

Under the inappropriate political arrangement, the Sunnis had been excluded from the process of forming the new Iraq, and it alienated them. There are several examples for the exclusion of the Sunnis from the politics. After parliamentary election in January 2005, which was set to establish new Iraqi constitution, the Sunni Arabs was broadly absent from the constitution-making due to the political advantage enjoyed by the Shiites and Kurds during the election and the boycott by the Sunni

Arabs (ICG, “The Next Iraqi War?” 12-13). Furthermore, about 500 Sunni candidates were disqualified to participate in the 2010 parliamentary election (Cordesman and Khazai 159). Also, the Shiite-dominated government led by Maliki failed to keep the promise to integrate the Sunni elements into the institution. For instance, the government neither kept the inclusion of the Sunni fighters under the name of Sunni Awakening and Sons of Iraq program into former Iraqi armies and other government jobs after the leaving of the US, nor completed the implement of 2008 law cancelling the ban on former Baathists to participate politics (Brynen et al. 54-55; Cordesman and Khazai 159-160). Finally, as what Cordesman and Khazai says:

Iraq’s failed attempts at political reconciliation – coupled to the Maliki government’s growing attempts to crack down on its political opponents – have exacerbated public discontent and agitation... Sunnis and former Ba’ath [=Baath] party members banned from participating in government, increasingly view the current regime as illegitimate, and have redirected violence once aimed at American occupiers towards the Maliki-led government (88-90).

The inaccessibility to power pushed the Sunnis to the opposition, which fits what “anocracy” hypothesis said.

In Iraq case, we can observe the effect of past hatred and “anocracy” during the present civil war. The tension between Sunni and Shiite, once significantly heightening between 2006 and 2007, might enhance again after 2011. Also, the marginalization of the Sunnis from power is also an essential factor pushing the Sunnis to take part in opposition against the government.

### ***3.5.2. Yemen as a Case***

In Yemen, under the influence of events happening in Tunisia and Egypt, youngsters took to streets protesting for economic, political, and social grievance, however, the situation exacerbated into clashes among several different groups. According to the available data about the fatalities in Yemen, the conflicts causes 2,000 deaths and 1,106 deaths in 2011 and 2012 respectively (“Yemen (2004 – First Combat Deaths)”) In 2012, President Ali Abdullah Saleh was forced to transfer power to his deputy Abd Rabbuh Mansur Hadi. In October 2013, the violence reached the climax, but there is no data about vitalities available now (ICG, “The Huthis” 3).

Despite of an effort to promote national reconciliation by the UN and the GCC: National Dialogue Conference, from March 18, 2013 to January 24, 2014, the situation in Yemen remained volatile until the time of writing.<sup>30</sup>

We can find the signals for the involvement of old hatred: in addition to AQAP occupying southeastern region, which is less relevant to this study, in the past both the Houthi movement in the north and the Hiraak movement in the south had fought against the Saleh regime. About the northern Yemen, it had been under the rule of an imamate characterized by Hashemites, the descendants from the Prophet's clan, and Zaydism,<sup>31</sup> a branch of Shiite, for about one thousand years until the 1962 revolution overthrowing it and establishing Yemen Arab Republic (YAR) which became the incumbent regime after unification with the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) in 1990. From 2004 to February 2010, the Houthi movement bearing both identities to Hashemites and Zaydism fought six rounds of wars with the Saleh regime in Saada governorate (Dorlian; ICG, "Yemen"). During the Arab Spring, the Houthi movement joined the opposition against the regime but then broke up with other oppositions. In addition, during the conflicts the Houthi movement expanded its territorial control from Saada governorate to Sanaa governorate where the capital located.

About the southern Yemen, it was once a British colony with Aden as a center, and after the 1967 independence it was ruled by PDRY until 1990 unification with YAR under the Republic of Yemen. Due to the feeling of unbalanced North-South distribution in resources and power, a civil war broke out between the North and the South for two months in 1994, and it led to casualties between 5,000 and 7,000 (ICG, "Breaking Point?" 4). From 2006 to 2007, there were popular demonstrations for more balanced distribution in power and resources in the south, and in late 2008 the core demand transferred into call for Southern independence due to inappropriate dealing by the government. The secessionist Hiraak was on the rise before the Arab Spring (ICG, "Breaking Point?" 6-9). During the Arab Spring, the Hiraak had tried to join the national protest but failed to reach a consensus with oppositions from the north; as a result, the Hiraak decided to go their own path to pursue independence (ICG, "Breaking Point?" 10-11). In short, as the above discussion show, there are signals for the fact that old hatred repeated in the new civil war.

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<sup>30</sup> The Houthi movement and AQAP still fought against the governmental forces in the northern region and southeastern regions, see "Yemen President Sacks 2 Army Chiefs".

<sup>31</sup> For more information about Hashemites and Zaydism, see ICG, "Yemen" note 2, 3.

As to the inclusiveness of Yemeni political institution, we can find that both Houthis and Hiraak are excluded from formal politics. The Houthis has been largely out of the formal politics, though there is a party, Hizb al-Haqq, bearing both Hashmites and Zaydism characteristics similar to the Houthis and once led by Hussein al-Houthi, who was an initiator of the Houthi movement and died in 2004. According to Phillips, Hizb al-Haqq “may be broadly sympathetic with some of the aims of the Houthi family, but it considers them a renegade group, not a formal faction of the party” (108). That is, there is still distance for Hizb al-Haqq from represent the Houthis in formal politics. Moreover, the urges by government officers and oppositions, including President Saleh, for the Houthis to form a political party also indirectly reflect the fact that the Houthis is out of formal politics (ICG, “Yemen” 25-26).

The exclusion of the South in Yemen led to the emergence of the Hiraak contradicting against the regime before and during the Arab Spring. Phillips suggests that the Yemeni institution is “a system that excludes southerners from government employment and other benefits” (Phillips 26). Although Yemeni Socialist Party is a party bearing symbolic significance for the South, it cannot fully represent the Hiraak. This party only has limited appeal among the Southerners, and there is rift between members supporting and opposing secession (ICG, “Breaking Point?” 18-19; Phillips 107). Furthermore, according to ICG report, there is a narrative that “Northerners purportedly purged Southern civil servants and military personnel” (“Breaking Point?” 5), and the feeling of inequality is prevalent among the Southerners. In addition to the narrative, in fact:

Centralization of government ministries and private sector offices in Sanaa put Southerners at a natural employment disadvantage... Southerners also suffered more from post-war civil services cuts... Although Southerners occupy prominent government posts, these are largely symbolic in a country dominated by informal access and decision-making (“Breaking Point?” 6).

The proofs above reflect the marginalization, whether in narrative or in practice, of the Southerners from the political institution in Yemen.

Though only the hypothesis cannot tell the whole story, it is not unreasonable to suggest that “peace duration” and “anocracy” hypotheses can explain the happening of Yemeni civil war in 2011. As what “peace duration” said, the Yemeni civil war in 2011 broke out along the old fault lines within the society: The past civil war between

the government and the Houthi movement from 2004 to 2010 ceasefire was repeated during the Arab Spring,<sup>32</sup> as to the Hiraak, though it had remained relatively peaceful, which might not go across the threshold of civil war, but we still can find the resurgence of the Hiraak during the Arab Spring. In addition, the Houthis and the Hiraak, both out of formal political institution, participated in oppositions against the government, which fit what “anocracy” hypothesis says.

## 3.6. Brief Summary

After the discussion of this chapter, I would like to summarize the research results here. First of all, according to Part 3.4.1, the best way to apply theories might be using C-H alone, because this has both explanatory effectiveness and theoretical parsimony. However, due to the comprehensiveness of the variables within F-L, I do not exclude the combination of C-H plus F-L from my discussion.

According to Part 3.4.2, I find that “anocracy”, “peace duration”, and “male secondary schooling” are factors closer to necessary conditions.

In Section 3.5, I further strengthen the argument that the “anocracy” and “peace duration” might be the necessary conditions by discussing Iraq and Yemen case.

It is worth noting that, though the explanatory power of C-H or C-H plus F-L is not bad, there are two evident outliers: Libya and Algeria. As a result, I will explore how “anocracy” and “peace duration” function in the two deviate cases during 2011 and exploit why the two abnormal cases deviate from what the two hypotheses say.

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<sup>32</sup> One thing is noteworthy that unlike the previous civil war, the conflicts also broke out between the Houthis and other oppositions, mainly former ruling elites. For the details about the oppositions fighting against the Houthis, see ICG, “The Huthis” 3.

## 4. Focusing on Two Deviate Cases: Algeria and Libya

According to the result of Chapter 3, two variables: “peace duration” and “anocracy” are close to necessary conditions for the onset of civil war in the context of the Arab Spring. However, the impacts of the two key variables on Algeria and Libya might deviate from the prediction of the theories. Here, I will examine the impacts of “peace duration” and “anocracy” on the two cases by digging into the substance of cases.

This chapter mainly progressed in two steps. The first step, including Section 4.1 and 4.2, is to make some clarification on “peace duration” and “anocracy”. To the former, I raise two questions: if some other factors can distort the impacts of hatred from previous civil war? And does only hatred from past civil war result in new civil war? To the latter, I reveal the price of using simplified indicators in capturing the praetorian polity. Although the doubtful representativeness of indicators for praetorian polity, I would not give up the opportunity to test the predictive power of praetorian polity directly. The second step, including Section 4.3 and 4.4, I discuss the two factors’ effect in the two cases, and discern possible causes behind their deviance from theoretical expectation.

### 4.1. “Peace Duration” Hypothesis

The “peace duration” is defined as “the length of the peace period (in month) since the end of the previous civil war.” And, the shorter the “peace duration”, the more intensive the hatred (Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 589, 595). My study focuses on only one of two forms of potential causal impacts implied by “peace duration”: the hatred originating from previous conflicts.<sup>33</sup>

The results of our two deviate cases: Libya and Algeria deviate from the expectation of the “peace duration” hypothesis. According to the hypothesis, a case

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<sup>33</sup> The other potential path is: the accessibility to cheap weapons prevailing during or after previous conflicts, see Collier and Hoeffler, “Greed” 569.

experiencing conflicts recently tends to encounter another outbreak of civil war later. However, during the observing period: from September 1945 to December 2010 Libya had never faced conflict fitting the criteria for civil war, and Libya surprisingly experienced a civil war in 2011. On the other hand, Algeria had experienced civil war from 1992 to 1999, and, also to theory's surprise, there was no civil war in Algeria during the Arab Spring. So, why the impacts of "peace duration" deviate in the two cases?

Under two situations, the exception may happen. First of all, earlier hatred from old conflicts might, but not inevitably, lead to new conflicts. In Algeria case, there was a bloody civil war between the government and the Islamists; however, the twice amnesties taken by Bouteflika, the Algerian president since 1999, might mollify the antagonism against the government. In other words, the reconciliatory actions aimed at old domestic hatred might counteract the effects from short "peace duration".

Secondly, it is not reasonable to argue that, as the hypothesis said, only earlier civil war leads to new civil war. It is also possible that other forms of conflict results in latter civil war. In Libya case, there was an event in 1996: massacre in Abu Salim prison, and its role in triggering the 2011 civil war is identifiable. However, the Abu Salim massacre does evidently not fit the definition of civil war by F-L used by my study ("Ethnicity"). That is, if we insist on the condition that previous conflicts accommodates to the definition of civil war, we might ignore some events with potential to cause civil-war-incurring hatred.

To sum up, discussing the functioning of the "peace duration" variable in the two outliers might be helpful for us to improve the variable and identify new casual mechanism.

## 4.2. "Anocracy" Hypothesis

To deal with a large number of samples, certain level of simplification is understandable. However, when discussing the substance of certain cases, it might be more appropriate to bring the complexity back.

This section includes four parts: (1) I will briefly introduce the theoretical basis of the anocracy hypothesis by F-L; (2) I will demonstrate how much price F-L pays in exchange the convenience to conduct research by large-N method ("Ethnicity"); (3) I will present what is the price for eliminate what Vreeland called the contaminated

factors from Polity score (“The Effect”); (4) I will develop some concrete criteria about praetorian polity that will be used when discussing our two outliers: Algeria and Libya.

### ***4.2.1. Praetorian Polity as Theoretical Basis***

In F-L (“Ethnicity”), “anocracy” clearly refers to praetorian polity in the words of Huntington.<sup>34</sup> According to F-L, “anocracy” is “a regime that mixes democratic with autocratic features, as this is likely to indicate political contestation among competing forces and, in consequence, state incapacity.” (Fearon and Laitin, “Ethnicity” H<sub>10c</sub> in 81) Similarly, Huntington described the praetorian polity as below:

These countries have held elections but they are clearly not democracies in the sense in which Denmark or New Zealand is a democracy. They have had authoritarian rulers, but they are not effective dictatorships like the communist states (81-82).

However, the middle position between democracy and authoritarianism is only one dimension of praetorian polity and, in fact, it is not the main reason behind political disorder.

The causes behind whether a regime suffers from political disorder, including civil war, lay on its political institution strength rather than on its position in the spectrum of regime typology. According to Huntington, during the process of modernization, “the lag in the development of political institution behind social and economic changes” should be cause behind the violence and instability. When the capability to provide welfare, mainly from economic changes, cannot match the enhancing aspiration among society, the consequence of social changes like more education and urbanization, the social frustration, gap between capability and aspiration, will result in “demand on the government and the expansion of political participation” (33-34, 53-55).<sup>35</sup> The impact of large-scale political participation

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<sup>34</sup> In Huntington’s words, praetorian polity is a regime lack of strong political institution to stand the impacts of large-scale political participation, and it is susceptible to the intervention “not only of the military but of other social forces as well”, see Huntington 194-197.

<sup>35</sup> According the Huntington, higher opportunities for horizontal mobility, emigration from country to city, and vertical mobility about occupation and income might relieve the social frustration. See Huntington 54.

depends on the development of political institution: for a polity with the well-developed political institution, it will be helpful for different social groups<sup>36</sup> to achieve consensus, that is, define the public interest, in the consequence, political participation will legitimize the political institution and expand the loyalty to it from wider society. In contrast, under a polity with an undeveloped political institution, social groups compete with each other for satisfying their private interests for lacking of clearly defined public interest, and the group identity and loyalty to group will be stronger than identity and loyalty to the state during the process of political participation (24-32, 197-198). The former brings political order, and the latter leads to political chaos that is “the hallmark of a society lacking political community and where participation in politics has outrun the institutionalization of politics” (82). In short, the political stability depends negatively on “the level of political participation” and positively on “the level of political institutionalization” (78-79).

About level of political participation, it is less important in this study. Political participation includes several aspects, and what concerns Huntington is how much swath of population taking part in politics. From high to low, Huntington divided the level of political participation into three: (1) modern; (2) transitional; (3) traditional or (1) mass; (2) radical (for instance, only certain classes participate in politics); (3) oligarchical (79-80, 197-198). In the nowadays world, however, a polity with low, and even medium, political participation is rare. At least, the political participation is quite high in the two cases I would like to deal with below: in Algeria society, elections, political parties, and other associations are so common; in Libya, whole the population are encouraged, even forced, to participate in the politics. Although I assume that the high level political participation is given; however, the level of political institutionalization is still mobile.

The other dimension of praetorian polity: political institutionalization is the focus of this study. Operationally, Huntington establishes a set of criteria to determine the level of political institutionalization. Given that a political institution highly institutionalized, we can more obviously observe the four characteristics below: (1) adaptability: the more challenging environment a political institution endured or the longer period it maintained, the more adaptability it is; (2) complexity: represents “both multiplication of organizational subunits, hierarchically and functionally, and

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<sup>36</sup> To Huntington, there are mainly two types of social groups (or social forces): on the one hand, the traditional one includes ethnic, religious, territorial, economic, or status groups; on the other hand, the modern one includes occupational, class, and skill groups. See Huntington 8.

differentiation of separate types of organizational subunits; (3) autonomy: “the extent to which political organizations and procedures exist independently of other social groupings and methods of behavior”; (4) coherence: represents “substantial consensus on the functional boundaries of the group and on the procedures for resolving disputes which come up within those boundaries” (12-24).

Obviously, the Polity score used by F-L is not enough to capture such a complex praetorian polity by Huntington. In the next part I will show how much theoretical complexity sacrificed by F-L for conducting a research in large-N method (“Ethnicity”).

### ***4.2.2. The Price for Using Polity Score***

The aim of this part is to judge if Polity score could accurately capture praetorian polity. I will start from introducing the composition of Polity score, and then I will reveal how many aspects of praetorian polity captured by the Polity score.

First of all, I will show the composition of Polity score. According to “Dataset User’s Manual” by Marshall, Gurr, and Jaggers, the Polity score is composed of six components, and they can be roughly divided into three types: executive recruitment (XRREG, XRCOMP, and XROPEN), independence of executive authority (XCONST), and political competition and opposition (PARREG and PARCOMP). The first component is XRREG that tries to determine “whether there are any established modes at all by which chief executives are selected,” and it has three possible results, including: (1) Unregulated; (2) Designational/Transitional; (3) Regulated. Among the six components, it is the only one that is not directly counted in the value of Polity score; however, it indirectly changes the value of Polity score through influencing the value of other Polity score’s components: XRCOMP and XROPEN. XRREG impacts XRCOMP and XROPEN in the below way: if a case is “Unregulated” or involves a transition to/from “Unregulated” (that is, “Transnational”, one sub-category of the second result “Designational/Transitional”), XRCOMP and XROPEN are coded as 0. XRCOMP is the second component of Polity score and it represents “the extent that prevailing modes of advancement give subordinates equal opportunities to become superordinates.” It has three potential situations: (1) Selection; (2) Dual/Transitional; (3) Election, and it will also influence the performance of a case on XROPEN. Thirdly, XROPEN, which is influenced by

both XRREG and XRCOMP, represents “the extent that all the politically active population has an opportunity, in principle, to attain the position through a regularized process.” The influence of XRREG on XROPEN has mentioned above, and the impact of XRCOMP as below: if XRCOMP is “Selection”, XROPEN might be (1) Closed or (2) Dual Executive-Designation; if XRCOMP is “Dual/Transitional” or “Election”, XROPEN might be either (3) Dual Executive-Election or (4) Open.

The fourth component is XCONST that refers to “the extent of institutionalized constraints on the decision-making powers of chief executives, whether individuals or collectivities.” It includes seven potential situations: (1) Unlimited Authority; (2) Intermediate Category; (3) Slight to Moderate Limitation on Executive Authority; (4) Intermediate Category; (5) Substantial Limitations on Executive Authority; (6) Intermediate Category; (7) Executive Parity or Subordination.

The fifth component is PARREG that represents “the extent that there are binding rules on when, whether, and how political preferences are expressed,” and it includes five possible results: (1) Unregulated; (2) Multiple Identity; (3) Sectarian; (4) Restricted; (5) Regulated. In addition, the value of PARREG will affect the value of the last component of Polity score: PARCOMP, representing “the extent to which alternative preferences for policy and leadership can be pursued in the political arena.” If PARREG is “Unregulated” or transition to/from “Unregulated”, PARCOMP will be coded as 0. Other than the former situation, there are 5 potential results of PARCOMP: (1) Repressed; (2) Suppressed; (3) Factional; (4) Transitional; (5) Competitive.

Then, I will ask: is Polity score enough to capture the praetorian polity? As I mentioned in Part 4.2.1, the concept of praetorian polity is established on the level of political participation and the level of political institutionalization (including adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence), and the latter is the focus in this study. As a result, the question can be specified: does Polity score include components about adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence?

As row two of the table in Appendix XII show, Polity score does capture some dimensions of praetorian polity, such as autonomy, coherence, and political participation; however, there is still something overlooked.

Autonomy, one of four criteria for political institutionalization, is captured by five components of Polity score. The first to is XRREG determining the extent that the established regulations for executive recruitment are independent of other social groups, including the social forces the incumbent belongs to. Additional components

reflect the autonomy of a political institution include: XROPEN, the opportunity for subordinates to access executive positions through legalized path, and XRCOMP, equal opportunity for subordinates to access executive positions (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, “Dataset User’s Manual”). All of them are the components assuring that the processes of decision-making or recruitment do not favor certain social forces.

Coherence, the consensus on the functional boundaries and dispute-resolving procedures within an institution, is captured by XCONST that implies the checks and balances on executives by “accountability group” (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, “Dataset User’s Manual” 24). The component assures that there is division of power in a polity.

In addition, there are two components reflecting some aspects of political participation, however, they are not about what Huntington mainly cares: the level that how many sections of the population involve in politics. The two components include: PARREG, determining the extent that the established regulations for political preference expression are independent of other social groups, and PARCOMP, pursuing alternative policy and leadership (Marshall, Gurr, and Jagers, “Dataset User’s Manual”). What both of them represent for is similar to the fairness and competitiveness during the process of political participation rather than the level of political participation in Huntington’s words. As a result, in my study the two components might be ignorable.

In sum, as Appendix XII reveals, the Polity score only capture autonomy and coherence, but there are still adaptability and complexity left. In the next part, I will discuss the indicator for praetorian polity my study actually takes: X-POLITY, and show the removal of components referring to the happening of civil war for fear that tautology appears.

### ***4.2.3. Impacts from Cleansing Contaminated***

#### ***Components***

Actually, this study takes X-POLITY, rather than Polity score, as an indicator for praetorian polity due to the reason presented by Vreeland: cleansing some contaminated components of Polity score. And it also causes withdrawal of some components form Polity score (“The Effect”).

As row three of the table in Appendix XII shows, what Vreeland removes are two components about political participation. To avoid the causal disruption from component prone to violence, Vreeland creates X-POLITY by subtracting PARREG and PARCOMP, the middle of them explicitly referring to political violence, from Polity score. Certainly, as Vreeland acknowledges, X-POLITY “leaves the Polity index (in this study, Polity score) without any measure of political participation” (“The Effect” 415). However, as mentioned in Part 4.2.2, the omission of the two components has not too much impact: on the one hand, they do not capture how much swath of population take part in politics, the aspects of political participation concerning Huntington; on the other hand, in my research I assume that the level of political participation in present world universally high. Though X-POLITY subtracts extra two components from Polity score, in this study this avoids the tautology mentioned by Vreeland, but this makes no significant differences in capturing the praetorian polity.

However, because X-POLITY is established on Polity score, in terms of indicating praetorian polity, both of them share the same omission of reality. As row two and row three of the table in Appendix XII show, both X-POLITY and Polity score lack of component measuring adaptability and complexity of political institution. We should not ignore the two aspects of political institution when measuring praetorian polity. Taking X-POLITY as an indicator leads to cleanse the contaminated components rather than to further omit theoretical complexity of praetorian polity.

Important of all, the simplification for measuring “anocracy” might erode the result I achieve in Part 3.4.2: “anocracy” might be one of necessary conditions, and it is difficult to evaluate the impact of omitting the two key dimensions of praetorian polity: adaptability and complexity. However, I still believe that the theoretical base of “anocracy”: praetorian polity is defensible.

Omitting adaptability and complexity might lead to distorted predictions. As a result, in the Part 4.2.4, I will set free our discussion from the limit from the using X-POLITY to measure praetorian polity by developing certain concrete questions I will ask when making further discussion.

#### ***4.2.4. Bring Theoretical Complexity Back***

To bring theoretical complexity back, when discussing the substance of the two cases we need to not only re-evaluate the autonomy and coherence of their political institutions but also take the adaptability and complexity into account. To achieve these objectives, I would like to develop a set of questions concrete enough in this part.

About the political institutionalization, I will focus on the level of institutionalization of political institution in general and of political parties in specific. According to Huntington, the main contribution of political institution to the stability is defining the public interest and forming the political community within which different social forces share consensus on identity and interest to some extent (8-11). And, the main contribution of political parties to political order lies on structuring “the expansion of political participation” subsequent to the political modernization (398). Without political parties, communal groups representing only for private interests of certain social forces fill the social space, and the rampancy of cliques and factions will foster the accumulation of antagonism and variety of oppositions, against the government (407).

Operationally, there are a series of concrete questions I would ask when evaluating the political institutionalization of the two cases. On the one hand, for political institution as a whole, I will evaluate it in four above-mentioned aspects: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence:

- (1) Adaptability: How long has a political institution maintained? Has there been peaceful power transfer within the institution? How challenging the environments in which the institution has been embedded?
- (2) Complexity: Whether there has been power division within the institution to provide alternative political authority during crises? Or the whole institution depends on an individual?
- (3) Autonomy: Can the institution exist out of the exclusive influence of certain social forces?
- (4) Coherence: Is the opinion of the accountability actor, such as political party or legislative, taken into consideration during the process of policy-making?

On the other hand, for political party in specific, I will evaluate it by asking three questions derived from the arguments of Huntington (408-412):

- (1) Can a political party survive after the leaving of the historic founder or leader?
- (2) Can a party subject the social forces within it, that is, its constituency? Or it is just the creature of its constituency?
- (3) Is the inter-party shift of individuals or social forces prevalent?

By discussion the above questions in the two cases below, we can clarify whether the political institutionalization in the two cases is strong enough.

In sum, it is all about give-and-take. If we want to observe in a macro vision, we have to overlook some dimensions of reality in exchange for convenience to collect data about larger number of cases and interpretation. In turn, if we only want to have a discussion on the substance of few cases, we afford to pay more attention to details of these cases. And I will do this in the following two sections.

### **4.3. Algeria as a Case**

Algeria, one of the two outliers in this study, has relatively short “peace duration”, roughly from 2000 to 2010 and is an “anocracy”, which according to the prediction of the theory tends to encounter civil war; however, was faced by only demonstrations in 2011. So, it is necessary to discuss the substance of this case here.

In this section, I will start by briefly introducing the old hatred incurred by the civil war from 1992 to 1999 and discuss the impact of reconciliatory policies taken by Bouteflika. Then, I will evaluate the Algerian military-civilian division political institution in general and multi-party system in specific. Finally, I will conclude by how the old hatred and political institution in Algeria effected the situation during the Arab Spring.

#### ***4.3.1. Civil War Experience and Bouteflika’s***

##### ***Reconciliatory Policy***

The Algerian civil war continued from 1992 to 1999 (Sarkees and Wayman). After the introduction of multi-party system by the President Chadli Bendjedid in 1988, Islamic Salvation Front (FIS), the emerging Islamist party, easily defeated National Liberation Front (FLN), the ruling party, in both the 1990 provincial and municipal elections and the 1991 first round of national parliamentary election. Perceiving the threat of losing power into the hand of Islamists, the army pre-empted the potential power transfer: canceling the scheduled second round of election, forcing Bendjedid to quit, and disbanding the parliamentary (Le Sueur ch. 2). Under the tough measures taken by the military, the demonstration on the Algerian streets radicalized into fierce fights between the armed Islamists and the government agents. On the one hand, the army bloodily repressed the oppositions, forcefully disappeared suspected oppositions, arrested FIS leaders, including Ali Belhadj, Abassi Madani, and Abdelkader Hachani, and limited the press freedom; on the other hand, the armed Islamists took various forms of violence, including direct resistances, assassinations and bomb setting, against security forces, political elites, such as General Khaled Nezzar, and civilian population (Le Sueur ch.3).

Does the series of violent conflicts between the Algerian army and the Islamists fit the definition of civil war mentioned in Section 3.1? About the Condition A, there were direct clashes between the security forces representing for the government and the non-state Islamist groups. About the Condition B, there are mainly several estimations of the civilian death toll in the Algerian civil war mentioned by scholars: some take 100,000 deaths (Brynen et al. 31; Mortimer 159) and others take 150,000 deaths (Hagelstein 9; Tlemçani 4, 6), still others take 100,000 to 200,000 deaths and plus 7,000 forcibly disappeared (Zoubir and Aghrout note 28), and all of them surpass the threshold: 1,000. Concerning the Condition C, the death toll on the non-state side is definitely over 1,000. However, no complete record for the casualties on state side is available, but according to Le Sueur, only in 1992 more than 200 security forces were killed (61).

To mollify the division between the Islamists and the army, through two times national referendum the Algerian government took the 1999 Law on Civil Concord and the 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, which provided compensation to the victim families and amnesty to both armed Islamist, mainly to Islamic Army of Salvation (AIS), a armed wing of FIS, and government security

forces.<sup>37</sup> According to the estimation provided by Le Sueur, there were about 5,000 Algerians who was given amnesty and 5,000 prisoners was set free after the passing of the 1999 Law on Civil Concord.

There are inevitably both positive and negative opinions towards these reconciliatory policies. Aiming at 1999 Law on Civil Concord alone, Mortimer provides his own evaluation:

Under the terms of civil concord, a substantial number of combatants, especially those of the AIS, turned in their weapons and returned to civilian life. Although some elements of the insurgency did not accept the amnesty, the level of violence that had plagued Algeria since 1992 began to diminish (162).

About the effects of both reconciliatory policies, Entelis claims, they “achieved their broad objectives of bringing relative peace to the country for which most Algerians were thankful and appreciative” (660). Le Sueur had some criticisms on the reconciliatory policies. By avoiding inquiry into the responsibility for civil war, especially those of state agencies, and reflection on the traumatic memory of civil war deeply and truly, those policies might only achieve temporary peace and left the problem among Algerian society unresolved (195-206). In sum, it is impossible for any policy to avoid criticisms, but these reconciliatory measures certainly, to some extent, released the longstanding tension among Algerian society.

### ***4.3.2. Civil-Military Division in Algeria***

The dynamics of power distribution between the military and civilian establishments has been the focus in the history of political development after the independence of Algeria. And the belonging of the minister of defense, a position that represents the power to intrude the inner affairs of the military, is an indicator reflecting the power relation between the army and the civilian: When the defense minister is held by the army, it means that the army’s power raises due to the fact that it might act without external interference. In contrast, if the position is under the control of civilian, the government reins the military to some extent.

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<sup>37</sup> In 1999 Law on Civil Concord, those who committed massacres, setting off bombs in public were excluded from the scope of seeking amnesty; however, according 2005 Charter for Peace and National Reconciliation, not only the former two crime but also committing rape could prevent one from obtaining amnesty. See Le Sueur 80, 91.

After the France was defeated by the alliance between FLN and the Army of National Liberation (ALN), Ben Bella, one of the leaders, in FLN held the presidency in 1962. Within around two years, Houari Boumediene, the head of ALN, wrested the presidency through a coup d'état. Under the control of Boumediene, FLN became the only legal political party monopolizing the power; in addition, Boumediene kept the defense minister for himself (Mortimer 156-157).

During the presidency of Bendjedid, the army overrode the civilian government. Bendjedid was the successor of Boumediene after 1978. When experiencing the economic and political crises, Bendjedid ceded the post of minister of defense to General Nezzar in 1990 (Le Sueur 44-45). The power relation between the army and the civilian government started to change. After the 1992 military intervention and the outbreak of civil war, the army became the “kingmaker” in Algeria; that is, the president of Algeria needed to be set with the back of the army (Le Sueur ch. 3).

There was a change in the civil-military relation since 2004. In 1999 presidential election, President Bouteflika was also a product of king-making. Nonetheless, Bouteflika was elected as the president again without the support of the army in 2004. Bouteflika built his own legitimacy and power base by enhancing the international reputation of Algeria and promoting reconciliatory policies for civil war, and he started to demilitarize the government through a series of changes in military personnel: the resign of General Mohamed Lamari, Chief of Staff, who is one of significant military heads, the replacement of four Algerian military regions' heads, and the changing of Head of the Land Forces and General Secretary of the Defense Ministry (Volpi, “Algeria’s Pseudo-Democratic” note 43; Mortimer). Finally, he created a new post: “Minister Delegate to Defense” to deal with military affairs, and kept the minister of defense for himself (Mortimer).

It might not be sure yet that Algerian civilian establishment completely controlled the army. In 2010, there were some signals for the fight back from the military: an assassination of Ali Tounsi, the head of national police and being responsible for creating a security force royal to the president, which was with suspected connection with the army, and an investigation to corruption initiated by military-controlled intelligence agency, which led to the resignation of personnel close to the president in Ministry of Energy and Sonatrach, a key national hydrocarbon company (Entelis 2011). After that, the civil-military relation became ambiguous.

## ***Political Institution in Algeria***

Now, I would like to evaluate the political institution of Algeria based on the four criteria presented by Huntington, including adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence, and determine whether it can stand the impact of large-scale political participation.

The adaptability of Algerian political institution is relatively high when keeping eye on the length of the period the institution maintaining, the frequency of peaceful power transfer. From 1962 to 2010, the Algerian political institution had maintained for forty-eight years before the Arab Spring. Experiencing such a long period, the process of power transfer was not so smooth and peaceful: Ben Bella, the first Algerian president after the independence, was overthrown by Boumediene through coup d'état in 1965. Bendjedid, the successor of Boumediene in peaceful way, also lost his position in a coup d'état in 1992. In 1995 Zeoual was elected as the new president, but he resigned in 1999. Although Bouteflika achieved presidential position in the peaceful way, his rein has maintained from 1999 up to now without experiencing new power transfer.<sup>38</sup> Furthermore, the institution had survived a challenging environment where happened a seven years civil war.

About the complexity, Algerian political institution is quite similar to the typical example of stable institution raised by Huntington: shogun-emperor institution in Japan before 1868. The advantage of an institution with dual authorities is that when one of the authorities declined during the crisis, the alternative one might still maintain the order (18). Similarly, Algerian political institution also has two cores, military and civilian establishment, and its functioning can be observed during and after the civil war: During the bloody domestic conflict, the army fought against Islamist militants and kept the situation under control. After the civil war, civilian sector, especially under Bouteflika, reestablished its authority and replaced the military sector, whose reputation was undermined by its cruel repression during the harsh fights, as the main authority.

About the autonomy of Algerian political institution, we also turn our focus on the composition of Algerian political elites and observe whether most elites exclusively come from certain social forces. Here, my discussion mainly bases on the research results by Werenfels focusing on the period between 1995 and 2004, but I

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<sup>38</sup> Actually, at the time of writing, Bouteflika had won his fourth president election in 2014.

still do some update for it. Emphasizing the mobility of Algerian elites and taking “the influence on decision-making on strategic issues of national relevance” as the standard, Werenfels sketches the structure of Algerian elites as concentric circles (22-25). The first circle, “the prime decision-makers or core elite”, was consisted of president and his entourage,<sup>39</sup> and certain key figures in the army. Until 2010, the tendency of de-militarization was obvious, but the influence of army on the Algerian politics could still not be ignored.<sup>40</sup>

In the second circle with “limited decision-making power but strong advisory power”, it was composed of the prime minister and certain ministerial positions held by figures close to or by actors co-opted by president or the army. Movement of Society for Peace (MSP, also known as Hamas), a moderate Islamist party, is within this circle. In addition, Forum des Chefs d'Entreprises composed of private sectors tycoons and their lobbies had significant power in making policy concerning about economic issues. Also, Union générale des travailleurs Algériens, Organisation Nationale des Moudjahidine, and religious brotherhoods (zaouïas) had their impact on policies relevant to their own interests due to their ability to mobilize certain electorates: labors, veterans, and Muslims, as a result, their statue enhanced before elections. Naturally, the civil-military division was reproduced in the second circle (Werenfels 62-68).

The third circle, with “indirect and often only temporary influence on decision making qua advisory, veto, bargaining or nuisance power”, witnessed a rapid increase in the number of its actors. The seats in the parliament, with the principal function to give legitimacy to the decision by the government, were held by opposite parties, such as Movement for National Reform (MRN, also known as al-Islah), the clients of the government, such as FLN and National Democratic Rally (RND) and co-opted

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<sup>39</sup> Most of them held key ministerial positions, including defense minister, commerce minister, and energy and mines minister, or advisory position. For example, Chakib Khelil had served as the president of Sonatrach and latter energy and mines minister, but in 2010 he was replaced by someone, who was believed to be close to the army, in a corruption investigation initiated by intelligence institution controlled by the army. See Entelis; Werenfels 57.

<sup>40</sup> According Werenfels, the key military figures might include: Mohamed Lamari (Chief of Staff), Mohamed Mediène (Head of Intelligence and Security), Smail Lamari (Head of Counter-Intelligence), Larbi Belkheir (the director of presidential cabinet), and the commanders of the six military regions, to name but not exhausted. See Werenfels 56-58, note 51. However, the powerful figures in the army vanished from the key political arena recently: Not only four of six military regions' commanders were changed in 2004, but also Mohamed Lamari resigned in August 2004. In addition, Belkheir was sent out of the power core as an ambassador to Morocco in August 2005, and Smail Lamari died in 2007. Mediène might be one of survived the few strongmen, see Mortimer 167; Volpi, “Algeria’s Pseudo-Democratic Politics” note 43. For the fighting back of the army against the civilian establishment, see Entelis.

opposite parties, such as MSP. In addition, Amazigh activists and human right groups had higher influence on policy-making in certain period: for example, the former during *Le Printemps Noir*, uprisings originating from Kabylie, in April 2001 and the latter during the civil war but before the 9/11 attack, when international community emphasizing war on terror but ignoring human rights (Werenfels 68-77).

In general, though the observable signs for demilitarization, the basic composition of the core elites experienced relative less changes: still, the civil-military division. However, the composition of outer circles gradually became more and more fragment.

Concerning the coherence of Algerian political institution, basically there is no evident constraint on the power of executive. One example for the unlimited power of Algerian executive was the direct denial of Sant'Egidio agreement. In 1995, to bring an end to the civil war, almost all main political parties in Algeria, including FLN, Socialist Forces Front (FFS), FIS, Workers Party, Movement for Democracy in Algeria, MRI, and Contemporary Muslim Algeria Movement, cooperated to achieve Sant'Egidio agreement in Rome, but this agreement was easily rejected by the President Zeroual (Le Sueur 66).

However, the Algerian executive occasionally needs to consider other political parties. MRN, an emerging powerful opposition party then, managed to pass the prohibition on wine importing and to promote electoral law reforms in November 2003 and January 2004 respectively (Werenfels 70-71). In addition, under certain conditions, the executive still needs to take the opinion of other political parties into account. Bouteflika's concession on the reform of the 1984 Algerian Family Code might serve as an example. Since 1999, Bouteflika had listed promotion of women's position as one of his priorities, and in 2003 he even constituted a commission for revising the 1984 Algerian Family Code that incurred dissatisfaction from women's organizations. However, Bouteflika did not completely fulfill his original commitment, because the reform was too risky for two reasons below: firstly, the Sharia, Islamic law, involving reform is such a sensitive issue that might lead to Islamist opposition against the government; secondly, there was a huge opposition against the reforms from political parties, including not only MRN, but also MSP (an Islamist party) and FLN, two components of Bouteflika's coalition government (Catalano). From the paradoxical examples above, other "accountability groups" is not totally without impact on decision-making of the Algerian executive, but it functions only under certain conditions.

Generally speaking, Algerian institution did not bad in main mission Huntington expects an ideal political institution should have: solving the dispute for private interests between social forces and forming a political community. Among the four aspects of political institution, Algeria performs better on adaptability and complexity, but worse on autonomy and coherence. Also, some observers are also optimistic to the transition of Algeria. In 2005, Henry described Algerian domestic politics as below:

Now that political Islam has been partly tamed and its violent elements discredited. Specially, the military leadership has an interest in removing itself from the political arena to protect its corporate identity. The civilian leadership put in place by the military may be able to exploit this opportunity by deepening alliance with emerging forces in civil society (78).

In 2011, Entelis also gave the so-called “Bouteflika era” in Algerian history a relatively positive evaluation that Bouteflika was “strengthening civilian authority and rebuilding state institution” (660-661).

### ***Multi-Party System in Algeria***

In this part, I will focus on certain significant political parties and their development from the introduction of multi-party system to the eve of the Arab Spring, namely, a period between 1988 and 2010.

During this period, there were three legislative elections in 1997, 2002, and 2007 and three presidential elections in 1999, 2004, and 2009.<sup>41</sup> And the data used below come from an online database, *Psephos: Adam Carr's Electoral Archive*.

There are numerous political parties in Algerian history, and I only focus on certain ones, including FLN, MSP, Islamic Renaissance Movement (MRI, also known as Ennahda), MRN, FFS, and Rally for Culture and Democracy (RCD). The main reason behind the selection is: from 1992 to 2010, they had relatively impressive performance in, especially legislative, elections.<sup>42</sup>

Then, I will briefly introduce these parties, principally on their position in politics, the date they were created, and the historic leaders in these parties. Firstly, FLN, as a government party, was built in 1954, before the independence of Algeria from France, and its founders included: Mohamed Boudiaf (1919-1992), Didouche

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<sup>41</sup> Here, I exclude 1992 legislative election, because it was interrupted by coup d'état in January 1992.

<sup>42</sup> Here, I exclude FIS and RND. I exclude FIS, because it has no further activity after being banned by the government. I exclude RND due to lack of key data about it.

Mourad (1922-1955), Mostefa Ben Boulaïd (1917-1956), Larbi Ben M'hidi (1923-1957), Rabah Bitat (1925-2000), Mohammed Khider (1912-1967), Hocine Aït Ahmed (1926-) and Ahmed Ben Bella (1918-2012) (Kapil 31-37). Secondly, there are three Islamist parties: MSP was formed by Mahfoud Nahnah (1942-2003) in 1990. MRI was established by Abdallah Djaballah (1956-) in 1998 (Kapil 44, 45-46). After being excluded from MRI, Djaballah created MRN in 1998 (ICG, "Diminishing Returns" 7). Finally, there are two Amazigh, namely, Berber, parties: FFS was formed by Aït Ahmed, also one of important leaders in FLN, in 1963. RCD was built by Saïd Sadi (1947-) (Kapil 38-40, 62-64).

Now, I am going to observe the Algerian parties in three aspects mentioned in Part 4.2.4: (1) the extent that a party depends on its historic founders or leaders; (2) the extent that a party is independent of social forces; (3) the level that members are loyal to the party.

About the dependency on the historic figures, we can measure it through observing whether there is a discernable difference in a party's electoral performance before and after the leaving of important founders or leaders from the party. In fact, the leaving of historic figures causes no identical impact on different cases.

Some parties experienced a decline in the number of votes they were receiving. MRI is the classic example that a party suffers from the losing of its historic figures. The historic leader and founder of MRI: Djaballah was excluded from MRI and built MRN in 1998. Before that, MRI received 9.9% of the vote in the 1997 election; after that, it only obtained 3.58% or 0.65% of the vote in 2002. On the other hand, the MRN, newly created by Djaballah, obtained 10.08% or 9.5% of the vote in the 2002 election.<sup>43</sup> In short, in the MRI case the leaving of the important figure obviously took the vote away from it.

In contrast, the leaving of the historic figures might not cause negative impacts on the performance of the party. The first case is an Islamist party: MSP. In 2003, the historic founder of MSP, died, and the leadership of MSP was succeeded by Aboudjerra Soltani. And we can observe that MSP received 7% of the vote in the 2002 legislative election but received 9.6% in the 2007 one. The second case is FLN. After the 1965 coup d'état by colonel Boumediene, most key figures were ousted from FLN (Kapil 34-35). Before the 1988 political liberation, FLN, as the only legal party in Algeria, monopolized power, and after introducing the multi-party system FLN

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<sup>43</sup> The figure before "or" comes from Algerian Ministry of Interior; the figure after "or" was derived from Constitutional Council, see ICG, "Diminishing Returns" 15.

suffered crushing defeats in 1990 and 1991 elections. However, in the three legislative elections we focusing, except for the 1997 one, obtaining only 61 of 380 seats, FLN maintained over one third seats in National Popular Assembly, the Algerian parliament, in 2002 and 2007 elections, with 199 of 389 seats and 136 of 389 respectively. In this case, the direct connection between the leaving of key figures and the electoral performance is hard to discern, because the key figures had left FLN for a long period before the launching of multi-party election. However, from the stable performance of FLN in recent elections, it is not unreasonable to claim that without those key figures FLN can still operate well now. In sum, to MSP and FLN, lack of historic figures did not cause troubles to their operation.

In addition, some parties had never experienced a change in the leadership from their establishing to the eve of the Arab Spring. For instance, FFS has been led by Aït Ahmed since the beginning, and Sadi led RCD since the creation of it. Without change of leadership, I cannot evaluate the level that these parties depend on the historic founders or leaders.

As to whether a party can maintain its own identity and operate relatively independently from the social forces within it, we can answer the question by observing the run-up campaign by each political party before 2002 legislative election. FLN might be the only party whose characteristics of campaigns were relatively universalistic. FLN's stronghold lied in the eastern Algeria, from where most of older ruling elites came, and rural and state sector might be the main source of its constituency (Willis, "The Illusion of Significance?" 18, 21). However, then FLN leader Ali Benflis managed to impress people by that FLN no longer represented the interests of a small clan and proposed manifesto taking care of the southern region, farmers, youths, and women (ICG, "Diminishing Returns" 6).

Some parties represent only parochial interests. Before 2002 election, Djaballah, the leader of a newly established Islamist party: MRN criticized the abuses of power and corruption by the government but attributed them to the fact that there is lack of Islamic value in the public life. In addition, he demanded to address the issue about 5,000 victims "forcibly disappeared" by the army during the civil war, and most of them were members or suspected members from Islamist groups (ICG, "Diminishing Returns" 8). Kabylie, an important Amazigh habitat in Algeria, is natural constituency to both FFS and RCD. In *Le Printemps Noir*, the clashes between security forces and Amazigh people broke out. As the result, FFS and RCD had no choice but to boycott the 2002 legislative election in response to the demand of furious Amazigh people

(ICG, “Diminishing Returns” 8-9; Maddy-Weitzman, *The Berber* 184-188). The MRN, FFS, and RCD cases were all examples for a party serving as the expression of specific social force’s interests.

In the Algerian political life, the loyalty to political parties is tenuous. In general, according to Willis, the fluid nature of the party allegiance in Algeria is exemplified by the fact that many elected members in the Algerian legislatures, though not formally allowed, still de facto switch their royalty from the original party to others (Willis, “Ideology and Identification” 15, note 43). In addition, there are two specific examples for the unstable party royalty. Firstly, Djaballah who left MRI in 1998 built MRN and became the presidential candidate representing for MRN in 1999 and 2004 presidential elections.<sup>44</sup> The second example is Bouteflika, who is RND’s presidential candidate in 1999 election, represented for MSP and RND in 2004 election, and participated in 2009 one in name of FLN and RND.

The above discussion shows that the development of Algerian parties might be only partially successful and here I would like to evaluate how Algerian political parties function. Firstly, I will show people’s perception towards parties and participation in political through parties by using three relevant survey records available (“Arab Barometer”; Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine; Lust-Okar).<sup>45</sup> Secondly, I make a comparison on the attractiveness to people between the regime and Islam. On the one hand, people’s royalty to the regime, according to Huntington, is formed through the process of being mobilized to participate in politics by political parties. On the other hand, in the context of the MENA, Islam has been the most powerful competitor for people’s royalty. After that, we can understand if Algerian parties can mobilize people and enhances the identification to the regime.

Most of Algerians have disillusion about political parties to some extent. According to Lust-Okar, 79% of respondents believe that parties serve the interests of its leaders, and lower than 20% think that parties serves interests of people. In addition, people believing that Algerian parties are “very successful” accounts for 5.5%, in contrast to 36.9% think parties “not very successful”, and most people

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<sup>44</sup> Actually, Djaballah had left MRN and formed a new party: Justice and Development Front in the end of 2011, see Seibold.

<sup>45</sup> The “Arab Barometer”, aiming at Algerian citizens over 18 years old, was conducted in fall 2006, and the sample size is 1,300. The survey by Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine was conducted in cities across Algeria in the second half of 2011 and aimed at Algerian youths, from 15 to 30 years old and accounting for 70% of the whole population, and the sample size is 2,028, see 548. Lust-Okar cooperates with Lindsay J. Benstead on a 2006 survey called “National Survey on Algerian Attitudes toward Parliament and Representation”, but there is no further information about the sampling.

(49.6%) think parties “partial successful” (243). According to “Arab Barometer”, when asking their trust in political parties, among more positive group 4.6% think “a great deal of trust” and 13.5% think “quite a lot of trust”; in contrast, among more negative group 21% think “not very much trust” and 51.3% think “not at all”. In short, Algerian perception towards parties is not so good.

When it comes to participate in politics through legalized path: parties, there is more negative responses. As “Arab Barometer” shows, in 2006, 45.2 % has experience about taking part in elections, and 43.3 % has no in 2006. In a 2011 survey, 11.76% participate political parties and 88.24% do not participate (Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine 552).

Identification to Islam is strong and common among Algerians. In the 2011 survey, and the result is: 87% strongly identify themselves as Muslim and 12% somewhat identify themselves as Muslim (Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine 551-552). When comparing with identities relevant to the regime, according to “Arab Barometer”, most people identify themselves as “Muslim” (70.5%), and only 20.4% and 5.6% identify themselves as “Algerian” and as “Arab” respectively. Islam seems to be more attractive than the political party as instrument to enhance the royalty towards the regime, but we are not allowed to simply conclude that the Algerian parties are totally failed.

Despite of the fact that Islam looks like more attractive than political parties among Algerians, there is still optimistic signal for the regime. If we divided Islamic groups into two kinds: Sufism, more moderate Islam, and Salafism, more radical Islam. Algerians have mild support for the regime’s policy: encouraging the former as an alternative to the latter (Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine 556-557). That is, the more threatening Islamic groups to the regime is losing its popularity. However, even to Sufism, only 11.67% of the Algerian youngsters feel affiliated with it because of the high level of education and the inconsistent governmental policy encouraging Sufism in the past (Khemissi, Larémont, and Eddine 552-553, table 3). In short, though the political party might not work well enough, Sufism, its potential competitor, is also not strong enough to constitute a threat to the regime.

### ***4.3.3. Old Hatred Out of Focus and Internal Division***

#### ***within Opposition***

Under the spillover effect of events happening in Tunisia and Egypt, the tide of protest, initiating in needy suburb of Algiers and Oran, stroke Algeria at the early January 2011. The original demand of protestors lied in socio-economic demand (Zoubir and Aghrout 68; Volpi, “Algeria Versus the Arab Spring” 106). On January 20, National Coordination for Change and Democracy (CNCD) was set up, which was composed of variety of political parties, such as RCD, associations, and trade unions. The CNCD demanded for democratization, and its three objects included: removing state of emergency since February 1992, canceling limitations on media and political activities, and setting free detainees due to involve in protests (Zoubir and Aghrout 68). However, CNCD failed to organize large-scale demonstration. In late February, the opposition lost its momentum due to its internal division between CNCD/Political Parties and CNCD/Civil-Society Organizations (Zoubir and Aghrout 69).

In this case, several relevant points can be observed: First, the issues about civil war since 1992 were not the key issue of protests in this time. Second, the inner fractions within opposition led to the failure of general mobilization strong enough to threaten the government.

The issues concerned people during Arab Spring was about dissatisfaction toward poor socio-economic conditions and increase of political freedom, rather than the bloody civil war experience during 1990s. During the Arab Spring, the Algerian media connected protests with the threat of civil war outbreak, and scholars tended to argue that the horrible experience of civil war hold most people back from taking to streets (Brynen et al. 32; Volpi, “Algeria Versus the Arab Spring” 107; Zoubir and Aghrout 69-70). However, from the fact that CNCD refused the former FIS leader Ali Belhadj and his supporters to join them for fear of protests hijacked by Islamists, it is arguable that the old hatred against the government faded away. And, I believe that the reconciliatory policies by Bouteflika in 1999 and 2005 played a significant role in pacifying the hatred. In sum, we can observe that the impact of the past hared on the situation during the Arab Spring was not significant.

The internal division of opposition caused negative impact on the mobilization. In Algerian society, there is, though partially, legal channels for dissent voices, which led to pluralistic political commodity. And, in the emergency it might be difficult to cooperation between different interests. In general, according to the report of BBC, “Algeria's main opposition parties stayed away from Saturday's planned march – organized by the National Co-ordination for Change and Democracy” (“Algeria

Police”). Furthermore, there is a concrete example: After CNCD signaling its intention to organize protests, RCD leader Sadi also mobilized people for their own demonstration (Volpi, “Algeria Versus the Arab Spring” 108). The competition in the leadership of demonstration against the government resulted in failure of constituting effective threat to the Bouteflika regime, and also avoided the escalation of conflicts between the society and the state.

In sum, we can attribute the fact that Algeria experience on civil war during the Arab Spring to mollified past hatred and the relatively institutionalized political institution. In Algeria case, previous civil war experience is no more the focus of contention between social forces and the government. The political institution brings people into public political competition. During the Arab Spring, we can observe that diversified political interests leads to the internal divisions between oppositions, and a strong alliance is thus failed to be formed. Eventually, the regime faced less challenges in 2011.

## **4.4. Libya as a Case**

Libya, as the other outlier in the pseudo-experiment in Chapter 3, has relative long “peace duration” and is not “anocracy”, which are less civil war prone according to theory, but in fact it experience serious civil war during the Arab Spring. As a result, we need to conduct a more detailed investigation into the substance of this case here.

In this section, I firstly introduce the Abu Salim massacre in 1996 and its impacts. Secondly, I access the Libyan institution: “Jamahiriya”<sup>46</sup> and the political vacuum due to the long-standing suppression of parties. Thirdly, I conclude by how the old hatred and political institution led to Libyan civil war in 2011.

### ***4.4.1. Old Scores Against Gaddafi Regime***

Abu Salim prison, where numerous political prisoners were jailed, tortured, and interrogated, was located in Tripoli, Libya, and was notorious for the harsh conditions

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<sup>46</sup> “Jamahiriya” is also called “people’s power” or “state of the masses”, see Obeidi, “Political Elites” 141.

within it, especially beating by the prison guards at will, scarce supply of food and bad medical treatment. On June 28, 1996, a group of prisoners, mainly Islamists, rose against prison guards in demands of better treatment for all the prisoners and medical care for the sick ones. After the riots, the prison authority controlled the situation and seemed to achieve an agreement with the uprising prisoners. However, on June 29, 1996, the authority slaughtered the uprising prisoners and ailing prisoners (Hilsum 106-110).

The tragedy in Abu Salim has never been appropriately managed by the Gaddafi regime. In 2001, only few victim families were met by government officials bringing them death certificates but without return of the bodies and satisfying explanation for the events. In 2004, Gaddafi explained the casualties as the result of an exchange of fire between the prison-breaking detainees and guards, which was obviously deviated from the perception among ordinary people. In 2009, an inquiry started, but the leading jury did not visit the relatives of victims or made a report about Abu Salim, even emphasized that the inquiry was for reconciliation rather than for justice. There were compensation but under the condition that the families receiving the money have to give up the right to investigate the responsibility of the government (Hilsum 112-115).

Is it reasonable to call what happened in Abu Salim as a civil war? We can make an evaluation based on the three primary conditions listed in Section 3.1. Concerning the Condition A for civil war, there was a fight between the prisoners and guards on June 28, which could be described as conflicts between state and non-state group; however, the fight on June 28 was not the cause for most casualties. In contrast, the main cause for the deaths, that is, prisoners participating the uprising assembled to the yard and shot from the roof on June 29, was more similar to a slaughter by one side rather than a fight between two sides. In addition, it was far-fetched to equal the demand for food and medical treatment to “take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies.” About the Condition B of civil war, the prisoners died for the event were about 1,270, over the threshold: 1,000 (Hilsum 110). As to the Condition C for civil war, there were over 100 deaths on the prisoners’ side, and, though no record available. However, it was not unreasonable that the casualties of the guards’ side were far less than 100, because the situation on June 29 was similar to massacre by one of two sides. Certainly, the event happening in 1996 does not fit the conditions of civil war.

Despite the Abu Salim event does not fit the definition of civil war, the hatred originating from the Abu Salim massacre played a role in triggering the Libyan civil war in 2011. Many scholars thought that the arrest of Fathi Terbil, a human right lawyer representing for the victims of massacre in Abu Salim prison, by the Libyan as the starting point for the trend that Libyan people took to the streets. (Brahimi 606; ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 3; Pargeter, *Libya* 213-215; Vandewalle 204)

#### **4.4.2. “Jamahiriya” in Libya**

On September 1, 1969, Muammar Gaddafi led the Free Unionist Officers Movement, consisted of a group of military officers whom was Gaddafi’s colleagues in the military academy of Benghazi, to overthrow the King Idris of Sanussi monarchy and established the revolutionary regime. According to Article 18 of the Constitutional Proclamation on December 11, 1969, the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC), composed of twelve leading role in the Free Unionist Officers Movement, was established as the supreme organization bearing both executive and legislative functions in Libya.

After the Declaration of the Authority of the People on March 2, 1977, new institution was set up and maintained until being toppled down in the Arab Spring without too much changes. The “Jamahiriya” was divided into two sectors: (1) Sector of People’s Power and (2) Revolutionary Sector. The former has three levels: local, municipal, and national level. At local level, according to the Article three in the Declaration of the Authority of the People, whole the Libyan population is allocated to several Basic People’s Congresses (BPCs) based on people’s residential places. BPCs are the main legislatures where all people are encouraged to participate in the debate in BPCs; in addition, each of BPC need to appoint the members of its own Basic People’s Committee that bears executive function and is responsible to the BPC. The municipal level congress was first introduced in 1998. There are several congresses, made up of delegations from the lower level congresses and committees, and they appoint their own committees that are responsible to them.<sup>47</sup> At the national level, there is only one institution called General Popular Congress that made up of

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<sup>47</sup> For the change in the number of congresses and committees at local and municipal levels, see: Obeidi, “Political Elites” 108.

delegations from the lower level and whose main agency is the Secretary of the General Popular Congress; however, it has no legislative powers, as Obeidi suggests, “[Its] role can be seen as coordinator, tabulating and shaping the recommendations and decisions made at the local level, which presented by... the BPCs” (*Political Culture* 144). Similar to the council of ministers in other states, General Popular Committee is appointed by General Popular Congress and comprises several secretaries, just like ministers.<sup>48</sup>

In the Revolutionary Sector, there are two main actors: the Leadership of Revolution, Gaddafi himself, and the Revolutionary Committee (RC). Within the sector, Gaddafi held most of power and projected his influence on Sector of People’s Power through RC composed of people appealed by Gaddafi’s ideology and permeating every BPC and Popular Committee. In addition, RC, as important instrument for controlling society, was well-armed and wide-spread across Libya, and directly responsible to Gaddafi (Mattes 65-68).

In 1990s, the significance of tribes in Libyan society was rediscovered by the regime. As a result, in 1993 the regime established Popular Social Leadership (PSL) composed of “respected natural leaders” from local communities and serving as an instrument to maintain local order (Obeidi, *Political Culture* 118-120).

### ***Political Institution in Libya***

Concerning the Libyan political institution, its adaptability might be not as high as at first glance. Although until the outbreak of the Arab Spring the Jamahiriya system had maintained for over thirty years (from 1977 to 2010), the regime went through no power-transfer. In fact, Gaddafi had reined Libya for forty-two years before 2011. Though one of his sons, Saif al-Islam Gaddafi, was believed to be the most possible successor for him, the power-transfer did not happen before the Arab Spring.

Despite under lots of international pressure, Gaddafi regime had faced less domestic challenges by the Arab Spring. The challenges the Gaddafi regime faced mainly came from two sources: (1) antagonism from the West, especially from the US and (2) domestic dissents. The Western antagonism originated from the explicit or

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<sup>48</sup> The number of the secretaries is not fixed. For the changing tendency of its number, see Obeidi, “Political Elites” 108.

implicit support from Libya to international terrorism<sup>49</sup>, and the animosity was concretized in a series of economic sanctions on Libya, including unilateral sanctions by the US between 1982 and 2004 and the multilateral sanctions by the UN from 1992 to 1998. On the other hand, the main domestic challengers to the regime included tribal rebellions and Islamist groups, including Libyan Islamic Fighting Group (LIFG), formed in about 1990 by former jihad in Afghanistan during the invasion of the Soviet, and Muslim Brotherhood, originating from the offshoot of Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood and resurging in the 1970s (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 85-92, 94-98).

The economic sanction, from 1990s to early 2000s, did not destroy the Gaddafi regime; on the contrary, it accidentally helped the regime to repress the domestic dissents and survive internal challenges. In economic aspects, those sanctions on Libya certainly had negative impacts on Libyan economy, for example, the life of ordinary people; however, it had less influence on the core of Libyan economy, including the operation of oil sector and the building of Great Man-Made River (Niblock ch. 8, ch. 9). In political aspects, the external threats projected Gaddafi “as the defender of the Libyan people against an aggressive and ill-intentioned West,” which may provide the regime enough legitimacy and authority to survive fatal rebellions by two vital tribes, serving as pillars of the regime’s survival: Warfalla and Magarha. In 1993, the regime strengthened its grip on the Libyan society through introducing PSL, restoring the functioning of RC,<sup>50</sup> and establishing new controlling instruments, like purification committee and volcano committee (Niblock 87-90).

In mid 2000s, Libya started to break the international isolation, which brought it more advantage to oppress domestic dissents legitimately. The resolving of Lockerbie dispute between the West and Libya and the giving up of Weapons of Mass Destruction cancelled the long-standing sanction on Libya, and the outbreak of the 911 terrorist attack created the ally between the US and Libya on the ground of “war on terror”. Under such a context, in the name of anti-terrorism Gaddafi had legitimacy to strengthen its security forces and fatally crush Islamist groups, such as LIFG. At the same time, the US and UK also assisted the regime by extraditing and providing intelligence about Libyan opposition abroad (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 99-102). In short, the series of international sanctions and “war on terror” surprisingly help Gaddafi to

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<sup>49</sup> Some of the famous cases in which Libya is believed to involve include the Murder of Fletcher in 1984, Berlin discotheque bombing in 1986, and Lockerbie bombing in 1988.

<sup>50</sup> In 1987, RC was publicly criticized and deprived of its powers by Gaddafi, and suspended between 1989 and 1992, period before the multilateral sanction, see Niblock 89; Vandewalle 140-141.

maintain his rule in the price of slight reforms.<sup>51</sup> In other words, there was only little motive for Gaddafi regime to adjust itself.

About the complexity, Libyan political institution exemplifies the typical weak political institution mentioned by Huntington, that is, system “which depends on one individual” (18). Despite of the formal structure of Libyan political institution which seems to be two sectors as mentioned above, the real power distribution in Libya is just like a concentric circles sketched by Obeidi: Gaddafi remains as the core of these circles. The first circle, whose power come from the personal relation with Gaddafi and who is qualified to discuss with him during the process of decision-making, is dominated by “Men of Tent”, who chiefly came from members of Gaddafi’s own family or tribe. In addition, there are still some members of RCC, who came from colleagues of Gaddafi in Benghazi military school and participated in 1969 revolution, and members of RC. The members of RCC, PSL, and RC consisted the second circle, that is, the intermediary elite groups. The third one included personnel in General Popular Committee, General Popular Congress, and BPCs, who provide legitimacy for Gaddafi’s policy (“Political Elites” 111-113). The dependency on single power core is obvious in Libyan institution.

In addition, multi-functioned RC also exemplified the less complexity of Libyan institution. RC, as the extension of Gaddafi’s power, served as an instrument to mobilize people, defense the regime from internal and external threat, and even make legal judgments (Mattes 65-68). It means that the power in Libya was less diversified.

Concerning autonomy, basically the recruitment of the Libyan elite was closed. Although there is no detailed data about the composition of core elites, the first and second circle around Gaddafi, available; however, Obeidi had conducted a careful investigation into the third circle. About the General Popular Congress, the two leading posts was held by Muhammad Al-Zanati and Ahmad Ibrahim, both of them coming form Gaddafi’s tribe, in most of period between 1977 and 2006. From 1977 to 2006, according to statistics, 69% members came from RC, who were intimate to Gaddafi, 22% and 9% of them were from technocrats and military respectively. (Obeidi, “Political Elites” 117-118, table 4.4) However, the bias in recruitment is less evident in General Popular Committee than in General Popular Congress. The members in General Popular Committee basically distributed according to the popular proportion of each region. And, most of them, 61%, came from technocrats rather

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<sup>51</sup> For the limited political and economic reforms in Libya, see St John 76-81, 100-112; Vandewalle 182-195.

than RC, and Obeidi explained this as out of practical requirement to execute policies. (Obeidi, "Political Elites" 119, 121-122) Despite lack of record about the core of elites, we know that pro-Gaddafi groups enjoyed advantage in Libyan institution from the fact that they even occupied most of key posts in the periphery of power, that is, the third circle.

As to coherence, theoretically BPCs or General Popular Congress, that is, the accountability groups, should be the key of decision-making; however, in practice, Gaddafi's influence on policies is almost incontestable. Niblock argues that:

Qaddafi [=Gaddafi] is seen as holding all the levers of power, manipulating and controlling all aspects of Libyan politics and society. The structure of institutions that exist tends to be discounted, seen as a front to camouflage the realities of power. This characterization holds some truth, but it is also misleading. The dynamics of power and policy cannot be understood solely in terms of Qaddafi's personal whims and wishes (82).

However, the influence casted by BPCs is extremely limited. One of rare occasions for BPCs to influence the policies mentioned by Niblock is the demand for the local facilities, such as electricity, schools, health centers, and roads (69-70). In general, as Mattes said, the functioning of BPCs has been under intensive intervention by the Revolutionary Sector and only less sensitive issues could be discussed freely (59-61).

As the result above show, Libya performs badly in all the four aspects: adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence. However, it is still abstract to realize the underdevelopment of the political institution. As a result, I try to present the underdevelopment of political institution by a concrete example: Cyrenaica, the eastern region in Libya.

In the history of Gaddafi ruling, Cyrenaica has born the tradition of resistance, the contradiction between Cyrenaica and the government comes from: tribalism and Islam. Actually, Libya is a state composed of three regions: Tripolitania in the west, Cyrenaica, and Fezzan in the south, and all of them has their own culture and identity. During Sanussi monarchy, Cyrenaica was the power base of the King Idris and his tribe: Sa'adi. After Gaddafi, whose power base located in Tripolitania, controlled Libya in 1969, it was natural that the contradictions between the government and Cyrenaica surfaced. Rather than trying to absorb Sa'adi into political community, Gaddafi and his tribe, Qadhadhfa, formed a tribe alliance against Sa'adi with other two tribes Warfalla in Tripolitania and Magharha in Fezzan (Brahimi 611).

Islam is the other sources of the suspicion and antagonism between Cyrenaica and Gaddafi. In nineteenth century, Sanussiya, a religious order, built its base in Cyrenaica and coordinate with existing local tribal structures and leaders. As a result, Cyrenaica, as Pargeter describes, “evolved into a kind of self-contained unit, where tribalism and Islam – both still defining features of the region today – were preserved” (*Libya*, 21). In 1980s and 1990s, Islamist groups revived, such as LIFG and Muslim Brotherhood, and many of their members came from Cyrenaica (ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 17-18). In face of such a religious region, Gaddafi regime, keeping intensive anti-Islam position,<sup>52</sup> the tension between the government and Cyrenaica gradually intensified.

The regime has never truly improved its bad relation with Cyrenaica. To tribalism, in 1993 Gaddafi built PSL to co-opt tribal leaders and maintain local order. To Islamists, Gaddafi conducted wide-scale arrest and oppression in Cyrenaica; in March 1997, he set a collective punishment law aiming at anyone who helped Islamists (Pargeter, *Libya* 169). Under such iron-fisted policies, most Islamists start to suspend their activities and flee abroad by the end of 1990s. In general, Cyrenaica had suffered from long-standing neglect and discrimination in political and economic under Gaddafi.<sup>53</sup> The above measures only temporarily oppressed the problem, but the Libyan political institution still could not fulfill the functions as Huntington said: defining public interest among different social forces and forming a political community into which absorbs whole the population.

### ***Suppressed Political Parties in Libya***

Gaddafi regime allowed no political party. Although there are still some illegal political parties of Libya, most of them were in diaspora.<sup>54</sup> As a result, they had no roots among domestic constituency in the Libya, and had little contribution to

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<sup>52</sup> About the attitude of Gaddafi regime towards Islam, see Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 83-85.

<sup>53</sup> According to Pargeter, Gaddafi deliberately kept the eastern region undeveloped and isolated, see *Libya*, 170-171. However, ICG report points out that “the government expenditure per capita has been higher in Benghazi than in any other metropolitan area in Libya”, in other words, the “marginalization” might mainly come from the perception of people in Cyrenaica, see “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 18, note 104. No matter which one is true, the poor relation of Cyrenaica with the regime, which resulted in strong resentment and rebellion in 2011, was not doubtful.

<sup>54</sup> For instance, National Front for the Salvation of Libya in the US and UK, Libyan Constitutional Union in the UK, The Libyan League for Human Rights in the UK and Germany, Libyan Liberation Organization in Egypt, and Libyan National Movement in Europe. See Deeb 372-379; ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 19.

organizing political participation. However, there is still institution bearing similar function to parties: organizing the political participation, that is, BPCs.

Both Obeidi and Al-Werfalli had evaluated operation of BPCs by conducting survey.<sup>55</sup> The operation of BPCs continued to suffer from the high absence rate. According to Al-Werfalli, the rates of attendance were between 60% and 70% from 1978 to 1989; however it plummeted down to about 20% in 1992 and then to 10% in 1997. (Al-Werfalli 53, figure 3.2) According to Obeidi's survey in 1994, when asked the frequency to attend the BPCs, only 6% of respondents attended regularly, and 43% and 51% answered "from time to time" and "never" respectively. (Obeidi 156, question 34 in appendix A) The most recent record about the attendance available was collected by Al-Werfalli in 2001: only 13.2% regularly attended, 41.1% occasionally attended, and 45.2% never attended. (Al-Werfalli 55, question 9 in appendix) Interestingly, according to Al-Werfalli's investigation in the reasons behind the attendance, the respondents who participated BPCs to avoid clashing with the regime was up to 40.4% of the sample, and 27.9% of the sample acknowledged that they were "forced to" attend. 21.7% of the sample took part in the meeting for influencing public or local policies, and only 9.9% considered it as a civic duty. (Al-Werfalli 56, 74, question 12 in appendix)

In addition, the surveys by both Obeidi and Al-Werfalli shows that few Libyan believed that the institution was the effective channels for conveying their opinions and that their trust in the institution was not high. In Obeidi's survey, only 32% respondents believed that their opinion could "influence" the decision-making process in BPCs, and 23% of them thought that they could "change" the policies (Obeidi 160-161, question 35a and 35b in appendix A). Up to 63.3% in Al-Werfalli's survey did not consider BPCs as a qualified expression for their opinions (Al-Werfalli 109, question 16 in appendix). As to trust in BPCs, only 51 % of the sample discussed politics with members of BPCs, in comparison to 80% or higher with their family or relatives or classmates respectively. The survey by Al-Werfalli reveals that: 36% with no trust or low trust in BPCs, in contrast, 35% with high trust in BPCs (Al-Werfalli figure 4.3; question 34 in appendix; Obeidi 162, question 38 in appendix A).

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<sup>55</sup> Obeidi took the survey for the university students in Garyounis University in Benghazi during the spring and summer in 1994, and the size of sample is 500, see *Political Culture* 5. Al-Werfalli conducted survey for the citizens living in Al-Qrouba in Benghazi in the winter in 2001, and the sample size is 887, see 6-7.

Given such dissatisfaction to BPCs among Libyans, under the theoretical implication from Huntington, I will try to find whether there is alternative platform for the political participation of Libyans, and my candidates are: tribes and Islam.

The role played in politics by Libyan tribes is not static because of the inconsistent attitude towards them by Gaddafi regime. During the Sanussi monarchy, tribes even served as the source of political legitimacy. The social role of tribe was still acknowledged by Gaddafi regime, but tribe was deliberately excluded from the political life between 1969 and 1980s (Obeidi 116-117). Even during this period, the identification to tribes was still strong among Libyans. According to the 1973 survey by El Fathaly and Palmer,<sup>56</sup> over 70% of respondents felt “very attached” or “attached” to their tribes and over 65% felt “very proud” or “proud” to belong to their tribes. In addition, 59% refused to drop all tribal identification and 80.6% refused to change to another tribe (El Fathaly and Palmer table 2-7). In 1993, the regime realized how significant and threatening the unrevealed power of tribes and started to pull tribes from the social space to the public political space through building PSL. After tribes’ political role accepted by the regime, the identification to tribes was strong. According to 1994 survey by Obeidi, 96% considered them as belonging to tribes and 90% felt themselves “very attached” or “attached” to tribes (Obeidi 120-122, 125-126, question 19a, 19b, 20, 21 in appendix A). In sum, the identification to tribes survived the suppression by Gaddafi regime during the earlier years, and the regime had no choice but to accept its significant role in 1990s.

However, there might be signals that the identity to tribes was weakened six years after the establishment of PSL in 1993. Based on Al-Werfalli’s records in 2001, only about 18% respondents highly trusted in the tribal chiefs who now might be co-opted by the regime, in comparison to 35.5% highly trusting in the BPCs (Al-Werfalli 61, 87, question 34 in appendix). It is noteworthy that the data about tribe collected by Al-Werfalli is relatively less comprehensive, by using only one question to measure, and more ambiguous, without distinguishing between the official-appointed tribal chiefs and the tribes in the whole. As a result, it is still doubtful that whether it is enough to prove the general distrust to tribes among Libyans based on Al-Werfalli’s data. In sum, the role of tribes might be eroded by the

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<sup>56</sup> Their survey was conducted in Zawiyah of western Libya during 1973. Despite there is a flaw in their data about Libyan tribes, that is, higher non-respondent rate, about 40 %, it still provides rare and useful information, see El Fathaly and Palmer 29, 33.

regime, and no direct proof is enough to argue that no political activity of tribes continues out of the surveillance of the government in Libya.

Islamist groups were other potential alternatives to BPCs, as platforms for political participation; however, both Muslim Brotherhood and LIFG could not evolve into qualified challenger against the regime. For Muslim Brotherhood in Libya, not only had they no intention to resort to charities like their counterpart in other Arab states, but also they could not conduct charitable activities because of the fact that the regime had kept close watch on the domestic social space. Also, Muslim Brotherhood had suffered from internal division. In 1998, the regime launched a harsh offense to extinct Muslim Brotherhood, and they could not recover from the deadly blow (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 90-92). In March 2006, after months of negotiation, some jailed members in Muslim Brotherhood were set free at the price of never taking part in political activities other than those within “Jamahiriya” system.<sup>57</sup> The deal between Muslim Brotherhood and the regime made the former excluded by other oppositionist groups from participating in an oppositional conference in London (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 100; ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 19; St John 77-78). According to an estimate in 2009, 200 of its members were in exile, and a few thousands remained in Libya (Ashour, “Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood” 120).

Similarly, LIFG faced an environment under the strict surveillance. In addition, LIFG did not have strong support base: on the one hand, most of its leaders lived abroad so that they had less domestic appeal; on the other hand, LIFG principally headquartered in eastern region in Libya, which resulted in lack of national appeal. As a result, LIFG clasped in 1998 and its members were jailed or fled abroad. Under “reform and repent” program, LIFG had a discussion with the regime on a deal by giving up resistance in exchange for releasing jailed members (Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 98, 100). In 2010, six leaders of LIFG forced to denounce the oppositions against the Gaddafi and dissolved LIFG (Ashour, “Ex-Jihadists” 117).

To sum up, due to lack of appropriate channel for political participation, political activities become clandestine. Political parties were banned and expelled form formal politics, and BPCs were highly skew towards the preference of the regime. Under such a situation, social forces like tribe and Islamic groups secretly grew. The

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<sup>57</sup> Actually, they were still viewed guilty, but they were released under the mercy of Gaddafi, Pargeter, “Qadhafi” 100.

regime might be powerful enough to temporarily put down those “illegal” groups, but the oppressed energy will break out when appropriate moment coming.

### ***4.4.3. Old Hatred as a Trigger and the Cooperation between Dissents***

In the context of the toppling of Tunisia and Egypt government, Libyan civil war was ignited by the arrest of Fathi Terbil and the consequent protest in Benghazi for releasing him. Under the bloody repression and limited concession of Gaddafi, the riots rapidly grew from a local mobilization to a national one. On March 5, NTC, an ally between different oppositions, was set up. With the passing of UN Resolution 1973 on March 17, a no-fly zone was established in Libya, and after that the resistant forces were stabilized, and the gap of power between them and Gaddafi forces gradually diminished. The situation of civil war was ensured.

For theoretical reason, I would like to focus on the role played by the grievance from the Abu Salim massacre in the Libyan civil war. Just like in other places in the MENA region during the Arab Spring, in Libya the grievances promoting people to go against the government were too complex to single out the most significant one of them. Dissatisfaction to poor socio-economic conditions and lack of political freedom certainly played their role in mobilizing the people. The impact of Abu Salim massacre could not tell the whole story in Libya; however, it was hard to ignore it during the process of situation escalating into civil war.

The hatred due to Abu Salim massacre promoted the initial protest in Libya during the Arab Spring. On February 15, RC arrested Fathi Terbil when planning for a protest in demand for compensation for massacre in Benghazi, and the event was believed to trigger a series of consequent events that enhance the antagonism between Gaddafi regime and Libyan people.

The hatred from Abu Salim massacre served as the cause for people to join the rebellion. It is unrealistic to do a survey for Libyans by asking them the cause promoting them to take part in rebellion. Nevertheless, there were some proofs reflecting that some key figures might join the rebellion for the hatred from the Abu Salim massacre. First of all, Fathi Terbil who had fought for and was jailed for a reason about Abu Salim massacre participated in NTC latter and was in charge of

affairs about youth there (ICG, “Popular Protest in North African and the Middle East (V)” 24). The other two examples here represented for two most suppressed groups under Gaddafi’s rule: LIFG and Muslim Brotherhood, whose members accounting for largest proportion of victims in Abu Salim (Ashour, “Ex-Jihadists” 117). In 2011, Abdel Hakim Belhaj, the former commander of LIFG and once prisoner in Abu Salim, led Tripoli’s Military Council to fight against the Gaddafi’s forces. Also, Fawzi Abu Kitef, jailed members of Muslim Brotherhood in the same prison, held the deputy defense minister in the NTC and led Revolutionary Brigades Coalition during the Arab Spring (Ashour, “Libya’s Muslim Brotherhood” 120). Though no data available to show how many Libyans were mobilized by hatred from Abu Salim massacre to fight against Gaddafi, we still cannot disregard its effect during the Libyan civil war.

In addition, there was other proof reflecting the connection between Libyans’ grievance and Abu Salim massacre: In response to the protest, the Libyan government set free not only Fathi Terbil but also 110 jailed members of LIFG from Abu Salim prison later (“Middle East unrest”). The intention of the government to mollify people’s grievance about Abu Salim was observable. Though we cannot exclude the possibility that the regime misperceived people’s mind, it is arguable that the regime’s attitude towards the protests support the might-be connection between the Abu Salim massacre and civil war in 2011.

In Libya case, we can observe that not only hatred from previous civil war but also from less violent past conflicts might serve as a cause for people to join the rebellion. However, it is defensible that due to the latter one involving narrower swath of population, such as the relatives of victims or fellows from the same Islamist groups, its influence might be limited. That is, when explaining the happening of civil war we need to give hatred, originating from less violent past conflicts, the explanatory weight that it should bear.

About political institution, to some extent, the outbreak of civil war in Libya resulted from the underdevelopment of the political institution. The regime’s failure is reflected by its relation with Cyrenaica and its policies towards tribalism and Islam. From the two examples below, we can see that Gaddafi regime failed to form a political community by defining public interests and be identified by the most of social forces.

Gaddafi regime has maintained an awful relation with Cyrenaica for a long time. As I mentioned before, to Gaddafi, Cyrenaica was the most rebellious region for its

connection with former monarchy and Islam. Under the long-term bloody oppression and systematic discrimination and neglect, it was not too surprising that Cyrenaica was the first place to rebel. The rebellion initiated in the eastern region exemplifies the failure of Libyan political institution to absorb population into the political community.

Certainly, the regime took some policies to keep the resistance calm, but it is obviously not effective in the long term. Realizing how powerful tribal leaders among people, the regime establish PSL to absorb them and increase its legitimacy, however, we know it is ineffective by the example that Gaddafi's failed try to achieve cease fire during 2011 civil war in the name of PSL (Brahimi 613). Also, Gaddafi's iron-fisted policies temporarily pushed the Islamist groups out of Libya but cannot permanently neutralize their dissatisfaction. When the regime exposed its vulnerability during 2011, the former members of these groups in exile returned Libya and participated in the war against the regime.

As to political parties, Gaddafi regime had banned the establishment of political party for a long time, so there was lack of public competition. Due to the restriction by Gaddafi, most opposition parties were in exile before 2011, and they had no thick connections with domestic constituency. In other words, the oppositions in Libya were relatively less fragmented, and it was suitable to be mobilized, especially while the hated regime suffering from serious crises during the Arab Spring. As a result, the shared objective: pulling Gaddafi regime down was easily to rally Libyans and made people temporarily put down prejudices among them.

Although our focus is past hatred and domestic political institution, the effect of foreign intervention should not be ignored. The substantial assistance from the NATO prevented NTC from being destroyed by Gaddafi's forces, and the international recognition gave more legitimacy to NTC.<sup>58</sup> Under the external help, most Libyan united behind the temporary ally: NTC constituting enough pressure to topple down Gaddafi.

In Libya case, the dissatisfaction from Abu Salim massacre and the underdevelopment of the Jamahiriya were two causes behind the civil war, and the external intervention assured the survival of and strengthened the rebellions. The

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<sup>58</sup> About recognition of the NTC, most of relevant powers did it before the toppling of Gaddafi regime in 2011: France on March 10, Italy on April 4; Germany on June 13, the US on July 15, the UK on July 27, Russia on September 1, and China on September 12, see "Libya: France recognizes"; "Focus-Libya"; "Germany Recognises"; "Fourth Meeting"; Nicholas Watt; "Statement"; "China Recognizes".

connection between the past conflict and Libyan civil war is observable, and the failure to form a political community excludes oppositions from formal and legal political competition which provides energy for rebelling. It is still not easy to prove that both of them are necessary conditions but their explanatory weight is significant.

## 4.5. Brief Summary

In Chapter 4, I focus on the two might-be necessary conditions behind civil war during the Arab Spring and the two deviate cases.

After analyzing the reason behind the deviation of Algeria and Libya, the findings are as below. Though the “peace duration” hypothesis tells that previous hatred will cause new civil war, in Algeria case I observe that the reconciliatory policies taken by Bouteflika might distort the impact of hatred from previous civil war. In Libya case, the ignoring of less intensive conflict, such as Abu Salim massacre, by the definition of “peace duration”, which only takes civil war into consideration, leads to the exception of theory. That is, not only civil war but also less intensive conflicts might trigger new civil war.

About the “anocracy”, I find it can still explain the happening of civil war after dropping the simplified indicator and returning to its theoretical base. Algerian institution has better performance in adaptability, complexity, and autonomy in general and in political parties in specific, as a result, it could avoid the outbreak of civil war. In contrast, Libyan institution has poor performance in the four aspects in general and almost no development of political parties, so it is not so surprising that Gaddafi regime was toppled down in 2011.

In sum, the analysis of the two outliers tells us some weakness of the definition of both “peace duration” and “anocracy”.

## 5. Conclusion


According to the above discussion, we find that: Strictly speaking, under the context, that is, in the MENA and during the Arab Spring, C-H alone can effectively and parsimoniously explain the difference in the level and form of political violence/mobilization. In addition, the past hatred, captured by “peace duration”, and the praetorian polity, theoretical base of “anocracy”, were the possible necessary conditions behind civil war under the context. And, based on these research results, I would like to make conclusion with theoretical implication and policy implications.

My recommendations for theoretical improvements are as below. It seems like “peace duration” hypothesis cannot explain the situation in Libya; in fact, the reason behind the exception from theoretical predication lies on that the definition of this variable ignore the less violent conflict, which might also cause new civil war. Because not only civil war but also less intensive conflict experience can lead to new civil war, we need to expand the scope of hatred source when designing variable to capture past hatred.

Based on the result of the Algeria and Libya cases, it is also looks like “anocracy” hypothesis, whose theoretical bases lays on praetorian polity presented by Huntington, cannot hold; however, the deviation from expectation might comes from the price of using simplified indicators, such as X-POLITY used by this study and Polity score used by F-L. As I mentioned in Part 4.2.2 and 4.2.3, both indicators ignore the two aspects of praetorian polity: adaptability and complexity, so I think they might be not qualified to represent the more complex concept praetorian polity. As a result, for future theoretical development we need to take adaptability and complexity into account when operationalizing praetorian polity next time.

As to the policy implication, there are both optimistic and pessimistic news. About optimistic one, despite of a case experiencing civil war before just like Algeria, under appropriate reconciliatory policies, it does not inevitably lead to new civil war. About pessimistic one, given that praetorian polity is one of necessary behind civil war, civil war might be harder to prevent, because the root of civil war lies in political dimension involving ruling groups’ fatal interests rather than economic dimension with which is easier to deal.

## Appendix I. Research Frameworks



## Appendix II. Potential Causal Factors in Theories

	Independent variable and its impacts		
Type	F-L	C-H	Boix
Motivation for rebelling:			
Economic grievance	--	--	FF*IOD (N)
Political grievance	--	Ethnic domination (D)	--
Greed	Oil exporter (D)	--	--
Conflict-incurring hatred	--	Peace duration (N)	--
Opportunity for rebelling:			
Terrain favoring rebelling	Mountainous area percent (P)	--	Noncontiguous territory (P)
	GDP per capita (N)		
Weak governmental capability	GDP per capita (N)	Population Gini coefficient (N)	--
	Population (P)		
	Anocracy (D)		
	Political instability (P)		
	Oil exporter (D)		
Low cost for rebelling	GDP per capita (N)	GDP per capita (N)	--
		GDP growth rate (N)	
		Male secondary schooling (N)	
Condition favoring mobilization	Population (P)	Oil exporter (D); Primary commodities dependency (M)	--
		Social fractionalization (N)	
		Peace duration (N)	

Note: “P” and “N” enclosed by the parentheses respectively mean the positive and negative association with civil war. “M” means if a case’s performance on the variable falls in the middle interval, it tends to be civil war. “D” means the “with” side of the dummy variable associates with civil war.

### Appendix III. Explanatory Performance by the Three Theories

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
A	X		X	<u>X</u>									<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
ED		X		<u>X</u>		X				X		X		X	
GGR					X	X		<u>X</u>					<u>X</u>	X	
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
MSS			X	<u>X</u>					X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
P	X		X	<u>X</u>					X			X			
PCD	X			<u>X</u>							X	X			<u>X</u>
PD	X			<u>X</u>	X		X			X			<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
PI				<u>X</u>											
F*I	X		X	<u>X</u>			*							X	<u>X</u>
MAP	X				X		X		X		*				<u>X</u>
NT											*				<u>X</u>
PGC		*				X		*			X		<u>X</u>	X	
SF	X		X						X	X		X			*
Total	9 (6)	2 (2)	6 (4)	<u>9 (8)</u>	3 (2)	4 (3)	2 (1)	<u>2 (2)</u>	5 (3)	4 (3)	3 (2)	5 (4)	<u>7 (6)</u>	5 (3)	<u>9 (6)</u>

Note a: The first row presents the name of 15 cases in shorthand, including “Alg” for Algeria; “Bhr” for Bahrain; “Egy” for Egypt; “Irq” for Iraq; “Jor” for Jordan; “Kwt” for Kuwait; “Lbn” for Lebanon; “Lby” for Libya; “Mrc” for Morocco; “Omn” for Oman; “Qtr” for Qatar; “Saa” for Saudi Arabia; “Syr” for Syria; “Uae” for UAE; “Ymn” for Yemen.

Note b: The first column shows the name of independent variable in shorthand, including “A” for “anocracy”; “PI” for “political instability”; “ED” for “ethnic domination”; “NT” for “noncontiguous territory”; “PD” for “peace duration”; “OE” for “oil exporter”; “MAP” for “mountainous area percent”; “P” for “population”; “PCD” for “primary commodities dependency”; “GPC” for “GDP per capita”; “PGC” for “population Gini coefficient”; “GGR” for “GDP growth rate”; “MSS” for “male secondary schooling”; “SF” for “social fractionalization”; “F\*I” for “FF\*IOD”.

Note c: “X” within cells means CWP index, and “\*” in cells means missing value.

Note d: Wording under line and in bold means cases with civil war, and cell with gray background means variables with one or more missing value.

Note f: The final row presents the number of CWP index in total for each case, and number between the parentheses means the number of CWP index in total for each case without taking variables with one or more missing value into consideration.

## Appendix IV. Explanatory Performance by F-L and Boix

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
A	X		X	<u>X</u>									<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
P	X		X	<u>X</u>					X			X			
PI				<u>X</u>											
F*I	X		X	<u>X</u>			*							X	<u>X</u>
MAP	X				X		X		X		*				<u>X</u>
NT											*				<u>X</u>
Total	6 (4)	1 (1)	4 (3)	<u>5 (4)</u>	1 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	<u>1 (1)</u>	3 (2)	1 (1)	1 (1)	2 (2)	<u>3 (3)</u>	2 (1)	<u>6 (3)</u>

## Appendix V. Explanatory Performance by C-H and Boix

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
ED		X		<u>X</u>		X				X		X		X	
GGR					X	X		<u>X</u>					<u>X</u>	X	
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
MSS			X	<u>X</u>					X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
PCD	X			<u>X</u>							X	X			<u>X</u>
PD	X			<u>X</u>	X		X			X			<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
F*I	X		X	<u>X</u>			*							X	<u>X</u>
NT											*				<u>X</u>
PGC		*				X		*			X		<u>X</u>	X	
SF	X		X						X	X		X			*
Total	6 (4)	2 (2)	4 (2)	<u>6 (5)</u>	2 (2)	4 (3)	1 (1)	<u>2 (2)</u>	3 (2)	4 (3)	3 (2)	4 (3)	<u>6 (5)</u>	5 (3)	<u>7 (5)</u>

## Appendix VI. Explanatory Performance by F-L and C-H

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
A	X		X	<u>X</u>									<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
ED		X		<u>X</u>		X				X		X		X	
GGR					X	X		<u>X</u>					<u>X</u>	X	
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
MSS			X	<u>X</u>					X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
P	X		X	<u>X</u>					X						
PCD	X			<u>X</u>							X	X			<u>X</u>
PD	X			<u>X</u>	X		X			X			<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
PI				<u>X</u>											
MAP	X				X		X		X		*				<u>X</u>
PGC		*				X		*			X		<u>X</u>	X	
SF	X		X						X	X		X			*
Total	8 (6)	2 (2)	5 (4)	<u>8 (8)</u>	3 (2)	4 (3)	3 (2)	<u>1 (1)</u>	5 (3)	4 (3)	3 (2)	5 (4)	<u>7 (6)</u>	3 (2)	<u>7 (6)</u>

## Appendix VII. Explanatory Performance by F-L

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
A	X		X	<u>X</u>									<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
P	X		X	<u>X</u>					X			X			
PI				<u>X</u>											
MAP	X				X		X		X		*				<u>X</u>
Total	5 (4)	1 (1)	3 (3)	<u>4 (4)</u>	1 (0)	1 (1)	1 (0)	<u>1 (1)</u>	3 (2)	1 (1)	1 (1)	2 (2)	<u>3 (3)</u>	1 (1)	<u>4 (3)</u>

## Appendix VIII. Explanatory Performance by Boix

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
F*I	X		X	<u>X</u>			*							X	<u>X</u>
NT											*				<u>X</u>
Total	1 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0)	<u>1 (0)</u>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	<u>0 (0)</u>	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	0 (0)	<u>0 (0)</u>	1 (0)	<u>2 (0)</u>

## Appendix IX. Explanatory Performance by C-H

	Alg	Bhr	Egy	<u>Irq</u>	Jor	Kwt	Lbn	<u>Lby</u>	Mrc	Omn	Qtr	Saa	<u>Syr</u>	Uae	<u>Ymn</u>
ED		X		<u>X</u>		X				X		X		X	
GGR					X	X		<u>X</u>					<u>X</u>	X	
GPC	X		X						X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
MSS			X	<u>X</u>					X				<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
OE	X	X		<u>X</u>		X		<u>X</u>		X	X	X	<u>X</u>	X	<u>X</u>
PCD	X			<u>X</u>							X	X			<u>X</u>
PD	X			<u>X</u>	X		X			X			<u>X</u>		<u>X</u>
PGC		*				X		*			X		<u>X</u>	X	
SF	X		X						X	X		X			*
Total	5 (4)	2 (2)	3 (2)	<u>5 (5)</u>	2 (2)	4 (3)	2 (2)	<u>1 (1)</u>	3 (2)	4 (3)	3 (2)	4 (3)	<u>6 (5)</u>	4 (3)	<u>6 (6)</u>

## Appendix X. Frequency of Indexes Appearing in Civil War


	OE	A	MSS	PD	GGR	GPC	PCD	ED	P	PI
Irq	X	X	X	X			X	X	X	X
Lby	X				X					
Syr	X	X	X	X	X	X				
Ymn	X	X	X	X		X	X			
Total	4	3	3	3	2	2	2	1	1	1

## Appendix XI. Specificity of Indexes to Civil War

	PI	A	MSS	PD	GGR	GPC	PCD	OE	P	ED
Alg		X		X		X	X	X	X	
Bhr								X		X
Egy		X	X			X			X	
<b><u>Irq</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>			<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>
Jor				X	X					
Kwt					X			X		X
Lbn				X						
<b><u>Lby</u></b>					<b><u>X</u></b>			<b><u>X</u></b>		
Mrc			X			X			X	
Omn				X				X		X
Qtr							X	X		
Saa							X	X	X	X
<b><u>Syr</u></b>		<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>		<b><u>X</u></b>		
Uae					X			X		X
<b><u>Ymn</u></b>		<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>		<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>	<b><u>X</u></b>		
%	100%	60%	60%	43%	40%	40%	40%	36%	20%	17%

## Appendix XII. Polity Score or X-POLITY Captures Praetorian Polity

Praetorian polity	Level of political institutionalization			Coherence	Level of political participation
	Adaptability	Complexity	Autonomy		
Polity score	--	--	XRREG, XRCOMP, XROPEN	XCONST	PARREG, PARCOMP
X-POLITY	--	--	XRREG, XRCOMP, XROPEN	XCONST	--



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